The repercussions of nuclear deal on Iran’s policies
Raghida Dergham/Al Arabiya/January 25/16
The lifting of international sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran passed as if it were a non-event. The U.N. Security Council bestowed immediate legitimacy on the move in accordance with the nuclear deal it had stamped with its seal of compliance.
Removing the freeze on Iranian assets means Tehran will obtain around $150 billion automatically, and up to $50 billion in promised investments over the next five years. According to experts, this would generate growth of up to 5 percent a year, rescuing the country from an economic crisis and enabling it to pursue internal and external projects despite falling oil prices.
Russia’s direct military intervention in Syria has relieved Iran’s budget, bearing in mind that most of Tehran’s spending on regional expansion in recent years reportedly came from the Iraqi treasury under former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
Now, after international sanctions are lifted, the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) will be able to resume their regional plans with a comfortable financial margin and also fight the battle with the moderate camp with equal comfort. The IRGC is the biggest winner, while the moderate camp led by President Rowhani and foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, in partnership with former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, will be comfortable in the next month’s elections thanks to the détente.
The Obama administration is wagering on Iranian economic prosperity to empower the moderate camp, which rarely defies the mullah-led establishment in Tehran and has hopes it would slow down Iran’s plans for regional dominance led by the IRGC hardliner camp.
There is need to think practically on the impact of lifting of sanctions on regional conflicts and the war against ISIS
However, these wagers will not materialize, at least not in the near future. Thus, they will not impact Iranian-Russian policy in Syria in support of Assad. Nor, I believe, will they lead to the dismantlement of Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq, or the wooing of Sunni support that is crucial for defeating ISIS and similar groups in both countries.
Hence, there is a need for thinking practically regarding the impact of lifting of sanctions on regional conflicts and the war against ISIS. If Washington has chosen not to undertake any action that could undermine the new relationship with Tehran, then the price to pay is much higher than it will imagine, and it might realize this only when it is too late.
The new page in U.S.-Iranian relations has become a reality that requires constructive scrutiny so that this relationship would be beneficial for both sides and the world. Caving in and complacency would otherwise be an investment in the forces of Sunni and Shiite extremism. Instead, there is now an opportunity for balance in Saudi-Iranian relations and regional balances.
Leveler called oil
Saudi-Iranian relations are not currently in a phase of accord and reconciliation. Rather, I believe, escalation reigns supreme. The new common denominator between the two countries is being affected by the drop in oil prices to below $30 per barrel.
Some believe Riyadh is against cutting production for reasons of national interests, and that there is no need to cut production to benefit Russia and Iran. Others believe one of the key reasons Riyadh insists on maintaining the same level of production is actually to undermine Iran and Russia economically, to prevent them from having a free hand in Syria.
However, oil policies are not just about Saudi-Iranian relations or the new rivalry in the oil world with the shale revolution in the United States. There are other factors in play, including China’s slowdown and the spending by oil-producing countries on direct and proxy conflicts.
Yet some oil experts believe that the collapse in oil prices will push traditional foes to set their differences aside and rescue their economies. These experts say there is no escape from accord because this is what interests require. The margin of accord will not stop at oil prices but will probably include outstanding political disputes in the region.
This logic may not apply to the IRGC in Iran, however, because its thinking is constrained by projects for regional dominance and the “export” of the Islamic revolution. The IRGC believes that given that it was able to double down at the time of isolation and sanctions, it could do much more after the sanctions have been lifted and money is flowing again.
The IRGC could come down hard on moderate forces that want to focus on economic growth and prosperity rather than military intervention, the creation of militias, and imposing costly dominance.
The battle within
The conflict in Iran between the moderates and the hardliners is not marginal, particularly on the eve of the elections scheduled for February 26. It would be crucial to slow down the unfreezing of Iranian assets and investment projects, given what’s at stake.
Instead, decision-makers such as U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov must take advantage of the Saudi and Iranian need for accord to ease their disputes practically and realistically, to the benefit of both Russia and the US, who are also oil producers.
But if the U.S. and Russia have decided low oil prices are in their interest in the years ahead, things would be completely different, and there would be no need for sponsoring Saudi-Iranian accord. In that case, the Middle Eastern oil-producing nations must think about their options, whether in terms of de-escalating proxy conflicts, or in terms of thinking to alternatives to their reliance on oil.
Some economists and experts in investment and technology have an interesting view: they believe lower oil prices can accelerate necessary reforms that would ensure oil is no longer the only factor in Middle East politics and policies, especially in the Gulf.
Sobriety and realism are essential in assessing the repercussions of the Iranian nuclear deal and the impact of the lifting of sanctions on Iran, internally as well as with respect to the ambitions of regional expansion adopted by the IRGC-led hardliner camp, if not the Iranian government itself under the leadership of supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini.
Limiting oneself to wailing and astonishment, no matter how justified, is going to be pointless: it is noteworthy how Obama marketed his audacious deal with the mullahs in Tehran while Iran pressed ahead with its regional meddling, imposing its views on Iraq and creating militias, inciting in Yemen, and intervening in Syria alongside Assad in his civil war.
Realistic strategies
There is no alternative to adopting realistic strategies either to coexist with the new reality or to upend it patiently and prudently. Relying on a new U.S. president to find the magic recipe for undoing the problem is delusional and wishful thinking. Republican candidates are criticizing Obama for the nuclear deal and claim it to be a threat to U.S. interests and security.
However, they will not rush to overturn the deal or the new rapprochement with Iran, as it is now a reality. What they could do is pressure Tehran to curb its expansionist policies but this will not happen at least for a year and things could change completely by then.
Therefore, what is needed is not just de-escalation in conflicts like Syria and Yemen, but also de-escalation of tension in the media, politics, and diplomacy between Saudi and Iran. It is unacceptable to burn embassies and it is not acceptable for Iran’s foreign minister to use a tone like the one he resorted to in The New York Times, whatever his calculations may be.
It is not useful to revisit Iran’s involvement in the Khobar bombing. It is too late for this.
What all parties should focus on is how to stop the war in Syria and Yemen, and stop the descent to chaos in Libya, Iraq, and Lebanon. ISIS is an enemy of Saudi Arabia just as it is an enemy of Iran.
Iran’s upcoming elections may generate a momentum of moderation, but this moderation requires engagement by the Iranian public to voice their opposition to Iranian extremism and meddling in Arab countries, while calling for an end to sectarian escalation and economic attrition through warfare or oil prices.
Let there be a political discourse that hits a chord with people’s consciences and desire for prosperity. The pictures of men, women, and children of Madaya is a living snapshot of war crimes committed by the countries backing the regime in Damascus, which starves its people as a weapon of war, and this must awaken the consciences of the public opinion in Iran. The Iranian public wants prosperity after living in austerity imposed by sanctions and the country’s expansionist policies from Syria to Yemen and Iraq.
Perhaps the cost of proxy wars and the collapse in oil prices will drain Saudi Arabia and Iran forcing them to pursue balanced and conciliatory relations instead of confrontation. Perhaps this would bring good tidings for the Middle East and its people who aspire to have a normal life instead of an endless cycle of violence and attrition.
Are Shiites divided over what to do about Saudi Arabia?
Ali Mamouri/Al-Monitor/January 25/16
Following the Jan. 2 execution of the Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr by Saudi Arabia, Shiite leaders from around the world issued statements of condolence and protest. Among the collection of stances expressed, a clear distinction could be seen between those reflecting the position of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and those following the thinking of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, leader of the Najaf Hawza. This distinction has been of consequence to the Saudi regime and will perhaps increase in importance with implementation of the Iranian nuclear deal and the public opposition to Nimr’s execution.
Khamenei issued a statement Jan. 3 that not only condemned the execution of Nimr and hurled accusations at the Saudi regime, but also went so far as to portend its demise. “The oppressed martyr’s blood will leave its mark, and divine vengeance shall strike down Saudi politicians for their conduct in his regard,” wrote Khamenei. In contrast, Sistani avoided attacking the Saudi regime, and instead expressed solidarity with the families of the 47 people executed — four Shiites (including Nimr) and the rest Sunnis, most of them affiliated with al-Qaeda. Sistani simply stated, “We condemn and denounce what occurred and express our condolences and sympathy to their bereaved families for this great loss.”
The different approaches of the two ayatollahs reflect a divergence between two distinct Shiite philosophies with an effect on Shiite minorities living in majority-Sunni worlds. The dichotomy is also reflective of the positions taken by Khamenei and Sistani over the years in their religious capacities.
Khamenei, the political and religious leader of the largest Shiite country in the region (and the world), considers himself to be the custodian of all Muslims, not just Shiites. On his official website, he describes himself as the “Guardian of Muslims,” a characterization justified by his view that the guardianship of Muslims is a divinely mandated post, about which Muslims have no say irrespective of whether they actually accept him as their guardian.
Meanwhile, Sistani does not consider himself to be the guardian of Shiites in Iraq or anywhere else in the world. He views all Muslims as brothers. In an August 2014 meeting with Shiites from the Gulf, a question arose about professing loyalty to him. Sistani responded, “Do not sanctify anyone and refrain from giving anyone importance beyond their status or rank.” Concerning Shiite relations with other segments of society, he said, “Do not attack or criticize the sanctities and symbols of others. Let mutual respect reign between all.” In addition, Sistani criticized the revolutionary movements of the Arab Spring, considering them seditious and the cause of sectarianism, resulting in heinous crimes.
After Nimr’s execution, official websites affiliated with Khamenei were filled with sharp criticism, similar to his, targeting the Saudi regime, prophesying its imminent demise. Khamenei had also earlier criticized the Saudi regime in various speeches as the Iranian-Saudi conflict intensified in the region.
Sistani, however, has been more balanced when discussing the Saudis. In Nimr’s case, Sistani chose first to focus his efforts on preventing Saudi Arabia from actually carrying out the death penalty against Nimr. In doing so, he avoided escalating and inflaming the political-sectarian conflict with the Saudi regime.
According to Saudi Shiite cleric Musa Abu Khamseen, the majority of Saudi Shiites follow Sistani and do not espouse the revolutionary approach advocated by Khamenei. They include the movement represented by Nimr, who belonged to the Shirazi school of thought, known for its religiously motivated opposition to the approach of Khamenei and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini based on political Shiism and revolutionary Islam, mixed with anti-Saudi inclinations. Nimr’s rhetoric focused on civic demands, although the lack of any meaningful redress by the Saudi regime ultimately compelled him to escalate his position and rhetoric. Saudi security forces arrested him after a speech he delivered in June 2012 and charged him with sowing sedition among Shiites.
Iran, after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, began spreading its philosophy to Saudi Arabia, giving rise to a strong anti-Saud opposition movement there, mainly through Hezbollah al-Hejaz, established in 1987. The latter initially attracted supporters from the kingdom’s predominantly Shiite Eastern Province, but collapsed in 1993 when its leadership — including Sheikh Hassan al-Saffar, known for his moderation and contacts with the Saudi regime — entered into negotiations and ultimately signed agreements with the regime concerning the return of exiled Shiite leaders.
In another sign that Shiites in eastern Saudi Arabia are not necessarily hostile toward the regime, Nimr’s brother, Mohammed al-Nimr, despite strongly condemning his brother’s execution, also condemned the storming of the Saudi Embassy in Tehran on the same day.
Sistani’s moderate stance and influence among Shiites is an important opportunity that the Saudi regime could take advantage of to provide equal civil rights to its Shiite minority and help defend against the rise of Iran-backed revolutionary movements. With the implementation of the deal on Iran’s nuclear program, the balance of power is shifting in Iran’s favor, making such a step urgent if it is to be taken. To strengthen its society against foreign powers, the regime must support all its components and integrate them in a united Saudi Arabia.
