Can the EU-Turkey refugee deal achieve its objectives?
Raed Omari/Al Arabiya/March 21/16
There is no doubt that the agreement reached between the European Union (EU) and Turkey, to deal with the influx of Syrian refugees, has political dimensions. The deal is also inseparable from Ankara’s quest for a full-fledged membership of the EU and its troubled relationship with the 28-member union. In fact, such is the “unsaid” backdrop of the agreement that the two sides couldn’t mention or even drop a hint. The two sides, especially the Europeans, have maintained that the deal’s sole objective is stopping refugees from making the dangerous journey across the Aegean Sea to Greece. This has become exceedingly important with around 1000 to 2000 people reaching the shores of economically-troubled Greece and then not being able to travel north as a result of border closures. For the Europeans, the deal is part of the efforts to come to grips with the migration challenge, which is turning into a major humanitarian catastrophe. So from this point of view it is all about humanitarian efforts. Yet, at the heart of this endeavor, it could all be about controlling the flow of human population. It may not be right to label the EU and Turkey as “human traffickers”, which they indeed are not, yet too much politics infused in it making this deal a lot less humanitarian. The deal is part of the joint action plan the EU and Turkey agreed on last year.
Ankara’s burden
It was also announced that the plan is aimed at alleviating Ankara’s burden. Under this plan, the EU had pledged €3 billion to help feed and shelter the almost three million Syrian refugees stranded in Turkey. In return, Turkey vowed to curb the smuggling of refugees to Europe through its shores and land routes.
The deal, which, in practice, aims to keep refugees outside Europe, is in a way the EU leaders’ acknowledgment of Ankara’s exploitation of the issue to press for more gains from the union. As this money hasn’t yet been paid to Turkey, waves of refugees continue to arrive at Europe’s shores, which probably pushed the EU to sign the deal with Ankara. This is what raises the question whether this is about controlling the flow of refugees across borders without any real humanitarian concerns. The deal, which, in practice, aims to keep refugees outside Europe, is in a way the EU leaders’ acknowledgment of Ankara’s exploitation of the issue to press for more gains from the union.
Smugglers’ boats
The Turks’ exploitation of the refugee crisis is not that difficult to pinpoint anyway. Having lived in Jordan and seeing how the movement of Syrian refugees is regulated (here I don’t mean crackdown), I wonder how thousands of Syrians move from the eastern side of Turkey to its west and from there to Greece via smugglers’ boats with the Turkish authorities either not doing anything or being completely unaware. In sending refugees back to Turkey or refusing to accept more, the EU is not violating the international law. For them, these are not refugees fleeing war zones – as they have already done so after moving out of Syria. They view these people as fleeing the security and relative comfort of internationally supported refugee camps in Turkey. Yet, human rights groups believe, refugee crisis has been mishandled by Europeans even though they always present themselves as “defenders of human rights.”
Amnesty International recently accused the EU of escaping its responsibilities toward people fleeing warzone by relying on Turkey to monitor European borders. It said that it has recorded unlawful detentions and forced returns of refugees to Turkey and from there to Syria. “Using Turkey as a ‘safe third country’ is absurd,” said Amnesty’s Deputy Director for Europe and Central Asia, Gauri van Gulik, adding, “Europe has an absolute duty to protect refugees.”Moreover, if humanity and ending the misery of refugees is the basis of the EU-Turkey refugee deal, then how is it that hundreds and thousands of refugees are relocated from a secure continent such as Europe to a less rich and security-challenged Turkey. Although the number of refugees in the EU countries is relatively large but they can still be absorbed in the continent if the religious and cultural considerations are kept aside.
Strategic constants behind the Russian withdrawal
Raghida Dergham/Al Arabiya/March 21/16
The strategic constants in the wake of Russia’s military redeployment out of Syria include the following:
First, the continuation of the US-Russian partnership in the Syrian arena, and its expansion into Yemen and Iraq where the remaining time Barack Obama has in the White House will be used to consolidate achievements in bilateral relations.
Second, the regime in Syria has been given a new lease on life, though through state institutions rather than by clinging to certain individuals in their posts, while opening the door to radical changes in the equation of power. For example, the army command, rather than the presidency, could be given to an Alawite.
Third, maintaining a long-term strategic relationship with Iran, but with the expansion of the policies of rapprochement with the Arab Gulf countries, Egypt, and Algeria to ensure balance in Russian relations with Sunni Arabs, so that Moscow does not appear like an exclusive ally to the Shiites in Iran.
Fourthly, making way for Sunni forces to intervene on the ground in the war against ISIS and similar terrorist groups, as the boots on the ground in the international anti-ISIS alliance, which could be developed to become under joint US-Russian leadership in the region, including in Syria.
Fifthly, fortifying the Russian interior and Russia’s neighbors against any possible retaliatory attacks resulting from Moscow’s continued spearheading of the war on Sunni extremism in alliance with Tehran-backed Shiite militias – which explains the Russian decision to avoid becoming further implicated in the Syrian quagmire.
Sixthly, strengthening Russia’s position in the global scene as an essential power in decision-making. Moscow will not accept to be bypassed anymore.
Seventhly, containing economic repercussions on Russia if it continues its comprehensive intervention in Syria without an exit strategy, bearing in mind that the value of the ruble has been declining in a way that hurt the economy and that oil and gas prices have been falling drastically.
Eighthly, taking advantage of available opportunities through reconciliations and settlements, in order to secure investments, open markets, and sell arms to the Gulf states.
And ninthly, Russia gains a foothold in the Middle East in Syria’s strategic bases, which will also be a foothold near the shores of Europe and NATO.
Talking federalism
President Putin’s decision reconfigured his intervention in Syria through a gradual and partial withdrawal of his forces there, amid negotiations, escalation, and talk of federalism in Syria. The decision came as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced Moscow had evidence of Turkish military presence inside Syria, and as Moscow was warning Ankara should it continue to transport arms into Syria.
It also came in the wake of a visit by the Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to Tehran and his meeting with President Hassan Rowhani amid talk of Iranian mediation between Russia and Turkey in exchange for Turkish mediation to improve Saudi-Iranian relations.
Putin’s announcement of his strategy of the Middle East coincided with increasing US-Russian coordination in Yemeni affairs, with indications they both agree to the priority of protecting Saudi national security along the Saudi-Yemeni border with mutual guarantees, including their influence on Tehran to prevent it from sending advisors and militias to Yemen as it had done in Syria.
Russian diplomacy is keen for the upcoming visit by Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz to Moscow to succeed, and become the key to better relations with Riyadh and other capitals of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Russia wants to build on what was achieved during the recent visit by the emir of Qatar to Russia, which also tackled the future of gas, Russia, Qatar, and Iran being the world’s top exporters.
The visit also tackled the Turkish-Qatari traditional support for the Muslim Brotherhood as opposed to Moscow’s utter hostility to this group’s rise to power in any Arab or Muslim country, most importantly Syria. Russian diplomacy has made it clear to Gulf diplomacy that it is prepared to turn the page on the hostility towards its previous policy in Syria, in return for active cooperation in crushing terror group and preventing the rise of fundamentalist groups to power.
The statement by veteran diplomat Sergei Lavrov praising Saudi efforts in facilitating the formation of a serious opposition grouping is but one example of the kind of developments that have taken place in Russian thinking and policy.
What matters to Putin is what US policy toward him will be like after Obama leaves and how his relations with Europe would evolve in light of the sanctions imposed on Russia over its meddling in Ukraine
Not long ago, Russian diplomacy was criticizing Saudi diplomacy for pushing the parties of the Syrian opposition to create the High Negotiations Commission (HNC), as tasked by the Vienna process to settle the Syrian conflict. Moscow was trying to force Syrian oppositionists into the list agreed upon in Riyadh, and was escalating on issues like defining who is an oppositionist and who is a terrorist in Syria.
Suddenly, Lavrov praised Saudi efforts after the opposition delegation arrived in Geneva to handle negotiations brokered by UN envoy Staffan de Mistura with the regime – though Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem said talking about the future of Assad was a red line and the head of the regime delegation Bashar al-Jaafari said Damascus rejects any discussion of a “transitional phase.”
These statements were tantamount to an obituary for the Vienna process, which is considered the legitimate offspring of Russian diplomacy. This was preceded by positions made by Damascus that annoyed Moscow, which saw them as undermining the credibility of Russian policy: Russia failed to stop barrel bombs, and was surprised by Damascus’s announcement it would hold parliamentary elections that conflict with the timetable of the Vienna process, which requires elections to be held within 18 months after a new constitution is drafted and a political transition is negotiated.
Exit strategy
All this obstruction coming from Damascus sought to prolong Russia’s military intervention until Bashar al-Assad’s agenda is implemented. But Vladimir Putin did not want to play that game. The Russian president has indeed rescued Assad by intervening in Syria more than six months ago. However, Putin did not want to be involved militarily in Syria for more than four months. His intervention was coupled with an exit strategy, and he did not want to slip into a quagmire in Syria that the West perhaps wished him to fall into, as he believes. Second, the mainstay of Russian military intervention in Syria are the strategic interests there represented in military bases and state institutions led by the army, and not keeping one man in power.
This does not mean, however, that Putin is prepared to abandon Assad or turn the table against him. In reality, Assad remains important in Putin’s calculations. Realism suggests that Putin’s US-style pragmatism makes him willing to abandon Assad in his long-term strategy, if needed. True, Putin is keen on having a reputation of loyalty to his allies against the opposite reputation the US has, but the man fully understands the language of interests and deals.
And because Putin’s legacy in the countries where he intervened militarily is a legacy of partition, some fear this would be his legacy in Syria. However, geopolitical reality could prevent partition in Syria in the full sense. Rather, the federal model could be pursued, a model adopted by the US, Russia, and Switzerland albeit in different modes of implementation.
What matters to Putin is what US policy toward him will be like after Barack Obama leaves the White House, and how his relations with Europe would evolve in light of the sanctions imposed on Russia over its meddling in Ukraine. Putin is also concerned about what it is going to take to save the Russian economy, which has paid a high price for Putin’s military and diplomatic adventures. Other questions include how terrorist Islamic groups can be defeated, and how he would benefit from his strategic foothold in Syria, with implications for both the Middle Est and NATO.
Vladimir Putin is a practical man. He is relying on Donald Trump because he is an arbitrary man to the point of farce. However, Putin realizes the dangers of arbitrary thinking, and he does not trust the US establishment whether it endorses this candidate or fights that candidate. True, Trump appears as if he is an anti-establishment candidate, but he could also be the product of the establishment for a specific purpose.
Most probably, Hillary Clinton will become the next US president with support from the establishment. Putin is concerned about what Hillary, a veteran politician, may be carrying to the White House. Especially so when Hillary probably remembers how she was tricked by Lavrov, who upended the Geneva Communique, before Lavrov made sure to facilitate success for her successor Kerry, making her appear as a failure.
Regardless of the history of US-Russian relations at the start of Barack Obama’s term, the current partnership between Russia and the US on Syria and Iran is crucial. It is a radical change in the relationship between the two countries, and in their respective relationship with key players in the Middle East region.
It is clear that Barack Obama has had tense relations with Arab countries, from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, and that he has prioritized the relationship with the Iran yet without daring to have this be at the expense of the Israeli ally. Obama started out his term by endorsing the Turkish model for changing Arab regimes, supporting the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen. He waged warfare through drones, which destroy others without returning coffins to the US carrying the bodies of American soldiers.
He withdrew America from others’ wars. He paved the way for Russia, Iran, and militias – as well as terrorists from all around the world – to join the battles but far away from American cities. He fought all these wars with others’ men and materiel, fulfilling the American desire to do so and helping the US economy recover through military industries and arms exports.
Barack Obama showed Putin an America that is old and infirm, unable and unwilling to be the world’s leader, and suggesting to Putin that there is a vacuum for him to fill. Putin pounced on the opportunity. However, it is now time now for Putin to curb Russia’s dash, because the fine print in the US invitation to Russia contains a plot to implicate it in a quagmire that reverses Russian gains made under Obama. This is why Russia has made its recent move.
The Russian rectification would be beneficial if other parties involved in the Syrian war learn from it, especially Hezbollah. Iran is aware of the meanings and implications of Russian strategic decisions, and is in turn engaged in developing strategies for exit and for remaining.
The player outside these calculations is Hezbollah, which is not yet aware of the implications of its involvement in Syria and Yemen while others are taking steps back. Perhaps the best thing Hezbollah can do for itself and Lebanon is to develop an exit strategy from Syria. An exit strategy is not foolish; it is greatly prudent.
