A King from the East approaches
Dr. John Duke Anthony/Al Arabiya/September 04/15
King Salman’s visit to Washington comes at a unique time in the U.S.-Saudi relationship, which is fundamentally strong. It is, however, characterized by a lack of adequate mutual understanding – there are different motives and goals, misattributions of intent, and stress on its underpinnings. It is human nature to accept the positive aspects of a situation as a given and to focus – in some cases obsess – on the negative. So the following is warranted: the relationship will not only endure, it is more likely to strengthen than weaken over time. The disagreements and trends outlined below will not significantly disrupt it.
Even if the meeting between King Salman and President Barack Obama contains moments that a freewheeling media may contend are contentious, the fact that they are meeting at all is a sign of the relationship’s strength. For example, the United States and Britain meet to resolve differences; the Koreas do not. Of these two relationships, one is strong and vital, the other is at best dysfunctional.
Undeniably, the media, members of Congress and lobbyists of all stripes will and have already begun to parrot and highlight elements of mistrust and misapprehension in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. This is in many ways to be expected. Jousting between friends, allies, partners and adversaries is part of the essence of two non-identical countries being regional and international leaders. The Iran deal has caused significant angst in the United States and Saudi Arabia. In both countries, it has surfaced differences that had seemingly been submerged in the interests of political and geostrategic expediency.
King Salman arrives in Washington in 2015 not without leverage in discussing how Saudis understand geography, and that their interests in the Iran deal are more significant than those of the United States. Significant numbers of Americans continue to second-guess Saudi Arabia’s commitment to fighting Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and similar extremist groups. Significant numbers of Saudis continue to question the efficacy of U.S. policies vis-à-vis its invasion and occupation of Iraq, not to mention Washington’s contributions to the Israel-Palestine conflict.
The nature, extent and consequences of U.S. commitment to Israel understandably remain a point of contention. At the same time, some have questioned one of the traditional underpinnings of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, namely Riyadh’s role as the “swing” if not dominant international oil producer. Underlying these and other issues is Saudi concern about succession after Obama, and U.S. concern about succession after King Salman.
Yemen
One of the strongest aspects of the U.S.-Saudi relationship currently is cooperation in the defense and security fields. This is now at its zenith. For the first time, both countries are jointly prosecuting two conflicts simultaneously. Riyadh’s superior knowledge and understanding of the internecine dynamics of Yemen’s governmental structures and systems of political dynamics, as well as with its Special Forces’ expertise, is unparalleled. This is combined with U.S. military equipment, expertise, and logistic and intelligence support. The efforts of both sides are proving essential to the campaign to restore Yemen’s legitimate government. Simultaneously, the Saudi air force’s support and participation in the international coalition against ISIS constitute an invaluable military contribution. Neither the Yemen nor the anti-ISIS campaigns are likely to achieve their political aims in the near future. That is because they are marked by a reliance on airpower more suited to limited operations aimed at inducing a political outcome, rather than the tactics employed by the Houthis and ISIS, neither of which has shown any inclination toward surrender. As such, the campaigns may be approaching the point where airpower will have run the length of its utility. King Salman and his American interlocutors, Obama included, cannot help but acknowledge that the Saudi air force has performed well over Yemen. However, both remain aware that reliance upon airpower alone against a determined enemy is unlikely to prevail. As NATO learned in Kosovo, airpower has its limits. The king and the president can be expected to discuss how the Saudi-led coalition, together with U.S. assistance, can help bring operations in Yemen to a satisfactory conclusion.
Syria, Iraq
Obama can be expected to seek support from King Salman regarding Iraq and Syria. Likewise, the king can count on meeting a U.S. president willing to listen and benefit from what he and his officialdom have to offer in this regard. No one outside the White House can claim to know exactly what questions will be put to the king or vice versa. Even so, it is fair to assume that Obama will seek to learn to what extent Riyadh would be willing to support this or that Syrian opposition movement, and the efforts of the Iraqi government against ISIS. Obama will be understood if, in his quest to prevent an open Sunni-Shiite war in Iraq, he were to view cooperation of the strongest Sunni state as an important if not vital key.
Defense sales, purchases
In the big scheme of things, whether a significant weapons sale is a result of the meeting ought to be insignificant. In this regard, and contrary to popular media-anchored belief, the dynamics of arms sales are not synonymous with the success or failure of Washington pitching the purchase of its weapons to a client. Americans ought to be aware, though the evidence is that the number who know is very low, that whenever a country asks to buy U.S. defense equipment, Washington is required by law to enter into a prolonged review as to whether the item in question ought to be released for purchase by other countries. In the United States, albeit not in other countries, such a review includes an analysis of the effect that a proposed sale of armaments to another country might have on Israel’s qualitative military edge toward all 22 Arab states combined. Yet this meeting could still see announcement of the sale of the U.S.-manufactured Theater High Altitude Air Defense system to enhance the kingdom’s Patriot Air Defense System. A joint declaration on missile defense, an increasingly preferred avenue for joint U.S.-Gulf defense cooperation, is also possible.
Iran nuclear deal
The success or failure of the meeting is unlikely to turn on arms purchases and sales, but rather the Iran nuclear deal. Riyadh and its fellow members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have questions about the deal. However, due to an extraordinary number of meetings, visits and briefings in the past year, the questions are far fewer of late. The GCC is on record as supporting the deal.
Even so, just as the U.S. executive branch of government has to contend with a public that is relatively ill-informed on international issues of importance to its perceived interests, the same is true for Saudi Arabia and many another countries. Hence, just as many in the American private sector claim the Obama administration has done less than it could to reach an agreement likely to advance regional and global peace, security and prosperity, so too is there a similar element at work within Saudi Arabia and the other GCC societies. Obama and his staff will have to explain how the deal will enhance Gulf peace and security. A grace note in underscoring the extent of common understanding and interests would be for both to highlight that this year marks two U.S.-Saudi 70th anniversaries.
First meet
In one, on Feb. 14, 1945, Saudi King Abdulaziz and U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt met aboard the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal. In so doing, they signalled their strong national and personal bonds that have well-served their peoples – and arguably the world too – ever since.Regarding the second event, the two countries’ leaders stood side by side as their foreign ministers co-founded in the United States the world’s highest political body, the United Nations, also in 1945.
King Salman arrives in Washington in 2015 not without leverage in discussing how Saudis understand geography, and that their interests in the Iran deal are more significant than those of the United States. Nor will he be without a voluminous file of evidence of Iran’s persistent meddling in what he and his fellow Arab heads of state regard as quintessential Arab affairs.
The king’s foreign minister, the exceptionally politically savvy Adel al-Jubeir, was until recently ambassador in Washington. More than many others, he is well placed to indicate the implications of the domestic U.S. argument over the Iran deal. He is also well situated to place in context how various American observers of international politics have been hoodwinked into believing Saudi Arabia and Israel are joined at the hip in opposing the Iran deal.
Despite the obstacles, to envision that Obama will be unable to summon all his formidable charm and powers of argument to continue to persuade Saudi Arabia of the value of the deal would be to underestimate him.
Strained budgets
An additional stress on the analytics of the U.S.-Saudi relationship is the financial challenges confronting both sides. Saudis are rightly concerned that the U.S. commitment to Gulf stability may wane in the wake of diminished U.S. defense budgets. Americans are concerned about the impact of low oil prices on Saudi Arabia. The U.S. defense budget will likely continue to be cut disproportionately to other budget items. That the United States no longer has an aircraft carrier constantly in the Gulf has been noted throughout the region, together with the implications for regional needs and policies of possible further U.S. defense budget shrinkage.
Obama’s burden will be to show how the U.S. commitment will remain constant even if the American “big-ticket” defense presence, if measured in terms of sheer physical military might, is not. Conversely, Americans might have concerns about the future of Saudi finances if oil prices continue at their current lows. Riyadh is heavily reliant on oil to fund its extensive defense and security structures and systems, as well as its social welfare programs.
The kingdom’s private non-oil industry, while booming and likely to continue to be robust, is yet to be developed to a level that can be sustained in the absence of a strong oil economy. In this context, Obama will welcome insight as to how the kingdom plans to manage this period of low oil prices, especially as there is every indication that it will be extended and deepened once Iranian oil hits the global market.
Future leadership
Both leaders might reasonably be concerned about what will come after they are gone. King Salman may be worried that a new U.S. president will choose not to honor commitments made by his or her predecessors. U.S. election season rarely brings much comfort to Saudi Arabia. This is understandable. The kingdom’s concerns are generally not viewed with the same sympathy as American voters view those of Canada, Mexico, Israel, Europe or Japan. Obama must do what he can to reassure King Salman that his existing undertakings, in addition to whatever understandings the two may agree to this week, will be honored by his successor. Conversely, Obama may be concerned about the future of Saudi leadership in light of recent changes made to the line of succession that put King Salman’s son in the position of deputy crown prince, and thus may have raised questions among other branches of the family. The robustness of the Saudi royal family, however, is generally underestimated in the West. In my lifetime, one Saudi monarch was deposed or disposed to abdicate, and another was murdered. In both instances, no chaos ensued. Nevertheless, mutual considerations of future leaders will be in the background.
Don’t believe the hype
The U.S.-Saudi relationship is strong. That the leaders of both nations are meeting at a time of regional turmoil is indicative of this strength. Both nations have roughly the same objectives in this meeting. The challenges will be to go beyond understanding each other’s perceptions – this, to a degree, they already do – and find policy courses most likely to achieve mutually beneficial aims. The public announcements after the meeting will be parsed and analyzed, yet from the perspective of analysts they are but trees in the forest. The greater message is that the king and the president are meeting as peers to resolve issues of mutual concern. The partnership between the two countries – as with any other two countries – can be strengthened only in this way. The relationship is one for the long term.
Renewing the decades-old strategic Saudi-U.S. partnership
Andrew Bowen/Al Arabiya/September 04/15
King Salman’s first visit to Washington since his ascension marks an important moment to renew the decades-old strategic partnership between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In the wake of the reaching of the P5 +1 agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, this visit comes at a critical period in both states relations with one another. While the partnership between these two countries has helped underwrite global security and stability and the stability of international energy markets, Washington’s perceived draw back from the region at a time of regional tensions with Iran, the surge of ISIS, a war in Yemen, and a civil war in Syria has created both uncertainty and tension at a time when both states need one another to secure the future of the Middle East and their respective interests.
A renewal of trust and cooperation after
The upcoming meeting between President Obama and King Salman as well is a crucial moment to build on the achievements made at the GCC summit at Camp David earlier this spring. mportantly, as well, in his last fifteen months, this White House meeting is an opportunity for Obama to build a stronger personal working relationship with the new Saudi King. With the number of critical issues both states are confronting, a renewal of trust is needed. This is an opportunity for the President to assure King Salman that Washington is as committed to fighting ISIS as bringing an end to President Assad’s reign of terror. However, it would be a mistake though to assume rhetorical commitments made at Camp David and a meeting at the White House alone would revive this new partnership and ensure that its on better footing since the nuclear agreement was reached. Better cooperation is needed between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia to solidify the commitments made at Camp David.
At the same time, in this changing energy landscape and the volatility of global energy prices, Washington and Riyadh have an important opportunity to build deeper and more diversified economic ties. The U.S.-Saudi investment Forum being held in Washington this week is an important avenue to further renew this partnership.
Delivering an important message
While the meeting between President Obama and King Salman isn’t expected to be one marked by significant new commitments made by Washington, President Obama has the opportunity to deliver an important message. Despite the reaching of an Iranian nuclear agreement, it would be premature to see such an agreement as a shift from the U.S.’s partnership with Saudi Arabia. Washington’s decades old relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a pillar of the U.S.’s long-term relationship with the region and that engagement with Iran will be conducted cautiously and judiciously and in consultation with Washington’s regional partners despite how the negotiations were previously conducted. President Obama also has an opportunity to more substantively discuss how the U.S. plans to build off of the commitments made at Camp David. Importantly, the President has an opportunity to detail his vision for the U.S.’s long-term position both in terms of security and economic commitments in the region after a nuclear agreement. The perceived growing U.S. energy independence and the rhetorical “tilt to Asia” has led many to speculate that the U.S. will not be in a position in the coming decades to support its Gulf allies and its regional partners as they face growing challenges and potentially future Iranian aggression. Washington’s response to Syria and its slow response to ISIS’ surge are indicative of this.
Strengthening security cooperation
The most pressing issues that will feature on the agenda of the leaders’ upcoming meeting will be: Iran, Yemen, Syria, and ISIS. While Riyadh has publicly supported the signing of the Iranian nuclear agreement, this meeting is an opportunity to further discuss how Washington and Riyadh can work together to ensure that Iran’s aggressive behavior is contained after the nuclear agreement and the associated lifting of sanctions. President Obama has the opportunity to assure King Salman that he’s not purely giving Ayatollah Khamenei a $160 billion dollar check to wage war on Saudi and U.S. interests in the region. Instead, Washington would be prepared to ensure the security of the Gulf States, the continued security of the Arabian Gulf, and will work with Saudi Arabia in countering Iran’s expansionary behavior in the region. President Obama may also seek to discourage his Saudi counterpart from pursuing a nuclear program. President Obama and King Salman will have an opportunity to discuss the current operation in Yemen and the Saudi efforts to secure Yemen’s long-term security, including the potential campaign to retake Sana’a and efforts to secure a peace settlement. This meeting is an opportunity both to assure Riyadh of Washington’s commitment to the operation and to bridge differences over the nature of the operation. Finally, this meeting is an opportunity to discuss Syria, an issue Riyadh views as Washington not taking that seriously. President Obama has an opportunity to use this meeting to assure King Salman that his administration will more seriously pursue a political settlement of Syria’s civil war and provide more substantive support to Syria’s opposition.
This is an opportunity for the President to assure King Salman that Washington is as committed to fighting ISIS as bringing an end to President Assad’s reign of terror. While Washington may view ISIS and Syria as related but distinct issues that can be addressed separately, Riyadh views these issues as inseparable and both have significant impact on Riyadh’s long-term security. Washington also can do more to assure Riyadh that they won’t seek a solution to the Syrian civil war, which favors Iran.
A note of caution
While this meeting is the beginning of a renewed U.S.-Saudi partnership, the coming months as both leaders grapple with regional challenges and the changing regional environment post-the nuclear deal will be the real indicator to see whether this renewal leads to more substantive cooperation. President Obama will need to substantively translate his words into actions. At the same time, both Washington and Riyadh will need to find more common ground on issues where they have differences in order for this partnership to further deepen. Entering the last fifteen months of his presidency, Obama has a new moment to chart a new course.
