A Bundle Of English Reports, News and Editorials For December 09- 10/2019 Addressing the On Going Mass Demonstrations & Sit In-ins In Iranian Occupied Lebanon in its 54th Day

Bundle Of English Reports, News and Editorials For December 09- 10/2019 Addressing the On Going Mass Demonstrations & Sit In-ins In Iranian Occupied Lebanon in its 54th Day
Compiled By: Elias Bejjani
December 10/2019

Tites For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News published on December 09-10/2019
My Almighty God Bless & Safeguard Bishop Elias Audi …He Witnessed For The Truth & For Lebanon
Greek Orthodox Metropolitan of Beirut Elias Audi: The country is ruled by a group with weapons
Bishop Elias Audi: Country Ruled by Armed Group and Person You All Know
Hezbollah Is Stubbornly Insisting To Replicate The Puppet & Corrupted Resigned Lebanese Cabinet
Aoun Expresses Relief over Lebanon Support Meeting
Aoun Vows to Eradicate ‘Malicious Germ of Corruption’
Parliamentary Consultations on New PM Postponed to December 16
Report: Two Equations Govern Formation of New Govt.
Rafting, Cars Submerged as Flooding Wreaks Havoc in Jnah
Army Fires Tear Gas to Contain Clashes between Protesters, Karami Supporters
UNIFIL spokesperson to NNA: We have no evidence indicating that a ship has breached Lebanon’s territorial waters
Berri chairs Development and Liberation bloc meeting: Enemy boat’s infiltration of Lebanon’s exclusive economic zone against sea law
Minister of Education sets Christmas, New Year holiday dates
Hariri contacts Emir of Kuwait
Army Commander welcomes Chief of Malaysian Armed Forces
Al-Brax: Petrol Stations Syndicate adheres to Ministry of Energy’s decision to deliver gasoline in LBP
Jabak bound for Oman to partake in WHO Global Meeting
Rainwater floods airport offices
Scuffles outside Faysal Karami’s residence in Tripoli
Raad Says Economic Situation More Pressing than Govt. Formation
Rockets Hit Iraq Military Complex Housing U.S. Forces
Lebanon Sunni leaders back Hariri to return as premier
Lebanon Protesters Scuffle with Lawmaker’s Bodyguards in Tripoli

The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News published on December 09-10/2019
My Almighty God Bless & Safeguard Bishop Elias Audi …He Witnessed For The Truth & For Lebanon
Elias Bejjani/December 09/2019
المطران الياس عودة شهد للبنان وللحق وسمى الأشياء بأسمائها
Lebanon’s Orthodox great Bishop of Beirut, Msgr Elias Audi has overtly, patriotically, and faithfully witnessed for the truth and for our beloved Lebanon, the Land of the Holy Cedars.
In his yesterday’s Homely he called things as they are, and named those forces who occupy Lebanon, as well as those Lebanese puppet officials who instead of serving Lebanon’s interests are siding with the terrorist Hezbollah, the occupier of Lebanon, and serving the Iranian agenda of occupation, expansionism and terrorism.
All those officials, politicians, clergymen and journalist who criticized Audi’s courageous homely are either Iranian mouthpieces, or mere Iranian mercenaries.
Accordingly all their Dhimmitude replies of criticism are valueless.
And yes as Bishop Audi stated, Hezbollah occupies Lebanon, and its leader Hassan Nasrallah is the actual ruler of the country, and yes the Lebanese officials are mere puppets.
Our Prays go to the oppressed and occupied Lebanon that Almighty God shall always guard, protect and safeguard
Below are excerpts from Bishop Elias Audi’s homely.

Greek Orthodox Metropolitan of Beirut Elias Audi: The country is ruled by a group with weapons
NNA/December 08/2019
Beirut’s Greek Orthodox Metropolitan Archbishop Elias Audi presided over a memorial Mass service at St. George’s Cathedral in downtown Beirut this morning, marking the fourteenth commemoration of the martyrdom of Gibran Tueni and his two companions.
In his homily, Audi paid tribute to the memory of Martyr Tueini, recalling the true essence of his words that still reflect on our present times. “To believe that the true word does not die, but resonates stronger, listen to what Gibran said many years ago, as if to describe the present situation in our beloved country, which was distorted by the hand of corruption, betrayal and repression,” he said.
“What remains of the truth, service, humility, deliberation, transparency, justice, openness, democracy and freedom, what is left of it in our country?” questioned Audi, criticizing the current rulers for adopting the ways of “totalitarian regimes with their one-party system.”
“How long are we to continue paying the price for internal and external polarizations? How long are we to continue wasting opportunities? How long will the people remain captive to the policy of an extremist party?” Audi went on to question. “This country is ruled by a person you all know and by a group that governs us with arms!” he exclaimed. The Archbishop considered that for a citizen’s identity to be preserved, the country must be preserved. “Today, unfortunately, Lebanon pays the price of the mistakes committed by a corrupt and bankrupt political class,” he said, adding, “Had it not been for the people who held on to their identity, Lebanon would have been lost a long time ago.”
“The Lebanese people have demonstrated their ability to preserve the country and identity after the many struggles it has gone through…We must learn to belong to the homeland and a new political class must be created,” he emphasized.
Bishop Audi hailed the Lebanese youth’s uprising under the country’s national flag, and slogans of achieving social justice, anti-corruption, accountability, liberation of the judiciary from political interference, and forming a min-government of specialists with integrity and competence. “Are these mere fictitious demands, or are they the simplest things required to build a state?” he wondered. “The Lebanese people take pride in being a peaceful people, whose weapons are unity, faith, honesty and truth, especially their steadfastness in the face of conspiracies and attempts to sow discord and despair in souls,” the Bishop maintained. “Birth, my dear ones, is preceded by a painful labour, and the birth of a new Lebanon is approaching,” he said. “It is a question of will, above all, the will to sacrifice, the will to abandon selfishness and personal interests, the will to open up to the other and extend the hand of dialogue and the determination to reach for what unites rather than highlight the differences,” stressed Audi. “Our country is in conflict and is waiting for a heroic act to save it,” he underscored.

Bishop Elias Audi: Country Ruled by Armed Group and Person You All Know
Naharnet/December 08/2019
Greek Orthodox Metropolitan of Beirut Elias Audi on Sunday decried that Lebanon is being ruled by one “person” and an “armed group.” “Today, this country is being ruled by a person you all know, and no one is saying a word, and it is being ruled by a group hiding behind arms,” Audi said in a sermon marking the 14th anniversary of the assassination of the journalist Gebran Tueni. “What has scared officials and is still scaring them is the voice of right and truth, the voice of the hungry and suffering people, the voice of everyone who cherishes the country,” Aude added.“The ruling authority has been sentenced to death while the people and their country will only find resurrection and victory. The birth of a new Lebanon is nearing,” the metropolitan went on to say. Commenting on the protests that have been sweeping the country since October 17, Aude said the Lebanese who are on the streets are “sacrificing a lot for the sake of a future whose fathers and grandfathers had waited but did not get.”

Hezbollah Is Stubbornly Insisting To Replicate The Puppet & Corrupted Resigned Lebanese Cabinet
/حزب الله مصر على استنساخ الحكومة التبعية والإفساد المستقيلة
Elias Bejjani/December 08/2019
The Iranian armed Lebanese terrorist proxy, “The Party Of God”, Hezbollah, is the actual ruler of Lebanon, and it fully controls the country’s decision making process, as well as all the officials including the president, House Speaker and the cabinet.
At the present time, and as a result of an Iranian recent orchestrated parliamentary elections, and an electoral non-constitutional law that was tailored and imposed by intimation and force, Hezbollah enjoys a majority in both the parliament and the Cabinet.
The mass public peaceful Lebanese revolution that has been going on for the past 52 days has forced the cabinet to resign.
But the Occupier, Hezbollah, and its Iranian masters, are still defiant and insist to maintain the pre revolution status quo.
Since the Cabinet’s resignation, Hezbollah has been stubbornly refusing to respond to any of the revolution’s just demands, and is insisting to maintain its irony Iranian grip on the country.
Hezbollah’s leadership in both Beirut and Tehran are evilly challenging the Lebanese peaceful revolution, and through terrorism and intimidation are adamant to replicate the corrupted-puppet resigned government in a bid to maintain their occupational status.
Apparently Hezbollah’s leadership has solely formed a new puppet government that is a mere replicate of the resigned one. But it is not yet official announced.
All that is left before its official announcement is a Lebanese Muslim Sunni politician that is willing to head it, as a facade cover no more no less.
Three Muslim Sunnis are competing for the post, Caretaker PM, Saad Al Hariri, Beirut MP Fouad Makhzoumi, and the businessman Samir Al Khatieb.
The PM’s name will be known tomorrow (Monday) through the folkloric president’s consultations with the 128 Members of the Lebanese Parliament.
But the real outcome is not clear due to the fact that many Lebanese well informed analysts strongly believe that the covert-Hariri Bassil business partnership is still very sold with the Hezbollah’s blessings which means that Hariri is still the one that Aoun, Bassil, Hezbollah and Berri prefer. They know him very well because he has been serving their interests, as well the Iranian agenda.
It is worth mentioning that 74 MP’s are all in Hezbollah’s leadership pocket and under its tip, and accordingly they will blindly vote in accordance to its orders “Faraman”.
In summary Hezbollah has belligerently refused to respond to all the demands of the revolution, and definitely will by force try to hold on to the ongoing status of its occupation.
Meanwhile the mass peaceful revolution is expected to go on in spite of all the oppression that its activists are facing, while all kinds of economical hardships that the country is facing are getting worse.
In conclusion, Lebanon needs a flood of divine intervention, and the floods of water on the roads to wash the ungodly leaders out.
Our Prays go to the oppressed and occupied Lebanon that Almighty God shall always guard, protect and safeguard.

Aoun Expresses Relief over Lebanon Support Meeting
Naharnet/December 09/2019
President Michel Aoun on Monday expressed relief over the meeting that the International Support Group for Lebanon will hold Wednesday in Paris, thanking France for making the initiative in coordination with the U.N. Aoun’s remarks were voiced in a meeting with U.N. Special Coordinator for Lebanon Jan Kubis. The president told Kubis that Lebanon will send an official delegation to the meeting, hoping it will yield practical results, especially amid “the critical economic circumstances that the country is going through.”Kubis for his part briefed Aoun on the measures that have been taken in order to convene the meeting, noting that the event will send a strong signal on ISG’s commitment to helping Lebanon. The meeting will be held amid the absence of an active government in Lebanon, a dire economic and financial crisis, and unprecedented street protests against the entire political class.

Aoun Vows to Eradicate ‘Malicious Germ of Corruption’
Naharnet/December 09/2019
President Michel Aoun on Monday pledged to eradicate what he called “the malicious germ of corruption,” in a tweet marking the International Anti-Corruption Day. “We will continue to work with all our effort and energy to eradicate the malicious germ of corruption which has infiltrated the country’s health and institutions as well as the mentalities of a lot of individuals,” Aoun tweeted. He also called for turning integrity into “an approach, culture and lifestyle.” Aoun’s remarks come amid an unprecedented popular uprising against corruption in the country.

Parliamentary Consultations on New PM Postponed to December 16
Naharnet/December 09/2019
The Presidency on Sunday postponed the binding parliamentary consultations for naming a new PM from Monday, Dec. 9 to Monday, Dec. 16, after Dar al-Fatwa told the candidate Samir Khatib that there is Sunni consensus on re-nominating Saad Hariri for the post. “In light of the developments, at the desire and request of most parliamentary blocs, and to allow for further consultations and contacts, President (Michel) Aoun has decided to postpone the binding parliamentary consultations previously scheduled for tomorrow to Monday, December 16,” the Presidency said in a statement. Aoun had held phone talks with Speaker Nabih Berri and caretaker PM Hariri after Khatib announced the withdrawal of his nomination earlier in the day. The main political parties, including Hariri’s al-Mustaqbal Movement, had reached consensus on Khatib’s nomination in recent days. Hariri stepped down on October 29, bowing to pressure from unprecedented street protests. The protest movement that has swept the country since October 17 has demanded the appointment of an independent technocrat government and an overhaul of the entire political system.

Report: Two Equations Govern Formation of New Govt.
Naharnet/December 09/2019
The political forces have floated two equations to form the new government amid ongoing delay, a media report published Monday said. According to al-Akhbar newspaper, the first equation is a government led by Saad Hariri but not containing Jebran Bassil while the other is a government in which the two men would be both inside or outside the government. If the parties don’t lean to any of the two equations anytime soon a “new postponement” of the binding parliamentary consultations to name a new PM “will not be surprising,” the daily added, citing political sources.
The Presidency on Sunday postponed the consultations from Monday, Dec. 9 to Monday, Dec. 16, after Dar al-Fatwa told the candidate Samir Khatib that there is Sunni consensus on re-nominating Hariri for the post. The main political parties, including Hariri’s al-Mustaqbal Movement, had reached consensus on Khatib’s nomination in recent days.Hariri stepped down on October 29, bowing to pressure from unprecedented street protests. The protest movement that has swept the country since October 17 has demanded the appointment of an independent technocrat government and an overhaul of the entire political system.

Rafting, Cars Submerged as Flooding Wreaks Havoc in Jnah
Associated Press/Naharnet/December 09/2019
Flash floods caused by heavy rains, bad infrastructure and clogged drainage systems on Monday invaded the Saint Simon area in the Beirut suburb of Jnah, turning roads into huge ponds and submerging dozens of vehicles. The floods also stormed homes, shops and factories as some residents used surfboards and kayaks to move around. Rainwaters meanwhile mixed with sewage as the sewers failed to withstand the huge amounts of water. “Residents of the area made personal initiatives and unclogged some sewers as they urged Ghobeiri Municipality to intervene,” the National News Agency said.
Rainwaters meanwhile leaked into several offices and the arrival and departure terminals at Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport, NNA added. A tunnel that passes under the airport remained closed for hours because pumps that clear water from inside it didn’t work.
Caretaker Public Works and Transport Minister Youssef Fenianos said the ministry will help remove flood waters in Jnah although the area does not fall under its responsibility. “I understand people’s suffering and we are instantly following up on all the roads that have been blocked by floods, but there is a difficulty in dispensing funds due to the financial crisis that the country is going through,” Fenianos added. “I’m not dodging my responsibility and I’m offering full support to all areas suffering from this dilemma. I’m following up on what’s happening moment by moment and the emergency crew have been mobilized,” the minister went on to say. He also revealed that he has contacted the public prosecution and asked it to act against anyone who contributed to the flooding in the Khalde and Naameh areas. “The 50-year-old infrastructure cannot withstand this amount of rain,” Fenianos added, also blaming “the recent population surge.” The flooding comes amid nearly two months of demonstrations against the country’s political elite and decades of widespread corruption and mismanagement. Protesters remained in their encampments in Beirut and other cities amid the heavy rain. Despite spending billions of dollars since the 1975-90 civil war on improving infrastructure, Lebanon still suffers hourslong electricity cuts every day, and many people rely on tanker trucks to bring water to their homes. Every year when it rains, roads get flooded with water because of an inadequate sewage system.

Army Fires Tear Gas to Contain Clashes between Protesters, Karami Supporters
Naharnet/December 09/2019
Scores of protesters rallied Monday afternoon outside MP Faisal Karami’s residence in Tripoli after his guards clashed with a smaller demo that hurled trash bags at the building. The army arrived on the scene and separated between the two groups as protesters continued to shout slogans and hurl empty plastic bottles.Fierce stone-throwing clashes later erupted between the two sides, which prompted the army to fire tear gas to contain the situation. Several people were injured by the flying rocks and objects. The protesters had thrown trash bags outside the houses of several Tripoli politicians, such as Ashraf Rifi, Najib Miqati, Mohammed Kabbara and Samir al-Jisr.

UNIFIL spokesperson to NNA: We have no evidence indicating that a ship has breached Lebanon’s territorial waters
NNA /December 09/2019
UNIFIL spokesperson, Tilak Pokharel, on Monday told the NNA that despite the fact that the UN organization had been aware of a report issued by a Lebanese newspaper — claiming that an Israeli ship had violated the Lebanese territorial waters on November 27, 2019 — UNIFIL still lacked the necessary evidence to prove this true. “There are two issues we’d like to note regarding this media report. First, UNIFIL has no evidence indicating that a ship has violated the Lebanese territorial waters, as the media report has claimed. Second, when making such allegations, journalist always tend to ignore the nature of UNIFIL’s tasks in Lebanon as per its mandate,” Pokharel said. “UNIFIL has not been mandated to monitor the line of buoys, which had been unilaterally installed by Israel, and was not recognized by Lebanon and the United Nations,” he explained. As for the UNIFIL Naval Force (MTF), Pokharel said: “According to the request of the Lebanese Government, and pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1701, UNIFIL has a specific mission, which is to assist the Lebanese Navy in preventing the entry of weapons or related materials by sea to Lebanon, without the approval of the Lebanese government; therefore, the deployment of UNIFIL’s naval force and its operational focus revolves around the practical requirements to provide such support to the Lebanese navy.”

Berri chairs Development and Liberation bloc meeting: Enemy boat’s infiltration of Lebanon’s exclusive economic zone against sea law
NNA /December 09/2019
Speaker of the House, Nabih Berri, on Monday chaired a meeting by the “Development and Liberation” Parliamentary bloc, during which he discussed the political situation with bloc members, most importantly the recent flagrant Israeli breach of Lebanon’s Exclusive Economic Zone.
A statement read by the bloc’s Secretary General, Anwar Khalil, in the wake of the meeting said that on 26/11/2019, a hydrographic survey ship arriving from Haifa port of the Israeli enemy carrying the flag of “Panama”, docked on the UN naval operations site. On 27/11/2019 at 13:19, the enemy vessel entered the Lebanese exclusive economic zone at a distance of five miles and remained in block 9 until 20:37 — a period of seven hours and eighteen minutes. “The infiltration of the vessel to conduct scientific research for the benefit of the Israeli enemy is considered a violation of Articles 56 and 60 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” MP Khalil said. Moreover, the bloc’s statement criticized the United Nations naval force for failing to implement the required procedures that necessitate summoning the ship and inquiring about the intent of its presence; it also condemned this heinous attack and asked of the United Nations to assume its responsibilities in this regard. Bloc members finally called for accelerating the formation of a government and responding to the positive international atmosphere by preparing for aid and support. Meanwhile, it also asked of the caretaking cabinet to assume its responsibilities and focus on the management of living conditions, food security, and the financial and economic situation.

Minister of Education sets Christmas, New Year holiday dates
NNA /December 09/2019
Caretake Minister of Education, Akram Chehayeb, on Monday issued a memorandum setting the Christmas and new year holiday dates as follows:
“On the occasion of Christmas and New Year’s Eve, high schools, public schools, institutes, and technical schools will stop teaching on the evening of Tuesday, December 24, 2019 until Thursday morning, January 1, 2020.”

Hariri contacts Emir of Kuwait
NNA /December 09/2019
Caretaker Prime Minister Saad Hariri contacted today the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, and discussed with him the political and economic difficulties that Lebanon is facing. Hariri thanked him for Kuwait’s permanent support for Lebanon and the Lebanese people.

Army Commander welcomes Chief of Malaysian Armed Forces
NNA /December 09/2019
Lebanese Army Commander, General Joseph Aoun, on Monday welcomed at his office in Yarzeh, Jen Tan Sri Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) chief, at the head of an accompanying delegation. Talks reportedly touched on the best means to bolster cooperation between the armies of both countries.

Al-Brax: Petrol Stations Syndicate adheres to Ministry of Energy’s decision to deliver gasoline in LBP
NNA /December 09/2019
Lebanon’s petrol stations syndicate chief, Sami Al-Brax, announced on Monday that the union plans to adhere to the implementation of the Ministry of Energy’s decision to deliver gasoline in LBP. “The Petrol Stations Owners Syndicate clings to the implementation of the Minister of Energy’s decision and requests of those concerned to interfere to impose its implementation and reject any attempt to repeal Resolution 3640 to deliver gasoline in LBP,” a statement by Al-Brax said. “The union rejects at the present time any amendment that alters the decision to deliver gasoline in Lebanese pounds. The Syndicate states that it is currently making all the contacts required to hand diesel oil to distribution companies and stations in Lebanese pounds,” he added.

Jabak bound for Oman to partake in WHO Global Meeting
NNA /December 09/2019
Caretaker Minister of Health, Dr. Jamil Jabak, on Monday headed to
Oman with an accompanying delegation to partake in the World Health Organization’s Global Meeting on noncommunicable diseases and mental health. Minister Jabak will deliver Lebanon’s speech at the conference, which is the first-ever Global Meeting on noncommunicable diseases since the United Nations Declaration of 2018 on noncommunicable diseases and its 2019 declaration on universal health coverage. More than 150 countries will participate in the Meeting, in addition to representatives of civil society organizations, the private sector, charitable foundations, academia and donors.
The World Health Organization is organizing the Global Meeting to Accelerate Progress on SDG Target 3.4 on Noncommunicable Diseases and Mental Health. The Meeting is hosted by the Government of the Sultanate of Oman from 9 to 12 December 2019 in Muscat. The overarching goal of the Global Meeting it to accelerate the implementation of national responses to address NCDs and mental health conditions with a view to reduce premature mortality and scale up interventions to reach SDG target 3.4 by 2030. The Meeting will focus on sharing success stories and challenges in countries.

Rainwater floods airport offices
NNA /December 09/2019
Several offices at Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut have been flooded with rainwater, NNA reporter said on Monday, adding that the water has also reached the arrival and departure halls. The airport’s external access hall has also been flooded with rainwater, which impeded the movement of cars for a while. In the meantime, maintenance teams are working on opening the drainage networks, NNA reporter added.

Scuffles outside Faysal Karami’s residence in Tripoli
NNA /December 09/2019
Clashes erupted between a group of protesters and MP Faysal Karami’s bodyguards in front of his home in Tripoli, NNA reporter said on Monday. Some protesters tossed trash bags in front of the building where the MP lives. The scuffles then turned violent, requiring the intervention of the army to disperse both sides of the conflict.

Raad Says Economic Situation More Pressing than Govt. Formation
Naharnet/December 09/2019
Finding solutions to the dire economic and financial crisis is more pressing than forming a new government, the head of Hizbullah’s parliamentary bloc said on Monday. “The government will be eventually formed, but we did not believe for a moment that things would go well nor that Samir Khatib was the one who would be nominated,” Raad said in a speech in the West Bekaa town of Suhmor. “At best, they were going to allow him to be designated before stepping down after failing to form a government and then (Saad) Hariri would have been designated. They did not allow him to reach the post and they kept him until the eve of the consultations and now we are before a new situation,” Raad added. He added: “By my estimation, we will ultimately find a solution for the issue of the government. It might take one or two months but we will find a solution. The problem is not in the formation or the non-formation of the government, but rather in the economic situation.”“What should we do with the economic situation that is affecting the people? What should we do regarding the dollar exchange rate that has changed?”Raad added: “Despite being close to people, because we belong to them, but do not believe anyone who tells you that we can replace the state. The state is the side that should address the economic situation with all its representatives who represent all Lebanese components.”Stressing that Hizbullah will not accept to “discuss preconditions that harm the country’s sovereignty,” the lawmaker said his party is willing to “offer concessions” regarding the formation of the government but “not at the expense of national dignity and sovereignty.”

Rockets Hit Iraq Military Complex Housing U.S. Forces
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/December 09/2019
Several rockets slammed into an Iraqi military complex that hosts U.S. forces next to Baghdad International Airport on Monday, wounding six Iraqi troops, the military said. Security forces found launchers with rockets that had not been fired properly, indicating a larger attack was planned, a military statement said. It is the latest in an uptick in rocket attacks targeting either Iraqi bases where American troops are located or the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. U.S. defense officials have blamed several on Iran-backed factions in Iraq. Security sources told AFP that the wounded in Monday’s attack belong to Iraq’s Counter-Terrorism Service, an elite unit that was created and trained by U.S. forces. Two of them are in critical condition, the sources said. The military complex also hosts a small group of U.S. soldiers and American diplomats. There have been at least nine attacks against U.S. targets in Iraq in the span of six weeks. There have been no claims of responsibility and no U.S. forces have been wounded. Security sources have linked at least one last week to Kataib Hezbollah, a powerful Shiite faction close to Tehran and blacklisted by Washington. Iran holds vast sway in Iraq, especially among the more hardline elements of the Hashed al-Shaabi, a security force largely made up of Shiite militias. A U.S. defense official told AFP the rocket attacks made the Hashed a bigger security threat to American troops in Iraq than the Islamic State group, the jihadist movement which the U.S. has vowed to help Baghdad wipe out. On Friday the United States imposed sanctions on three senior Hashed figures. Tensions between Iran and the U.S. have soared since Washington pulled out of a landmark nuclear agreement with Tehran last year and reimposed crippling sanctions. Baghdad — which is close to both countries and whose many security forces have been trained by either the U.S. or Iran — is worried about being caught in the middle. U.S. officials say they are considering plans to deploy between 5,000 and 7,000 additional troops to the region to counter its arch-foe Iran.

Lebanon Sunni leaders back Hariri to return as premier
AFP/Ynetnews/December 09/2019
Businessman previously tapped to succeed as PM says he was informed by Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdellatif Deryan that ‘a consensus had been reached to name Saad Hariri as prime minister to form the next government’. Sunni Muslim leaders in protest-wracked Lebanon have thrown their support behind ex-premier Saad Hariri to return to his post a month after he stepped down, a sidelined candidate said Sunday. Businessman Samir Khatib had been put forward as a likely contender to succeed Hariri, but he said a visit to the country’s highest Sunni Muslim authority had indicated otherwise.Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdellatif Deryan informed Khatib that “a consensus had been reached to name Saad Hariri as prime minister to form the next government”, the 72-year-old businessman said. Khatib then met Hariri, who has stayed on in the role of caretaker premier and has supported him in his bid, to inform him of his withdrawal from the race, he said in televised comments. Lebanon has been gripped by unprecedented cross-sectarian protests since October 17, denouncing perceived official mismanagement and corruption. Hariri stepped down less than two weeks into the nationwide movement, but a deeply divided political class has since failed to reach an agreement on a new premier. The names of several potential candidates were circulated in the media, but protesters rejected Khatib as being too close to traditional circles of power. The president has called for mandatory parliamentary consultations starting on Monday to decide on a new premier. Cabinet formation can drag on for months in the multi-confessional country, with Hariri taking almost nine months to reach an agreement with all political sides for the last one. According to a complex political system that seeks to maintain a fragile balance between religious communities, Lebanon’s prime minister is always a Sunni Muslim. Hariri has been prime minister on and off since 2009, stepping down and returning on two previous occasions. The 49-year-old follows in the footsteps of his father, late premier Rafik Hariri, and is considered the traditional political leader of the country’s Sunni Muslim community. Lebanon desperately needs a new government to rebuild trust with both protesters demanding a cabinet of independent experts, and international donors able to provide financial aid.
The Mediterranean country’s economy is in freefall, even as Lebanese struggle with a dollar liquidity crisis.

Lebanon Protesters Scuffle with Lawmaker’s Bodyguards in Tripoli
Asharq Al-Awsat/Monday, 9 December, 2019
Lebanese soldiers had to separate protesters and the bodyguards of a member of parliament after scuffles broke out under heavy rain Monday evening between the two sides in the northern city of Tripoli, leaving at least one person injured. Tripoli has witnessed some of the largest protests since nationwide demonstrations broke out on Oct. 17 against widespread corruption and mismanagement. The protesters have since transitioned to demand an end to the rule of the political elite that has run the country following the 1975-90 civil war. The scuffles started after protesters threw bags of trash in front of the home of legislator Faisal Karameh. The protesters then started throwing stones at Karameh’s guards, who responded by also throwing stones, prompting troops to split them up. In video aired live on local TV, at least one person was seen injured in the head and ambulances arrived in the area afterward. Nearly half an hour after the scuffles, troops were able to push the protesters away from Karameh’s home. Karameh is a harsh critic of outgoing Prime Minister Saad Hariri, who resigned on Oct. 29. His resignation met a key demand of the protesters. Political disagreements between rival groups have so far delayed the formation of a new Cabinet, worsening the country’s economic and financial crisis. On Sunday, a possible candidate for prime minister of Lebanon said he was withdrawing from consideration for the post, prolonging the country’s political crisis. Samir Khatib said the country’s top Sunni religious authority told him the community supports the re-appointment of Hariri for the post.

Titles For The Latest Lebanese LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on December 09-10/2019
My Almighty God Bless & Safeguard Bishop Elias Audi …He Witnessed For The Truth & For Lebanon/Elias Bejjani/December 09/2019
Hezbollah Is Stubbornly Insisting To Replicate The Puppet & Corrupted Resigned Lebanese Cabinet/Elias Bejjani/December 08/2019
Environmental issues add to Iraqi, Lebanese misery/Chris Doyle/Arab News/December 09/2019
Lebanon: Vague Int’l Stances and Regime’s Provocative Practices/Sam Menassa/Asharq Al-Awsat/December 09/2019
Lebanon floods increase anti-government anger/Sunniva Rose/The National/December 09/2019
Lebanese mothers struggle to keep protests non-violent/Samar Kadi/Arab Weekly/December 09/2019
Fallout on Syria from Lebanon’s crisis is not just economic/Simon Speakman Cordall/Arab Weekly/December 09/2019
Lebanon Is Not a Hezbollah State/Hussein Ibish/Bloomberg/December 09/2019
Lebanese sarcasm: A powerful token of defiance/Salma Yassine/Annahar/December 09/2019
Lebanon’s exit path from economic woes/Marwan Mikhael/Anahar/December 09/2019
Why Russia Wants Lebanon/Grigory Melamedov/Middle East Quarterly
A Duel on a Sinking Ship/Ghassan Charbel/Asharq Al-Awsat/December 09/2019

The Latest Lebanese LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on December 09-10/2019
My Almighty God Bless & Safeguard Bishop Elias Audi …He Witnessed For The Truth & For Lebanon
Elias Bejjani/December 09/2019
المطران الياس عودة شهد للبنان وللحق وسمى الأشياء بأسمائها
Lebanon’s Orthodox great Bishop of Beirut, Msgr Elias Audi has overtly, patriotically, and faithfully witnessed for the truth and for our beloved Lebanon, the Land of the Holy Cedars.
In his yesterday’s Homely he called things as they are, and named those forces who occupy Lebanon, as well as those Lebanese puppet officials who instead of serving Lebanon’s interests are siding with the terrorist Hezbollah, the occupier of Lebanon, and serving the Iranian agenda of occupation, expansionism and terrorism.
All those officials, politicians, clergymen and journalist who criticized Audi’s courageous homely are either Iranian mouthpieces, or mere Iranian mercenaries.
Accordingly all their Dhimmitude replies of criticism are valueless.
And yes as Bishop Audi stated, Hezbollah occupies Lebanon, and its leader Hassan Nasrallah is the actual ruler of the country, and yes the Lebanese officials are mere puppets.
Our Prays go to the oppressed and occupied Lebanon that Almighty God shall always guard, protect and safeguard

Hezbollah Is Stubbornly Insisting To Replicate The Puppet & Corrupted Resigned Lebanese Cabinet
/حزب الله مصر على استنساخ الحكومة التبعية والإفساد المستقيلة
Elias Bejjani/December 08/2019
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/81229/elias-bejjani-hezbollah-is-stubbornly-insisting-to-replicate-the-puppet-corrupted-resigned-lebanese-cabinet-%d8%ad%d8%b2%d8%a8-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%84%d9%87-%d9%85%d8%b5%d8%b1-%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%89-%d8%a7/
The Iranian armed Lebanese terrorist proxy, “The Party Of God”, Hezbollah, is the actual ruler of Lebanon, and it fully controls the country’s decision making process, as well as all the officials including the president, House Speaker and the cabinet.
At the present time, and as a result of an Iranian recent orchestrated parliamentary elections, and an electoral non-constitutional law that was tailored and imposed by intimation and force, Hezbollah enjoys a majority in both the parliament and the Cabinet.
The mass public peaceful Lebanese revolution that has been going on for the past 52 days has forced the cabinet to resign.
But the Occupier, Hezbollah, and its Iranian masters, are still defiant and insist to maintain the pre revolution status quo.
Since the Cabinet’s resignation, Hezbollah has been stubbornly refusing to respond to any of the revolution’s just demands, and is insisting to maintain its irony Iranian grip on the country.
Hezbollah’s leadership in both Beirut and Tehran are evilly challenging the Lebanese peaceful revolution, and through terrorism and intimidation are adamant to replicate the corrupted-puppet resigned government in a bid to maintain their occupational status.
Apparently Hezbollah’s leadership has solely formed a new puppet government that is a mere replicate of the resigned one. But it is not yet official announced.
All that is left before its official announcement is a Lebanese Muslim Sunni politician that is willing to head it, as a facade cover no more no less.
Three Muslim Sunnis are competing for the post, Caretaker PM, Saad Al Hariri, Beirut MP Fouad Makhzoumi, and the businessman Samir Al Khatieb.
The PM’s name will be known tomorrow (Monday) through the folkloric president’s consultations with the 128 Members of the Lebanese Parliament.
But the real outcome is not clear due to the fact that many Lebanese well informed analysts strongly believe that the covert-Hariri Bassil business partnership is still very sold with the Hezbollah’s blessings which means that Hariri is still the one that Aoun, Bassil, Hezbollah and Berri prefer. They know him very well because he has been serving their interests, as well the Iranian agenda.
It is worth mentioning that 74 MP’s are all in Hezbollah’s leadership pocket and under its tip, and accordingly they will blindly vote in accordance to its orders “Faraman”.
In summary Hezbollah has belligerently refused to respond to all the demands of the revolution, and definitely will by force try to hold on to the ongoing status of its occupation.
Meanwhile the mass peaceful revolution is expected to go on in spite of all the oppression that its activists are facing, while all kinds of economical hardships that the country is facing are getting worse.
In conclusion, Lebanon needs a flood of divine intervention, and the floods of water on the roads to wash the ungodly leaders out.
Our Prays go to the oppressed and occupied Lebanon that Almighty God shall always guard, protect and safeguard.

Environmental issues add to Iraqi, Lebanese misery
Chris Doyle/Arab News/December 09/2019
As protests in Iraq and Lebanon continue unrelentingly into the heart of winter, the main drivers are unquestionably frustration at the rampant corruption and government mismanagement in both countries, as well as a desire to terminate the dead hand of the sectarian systems each society is held back by. Differences exist too, not least the bloodier, more repressive approach of the Iraqi security services and associated militias, with Iranian encouragement.
Yet one issue that lurks in both sets of protesters’ minds is the environment. In both countries, the total failure to tend to natural resources, protect the ecosystem and ensure clean air and water are telling symptoms of the broader failures of governance at every level. This makes these protests slightly different to those in other countries over the last decade. It may be also be a sign of things to come as overpopulation, combined with desertification, drought, sea rises and other phenomena, blight the planet.
Environmental issues have triggered protests before in both countries. In 2015, Lebanese protested for eight weeks at what was called the “great stink.” Trash was everywhere, even piling up outside hospitals. Landfills had become more like garbage mountains, with glaciers of detritus. The foul air hanging over the country caused by the garbage crisis could hardly be ignored. The air was toxified by large amounts of rubbish, including plastics, being burnt, leading to breathing and skin disorders. Today, temporary landfills on the coast are still infuriating Lebanese, who want them closed. Lebanon should have a glorious coastline on the Eastern Mediterranean. Instead, many of its beaches are unfit to swim at, with raw sewage soiling the water and plastic washed up on to the shore. Only the upmarket private resorts are acceptable, though not always.
Meanwhile, in Iraq in the summer of 2018, Basrans also came out to protest. Turn on a tap in Basra and you got a murky trickle of brown, salty water. That summer, water contamination led to 118,000 people going to hospital for reasons related to water quality in a city that could once boast of its glorious canals, for which it was nicknamed the “Venice of the Middle East.” Today, these same canals are clogged with pollutants and garbage.
Added to that, Iraq is also suffering from a major increase in dust storms. This is partly due to drought and climate change, but is also due to the chronic mismanagement of Iraq’s ecosystem and fertile areas. These storms have become almost routine, but lead to serious health issues.
What energizes the protesters on these issues is that the problem is largely political, with environmental consequences.
Of course, for both countries, wars have been devastating for the environment. Imagine the battering the Iraqi environment has suffered, not least after three major interstate wars — the Iraq-Iraq War, the US-led attack in 1991 and the US and UK-led invasion of 2003. More recently, Daesh adopted a scorched earth policy in its fight for survival, setting many oil fields alight to cause even more harm to the air quality. The toxic clouds often blocked out the sun and were referred to as the “Daesh winter.” Lebanon suffered from its own civil war, but also the periodic conflagrations with Israel, the last major one being in 2006. Assessing the real extent of environmental damage is tough in both countries given the lack of verifiable data. Environmental issues have always been very low down on the government priority lists — at least until now.
What is certain is that, without a real and systematic change in approach, these issues are only going to get worse. Global warming is not going to make any of this easier. Between 1970 and 2004, Iraq’s annual mean temperature rose by 1 to 2 degrees Celsius. Iraqis will have to face higher temperatures — a challenge given that summertime temperatures have been known to reach 53 C. The rise in sea levels and the decline in rainfall will only exacerbate subsequent droughts. Rising salinity levels, which have already damaged much of Iraq’s finest agricultural lands, will continue to climb.
The Tigris, Euphrates and Shatt Al-Arab rivers have all suffered from decreased water quality thanks to the damming taking place further upstream, which has drastically cut water flows.
Green movements in most of the Middle East are in their fledgling stage. What energizes the protesters on these issues is that the problem is largely political, with environmental consequences. Lebanon’s garbage crisis is largely down to the corrupt carving up of the system. Iraq’s government has failed to even start investing in the well-being of the country despite having vast hydrocarbon wealth at its disposal.
All sectors in these countries require significant education about these challenges. In Lebanon, protesters have been clearing up and recycling garbage after their demonstrations in Beirut, making a strong political point. The level of recycling in Lebanon is still far too low.
Governments, businesses, civil society and the broader public have to start working in harmony to address these issues — rather than working against each other — before it is too late. Both countries need to adopt smarter water management and irrigation strategies and provide incentives to keep water clean, prevent the dumping of toxic waste, to recycle and to maintain a healthier environment. Better public transport services are vital to reducing the amount of cars on the roads; something anyone who has suffered Beirut traffic jams would appreciate. The international community should be generous in offering support and expertise to address these issues in a holistic and on a long-term basis.
*Chris Doyle is director of the London-based Council for Arab-British Understanding (CAABU). He has worked with the council since 1993 after graduating with a first class honors degree in Arabic and Islamic Studies at Exeter University. He has organized and accompanied numerous British parliamentary delegations to Arab countries. Twitter: @Doylech

Lebanon: Vague Int’l Stances and Regime’s Provocative Practices
Sam Menassa/Asharq Al-Awsat/December 09/2019
Since the beginning of the Lebanese uprising on October 17, those following the events are asking the question of Lebanon’s geographic importance in the strategies of major countries. Especially given what this popular rage across sects and regions has embodied and the regime denying the uprising’s magnitude and significations on the one hand, and the regime’s responses that have provoked the majority of Lebanese people who have filled the streets and squares across the country.
Perhaps the most vulgar of these practices is the atmosphere that has surrounded the formation of a government, from the delays in the binding parliamentary consultations, trying to come up with a line-up before appointing a prime minister and imposing an action plan on it. All of this goes against the constitution, traditions, and the balances in the country.
Surveying international positions could help the Lebanese uprising persist and not retreat and could motivate it to move to more advanced stages and positions. It is no secret that the phase Lebanon is currently going through is decisive, and it is the most delicate after Iran began expanding in the region after the collapse of the Iraqi Baath regime in 2003 and the start of the Syrian revolution in 2011. Lebanon is now in the eye of the storm, while international and regional positions towards it have changed as a consequence of unbridled Iranian influence reaching hazardous levels. This has posed an existential threat to Lebanon by toppling the values of democracy in it, the balance of its components, and the positive neutrality that has characterized its foreign policy. All of these factors have contributed to periods of stability and sometimes leisure in Lebanon.
Today, regional and international powers only view Lebanon through their interests in their conflict with Iran and how to tame its influence in the region. Within this framework, we cannot but look at the international and regional positions on the Lebanese uprising. Subsequently, we must also look at the practices of the Lebanese regime with its Shiite duo and their Christian cover, and what implications that may have on the Lebanese regime and its existence.
In reality, the question about international and regional positions on the uprising poses many problematics: Are the international and regional forces interested in the uprising? Would this be in the interest of the uprising, or will it carry dangers that threaten its continuity and success? In both cases, what are the international and regional forces’ positions on the regime’s reactions to the uprising and on managing the political, economic, financial, and monetary crises?
Washington views Lebanon as one of the fronts in its struggle with the Iranian regime. The severe sanctions on Iran are not separate from those imposed on Hezbollah in Lebanon, and they are aimed at weakening the Mulla system and its affiliated militia extensions.
It is clear that Washington has abandoned military confrontation in the region, at least for now, and has leaned more towards enhancing its military presence in the Gulf. Also, the US is pursuing a plan to delegitimize the Iranian regime both politically and religiously by disseminating images of the massacres committed against Iranian protesters and information on hundreds of deaths and thousands of prisoners. It is doing so to unmask Iran both religiously and morally and to expose it for the monstrous and authoritarian regime that it is.
Regardless, the US is very patient with its strategy in the region, while Lebanese patience runs out very quickly.
Russia, on the other hand, is relentlessly attempting to fill the gaps the US has left to retrieve its traditional role in the Middle East and enable its new role in Syria, and to some extent, in Iraq. It is doing so by holding extensive communications with Lebanese parties, officially and at the level of leadership. In fact, it is also doing the same with the uprising, and of course, with Hezbollah, in an attempt to infiltrate the Lebanese sectors that are still distant from it, such as arming the Lebanese army, after reaching deals to extract oil and gas. The Russian strategy, so to speak, is advanced in Lebanese decision-making, which completes its presence and role in Syria and its objective alliance with Iran based on common interests.
Russian diplomacy is aware of the Lebanese concerns around Iran and its ambitions in the country, and it takes advantage of the reservations the US’ traditional allies have towards the unstable Trump administration and its blind support of Israeli policies.
However, is Russia capable of playing a rescue role in Lebanon, and to impose itself as a partner that can negotiate with the Trump administration and even co-exist with it such as what is happening in the Qamishli Air Base, and the أmeimim Air Base that are not far from American deployment and the Hamat Air Base in Lebanon? Despite all of this, Russia will not make any compromises that would not satisfy Hezbollah, for reasons that go beyond Lebanon and are more important for Moscow. Nevertheless, it announces that it is responding to the uprising’s demands while maintaining its support for the regime and communicates with it, leaving the doors of the presidency and Free Patriot Movement wide open in front of it.
European positions, on the other hand, are not very reassuring as they indicate some satisfaction, at least, if not motivation, towards the regime’s position and the formation of another Hezbollah-approved government, disregarding the popular uprising that has no precedent in this small country.
As for Arab silence, some consider it an attempt not to put the uprising in an awkward position and leave it to take its course, while others consider it a result of expelling Arab influence in Lebanon. Both theories may carry some truth, but it can be said that the Arab position on the Lebanese events, both at the level of the regime and the uprising, is that of watching and waiting. It views Lebanon through the lens of strategic confrontations that it has in the region. We cannot forget the unstable circumstances that Arab countries are going through, in addition to regional threats, drawing most of its attention to achieving internal and external security.
Have Washington, London, the Arabs, and Paris, especially President Emmanuel Macron, let go of Prime Minister Hariri returning to the government? It may not be merely giving up Hariri as a person but the role of the Lebanese Sunni sect in Lebanon on the one hand, and the fate of the popular uprising on the other. Has overriding the Taef Agreement and the constitution become this easy? Are these positions merely the result of a receding western influence facing Iran and Russia retrieving its role? Or, is it the result of the failure of the forces confronting Iran in Lebanon, particularly Hezbollah, and the region to attract international and regional support? These blurry international and regional positions on the popular uprising is a cause for worry, as it leaves things to the regime. This may drag Lebanon into a situation similar to what is happening to the Iraqi uprising in terms of violent repression by the Iran-backed regime and its proxies across Iraq. Today, there is concern that whoever is deciding the fate of the Lebanese uprising is the same as whoever decided to confront the demonstrations at the beginning of the war in Syria and the protests in Iraq.

Lebanon floods increase anti-government anger
Sunniva Rose/The National/December 09/2019
Torrential rain brings traffic to standstill in many areas of country
Flooding in Lebanon sparked more anger against the government on Monday, nearly two months after protests erupted against decades of mismanagement by the ruling elite. “Lebanon is drowning” was trending on Twitter after heavy rain hit the country on Sunday. Videos and photos of flooded roads and leaking government offices were widely shared on social media as more examples of politicians’ failure to provide decent infrastructure to the Lebanese since the end of the civil war in 1990. “Welcome to the Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport: a fitting legacy for Hariri, besides the toilets,” tweeted Lebanese journalist Lara Bitar under a video of passengers dodging water dripping from the ceiling as they pulled their luggage. Water seeped into several offices at the airport and the arrival and departure halls, the state-run National News Agency reported. Nearby roads were flooded, causing massive traffic jams.
Another video, showing people wading through water in a corridor of a Labour Ministry building, went viral on Twitter. Men kayaked along roads in the southern suburbs of Beirut, leading many to jokingly compare the Lebanese capital to the Italian city of Venice. “This political class has turned Beirut into the Venice of the Middle East,” satirist Karl Sharro tweeted.
Perhaps the most widely commented video showed dozens of submerged cars on a highway in Ouzai, a suburb in South Beirut. “The water entered shops and homes” in the area, NNA reported. In a tunnel near by, drivers had to abandon their cars to escape the rising water on foot. Roads in the southern suburbs were reopened by Monday afternoon. The caretaker Minister of Public Works, Youssef Fenianos, blamed MEAS, a private company affiliated to the national carrier Middle East Airlines, for the flooding in Ouzai tunnel. Mr Fenianos said he “understood the suffering of the people but there are difficulties in disbursing the credits due to the financial crisis that the country is going through”.The rain turned to snow in Lebanon’s mountains, closing a major highway in the remote region of Hermel.

Lebanese mothers struggle to keep protests non-violent
Samar Kadi/Arab Weekly/December 09/2019
From Lebanon to Argentina to Chile mothers have been the vanguard of non-violence and peaceful coexistence, said Tanya Ghorra, a founding member of Mothers for Non-Violence.
BEIRUT – While watching clashes between anti-government protesters and Hezbollah and Amal sympathisers amid mounting sectarian rhetoric reminiscent of the devastating civil war, Lebanese mothers took to the streets pledging not to allow their children to experience the ills of civil strife.
Taking a stand against sectarian-inspired violence, the group Mothers for Non-Violence rallied thousands of women who marched in Beirut and other Lebanese cities in a show of national unity.
“What happened in the past couple of weeks sounded the alarm. What we saw reminded us of the pain and suffering of the civil war. We just had to act,” said Tanya Ghorra, a founding member of Mothers for Non-Violence.
“The call we posted on social media went viral in a few hours because it answered concerns of mothers who were helplessly watching these incidents. No mother on Earth wants war and violence. Mothers from all regions, backgrounds and religions came together to pledge no return to civil strife.”
Clashes erupted after supporters of the Shia groups Hezbollah and the Amal Movement stepped up violence and intimidation against peaceful protesters across Lebanon, with their sympathisers attacking demonstrators in Beirut, Baalbek and Tyre.
The particularly intense confrontation on a former front line of the civil war between Beirut’s neighbourhoods of Ain el-Remmaneh and Chiyah raised the alarm. Chiyah is known as a support base of the Amal Movement. Ain el-Remmaneh is a stronghold of the Christian Lebanese Forces party.
“We marched, mothers from all religious and social backgrounds, to build human bridges. We were there to say no to sectarianism, no to civil strife and no to violence. We are the people of one land,” Ghorra said.
“There were happy faces and big smiles in the demonstrations with people exchanging white roses and others throwing rice on us as we marched. Even the young guys who might have participated in the clashes were smiling and welcoming. Emotions were very high, very strong.”
Similar demonstrations took place in other parts of Beirut and in Tripoli in northern Lebanon. “It had a contaminating effect spreading from one place to another… a constructive contamination,” Ghorra added.
From Lebanon to Argentina to Chile mothers have been the vanguard of non-violence and peaceful coexistence, Ghorra noted in reference to the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo movement in which Argentine women campaigned for their children who disappeared during military dictatorship in the 1980s.
“Anywhere in the world mothers speak a common language,” she said. “Be it in Lebanon or Argentina or Chile they have the same rhetoric. Because we give life, we know more how precious and valuable life is. Our voice is one globally.”
The families of the missing who are suffering from the sequels the civil war (1975-90) were particularly vocal in the mothers’ march for peace.
“We participated in large numbers in the marches against the return to civil strife because we are the best example of what wars do to people,” said Wadad Halwani, founder of the Committee of the Families of Kidnapped and Disappeared in Lebanon.
“When we heard about the clashes between Ain el-Remmaneh and Chiyah, the first thing that came to mind was the reincarnation of the front line. We participated in the demonstration to say that women, not only the wives or mothers of the disappeared, are the most afflicted by the scourge of war and, in the aftermath of conflict, they act as a compass or a fire extinguisher.”
The Committee of the Families of Kidnapped and Disappeared in Lebanon has been staging a sit-in in a public garden in downtown Beirut since 2005 to press for information regarding the fate of some 17,000 people missing in the war.
“We consider our sit-ins in the heart of the current protests to be against corruption and injustices. Our common tragedy has brought the families of the missing together more than 30 years ago regardless of affiliations, religion and background. Today, a large bracket of the Lebanese people has realised that they have the same concerns and sufferings that unified them,” Halwani said.
The mothers’ movement has eased tensions, the organisers said. The traditional ruling parties have long pushed rhetoric of sectarian coexistence to gloss over deep class divides and to maintain their hold on power in the face of protesters’ challenge. “The power of women on the ground is very big,” Ghorra said. “Women have proved to be instrumental in containing tensions and preventing friction in the protests. They say: ‘We gave you life and we will stop you from imperilling it.’”
*Samar Kadi is the Arab Weekly society and travel section editor.

Fallout on Syria from Lebanon’s crisis is not just economic
Simon Speakman Cordall/Arab Weekly/December 09/2019
The result has thrown the shadowy relationship between Syria and the opaque Lebanese banking sector into sharp relief.
TUNIS – The Syrian pound hit a record low while protests in neighbouring Lebanon pressured Beirut’s banking system and choked one of Syria’s few financial gateways to the world.
Lebanon’s open-market economy and banking system have long served as vital financial conduits between Syria and the world. However, since protests erupted across Lebanon in mid-October, controls have been imposed on Lebanon’s historically robust banking sector, limiting currency withdrawals and restricting financial transfers abroad.
The fallout is bound not to be just economic. Few dispute that Syria’s and Lebanon’s fates are tightly bound. Thousands of Syria’s refugees are in makeshift camps along the Lebanese-Syrian border, reliant on international aid, much of it dispersed through the Lebanese government.
That makes the protests of acute political interest to policymakers in Damascus, who are trying to re-establish stable governance after years of civil war. However, further to the political ties between the two countries are economic ones, which predate Syria’s civil war, that decimated Syria’s economy. As such, businesses, wealthy families and Syria’s diaspora have relied on Lebanon’s banking sector and its high rates for financial security or to transfer money from abroad to relatives in Syria.
As unrest has overtaken Lebanon, dollar transfers to Syria have dwindled to next to nothing, Reuters reported. “These deposits are now trapped. You can imagine the aftershocks from this which is beginning to surface in the Syrian economy,” a senior Lebanese banker who handles accounts of wealthy Syrians told Reuters on condition of anonymity.
As the supply of dollars has shrunk, Syria’s pound, pegged at 47 to the dollar prior to 2011, was trading at a record low of 1,000.
One middle-aged Syrian in Damascus told VOA News he couldn’t understand what was happening. “The supermarket, the vegetable man and the taxi drivers tell us that prices are rising because the dollar is rising. It makes no sense, though, he says, because we’re in Syria and we’re paid in Syrian pounds. Who cares what the dollar is worth?” he asked.
Lebanon’s banking sector and its role in ensuring the supply of hard currency to Syria is becoming apparent.
“Lebanon’s banking sector is one of the few remaining viable ways for Syrians to get access to dollars and to trade with the wider world,” said Ryan Bohl, Middle East and North Africa analyst with risk consultancy Stratfor.
“Although the Jordanian border has reopened and Syria now controls some Iraqi border posts again, trade between those countries hasn’t rebounded back to pre-war levels and they don’t have major financial sectors either. So this is a key financial route for Damascus to maintain access to capital.”
Given the opaque nature of Lebanon’s banking sector, no one can be certain about precisely who in Syria may be benefiting from its loose controls.
“Nobody really knows if Syria’s government or its top leaders have money in Lebanon,” Bohl said. “They probably do, at least on a personal level, in part because it’s a safe place to park their money but in the sense of Syria’s Central Bank and its very small reserves (which are propped up by Iranian credit lines and Russian aid), there’s less direct exposure to Lebanon’s financial sector.”
While the extent of Damascus’s financial commitments in Lebanon’s banking sector is unclear, there is a network of Syrian businesspeople who rely on the sector to import goods to Lebanon, which can be transported or smuggled to Syria. “Syrian businesspersons are also using this sector to avoid sanctions impact and to be more flexible in trading with Western companies,” said Zaki Mehchy, a fellow with Chatham House, a think-tank in London.
“It is worth mentioning that many Syrian businesspersons have made fortunes from violence and conflict-related activities such as smuggling, kidnapping, arms dealing and human trafficking and, unfortunately, they are using the Lebanese banking sector to clear their money through projects inside Lebanon or transactions with foreign companies.”
After more than a month of unrest, the future of Lebanon’s declining economic fortunes, which sparked the current protests, is uncertain.
Dramatic slashes to the central bank’s interest rates, a factor that had made the sector so attractive to Syrian investors in the first place, has been like “bringing a bucket to a wildfire,” Farouk Soussa, an economist at Goldman Sachs, told the Financial Times. “It’s helping but at the margins.”
*Simon Speakman Cordall is a freelance writer.

Lebanon Is Not a Hezbollah State
Hussein Ibish/Bloomberg/December 09/2019
The country’s military has demonstrated reassuring independence from the Iran-backed militia, and deserves American support.
On Monday, the Trump administration finally released $105 million in annual aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces that had been appropriated by Congress but, like the more notorious hold on military assistance to Ukraine, was inexplicably delayed by the White House.
Better late than never, particularly since the Lebanese military has been protecting protesters in the streets of Beirut and other cities from intimidation by the pro-Iranian militias of Hezbollah and Amal.
The Lebanese protests, now coming close to their third month, are a powerful rebuttal to the pernicious notion that all of Lebanon, or even just the Lebanese state, is simply an extension or a tool of Hezbollah, and should be therefore treated as a terrorist entity and pariah.
Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese, from all walks of life and throughout the country, have been protesting the entire socioeconomic and political establishment. Their anger isn’t directed primarily against Hezbollah or Iran, but against the entire power structure in the country, which they blame for mismanaging the economy and enriching itself at the expense of the general population.
Obviously, this threatens everyone who benefits from the status quo. But the threat to Hezbollah and its allies is particularly severe.
Through force and guile, Hezbollah has maneuvered over the decades to maximize its influence in Lebanon, ensuring that it remains the most potent armed force in the country, while minimizing its responsibility for the failures of the state.
It poses as a revolutionary group focused on combating Israel and only a small party of the government with a few minor ministries. In reality, it is by far the most powerful force in the country, maintaining its own foreign and defense policies, independent of the Lebanese government.
Hezbollah initially pretended to side with the protesters. But its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, quickly changed his tune and decided that the protests were “inauthentic” and manipulated by foreign “hidden hands.”
This is because any profound change to the political order in Lebanon must have one of two negative effects for Hezbollah. If the upheaval leads to real change, the group’s leverage can only decrease. Alternatively, if things don’t change, Hezbollah will become increasingly associated in the public mind with the corruption and repression that props up the system that maximizes its influence. Hezbollah’s bluff will be called, and its role exposed. Either outcome is a long-term threat to Hezbollah’s credibility and power.
So, the organization has been trying to disrupt the protests through threats and intimidation by goons. Protesters from Shiite communities have been repeatedly filmed “apologizing” to Hezbollah and its leadership, or to the state, for “insulting” them in the demonstrations. This is a familiar strong-arm tactic, in which the gun behind the camera cannot be seen by the viewer but is clearly evident in the expression of the victim. It has also been deployed by the regime in Tehran to try and undermine recent protests in Iran.
This is why supporting the Lebanese army is urgent and important. The army is the primary national institution that can serve as a bulwark against thoroughgoing Hezbollah domination. In recent weeks, it has repeatedly intervened on behalf of the demonstrators when they were attacked by gangs of Hezbollah and Amal thugs.
It is likely that the original impulse to withhold the congressionally-appropriated U.S. aid to the Lebanese military originated from the wrongheaded notion that Lebanon equals Hezbollah and therefore shouldn’t get any American support. Senator Chris Murphy, who lobbied for the release of the funds, has said that “there is at least one person at the [National Security Council] who wants to punish Lebanon for having a political relationship with Hezbollah.” Given that numerous commentators with close ties to the administration have been pushing for just such a perspective, that’s not surprising.
But the protests, and the army’s performance in recent weeks, have shattered this myth.
The protests represent the rejection of the sectarian order in Lebanon, and the resurrection of the pre-Civil War vision of Lebanon as a modern, unified nation-state with a national consciousness beyond communalism. That threatens much of the power structure, but it is a mortal danger to Hezbollah and its nefarious state-within-a-state in Lebanon.
Everyone interested in combating Hezbollah domination of Lebanon and power in the Middle East ought to take advantage of this opportunity and understand that the Lebanese state isn’t equivalent to Hezbollah. To the contrary, it is the alternative to Hezbollah. As such, it deserves support rather than isolation.
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

Lebanese sarcasm: A powerful token of defiance
Salma Yassine/Annahar/December 09/2019
Lebanese sarcasm, during a revolution or even on mundane days, has the ability to bring together the totality of the Lebanese masses.
BEIRUT: Whether sprayed on walls, printed on clothing, scribbled on posters, coiled within Arguileh smoke emanating from the streets, screamed in chants, sang in melodious tunes, or even jubilantly spread in spoken words, Lebanese sarcasm is rendered the emblem of an unconventional way to revolt peacefully.
Sarcasm is bluntly and effortlessly woven within the mundane daily conversations of the Lebanese, wherein Arabized memes and stickers are other forms of colloquial expression they resort to when chatting for instance.
These depictions often reflect tragic realities, such as economic crises and harsh living conditions. They also entail powerful messages intended to be voiced at the ruling class either in a direct or an indirect manner.
Iyad Al Hout, a stand-up comedian, stated that sarcasm can be a very significant tool to ridicule or undermine something or someone in a seemingly polite manner. It can also be a token of defiance, especially when ingrained in a culture that is obsessed with social norms and etiquette.
“Humor is an important tool that subverts and undermines structures of power. One of the reasons power structures work so well is because people fear them, but you can’t fear something that makes you laugh. People can either find clowns funny, or scary, it’s never both. Our society still mostly fears the clowns that are our politicians, but a lot of us comedians are trying to change that perception,” he added.
This expressive tool is perceived to be an escapade from the daily troubles that burden the people in times of difficulty, especially when bombarded with the current revolutionary situation.
One example of this would be the online platforms, such as Sarcasm Beirut and Overheard Beirut that receive submissions and post original and authentic material that reflect the crux of the Lebanese nature. Their content consists of jokes and moments that a plethora of Lebanese people experience.
Even when these platforms fail to make their audience laugh, they merely remain an unconventional and bizarre outlet for a bundle of statements that unifies the nation under the parasol of comedy.
“Despite the troubles that have been clouding Lebanon up until this very moment, we have earned the epithet ‘happiest depressed people,’” the founder of Sarcasm Beirut noted.
This comedic and sarcastic sphere has built a “safe haven,” as the founding team of Overheard Beirut told Annahar, “in the form of a community that welcomes glimpses of people’s realities, those we aim to share with members of the Lebanese society as well as neighboring Arab countries.”
Lebanese sarcasm, during a revolution or even on mundane days, has the ability to bring together the totality of the Lebanese masses. Sarcasm helps the people scatter the untold truth; it helps them deal with that which is expected to be left unsaid.
“Lebanese humor gave us a great advantage during this revolution. Those elements played a pivotal role in its viral spread across the globe. It has, in a way, become our coping mechanism too,” Farrah Khatib, a journalism student, told Annahar.

Lebanon’s exit path from economic woes
Marwan Mikhael/Anahar/December 09/2019
The government should aim at restoring confidence through economic sustainability and balanced growth.
There is one question on everyone’s mind: Is there still a way out of the current crisis or are we going to fall into an abyss with an intense deterioration of all economic indicators that could lead to dire consequences? A summary of the current economic situation will help us analyze its sustainability. Then we can try to find a way out of the crisis with the least damage to the economy.
The protests accelerated what was already a deteriorating economic and financial environment. The protests on the street accentuated panic among the population, with the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri being the cherry on the top. When banks opened following 14 days of closure, people rushed to withdraw and/or transfer their deposits into dollars or outside the country.
Banks were obliged to adopt further restrictions in order to maintain financial stability for the longest possible time. No banking system in the world could survive an unchecked rush on banks. When depositors place their money in a Lebanese bank, the bank, in turn, uses these funds to loan to other customers or to buy government bonds or Certificates of Deposit from Banque du Liban (BDL), Lebanon’s central bank. Such uses are standard practice world over, and so long as depositors are content to keep their money in banks and do not en masse try to withdraw their deposits, the banking system remains stable and functional. In Lebanon, the liquidity issues of banks were also exacerbated as the banking system had already lost part of its foreign assets starting in 2011, with the balance of payments (BOP) in the red for more than eight years. Moreover, the BOP deficit had accelerated over the past two years.
The current economic and financial situation can only be transitory as its downfall has been accelerated by the protests, making the economic and financial situation unsustainable. The restrictive measures adopted by banks will make it less likely for capital to flow into the economy as investors will become worried about the risk of being unable to withdraw money from the system. It will, therefore, become more and more difficult to attract money and the economy will have to rely on its own existing stock of foreign assets to finance its imports of goods and services. Imports will decline as a result yet will continue to constitute the major drain on foreign assets.
Another source of draining deposit is cash withdrawals from banks. People are withdrawing as much cash as they can, in both currencies (Lebanese lira and US dollars), to counter the restrictive policies of banks. Then, being unable to transfer cash outside the country, this money is kept in safe boxes at homes. Estimates based on the balance sheets of BDL find that the amount of cash withdrawn from banks in October and November has amounted to more than $2.5 billion.
Taking a longer view, successive governments since 1990 were never able to restore investors’ confidence level to where it was before the war started. The dollarization rate never went below 50 percent and most of the time interest rates on lira were much higher than on dollars. During the episodes of shocks like in 1995, interest rates went up to 38 percent, while in 2005, 2006, 2008, and more recently, the price of credit default swaps (CDS)—these are an insurance against the risk of default of the Lebanese government—increased to more than 2400 basis points, meaning that there is a greater risk of default. Theoretically, the five years CDS should be equal to the difference between five years Lebanese Eurobonds and five years US bonds, which has crossed 1000 basis points.
As demonstrations continue, the restrictive policies of banks will remain in place and the repercussions of both on economic growth are substantial. Analysis of various sources including the Purchasing Managers’ Index, finds that companies’ turnovers fell by more than 50 percent in October, depending on the sector. The impact in November is anticipated to be larger than the previous month as banks froze their facilities for individuals as well as for companies, and reduced credit card limits. Consumption and imports are de facto declining and traders are feeling the heat.
The result is an economic recession combined with a liquidity drought that is unsustainable beyond the short term. Either a government is formed and the country is put on the right track of reforms or the restrictive policies will increase and the parallel exchange market will see a larger depreciation of the Lebanese lira. The cash economy will flourish as depositors will avoid putting money at banks.
So the million-dollar question remains: If a government is formed, is there a way out without a haircut on deposits, a restructuring of government debt, and devaluation? The most urgent issue is to restore investors’ confidence in order to be able to levy the restrictive measures of commercial banks and for capital to start flowing in again. A way out can be found without a haircut on deposits and devaluation, but a restructuring of government debt, at the least the debt in Lebanese lira, is preferable in order to reduce the burden on public finances.
The first step before getting into any future economic plan is to form a government. This government has to be formed quickly and, according to the Lebanese constitution, it has to get the support of the majority of parliamentarians. Beyond parliamentary approval, the government has to gain the confidence of people on the streets, but, most importantly it has to get international recognition as trustworthy and cooperative. Debating the composition of the new government is like debating the sex of angels. Be it technocratic, techno-political, or purely political, the most important thing— besides being approved by the international community—is for the government to be coherent, to have an economic and financial plan for the upcoming three to four years, and to be responsible for its actions, in order to be productive and immediately start to tackle the current economic and financial crisis.
If a government with international support is formed, then resolving the current economic woes will become easier. An inflow of deposits from the GCC governments of $7 billion to $10 billion as deposits at BDL will also be very vital to support confidence, as BDL will then be able to pump dollars in the market, and banks will relax capital controls in few months’ time. Of course, this will be conditional on the new government adopting an ambitious yet credible comprehensive economic reforms plan for the upcoming three to four years.
As capital controls will be maintained in the near term, the banking system has to move into reducing interest rates in order to limit the increase in its foreign currency exposure. A drastic reduction in interest rates is advisable on both dollar and lira deposits. The interest rate differential will have to decline to a quarter or half a percentage point as it is the case in economies with pegged currencies. This step will lead to a reduction in the cost of funds for banks, especially in dollars, at a time where capital inflows have been reduced to negligent levels. Banks will then move to reduce interest on corporate debt and start to provide loans again to businesses.
In order to accelerate the recovery process, it would be advisable for the new government to reach an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as soon as possible. The importance of an IMF program is that it will act as a catalyst for capital inflows. The IMF will agree with the government on three years Extended Fund Facility (EFF) that will consist of an economic program agreed with the government including a timeline with quarterly evaluation by the IMF. It will also entail a package that could go up to a few billion dollars with quarterly disbursements if the review by the IMF mission is positive on the implementation of the reform program. Once the IMF gives a green light for the disbursement, international donors will do the same. Hence the IMF will act as a leverage to attract capital from abroad. If the IMF program will disburse $3 billion over three years, it is expected that this money will attract more than $10 billion over the same period. It is important to note that citizens will need to sacrifice in the short term, while gradually getting better public services over the medium term.
Having covered the pressing issues of the current situation, let us then look more specifically at the economic reality that Lebanon finds itself in and the measures that need to be undertaken in the immediate and the long term to put the country on a path toward recovery.
The government should aim at restoring confidence through economic sustainability and balanced growth. The strategy should be founded on three pillars:
1. Macroeconomic stabilization along with poverty reduction. This includes Large reduction of the fiscal deficit over the coming three and a half years (from the second half of 2020 till the end of 2023) through an effort to mobilize revenue that will generate 3-4 percentage points of GDP in gross additional tax revenue by end 2023 (it will be 1-2 percent on a net basis due to the privatization of telecoms in 2021), and a strategy for cost recovery in Electricité du Liban (EDL); monetary policy that will continue to aim at preserving the exchange rate peg for the moment, as it is an anchor for confidence and the negative impact from floating the lira outweighs its positive impact on competitiveness and on the reduction of the current account deficit; monetary policy that will try to reach an inflation objective of 4 percent or less in order to help in shoring up confidence; and increasing social and development spending to protect the most vulnerable.
2. Structural reforms with improved transparency and governance to strengthen public enterprises and institutions, and to foster higher economic growth. This will include: improving public financial management through better collection and better control of tax evasion to achieve more fiscal discipline and greater budgetary transparency; reforming EDL and the tariff structure to ensure a balanced budget for the energy sector and better services; modernizing and corporatizing all the enterprises owned by the government in order to prepare them for privatization; strengthening anti-corruption agencies such as the central inspection authority and the court of audit; and improving the regulatory framework of investment and job creation.
3. Adequate new financing from the international community to support Lebanon. If such a program is adopted, the government will be able to catalyze new external financing from governments and multilateral institutions, which will help close the financing gap and allow reforms to work.
Public debt restructuring is essential if Lebanon wants to get out of the vicious cycle of debt and deficit and put the debt to GDP ratio on a sustainable path. However, it should not include a haircut on the principal of the debt. Restructuring the debt does not mean a haircut on the debt as it will de facto lead to a haircut on deposits, even if it is the one held by the central bank only. The idea of BDL writing off its holding of government debt in order to substantially reduce the stock of debt—BDL holds close to $38 billion of Treasury Bills and Eurobonds—is not a viable option. Any decline of this magnitude in BDL assets will have to lead to a decline in its liabilities, meaning a haircut on banks deposits at BDL, which will result in banks having to do a haircut on their customers’ deposits.
Restructuring of government debt has to entail lengthening the maturity of government debt, while drastically reducing interest rates on the debt for the coming three years. Of course, this decline will hit the banking system profits for the upcoming few years. However, it is the least painful compared to any other measure that can help with getting out of the current crisis. In our scenario, we considered a decline in the effective interest rate on government debt to 1 percent in 2020, 2 percent in 2021, and 3 percent in 2022 and 2023. Interest rates will go back to market-rate starting 2024. This decline in debt service will help the government reduce the total deficit at a time when tax measures and expenditure tightening will help boosting the primary surplus. In our scenario, public debt to GDP ratio will decline from 154.7 percent at the end of 2019 to 113.7 percent at the end of 2023.
The government has to initiate the privatization process of telecom companies. The Higher Council for Privatization and PPP (HCP) will have to coordinate with the Telecom Regulatory Authority (TRA), which has to be appointed as soon as possible, in order to prepare for the privatization of the two telecom companies.
The best privatization strategy will have to bring in both citizens and strategic investors along with the government. It will serve three purposes: to develop capital markets, to give ordinary people a stake in the company to be privatized, and to ensure better management and higher future profits by bringing in a strategic investor. This strategy is based on the fact that the government will do an initial public offering (IPO) for a certain percentage of the company, open to the public. People will get a share of the profits while the strategic investor and the government will divide the remaining share. The government will continue to collect the taxes on the sector and will keep a share in the company; however, it will be a minority share.
Saying that the government should not privatize companies that are providing large profits to the Treasury is not an accurate statement. The privatization of the telecom companies will help reduce government debt by more than $6 billion in one shot (in our scenario, the privatization of the two mobile companies will take place in 2021), in addition to the fact that it will enhance the management and will reduce political interference. Services will improve and prices may decline while key performance indicators will be set for the companies to implement government strategy, mentioned above, in the telecom sector.
*Marwan Mikhael is an economist and lecturer at Saint-Joseph University (USJ).

دراسة مطولة تشرح الأسباب التي من أجلها يريد الروس لبنان
Why Russia Wants Lebanon
By: Grigory Melamedov/Middle East Quarterly
كيف تسعى روسيا الأرثوذكسية لبسط نفوذها على لبنان
سامي خليفة/المدن/10 كانون الأول/2019
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/81299/why-russia-wants-lebanon-by-grigory-melamedov-middle-east-quarterly-%d8%af%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%b3%d8%a9-%d9%85%d8%b7%d9%88%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d8%b4%d8%b1%d8%ad-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d8%b3%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%a8/
https://www.meforum.org/60026/why-russia-wants-lebanon
Russia’s attempts to draw Lebanon into its sphere of influence by placing it under Moscow’s air defense umbrella and selling weapons to Beirut have been discussed by American experts for years. Some analysts argue that Washington should not try to compete with the Kremlin there while others maintain that any concession is unacceptable. Russian arms sales to Lebanon would likely not affect the region’s balance of power, but Moscow’s expansion of its Syrian air defense umbrella could tip the balance of forces in the Arab-Israeli and Iranian-Israeli conflicts and create a serious challenge for the United States in the near future.
Moscow on the Mediterranean
During the first half of 2018, Russia increasingly expressed unhappiness with Israeli air strikes against Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria. On September 17, 2018, Syrian air defenses shot down a Russian Ilyushin IL-20 military aircraft, supposedly by accident, during an Israeli operation. Moscow blamed Israel for the incident and immediately deployed S-300 air defense systems to Syria, significantly limiting the Israeli air force’s freedom of movement. Russian military and civilian experts openly insisted that now was the time to show Israel that the Kremlin dictated the rules in Syria. Fyodor Lukyanov, chairman of the Presidium of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy stated: “If Israel were to defy Russia’s dominant role, Russia would react and take a stand. This is unlikely to happen because Israel knows Russia defines the rules in Syria.”[1]
The main Israeli objective in Syria was to prevent weapons transfers from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Jerusalem used Lebanese air space to foil such transfers. In November 2018, Lebanese president Michel Aoun asked Moscow to protect Lebanon’s air space. Russian media reports that the defense ministry was favorably considering the idea alarmed the Israelis.[2]
Earlier, in February 2018, Russian natural gas producer Novatek obtained permission from the Lebanese government to develop natural gas fields in territorial waters in the Mediterranean Sea disputed by Lebanon and Israel. This action signaled that Moscow unambiguously sided with Lebanon and claimed the right to protect its natural gas investments during a military crisis.
The Russians remained neutral during Operation Northern Shield (December 2018–January 2019) when the Israel Defense Forces destroyed Hezbollah tunnels that crossed the Lebanese-Israeli border into northern Israel. However, Moscow’s ambition to draw Lebanon into its sphere of influence predates its intervention in Syria and persists to this day. Tensions could rise again at any time.
Russia and Lebanon
Lebanon is the only Middle Eastern country where Moscow can rely on a substantial Christian community. Its natural ally is the Orthodox Church, subordinated to the Patriarchate of Antioch. Currently, the Orthodox community comprises about 8 percent of Lebanon’s population. In the Lebanese government formed in January 2019, four ministers represent the Orthodox community politically, including Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Health Ghassan Hasbani and Defense Minister Elias Abu Saab. Former minister of defense, Yaacoub Sarraf, whom Russian media had reported as favoring Russian arms sales to Lebanon, is also a member of the Orthodox Church.
Since the Stalin era, Soviet diplomats in Lebanon and Syria have been tasked with holding the Antioch Patriarch within the sphere of influence of the Russian Orthodox Church. Under Putin, contacts with the Orthodox Christians have tremendously increased, and Moscow has also sought to ally with the Maronites—Lebanon’s largest Christian community. Historically, the Maronites’ main international partner was France, but this relationship significantly weakened when the Maronite Patriarch of Antioch, Bechara Boutros Rahi, refused to support the “Arab Spring” and welcomed Russian troops in Syria. Because Rahi is subordinate to the Vatican, he tries to maintain a balance between Russia and the West, but his position seems closer to Putin’s than to the West’s. As he stated on Vatican Radio:
So, if you want democracy, apply it and listen to what the people say. Want to know what the fate of Assad is? Let the Syrian people decide! It is not your place to decide the president of Syria, of Iraq, of Lebanon.[3]
Putin has also revived a network of religious and secular organizations formed to lobby for Moscow’s interests in Lebanon, which went dormant after the Soviet collapse. The most noteworthy is the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (IOPS), which had created roughly a hundred Orthodox schools in the region since its foundation in 1872. Sergei Stepashin, former head of the Audit Chamber of the Russian Federation, is the IOPS’s chairman, and Russia’s deputy foreign minister Mikhail Bogdanov is a member. During the Russian operation in Syria, Bogdanov, as a special presidential representative for the Middle East, tried to establish a dialogue between Assad and the moderate opposition. Another prominent IOPS member is Oleg Ozerov, deputy director of the Africa Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, former ambassador to Saudi Arabia and former permanent representative to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
The Association of Orthodox Families of Beirut also lobbies for Russian interests in Lebanon and maintains close links with the IOPS. The Lebanese Sursock family is one of its most influential and cooperated with the Russian consulate general in Beirut as early as the nineteenth century.[4] Robert Sursock, one of the family’s current representatives, served as chairman and chief executive officer of Gazprombank Invest Mena from 2009 to 2015.[5]
Lebanon is the only Arab country other than Syria where pro-Soviet leaders maintained power from the 1970s through the present. Nearly all of Lebanon’s most powerful elites, both pro- and anti-Russia, remained in place after the “Beirut Spring” in 2005. The Hariri, Aoun, and Jumblatt families are hardly Russian assets, but they still play major roles, and the Kremlin uses this to its benefit.
Leading Lebanese politicians have long sent lobbyists to Moscow who have strong ties with Russian big businesses established over the past quarter century. Notable among these are George Sha’ban, who has represented the Hariri family’s business, Saudi Oger Ltd., in Russia for a long time and has helped Russian oil monopolies break into the Saudi market, and Amal Abu Zeid, President Aoun’s representative to the highest rungs of the Russian political and economic elite, including President Putin. Abu Zeid’s company, ADICO Investment Corporation, entered the Russian market in 2000, specializing in Russian oil enterprises in Southeast Asia, and in 2014, Abu Zeid was made advisor for Lebanese-Russian affairs in the Lebanese Foreign Ministry. He has active contacts with the Russian Orthodox Church as an influential member of the Lebanese Maronite community.[6]
Russia also influences Lebanese Christians via groups associated with European far-right parties.
Finally, since Soviet times, Moscow, has relied on Russia-educated Lebanese students, and there are some ten to twenty thousand of them now.[7] The Association of Alumni of Soviet Universities in Lebanon was established in 1970 and has since intensified its activities, comprising some four thousand members according to official Russian sources.[8] Russia experts also claim there are as many as eight thousand mixed families in Lebanon formed by marriages of Russian women to Lebanese men.[9] The Russian media often mention that former students now occupy high posts in the Lebanese economy and political system and that mixed families strengthen Russia’s ties with Lebanon.
According to Deutsche Welle journalist Benas Gerdziunas, Russia also influences the Christian community via the European Solidarity Front for Syria, which is closely associated with European far-right parties, as well as with Lebanon’s radical Levant Party that calls itself the defender of Eastern Christianity in the Arab world.[10]
Pushback inside Lebanon
However, Moscow’s growing influence worries some Lebanese politicians. That became clear in January 2019 when Lebanon’s Ministry of Energy and Water gave the Russian state-owned oil firm Rosneft permission to manage the oil products storage terminal in the city of Tripoli for twenty years. According to L’Orient Le Jour, Druze leader and Progressive Socialist Party president Walid Jumblatt tweeted that the deal was reminiscent of the colonial powers’ struggle for oil in the region a century ago. “With Rosneft in Tripoli,” he wrote, “and tomorrow in Banias and Basra, Zarif-Lavrov [the Iranian and Russian foreign ministers] will be the headline of the new Middle East between the Russians and Persians.”[11] Despite such statements, Jumblatt and his son Taymour still frequently visit Moscow and maintain close contacts with Russian officials including deputy foreign minister Bogdanov.[12]
Antioch patriarch Ignatius IV (Hazim) opposed using the Orthodox Church for political purposes before he died in 2012.[13] His successor, Patriarch John X, takes a pro-Russian stance on many key issues,[14] making Moscow’s soft penetration into Lebanon easier than it otherwise would have been.
At the same time, some Orthodox Christians in Lebanon follow the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople—with which Moscow broke off relations—rather than the Antioch Patriarch. In October 2015, forty-six prominent leaders signed a petition denouncing the Russian Orthodox Church’s characterization of Moscow’s military intervention in Syria as a “holy war.” Russia’s claim that it is “protecting Christians,” they said, is a pretext for its nationalistic and political goals.[15] They believe that Moscow is using the same ploy to seize a more active role in Lebanon. Bishop Elias Audi of Beirut told Russian ambassador Alexander Zasypkin that his congregation “never asked to be protected.”[16]
Audi and his small group of supporters is the only organized political force in Lebanon attempting to prevent Russian interference in the country. The pro-Russian lobby is much better organized and more active.
Russian Objectives and Methods
Russia has two primary goals in the Middle East: to draw as many countries as possible from the U.S. sphere of influence into its own and to achieve a privileged position, if not a monopoly, in the regional weapons market. Both of these goals include Lebanon.
Putin fosters large Russian businesses and increases their profits via the Kremlin’s foreign allies.
According to Alexander Shumilin of the Center for the Analysis of Middle East Conflicts at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy, Putin has a two-pronged approach. As the Kremlin did during the Soviet era, Putin seeks to bind client states to Moscow by providing military assistance and economic support. The upside for the Russians is that the junior ally becomes dependent on Moscow; the drawback is that it is expensive. Putin also looks to foster the interests of large Russian businesses and increase their profits via the Kremlin’s foreign allies. Each junior ally must, therefore, be financially sound. Both approaches help Moscow fill spaces neglected by Washington.[17]
The interrelationship between these methods is evolving. Putin used the Soviet playbook in Syria and rescued the Assad regime. However, near the end of the operation, tycoons linked to Putin’s close aides signed contracts for postwar reconstruction work in exchange for oil, natural gas, phosphate, and other natural resource rights.[18]
After that, Russian expansion into Lebanon significantly changed. Though initially based on the principle of “economics first, then politics,” Moscow later rushed to link Lebanon to Russia by focusing on its relationship with Hezbollah and its attempt to sell weapons to the government. This plan meant sacrificing some of the economic benefits it might have reaped had it moved more slowly.
Off and On Military Assistance
The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were restructured in 2005-06, after the assassination of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri and the subsequent withdrawal of Syrian forces. Most of their weaponry came from the United States, though France, Germany, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Syria, and Russia also supplied weapons until 2008. Moscow’s contribution comprised of heavy-duty mobile bridges, trucks, cranes, bulldozers, and other vehicles valued at about $30 million.
The UAE contributed most to the small Lebanese air force with nine SA 342L Gazelle combat helicopters armed with machine guns, and France supplied the helicopters with fifty HOT long-range anti-tank missiles. Washington promised sixty-six surplus M60A3 tanks transferred from Jordan (after modifying the tanks’ stabilization systems to allow them to fire while moving) and thirty-four M109 155mm turreted, self-propelled howitzers for delivery after 2009, though only 10 tanks and 12 howitzers were actually supplied.[19]
There were, however, two main problems with U.S. military assistance to Lebanon at that time: Washington’s reluctance to supply heavy weapons, and internal bureaucratic procedures that slowed the implementation of the agreements. Washington also self-imposed three constraints in order to manage the balance of power:
It would provide the LAF with sufficient firepower to counteract Hezbollah and Sunni terrorist organizations.
It would not transfer weapons that could be captured by Hezbollah.
It would not provoke any escalations at the Lebanese-Israeli border. [20]
These restrictions were clearly justified from the U.S. and Israeli perspectives but were resented by many Lebanese journalists and politicians. In December 2008, Russia made the first attempt to exploit this dissatisfaction by offering to sell T-54/T-55 tanks for roughly $500 million during defense minister Elias Murr’s visit to Moscow. As the deal went nowhere, the Kremlin offered ten MiG-29 jet fighters for free, only to be told by the Lebanese government that its army needed helicopters rather than these fighting aircraft.[21] Many experts in Russia and Arab countries claimed that U.S. and Israeli diplomats killed the deal,[22] but Moscow should have known that Lebanon would not be able to stomach a $500 million price tag.
Either way, the offer sent an important message to Lebanon: If you can afford it, we will sell you heavy weapons without conditions. In addition, Putin had already demonstrated that he did not need approval from Russia’s Federal Assembly to sign international agreements. Lebanon could purchase weapons whenever it wanted.
Moscow made another attempt in early 2010 and offered six Mi-24 helicopters, thirty T-72 heavy battle tanks, thirty 130-mm artillery systems, and a significant quantity of ammunition. On February 25, 2010, Moscow and Beirut entered a formal agreement on military-technical cooperation but nothing came of it.
Russia perceived Lebanon as an extension of the Syrian war zone.
Then, in 2013, jihadists from Syria attempted to infiltrate Lebanon. In response, Saudi Arabia pledged $4 billion in assistance, mainly to purchase French military hardware. Riyadh suspended this pledge in 2016 after the Lebanese government failed to condemn attacks on Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran.
Russia again tried to fill the void, and in summer 2016, Lebanon’s ambassador to Moscow, Shawki Bou Nassar, revealed that the two states were negotiating the purchase of a wide range of weaponry, including guns, 9M133 Kornet anti-tank guided missiles, and T-72 tanks.[23] Putin expected the negotiations to succeed and reacted harshly when Beirut failed to sign the deal, temporarily banning Lebanese officials from Russia and announcing the Kremlin’s refusal to engage Beirut with these kinds of initiatives again.[24] Nevertheless, negotiations resumed after Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri visited Moscow in September 2017 and continued throughout 2018.
During this period, new factors influenced Moscow’s Middle East policy. First, Russia’s military leaders acquired more political power during the Syrian war, and the media repeated their talking points by pushing back against the opinion that Russian troops should not respond to Israeli strikes on Hezbollah or Iranian positions in Syria.[25]
Traditionally, the Russian military stayed out of politics and refrained from announcing weapons deliveries to other countries. However, after Syria’s allegedly accidental downing of the Russian IL-20 aircraft, the Ministry of Defense blamed Israel before the foreign ministry commented. The defense ministry then announced its decision to send S-300 air defense systems to Syria, “in accordance with the President’s instruction to strengthen the safety of the Russian military in Syria.”[26] Discussion of additional ways to “punish Israel” appeared mainly in the media associated with Russian military circles.[27]
Also, U.S. military strikes in Syria further irritated Moscow. Russia perceived Lebanon as an extension of the Syrian war zone, and its ambassador to Beirut, Alexander Zasypkin, announced on al-Manar, a Lebanese satellite television station affiliated with Hezbollah, that Moscow reserved the right to shoot down U.S. missiles.[28]
Another factor influencing Moscow’s Middle East policy was its changing view of possible military action in Lebanon following President Aoun’s November 2018 request that Russia extend its S-300 air defense umbrella to Lebanon. Third, Russian news media suggested that a foothold in Lebanon could boost Moscow’s recovery and restoration efforts in Syria.[29]
While all this was happening, U.S. aid to Lebanon declined. The Trump administration recommended cutting military and security assistance by 80 percent from fiscal year 2016 to 2018.[30] Moscow responded by offering Beirut a $1 billion line of credit for weapons purchases[31] and even offered some assistance for free.[32] The draft agreement extended beyond the ordinary scope of arms agreements by including the following:
Protection of Lebanese territory by Russian air defense systems deployed in Syria.
Access to and use of Lebanese ports, particularly the port of Beirut, for entry and repair of Russian warships.
Access to and use of Lebanese airspace for passage of Russian aircraft.
Access to three military bases, one of which had been used by the U.S.-led counterterrorist coalition until 2017.[33]
The ultimate fate of this proposal remains unclear. Hariri declined it in December 2018, but said he would accept Russian donations to Lebanon’s internal security forces.[34]
In March 2019, Aoun met Putin in Moscow when, according to Russian media, they discussed arms transfers in addition to the situation in Syria. However, the official joint statement did not mention an arms deal.[35] Russian experts and Lebanese supporters of an alliance with Moscow accused Washington of pressuring the Lebanese leadership to sabotage the agreement.[36]
In Moscow’s view, Hezbollah should not be classified as a terrorist organization.
Putin may not expect his entire proposal to be accepted; one or two provisions may be enough to satisfy him. Either way, Russia is reverting to the Soviet principle of prioritizing military and strategic interests over commercial concerns.
Russia and Hezbollah
From Moscow’s point of view, the fact that Hezbollah has a so-called political wing means the entity as a whole should not be classified as a terrorist organization. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in early 2006:
The question of legalizing Hezbollah is not relevant. It is a legal, political Lebanese organization. It has representatives in parliament and the government. Hezbollah is part of the Lebanese Shiite community. It is not an imported product.[37]
Hezbollah members of parliament visited Moscow for the first time in 2011. The Russian media assumed they were probing the depth of Putin’s support for Assad.[38] The Kremlin and Hezbollah cooperated substantially in Syria throughout the Russian intervention there.
Since then, Moscow has repeatedly insisted that Hezbollah fighters withdraw to Lebanon, for several reasons. First, Russia and Iran disagree about the future of Assad’s army. Tehran wants to maintain a Shiite military bloc in Syria led by Hezbollah that would be subordinate to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Moscow would rather restore the regular Syrian army and leave no place for Hezbollah. Second, some Sunni militias have refused to make agreements with the Assad regime, despite Russian efforts, because local civilians are afraid of Hezbollah. Third, Turkey and Israel have demanded that Hezbollah withdraw. Moscow cannot ignore these demands, especially since they align with its own preferences. According to some reports, the Russian army has even tried to stop a critical source of income for Hezbollah: drug trafficking along the Lebanese-Syrian border.[39]
Hezbollah’s current posture toward Russia is ambiguous. On the one hand, it is incensed by its envisaged eviction from Syria. “The world is heading to a new achievement that Russia will cooperate with them to get Iran and Hezbollah out of Syria,” Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah complained in June 2018.[40] On the other hand, Hezbollah suffered such heavy losses that it had no choice but to reduce its presence. Despite what the party has won, it lost popularity both inside Lebanon and among other Arabs. According to retired Lebanese Brig. Gen. Hisham Jaber, some 1,500–2,000 Hezbollah fighters have been killed in Syria, and hundreds have been left with disabilities.[41]
Russian efforts in Lebanon have failed precisely because Lebanon is politically competitive.
Throughout 2018, many Russian experts blamed Beirut’s indecisiveness over an arms deal on U.S. pressure and the Lebanese government’s internal problems. Putin may have expected that the new government formed in January 2019, when a Hezbollah-led bloc emerged with a significant majority, would pursue a more pro-Russian policy. But Hezbollah’s political success alarmed the other factions with Lebanese leaders routinely criticizing each other for aligning themselves with Hezbollah and Tehran. In February 2019, the former coordinator of the March 14 General-Secretariat, ex-member of parliament Fares Soaid called for forming an “opposition front” against Prime Minister Hariri, Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil and Hezbollah. Walid Jumblatt criticized Hariri as well.[42] Bassil, too, stated,
Hizbollah must admit that had it not been for the Free Patriotic Movement, it would not have managed to persevere in the face of Israel, terrorism or the isolation attempts.[43]
Many are angry at Moscow as well. Even Jumblatt, a Kremlin ally during the Lebanese civil war, said Lavrov and his Iranian counterpart Zarif were trying to divide the Middle East as Sykes and Picot did during World War I.[44] Furthermore, in February 2019, Nasrallah began lobbying for the purchase of an air defense system from Iran instead of Russia. In this political context, Russia will have a hard time maintaining an effective lobby unless it uses economic incentives and sacrifices Russian business interests for political gain.
Putin’s Options
Putin follows the age-old adage of no permanent enemies and no permanent friends.
Russia’s primary source of political capital in the Middle East are actions taken by U.S. administrations that regional politicians interpret as weakness. In order to leverage it, however, Putin’s image as a strong and resolute leader must be consistent. He cannot abandon his goal of drawing Lebanon into his sphere of influence after expending so much effort. All of Moscow’s present clients are dictatorships, and Russian efforts in Lebanon have failed precisely because it is politically competitive.
But, Putin will press forward, and he has several options:
To re-bind Lebanon to Syria by nurturing a powerful pro-Syrian coalition in Beirut. Since the formation of the newest government, Lebanon is likely to reorganize its political blocs, and Moscow may attempt to benefit from that adjustment.
To establish Moscow as the principal mediator of Lebanese-Syrian relations while guaranteeing Lebanese sovereignty. By actively promoting the repatriation of Syrian refugees from Lebanon, Russia is improving its relations with the Lebanese military, which may lead to an opportunity to police the Lebanese-Syrian border. If it can pull off the latter, Moscow might be able to expand its mission if violence erupts in the border region.
If Russian oil and natural gas companies can obtain additional extraction rights in Lebanon, Moscow might be able to justify using private military contractors to protect them. This practice began in Ukraine in 2014, from where it spread to other parts of the world. In early 2018, for instance, over a hundred operatives of the Russian private military group Wagner were killed in combat operations near the Syrian town of Deir az-Zour. The group has been reportedly active in Libya, Sudan, and a number of Central African countries, where its personnel carry out security tasks for Gazprom, major Russian oil corporations, and companies engaged in gold and diamond exploration.[45] Such military contractors are not regulated by Russian law—meaning the Kremlin does not take responsibility for them—and they could potentially intervene in new conflicts.
Moscow’s best bet is an à la carte offer of protection under Russia’s air defense umbrella without strings attaching it to military aid. The strategy would be based on the developments in the Iran-Israel conflict. If Israel intensifies its attacks on Iranian and Hezbollah targets near its northern border, the Russian military lobby will become increasingly anti-Israel. Even if Putin does not want to aggravate relations with Israel, his desire or perceived need to appear strong would pressure him to proceed anyway.
Most Russian experts believe Hezbollah and Israel are stalemated, that neither side will seriously attack the other. But they are wrong. A heavily armed paramilitary organization with fresh combat skills, recent experience, and upgraded weaponry will not be idle for long if it is financially desperate. Hezbollah has only two options if Russia blocks it in Syria: discredit itself by inciting civil war in Lebanon or rally Arab support to its side by attacking Israel with Russian air support.
Conclusion
While Putin follows the age-old adage of no permanent enemies and no permanent friends, he exhibits no such flexibility toward the United States. He has nurtured an atmosphere of anti-American hysteria in Russia since before he even took office and has locked himself into a permanent anti-U.S. course to preserve his legitimacy. If Washington takes action against Iran, Putin will support Tehran both vis-à-vis the United States and in the Iranian-Hezbollah-Israeli conflagration that will likely erupt in such circumstances. This will make Lebanon a major battleground. It is therefore critical for Washington to ensure that any U.S.-Russian agreement on Syria would prohibit an expansion of Russia’s defense system to Lebanon. Whether or not Washington and Moscow can agree, a comprehensive U.S. policy toward Lebanon and Syria would be best. The U.S. administration should also focus on Christian communities in Lebanon to prevent them from irreversibly falling under the sway of Moscow, Hezbollah, and its Iranian patron.
Grigory Melamedov holds a doctorate from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and is a Moscow-based, independent researcher.
[1] The Times of Israel (Jerusalem), May 10, 2018.
[2] See, for example, Russkiye Vesti (Moscow), Nov. 22, 2018.
[3] Vatican News (Rome), Apr. 14, 2018.
[4] See, for example, Po Priglasheniyu IPPO Associaciya Pravoslavnyh Semey Beiruta Posetila Moskvu, The Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society website, June 23, 2014.
[5] “Robert K. Sursock, Executive Profile,” Bloomberg L.P., New York.
[6] Mohanad Hage Ali, “Our Comrades in Beirut,” Diwan, Middle East Insights from Carnegie, Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut, Apr. 25, 2018; “Russia-Saudi Arabia Relations: Facts & Details,” Sputnik News Agency (Moscow), Oct. 5, 2017; Sanaa Nehme, “Amal Abou Zeid,” My Lebanon, Moscow, Nov.15, 2017; Reda Sawaya, “Ibr al-Hudud Bayna as-Siyasa wa-l-Iqtisad,” al-Akhbar (Beirut), Apr. 22, 2015.
[7] “Chleny IPPO Prinyali Uchastiye Vo Vstreche S Livancami,” The Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, Feb. 9, 2015.
[8] “Vsemirnaya Organizaciya Vypushnikov Vysshyh Uchebnyh Zavedeniy,” Association of Alumni of Soviet Universities in Lebanon.
[9] Veniamin Popov, “Russkaya Koloniya V Livane,” Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Apr. 25, 2013.
[10] Deutsche Welle (Bonn), Aug. 5, 2018.
[11] Mohanad Hage Ali, “Le Liban, Nouveau Banc d’Essai des Ambitions Régionales Russes,” L’Orient Le Jour (Beirut), Feb. 23, 2019.
[12] Ali, “Our Comrades in Beirut”; Rosanna Sands, “Hajj Lubnani Nahwa Musku?” al-Bina (Beirut), Aug. 21, 2018.
[13] Al-Monitor (Washington, D.C.), Dec. 24, 2012.
[14] Orthodoxie.com (Paris), June 8, 2018.
[15] Ya Libnan (Beirut), Oct. 16, 2015.
[16] Deutsche Welle, May 20, 2018.
[17] Alexander Shumilin, “Rossiyskaya Diplomatiya na Blizhnem Vostoke: Vozvrat k Geopolitike,” Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Russie.Nei.Visions, May 2016, p. 8.
[18] See, for example, RBC News (Moscow), July 6, 2018.
[19] “US Military Assistance to Lebanon: Equipping LAF Not Transforming It,” Defense Magazine (Beirut), Oct. 2012; The Times of Israel, Feb. 8, 2015.
[20] Aram Nerguizian, “The Lebanese Armed Forces: Challenges and Opportunities in Post-Syria Lebanon,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., Feb. 10, 2009.
[21] See, for example, The Times (London), Dec. 18, 2008; Lenta.ru (Moscow), Mar. 1, 2010.
[22] Nour Samaha, “Is Lebanon Embracing a Larger Russian Role in Its Country?” The Century Foundation, New York, Aug. 7, 2018; Tehran Times, Apr. 10, 2011.
[23] Geopolitica.ru (Moscow), July 11, 2016.
[24] Ad-Diyar (Beirut), Dec. 12, 2017.
[25] See, for example, Riafan.ru (St. Petersburg), Federal News Agency, Sept. 22, 2017.
[26] TV Rossiya-24 (Moscow), Sept. 24, 2018.
[27] See, for example, Pravda (Moscow), Sept. 18, 2018.
[28] RIA Novosti, Apr. 11, 2018.
[29] See, for example, Gaseta.ru (Moscow), Apr. 24, 2017.
[30] Hardin Lang and Alia Awadallah, “Playing the Long Game: U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance for Lebanon,” Center for American Progress, Washington, D.C., Aug. 30, 2017.
[31] The Arab Weekly (London), Mar. 18, 2018.
[32] Naharnet (Beirut), Mar. 17, 2018.
[33] Alexander Kuznetsov, “O Vozmozhnom Voyennom Sotrudnichestve Mezhdu Rossiyey I Livanon,” The Institute of the Middle East, Moscow, Apr. 13, 2018.
[34] See, for example, al-Akhbar, Nov. 27, 2018.
[35] Joint statement between Michel Aoun, Lebanese president, and Vladimir Putin, Russian president, Presidential Press Office, Kremlin, Moscow, Mar. 26, 2019.
[36] See, for example, Alexander Kuznetsov, “Situatsiya v Livane,” The Institute of the Middle East, Moscow, Apr. 7, 2019.
[37] Sergey Lavrov, Russian minister of Foreign Affairs, interview, “‘Hezbollah’ Ne Importny Product,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Moscow, Sept. 6, 2006.
[38] Anna Borshchevskaya, “Russia in the Middle East: Motives, Consequences, Prospects,” Policy Focus 142, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., Feb. 2016, p. 28.
[39] See, for example, Novaya Gazeta (Moscow), July 22, 2018.
[40] Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, speech, reprinted in Alahed News (Beirut), June 8, 2018.
[41] See, for example, Asharq al-Awsat (London), Jan. 12, 2019.
[42] Naharnet, Feb. 5, 2019.
[43] Ibid., Feb. 5, 2019.
[44] Muhannad al-Haj Ali, “Az-Zuhaf ar-Rusi ila Lubnan,” al-Modon (Beirut), Jan. 28, 2019.
[45] See for example, The Moscow Times, Nov. 12, 2014; Grzegorz Kuczyński, “Putin’s Invisible Army,” The Warsaw Institute Foundation, Mar. 30, 2018; Arti Gercek news agency (Köln, Ger.), July 11, 2018; Novaya Gazeta, Jan. 23, 2019.

A Duel on a Sinking Ship
Ghassan Charbel/Asharq Al-Awsat/December 09/2019
Foreign observers find it difficult to understand the developments of the Lebanese situation and its sudden turns. This is not surprising. Lebanon is not a normal democracy, to which the known rules of such system apply. Lebanon’s democracy is bizzare. It resembles nothing but itself. A fragile democracy that is constantly on the brink of collapse and only escapes with treatments that today are no longer available.The Lebanese find it difficult to explain to non-Lebanese what is going on in the Land of Cedars. The game there is not governed by the accepted rules regarding elections, majority, and minority.
It is not enough to reflect on the provisions of the constitution to understand the story. It is true there is a constitution that is supposed to regulate the life of this republic that is heading towards bankruptcy. But the constitution alone is not enough.
There are turns, circumventions, and ambiguities, as well as the ingenuity of the designers of derogatory constitutional models, who have imaginations that exceed the skillful minds of the most famous fashion designers such as Elie Saab, Zuhair Murad, and others.
Unfortunately, the constitution is not the referee, nor has it the last say. In difficult seasons, it becomes the victim, not the guardian. Disregarding the constitution has become entrenched, as has the habit of disregarding the citizens.
Lebanese political games seemed amusing and cute on normal days. But they are painful and provocative in a country that sends out distress calls, such as drifting ships at sea… A country, in which words such as collapse and bankruptcy are in all conversations… A country, where a citizen commits suicide for not being able to secure half a dollar for his daughter or sets himself on fire for his inability to provide bread or to pay school fees for his children.
I don’t want to be too pessimistic and say that a beautiful Lebanon is just a lie that was invented by the Rahbanis and promoted by the scattered gold from the voice of Fairouz. I was willing to write about another topic. But what happened yesterday provoked me.
The prevailing impression was that the binding parliamentary consultations, which President Michel Aoun was scheduled to conduct after a long wait and stalling, would result in the nomination of businessman Samir al-Khatib. The latter was expected to form the government that would face the most difficult task in Lebanon’s independent history, especially since the economic collapse is no longer an imminent threat, but rather a reality.
According to rumors, the choice of Khatib would have freed the government from the burden of some ministers, who went too far in poisoning the Lebanese water of coexistence. Suddenly, Khatib, following a visit to Grand Mufti Abdullatif Derian, announced his withdrawal from the race, saying that the Sunni community was unanimous in supporting Saad Hariri as prime minister. Hariri had previously announced that he was not interested in forming the new government, after the other team insisted on a techno-political cabinet. He argued that only a technocrat government could help resolve the economic and financial collapse and address the international community.
With the postponement of binding parliamentary consultations, it seemed clear that it was difficult to overcome what became known as the “Hariri node”. This node started since his father’s entry in the club of prime ministers in 1992 with an exceptional aura and as a striking force based on an arsenal of Arab and international relations, in addition to his financial capabilities.Hariri succeeded in becoming the axis around which the regime revolved, despite the Syrian tutelage in Lebanon. The search for the president of the republic began on the basis of who can control and obstruct Hariri, after it became difficult to continue without him. Despite the differences, the experience was repeated with Saad Hariri, who suddenly emerged in the Lebanese arena, carrying the coffin of his father, whose assassination in 2005 constituted a turning point in the turbulent life of the Republic and put it on the path of decline.
The “Hariri node” was present in the elections and the formation of governments. His presence was imperative and his opponents had no option but to accept him, seek to obstruct him, and set ambushes to topple him whenever the opportunity aroused.
The Hariri government was brought down at the hands of Aoun and his allies. But the man returned to the Serail because he was the strongest in his sect and because he kept most of the arsenal of international relations that his father engineered and excelled in maintaining.
When the Hariri sect insists today on his appointment as prime minister, it acts in the same way as Michel Aoun’s allies, when they kept postponing the presidential elections to ensure his arrival as the figure who represents the most the Maronite community, and after the country suffered for years from what was known as the “Aoun node”.
A third node in the current system is that of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. The State is unable to have a say on major issues without his approval. The past years have consolidated a dangerous norm. The strongest man in a sect or confession cannot be trespassed. This norm has distorted the Lebanese system, even if it was not translated in constitutional texts. There are those who are demanding the return of Hariri because he is the best able to address the Arab and international community, perhaps because he could save the Lebanese sinking ship. Others are calling for his return to be a partner in bearing the consequences of the collapse, as hopes for survival are diminishing. The dance of alliances and bickering between the Lebanese islands was taking place in a country that had long succeeded in postponing the hour of truth. But today, it is taking place in a country that witnesses the largest protest movement in its history amid rising poverty, unemployment, and bankruptcy. Politicians went too far in the game of coalitions and wrangling, and they did not stop at the signs of internal deterioration, nor at the US-Iranian tension line.
Lebanon is a difficult story that transcends its men. It is a magnificent Rahbani lie, where the resounding voice of Fairouz rises above tremendous destruction.