J. Post: Hezbollah doesn’t want another war with Israel, yet/Is Iran really leaving Syria/ Misinformation and leaks: The love-hate Russia-Iran relationship in Syria/حتى الآن حزب الله لا يريد الحرب مع إسرائيل/التسريبات والمعلومات المغلوطة وعلاقة الحب والكراهية الروسية والإيرانية في سوريا/هل حقيقة إيران بدأت بمغادرة سوريا؟
Hezbollah doesn’t want another war with Israel, yet/Anna Ahronheim/Jerusalem Post/May 08/2020 جيروسالم بوست: حتى الآن حزب الله لا يريد الحرب مع أسرائيل
Is Iran really leaving Syria?/Anna Ahronheim/Jerusalem Post/May 08/2020 جيروسالم بوست:: هل حقيقة إيران بدأت بمغادرة سوريا؟
Misinformation and leaks: The love-hate Russia-Iran relationship in Syria/Seth J. Frantzman/Jerusalem Post/May 08/2020 جيروسالم بوست: التسريبات والمعلومات المغلوطة: علاقة الحب والكراهية الروسية والإيرانية في سوريا
***** Hezbollah doesn’t want another war with Israel, yet/Anna Ahronheim/Jerusalem Post/May 08/2020 جيروسالم بوست: حتى الآن حزب الله لا يريد الحرب مع أسرائيل
Hezbollah went from a guerrilla group to a terror superpower
Twenty years after the last IDF soldier left southern Lebanon, the hostility between Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah has only intensified.
The former guerilla group has morphed into a “terror superpower,” while Israel has strengthened its military might over concerns of a future war with its archnemesis.
Though Hezbollah once spread its wings across the globe in an attempt to inflict as much damage as it could on Jews and Americans, their focus has shifted. The group turned to its neighbor, Syria, and built up local allied groups to open a new front in the south to counter Israel.
Israel has always been willing to take calculated risks when it comes to defending its security and has recently taken the approach of warning Hezbollah fighters of incoming strikes in order to avoid deteriorating into a full-scale war.
And while Israel has overall refrained from attacking the organization in Lebanon, it has carried out hundreds of strikes against Hezbollah infrastructure in neighboring Syria in an attempt to prevent it from obtaining precision missiles and other game-changing weaponry.
On Monday night, an airstrike targeted a Syrian military research complex outside the city of Aleppo. According to reports, Iranian and Syrian scientists and engineers at the facility are working on bioweapons to use against rebel groups, as well as long-range missiles able to deliver large payloads for Hezbollah deep into Israeli territory.
Senior IDF officers, as well as politicians, say that Israel’s military has the ability to end any future conflict with Hezbollah quickly and will completely destroy the group’s capabilities and infrastructure, even if that means incurring civilian casualties.
But, while Israeli jets can wreak havoc on the group far from Israel’s borders, the defense establishment knows that no war can be won without boots on the ground. The IDF hasn’t conducted a proper ground manoeuvre in enemy territory since troops entered Gaza in 2009 during Operation Cast Lead.
The Hezbollah of 2020 is not the Hezbollah of 2000, or even 2006.
On the eve of the Second Lebanon War in 2006, when the two foes fought a deadly 34-day war in which both sides lost hundreds of fighters and hundreds of civilians were killed, Hezbollah had some 15,000 rockets and missiles and fired 4,000 of them at Israel.
Over a decade later, the group has expanded its arsenal with over 130,000 rockets and missiles of all sorts of ranges and payloads. With the help of its patron Iran, the group also continues to work on its precision missile project. But despite the effort and years invested, the organization has only several dozen such missiles.
Nevertheless, security officials believe that in the next war, the terrorist group will aim to fire some 1,500-2,000 rockets per day until the last day of the conflict. With more than 40,000 fighters organized in battalions and brigades, Hezbollah fighters have gained immeasurable battlefield experience fighting in Syria.
The cross-border terror tunnels discovered and destroyed by the IDF last year are another part of the group’s attack plans. The tunnels, the largest of which the author visited, were significantly more advanced than tunnels built by terror groups in the Gaza Strip.
Hezbollah’s flagship tunnel began in the southern Lebanese village of Ramiya and stretched one kilometer before it infiltrated several dozen meters into northern Israel, close to the communities of Zarit and Shetula.
The Ramiyah tunnel, which Hezbollah had been in the process of completing, had been dug at a depth of 80 meters and had 20 stories of stairs. The tunnel, which took Hezbollah several years to dig, also contained railroads to transport equipment, garbage, and was equipped with lighting equipment, ventilation and ladders.
It was astounding and only one of six. And while the IDF says it has destroyed all cross-border tunnels, there are others which have been dug but have not yet crossed into Israeli territory.
Yet.
And with the civil war winding down, Iran and Hezbollah have been able to focus more of their energy on other targets, with Israel topping the list.
But neither side wants war. At least right now.
Indeed, Hezbollah’s leader Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah had to apologize after the end of the 2006 war for the ambush which set everything off. He has since promised the Lebanese people that he is doing all he can to prevent another war with the IDF.
Senior defense sources have said that Nasrallah is a patient, calculating and smart commander willing to take the long route.
“It’s a fact that we are harming his group. It might be under the radar and not published by the media, but he’s heard about it. But he’s done nothing to us in return,” one source told The Jerusalem Post.
Of course, Hezbollah has not been waiting around and has responded to Israeli operations which have targeted its operatives. In mid-April the group sent Israel a message by cutting several holes in the border fence after the IDF reportedly carried out a drone strike against a Jeep carrying Hezbollah operatives.
But nobody was killed in the drone strike on the Jeep, and no Hezbollah operative crossed into Israeli territory.
The message from both sides was clear.
In September, after the IDF carried out a deadly strike against Hezbollah operatives planning a drone attack against targets in northern Israel from Syria, the group fired an anti-tank missile towards an IDF ambulance driving close to the border community of Avivim.
That time Hezbollah aimed to kill IDF troops. None were killed in the attack, but it led to a spike in tensions not seen in years.
The IDF, which has focused much of its covert operations in preventing Hezbollah from acquiring game-changing weaponry, has nevertheless been deterred from striking the group on its home turf.
Israel doesn’t want a similar situation in Syria where it currently has air and intelligence superiority over its enemies. It’s better to deal with Hezbollah when it’s still small rather than when it’s strong and ready to strike.
Israel’s war-between-wars campaign against Iran and its proxies, namely Hezbollah, began close to a decade ago and has seen action on a weekly basis in recent years, with thousands of airstrikes taking out infrastructure and equipment.
And while senior Israeli defense sources recently said that Iran has reduced its forces significantly in Syria, according to a Western diplomat who visits Syria regularly and quoted by Foreign Policy, Hezbollah fighters are doubling down in the Golan Heights and plan to embed themselves as part of the Syrian Arab Army in the south of the country.
Hezbollah has always had a presence in Syria but has recently grown its influence in areas it wasn’t active in before, so that Israel will be deterred from striking these areas like it is deterred from striking the group in Lebanon. In July 2019 the IDF said that the group has begun an attempt to establish and entrench a covert force in the Syrian Golan Heights, designed to act against Israel when given the order.
Called “The Golan Project”, Israel has been blamed for several strikes targeting operatives belonging to the project.
“If no one bothers Hezbollah in the Golan then it will continue to grow and bring in more capabilities to threaten the homefront,” a senior IDF source told the Post. “It doesn’t matter if Iran is hundreds of kilometers away from Israel, if Hezbollah has local operatives on the Golan who can act against Israel.”
But “Nasrallah is walking a tightrope,” said another defense source, explaining that the group is not only feeling a squeeze on its finances due to the economic crisis in Iran, but thousands of Hezbollah fighters have been killed fighting in Syria for the Assad regime.
“What does Hezbollah want? How much power do they really have and how much face can they save in another war with Israel?” he asked.
While the Gaza Strip has for years preoccupied the IDF, with several military operations and dozens of rounds of deadly violence in the last two years alone, Israel’s northern front has once again grabbed the top spot in its list of priorities.
Because over 20 years after the last IDF officer – Benny Gantz – locked the gates with Lebanon, Hezbollah has turned into the military’s greatest foe.
Is Iran really leaving Syria?/Anna Ahronheim/Jerusalem Post/May 08/2020 جيروسالم بوست:: هل حقيقة إيران بدأت بمغادرة سوريا؟
Is it really because of Israeli airstrikes or is it more complicated?
Earlier this week senior defense officials in Israel announced that after years of Israel’s war-between-war campaign to drive Iran out of Syria, the Islamic Republic was finally withdrawing from the war-torn country.
The news came just hours after an airstrike blamed on Israel targeted a research facility in Aleppo in Syria’s north.
But the announcement also came as Iran is still regrouping from the targeted killing of Quds force commander Qasem Soleimani in January and as it continues to deal with the ongoing coronavirus pandemic and a disastrous economic crisis hitting the country,
Israel’s war-between-war campaign, known in Hebrew as MABAM, has been going for close to 10 years but has increased its pace over the past three years with thousands of strikes targeting Iranian and militia infrastructure in Syria.
Almost on a weekly occurrence foreign publications are reporting airstrikes- from the Golan Heights on Israel’s northern border to deep inside Syrian territory like Al Bukamal on the Iraqi border to Aleppo in the country’s north on Monday night.
The increase of tempo of strikes as well as the distance of the location of the strikes, deep inside Syria, a senior defense official said, are what is pushing Iran to withdraw its forces and close bases across the country.
Independently, Iranian-backed Shiite militias have also begun to withdraw from Syria as the civil war continues to wind down.
Iranian troops are leaving the country, both in caskets and by air, but the reasons behind that withdrawal may be a bit more complicated than just an increase in airstrikes.
At the height of the civil war, Iran, one of the main backers of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, sent thousands of troops and ferried countless weapons into the war-torn country. Not only was it propping up the regime which was at risk of collapse, under the watchful eye of Soleimani, Iran’s aspirations of regional hegemony almost came to pass.
The death of Solemani, viewed by even Israeli defense officials as an incredible frontline commander and mastermind, was a major strike to Iran’s plans.
And while he was replaced by Ismail Ghaani, it’s hard to replace an individual as charismatic and cunning as Soleimani. Not only did he bump elbows in the halls of high ranking political officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, but he also got down in the dirt with the soldiers on the frontlines.
Ghaani is not the same and knows that he can’t fill his predecessor’s shoes. And while he is an active commander, the men of the Quds force on the ground in Syria understand that he’s no Soleimani.
Inside Iran, the situation is going from bad to worse and the public are fed up with billions of dollars being spent on Hezbollah, Assad, and even the Houthis in Yemen. They want food on their table, they want to work.
With dozens of strikes targeting airbases used by Iran to ferry in fighters and weapons, there are reports that Iran has began to use Russia’s Hmeimin airbase close to the port city of Latakia, but how long will that last? Russia, which along with Iran, has been instrumental in keeping Assad in power has also begun to run out of patience with Tehran.
The senior defense official who told reporters that Iran was withdrawing from Syria also stressed that Israel would “step up pressure on Iran until it leaves Syria.” Israel knows that if it leaves Iran alone, it risks allowing a monster to grow on its northern front.
But even if Iran and the militias leave, they have been laying down local infrastructure so that Iranian blood doesn’t need to be lost. The locals who align with them can fight against Israel and will pay the price.
Hezbollah has also been investing significant amounts of manpower and time into Syria and has been reported to be embedding itself into the Syrian Arab Army in order to guarantee its survival in the country.
So while the Iranians may be leaving, the reason behind their withdrawal may be more complicated than just Israeli airstrikes.
Misinformation and leaks: The love-hate Russia-Iran relationship in Syria/Seth J. Frantzman/Jerusalem Post/May 08/2020 جيروسالم بوست:: التسريبات والمعلومات المغلوطة: علاقة الحب والكراهية الروسية والإيرانية في سوريا We will never fully know what Iran and Russia actually think of Assad or each other’s historic role in Syria.
A secret Russian plan sees Syrian regime President Bashar al-Assad as a ‘’burden,” reports this week asserted. In this narrative by Asharq Al-Awsat there are hints that Russia, Turkey and Iran will remove Assad and establish a ceasefire that includes the Syrian Democratic Forces. Turkey’s TRT believes that Iran has more influence over Assad and agrees that Russia is non-plussed.
We will never fully know what Iran and Russia actually think of Assad or each other’s historic role in Syria. What we do know is that a concerted media campaign is being waged to undermine Russia’s alliance with Assad and stir the pot between Moscow and Tehran.
When Turkey’s state media says that “Bashar al-Assad does not seem to be ready to heed Russia’s advice to compromise with his enemies and lay out the country’s future as corruption levels move from bad to worse,” the message is intended for Moscow. Turkey is saying “work with us in Syria, not Assad, we will help secure the regime.” Turkey claims Iran is gaining power in Damascus to embarrass the Assad regime.
The Turkish narrative is that while Iran secures its power over Assad this could hurt Russia’s interests in Syria because Syria won’t be rebuilt if Assad doesn’t budge. But wait. This week the business tycoon and regime insider Rami Makhlouf appeared to split with the Assad regime. That may have been engineered by Russia, reports assert. But why would Russia weaken the hand of its fragile ally which is has invested so much in.
In Russia Sputnik news highlights what it says are recent Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s interests in Syria. It argues that Israel will continue operations in Syria to pressure Iran until Iran leaves. Russian sources quoted by Middle East Monitor also push the bombshell claim that Russia and Turkey and Iran would remove Assad. It quotes a former Russian ambassador as asserting that Assad was not ready to reform.
Meanwhile in Tehran the local Tasnim news highlighted a letter from Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Iran’s Javad Zarif, in which Lavrov expressed solidarity with Iran against US sanctions. Iran’s narrative is that all is well with Russia. Evidence that Iran and Russia are embracing appears to come from recent evidence that Iranian flights flew from Tehran to Russia’s Khmeimim air base. This allegedly is due to the fact that when Iranian flights arrive in Tiyas, Shayrat or Mezzeh and other airports that what they unload gets hit with airstrikes. Russia’s base is the only place that is protected by serious air defense and which no other country would attack in Syria. Almasdar media claims that Russia has given Iran access to the airbase in a “rare” move.
How does that information fit in with yet other reports that Iran is reducing its presence in Syria? How can Iran be reducing its presence, also shifting flights to a Russian air base and working with Assad and plotting with Russia to remove Assad at the same time? Clearly none of that may be the full story.
For several years messaging sought to present Russia and Iran at odd over Syria. Russia wants a strong Syrian regime to survive. Iran was a weak, decentralized Syrian regime that can be hollowed out by Iranian-backed militias. Iran carves out spheres of influence in Syria, for instance from Albukamal on the border with Iraq to Deir Ezzor and in southern Syria near the Golan and on roads to Lebanon to funnel weapons to Hezbollah, and around Tiyas and Homs, as well as at the Sayyida Zaynab tomb in Damascus. On the other hand there were stories over the years that Russia would somehow help remove Iran’s forces, either by purposely not aiding Syrian air defense to stop attacks on them, or even getting groups like Hezbollah to leave.
On the other hand, Syria’s regime may be strengthened by willingness to clash with Makhlouf and reduce his role. He was a symbol of corruption. So if that is the case then isn’t it in line with Russia’s desire to reduce corruption?
“Iran’s steadfast support for Assad limits Russia’s influence over domestic politics,” writes Alexander Bick at the Wilson Center. But Russia can’t move Assad much because it has invested so much of its own Russian defense narrative in keeping him as a reliable partner. If Assad is weak, it weakens Russia’s hand. But if he is co-opted entirely by Iran and Israel’s airstrikes increase then the regime looks weak also. Assad has his own role in this, which is he prefer to balance Iran’s octopus-like grip with Russia’s hammer. Putin visited Assad in January, a clear sign of support. Iran’s foreign minister came to Syria in April. Assad went to Syria in February 2019.
Much remains uncertain in Syria. In late February and early March Syrian regime troops clashed with Turkish troops in Idlib. After initial Syrian successes Turkey claimed to deal the regime a devastating blow. Did Syria’s overreach give Russia’s its ‘headache.” Or did Russia engineer the attacks on Turkish troops to show how easily they could be killed and send a message to Ankara that it needed to sign off on a new ceasefire? On March 15 Russia and Turkey began joint patrols on the strategic M4 highway near Aleppo. They completed their 9th patrol this week.
The evidence points to a more complex triangular love affair between Moscow, Tehran and Damascus. The relationships are undermined, and complexity increased by leaks and misinformation that appears in regional media, percolating up from Russian, Turkish, Arabic or Iranian sources. The idea is to leak embarrassing details about who might be “removing Assad” or who got a headache from Assad, whose air defense doesn’t work, or who is secretly hoping Israel will harm Iran’s interests, who leaked claims to Russian media that Assad bought his wife an expensive painting, and so on.
The problem with Syria, like the Gulf conflict between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, is that the stakes are very high. There at many countries that want to benefit from what happens next. Syria is the gordian knot that ties together America, Russia, Iran, Israel, Turkey; it is the crossroads for Iran’s road to the sea, the so-called “Shia crescent” and Russia’s ambitions to return to great power status and Turkey’s desire to defeat the PKK and return to Ottoman empire imperial greatness, and maybe even the Muslim Brotherhood’s desire to carve out a win that links Qatar, Turkey and Libya. It is even a lynchpin for whether Israel can avoid a larger conflict with Iran and whether the US role in the Middle East will decline. With so much at stake, the Russia-Iran relationship over Assad, or competition, is managed in media rumors.
One thing is for certain, any story that claims there will be an agreement for a post-war Syria that involved Turkey and the US-backed SDF, is nonsensical. Russia wants the US out of Syria. Turkey wants the US out of Syria, Iran wants the US out of Syria and so does Assad. On that they all agree. They just can’t agree how to get there.
