Dr. John C. Hulsman:Why King Salman’s visit to Washington matters now/Salman Aldosary: King Salman in Washington/Simon Henderson: Saudi King Comes to Washington, with His Son

Saudi King Comes to Washington, with His Son
Simon Henderson/Washington Institute/September 04/15
The royals will likely try to smooth relations that have been strained by the Iran nuclear deal and differences over Syria and Yemen. On September 4, King Salman is scheduled to visit the White House for the first time since succeeding to the throne in January. His inaugural visit to Washington was originally supposed to occur during the May summit of Gulf leaders at Camp David, but he cancelled at the last moment in what was widely perceived as a snub to President Obama’s then pending nuclear agreement with Iran. The upcoming visit is expected to focus on repairing the diplomatic damage. At seventy-nine years old, the king has limited physical and mental capacity for diplomacy. He is flying in from Morocco, where he has spent the past month on vacation after curtailing a planned sojourn in southern France on a whim. His formal discussion with President Obama is expected to be short and tightly scripted — the more crucial character in the room will probably be his favorite son, the thirtyish Muhammad bin Salman (a.k.a. MbS), who serves as defense minister and deputy crown prince. The king’s notional heir apparent — fifty-six-year-old nephew Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef (MbN) — will remain in the kingdom.
MbS is now the closest aide to his father, who has encouraged the young man’s ambition and meteoric rise in the past few months. In addition to being seen as the architect of the war to reinstall Yemeni president Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, who was pushed out by pro-Iranian Houthi rebels, MbS has been used as a top diplomatic envoy, visiting Egypt, Russia, and Jordan. Whereas the late King Abdullah was categorical in his loathing of the Muslim Brotherhood, Salman — or in reality perhaps MbS — distinguishes between extreme and less extreme parts of the group. This approach is in line with his more general vision of bringing the Arab world closer together, in large part to counter Iran. Hence the wide coalition that Riyadh has put together in Yemen, as well as its efforts in Syria, where the kingdom sees the conflict against the Iranian-supported Assad regime as an extension of the wider Persian/Arab rivalry.
As for the nuclear agreement, despite a public statement of conditional support for the deal, Riyadh remains very concerned, believing that sanctions relief will be used to finance Iranian troublemaking in the region. The kingdom regards the Obama administration’s defense of the deal as naive and therefore views it with extreme skepticism. King Salman’s visit also coincides with a U.S.-Saudi investment conference, so his delegation is expected to include senior financial and economic figures. As president of the newly established Council of Economic and Development Affairs, a crucial decisionmaking body, MbS is a key personality on this side of the visit as well. While the bilateral relationship remains strong at a business level, there is concern about how the kingdom is being affected by the weak price of oil, which is partially a consequence of continuing high Saudi production — a strategy intended to retain market share and force U.S. shale oil firms to shut down. Already, ambitious construction projects started during the reign of King Abdullah are being delayed and budgets are being cut, including in defense spending. The high production policy has been unsuccessful in raising prices thus far, but there is no indication of it changing — in fact, the Saudis are apparently willing to let prices weaken further.
Finally, although MbS will be careful not to upstage King Salman, his presence alongside the king will likely further benefit his position, which could mean that he will eventually succeed his father rather than MbN. Therefore, despite the range of disagreements between Washington and Riyadh, the visit is another opportunity for U.S. officials to develop a relationship with MbS, with whom they already interacted at the Camp David summit. And regardless of what happens inside the meeting, any post-visit statement will no doubt try to paper over these differences.
**Simon Henderson is the Baker Fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute.

King Salman in Washington
Salman Aldosary/Asharq Al Awsat/September 04/15
By choosing the United States to be the destination of his first visit since acceding to the Saudi throne, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman Bin Abdulaziz has dismissed speculation that the honeymoon between Washington and Riyadh was coming to an end. Both countries have changed their stances on several key issues. Nevertheless, the strategic, historic alliance between them never appeared to be threatened by the winds of change. It is true that their relations chilled and their stances differed in the last few years, but their 70-year alliance that started with the famous 1945 meeting between the late King Abdulaziz Al Saud and the then US President Franklin D. Roosevelt has managed to contain all those differences. In fact, all information points towards continuing this alliance for decades to come. The visit, which has been described by US officials as reflective of the significance of the strategic alliance between Riyadh and Washington, represents an opportunity for both countries to develop bilateral relations under King Salman who is fully familiar with the weaknesses and strengths of the US-Saudi relations and to whose consolidation and continuity he has greatly contributed. When King Salman meets with President Barack Obama on Friday, his message will be undoubtedly clear that Riyadh is committed to the continuity of the strong and historic relations between the two countries and will strive to consolidate and deepen them to serve their mutual interests. Remarkably, the differences between Riyadh and Washington are not about objectives as much as methods. The Saudis cannot be denied the right to exercise pressure by whatever means they see fit in order to influence the US policy in the region. The official circles in Washington presumably understand that and do not object to it.
The current US administration has taken a different line on three main issues, which are perhaps the reason behind the recent tensions between Riyadh and Washington.
First, no progress has been achieved over the past seven years to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict which remains in a state of deadlock. Second, the Obama administration’s reluctance to deal with the Syrian crisis has raised questions about Washington’s credibility and commitment. Third, Iran’s regional ambitions, which began shyly at first, have taken the shape of a hostile policy, something which has been admitted by senior US officials. Later, Iran surprised the world by signing with world powers a nuclear deal that is likely to give Tehran more protection as long as there is no way the international community can ensure that Iran will not violate the terms of the agreement.
It would be a mistake to envision that the Saudi-US relations are based on complete consensus. In fact, relations between the two countries are based on fundamental, mutual interests pertaining to maintaining the security of the Gulf and ensuring the delivery of oil supplies. Officials in both countries have always stressed their mutual security interests while at the same time acknowledging the presence of political differences. One thing to add, the US-Saudi alliance cannot be reduced to the mere import and export of oil.
The magical equation that could bring back warmth to the US-Saudi relations can be summarized in two words: mutual interests. Saudi Arabia has major interests in the US just like Washington has in the region. King Salman’s visit to Washington drives home the message that the winds of change have not affected the US-Saudi relations.

Why King Salman’s visit to Washington matters now
Dr. John C. Hulsman/Al Arabiya/September 04/15
“Darling, this thing is bigger than the both of us”
Keith Richards to Mick Jagger, on the need to resolve their differences within the Rolling Stones
While Israelis are habitually seen as having the edge when it comes to understanding the ways of Washington, it seems to me that King Salman’s astute response to the nuclear deal with Iran has proven far more practically productive than the hapless petulance of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Whereas the Israeli Premier has foolishly spent his political capital futilely rallying American congressional opposition to the deal (and thus incurring the Obama administration’s enmity), the King’s administration has shown itself to be the better political risk analysts. Rather than publicly indulging in a temper tantrum about the nuclear deal, Riyadh seems to have quietly (and tepidly) accepted the inevitable; that Congress will not stop the deal. As such, making the best of it has become the kingdom’s watchword. The reward for such a grown-up response will be the King handing the White House its bill for this valuable diplomatic support during his upcoming visit to Washington this week. For much like Keith Richards’ insight about his fraught ties with Mick Jagger during the Rolling Stones heyday, Riyadh might have come to understand that it is fundamentally in its interests to move on from the nuclear deal, that U.S. -Saudi ties must transcend present tensions as almost nothing can be achieved without the two powers working together in rough concert. Diplomatically, the relationship is truly bigger than the both of them.
The particulars of the bill
There are likely to be three basic questions that are likely to be presented before the Obama White House. First, what the U.S, intends to offer the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states in terms of military hardware, a promise the White House made last Spring. Specifically, the Saudis will seek upgrades for their F-15s, even though Israel worries this might lessen their military edge in the region. Look for the Saudis to also press this issue as a litmus test of how far the White House is prepared to go to retain Saudi favour, given possible congressional opposition to the upgrade. Rather than publicly indulging in a temper tantrum about the nuclear deal, Riyadh seems to have quietly (and tepidly) accepted the inevitable; that Congress will not stop the deal. Riyadh is also an enthusiastic supporter of establishing a GCC rapid reaction force to deal with unanticipated military crises that may emerge in the Gulf State region. Up until now, Washington has merely paid lip service to such a possibility. The Saudi visit will allow the King to probe and see if America will provide more enthusiastic diplomatic support in the near term.
Second, and beyond strategic concerns, look for the Saudis to seek broad America backing for their foreign policy. Since King Salman ascended the throne in January 2015, Saudi Arabia has departed to an extent from Riyadh’s traditional behind-the-scenes foreign policy, instead forthrightly championing measures that explicitly attempt to articulate and further specific Saudi national interests. In particular, the King is likely to press the Obama team to do more in Yemen. Up until now, the U.S. has provided limited logistical and intelligence support for the Saudi-led coalition there. Recently, Riyadh has been pleased that the Pentagon has more than doubled the number of military advisers it has on the ground in Yemen, who provide the kingdom with targeting intelligence for Saudi air strikes against the Iranian-backed Houthi militias. Given the recent coalition advances in the country, look for the Saudis to press the Americans to do even more.
The elephant in the room
Curiously, I believe discussions about the elephant in the corner of the room—the Iran nuclear deal—will only amount to the Saudis’ third priority during the Washington visit. However, with King Salman’s September 4th trip occurring just days before the proposed congressional vote on the Iran deal, everyone will watch his presence. Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic posture has been to endorse the deal, all the while expressing concern over its details. This lukewarm but vital diplomatic support—as is often the case in the rough and tumble world of international relations—has come with strings attached. The Saudis will be seeking concrete assurances from the White House regarding America persevering in establishing a toughened inspections regime over Iran’s nuclear sites, allowing for easier snapback sanctions to be put in place should Iran cheat on the terms of the accord. Rather, than wasting capital coming out against the compact, King Salman will use Saudi diplomatic leverage to make sure the impending deal is in practice as strong as it can be made.
Given both his shrewd reading of the American political facts on the ground over the Iran accord and Keith Richards’ insight that the Saudi-American relationship is truly bigger than the both of them, it is highly likely that King Salman’s diplomatic bill for his support for the administration will be honored. If it is, U.S. -Saudi relations will truly have been re-set.