Ali Hashem: Is defeating the Islamic State impossible/Amir Toumaj: Khamenei’s Reinterpretation of Nuclear Deal and the Implications/Grant Rumley: Israel’s Islamic Movement: Context and Possible Implications

Is defeating the Islamic State impossible?
Ali Hashem/Al-Monitor/November 20/15

While working on a documentary about Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, I had the chance to meet Abu Omar, a former IS operative who was once an inmate in the infamous Camp Bucca facility that brought together all those who later became the ruling elite of the most notorious terrorist group in modern history. I asked Abu Omar whether there was any recipe to defeat IS, which seemed unbeatable. In response, he smiled and said, “First, the world will have to really believe it exists — that it’s not an American conspiracy, nor a Turkish secret project, nor an Iranian-Syrian backed organization — that it’s simply the most advanced edition of global jihad resulting from 30 years of experience. It also must not be conceded that no one can win this war.” Since the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924, the dream of reviving the caliphate has been alive in the souls of those adopting political Islam as a doctrine. Ordinary Muslims’ feelings of weakness and a sense of disconnection with and lack of support from the regimes that have ruled the Arab and Muslim world grew over time and was inherited by members of the Muslim millennial generation who wanted to belong to an entity that blends power, religion and modernity. IS came with the three together. While many might debate the last point, IS is using cutting-edge technologies in many of their activities, including in the professional use of media tools that fulfill a feeling of superiority through well-crafted videos and clips. As for power, IS was able to prove its strength by creating a de facto state within the borders of Syria and Iraq, challenging the world powers and showing a high level of discipline in the areas under their control. The other element, religion, is the magnet that directly or indirectly attracts people to IS, for the group introduces itself as the guarantor for the application of God’s rule on Earth, and that the caliph is a continuation of the Prophet Muhammad’s legacy. The fact is that the Islamic State, as a doctrine and practice, has been an unbeatable model in the Sunni Muslim world to those seeking this blend of religion, power and modernity. Sunni and Shiite Islamists shared many similar aspirations until the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran succeeded in toppling the Shah; at the time, Sunni Islamists such as Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, the co-founder of al-Qaeda with Osama bin Laden, celebrated Imam Ruhollah Khomeini’s victory in one of Amman’s mosques. Later it became clear that the revolution was more an answer to the aspirations of Shiite Islamists than Sunnis; therefore, the next stop for Azzam and his comrades was Afghanistan, and they later became what were called the Afghan Arabs.
When the creation of the Islamic State was announced, one of the main strategies adopted by its leadership was social engagement. The de facto, self-styled state opened its doors to jihadi foreigners, and thousands came with their families and settled in cities under IS control; according to a UN report, more than 25,000 from over 100 nations have made it to IS territory. Some of them get married to women from tribes in the areas in order to strengthen ties and complicate any attempts to oust IS. The foreign jihadis are persona non grata in their home countries, and if IS falls, their lives and future may be endangered wherever they may be; they have no safe haven but the Islamic State and therefore will fight to the last man standing to keep it alive. Part of its social and economic strategy was to engage the main tribes in control of the oil business; this helps not only in providing profits but also in strengthening ties with local tribes.
The thinking is that IS tied several knots around its core to make it extremely difficult for enemies to target it effectively. This apparently meant that three years of ground and air operations, international and regional attempts to counter IS and direct media and public campaigns did not effectively harm the group, and now it is able to function in several countries in several continents and is capable of carrying out its tactics with effective command and control, with the multiple attacks in Paris being a strong example. To defeat IS, the world needs to hit the core of the group, and this means untying the shroud of knots surrounding it and cutting blood off from IS’ heart. A counter model is needed to fight the IS model, a model that is powerful, modern and shows real respect and appreciation for Islam. With such a model it would be easier to deprive the terrorist entity of sympathizers who might become future operatives. As former IS operative Abu Omar told me, “IS is very clever and smart in attracting people with potential; they know how to talk to them and how to address their ambitions. They are also very smart in exploiting mistakes committed by their enemies, and use these mistakes to prove to their supporters why they are the right choice.” He said, “I was behind their walls; therefore, I understand the mentality. If you really want to finish IS, you need to address people’s concerns, let the sheikhs talk to youths and stop making big mistakes. IS is surviving as the result of the dire mistakes committed by governments of the region.” Defeating IS should not be impossible if the above is addressed and serious military and economic steps are taken to prevent the group from expanding both financially and geographically. This means doing battle on the war fronts and imposing sanctions on countries and individuals financing the group or allowing money to flow to it or buying goods, mainly oil, from territories under its control. Long-term strategic steps must be taken or IS will be here to stay and expand. ​

Khamenei’s Reinterpretation of Nuclear Deal and the Implications
Amir Toumaj/Foundation for Defense of Democracies./November 20/15
Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative to the council, reiterated Tuesday that the government would continue to implement the supreme leader’s “stipulations about the JCPOA.” He was referring to Khamenei’s letter to President Hassan Rouhani on October 21 laying out new conditions for the implementation of this summer’s nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Shamkhani added that the council had formed a committee to implement Khamenei’s unilateral reinterpretation of the deal. The letter raises serious concerns about the nuclear deal’s enforcement. For one, Khamenei’s letter challenges the agreed-upon timetable for the agreement’s implementation. According to the JCPOA, Iran was to begin redesigning the Arak heavy water reactor and shipping out 98 percent of its low-enriched uranium after the deal went into effect (“Adoption Day”) on October 18. According to Khamenei’s letter, however, that must happen only after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) “closes the file” on the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Tehran’s past nuclear program. Practically speaking, this translates to a two-month delay, with the IAEA report due out by December 15. More troublingly, the supreme leader demands that the U.S. and the EU remove, in writing, the “sanctions structure.” This is a reference to the non-nuclear sanctions (terrorism and human rights), as well as the sanctions that could be “snapped back” if Iran is found to be in significant non-compliance over the first eight years of the agreement. Notably, the Obama administration relied on these sanctions to assuage Congressional concerns about the JCPOA. More importantly, Khamenei’s conditions represent a significant reversal on key aspects of the nuclear deal.
It is also worth noting that Iran has made it clear that it will continue to reinterpret the ballistic missile provisions of the agreement. Major General Hassan Firouzabadi, chief of the Armed Forces General Staff Headquarters and a close disciple of Khamenei, told senior military commanders on November 3 that Iran would build missiles with a 2,000-kilometer range. That announcement came days after Iran tested a long-range ballistic missile. The test and ongoing construction clearly violate United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1929. After the provisions of UNSCR 1929 are terminated, Iran’s continued ballistic missile activities will be in violation in UNSCR 2231, which endorses the JCPOA. While the West has voiced concern over the ballistic missile issue, none of the P5+1 member states have commented on Khamenei’s letter or on his new committee. To Khamenei, this could signal tacit acceptance of his conditions. To ensure that this is not the message, the U.S. administration and Congress should declare their inflexibility on the supreme leader’s reinterpretation of the deal and make clear that the final draft of the JCPOA, deeply flawed as it may be, is just that—final.
**Amir Toumaj is a research analyst at Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow him on Twitter @AmirToumaj

Israel’s Islamic Movement: Context and Possible Implications
Grant Rumley/Foundation for Defense of Democracies./November 20/15

Israel outlawed the northern branch of the Islamic Movement on Tuesday over ties to terror groups and attempts to incite violence against Israelis. Israelis believe the measure can help bring an end to the recent spate of violence; the move gives authorities the right to arrest anyone caught working with the group. However, Arab-Israeli groups have already called for a general strike on Thursday, and one Arab-Israeli member of Knesset slammed the ruling as a “declaration of war.”The northern branch of the Islamic Movement is the hardline splinter group of the broader Muslim Brotherhood movement in Israel. The movement – with a membership of roughly 20,000 – rose to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s after winning several municipal elections in northern Israel. Under the leadership of the radical cleric Raed Salah, the northern branch has leveraged the Arab Israeli population’s sense of disenfranchisement to oppose Israeli policies and its very existence as a Jewish state. The group habitually calls on its members to take to the streets, boycotts all interaction with the government, and regularly accuses Israel of altering the status quo on Jerusalem’s Temple Mount. Salah’s home-base of Umm al-Fahm – Israel’s second-largest Arab city – annually hosts tens of thousands in rallies to “defend” Jerusalem’s contentious al-Aqsa Mosque. Salah himself has forged close relations with Hamas in Gaza, met with an Iranian intelligence agent, and sailed with the 2010 Gaza flotilla on its ill-fated journey to the Strip. The 57-year old Salah has been arrested several times over connections to terror groups, incitement, and assaulting a police officer. Israel’s decision to ban the organization comes shortly before Salah is set to serve an 11-month prison term. His sentence has, so far, only seemed to enhance his leadership. Other Arab-Israeli leaders criticized the sentence, with some calling it a ruling “against the entire Arab population,” while a member of Knesset urged: “We must stop the campaign against the Islamic Movement.” Many Israelis believe Salah has contributed to the current upsurge in terror attacks rocking the country. His annual rallies for al-Aqsa and constant claims that Israel is altering the status quo – coupled with his longstanding ties to Hamas – have played a significant role in the escalating anti-Israel fervor among Palestinians in East Jerusalem. This was the logic behind the ban. But the move could also backfire, and help Salah generate new adherents.
**Grant Rumley is a research analyst at Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow him on Twitter @GrantRumley