Manuel Almeida: Russia may be salvaging the ‘Axis of Resistance’/Abdallah Schleifer: Obama and Sisi: Whose cold shoulder/Dr. Majid Rafizadeh:Signs of further cooperation between the U.S. and Iran
Russia may be salvaging the ‘Axis of Resistance’ Manuel Almeida/Al Arabiya/October 02/15
Defined by its anti-Western and anti-Israeli stance, the so-called “Axis of Resistance” has over the last decade gone through an up-and-down trajectory. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq provided a boost to the Iranian-led block, with the rise to power in Iraq of pro-Iranian Shiite politicians such as Nouri al-Maliki and the gradual growth of various Shiite militias in Iraq. After Hezbollah’s display of resilience in the war against Israel in the summer of 2006, the leader of the Iranian-sponsored militia, Hassan Nasrallah, was hailed as a hero by many in the Muslim world, despite the loss of hundreds of experienced fighters and the conflict’s devastating consequences for Lebanon. However, the eruption of the Syrian conflict and the prospect of seeing President Bashar al-Assad fall represented a life-threatening development for the axis. Thus, Iran and Hezbollah intervened to protect a leader slaughtering his own population and willing to burn Syria to the ground.
Backlash
This intervention shattered the image the Iranian regime had been seeking for itself as protector of Muslims in distress. Palestine’s Hamas, the only Sunni member of the axis, closed its main office in Damascus and broke away in 2012. Beyond Hezbollah’s need to preserve key supply routes and strategic lines, in the eyes of many in the region it also revealed the militia’s darkest side and its loyalty to Iran’s supreme leader above all else, while neglecting its obligation to shield Lebanon from the mess next door. It would be both a strategic straightjacket and a display of insecurity from President Vladimir Putin to tie Russia so closely to the Iranian-led axis. Former Hezbollah Secretary-General Subhi al-Tufayli, who had split from the movement after criticizing it as “too moderate,” accused it of no longer being the party that defends the Umma (Islamic Nation). “Instead it plagues the Umma,” he said in an interview. Despite the Iranian-led efforts to prop up Assad, government forces lost control of much of the territory, and the Sunni opposition grew increasingly radicalized. The various opposition groups, including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have built up the pressure on the regime, to the point that Assad himself recognized bluntly this summer that his army was severely struggling. The current Russian military build-up in Syria is inescapably linked to that recognition, although Russian intentions are complex. With Assad, Iran and Hezbollah under pressure, is the ongoing Russian intervention just what the axis needs to eventually regain the upper hand in Syria?
New coalition?
With Moscow already conducting aerial strikes in Syria following approval from Russia’s parliament, according to Iraqi military officials there is an effort under way to intensify intelligence and security cooperation between Russia, Iran, Iraq and Syria to confront ISIS. Going far beyond intelligence and security cooperation, the editor-in-chief of the pro-Hezbollah daily newspaper Al-Akbhar recently claimed that secret talks between the four countries have given birth to a new alliance, “the most important in the region and the world for many years.” Wishful thinking? Yes, says the president of Iran. Just a few days ago in New York, Hassan Rouhani dismissed the claims about an Iranian-Russian coalition. All there is between Iran and Russia, he claimed, is intelligence-sharing. Yet Rouhani still recognized that the Iranian and Russian views of the Syrian crisis are like “a mirror” of one another. It would be both a strategic straightjacket and a display of insecurity from President Vladimir Putin, who aspires to beef up his country’s global and Middle Eastern roles, to tie Russia so closely to the Iranian-led axis. The debate about Russia’s intentions will go on, but at least a few aspects of its Syria strategy seem relatively consensual among pundits: protect and strengthen the Syrian regime, degrade ISIS, and ensure a key role for Russia in any future political settlement. The axis has cornered millions of Syrians between Assad’s forces, Shiite militias and ISIS. Russia may be on the way to giving it a major hand.
Moreover, it is possible Moscow will eventually realize that Iran’s cynical position on Syria – serious negotiations on a political settlement and regime reform only when and if ISIS is defeated – is a disaster for Syria and the region, and thus contrary to Russian interests. The main doubt until the airstrikes began was whether or not Moscow was being honest about the only military target being ISIS, and not every opposition group threatening Assad’s regime. Soon after the first sorties by Russian airplanes, the opposition Free Syrian Army (FSA) claimed the strikes did not hit ISIS but other opposition groups as well as civilians. On Thursday, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov admitted that “the aim is really to help the armed forces of Syria in their weak spots.”Even if Russian airstrikes target mainly ISIS – something quite complicated to achieve – then the big problem with Russia’s new assertiveness on Syria lies with the unintended consequences. Without a push for a political settlement, the effort to beef up the Syrian regime’s military strength and protect it from the most radical groups can have an impact on the conflict beyond the fight against ISIS. If that happens, Russia, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, will be contributing to the further weakening of the moderate opposition groups and the irreversible fragmentation of Syria. In 2012, Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior advisor to Iran’s supreme leader and former foreign minister, described the importance of Syria to the axis: “The chain of resistance against Israel by Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the new Iraqi government and Hamas passes through the Syrian highway… Syria is the golden ring of the chain of resistance against Israel.” Today, the axis has cornered millions of Syrians between Assad’s forces, Shiite militias and ISIS. Russia may be on the way to giving it a major hand.
Obama and Sisi: Whose cold shoulder? Abdallah Schleifer/Al Arabiya/October 02/15
As significant as everything Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said when he addressed the U.N. General Assembly this week is what he did not do. That was to travel to Washington to meet with U.S. President Barack Obama, who could alternatively have found time, as he did last year, for a private meeting with Sisi in New York. Obama did find time to meet privately with Russian President Vladimir Putin and talk about Sisi, because when that meeting was over it was announced that Egypt should participate in the international contact group on Syria, which meets later this month. Egypt’s Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry would not agree with me. According to him, a trip to Washington was scheduled, but had to be called off because Sisi had to return to Egypt given the recent cabinet reshuffle. However, both Sisi and Obama were in New York, and both found time to meet with other heads of state. For all America’s continuous harping on about Egypt’s human rights abuses, Sisi’s importance and accomplishments have been honored by the rest of the world. Sisi was particularly active.
He met with French President Francois Hollande, and thanked him for facilitating Egypt’s purchase of two aircraft carriers for helicopters. Sisi also met with Jordan’s King Abdullah, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abaidi, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, Senegalese President Macky Sall, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, and Italy’s Prime Minister Matteo Renzi. Libya was reportedly the main topic of the meeting with Renzi, who was asked to support lifting the arms embargo against the Libyan army, which is fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). So Shoukry’s denial that there was anything significant about Obama and Sisi not meeting does not really hold up. How could a cabinet reshuffle take precedence over a meeting with the U.S. president? Who decided not to meet? In his interviews, Sisi went out of his way not to be openly critical of U.S. policy toward Egypt, as he has been previously. Not only did he declare that relations with the United States were “strategic and stable,” but said Washington had never let Egypt down. Sisi sounded almost wistful or melancholic rather than upset when he told CNN: “The last two years were a real test of endurance and strength of the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship.”
Regional issues
In his U.N. General Assembly speech, Sisi talked about the problem of Palestine. He said the creation of a Palestinian state would eliminate one of the most dangerous pretexts for extremism and terrorism. “The recent events at Al-Aqsa [mosque] emphasize the need for a comprehensive solution,” he added. In an implicit reference to the peace plan endorsed by the Arab League, Sisi said he hoped other Arab states would be able to follow Egypt in making peace with Israel. The most controversial part of Sisi’s speech dealt with Syria. He warned that the civil war must not end with the collapse of the Syrian army and state, as this would lead to the regime’s weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. Both Obama and Sisi are opposed to ISIS, and both believe in a political solution in which President Bashar al-Assad could initially play a role in a transitional government. However, Sisi does not denounce Assad, while Obama stresses the Syrian president’s culpability. If Washington has restored all its commitments to supply Egypt’s armed forces, and if Obama’s secretary of state was in Cairo to revive strategic talks, why would Obama not find time for Sisi? It is possible that Obama cannot get over the fact that, for all America’s continuous harping on about Egypt’s human rights abuses, Sisi’s importance and accomplishments have been honored by the rest of the world, except for Turkey and to a lesser degree Qatar. Sisi threw into disarray Obama’s strategic plan, dating back to 2009, to cultivate the Muslim Brotherhood because it allegedly would play a vital and effective role against Al-Qaeda once in power. Although it violates foreign policy realism, heads of state can hold grudges.
Signs of further cooperation between the U.S. and Iran
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Al Arabiya/October 02/15
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani contradicted Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s remarks about their country’s potential rapprochement with the United States. Although Khamenei continues to reject any additional detente, Iran’s latest tactical shift in its foreign policies and priorities, as well as Rouhani’s message at the U.N. General Assembly, suggest a different landscape.Although Iranian leaders’ speeches are just a collection of words rather than actions, if we analyze Rouhani’s speech meticulously, the broader tone of his remarks suggest two major and intriguing issues. Firstly, the general tone was of Tehran’s willingness to further engage with the West and the United States. The engagement appears to be on two levels: economic and geopolitical. Rouhani said Iran is prepared to be a regional business hub by increasing economic deals with the West and other nations. This shows that Rouhani, under Khamenei’s supervision, is putting economic and national interests ahead of ideological interests. Washington will continue to indirectly ratchet up Iran’s global legitimacy and projection of power due to U.S. unwillingness to act decisively. Secondly, Rouhani depicted Iran as a country fighting terrorism and willing to cooperate with the international community to resolve conflicts in the region. In other words, he is attempting to ratchet up Iran’s global and regional legitimacy without mentioning its role in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, and without attracting attention to the role of Al-Quds force – a branch of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that operates in foreign countries – in fueling conflicts in the region.
Economy and ideology
Tehran’s increased geopolitical legitimacy on the global stage – which is orchestrated by Iranian leaders and indirectly facilitated by U.S. foreign policy toward Tehran – can have significant impacts on Iran’s embattled economy, causing it to revive more quickly. Western countries are more willing to do business with Iran when its legitimacy is viewed as being restored. This legitimacy is validated by Washington’s view of Iran as a significant player with a constructive role in resolving conflicts and fighting terrorism. However, since Washington does not have clear and detailed policies toward Middle East conflicts, it is more willing to delegate the task of fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and resolving the crises in Syria and Yemen, to Tehran and Moscow or other nations. This suggests that Washington will continue to indirectly ratchet up Iran’s global legitimacy and projection of power due to U.S. unwillingness to act decisively.
Continued hostility?
Some might argue that Rouhani is not sending signals of further bilateral cooperation, since he slammed Washington over the conflicts in the region. The argument goes that the supreme leader made clear that there would be no further rapprochement. However, Khamenei previously drew several red lines regarding the nuclear deal, only for most of them to be crossed. Khamenei’s public statements do not genuinely reflect the way he instructs his president and senior cadre of the IRGC in private. In public, he has to reiterate Iran’s anti-American policies due to his need to satisfy his social base’s revolutionary principles. In addition, Rouhani needs to satisfy his critics at home by criticizing the United States and certain countries in the region. Tactical cooperation between Tehran and Washington, and between Tehran and the West, is likely to increase. However, this will not resolve regional crises because Tehran will not alter its foreign policy fundamentally.
Khamenei is instructing the president’s team to prioritize national and economic interests over revolutionary ones. This is due to the fact that the nuclear deal and Iran’s change of tone on the global stage would not have been possible without a green light from the supreme leader. Every crucial foreign policy issue enacted by the president has to be approved by the supreme leader. Although Iran is prioritizing its economic and national interests, this does not necessarily mean that Tehran is abandoning its revolutionary norms. It cannot afford to do so because they are the deep-rooted character of the government and how it gains its legitimacy. This revolutionary establishment is even out of Khamenei’s control. Prioritizing economic and national interests is a short-term tactical shift. Such prioritization, the indirect American facilitation of Iran’s global legitimacy, and the U.S. wait-and-see foreign policy in the Middle East, suggest that tactical cooperation between Tehran and Washington, and between Tehran and the West, is likely to increase. However, this will not resolve regional crises because Tehran will not alter its foreign policy or revolutionary norms fundamentally
