Saudis increasingly frustrated with Lebanon
Ibrahim al-Hatlani/Al-Monitor/February 29/16
Saudi Arabia is not happy with Lebanon or its failure to control the Islamist militant group Hezbollah, and it’s making its displeasure clear. What’s not known is what it will take to appease Riyadh. The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Feb. 23 asked its citizens not to travel to Lebanon, for their own safety. It has also asked citizens residing in or visiting Lebanon to leave, unless they absolutely have to stay. This stance pe rsists despite attempts by the Lebanese government and others to convince Riyadh to reconsider its Feb. 19 decision to cancel $4 billion in military aid to Lebanon. Riyadh said it is protesting Lebanese Foreign Minister of Affairs Gebran Bassil’s stance during a Jan. 10 ministerial meeting of the Arab League. Bassil refrained from condemning the recent attack on the Saudi Arabian embassy and its consulate in Iran. Lebanon has a long-standing policy of distancing itself from external conflicts.
Saudi Arabia’s actions come against a Lebanese government that has been politically hijacked by Hezbollah, according to Hezbollah’s opponents in Lebanon and abroad. Also, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has been escalating his media attacks on Saudi Arabia.
Adding to the hostility, Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi declared Feb. 16 that Hezbollah members have been directly implicated in supporting Houthis in their war against the Saudi-backed legitimate Yemeni government. On Feb. 24, the military adviser to Saudi Defense Minister Ahmad Assiri said, “We have intelligence information and recordings about the involvement of Hezbollah’s militia in supporting Houthis.” That same day, Saudi media published a video that seems to have been taped between June and July. The Yemeni army said it had found the video in an area where the Houthi militia had been. The video reportedly showed a Lebanese recruiter from Hezbollah talking to Houthi soldiers about carrying out suicide attacks in Saudi Arabia. “Hezbollah is a threat to all Arab states, especially the Gulf,” a source from the Gulf Cooperation Council told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity. “We have all suffered from Hezbollah’s terrorism and Iran’s use of it,” he continued. “The security services have succeeded in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE [United Arab Emirates] in controlling several security and financial operations of Hezbollah during the past three years, and we are in solidarity with Saudi Arabia.
“There must be a radical change in the balance of power in Lebanon, either through the emergence of a party with equal strength to Hezbollah or through weakening Hezbollah to become equal to other Lebanese parties.”
Hezbollah anticipated the Gulf’s angry measures and sent a security delegation to Cairo. The delegation met with Egyptian officials, reportedly admitted Hezbollah’s role in Yemen and asked Cairo to intercede.But Saudi Arabia is not expected to accept any mediation in this issue, especially from Cairo, which hosted the Houthis in July and permitted them to stage seminars during which they criticized Saudi Arabia.
The Saudi retaliation against Lebanon surprised many observers there and abroad. It is part of a series of security measures that Riyadh has taken against figures or parties operating directly or indirectly in Saudi Arabia in favor of Iran or Hezbollah. These measures include Saudi trials in May that restricted bank accounts, investments and real estate assets of 44 Lebanese people affiliated with Hezbollah in Saudi Arabia. Saudi authorities also pursued several Shiite clerics in the eastern provinces of Qatif and Ihsaa who collect money from their Shiite citizens and send it to their religious authorities in Tehran. Some clerics were arrested on the grounds of money laundering, like Sheikh Khaled Seif, who was tried in October and sentenced to five years in jail.
The kingdom’s ruling parties are convinced Hezbollah is working with Iran to penetrate the Gulf and foil or paralyze Saudi Arabia’s plans to lead the region on both military and security levels. Those plans began when King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud became ruler, and grew as his ambitious son Mohammad Bin Salman launched Operation Decisive Storm in March. The plans continued with the kingdom’s success in forming an Arab alliance to face Houthis in Yemen and were bolstered in December when it formed a 34-country Muslim military alliance to fight terrorism.
Saudi Ambassador to Beirut Awad Assiri launched an open-arms policy in April 2013, but Riyadh has failed to contain Hezbollah behind diplomatic doors. Now it seems Riyadh will not stop at diplomatic and economic displays of anger. It’s not looking for a middle ground with the Lebanese government, which is unable to control Hezbollah locally and abroad.
Why is Saudi Arabia angry at Lebanon
Hussain Abdul-Hussain/Now Lebanon/February 29/16
Lebanon is inching closer toward becoming a failing state. Services are mediocre, the infrastructure crumbling, garbage piling up and the economy contracting. Now Beirut has added yet another failure to its list: Amateurish diplomacy that is turning whoever is left of Lebanon’s friends into enemies. Lebanon’s deteriorating relationship with Saudi Arabia is a case in point. But before we understand the reasons behind Beirut’s crumbling relations with Riyadh, a quick history is in order. During the civil war, the Lebanese state managed to maintain some neutrality and decency. In the thick of war, Beirut deployed skilled Foreign Ministers like Fouad Boutros and savvy diplomats like Ghassan Tueni. But when the war ended in 1991, warlords and their militias took over the state and infested its bureaucracy. Suddenly, the nation’s foreign ministry turned from the voice of a weak, yet credible, government into one of the spoils rewarded to Lebanon’s new and incompetent leaders.
During the 1990s, late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri — a leader with unparalleled skills — covered up for the failure of Lebanese diplomacy. During all-out wars with Israel, like in 1996, Hariri shuttled between foreign capitals and invaded international broadcasts making the case for Lebanon.
At the Arab Summit in Beirut in 2002, when Syrian President Bashar al-Assad instructed his Lebanese counterpart Emile Lahoud to censor late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat’s live video address from his siege in Ramallah, it was Hariri who roamed the corridors at Phoenicia Hotel and brought back the Palestinian delegation, thus saving face for Beirut and its summit. But after Hariri, the inadequacy of Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry became evident, especially after the takeover by Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, an engineer by training. Those who think career diplomats can make up for Bassil’s inexperience, keep in mind that — like in the rest of the Lebanese bureaucracy — sectarian quota and appointment by political intercession trumps qualification.
Bassil’s shortcomings at Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry — like in his role at the Ministery of Electricity — have been evident for a long time. Bassil abused state resources by treating himself to a summer trip to Brazil to watch the 2014 World Cup games, justifying his trip by saying that its goal was to connect with the Lebanese Diaspora (even though emigrants usually visit Lebanon in the summer). The Lebanese also watched another one of Bassil’s scandals, on video, when he looked as if he was offering the sexual services of one of Lebanon’s senior female diplomats in New York to the Foreign Minister of the UAE.
Bassil’s blunders at the Foreign Ministry and his amateurism eventually caught up with him at the Arab League’s meeting that was convened, in January, to condemn Iranian attacks on the Saudi embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Meshhad. Had Bassil had the slightest of diplomatic wit, he would have noticed that Iran’s three most ardent Arab allies — Iraq, Oman and Algeria — voted for the resolution. Algeria, which noted its reservation on commending the Saudi severing of ties with Iran, still voted for the resolution. Bassil did not.
Even Iranian President Hassan Rouhani denounced the attacks and said that his government had opened an investigation to punish the perpetrators. So here you have it: Lebanon’s talentless Foreign Minister Bassil, who won his position thanks to his familial connections, has taken down the last shred of respectability that the Lebanese state once enjoyed. Perhaps Bassil thought that Arab League meeting was one of Lebanon’s irrelevant cabinet meetings. Perhaps he thought he could erase his mistake by having his and Hezbollah’s media tweaking the story, just like they did with the UN Tribunal, among other false propaganda stunts. Unfortunately, the only thing worse than Bassil’s blunder at the Arab League was the Lebanese failure to understand the mistake and rectify it. Lebanon’s enemies of Saudi Arabia started questioning its angry position. Lebanon’s friends of Saudi Arabia launched a campaign against Iran and Hezbollah. A better response might be to review the bylaws of the Arab League and see whether Beirut can recast Lebanon’s vote. Symbolic as it may be, recasting the vote might tell Riyadh that Beirut understands that Lebanese-Saudi relations cannot be run by amateurs like Bassil, for if Saudi Arabia believes that the Lebanese government is in the image of Bassil, the kingdom will certainly continue distancing itself away from Lebanon, for the first time since the inception of both countries.
Recasting Lebanon’s vote at the Arab League might help rekindle the crumbling Lebanese-Saudi friendship, which if it ever collapses, will cost the Lebanese dearly.
**Hussain Abdul-Hussain is the Washington Bureau Chief of Kuwaiti newspaper Alrai. He tweet @hahussain.
