What Russia is up to in Syria/لامونت كلوشي/ذهيل: ماذا تريد روسيا من سوريا/Defense officials: Iran pulling out of Syria as Israel pummels its forces there/عسكريون: فيما إيران تنسيحب من سوريا الطيران الإسرائيلي يقصف قواتها/Iran Changes the Rules of the Game with Satellite Launch/إيران تغير قواعد اللعبة فيما يتعلق بلإطلاق الأقمار الصناعية
What Russia is up to in Syria/Lamont Colucci/The Hill/May 05/2020 لامونت كلوشي/ذهيل: ماذا تريد روسيا من سوريا
Defense officials: Iran pulling out of Syria as Israel pummels its forces there/Judahari Gross/Times Of Israel/May 05/2020 تيمز اوف إسرائيل: خبراء عسكريون: فيما إيران تنسيحب من سوريا الطيران الإسرائيلي يقصف قواتها
Iran Changes the Rules of the Game with Satellite Launch/Munqith Dagher/ the Washington Institute/May 04/2020 إيران تغير قواعد اللعبة فيما يتعلق بلإطلاق الأقمار الصناعية
*** What Russia is up to in Syria Lamont Colucci/The Hill/May 05/2020 لامونت كلوشي/ذهيل: ماذا تريد روسيا من سوريا
Although the world has ground to a near-standstill as a result of COVID-19, America’s foreign policy problems have not disappeared. To the contrary, many are becoming much worse, as dictators across the globe forge ahead with their destructive plans.
Russia’s recent machinations in Syria are a case in point. The Kremlin’s 2015 decision to enter the Syrian civil war on the side of dictator Bashar al-Assad was informed by the “Putin Doctrine,” which had been laid out by Russia’s president in 2008 and the chief focus of which is blunting American influence globally while increasing Russia’s regional status and ability to project power. The subsequent Russian incursion was a prime example of a marriage of Tsarist imperialism and Soviet expansionism: Although Syria’s Ba’athist state does not border the old Soviet empire, it served as a critical piece to Soviet strategy during the decades of the Cold War — and today, of Russia’s, too.
Russia’s activities there over the past half-decade, in turn, have yielded concrete dividends for the Kremlin. Under the guise of an ongoing struggle against ISIS and other “wahhabists,” Moscow has transformed the country into a laboratory for the testing of weapons, technology, strategy, and tactics. In a reflection of this role, the Russian High Command has termed Syria a model for training and its operations there a “strategy of limited action.”
Today, some 5,000 Russian troops, primarily military advisors, special forces, and air support personnel are estimated to operate in Syria. Russia continues to supply Assad with weapons and gives the Syrian dictator much needed diplomatic backing on the international stage. Russian airstrikes, a critical component of the Assad regime’s continued survival, have been directed primarily against rebel forces fighting Assad rather than against ISIS.
These airstrikes, moreover, have indiscriminately targeted Syrian civilians; according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, the total civilian death toll in Syria since March 2011 was 226,247, with at least 6,514 of them killed directly by the Russians. Other estimates put the number closer to 8,400. Further, the United Nations has accused Russia of engaging in war crimes through indiscriminate airstrikes against civilians that have terrorized the population and displaced large numbers of Syrian people.
Moscow has learned from its past military mistakes, however. Unlike the Soviet experience in Afghanistan in the 1980s, Russia has been very measured in its commitment to the Syrian battlefield. The Russian government has prioritized the use of stand-off tactics (like aerial strikes) and military contractors. The results speak for themselves; as of last Spring, the Kremlin has officially confirmed just 116 Russian fatalities.
At the same time, Russia has put a premium on strengthening its military foothold in the country. It has reinforced its naval presence in the southern port city of Tartus, erected an airbase at Hmeimim, and created military encampments elsewhere in the country. For these facilities, Moscow has managed to secure long-term, open-ended leasing arrangements from the Assad government, which remains weak and is eager to see Russia stay and provide security protection.
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Economically, Russia has deftly exploited Syria’s precarious situation. Its energy conglomerate Stroytransgaz (which has been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department) dominates the Syrian energy sector, developing gas fields whose revenue feeds Assad’s killing machine. The company has secured contracts for exploiting hydrocarbons in eastern Syria, completing pipelines linking Syria and Jordan, multiple gas processing plants, and is given preferential treatment by the Assad regime.
These activities, and Russia’s continued presence in Syria, represent a threat to American interests. They help to undermine U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. They have allowed the Kremlin to reemerge as a serious player in regional politics and begin to shape Middle Eastern affairs in its image. And they have helped to strengthen Russia’s long-standing ties to Iran, which is also aiding Syria, and which the Trump administration continues to seek to isolate and contain. As such, Moscow’s machinations should be understood for what they are, a serious national security concern for the United States, and should be treated as such by Washington.
*Lamont Colucci is senior fellow for national security affairs at the nonprofit American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C.
Defense officials: Iran pulling out of Syria as Israel pummels its forces there/Judahari Gross/Times Of Israel/May 05/2020 تيمز اوف إسرائيل: خبراء عسكريون: فيما إيران تنسيحب من سوريا الطيران الإسرائيلي يقصف قواتها
Amid increased reports of IDF strikes on Tehran-linked bases, security officials say Israel wants to make clear to Damascus that Iran is a burden, not an ally
Iranian forces are pulling out of Syria and closing military bases there, Israeli defense officials said Tuesday, amid increasing reports of Israeli airstrikes on Iran-linked militias in the country in recent months, including two such incidents late Monday night in which 14 Iran-linked fighters were reported killed.
The Israeli officials refused to comment on these reported attacks, maintaining Israel’s policy of ambiguity, under which it generally acknowledges taking action against Iran in Syria without specifically confirming individual strikes, under the assumption that public confirmation increases the likelihood of retaliation.
Though Israel’s fight against Iran in Syria has been ongoing for nearly a decade, after Tehran began sending its troops and its proxies into Syria at the outbreak of the country’s civil war in 2011, recent months have seen an increase in the number of strikes against Iran-linked sites in the country, targeting locations across the country with the highest concentration around Syria’s capital Damascus.
The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that this effort appears to be bearing fruit as Iranian forces have begun leaving the country, evacuating a small number of military bases previously under their control in the process. Independently, there has also been a drop in the number of Shiite militias operating in Syria, though this decrease is because of the natural progression of the civil war and not because of Israel’s actions.
The officials said that while Israel does not believe the Iranians will accept these setbacks without responding in some way, an imminent retaliation does not appear to be in the offing.
“We are determined, more determined [than Iran], and I can tell you why — for Iran, Syria is an adventure happening 1,000 kilometers away from home. For us, it’s our lives,” Defense Minister Naftali Bennett said Tuesday.
“Iranian soldiers who come to Syria and operate there, their lives are in their hands. They are putting their lives at risk, they are paying that price and will continue to do so. We will not give up and we will not allow the establishment of an Iranian forward operating base in Syria,” Bennett said.
The number of transport flights from Iran to Syria, bringing advanced munitions into the country, have also dropped dramatically in the past half-year, apparently the result of Israeli strikes on the airports in Syria where these flights would land.
Alongside the uptick in the number of strikes on Iran-backed forces in Syria, Israel has also reportedly targeted a larger number of Syrian military air defense systems.
“Syria is paying a growing price for the Iranian presence in its territory, for a war that isn’t [Syria’s]. Iran has turned from an asset to Syria into a burden,” the defense officials told reporters.
They added that Israel plans to keep up its pressure on Iran until its military leaves Syria for good.
Though the officials boasted of Iran’s departure from Syria as a recent development, the Israel Defense Forces has been saying since at least 2018 that its operations against Iran have forced Tehran to radically change and scale back its plans for Syria.
Jerusalem has long maintained that Iran was working to establish a permanent military presence in Syria in order to use it as a springboard for attacks against Israel — similar to what Tehran accomplished by supporting its proxy Hezbollah. That organization began as a small terrorist group in southern Lebanon carrying out deadly but minor attacks on IDF troops, but has gone on to become one of the most powerful military forces in the region, with capabilities exceeding those of many sovereign nations.
In recent years, Israel has also warned that Iran was helping Hezbollah convert its massive arsenal of simple rockets into far more lethal precision-guided missiles, a project that the IDF has designated as the second-most significant threat to the country after Tehran’s nuclear program.
Indeed, one of the strikes attributed to Israel on Monday night targeted a Syrian military research center, which was reportedly involved in this precision project.
The defense officials partially credited the successes against Iran in Syria to the US strike on the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’s expeditionary Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani, earlier this year, which left Tehran without one of its most skilled generals.
For Israel, either path Iran decides to take in Syria — remain there or fully leave — is potentially beneficial. If Iran leaves, Israel will have successfully prevented the opening of another front against it. If Iran stays in Syria, where Israel maintains intelligence and aerial superiority, the IDF would be able to continue striking Iranian forces, exacting a heavy price from Tehran, while being able to defend against and thwart Iranian attacks.
Iran Changes the Rules of the Game with Satellite Launch/Munqith Dagher/ the Washington Institute/May 04/2020 إيران تغير قواعد اللعبة فيما يتعلق بلإطلاق الأقمار الصناعية
Munqith Dagher is the CEO of the Baghdad-based Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies (IIACSS).
On April 22, Iran announced the successful launch of its first Noor satellite into orbit by the IRGC after several previous failed attempts, a feat confirmed by NORAD. Despite the practical and scientific importance of this achievement, no less important is that the launch demonstrates Iran’s ability to manufacture the missile that carried this satellite into orbit using both liquid and solid fuel. Moreover, the demonstrated range of the satellite suggests that, in theory, Iran is now capable of launching a missile that can reach targets on U.S. soil.
Iran’s successful development of this type of intercontinental space missile has changed the rules of the military-political game it has been playing with the United States. Even with the many other factors currently at play in U.S.-Iran tensions, the satellite launch will have serious repercussions on future relations between the two countries—already at a nadir.
What remains to be seen, however, is how these repercussions will unfold, and who will be able to take advantage of this new situation. In response to the launch, Pompeo has stated that all countries of the world must condemn this glaring Iranian violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 of 2015, which states that “Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.” Iran has responded by insisting that its missile activities are for peaceful purposes. It is true that the current launch featured a satellite rather than a warhead, but the technology is equivalent. The United States has unequivocally rejected this claim and is likely to call for a UN Security Council session to discuss potential responses.
Yet while the legalities of the launch can be debated, the immediate repercussions of this latest development will almost certainly escalate the U.S.-Iran conflict to a new and dangerous level. Concern over Iranian missile developments has characterized the Trump administration’s messaging and policy towards Iran. Back in March 2018, when Iranian missiles had much shorter demonstrated ranges, the U.S. administration via Pompeo insisted that a halt on Iranian ballistic missile activity served as one of its twelve conditions for lifting its heavy sanctions on Iran.
The crucial question now seems to be why Iran chose the current moment to stage this landmark launch, and whether Iranian officials erred in their timing. There are several factors already impacting recent U.S.-Iranian tensions. Aside from the recent targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani, the devastating effects of coronavirus on both Iran and the United States have not stopped either from making statements against the other or, in the U.S. case, imposing new sanctions.
From the Iranian perspective, however, the upcoming U.S. elections are key for understanding the future trajectory of these tensions. Iranian officials appear to have been hoping for an electoral defeat of Trump in the upcoming U.S. elections in November. These officials see Democrats as likely being more flexible in dealing with the Iranian issue, especially given presidential candidate Joe Biden’s role in securing congressional approval for the JCPOA during the Obama administration. The idea of Iran possessing long-range missiles that threaten not only Israel and Saudi Arabia—longstanding U.S. allies—but America too, especially as those missiles have the ability to carry nuclear warheads, is a strategic game changer in the relationship between the United States and Iran.
As such, Iran’s decision to test the satellite launch capability now is somewhat puzzling. The move appears to provide a major justification for Trump’s policies vis-à-vis Iran. Although American foreign policy is not necessarily an important consideration for most American voters—especially given the country’s current domestic economic challenges—this latest development gives a window for the Trump team to bolster his image among his loyal base as a strong, resolute leader needed against a major challenge. Likewise, the concrete threat of a missile launch provides an easy way for Trump to stoke the fears of his base voters, which is an essential element of victory for a politician like Trump, who depends on such strategies for his electoral success.
The launch also appears to put the United States in a better position on the international stage. The world’s nations that have supported the Iranian position regarding the nuclear agreement so far will have difficulty taking the same stance now that Iran has revealed its new missile capability.
Because of how the missile launch may affect U.S. policy toward Iran, it is unclear whether the more moderate forces of Iran, such as the president and the foreign ministry, will welcome the timing of this missile launch. This is of particular importance since one of the current U.S. administration’s oft-repeated talking points when voicing its dissatisfaction with the nuclear agreement signed by the Obama administration is that this agreement did not address the issue of ballistic missiles, which represent a threat to global and regional security.
Moreover, the Iranian foreign ministry’s campaign to promote Iran’s position and to attack America’s always focuses on two basic elements: the legal element, wherein Iran is committed to international law, as well as the humanitarian cost of U.S. sanctions, based on Iran as a peaceful nation that does not pose a threat to regional or international peace. These two crucial elements of Iran’s defense now face a serious challenge because of the implications of the launch of its satellite.
Given all these factors, the satellite launch must be seen not as a policy supported by the entire Iranian state apparatus, but rather as a victory for the IRGC over other streams of Iranian authorities—the newest event in a years-long power struggle that can also be seen in the IRGC’s proactive approach to coronavirus relief efforts. In contrast to elements more interested in negotiations, the IRGC strategy has long built itself around threats, creating a type of brinksmanship used successfully during the Obama administration that prompted Western countries to sit and work out a good deal with Iran.
It is clear that the struggle for influence and power between the civilian authorities of Iran and the IRGC has been evolving over the last couple of years. The temporary resignation of Iran’s foreign minister Javad Zarif back in February, 2019 after IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani invited Syria’s Assad to visit Tehran without informing him was one very public indication of this rift. The targeted killing of Soleimani almost a year later has threatened to increase the power of the official, civilian Iranian institutions, such as the presidency, foreign ministry, national security ministry, and others. The designation of Mustafa Khadimi as prime minister in Iraq represents another loss for the IRGC parallel state as the latter views him as relatively close to the United States.
By launching this satellite by means of the ballistic missile, the IRGC has sent a clear message that it has no intention of losing ground to the official, civilian institutions of Iran. This struggle will likely continue to be a prominent feature of Iranian politics as the country works to rebuild after coronavirus, and is likely to gain more momentum if the powerful yet elderly supreme leader passes away.
Now that Iran has made a major change to the status quo, it is up to the United States for the next move. How, and whether the United States will respond to the satellite launch will dictate the direction of this new chapter in the tensions between the two countries.
As this new threat is likely to go through a thorough evaluation by the U.S. government, there should be an internal consensus within U.S. institutions that this missile launch represents a clear and present danger to U.S. security. The U.S. administration should also coordinate its reactions to this serious threat with its Western allies rather than unilaterally addressing the issue. While the United States and its allies have not necessarily agreed on an approach to Iran in the past, Iran’s most recent actions should be a clear sign that there is a serious threat developing. And in recognizing the different powers at play in Iran, the United States should also work to initiate communication channels with the civilian channels within the Iranian state while maintaining pressure on the IRGC. Encouraging relatively moderate forces during an internal power struggle is an advantageous alternative to escalating the current confrontation with the regime.
Whatever the solution, the rules of game in the showdown between the United States and Iran have changed. Just as the world after coronavirus will be different from what preceded it, so too will the realities of the US-Iranian relationship after the launch of the Noor satellite, and those differences must be acknowledged and understood.
*Fikra Forum is an initiative of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The views expressed by Fikra Forum contributors are the personal views of the individual authors, and are not necessarily endorsed by the Institute, its staff, Board of Directors, or Board of Advisors.
