Oman, stuck between Saudi Arabia and Iran
Giorgio Cafiero/Al-Monitor/January 10/16
SALALAH, Oman — The Sultanate of Oman has always been the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member on best terms with Iran. Muscat’s alliance with Tehran must be understood within the context of Oman’s independent approach to foreign affairs under Sultan Qaboos’ leadership.
Since seizing power in 1970, Qaboos has wisely and strategically balanced the conflicting interests of Oman’s larger and more powerful neighbors against one another without making enemies. A key pillar of Oman’s foreign policy has been to maintain alliances with both Riyadh and Tehran, rather than siding with Saudi Arabia to counter the Islamic Republic.
The Middle East’s escalating geopolitical crisis of early 2016 — stemming from Saudi Arabia’s execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr on Jan. 2, followed by Iran’s livid response — is testing Oman’s ability to maintain such strategic neutrality at a time when Riyadh is determined to unite its allies against Tehran.
At this pivotal juncture in Middle Eastern history, during which sectarian tensions have reached their highest level since the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), there is no indication that Oman is on the verge of abandoning this conciliatory approach. On the contrary, Omani officials have responded to the escalation of Saudi Arabia and Iran’s geopolitical rivalry in their traditionally calm manner.
Omani leaders did indeed condemn the violent attacks on Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic presence in two Iranian cities following Nimr’s execution, calling the actions “unacceptable.” However, unlike the other GCC members, Muscat did not sever and/or downgrade diplomatic relations with Tehran. In fact, Oman’s foreign minister, Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah, and Oman’s ambassador to Iran, Saud bin Ahmad al-Barwani, traveled to Tehran to meet with Iranian officials and to discuss the crisis.
From Muscat’s vantage point, this escalation of geopolitical tension and sectarian strife is unfortunate, and may severely undermine Oman’s own national interests across the region. Last year, Muscat spent considerable effort advancing dialogues between Syria and Yemen’s warring factions. Yet, now that Saudi Arabia and nine of its allies and partners (Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates) have severed and/or downgraded diplomatic ties with Iran — with leaders in Egypt and Turkey expressing pro-Saudi positions — such a diplomatic crisis truly jeopardizes fragile peace initiatives in Syria and Yemen.
Omani national interests
Oman shares ownership of the strategically prized Strait of Hormuz with Iran, and therefore has its own deep national interests at heart in cooling tensions between fellow GCC members and the Islamic Republic. The issue of the sultanate’s long-term energy demands is at the fore. Although the project has not moved as quickly as Muscat would have preferred, Oman and Iran are in the process of developing an underwater natural gas pipeline between the two nations. Oman, which is less oil rich than other GCC members and faces grave economic problems as a result of low oil prices, views the importation of Iranian natural gas as a critical geopolitical and economic objective. Surely Muscat will be careful to avoid moves that could compromise this growing energy relationship with Iran, which, by extension, opens up Oman to the gas-rich nations of Central Asia.
Not lost in the equation is sectarianism. Oman, with an Ibadi majority, views the escalation of sectarian strife between the Middle East’s Shiite and Sunni Muslims as a tragedy for the greater Islamic world. Rather than joining Saudi Arabia in arming Sunni fundamentalists across the region to counter Iran’s extended influence, Oman has avoided taking sides in such conflicts, valuing instead a peaceful resolution. Oman has leveraged its neutrality to develop trustworthy relationships with all sides in the Syrian and Yemeni crises, enabling the sultanate to serve as a legitimate and impartial mediator in ways that no other GCC member could.
Oman: Iran’s only loyal friend in the GCC
Historical bonds between Iran and Oman (made especially strong by the shah’s deployment of forces to the Dhofar governorate to help the sultanate crush a foreign-backed Marxist insurgency in the 1970s) shape Muscat’s unique understanding of Iran and its role in the Gulf’s geopolitical order. Oman does not view Iran as a Persian empire, a monarchy or as an Islamic republic, but rather as a neighbor that will always exist regardless of whichever political structure holds power.
That said, no two states have all interests in common, and Oman and Iran’s relationship is not entirely free of issues. Ever since the Iranian revolution, officials in Muscat and Iran have had fundamentally different outlooks on the American military role in the Gulf. Oman, a close ally of the West, has always relied on the world’s strongest naval power of the day — once Britain, now the United States — to safeguard its national security. Since 1979, however, Iran’s leadership has viewed the US military’s presence in the Middle East as a root cause of insecurity and instability.
Despite Muscat and Tehran’s conflicting understandings of America’s military presence in the region, Omani officials have always believed that it is best to address problems in Arab-Iranian relations using dialogue, not belligerency. Undoubtedly, the severing and/or downgrading of relations between 10 Sunni African and Arab governments in the region and Iran mark a setback to Muscat’s efforts to advance such a meaningful dialogue.
The unfortunate events that heralded in the new year underscore how Oman is truly the GCC’s outlier. In breaking with the Saudi-led council’s framework, Muscat did not permit Iran’s angry response to Nimr’s execution to justify cutting off diplomatic ties with Tehran.
The full implications of this dangerous escalation of tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran have yet to be realized. However, as the one GCC state that has maintained official relations at the highest level with Iran, Oman is likely Riyadh’s only ally in a strong enough position to cool Saudi Arabia and Iran’s recently exacerbated tensions through mediation. It would be wise for leaders on both sides of the Gulf to tone down their inflammatory rhetoric, to put an end to recklessly impulsive behavior and to follow Oman’s mature lead by engaging in dialogue rather than issuing threats.
The Saudi predicament
Week in Review/Al-Monitor/January 10/16
Washington Post columnist David Ignatius described Saudi Arabia on Jan. 5 as a “frightened monarchy” and warned that “countries that feel vulnerable sometimes do impulsive and counterproductive things.”The execution on Jan. 2 of Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, along with 46 others accused of extremism and terrorism, provoked a predictable wave of outrage and demonstrations among Shiite populations across the Middle East, and worsened already terrible relations between Riyadh and Tehran. Saudi Arabia could not have expected anything less. The kingdom broke ties with Iran after demonstrators ransacked the annex to the Saudi Embassy in Tehran, although, as an Iranian diplomat told Ali Hashem this week, “in practice, we had no real diplomatic relations in recent years.”
Of the 47 executed on Jan. 2, 43 were linked to al-Qaeda. The US State Department released a statement that said it was “particularly concerned that the execution of prominent [Shiite] cleric and political activist Nimr al-Nimr risks exacerbating sectarian tensions at a time when they urgently need to be reduced.” The killing of Nimr and three other Shiite citizens for inciting violence in the Saudi Eastern Province suggested that the kingdom was also “using the death penalty in the name of counter-terror to settle scores and crush dissidents,” said Philip Luther of Amnesty International, which characterized Nimr’s trial as “political and grossly unfair.”
Mohammed al-Nimr, the brother of the executed cleric, told Jean Aziz, “Sheikh Nimr’s defense lawyer, Sadeq al-Jibran, skillfully represented my brother. But, I contend that the trial was political, and its outcome was predetermined.” Mohammed al-Nimr offered his explanation for the execution, and said, “When news leaked about the death sentence, we thought that because al-Qaeda and Islamic State members were to be executed, Sheikh Nimr’s name was included to placate some members of the Sunni community and create a sort of sectarian balance. But, we later determined that the opposite was true. The whole intent was to get rid of Sheikh Nimr, with the names of terrorists added to cover that up. This was proven by the fact that 42 of the 47 people who were executed had been on death row for 10 to 13 years, while Sheikh Nimr had been convicted only a little over a year ago.”
The execution of the al-Qaeda figures carries its own risks. This column reported last week that Saudi Arabia could become the next target of the Islamic State. The executions will likely encourage IS, al-Qaeda and their fellow terrorist travelers to seek retribution and expand their operations in Saudi Arabia.
The already fragile Syrian peace process is now on life support. Again, this should have been no surprise. UN Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura met in Riyadh on Jan. 5 with Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir and Syrian opposition representatives to try to salvage the talks. While Jubeir reaffirmed Riyadh’s commitment to the Vienna process, it is almost impossible to imagine that Saudi Arabia and Iran will be burying the hatchet anytime soon to bring relief to the besieged Syrian people. The expectations for the next meeting of the International Syria Support Group on Jan. 25 in Geneva, regrettably, could not be lower.
The executions coincided with an intensification of airstrikes and fighting on the ground by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said Jan. 8 that he was “deeply concerned” about the expanded military operations, especially in residential areas, and reports of the use of cluster munitions by the Saudi-led coalition. A chamber of commerce, wedding hall and center for the blind have been the target of recent airstrikes in Yemen, according to the United Nations. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, in a letter to Ban about the “Saudi strategy to derail the nuclear agreement and maintain and even exacerbate tension in the region,” claimed that Saudi airstrikes hit Iran’s embassy in Yemen on Jan. 7. There have been 2,800 civilian deaths in Yemen so far as a result of the war.
Bruce Riedel describes Saudi Arabia as now facing “a potentially perfect storm of low oil income, open-ended war in Yemen, terrorist threats from multiple directions and an intensifying regional rivalry with its nemesis Iran.” Riedel writes that “the most dangerous threat is economic.” An International Monetary Fund report in October 2015 concluded, “While the substantial fiscal buffers meant there is no need for a knee-jerk reduction in fiscal spending, a medium-term fiscal consolidation plan needs to be established and a gradual adjustment started.” Riedel continues, “The Saudi welfare state — which provides subsidies for health and housing, cheap gasoline and free education — is already being cut back because of the large deficit between oil revenues and government spending. Last years’ deficit totaled $98 billion and foreign reserves dropped from $728 billion to less than $640 billion. With Iranian oil returning to the market, Saudi revenues could be depleted even faster than anticipated in the 2016 budget.”
This week, the kingdom announced that it is considering listing shares in Saudi Aramco, the world’s largest oil producer, which is widely viewed as a means to address the growing budget imbalance. The son of King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud, Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman — who also serves as minister of defense and head of the Council for Economic and Development Affairs — told The Economist that the kingdom is considering an ambitious economic agenda of subsidy reductions, reform and privatization. While in principle the Saudi economy could, and should, over time benefit from reducing its bloated welfare state, reform and change are not without social and political consequence, especially given the free fall in oil prices and the kingdom’s precarious security predicament.
