MEB:The Impact of Saudi-Iran Escalation on Russia’s Syrian Intervention/Congress Ready to Battle Obama over Iran Sanctions/JSOC “Decapitation” Program Hits ISIL Command

The Impact of Saudi-Iran Escalation on Russia’s Syrian Intervention
MEB/Middle East Briefing/January 17/16

In the general picture of the state of affairs of Russia’s Syrian enterprise, we will detect three important factors impacting what we see now. The first is the escalation in the regional conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The second is the internal logic of an event with the magnitude of the military confrontation in Syria which cannot be pre-molded in any predictions and which might be the ultimate test for any planner. And the third is the internal elements shaping perceptions among Syrians in general and their opposition groups in particular in regard to Russia’s role. These three factors inter-react in a fascinating way to draw a picture that should make Moscow’s strategists very uncomfortable.
The plan of Mr. Putin was to move quickly to end his military role but only after improving future prospects of the Syrian State, weakening “Islamist” opposition and reaching a deal on an “equilibrium point” in the future Syria after. This equilibrium hoped for by Moscow is that which preserves the State, directs arms to fighting terrorists, safeguards Russia’s interests and maintains unity and order.
In regard to Russia’s resources, it is safe to assume that President Putin did not plan an open ended military operation in Syria and that he was planning to make a U-Turn at one point, hopefully after few months, and to scale back his exhausting military effort but only after securing his objectives in Syria.
But as is always the case (remember invading Iraq in 2003), things go according to real life’s logic, not according to preplanned schedules. Deepening regional polarization makes Mr. Putin’s Syrian enterprise more risky than ever. By virtue of the bold military role he chose to play, the Russian President showed that he did not fully understand that he may be unintentionally and gradually closing the door on any attempt to make a U-Turn or reduce his military engagement there. Syria is not Grozny. He cannot kill all Syria rebels. He cannot even kill enough of them to guarantee a mission progress within a reasonable timeframe or a triumphant “mission accomplished”.
Escalation in regional tension would definitely be reflected on Syria’s battle fields and the planned transitional talks. In fact, this regional increase in polarization is making the dynamics of the Syrian crisis worse. While the transitional talks may indeed begin, what we detect behind the façade of the ongoing diplomatic preparations is that positions of the relevant parties are hardening quickly. That makes chances of success even lesser than previously thought. Furthermore, the cards of each side are too visible and readable by the other. This is a factor that reflects on the talks as we will explain in a minute.
Furthermore, the Russian blind air campaign in Syria is killing too many civilians to expect any future opposition overture to Moscow in the post Assad Syria. Official statements from Washington indicate that 70% of Russia’s air raids in Syria targeted opposition forces and civilian, not ISIL. The scars of the Russian heavy-handed military intervention are too deep to be forgotten. Brutal force begets radicalization. And indeed, there is a gradual shift within the body of the opposition under the heavy Russian bombardment. It may not be evident in the statements of the leaders of the opposition or their diplomatically sensitive sponsors, but following social media views testifies clearly to that. And this will certainly be reflected on the negotiating table.
On the other hand, Assad forces cannot achieve any strategic advancement in opposition territories. These forces take a village or two and lose a village or two. But there is nothing to reflect Russia’s planners’ earlier assessment–in the beginning of their military operation in Syria-that their forces engagement may take three to four months. The focus of Assad and the Russian forces now seems to be the areas closer to the “Assad’s Syria”, that is the Western part of the country. But we argued previously that this a dead end anyway.
And then comes the “unknown unknowns”. After The incident of downing a Russian jet by Turkey, we may see more of the same. Currently, Kurdish forces are advancing rapidly in ISIL controlled areas, some of which happen to be adjacent to Turkish borders. This may provoke Turkish forces to cross the borders, which in turn will provoke a Russian military reaction. Ankara should be advised to avoid enterring Syria in the current context.
But the unknown unknowns are difficult to predict by virtue of their own “eternal” definition. The general rule however is that in extremely fluid situations like civil wars, no one can see but only the general lines of the structure of the moment and the trends it is pregnant with. In these cases, the space occupied by unpredictable events is particularly important.
In an attempt to keep his road to reduce his military role opened, Putin gave initial greenlight to the opposition delegation formed in Saudi Arabia in the last few weeks, while negotiating with Washington in Geneva some limited modification. The UN Envoy, Staphan de Mistura refused to receive representatives of groups labeled by the Assad regime as “the legitimate opposition”. This “legitimate opposition” is mainly made of organizations built by Assad security lieutenants to replace the real opposition groups in the negotiations. Russia did not insist on including this “legitimate opposition”, while de Mistura refused to see them.
If all details are set aside, we easily see a future path for Russia and Iran in Syria which, if the civil war goes on, cannot be extended by virtue of the objective balance of power. Could it be extended by negotiations? In other words, could what proved to be impossible to achieve militarily be achieved through talks and diplomacy? The modern times Master of Negotiations Dr. Henry Kissinger explained the central role of perceptions in any similar talks. In reality, that is objectively speaking, Russia, Assad and Iran do not stand a serious chance to win in the war fields. So, they will try to win through Syria’s peace process which is about to start. In fact, to get a solution favorite to Russia’s interests and pull out quickly was one of the raison d’etre of the Russian intervention in the first place, that is if a decisive military victory is not achieved fast enough.
Yet, the real balance of power, objectively defined, may be different than the perceptions of it formed in the minds of the concerned parties. The actual balance of power, on regional scale, has been tested here and there for some time. Yet, the energy in the conflict is so overwhelming that a proper analysis of reality is not crystalized distinctively enough in the minds to make these parties change their calculations. This what makes Syria difficult to negotiate.
The trilateral alliance’s (Russia, Assad and Iran) general idea here is to use whatever momentum Russian air raids provided, in addition to international pressure, to try to reach a deal that does not reflect the existing objective shortcomings of their military reach looked at from a longer time perspective. In other words, the three allied forces understand that tomorrow will not be better than today, therefore they will try to reach the best possible deal based on the situation of today. Here, perceptions come to play an important role.
This is why Moscow, which understands the real nature of the dilemma, quietly abandoned the bulk of its outlandish objections to the representatives of some armed groups. This decision came parallel to a series of assassinations of prominent opposition leaders (a less expensive method to shape the opponents). These assassinations were most likely conducted by Assad intelligence services. It was an attempt to “trim” the representation of the opposition and get rid of some of its most recognized faces.
Therefore, we have regional escalation, embittered opposition and unknown unknowns which keep coming. We also have an objective reality that encourages a continuation of the conflict so long as one side believes it will win all, and a daring diplomatic attempt to end the conflict. And we have negotiating parties which seem to read the situation more or less accurately, that is as it is.
The only influenceable element in this equation is that of perceptions (And that is what Putin is trying to do by his forces in Syria). And the proper place for changing perceptions may be the introduction of a factor that comes from the future, not from a potential zero sum game supported on an accurate reading of the situation on the ground. In other words by introducing uncertain and intentionally left ambiguous consequences of failure. This is why such a particular element must be introduced to the current calculations of all participants. And this is the only way to compensate for the lack of global leadership that is capable of forming a wide international coalition to pacify Syria diplomatically.
As it stands now, perceptions pretty much match reality. In other words, we will be entering the negotiations with the cards of each side too visible to the other. Creative ambiguity in words would not be much of a help. Creative ambiguity in future actions may be needed. Conceptually, some element of the equation must be intentionally made unknown or unclear in order to leave the concerned parties in a state of trying to calculate the impact of such future actions on the perceived future course of actions. Without introducing such “unknowns”, the logical base of the talks seems to be shaky at best. Otherwise we are left with a balance of power nit conductive to a deal, and an accurate reading of this fact by all concerned parties.
This might be not sufficient to get the talks to a successful conclusion. But reality is not conductive to success either. And if the future course of events is too clear and easily predictable, there will be nothing much that could save the talks.
Unspecified, or ambiguous, consequences of failure in the transitional process should be waved in front of all parties to influence their perceptions of what may follow failure. But the other half of the cup should be to illustrate as concretely as possible the results of success and how this will achieve the goals of the Syrian revolution. It is important to show, in the first day of the talks, that the Syrian people are indeed the principle beneficent of peace, and to indicate that the truth of what will happen in the talks will be announced to all Syrians and that those who made the talks a success or a failure will be revealed publicly. If it is Assad who would bring the talks to failure, and as he does not care of being condemned globally, the Russians have to make the consequences clear to him beforehand.
As much as possible, the impact of the regional polarization on the talks has to be contained, and the bright and peaceful future for all Syrians should be explained as the promised outcome of a successful transitional talks.
Overall, and from a certain perspective, the Syrian talks will start in the worst possible timing. Yet, it has to be clear to all parties that the suffering of civilians in Syria will not be tolerated any longer. Those around the negotiations table should not be given an easy way out without a deal. The major global parties participating in the talks should indicate that they will be ready to act even militarily to stop the Syrian tragedy if the talks fail to reach a reasonable solution. It is no longer sufficient to limit any role to fighting ISIL. The goal should be peace and freedom to all Syrians. Depriving Syrians from their freedom and peace is the reason ISIL is there in the first place.

Congress Ready to Battle Obama over Iran Sanctions
MEB/Middle East Briefing/January 17/16
Although the Obama Administration has reached a quiet deal with the Iranians over the two recent ballistic missile tests that violate United Nations resolutions, a bipartisan bloc in the US Congress is ready to go to war against the White House over the scheduled lifting of sanctions against Iran. Given the bipartisan skepticism over the Administration’s handling of the negotiations with Tehran, there is a very real prospect that the Congress could impose new sanctions or enforcement demands on Iran that would pass by a veto-proof majority.
The biggest leverage that the Obama Administration has to push back against the Congressional revolt is the fact that Iran did ship 25,000 pounds of enriched uranium to Russia, as part of its compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known as the P5+1 deal. By late January, Iran could complete the other remaining requirements, including the reconfiguring of the Arak heavy water reactor, to prevent the production of plutonium, and the introduction of new, intrusive IAEA inspections. At that point, President Obama would begin to issue waivers on existing US sanctions, at the same time that the United Nations is prepared to lift sanctions. Opponents call this looming deadline “Implementation Day.”
Despite this, Iran has conducted two ballistic missile tests—in October and November 2015—that violated UN Security Council resolutions, and US Congressional opponents of the P5+1 deal have seized upon these violations to press for both new sanctions and a ten year extension of existing sanctions against Iran. Several new pieces of Congressional legislation, introduced just before the end of last year, zero in on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and call for new sanctions against IRGC business collaborators. These legislations will gain more momentum after recent IRGC provocations in the Gulf against US Navy vessels.
Those “indirect sanctions,” along with the visa restrictions passed by Congress and signed into law by President Obama before the Christmas-New Year recess, could impact as many as 38 US allies. Already the Iranian Foreign Ministry has issued a blistering response to the visa restrictions, which impact anyone travelled to Iran, Iraq, Syria or Sudan in the past five years. The Iranians claim the new law violates the P5+1 deal. Obama Administration officials, including Secretary of State John Kerry, have tried to assure Tehran that the measures are directed against the Islamic State, and will not impede US-Iranian business activities. Just before the year-end recess, three bills were introduced into the US House, all of which target the IRGC—and the P5+1 deal. Opponents of the Obama-Tehran deal see these legislative initiatives as powerful tools to block Iran agreements.
Rep. Devin Nunes, Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, has introduced H.R. 4257, the IRGC Sanctions Act, blocking President Obama from removing Iran from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, and restricting all US business dealings with the IRGC and its front companies and business agents. It would, in effect, block Obama or any future president from lifting trade sanctions against Iran. Nunes has 26 co-sponsors on the bill.
H.R. 4258—the Quarantining the Ayatollah’s State Sponsored Aggression and Militancy Act (“QASSAM Act”)—imposes new sanctions on any entities with 20 percent or more IRGC ownership. Under the Ahmadinejad regime, IRGC virtually took over the Iranian economy, through majority holdings in all essential corporations. The bill would also mandate divestment of all Federal, state and local government dealings with individuals trading with IRGC fronts.
The IRGC Sanctions Implementation and Review Act would authorize the US Comptroller of the Currency to provide annual reports to the President and Congress on all individuals and entities doing business with the IRGC, and would allow the Comptroller to receive information from both government agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The Act would force the President to grant waivers, permitting business transactions with IRGC partners.
The Senate is close to passing veto-proof legislation that would further push back against President Obama’s rush to open business with Iran and unfreeze assets. A powerful bipartisan group of Senators, including the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ben Cardin, is promoting a ten year extension on the original Iran Sanctions Act, which would extend the bill to 2026. The bill is sponsored by Senators Robert Menendez and Mark Kirk, and has the backing of two Republican presidential candidates—Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz. Senator Bob Corker, chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is also supporting the Kirk-Menendez bill in principle.
The Senate bill would require four Democratic votes to secure a veto-proof majority, and Menendez and Cardin are already on board, and two other Democratic Senators, Chris Coons of Delaware and Gary Peters of Michigan have indicated their support for the idea of sanctions extension.
For the moment, the Obama Administration’s behind-the-scenes deal with Tehran over restrictions on future ballistic missile tests (see last week’s MEB) is delaying immediate Congressional action. But Congressional leaders vow that there will be action taken up in the first two months of the 2016 session. Any action by Iran, whether a new missile test, an aggression against US interests in Iraq or elsewhere, or any act of international terrorism attributed to the IRGC, would trigger a firestorm on Capitol Hill, one that Obama, who is already a lame-duck and has been widely criticized as a weak leader, would have a hard time putting out.

JSOC “Decapitation” Program Hits ISIL Command
MEB/Middle East Briefing/January 17/16
In December, MEB highlighted the significance of the announcement by US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter of the deployment of 200 US commandos from the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) to Iraq and Syria, to join the fight against the Islamic State (ISIL). At the time, we noted that these special counter-terror teams would be operating independent of the Iraqi Armed Forces, as self-standing “decapitation” units, targeting leaders of the Islamic State on both sides of the Iraq-Syria border.
In the aftermath of the Nov. 13 Paris attacks and the subsequent shootings in San Bernardino, California, the JSOC teams increased their operating tempo and have now succeeded in killing a number of top Islamic State leaders, including the mastermind of the Paris attacks. Col. Steve Warren confirmed, in a Dec. 29 Pentagon briefing, that a JSOC operation had killed Charaffe al Mouadan on Dec. 24, at an undisclosed location inside Syrian territory. Mouadan was identified as the planner of the Nov. 13 Paris attacks and was in direct contact with the leader of the Paris attacks, Abdel Hamid Abaaoud.
Mouadan and nine other “high value” ISIL figures were killed in drone strikes in Syria and Iraq, between Dec. 7 and 27, all as the result of the JSOC operations.
JSOC teams have been able to develop a more precise map of the Islamic State leadership and vital personnel, and have greatly increased the speed in which actionable intelligence has been used to hit priority decapitation targets in ISIL strongholds.
Other key ISIL figures who have been killed in the December drone strikes, called in by JSOC teams on the ground in Iraq and Syria, included Siful Haque Sujan, a British-trained computer hacker who was identified as a key figure in the Islamic State’s cyber warfare structures; Abu Anas, a key demolition expert and explosives manufacturer; and Yunis Khalash, the deputy emir of the Islamic State for finance. Several other, unnamed top cyber operatives for ISIL have also been killed in the targeted drone strikes.
The Pentagon’s assessment of the first month of the JSOC “decapitation program” is that it has begun to shift the balance against the Islamic State. ISIL leadership is, for the first time, concerned that their organizational profile has been successfully penetrated and that key individuals are more vulnerable to assassination. This is impacting the ability of the Islamic State to manage its territories and maintain the recently-launched global terrorist offensive. Some of the individuals killed in the targeted strikes are considered by Pentagon intelligence analysts to be “indispensable” to the functioning of the group. “The drone kills have been successful because they are based on perfect intelligence,” one official noted. The JSOC teams, operating independent of any reliance on poorly sourced intelligence, coming from Iraqi and Syrian sources, and with real-time ability to call in drone strikes, have been able to carry out precision strikes that depend on pinpoint timing.
The US JSOC deployments are not the only “decapitation” actions underway in Iraq and Syria. On Dec. 25, a Russian or Syrian missile hit a meeting of the Islam Army (Jaish al-Islam) in the Eastern Ghouta region of Syria just outside of Damascus, killing a number of leaders of the Saudi-backed group, including the group’s undisputed leader Zahran Alloush. In July 2012, Islam Army, then known as the Islam Brigade (Liwa al-Islam), had grabbed headlines by claiming credit for the killing of a number of top Syrian national security officials, in a bombing at the National Security Office in Damascus.
Under the terms of the United Nations Security Council resolutions, that were passed unanimously in mid-December, a meeting of the Vienna group with leaders of both the Syrian opposition and Syrian government representatives is scheduled in Geneva on Jan. 16-17. The intent is to negotiate terms of a cease-fire involving government and rebel forces, excluding the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra.