The Iran strike that never was
Nahum Barnea/Ynetnews/Published: 08.24.15/ Israel Opinion
Op-ed: Ehud Barak’s interview outtakes shown on Channel 2 News tell a skewed version of what happened when the government decided to avoid striking Iran’s nuclear sites. Meir Dagan, Yuval Diskin, Gabi Ashkenazi, Benny Gantz, Gadi Eisenkot, Amir Eshel, Aviv Kochavi, Tamir Pardo, Dan Meridor, Benny Begin, Yuval Steinitz, Moshe Ya’alon – these are the real Israeli patriots when it comes to attacking Iran’s nuclear sites, attacks that did not happen. Plans of attack were discussed three times: In 2010, 2011, and 2013. Allegedly, the top three members of government urged the approval of these plans with all the vigor they could muster. I say “allegedly” because the members in question are Benjamin Netanyahu, Ehud Barak, and Avigdor Lieberman, three men for whom “allegedly” is practically a middle name.
The discussions focused on two questions, one obvious and one crucial. The obvious question was what Barak calls “operational readiness” – can the IDF significantly damage the nuclear sites and bring its pilots back home safely. The crucial question was what is it good for, what will the results of the strike be if it’s successful, what will be the impact on the Iranian nuclear program, what will happen to the Middle East. The interview outtakes of Ehud Barak speaking to Ilan Kfir and Danny Dor, two journalists who have written a new biography of him, which were recently aired on Channel 2 News, focus on the less crucial first question.
Those who hear the outtakes might come to three conclusions: First, that there was some patent, a magic wand, a brilliant operation with which a single blow could have been landed and with it destroy an existential threat to Israel. Second, that there were three brave ministers, determined spirits with the will to take action, but a group of cowardly politicians prevented them from doing so. And third, that among these three was an internal division: Barak was trying his hardest to get the operation greenlit, Lieberman didn’t do very much, and Netanyahu failed as a leader.
Wrong, wrong, wrong.
The main point raised against an attack on Iran was that it would do more harm than good: The moment Israel attacked, Iran would have been free to push its nuclear program forward at full force while claiming self defense. In two years, at the most, it would have manufactured its first bomb. Had we attacked in 2010, Iran would have been nuclear in 2013; had we attacked in 2013, it would have been nuclear today, without binding agreements or international oversight. The Israeli strike could have borne fruit only if it had dragged the United States into war. Israel attacks, Iran retaliates harshly against the Israeli populace, the US is forced to stand with its ally and commit its full military power. The participants in the discussions that took place had to suspect that this was Netanyahu and Barak’s real goal, that this was the gamble. Otherwise, the Israeli attack had no purpose.
The Israeli tail wanted to wag the American dog and start a regional war, one whose end was unknown. If Churchill could recruit Roosevelt into the fight against Hitler, Netanyahu will force Obama into fighting Khamenei. But Obama isn’t Roosevelt, Netanyahu isn’t Churchill, and Khamenei isn’t Hitler. It’s all talk. The heads of the defense establishment who participated in the discussions didn’t want to be seen as cowards. Therefore, they supported spending billions on purchases and training meant to bring the IDF to full operational preparedness. A large part of this investment went down the drain. We can take comfort in the fact that knowledge of the preparations for a possible Israeli attack contributed somewhat to the severity of the sanctions imposed on Iran.
Barak is a dangerous kind of person to drive behind. The kind who might signal left, turn the steering wheel in that direction, and still turn right in the end, or the other way around. It’s doubtful whether we’ll ever know if he really wanted military action, or if he hoped that Netanyahu would back out in the last moment and save him from being responsible for a catastrophe.
The prime minister holds a crucial role in this kind of decision. Ben-Gurion passed every important decision he supported through government votes during the 1948 Independence War, including the decisions on the Altalena Affair and the dissolution of the Palmach. On one decision, a majority of ,inisters voted “no”: Conquering Mount Hebron. They saw that the prime minister was ambivalent. Ben-Gurion would go on to accuse his government of creating an “endless tragedy,” but the ministers knew the truth.
When all the defense chiefs oppose a military operation, the prime minister knows that if it fails, he won’t have anyone to share the blame. Everything will land in his lap. Menachem Begin took that risk when he chose to strike Iraq’s nuclear reactor. He gambled and won. It’s easier to overcome opposition by ministers. When Netanyahu can’t convince Steinitz, there’s no escaping this conclusion: Either Steinitz is, deep down, very conniving – Che Guevara Steinitz – or Netanyahu, influenced by his own motivations, didn’t really try.
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas confirms visit to ‘sister country’ Iran
Roi Kais/Ynetnews/Published: 08.24.15/ Israel News
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas confirmed on Sunday that he will soon visit “sister country” Iran, even though Tehran has denied such a visit would take place. Speaking to Polish reporters in Ramallah, Abbas said that “the details of the visit haven’t been coordinated with Iranian officials yet.” The PA president referred to Iran as “a neighboring, sister country,” saying “Our relations with it were not good, but we have an embassy in Tehran, and therefore it recognizes us.” The embassy in Tehran used to serve as Israel’s embassy, until the 1979 Islamic Revolution, following which it was handed to the Palestinians. PLO Executive Committee member Ahmad Majdalani told Palestinian news agency Ma’an that the possible visit was raised in a meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif during a meeting in Tehran.
“Our relationship with Iran is an urgent necessity concerning international and regional developments,” Majdalani told Ma’an. “They talked about the bilateral relations and the desire to have proper relations between the states, particularly after the nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers,” Abbas said. “What’s important to us is that there is peace and stability and that the Middle East is demilitarized from nuclear weapons.” According to Ma’an, the two sides have reportedly discussed the formation of a joint committee for consultations on political issues, commerce and education exchanges. Last week, Tehran denied reports on Abbas’ October visit, with the Iran Parliament Speaker’s Adviser for International Affairs, Hussein Sheikholeslam, telling a Hamas-affiliated website that the Palestinian Authority has “requested the visit more than once but we haven’t accepted it yet; they have recently repeated their demand once again but we have not provided them with a positive response.”
Sheikholeslam told the Al-Risala website that Tehran “diligently supports the resistance and its fighters,” led by Hamas. If it goes ahead, it would not be Abbas’ first visit to Iran. In 2012, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad served as the president of the Islamic Republic, he met with Abbas in Tehran as part of the Non-Aligned Movement Summit. Ahead of the summit, Iran tried to cause a rift among the Palestinians by inviting Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniyeh as a representative of the Palestinian people as well, but Haniyeh eventually did not attend the summit. In his meeting with Polish journalists, Abbas also addressed the freeze in talks with Israel, saying “we want peace with Israel. Our hand is extended in peace.”
He repeated previous Palestinian condition to returning to the negotiating table, saying that if Israel stopped construction in West Bank settlements, he was willing to immediately start talks.
On Sunday, Abbas resigned from the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) top leadership body, but did not resign as Palestinian president. Abbas told journalists Sunday he and up to 10 others are submitting resignations from the PLO Executive Committee, in an effort to elect a new committee at a rare meeting of the Palestinians’ parliament-in-exile next month. The upcoming shakeup is seen as one of Abbas’ recent efforts to sideline critics and potential rivals. The PLO has atrophied since the 1990s, as power shifted to the Palestinian self-rule government headed by Abbas. Yet changes in the PLO leadership could help determine Abbas’ eventual successor.
The Associated Press contributed to this report.
