English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For October 17/2026
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news

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Bible Quotations For today
I tell you, there is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner who repents.
Luke 15/08-10:””What woman having ten silver coins, if she loses one of them, does not light a lamp, sweep the house, and search carefully until she finds it? When she has found it, she calls together her friends and neighbours, saying, “Rejoice with me, for I have found the coin that I had lost.” Just so, I tell you, there is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner who repents.’”

Titles For The English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on October 16-17/2026
Lebanon’s Judiciary is Kidnapped and the Military Court Protects the Iranian Occupation… The Complaint Against Ambassador Nada Mouaouad is a Scandal and an Insult to the Judiciary, to the President of the Republic, and to the Government/Elias Bejjani/October 15/2026
The Martyrs of October 13, 1990: Michel Aoun’s Betrayal of Them and of Lebanon, and His Descent into the Illusions of Power and Money/Elias Bejjani/October 13/2026
Hezbollah announces ‘Promise and Commitment’ housing and reconstruction program/David Daoud and Ahmad Sharawi/ FDD's Long War Journal/October 16/2026
Rubio tells Aoun not to return seized explosives to Hezbollah
Is Israel Signaling a Wider Occupation of Southern Lebanon?
Hezbollah’s Support Base Dismayed Over Limited Compensation
Lebanon Revokes Bank Saderat Iran’s License amid US Pressure
Intimidation Through Memory: Fear as a Substitute for Assassination
Visiting Qatari PM vows to solve Lebanon's electricity crisis
Visiting Iranian official calls on Lebanese govt. to 'arm everyone'
Qatari PM meets Aoun, says Israel must let Lebanese Army deploy in South
Syria says Kayali's 'arrest' in Lebanon was coordinated with Lebanese authorities
'Doctor Food' released from jail under new amnesty law
Trump move to restart direct US flights with Lebanon hits roadblock

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on October 16-17/2026
Trump Says US May Need to Strike Iran's Pickaxe Mountain
Iran President Says Conflict in Mideast Amounts to 'Ecocide'
Trump Says US May Need to Strike Iran's Pickaxe Mountain
Pezeshkian: We Are Ready for Dialogue and Do Not Seek Nuclear Weapons... He Emphasized That Continued US Sanctions on His Country Would Exacerbate the Situation
US military aids financial chokehold on Iran, blocking $25 billion in oil exports
Iran is backing and encouraging escalated Houthi attacks: Senior Saudi diplomat
CENTCOM: Strait of Hormuz Under US and Regional Partner Control, Not Iran’s
CENTCOM Commander: 400 Commercial Vessels Transited the Strait of Hormuz in the Last Week
Iran Reaffirms It Does Not Seek Nuclear Weapons and Signals Readiness for Dialogue
Teen Sentenced to 20 Years for UK Murder Plot Tied to Iran-linked Group
17,000 Strikes on Houthis Since Launch of Operation Dawn of Yemen
Coalition Intercepts Ballistic, Cruise Missiles and UAVs
Sanaa Tribes Hamper Houthi Push to Expand Recruitment
Iraq Parliament Fills Cabinet Posts, Naming a US-Sanctioned Deputy Prime Minister
Iraq Says it Lost $60Bn Due to Mideast War
China Says Israel Should Stop Its 'Forced Establishment' of West Bank Settlements
Netanyahu Says Spoke with Syria’s Sharaa on Sweida Unrest
Israeli Settlers Attack Palestinians During Olive Harvest
Italy names senior Israelis, Katz in probe over Gaza flotilla activists
Israel's Arab-led parties could decide the election if anyone would partner with them
Commercial goods are no longer entering Gaza, raising fears of worsening shortages
Pope Leo Celebrates Mass in Hospital After Cancer Surgery

Titles For The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on October 16-17/2026
Do Not Provoke Us!': The Extremist Persecution of Christians, June 2026/Raymond Ibrahim/Gatestone Institute/October 16, 2026
Les équivoques d’un pays en fin de parcours/Dr. Charles Chartouni/icibeyrouth/October 15/2026
The Ambiguities of a Country at the End of Its Road/Dr. Charles Chartouni/icibeyrouth/October 15, 2026
Question: What is Moralistic Therapeutic Deism?/GotQuestions.org//October 16, 2026
The Next War of Attrition is in Yemen/Ari Heistein and Edmund Fitton-Brown/The Cipher Brief/October 16/2026 |
Iran: A Cluster of Problems/Amir Taheri/Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
Why Not Deal With the Houthis Instead of Fighting Them?/Abdulrahman Al-Rashed/Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
Selected Face Book & X tweets on October 16/2026

Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on October 16-17/2026
Lebanon’s Judiciary is Kidnapped and the Military Court Protects the Iranian Occupation… The Complaint Against Ambassador Nada Mouaouad is a Scandal and an Insult to the Judiciary, to the President of the Republic, and to the Government
Elias Bejjani/October 15/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/10/158299/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WjqWyVZwwjU&t=10s
There has been no judiciary in Lebanon since the era of the barbaric Syrian occupation. What exists is a security and judicial branch of the Iranian occupation axis, run by the terrorist Hezbollah and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, the king of corruption and corrupting, Iran’s parliamentary front and its ugly tool behind which the leaders of the terrorist Hezbollah hide.
It is a confiscated judiciary, fully controlled. Its mission is not to enforce justice, but to intimidate and terrorize, the Lebanese, to muzzle them, and to pursue anyone who rejects the lie of the “Resistance” and its Iranian enterprise.
Hezbollah, with its diabolical mindset, has invented a cheap method of intimidation: an army of lawyers working for it, whose sole task is to file reports and complaints against every free Lebanese — journalist, activist, writer, business owner, ordinary citizen. The charge is ready-made and canned: “Insulting the Resistance,” “Cursing the Resistance,” or the most vulgar and common charge: “Violating the laws that consider Israel an enemy.” They practice full-fledged legal prostitution, and their insolence, debauchery, and political prostitution have reached the point of filing a claim against Lebanon’s Ambassador to Washington, Mrs. Nada Hamadeh, because she performed a basic humanitarian act and contacted her colleague, the Israeli Ambassador in Washington, to wish his son a speedy recovery after he was targeted in a terrorist attack by a Palestinian jihadist criminal in the West Bank.
What inhuman depravity is this? Disabled minds and anesthetized — if not dead — sensibilities. How could Ambassador Hamadeh not contact her colleague, the Israeli Ambassador, when she heads the Lebanese dialogue delegation with Israel and spends long hours with him in dialogue and in preparation for it?
In the same context, Hezbollah singles out with its claims honorable, free and sovereign activists such as the writer and director Youssef Khoury, against whom the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council — which is nothing more than a religious arm of Hezbollah — filed a claim on charges of “Insulting the Karbala incident.” And in this domain we have dozens of claims filed by Hezbollah against anyone who does not agree with and cheer for their lie, their deception, and their Persian-Iranian trade in bloody and farcical theatrics of what is called “resistance.”
The Lebanese Constitution does not name Israel as an enemy, nor any other state: Contrary to the lies of Hezbollah’s media, there is not a single text in the Lebanese Constitution that defines or imposes enmity toward Israel or any other state. This is an established legal fact; as the legal and historical framework of Lebanon’s relationship with Israel was not defined by the Constitution, but by the General Armistice Agreement of 1949, which remained a foundational point in the Taif Agreement that became the current Constitution. The Constitution in its preamble says only that Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent homeland, a final homeland for all its sons, committed to the charters of the United Nations and to coexistence. As for defining the enemy, it left it to practice and deed, i.e., to whoever violates sovereignty and occupies land. And here we say it clearly: He who fits the constitutional definition of the enemy today is Hezbollah itself, because it is the one that violates the Constitution, occupies the country and confiscates its decision, contradicts the charter of coexistence, and violates sovereignty by land, sea, and arms.
Where then did the charge of “the enemy” come from? From two expired ordinary laws:
A- The Law Boycotting Israel, issued on June 23, 1955: Issued under Camille Chamoun in compliance with the resolutions of the Arab League, and stipulates in its first article that: “It is prohibited for any natural or legal person to conclude by himself or through an intermediary an agreement with bodies or persons residing in Israel or belonging to it by nationality or working for its account or for its benefit, whenever the subject of the agreement is commercial transactions or financial operations or any other dealing whatever its nature.” Noting that all Arab states have completely abandoned this law and most of them have concluded peace agreements with the State of Israel.
B- The Lebanese Penal Code:
Article 285: “Shall be punished by imprisonment for at least one year and a fine of no less than two hundred thousand Lebanese pounds, every Lebanese and every person residing in Lebanon who undertakes or attempts to undertake, directly or through a borrowed person, a commercial deal or any purchase or sale or barter deal with one of the nationals of the enemy or with a person residing in the enemy’s country.”
Article 286: “Shall be punished with the same penalty whoever contributes to a loan or subscription for the benefit of a hostile state.”
Articles 278 and following: Criminalize contact with the enemy with the intent to oppose state projects, and its penalty reaches life imprisonment with hard labor.
These articles were enacted to punish commercial and financial deals and military espionage, not to punish a humanitarian contact or diplomatic dialogue carried out by Lebanon’s official Ambassador who heads the negotiating delegation.
The Armistice Agreement nullifies absolute enmity: And this is the knockout blow to all of Hezbollah’s bravado and heresies. The Lebanese-Israeli Armistice Agreement signed in Ras al-Naqoura on March 23, 1949, under the auspices of the United Nations, does not mention the word “enemy” at all in its full text published in the United Nations archive.
The terms used in the text are:
“The parties to the present agreement”
“facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine”
Article One affirms “mutual guarantees” and “the right of each party to its security,” and Article Two affirms that the provisions of the agreement are “dictated exclusively by military considerations” and do not prejudice the final peaceful settlement. In international law, states that sign an armistice agreement between them, define an armistice line, and establish a joint armistice commission, are no longer legally in a state of absolute enmity, but in a state of temporary truce paving the way for permanent peace. The agreement itself stipulates that it remains in force “until a peaceful settlement between the parties is achieved.”
So, how can the humanitarian contact of Lebanon’s Ambassador be a crime of “contact with the enemy,” while the Lebanese state itself is a signatory with this party to an armistice agreement recognized by the United Nations until today? Ambassador Mouaouad is also officially tasked by the President of the Republic and the Government with the negotiating mission with the State of Israel that she is carrying out.
The truth is that it was not Israel who violated the truce and abrogated it, but Lebanon when it allowed, since the Cairo Agreement of 1969, Palestinian terrorist organizations and then the terrorist, jihadist Hezbollah — a criminal organization — to use its land as a platform for war against Israel, which transformed Lebanon from a truce state into a state of aggression.
The Military Court… The Court of the Inquisition
And here comes the most dangerous role: the role of the Military Court, which should be called the Military Court of Hezbollah and Nabih Berri. It is the one that encroaches upon free people and issues unjust, illegal, and unconstitutional judgments against them, in literal implementation of Hezbollah’s agenda. The court is not a court, but rather a tool of repression and a sword hanging over the necks of Lebanese who reject the Iranian occupation and before that rejected and resisted the Syrian occupation. Therefore, the national and legal demand is clear: abolish and close the Military Court immediately, annul all judgments it has issued, and prosecute the judges who headed it because they betrayed their oath and betrayed justice.
The Lebanese judiciary must free itself from the yoke of the corrupt and heretical Berri and from the jihadist and terrorist Hezbollah, and must categorically refuse to accept any complaint filed by Hezbollah or its lawyers, against anyone and for any reason. And why? Because legally, Hezbollah is an illegitimate organization and outside the law in accordance with the decisions of the current Lebanese government itself, which approved the exclusivity of arms in the hands of the state. It is an illegal armed militia, a criminal organization that assassinated hundreds of Lebanese and thousands of Syrians, and carried out for Iran hundreds of terrorist operations in dozens of countries, and is listed on the terrorism list of the Arab League and in dozens of regional and international countries, noting that the United States classifies it as a terrorist and criminal group fully affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
Sound legal logic does not call for accepting the complaints of Hezbollah and Nabih Berri, but for dissolving Hezbollah and dismantling all its institutions, confiscating its properties, and prosecuting its leaders as war and terrorism criminals.
The Constitution does not name Israel as an enemy by name, nor any other state, but defines the enemy by its actions. And the enemy is he who occupies the land, confiscates the decision, assassinates those who oppose him, destroys the economy, displaces citizens, and openly declares his absolute subordination to a foreign state. And this description applies 100% to Hezbollah itself.
The question is: Why doesn’t a single Member of Parliament step forward in Parliament — and only one MP is required, not ten as is rumored — with a bill to abolish all laws and legislation that prohibit a Lebanese citizen from dealing with Israelis and the State of Israel, in the same free and unrestricted manner as he deals with all other countries of the world?
*The author, Elias Bejjani, is a Lebanese expatriate activist
Author’s Email: Phoenicia@hotmail.com
Author’s Website: https://eliasbejjaninews.com

The Martyrs of October 13, 1990: Michel Aoun’s Betrayal of Them and of Lebanon, and His Descent into the Illusions of Power and Money
Elias Bejjani/October 13/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/10/112651/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=71ovkF-d5XA
The martyrs blessed us with their sacrifice and freely and joyfully gave us their lives because they believed in the words of the Lord Jesus Christ: “Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends” (John 15:13). Surely, the heroic martyrs of October 13, from their graves, are crying out in thunderous voices: “Not a single leader has ever passed by our graves without each one of us shouting in his face: ‘Where is my blood, you man? Where is the justice for which I died?’”
The height of hypocrisy is for some people to commemorate the martyrs of October 13 and raise their banners while, today, they are allied with those who killed them, slaughtered them, and desecrated their bodies. This is self-deception, political depravity, deadly narcissism, and a desecration of the sanctity of martyrdom. Today, with sorrow and grief, we remember the righteous martyrs who fell on October 13, 1990, along with all the heroic martyrs of the Land of the Cedars, who watered Lebanon’s soil with their pure blood.
We remember the civilians and military personnel who were martyred with courage and bravery as they confronted the invading and occupying Syrian Baathist army, accompanied by its columns of Trojan collaborators and local mercenaries. They fought in defense of the Land of the Cedars, its mission, history, humanity, and independence. Today, we also remember, with bitterness and anguish, the hundreds of our people—monks, military personnel, and civilians—who were abducted by the Syrian occupation army and its mercenaries and transferred to the Nazi-like detention centers of the Assad regime. Their fate remains unknown to this day.
We recall their heroism and imagine them today, in our hearts and minds, turning restlessly in their graves in anger and sorrow over what has become of their beloved homeland, whose soil they watered with their blood and for which they sacrificed their lives.
The martyrs of October 13, and all the martyrs of the Land of the Cedars who preceded and followed them, must surely be cursing, from their resting places as they await the Resurrection, every ruler, politician, party official, power broker, and citizen who has forgotten their sacrifices and failed to honor their blood. These modern-day Judases trade in the blood of the martyrs to serve their own agendas of power rather than the interests of the homeland and its people.
These Judases among the rulers and the merchants of political parties have trampled over the blood of the martyrs, sold out dignity and independence, bartered sovereignty for political seats, and surrendered to the fait accompli in humiliation and submission. They have learned to coexist with the Iranian occupation, its weapons, and its state within a state, their consciences anesthetized after losing their national and spiritual compass. They have sunk into the mire of tribal instincts and collaboration, following the broad roads against which the Holy Gospel warned us.
Yet, thanks to the sacrifices of these righteous martyrs, including those who fell on October 13, 1990, and despite all the hardships and suffering, as well as the reality of the Iranian occupation and the terrorism imposed upon our homeland, we continue to enjoy complete freedom within ourselves, in our consciences, and in our faith. Our dignity remains intact, and our heads remain held high.
The martyrs are the grain of wheat that fell into the earth and died to bear much fruit. They are the leaven that continually renews the determination, pride, conscience, and spirit of Lebanon’s free people, enabling them to continue, with faith, courage, piety, and dedication, along the path of martyrdom, Calvary, crucifixion, and Resurrection.
Lebanon, the Land of the Cedars, is the land of holiness, redemption, and mission; the den of the free and the martyrs, and a refuge for every oppressed and weary soul. This is what Lebanon has always been, and this is what it shall remain until the last day and the Resurrection.
It is the duty of every believing and freedom-loving Lebanese citizen to bear witness to the truth without fear or hesitation and to raise high the banners of faith, brotherhood, freedom, love, generosity, and tolerance.
Saint Paul the Apostle says in his Letter to the Romans (8:31–32):
“What shall we then say to these things? If God be for us, who can be against us? He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things?”
In conclusion, yes, God is with us, and Lebanon is in His heart. He stands with every free and sovereign-minded Lebanese citizen confronting the Iranian occupation, its Trojan collaborators, and its local instruments.
Therefore, no matter how varied their colors and weapons may be, the wicked, the demonic factions, the terrorists, the fundamentalists, and the isolationists will never succeed in breaking our spirit, imposing their diabolical will upon us, or forcing us to accept their rigid and intolerant way of life.
Thank you to every martyr who took up the arms of love and offered his life as a sacrifice upon the altar of the Land of the Cedars so that Lebanon might remain free, sovereign, and independent.
Thank you to the families of these great martyrs, distinguished by their faith and patriotism, for bringing such righteous heroes into the world. And thank you to Lebanon’s sacred soil, which gave birth to martyrs and embraced their pure remains.
Note: This article and its accompanying video are from the 2025 archive.
*The author, Elias Bejjani, is a Lebanese expatriate activist
Author’s Email: Phoenicia@hotmail.com
Author’s Website: https://eliasbejjaninews.com

Hezbollah announces ‘Promise and Commitment’ housing and reconstruction program
David Daoud and Ahmad Sharawi/ FDD's Long War Journal/October 16/2026
Hezbollah announced a yearlong housing-assistance program on October 13, offering eligible families displaced by the 2024 and 2026 wars with Israel up to $14,000 for rent and furniture. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam also met separately with Hezbollah and allied Shiite Amal Movement lawmakers to discuss government-administered reconstruction projects in southern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs.
Hezbollah Executive Council Chairman Sheikh Ali Daamoush unveiled “Promise and Commitment” at Ghobeiry’s municipal center in Beirut’s southern suburbs. The US State Department designated Daamoush a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in January 2017 for heading Hezbollah’s Foreign Relations Department, which Washington accused of recruiting terrorist operatives and gathering intelligence abroad.
The new assistance program revives a post-2024-war initiative at the same payment rates. Daamoush said housing and furniture aid would form the first phase, with later phases to be announced when conditions permitted. He criticized the government for failing to assist displaced families directly or approve a mechanism to assess damage and calculate compensation. He also defended Hezbollah’s continued armed role and accused unnamed Lebanese institutions of helping enforce external restrictions on aid.
Who qualifies, how much they receive, and how payments work
Daamoush outlined the maximum assistance available for each eligible residential unit:
Beirut and its southern suburbs: Up to $14,000, comprising $8,000 for furniture and $6,000 for rent.
Elsewhere in Lebanon: Up to $12,000, comprising the same $8,000 furniture allowance and $4,000 for rent.
Payment schedule: Four installments, one every three months over a year. The first is $3,500 in Beirut and its southern suburbs and $3,000 elsewhere for households qualifying for the full package.
Daamoush also warned landlords and furniture retailers against raising prices in response to Hezbollah’s program.
The program covers families whose primary homes were destroyed, rendered uninhabitable, or are in buildings designated for demolition. Also eligible are people unable to return to Israeli-held border villages or neighboring areas Daamoush described as effectively inaccessible, even if their homes were undamaged. The program excludes summer homes, secondary residences, and properties that are vacant because their owners live abroad.
Families owning another habitable home may receive furniture assistance but not rent money. Families given both allowances after the 2024 war can receive rent assistance again, but not a second furniture allowance, provided they lack alternative housing. Daamoush outlined separate rules for tenants, partially destroyed or uninhabitable homes, and other cases. He said the program would operate regardless of recipients’ sectarian or political affiliations.
Hezbollah’s regional committees are surveying affected homes using forms from Meamar Construction, a Lebanese engineering and construction company. The US Treasury Department sanctioned Meamar in September 2020, saying Hezbollah owned, controlled, or directed the company and used it to conceal financial transfers and evade US sanctions.
Meamar will compile beneficiary lists and prepare payment instruments for Hezbollah’s regional offices. Those offices will designate inquiry and payment centers, schedule collection, and notify beneficiaries when and where to collect and redeem the instruments. Daamoush did not identify the institution responsible for honoring them.
Significant Hezbollah-linked attendees
FDD’s Long War Journal identified six attendees in footage of Daamoush’s press conference:
Suhail Hassan Ghamloush is a Lebanese architect who serves as the structural rehabilitation coordinator at Hezbollah’s Jihad al Bina construction and reconstruction organization and served as deputy director of Arch Consulting, an engineering and consulting firm affiliated with Hezbollah. The US Treasury Department sanctioned Jihad al Bina in 2007 and Arch Consulting in September 2020.
Based on LWJ’s review of Lebanese corporate records, Ghamloush also holds a 50 percent ownership stake in Al Majabel al Amiliya LLC, a Lebanese company specializing in concrete, asphalt, and construction materials. The company operates within Ansar Group, which also includes National Crushers and Nour Trading and Contracting. On October 16, 2025, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported striking a quarry near Mazraat Sinay that it alleged Hezbollah used to produce concrete for rebuilding its infrastructure. Lebanese reporting identified facilities belonging to Al Majabel al Amiliya among the sites struck, though the IDF did not name the company. In February 2025, Ghamloush reported that Jihad al Bina had completed more than 90 percent of its structural damage assessments in accessible areas, while in July 2026, he warned that 22 damaged buildings in Beirut’s southern suburbs were at risk of collapse.
Imad Faqih: A Lebanese civil engineer and general manager of Faqih Group, Faqih became a member of Beirut’s Municipal Council with Hezbollah’s backing in May 2025. He chairs its classified establishments committee and is identified by Lebanese media as Hezbollah’s representative on the council.
Nasser Zein al Din headed Hezbollah’s electoral operations in Haret Hreik during the May 2025 municipal elections.
Ahmad al Khansa: The mayor of Ghobeiry municipality since May 2025, Khansa was reportedly nominated by Hezbollah in coordination with Amal.
Sheikh Fouad Hanjoul directed Hezbollah’s Municipal Affairs Directorate in Jabal Amel I from at least 2012 through April 2019, before Ali al Zein was identified as his successor that July.
Ali Mohammad al Zein: The former president of the Jabal Amel Union of Municipalities, Zein became Hezbollah’s municipal-affairs director in Jabal Amel I by July 2019 and remained in the role as of July 2025. In March 2011, as municipal-union president, he signed a cooperation agreement with Jihad al Bina to implement agricultural, development, and training programs.
Earlier promises, suspended payments, and disputed Iranian financing
In August, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem promised housing, repairs, and reconstruction assistance to families displaced by the war with Israel, particularly those who had lost their homes. He reiterated that commitment on September 27, pledging available resources and donations while insisting that Lebanon’s government bore primary responsibility for reconstruction.
On February 6, the Hezbollah-controlled financial institution Al Qard al Hassan announced it would resume redeeming new housing payment instruments on February 9 for February to April 2026. Only newly issued instruments marked for housing assistance qualified; older instruments for repairs, furniture, and housing remained frozen. The US Treasury Department sanctioned Al Qard al Hassan in July 2007, identifying it as an organization Hezbollah used to manage its finances. In July 2025, Lebanon’s central bank barred licensed financial institutions from transacting with Al Qard al Hassan and other unlicensed or sanctioned entities.
Hussein Khair al Din, a reconstruction coordinator with Hezbollah’s construction organization Jihad al Bina, told Al Ahed, Hezbollah’s official news website, that Jihad al Bina prepared beneficiary lists for Hezbollah’s regional offices. In a December 2024 interview, Khair al Din also identified himself as Meamar Construction’s director. The regional offices issued checks, contacted beneficiaries, and directed them to redeem the checks at Al Qard al Hassan to collect payments.
The announced February round provided three months of housing assistance: $1,500 in Beirut and its southern suburbs and $1,000 elsewhere. On February 9, however, Al Ahed clarified that Jihad al Bina was transferring beneficiary lists to Hezbollah’s regional offices for verification; payments had not begun. Disbursements had been expected later that week.
Asked about Hezbollah’s earlier obligations at his October 13 press conference, Daamoush acknowledged that outstanding repair allowances from the 2024 war remained deferred. He disclosed neither a total budget nor a final count of beneficiaries.
On October 7, Reuters, citing two people with direct knowledge, reported that Hezbollah received $200 million from Iran in September for displaced families, with intermediaries reportedly charging a 20 percent transfer fee. The sources did not explain how the money reached Lebanon. One said financial companies in Iraq and Dubai that previously handled transfers were unavailable, while firms in Turkey also faced pressure. Separately, on September 10, the US Treasury Department described an earlier channel moving Iranian oil-sale proceeds through front companies and Lebanese currency exchanges to Hezbollah couriers. Treasury said the network transferred hundreds of millions of dollars to Hezbollah between May and September 2025.
One Reuters source estimated that roughly 50,000 families would be prioritized, initially receiving $3,000 each. US State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott disputed the money’s existence, and Daamoush declined to confirm or deny the report. Daamoush’s mention of an initial $3,000 payment outside Beirut matched the amount that Reuters’ sources anticipated.
Salam’s meeting and the government’s reconstruction projects
On October 13, Prime Minister Salam received seven lawmakers at the Grand Serail, the seat of Lebanon’s government in Beirut. Amal’s Development and Liberation parliamentary bloc was represented by Ali Hassan Khalil, Hani Qobeissi, Qabalan Qabalan, and Mohammad Khawaja; Hezbollah’s Loyalty to the Resistance bloc by Amin Sherri, Ali Ammar, and Hassan Ezzeddine. The US Treasury Department sanctioned Khalil in September 2020, accusing him of facilitating financial transfers to Hezbollah-affiliated institutions and engaging in corruption. It also sanctioned Sherri in July 2019 for acting on Hezbollah’s behalf, including by pressuring Lebanese financial institutions to assist the organization. Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) president Mohammad Ali Qabbani and Zahi Shaheen, director of the Central Operations Room at the Prime Minister’s Office, also attended, according to a statement published by the Lebanese network Al Jadeed.
Salam said contracts under the World Bank-backed Lebanon Emergency Assistance Project (LEAP) were close to being awarded, with roughly $70 million in projects expected to be awarded by year-end 2026. On October 9, the CDR, which administers LEAP, issued a provisional award notice for roughly $3.69 million for road-clearing and repairs in the Nabatieh district in southern Lebanon.
The meeting also addressed reinforcing and rehabilitating damaged buildings in Beirut’s southern suburbs. Lebanon’s emergency-relief agency, the Higher Relief Commission, was expected to begin that work within days, subject to funding. Participants also discussed roads, water networks, and public facilities. In August, Social Affairs Minister Haneen Sayed announced a pilot cash rental-assistance program for displaced families during a visit to Beirut’s southern suburbs that was attended by Sherri and Ammar. Later that month, Salam directed officials to coordinate with the ministry on rental assistance for displaced residents of several southern villages.
The Council of the South, a state body under the Prime Minister’s Office, has longstanding political ties to Amal and parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri. At the August meeting, Salam instructed the council to repair partially damaged homes and expedite prefabricated housing procurement alongside the Higher Relief Commission. Salam’s office confirmed in September that the council was also repairing schools, clearing rubble, and rehabilitating infrastructure while coordinating with the CDR. The independent Lebanese news website Al Modon reported on October 2 that the council was using remaining budget funds for these projects and contracting for prefabricated housing alongside the Higher Relief Commission.
World Bank financing and the June 26 Framework
LEAP was designed as a $1 billion reconstruction framework, with an initial $250 million World Bank loan for rubble management and restoring public infrastructure and essential services. The World Bank’s February summary identified a $750 million financing gap. Its February eligibility criteria covered areas damaged during the 2023–2024 conflict, not damage solely from the subsequent 2026 war. LEAP finances public works rather than direct compensation to owners of destroyed homes.
The June 26 US-brokered framework agreement aimed at ending hostilities between Israel and Lebanon, signed by Lebanon, Israel, and the United States, also addresses reconstruction financing, disarmament of non-state armed groups, and phased Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory. Paragraph 11 commits Lebanon and the United States to preventing funds from reaching individuals and entities affiliated with non-state armed groups and requires Lebanon specifically to prevent reconstruction funds from reaching those groups or connected entities. Under paragraph three, internationally supported reconstruction in designated southern border areas follows verified disarmament of non-state armed groups and the Lebanese Armed Forces’ assumption of full security control.
*David Daoud is senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he focuses on Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon affairs. Ahmad Sharawi is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies focused on Iranian intervention in Arab affairs and the Levant.

Rubio tells Aoun not to return seized explosives to Hezbollah
Agence France Presse/16 October 2026
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio told President Joseph Aoun in a phone call that he should not return several hundred kilograms of explosives seized by Lebanese authorities from Hezbollah, a U.S. official said. "He urged President Aoun to hold accountable all those who ordered, financed, and directed the shipment, and underscored that returning explosives to Hezbollah should be out of the question," the official told reporters on condition of anonymity. The Iran-backed militant group acknowledged on Thursday that a 500-kilogram shipment of explosives belonging to it was seized last week by Lebanese authorities, saying it was intended for "the resistance.""The vehicle and its cargo belong to the resistance" against Israel, Hezbollah lawmaker Hassan Fadlallah had said, adding that the group requested the release of those arrested over the seizure and demanded the return of the shipment. Rubio also raised the issue of Lebanon's 1955 boycott law, which bans direct relations with Israel and "deters steps towards peace." Rubio "emphasized that the law is impractical and urged direct military-to-military communication between Lebanese and Israeli forces for deconfliction," according to the U.S. official, adding it "would help to reduce miscalculation and to advance sequenced implementation" of the framework agreement. Under international pressure, Lebanon has drawn up a plan to disarm Hezbollah, and negotiations between Israel and Lebanon facilitated by the United States led to the conclusion of a framework agreement at the end of June.

Is Israel Signaling a Wider Occupation of Southern Lebanon?
Beirut: Soubhi Amhaz/Aden: Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
Israel has escalated threats to expand its occupation of southern Lebanon, with Defense Minister Israel Katz warning that the Nabatieh and Litani areas could be added to what he called a permanent security zone if Hezbollah joins a possible confrontation between Israel and Iran.
The warnings have raised questions over which areas Israeli forces may seek to seize and whether they are preparing for a broader ground operation, as military activity continues and Israel moves closer to Knesset elections. Katz had threatened to evacuate residents from broad areas of southern Lebanon as far as the Zahrani and Awali rivers, as well as Beirut’s southern suburbs. He said more than one million people could be displaced and that the Israeli military was ready to carry out a ground maneuver. The threats come after Israeli forces expanded their deployment toward strategic high ground, including Beaufort Castle and Ali al-Taher near Nabatieh. Israeli strikes have also hit the Rihan, Sajd and Jabal al-Rafi heights, raising questions over whether Israel could seek wider control of elevated terrain and geographic corridors.
Israel seeks natural geographic barriers
Retired Brigadier General Fadi Daoud said Israel’s threats went beyond targeting Hezbollah and dismantling its military infrastructure, pointing to broader political and geographic aims.
“Military positions and ground operations, regardless of their size or depth, must serve the concept of a military maneuver on the ground, and that maneuver in turn serves a major political objective,” Daoud told Asharq Al-Awsat. “The Israeli objective is not limited to striking Hezbollah positions and dismantling its military infrastructure. It goes beyond that to objectives linked to geography and control of territory.”Daoud said Israeli movements in southern Lebanon should be viewed alongside developments in southern Syria, particularly in the Quneitra countryside and the Mount Hermon area, where he said the two tracks appeared interconnected within an Israeli approach centered on using geography to create security zones. He said Israeli intentions should be read from developments on the ground rather than statements alone, adding that Israel had not yet reached the phase line it was seeking and that any military advance would unfold in stages, regardless of the distance involved. “Any military action, even if the required advance is no more than 100 meters, is divided into stages, beginning with preparatory fire and securing the flanks, followed by launching the attack and consolidating positions,” he said. Military phase lines, he added, are typically based on natural geographic barriers that allow attacking forces to consolidate their deployment and organize their defenses. “What matters is not what Israel says, but what it does on the ground and the positions it is seeking to reach,” Daoud said. “Israeli forces are seeking to stop at a clear geographic line. They cannot stop in the middle of an area without relying on a geographic barrier that allows them to consolidate their presence.”Daoud said Israeli military ambitions could extend to the Awali River, north of Sidon. Reaching and controlling that line, he said, would push the security belt deep into Lebanese territory and affect all areas to its south, including Iqlim al-Tuffah and surrounding villages.
Escalation linked to Iran
Retired Brigadier General Naji Malaeb linked the Israeli threats to military preparations and the prospect of a confrontation with Iran as Israeli elections approach. “Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz’s talk of possibly reaching the Awali River means the threats are no longer confined to Nabatieh district or the Litani area, but now cover a broader geographical area extending to Sidon and its surroundings,” Malaeb told Asharq Al-Awsat. He said the threats also extended beyond southern Lebanon to Beirut’s southern suburbs, reflecting a sharp escalation in Israeli rhetoric ahead of the elections. Malaeb pointed to what he described as significant Israeli military activity on the ground. The Israeli military’s 282nd Artillery Brigade, he said, had completed extensive drills on countering drones used by Hezbollah and on evacuation operations during combat. The brigade then moved directly to southern Lebanon, he said, giving Israel additional artillery forces alongside those already deployed and ready to act if orders are issued. Malaeb said any expansion of Israeli military operations would depend less on specific locations than on Israel’s political and military decision-making and on the extent of Hezbollah’s involvement in any renewed confrontation between Israel and Iran. He said several scenarios were possible, including Iran seeking to use the Israeli election period to launch attacks or influence the electoral process, or Israel moving to expand the war against Iran before or during the elections. Malaeb said the prospect of a broader confrontation with Iran had been discussed between the United States and Israel, amid reservations expressed by Israeli Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir over the consequences of entering a conflict that could have difficult repercussions for Israel, particularly if it was not militarily prepared and with elections approaching.
On Hezbollah’s preparations, Malaeb said the seizure by Lebanese security forces of one truck loaded with explosives and linked to the group did not necessarily mean it was the only one to have crossed, as others could have passed without being intercepted. That, he said, raised the possibility that Hezbollah was preparing for military action if a new regional confrontation erupted.
“The main question today is not which positions Israel may seek to control, but whether the political and military decision to expand the operations will be taken,” he said.
Developments on the ground
Israeli warplanes on Friday carried out a heavy strike on Kfar Tibnit in Nabatieh district, as air and artillery attacks intensified in the districts of Tyre and Bint Jbeil. The attacks included three strikes on Mansouri and a fourth on Wadi Zibqin. Artillery fire hit Baraachit and Haddatha, the outskirts of Haris, areas around Zibqin and Shaqra, and later Mansouri and Majdal Zoun before dawn.
Warplanes also carried out simulated air raids over Tyre and nearby villages and dropped illumination flares over Mansouri and Bayt al-Sayyad. Lebanon’s Health Ministry said two people, including a four-year-old child, were wounded in a strike on Haddatha. In Kfar Shouba, an Israeli force prevented Lebanese farmers from entering the areas of Azrael and Bastara to harvest olives, as residents of border villages continued to face difficulties reaching their farmland.

Hezbollah’s Support Base Dismayed Over Limited Compensation
Beirut: Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
The financial assistance Hezbollah said it would provide to people displaced from southern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs because of the war with Israel has sparked dismay within its southern support base, with some describing the sums as “meager” and saying they “do not even cover six months’ rent.”Others have criticized the payments as “unfair” and said they reinforce disparities between residents of the southern suburbs and those of southern Lebanon. Ali Damoush, head of Hezbollah’s Executive Council, announced on Tuesday a housing assistance program for displaced people and for those whose homes have been destroyed or severely damaged by Israel and are no longer habitable. He set the maximum assistance at $14,000 for housing units in Beirut and its southern suburbs, and $12,000 for homes outside those areas. Damoush said the money would be paid in four installments, with each payment amounting to $3,500 for displaced residents in Beirut and the southern suburbs and $3,000 for those in other areas.
Rent Payments Fall Short
No sooner had Damoush announced the payments than discontent spread among residents of southern Lebanon, who described the amounts as “unfair.”A local source in Nabatieh told Asharq Al-Awsat that the money would “barely cover six months of monthly rent.”“At the very lowest estimate, rent for a house outside the city is $500 a month, while anyone wishing to rent in the city will have to pay $800,” the source said. “Is this amount enough to cover rent?”“We waited six months. The state paid nothing and paid no attention to us, while Hezbollah has now announced meager payments that would not even be enough to buy a bed or a refrigerator,” the source added, describing the announced assistance as essentially pointless. The United Nations Development Programme estimates that around 17,900 housing units have been completely destroyed in southern Lebanon, while approximately 5,200 buildings have been damaged by the war.
Heavy Losses
The same source in Nabatieh said war-related losses were “extremely heavy,” ranging from destroyed buildings and rental costs to businesses and livelihoods brought to a halt. This comes on top of six months during which residents have had to pay rent out of their own pockets without receiving assistance. “The initiative undertaken by Hezbollah cannot be relied upon because the amount is extremely small and does not take into account people’s suffering and needs,” said the source, who requested anonymity. The frustration extends to residents currently living in the city of Tyre after being displaced from occupied and destroyed border villages, particularly Naqoura, Aita al-Shaab, Marwahin, Umm al-Tout and Tayr Harfa. One displaced resident living in Tyre told Asharq Al-Awsat that they have been paying rent for nearly three years, “and now we will receive a payment that does not even cover three months’ rent in the city,” where average residential rents stand at around $700. “Hezbollah is applying double standards to displaced people,” he said. “We live in a city, and residents of the southern suburbs live in a city too. Why are they receiving $3,500 while people from the south are receiving $3,000?”He described the proposed payments as “meager,” saying they appeared to represent “an attempt to shirk responsibility while promoting assistance that falls short of people’s growing needs.”
No Compensation for Repairs
Hezbollah is facing financial difficulties as a result of restrictions imposed on the flow of funds from Iran. Its supporters, however, say the group “is doing what it can under the current circumstances,” noting that the money to be distributed now is only a first payment and that additional payments will follow. That has done little to dispel the frustration repeatedly expressed by displaced southerners. Their dissatisfaction is not limited to the modest sums involved or what they describe as “discrimination between the south and the southern suburbs.” It also extends to thousands of people whose homes were damaged in the war but who will receive no money from Hezbollah to repair them. A resident of a village in the Tyre area told Asharq Al-Awsat: “For four months, I kept plastic sheeting over the windows, hoping Hezbollah would provide repair assistance so I could install glass windows, but that did not happen. With winter approaching, I will have to borrow $1,000 to install glass windows to replace those shattered during the war.”“It seems Hezbollah has its priorities, and those of us whose homes were damaged by the war are at the bottom of its list,” the source added. “If money is being provided to people displaced from their homes, why is there no money for those whose homes have been damaged?”
Discontent in Beirut’s Southern Suburbs as Well
Despite the frustration in southern Lebanon, residents of Beirut’s southern suburbs also appear dissatisfied. A significant number of buildings surrounding those that were destroyed have themselves sustained heavy damage, yet Hezbollah will not provide any financial assistance to their residents, unlike what happened following the 2024 war. Residents of the southern suburbs say Hezbollah has not provided any payments, preventing hundreds of families from returning to their damaged homes. Other families have been forced to pay for repairs out of their own pockets, while some have opted to cover shattered windows with plastic sheeting and carry out only “the bare minimum of repairs needed to allow us to return home.”A study conducted by the United Nations Development Programme in coordination with Lebanon’s National Council for Scientific Research, and in cooperation with the Lebanese Army and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security, found that 146 buildings were completely destroyed in the Beirut and Mount Lebanon governorates, while 264 buildings were partially damaged. At the housing-unit level, the study recorded the complete destruction of 3,168 residential units, while another 4,437 units sustained partial damage.

Lebanon Revokes Bank Saderat Iran’s License amid US Pressure
Beirut: Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
Lebanon’s central bank has revoked the local license of Bank Saderat Iran, one of Iran’s largest banks, as Washington intensifies pressure on countries to sever commercial ties with Tehran. Banque du Liban Governor Karim Souaid told Bloomberg that the decision, taken this week, was intended to demonstrate Lebanon’s determination to protect its banking sector from institutions that could expose it to financial and regulatory risks. The move follows tighter restrictions imposed on Iran’s financial system by other regional central banks and coincides with mounting US pressure worldwide, according to the governor. Bank Saderat is one of Iran’s oldest commercial banks, with several branches overseas. In Lebanon, however, it did not operate as a full-scale commercial bank serving the general public or offer the extensive retail banking services typically provided by major Lebanese lenders. Its operations were largely confined to facilitating certain transfers and financial activities linked to specific networks or entities. Sanctions targeting Iranian institutions had effectively isolated the bank from major international banking messaging networks, including SWIFT, and global payment systems. Washington is pursuing a campaign to isolate Iran economically in an effort to force Tehran to accept US terms for ending the war. Last month, Britain announced it would reject new license applications from Iranian banks subject to US sanctions, including Bank Saderat, which operates a branch near the Bank of England in London’s financial district.
Avoiding financial risks
Speaking on the sidelines of the International Monetary Fund’s annual meetings in Bangkok, Thailand, Souaid noted that larger economies, including the United Arab Emirates and Türkiye, had complied with similar demands to preserve their banks’ ties to the international financial system".
He stressed that Lebanon could not afford the risks associated with failing to take such measures. The governor acknowledged that some decisions could be politically sensitive but maintained that protecting Lebanon’s banking sector from foreign sanctions and external pressure must take priority.
Souaid also emphasized the need for Lebanon to secure its removal from the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) gray list, where it was placed over shortcomings in combating illicit financial flows. He called for eliminating illicit funds and money-laundering proceeds from the Lebanese economy.
The central bank has hired a specialized US firm to map Lebanon’s cash economy and identify suspicious financial activity, according to the governor. For years, Bank Saderat and its operations had faced scrutiny from international financial authorities, particularly the US Treasury Department, which regarded it as a potential financial conduit for regional groups such as Hezbollah. Despite that pressure, its Lebanese branch maintained a legal presence under a longstanding license issued by Banque du Liban, even as Washington repeatedly called for its closure and the complete severing of its financial channels.
IMF negotiations
Lebanon is seeking to revive its economy after a financial collapse that led it to default on approximately $30 billion in international bonds in 2020. The country is holding talks with the IMF over a potential loan, seen as a crucial step toward economic recovery. Souaid described efforts to clean up the financial sector as an important issue in those negotiations. Although such measures are not among the IMF’s formal conditions for a potential support package, he explained that international lenders and donors participating in any program would nevertheless expect Lebanon to maintain a financial sector free of illicit activity.

Intimidation Through Memory: Fear as a Substitute for Assassination
Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
Hezbollah may have succeeded in reviving Lebanon’s troubled memories without actually having to act. Here, the “act” means eliminating opponents, namely political assassination, which has been surrounded by near-certain suspicions since 2005, from former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri to Lokman Slim. In this case, restoring fear to the heart of Lebanese political life no longer requires explosives to serve its purpose. From this perspective, the findings of the investigation into the source of the C4 shipment, its destination, or its intended recipient are no longer particularly important. The intimidation has already taken place, and the C4 shipment has achieved its purpose. This raises another possibility: What if Hezbollah deliberately allowed its shipment to be discovered? By doing so, it would spare itself the need to use it while still imposing an equation of intimidation and reviving the memory of assassinations in Lebanon’s collective consciousness, particularly among politicians who oppose it. Within the logic of intimidation and political elimination under Hezbollah’s current circumstances, acknowledging ownership of the shipment and assuming responsibility for it, even indirectly, may be far less costly than bearing responsibility for any political assassination that might occur. Under the pretext of resistance and confronting the Israeli enemy, Hezbollah can justify possessing explosives. Using them in a political assassination, however, would expose it to political and social repercussions that would be difficult to contain.
Hezbollah is not a conventional or traditional political party that can easily come to terms with its waning influence or its inevitable and painful decline. As an ideological organization, its danger may become most pronounced during periods of retreat and weakness, when it seeks to target those benefiting from its crisis and decline, while preventing the emergence of alternatives that could challenge its claim to represent its own constituency.
Yet under current conditions, and given the scale of the transformations it is undergoing, the room for assassination has become extremely narrow. A single assassination could unite everyone against it, draw it into an all-out confrontation, and undermine the “sanctity of its weapons,” which derives from their portrayal as weapons of resistance. This is especially so after Hezbollah lost its historic leadership, which had been capable of compelling Lebanese society to accept its narrative, as well as its strategic depth in Syria, whose loss has effectively pushed Iranian geopolitics out of the Lebanese equation. Given Iran’s current circumstances, assassination would amount to suicide. This is where the idea of “intimidation through memory” comes into play: accumulated fear stemming from past assassinations can once again perform a political function without those killings having to be repeated. When politicians understand that the possibility of violence remains present, they may resort to self-censorship, reconsider their positions, and refrain from carrying confrontation through to its conclusion. The memory of assassination thus becomes an instrument of intimidation before any crime has even occurred.
Could the discovery of explosives, then, become a substitute for their actual use, allowing fear to achieve what assassination might no longer accomplish without exacting a prohibitive price? The question here is no longer confined to the shipment itself. It extends to a society being made to calculate its political positions under the shadow of possible death, and to a state whose true test remains its ability to end the capacity of any actor to turn weapons and memory into tools for subjugating political life. Accordingly, the distinction between acknowledging possession of a tool that can be politically justified and bearing responsibility for its actual use in a security operation remains key to understanding this hypothesis.

Visiting Qatari PM vows to solve Lebanon's electricity crisis
Agence France Presse/16 October/2026
Qatar will help revive Lebanon's ailing energy sector and solve its chronic problems in providing reliable electricity, the Lebanese and Qatari prime ministers said Friday. "We have agreed to establish a comprehensive framework for cooperation in the energy sector and to present viable solutions," gas-rich Qatar's Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani said during a visit to Lebanon. This is an "old project that Qatar had discussed with Lebanon... for years," he added, saying it was now "about to see the light of day." Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said the project would be carried out and financed by Qatar. "We are close to reaching a project... aimed at rehabilitating, developing, and modernizing the electricity production infrastructure... at a lower cost," Salam said. Lebanon's electricity sector has cost Lebanon more than $40 billion since the end of its 1975-1990 civil war, and successive governments have failed to reduce losses or repair crumbling infrastructure.

Visiting Iranian official calls on Lebanese govt. to 'arm everyone'
Naharnet/16 October/2026
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Saeed Khatibzadeh told Al-Jadeed TV on Friday that he met with a number of Lebanese officials over the past two days to exchange views and positions, describing the atmosphere of the meetings as good. He added that a recent meeting in New York with Lebanese officials addressed the issue of the controversy over the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, noting that there are proposals to choose a path acceptable to both parties. Khatibzadeh also considered that the issue of the ambassador “should not have reached this point.” As for Hezbollah’s arms, the Iranian official called on the Lebanese government to “arm everyone” instead of “removing weapons in the face of the aggressors.” He added that any decision regarding Hezbollah's involvement in a potential new Iran-Israel conflict would rest with the group itself, rather than with Tehran.

Qatari PM meets Aoun, says Israel must let Lebanese Army deploy in South
Naharnet/16 October/2026
Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani held talks Friday at the Baabda Palace with President Joseph Aoun. Speaking after the meeting, Sheikh Mohammed said the discussions covered "bilateral relations between the two countries and ways to implement joint projects that contribute to the security, stability and prosperity of the region."He pointed out that "the energy sector is at the heart of interests in the sisterly Lebanese republic, and the State of Qatar seeks to provide integrated solutions in this field.”“During subsequent meetings with the Prime Minister, we will be keen to activate the projects that have been agreed upon," the premier added. Moreover, he said the talks tackled regional and international developments, particularly the situation in southern Lebanon and “the actions of the Israeli occupation toward Lebanon.”
“The State of Qatar supports the steps taken by the Lebanese state, as well as the withdrawal of the Israeli occupation army from the occupied territories and handing them over to the Lebanese Army. Qatar will remain a supporter of Lebanon," Sheikh Mohammed went on to say.
Media reports said the Qatari prime minister is carrying a comprehensive plan to resolve Lebanon’s chronic electricity crisis.

Syria says Kayali's 'arrest' in Lebanon was coordinated with Lebanese authorities
Agence France Presse/16 October/2026
Syrian authorities have announced the arrest of a former paramilitary leader who is the main suspect in a massacre of nearly 250 civilians by Assad-allied forces during the country's civil war.
A Syrian security source told AFP that Ali Kayali was apprehended in Lebanon during an operation coordinated with Lebanese authorities. Lebanese media reports said Thursday that the man was “kidnapped” from his home in Lebanon's Mansourieh and that his wife and son were tied up by the culprits. Lebanese authorities have yet to comment on the issue. Syrian state news agency SANA said "intelligence services have arrested Ali Kayali, who also went by the name Mihrac Ural, the main suspect in the Banias massacre of 2013." It said he "was attempting to flee across the border," without specifying to which country. Kayali was a member of a paramilitary group that fought alongside former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad's troops during the war. In May 2013, government forces and their allies killed at least 248 people in mass executions in the predominantly Sunni Muslim towns of Bayda and Banias, located in the coastal province of Tartus, according to Human Rights Watch. The monitor at the time described the killings as "one of the deadliest instances of mass executions in Syria's increasingly bloody conflict." Syrian Justice Minister Mazhar Alwais wrote on X Thursday that the arrest "sends a clear message: there is no room in Syria for impunity for criminals; the rights of victims will not be lost, no matter how much time passes."Syria and Lebanon have been trying to write a new chapter in their relations since Assad was deposed in late 2024 by an Islamist coalition, which has contributed to the weakening of Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, an Assad ally.
Dozens arrested
Lebanese authorities in September arrested a distant cousin of Assad, and earlier detained a former Syrian intelligence officer and several accomplices alleged to have planned attacks against forces of the new Syrian government. In August, Beirut also extradited to Damascus a former general from the Assad era who is accused of crimes including murder and torture. Syria's war began with pro-democracy protests in 2011 that were violently suppressed by the government. The protests quickly morphed into a complex armed conflict that drew in paramilitary forces, jihadists and foreign powers.It ended with the ousting of Assad in a lightning offensive led by an Islamist rebel group that subsequently took power. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights monitor, the death tolls in Banias and Bayda came to around 400. Kayali, originally from Turkey, served prison time in that country before fleeing in 1982 to settle in Syria, where he would end up founding a paramilitary force allied with Assad's government. He married a relative of the Assad family and amassed a fortune, according to Turkish state media. Kayali is also suspected of having planned, with the help of Assad's intelligence services, a double car bombing that killed 53 people in 2013 in southeastern Turkey, according to prosecution documents cited by Turkish state media. In Syria, the new authorities have arrested dozens of former security officials since they took power in late 2024. Their trials began in April.President Ahmed al-Sharaa's media adviser Ahmed Zeydan welcomed Kayali's arrest, describing him as "a criminal... who committed massacres during the Syrian war, including those in Bayda and Banias.""Every murderous criminal will be hunted down," he said.

'Doctor Food' released from jail under new amnesty law
Agence France Presse/16 October/2026
Lebanese authorities have released a famous TikTok content creator arrested for drug trafficking and smuggling, dropping the charges against him under a new amnesty law. Georges Dib, better known as "Doctor Food" to his more than eight million followers, was arrested in August after being sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment in March. Dib, who also owns confectionery businesses, had been the subject two years earlier of an arrest warrant for "manufacturing narcotics, trafficking and smuggling abroad," according to state-run media. But the judiciary "decided to drop the charges against him in the drug case for which he was recently arrested, since he is covered by the general amnesty law," a judicial source told AFP. Parliament passed the sweeping amnesty law, which covers drug offenses among various other crimes, on August 12. It was the country's first since 1991. Until his arrest at his home in the north, he had continued to post on TikTok, claiming to be "innocent" and urging his followers "not to listen" to what was being said about him. Georges Dib first became known with his ex-wife, known as Shorouk, a Canadian of Palestinian origin followed by more than 15 million people, by posting content about cooking and their daily life. They separated after she accused him of abuse.

Trump move to restart direct US flights with Lebanon hits roadblock
Reuters/16 October/2026
The United Nations aviation agency has found Lebanon’s main airport lacks valid certification, according to a report summary seen by Reuters, in a setback to US President Donald Trump’s move to revive direct US-Beirut flights. Trump made the announcement in July and signed an order last month for the US government to allow direct flights from the US to Lebanon, reversing a four-decade-long suspension after TWA Flight 847 was hijacked and forced to land in Beirut in 1985. While the US Federal Aviation Administration and the Transportation Security Administration would still need to conduct safety reviews before flights could resume, the Lebanese embassy in Washington called Trump’s order “a significant first step toward restoring direct air service between Lebanon and the United States.”However, the UN’s International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) technical assistance mission to Lebanon in July identified shortcomings at Beirut-Rafik Hariri International Airport and in the aviation system. The findings, which two senior industry officials familiar with the matter expect to delay the resumption of service, complicate efforts to follow up on an order Trump signed after meeting Lebanese President Joseph Aoun. Washington has backed Aoun as it pushes for Iran-backed Hezbollah to be disarmed. The agency sent its internal report, made at the request of the Lebanese Civil Aviation Authority (LCAA), to Lebanon in September.
Airport lacks emergency plan: ICAO
Beirut airport’s firefighting resources are equipped for single-aisle planes, but not twin-aisle jetliners used for long-haul flights, according to a summary of ICAO’s report. The airport also lacks an emergency plan, and its conditional certification has expired, the report said.
“This is a serious and time-critical matter that must be addressed immediately to preserve the airport’s operational status,” the summary said. The report also found the Lebanese regulator LCAA lacks qualified inspectors to oversee air traffic control licensing, and has no fully established, operational and independent aircraft accident investigation authority with clearly defined roles. Such concerns were flagged during a two-day workshop last month where officials from ICAO, Lebanon’s government, the FAA and others discussed efforts to revive direct air service, according to the industry officials and an agenda of the meeting seen by Reuters. Lebanon’s Minister of Public Works and Transport Fayez Rasamny said Lebanon was taking steps to address the concerns, with efforts to certify the airport starting on Saturday. The LCAA expects to issue conditional certification in the coming days.
“Most of the issues highlighted in the report had already been identified by the LCAA, and corrective action had already been initiated,” Rasamny said in a statement, adding that progress had been delayed by war. Israeli forces remain in southern Lebanon and have continued strikes despite a US-brokered framework agreement signed in June between Israel and Lebanon. Hezbollah has rejected it. The FAA and ICAO declined to comment. The US State Department advises Americans not to travel to Lebanon given safety concerns. It said the FAA advises caution for flights operating in Lebanese airspace due to heightened military activity in or around Syria, including the risks of errant long-range surface-to-air missiles originating from Syrian territory.
Middle East unrest disrupts air travel
Foreign airlines have avoided large swathes of Middle East airspace because of missile and drone threats since US and Israeli strikes on Iran in February triggered regional hostilities, with an airport in Saudi Arabia the latest site to come under attack. Lebanon and its national carrier have been praised domestically for maintaining air navigation services and flights, helping to prop up an economy that depends on tourism and remittances. Three US airline officials told Reuters on the condition of anonymity they do not think any American carriers would resume flights to Lebanon in the near term, citing security concerns. While there are no direct flights between Beirut and the United States, such service exists between Lebanon and some large European cities. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency said it was aware of the ICAO report and added that EU airlines must conduct their own assessment of an airport’s safety and operational readiness before launching services.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on October 15-16/2026 (Some of the News reports below are translated from Arabic by AI)
Trump Says US May Need to Strike Iran's Pickaxe Mountain
Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
President Donald Trump said the US may have to target Pickaxe Mountain, a site linked to Iran's nuclear program, as he aims to ensure Tehran does not get a nuclear weapon. In an interview with Newsmax on Thursday night, Trump also said he would not use a nuclear weapon in the war on Iran, which began in February ⁠with US-Israeli strikes.⁠Trump said the US wanted to make sure Iran will never have a nuclear weapon "because if they had it, they would use it.""Their nuclear is buried under millions of tons of mountain. ⁠Now we're looking at Pickaxe Mountain. We may have to go there. We'll take a shot at that one. We'll knock it out fast," Trump told the news outlet. Pickaxe Mountain is a fortified facility buried deep underground near one of Tehran's main nuclear sites. The US president said there was no need to use a ⁠nuclear bomb ⁠in Iran. "I wouldn't use nuclear. We don't have to." Trump reiterated he was not considering using US ground troops in Iran. Trump did not say if he had authorized the use of GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast Bomb, also known as the "mother of all bombs," against Iranian energy infrastructure and nuclear sites. He did say the MOAB bomb was not a nuclear bomb.

Iran President Says Conflict in Mideast Amounts to 'Ecocide'
Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian on Friday urged countries to condemn what he called "ecocide" in the Middle East caused by "wars of aggression". Pezeshkian said the conflicts in Gaza and the wider Middle East had inflicted a significant toll on nature that extended beyond borders and required "international solutions", AFP said. "What has occurred in our region as a result of wars of aggression is ecocide, or environmental genocide, and it must be condemned," Pezeshkian told a nature summit in Armenia attended by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.

Trump Says US May Need to Strike Iran's Pickaxe Mountain
Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
President Donald Trump said the US may have to target Pickaxe Mountain, a site linked to Iran's nuclear program, as he aims to ensure Tehran does not get a nuclear weapon. In an interview with Newsmax on Thursday night, Trump also said he would not use a nuclear weapon in the war on Iran, which began in February ⁠with US-Israeli strikes.⁠Trump said the US wanted to make sure Iran will never have a nuclear weapon "because if they had it, they would use it.""Their nuclear is buried under millions of tons of mountain. ⁠Now we're looking at Pickaxe Mountain. We may have to go there. We'll take a shot at that one. We'll knock it out fast," Trump told the news outlet. Pickaxe Mountain is a fortified facility buried deep underground near one of Tehran's main nuclear sites. The US president said there was no need to use a ⁠nuclear bomb ⁠in Iran. "I wouldn't use nuclear. We don't have to."Trump reiterated he was not considering using US ground troops in Iran. Trump did not say if he had authorized the use of GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast Bomb, also known as the "mother of all bombs," against Iranian energy infrastructure and nuclear sites. He did say the MOAB bomb was not a nuclear bomb.

Pezeshkian: We Are Ready for Dialogue and Do Not Seek Nuclear Weapons... He Emphasized That Continued US Sanctions on His Country Would Exacerbate the Situation
Riyadh – AlArabiya.net | October 16, 2026
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian affirmed on Friday that the continuation of US sanctions imposed on his country would worsen the situation, stressing the importance of adopting dialogue rather than a policy of force when dealing with Tehran. He reiterated that Iran does not seek nuclear weapons and is open to dialogue, a statement coinciding with reports that Trump is discussing plans to resume hostilities. During meetings in Armenia, Pezeshkian emphasized that "Iran cannot be subdued by sanctions," noting that "the United States must realize that Iran will vigorously continue its relations with the world by relying on its people and coordinating with its neighbors." Addressing the US sanctions, Pezeshkian asserted, "The United States has caused problems not only for us but for the entire world; if it persists on this path, the situation will deteriorate globally. Therefore, it is better to resort to rational dialogue rather than the use of force." Earlier on Friday, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and held talks with him on the sidelines of the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17) to the Convention on Biological Diversity. During the meeting, the Iranian President emphasized the need to formulate a long-term strategic program between the two countries covering the mining, trade, economic, tourism, and cultural sectors, stressing that "developing a strategic program between the two nations could deepen their relations across various sectors." Pezeshkian noted that "deepening relations between the two countries will lead to stability and security in the region."

US military aids financial chokehold on Iran, blocking $25 billion in oil exports
Al Arabiya English/16 October/2026
The US military’s blockade on Iran is increasing financial pressure on Tehran, preventing at least $25 billion in crude oil exports, helping freeze hundreds of millions of dollars in cryptocurrency assets and contributing to mounting payroll problems within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the US Central Command chief said Friday. The measures are part of a broader campaign aimed at crippling Iran’s ability to finance its military, rebuild weapons factories and support militias and terrorist groups across the Middle East following the 38-day US military campaign known as Operation Epic Fury. CENTCOM Commander Adm. Brad Cooper said US forces, working closely with other government agencies, had delivered significant blows to Tehran in three key areas: oil exports, digital financing and payments to security forces. “So far, we’ve prevented Iran from exporting at least $25 billion worth of crude oil,” he said in a recorded video address. The commander said those funds would otherwise have been used to finance Iranian-backed militias, criminal networks and attacks against American forces and regional allies. CENTCOM has also supported US interagency efforts to freeze nearly $350 million in cryptocurrency assets, further restricting Tehran’s ability to finance armed groups or replace weapons and military infrastructure destroyed during the US campaign. The financial pressure is increasingly affecting Iran’s ability to pay its own security forces, including members of the IRGC, according to Cooper. He said Tehran was withholding salaries, pensions and benefits across several sectors, including oil, energy, manufacturing, construction and security. The financial strain has also reportedly extended to Iran-aligned militias across the region, some of which are withholding payments to their fighters to redirect funds to the IRGC. Cooper said the IRGC itself was struggling to pay its personnel, describing the developments as evidence of growing financial desperation within Iran’s security establishment. He also emphasized that the US naval blockade of Iran remains in effect, with humanitarian assistance the only exception to restrictions on maritime imports and exports. “As a point of emphasis, with the exception of the humanitarian assistance we’ve allowed in, Iran has no exports and no imports by sea,” he said.

Iran is backing and encouraging escalated Houthi attacks: Senior Saudi diplomat
Al Arabiya English/16 October/2026
Iran is backing and encouraging the recent escalation in Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia, violating UN Security Council resolutions and the China-brokered agreement between Riyadh and Tehran, a senior Saudi diplomat said. “We think the escalation by the Houthis at this later stage of the conflict is encouraged by Iran,” Saudi Deputy Minister for Public Diplomacy Rayed Krimly said. Krimly said Tehran “continues to arm, train and support the Houthi militia in violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in violation of its commitments in the Beijing agreement.”
He was referring to the 2023 agreement brokered by China, under which Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to restore diplomatic relations and reopen their respective embassies and diplomatic missions. Speaking to reporters during a briefing on Thursday, the Saudi diplomat also revealed that the Iran-backed Houthis rejected a Saudi proposal to hold talks in Oman in July aimed at resolving outstanding differences and ending the escalation in Yemen. According to Krimly, the militants refused to attend the proposed meeting.
In recent weeks, the Houthis, a US-designated terrorist organization, have launched attacks against civilian and energy infrastructure across Saudi Arabia, including King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh and Saudi Aramco’s headquarters. The attacks have also targeted Islam’s holiest sites in Mecca and Medina. Yemen FM says battle against Houthis is a must, rules out return to failed ceasefires
Middle East
Yemen FM says battle against Houthis is a must, rules out return to failed ceasefires
Despite Iran’s continued support for the Houthis, Krimly said Riyadh remains open to dialogue with Tehran and maintains direct channels of communication with Iranian officials. He stressed, however, that Saudi Arabia has not requested Iranian mediation. “We maintain direct channels of communication with the Houthis, and Oman serves as a facilitator of these talks and not as a mediator,” he said.Krimly also pointed to Russian and Chinese involvement in providing capabilities and intelligence that have benefited Iran and the Houthis, while noting that some of the support may originate from commercial entities. “Of course, some of the capabilities of Iran, and of the Houthis, do come – or the intelligence – do come from at least elements in Russia or China, even commercial elements sometimes, but we do discuss these matters regularly with China and Russia, and we will continue to do so,” he said.On regional coordination, Krimly said Saudi Arabia continues to maintain direct communication with fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, including the United Arab Emirates.
US-Iran deal
Turning to efforts to end the US-Iran war, Krimly said Saudi Arabia supports mediation efforts led by Pakistan and Qatar but warned that two major obstacles continue to prevent progress toward an agreement. The first involves securing safe passage for commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for Washington lifting its naval blockade on Iran. The second concerns reaching a clearer understanding of the scope and framework of future negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. Krimly said Tehran is prolonging negotiations without offering sufficient concessions. “In both fronts, the Iranians take a long, long time to come back to the mediators with any new proposal, and what they come with is insufficient,” Krimly said. “And then they begin to talk about a temporary arrangement in (the Strait of) Hormuz, and a temporary arrangement to this and that, and then we spend sometimes weeks and months discussing this, back and forth.”He suggested that internal disagreements on the Iranian side were further complicating diplomatic efforts. “They don’t seem to be able to reach consensus on the needed solutions that will pave the way for a peaceful solution of the conflict,” Krimly said. with AP

CENTCOM: Strait of Hormuz Under US and Regional Partner Control, Not Iran’s
CENTCOM Commander: 400 Commercial Vessels Transited the Strait of Hormuz in the Last Week
AlArabiya.net / October 16, 2026
US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Brad Cooper affirmed on Friday that the Strait of Hormuz is under the control of the US and its regional partners, not Iran, noting that 400 commercial vessels had transited the strait over the past week. The CENTCOM commander added, "We have helped transport more than 1.3 billion barrels of oil through the Strait of Hormuz," pointing out that CENTCOM’s measures impose heavy costs on the Iranian regime—and the Revolutionary Guard in particular—and that sustained pressure on Tehran is affecting all sectors of its economy. He stated that Iran has been prevented from exporting crude oil worth at least $25 billion, noting that more than 50,000 military personnel are currently deployed in the Middle East. Cooper stated that his command has severely damaged Iran's ability to project influence beyond its borders and that Iran no longer has any exports or imports due to the tightened naval blockade. He continued, "When US forces conducted large-scale combat operations during Operation 'Epic Fury' earlier this year, we inflicted severe damage on Iran's ability to project military influence into areas far beyond its borders." The spokesperson added, "We sank the Iranian navy, destroyed its weapons factories, and curtailed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' ability to launch ballistic missiles and drones." He continued, "Since our highly successful 38-day military campaign, more than 50,000 U.S. troops deployed in the Middle East have continued to perform exceptional work alongside our regional partners. They are defending against Iranian attacks, clearing Iranian naval mines from the Strait of Hormuz, and protecting commercial shipping, in addition to enforcing a tight naval blockade—implemented twice—that remains in effect." He emphasized that, with the exception of permitted humanitarian aid, Iran has no maritime exports or imports. U.S. Central Command also supported U.S. government agency partners in freezing cryptocurrency assets valued at approximately $350 million; this further restricts Iran's ability to finance terrorism or replace the weapons and facilities we destroyed, the CENTCOM commander added. Cooper noted that the cumulative impact of U.S. pressure on Iran is being felt across all sectors of its economy; the Iranian government is withholding salaries, pensions, and benefits from workers in sectors including oil, energy, manufacturing, construction, and security—and even from the Revolutionary Guard itself. Financial pressure on the Iranian military has become so severe that reports indicate pro-Iran armed groups across the region are withholding their fighters' salaries to divert funds to the Revolutionary Guard, which, in turn, is failing to pay its own personnel. It is clear, according to Cooper, that the Iranian regime is feeling the economic pain and that the Revolutionary Guard is increasingly showing signs of desperation as a result. The CENTCOM commander stated that... In recent days and months, the region has witnessed repeated attacks by the Revolutionary Guard on Russian vessels traversing the Strait of Hormuz—attacks that, in numerous instances, have resulted in the deaths of innocent civilian sailors. The International Maritime Organization reports that more than 20 civilian sailors have been killed in Iranian attacks on commercial vessels since last February. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world's most vital maritime corridors for energy trade; it connects the Arabian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, situated between Iran to the north and the Sultanate of Oman to the south. At its narrowest point, the strait is approximately 34 kilometers wide, with vessels passing through two shipping lanes—each about 3 kilometers wide—separated by a buffer zone. The strait serves as a key outlet for energy exports from Gulf states to global markets, particularly Asia, making the safety of navigation there a critical factor influencing supply security and oil and gas prices.

Iran Reaffirms It Does Not Seek Nuclear Weapons and Signals Readiness for Dialogue
Tbilisi / Asharq Al-Awsat / October 16, 2026
On Friday, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian denied—during talks with the Prime Minister of Georgia—that Tehran is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. He expressed readiness for dialogue while condemning US sanctions. During his meeting with Irakli Kobakhidze, Pezeshkian also called for strengthening ties with Georgia, coming weeks after Tbilisi severed air links between the two nations in response to US sanctions on Iranian airlines. The two officials met on the sidelines of the UN Biodiversity Summit in the Armenian capital, Yerevan, according to Agence France-Presse (AFP). In a statement issued by his office, Pezeshkian said, "Iran does not seek to possess nuclear weapons, and we consider the malicious propaganda against our country to be nothing but lies." He added, "We have always been ready for dialogue. They think they can force us to surrender, but we will not yield to coercion," describing the US sanctions imposed on Tehran as "unjustified and inhumane." During the meeting with Kobakhidze, Pezeshkian also called for establishing a clear timeline to expand cooperation between Tehran and Tbilisi, according to the Iranian news agency Tasnim. The agency quoted Kobakhidze as saying he opposes foreign interference in the internal affairs of neighboring countries, though his office made no mention of those remarks in its statement regarding the meeting. The statement noted that the officials discussed bilateral relations and regional security, with Kobakhidze emphasizing "the importance of dialogue and diplomacy in de-escalating tensions and establishing lasting peace." The Georgian Civil Aviation Agency had announced in September that it would comply with US sanctions, while Kobakhidze affirmed that Tbilisi does not impose bilateral sanctions on Tehran.

Teen Sentenced to 20 Years for UK Murder Plot Tied to Iran-linked Group
London: Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
A Norwegian teenager who planned to commit murder in Britain after being recruited by a Swedish organized crime group linked to the Iranian government was on Friday sentenced to 20 years' detention. Johannes Natland, now 19, was arrested in a hotel room in Huddersfield, northern England, in March ⁠2025 with two ⁠firearms and ammunition in his possession. Natland was recruited by the Foxtrot Network, a Swedish organized crime group used by the Iranian state and sanctioned by ⁠both Britain and the United States, prosecutors said.
He admitted possessing a semi-automatic pistol, a revolver and ammunition, but denied conspiracy to murder and claimed he did not intend to carry out the plan. But he was convicted in July after a retrial ⁠and ⁠was sentenced at London's Woolwich Crown Court to detention for 20 years.
Natland was the latest young adult to stand trial in Britain and elsewhere over serious criminal acts allegedly carried out after being recruited online for money, often as an unwitting proxy for a foreign state.

17,000 Strikes on Houthis Since Launch of Operation Dawn of Yemen
Aden: Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
Yemen’s armed forces said air and ground strikes carried out with support from the Coalition to Support Legitimacy had topped 17,000 since the launch of Operation Dawn of Yemen, as government forces repelled fierce Houthi attacks in Taiz and Lahj. More than 1,250 strikes were carried out in the past 24 hours, neutralizing about 700 Houthi fighters and destroying or disabling more than 150 vehicles and pieces of military equipment, the armed forces said. The heaviest fighting centered on western Taiz, where government forces said they repelled a Houthi assault that lasted about 12 hours, along with attacks in Al-Dhabab, Al-Aqrud and Al-Shaqab. Clashes also erupted on the Al-Mudaraba and Al-Wazi’iya fronts in Lahj province. Colonel Majid al-Nuzaili, spokesman for Yemen’s armed forces, said operations over the past day targeted positions, fortifications, trenches, firing points, observation and reconnaissance posts, forward command-and-control centers, and Houthi assembly and supply areas. He said the strikes were aimed at weakening the group’s defensive lines and limiting its ability to launch attacks, with a particular focus on the Taiz fronts. Heavy fighting broke out west of Taiz city after a large-scale Houthi attack around Jabal Han that lasted about 12 hours, according to field accounts from government forces. The forces said they repelled the assault and forced the attackers to withdraw from positions they had tried to seize. Clashes spread to the old airport area, Ghurab and Bir Basha, with heavy and medium weapons, artillery and rockets used in the fighting. Confrontations also continued around the Republican Palace east of the city, amid reports of Houthi shelling of residential neighborhoods in the old airport area. Government forces said they held their positions at Jabal Han and recaptured sites infiltrated by the attackers. In southern Taiz province, government forces repelled Houthi attacks on the Al-Aqrud and Al-Shaqab fronts, while airstrikes hit a convoy of tanks and military vehicles in the Ras al-Najd area of Al-Misrakh district.Other strikes targeted Houthi positions on Sofitel Hill east of Taiz city, as well as a tank and a military vehicle on the Al-Dhabab front to the west. Government forces said the clashes and airstrikes killed or wounded dozens of Houthis. No independent casualty figures were available.
Reinforcements and attrition in Lahj
In western Lahj province, along the border with Taiz, the Southern Giants Brigades, led by Presidential Leadership Council member Abdulrahman al-Muharrami, sent reinforcements from the 6th Infantry Division and support units to the Al-Mudaraba front. The deployment was aimed at reinforcing forces in the area and countering Houthi infiltration attempts. The Giants Brigades said they destroyed Houthi military vehicles and equipment while repelling infiltration attempts. Their media outlets also said the last company of the group’s 11th Reserve Brigade had been eliminated, describing it as part of the losses suffered by Houthi formations during the fighting. The moves came as fighting continued on the Al-Wazi’iya front west of Taiz, where government forces are seeking to thwart attacks and prevent the Houthis from making gains toward areas bordering Lahj province. The forces are also seeking to prevent the Houthis from outflanking government troops at Bab al-Mandab in an effort to break the siege of Houthi pockets. Alongside the ground fighting, local authorities in Marib said the Houthis fired nine ballistic missiles and seven other projectiles at residential neighborhoods in the city on Thursday evening.
The authorities warned against continued attacks on populated areas and called on the international community and the United Nations to act to halt them. In Aden, the death toll from a missile attack targeting the presidential Maashiq Palace and the Al-Buraiqa area west of the city rose to five, with 16 wounded, according to Public Health and Population Minister Qasem Buhaibeh.He said the casualties included security personnel and civilian employees.
Operation continues
Chairman of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council Rashad al-Alimi reviewed developments in Operation Dawn of Yemen and fighting across the various fronts during briefings from senior military and local officials. The briefings were delivered by Defense Minister Lieutenant General Taher al-Aqili, Chief of the General Staff and Commander of Joint Operations Lieutenant General Sagheer bin Aziz, Commander of the Fourth Military Region Major General Hamdi Shukri, and the governors of Taiz and Lahj. According to the briefings, the armed forces, with support from the Coalition to Support Legitimacy, had carried out more than 17,000 air and ground strikes since the operation began, targeting Houthi positions, concentrations and military capabilities across multiple fronts. Al-Alimi praised the performance of the armed forces, military formations and popular resistance forces, and commended Saudi Arabia’s support and the role of the Coalition to Support Legitimacy in backing the Yemeni state and its armed forces. He said the operation would continue in line with its stated objectives of restoring state institutions and extending state authority across all Yemeni territory, ultimately reaching the capital, Sanaa. The briefings also covered humanitarian and public service conditions in Taiz and Lahj, including measures to respond to waves of displacement and secure basic services and supply routes amid the military escalation. Al-Alimi accused the Houthis of imposing coercive measures in areas they had infiltrated in Taiz province, including forced recruitment, ideological mobilization and attempts to alter the identity of educational and community institutions. He warned of the consequences of such practices and said the state was responsible for protecting citizens and holding those involved in violations accountable.

Coalition Intercepts Ballistic, Cruise Missiles and UAVs
Riyadh: Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
Official Spokesperson for the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen Major General Turki Al-Malki stated on Friday that a ballistic missile launched toward Yanbu was intercepted and destroyed. In separate statements, he said that two cruise missiles were intercepted and destroyed over the Red Sea, and three UAVs were intercepted and destroyed in the Southern and Riyadh regions. The UN Security Council strongly condemned on Thursday the ongoing and escalating Houthi attacks targeting Saudi Arabia, including those that hit civil aviation and energy infrastructure, resulting in civilian deaths and injuries.

Sanaa Tribes Hamper Houthi Push to Expand Recruitment
Sanaa: Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
Houthi efforts to expand mobilization and recruitment around Yemen’s Houthi-held capital Sanaa are facing growing tribal resistance after the group failed to rally residents in several districts for armed gatherings backing its military escalation, as it steps up pressure on tribal sheikhs to send more young men to the front lines and offset mounting losses. Local and tribal sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Houthi leaders have intensified contacts in rural Sanaa since the start of this month, pressing tribal sheikhs to raise readiness for what the group calls “tribal mobilization,” stage armed gatherings and provide new batches of fighters to reinforce the fronts. The campaign has targeted Bani Matar, Sanhan and Bani Bahloul, Bilad al-Rus, Khawlan, Jihana, Hamdan, Arhab, Nihm, Saafan and Manakha. But the push has met reluctance from a number of sheikhs and local dignitaries, the sources said, amid growing resentment over the continued depletion of tribal communities in battles whose human and economic costs are borne by families and local communities. Some tribal leaders have told the Houthis they are unable to provide new fighters, the sources added, as recruitment calls draw fewer responses and fears grow over sending more young men to fronts where the group is suffering repeated losses. The Houthis have gone beyond outreach and mobilization calls, the sources said, putting pressure on tribal sheikhs to comply with their demands.
The measures have included threats to withdraw privileges and impose financial penalties on those who fail to comply, while offering cash and material incentives to those who agree to supply fighters to the fronts. Through these tactics, the group is seeking to shift responsibility for providing fighters onto tribal sheikhs and use their social influence to recruit men from their communities, as casualties mount on fronts in Taiz, the western coast, Marib, al-Jawf, Lahj and al-Dhalea.
In a sign of the difficulties facing the recruitment drive, areas in Bani Matar, Sanhan and Nihm in Sanaa province recently held separate tribal gatherings called by the Houthis, but turnout was limited, local sources said. The group used its media outlets to portray the gatherings as expressions of tribal support, seeking to bolster its image and justify continued military activity while pushing to recruit more fighters. The limited turnout, according to the sources, underscores the difficulty of turning Houthi appeals into broad tribal mobilization, particularly as objections grow to the depletion of young men and the use of tribal ties to serve the group’s military objectives.
The recruitment drive coincides with continued restrictions and pressure on residents of rural Sanaa, amid accusations that the Houthis are tightening their grip on opponents and continuing to seize privately owned land and property, further fueling public resentment.
As living conditions and public services deteriorate, families are facing heavier economic burdens while the group continues to focus its efforts on mobilization campaigns and military activity rather than residents’ basic needs. The campaign comes as the Houthis continue efforts to reinforce the fronts with fighters, while families grow increasingly fearful that their sons could be killed or return with permanent injuries, at a time of worsening economic hardship and declining basic services in Houthi-controlled areas. Residents of the targeted districts in rural Sanaa are calling for an end to recruitment and mobilization campaigns and for efforts to be redirected toward easing economic hardship and improving services, rather than sending their sons to the front lines.
The Yemeni government has called on tribal sheikhs, fathers and mothers in those areas to prevent their children from joining Houthi ranks, warning against sending them into battles that, in its view, serve Iran’s project and regional agenda at the expense of Yemeni lives and the country’s future.
The government accuses the group of exploiting social influence and economic hardship, alongside intimidation and inducements, to draw young people into mobilization camps and onto the front lines instead of providing conditions that would allow them to work and live away from war.

Iraq Parliament Fills Cabinet Posts, Naming a US-Sanctioned Deputy Prime Minister
Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
Iraq's parliament voted Thursday to appoint ministers to previously vacant Cabinet posts and complete the country's government, including a deputy prime minister who is under US sanctions. Laith al-Khazali, appointed to that post, is the brother of Qais al-Khazali, leader of the Iran-backed Asaib Ahl al-Haq armed faction. Laith al-Khazali was arrested by US forces in 2007 over allegations related to an attack targeting American forces in Karbala in January of that year, which resulted in the deaths of five US soldiers. He was released from US custody in June 2009. In 2019, the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on him, citing his leadership role in Asaib Ahl al-Haq and allegations involving human rights abuses as well as the 2007 attack. His appointment to a senior government position raises questions about its potential implications for relations between Baghdad and Washington. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi was backed by US President Donald Trump when he took the post and has strong relations with Washington, but he has also sought to maintain relations with Iran. Past Iraqi governments have also sought to balance relations with Washington and Tehran, but the balancing act has become more difficult since the US and Iran went to war on Feb. 28. There was no immediate official statement from the US on the appointment. Republican US Rep. Joe Wilson wrote on X that al Khazali “is a designated terrorist and Iranian puppet whose militia AAH killed Americans and Iraqis.”“He is no better than ISIS, maybe even worse,” Wilson said. "It is outrageous but sadly not shocking that he has been appointed deputy PM of Iraq.”The parliament also appointed two other deputy prime ministers, as well as a new interior minister, defense minister, planning minister, minister of higher education and scientific research, and culture minister. The other Cabinet posts had been appointed five months earlier. Al-Zaidi said in a statement that with the vacant posts filled, “we are embarking on a phase of accelerated, diligent work” and pledged to "move forward in implementing our government’s priorities and program, and in fulfilling the aspirations of all Iraqis.”He said the government had worked over the past several months amid complicated domestic and international circumstances, noting that the war in the region had imposed exceptional economic challenges on Iraq, in addition to security challenges.
Al-Zaidi has vowed to fight corruption and strengthen Iraq's sovereignty, both by completing the withdrawal of US forces from the country and by disarming non-state armed groups.Some of the most powerful factions have said they have no intention of giving up their weapons, although Asaib Ahl al-Haq is one of a handful that have agreed to hand over their arms.

Iraq Says it Lost $60Bn Due to Mideast War
Baghdad: Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
Iraq has lost around $60 billion during the Middle East war, Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein said on Thursday, with Iran blockading the Strait of Hormuz that is crucial to global energy flows, AFP reported. Iraq was producing about four million barrels of oil per day before the conflict, exporting about 3.5 million bpd -- mostly shipped from the country's south via the strait. But Iran's stranglehold on the waterway forced Iraq, lacking storage capacity, to halt most production and fall back on limited exports via Syria and Türkiye, by truck and pipeline respectively.
"Iraq has suffered losses estimated at around 60 billion dollars during the recent war between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran," Hussein told his Italian counterpart in Rome, according to a statement from the Iraqi foreign ministry. After a heavy drop in production, Iraqi oil exports, which provide about 90 percent of the country's revenues, recovered modestly last month, reaching 2.6 million barrels per day between September 1 and 21, according to the oil ministry. But at the same time, Iraq's foreign currency reserves have shrunk by 20 billion dollars and consumer prices have risen sharply, plunging it into economic crisis. To try to contain the fallout, the Central Bank of Iraq last week devalued the dinar against the dollar for the first time in more than three years. 07 October 2026, Iraq, Duhok: Iraqi dinar and US dollar banknotes are displayed at a currency exchange shop in Duhok in Iraq's Kurdistan region.
Iraq relies heavily on foreign currency generated by oil sales to finance imports, stabilize the dinar, and pay the salaries of public sector employees and retirees. According to the authorities, Iraq is seeking to diversify its economic resources and raise non-oil revenues from 10 percent to 45 percent by 2037.

China Says Israel Should Stop Its 'Forced Establishment' of West Bank Settlements
Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told Israeli President Isaac Herzog that Israel should stop and reverse its "forced establishment" of West Bank settlements, China's foreign ministry said in a statement on Friday. China has consistently held that the Palestinian question is the greatest historical injustice of this ‌century, Wang ‌told Herzog during a meeting ‌in ⁠Azerbaijan, the ministry ⁠added. Wang had earlier said that promoting peace and reconciliation in the region is the "cornerstone" of China's Middle East policy. China believes that the "two-state solution" is the right path ⁠to a resolution and the ‌immediate priority ‌is to fully open access to the ‌Gaza Strip so a humanitarian "catastrophe" ‌is not allowed to spread, Wang added. At the same time, Israel should stop and reverse its forced establishment of ‌settlements in the West Bank, he said. China is ⁠willing ⁠to work with the international community to push all parties to return to dialogue and consultation as soon as possible and seek a political settlement of the conflict, Wang added. China has long been a supporter of the Palestinian cause and Beijing also has close ties with Israel's main regional foe, Iran.

Netanyahu Says Spoke with Syria’s Sharaa on Sweida Unrest
Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Thursday that he had previously spoken with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa about violence towards the Druze community, in his first acknowledgement of direct contact. Netanyahu did not say when exactly the call took place, but implied it had been during bloody clashes in southern Syria in July of 2025 involving Druze factions, Bedouin fighters and government security forces. "I called al-Sharaa. It was a very short, very sharp conversation, and the slaughter stopped," Netanyahu said at an election rally with Israel's Druze community, according to footage aired by Israel's public broadcaster KAN.The 2025 clashes erupted in Syria's Sweida province between armed Druze factions and Bedouin fighters, with government security forces and some tribal groups then intervening. A committee set up by the Syrian government said it had documented 1,760 deaths. Israel, which also has a Druze population, intervened militarily during the clashes, with strikes in Sweida and against government targets in Damascus, saying it was defending the minority community. Government-aligned forces later withdrew from Sweida city, leaving a fragile ceasefire in place, and in July of this year Damascus said it had begun trying suspects over the violence. A Syrian government source told the country's state news agency SANA on Thursday that Damascus "categorically rejects any attempt to politicize (Syria's Druze minority) or to involve it in Israeli propaganda and elections," without confirming nor denying whether the call between Netanyahu and Sharaa had taken place. Since the December 2024 ousting of longtime Syrian ruler Bashar al-Assad, Israel has carried out hundreds of strikes in Syria and sent troops into a UN-patrolled buffer zone that had separated Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan since 1974. It has also carried out repeated incursions deeper into Syrian territory and has vowed to keep troops in a so-called "security zone" in southern Syria, where it seeks a broader demilitarized area. Syria's new leaders have condemned Israeli military action in the country's south but have refrained from responding with force. Despite the tensions, Syria and Israel have held several rounds of direct talks as they edge towards a security agreement.

Israeli Settlers Attack Palestinians During Olive Harvest
Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
Israeli settlers attacked Palestinians in multiple villages across the occupied West Bank on Friday and trees and cars were set on fire, according to local officials and emergency responders with the Palestinian Red Crescent Society. The Palestinian Red Crescent Society said six people were injured in two attacks it responded to in the town of Abu Falah outside Ramallah. A 63-year-old woman and a 40-year-old man were taken to a hospital after being beaten by settlers, The Associated Press quoted the Red Crescent as saying. "The settlers want to attack us and force us from our homes," said Moutaz Abdelhadi, ⁠42, a farmer ⁠who witnessed the attack in Abu Falah. Partway through the attack, at least two Israeli military jeeps sped through the area, kicking up dust as villagers ran out of their way. The attack continued after the military's arrival, with Israeli soldiers firing tear gas in the direction of the Palestinians who had dodged the jeeps. The sound of live gunfire could be heard in the area, and a Reuters photographer saw at least one armed settler fire ⁠a gun. Among the injured was Heidi Levine, a photojournalist with the Washington Post. The newspaper did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Israel has imposed new rules on the olive harvest this year, prohibiting Palestinians from working in what’s known as Area C, which is under Israeli security control and encompasses the majority of the territory’s agricultural land. At least four Palestinians have been killed and more than 100 injured since the harvest season began earlier this month, according to Palestinian officials. They say thousands of trees have been damaged, costing farmers hundreds of thousands of dollars. Israel’s police and army did not immediately respond to questions about the attacks. The Abu Falah attack followed a similar attack on Friday morning in the area of Turmus Ayya village, where settlers burned three cars after attacking a group of farmers harvesting olives. Salah Abu Niswa, who witnessed the attack in Turmus Ayya, said the settlers "snuck up like thieves, they caught someone by himself and began to beat him."

Italy names senior Israelis, Katz in probe over Gaza flotilla activists
Reuters/Published: 16 October ,2026
Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz and senior military, police and prison officials have been placed under investigation in Italy over the treatment of Gaza flotilla activists, Italian prosecutors said on Friday. The move expands an investigation that was previously focused on Israel’s far-right national security minister, Itamar Ben-Gvir.The case concerns suspected torture, kidnapping, personal injury, robbery and damage when Israeli forces intercepted small fleets of boats headed towards Gaza in 2025 and 2026, the Rome prosecutors’ office said in a statement. Investigators opened the probe after complaints from 50 Italian citizens who were detained by Israeli authorities following two Global Sumud Flotilla missions in September to October 2025 and April to May 2026. Katz did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Ben-Gvir in June dismissed news that he was under investigation, saying he would “continue to stand proudly alongside our fighters.”
Death threats and beatings alleged
Prosecutors said activists detained after the first mission had reported beatings, injuries, death threats, insults and accusations of terrorism. Activists involved in the second mission reported even harsher treatment, including beatings in the dark, the use of tasers and rubber bullets, the statement said. Investigators had identified various individuals forming the military and police chains of command involved in the operations, prosecutors said. Besides Katz and Ben-Gvir, prosecutors named 12 senior Israeli military, police and prison officials as suspects, including military chief Eyal Zamir. Zamir also did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Prosecutors said they had sent Israel a request for judicial assistance in June, seeking information needed to reconstruct events and establish individual responsibility. They did not say whether Israeli authorities had responded. The prosecutors said they had also held talks at the European Union’s judicial cooperation agency Eurojust because similar investigations into the two flotilla missions were under way in other unnamed European countries. Under Italian law, crimes committed abroad against Italian citizens can be prosecuted in Rome. Being placed under investigation in Italy does not imply guilt and does not automatically lead to a trial. However, if the probe determines that charges are warranted, prosecutors could lodge a formal request for trial. Flotilla organizers say they aimed to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza by delivering humanitarian assistance. Israel says its naval blockade on Gaza is lawful.

Israel's Arab-led parties could decide the election if anyone would partner with them
Associated Press/October 16, 2026
Mansour Abbas has done nearly everything Israel asks of its Palestinian citizens.
The leader of a small Arab political party condemned Hamas' Oct. 7, 2023, attack. He rarely speaks about the war in Gaza or Israel's occupation of the West Bank, instead focusing on local issues like crime. He broke a taboo in 2021 by bringing an Arab party into an Israeli government, in which he served as a loyal partner. This time around, the second-ranked member of his party list is a mainstream Jewish candidate. But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his chief rivals have said they won't form a coalition with his or any other Arab-led party after the Oct. 27 election – even if that means months of gridlock and another round of voting. It's a measure of where Israel's long-marginalized Arab minority finds itself three years after the Oct. 7 attack. Their speech is heavily policed, their leaders have been branded as traitors, and at one point their parties were outlawed before a court lifted the ban. Yet in a tight race, Abbas and other Arab politicians are poised to play a potentially decisive role in choosing the next prime minister — a rare opportunity to wield their influence. The stakes in the coming election are "existential," said Yousef Jabareen, leader of the Joint List of Arab parties, which adopt a less conciliatory line than Abbas' Islamist Ra'am party.
"We have to use our political power in order to basically block the deterioration of the situation," he said at a small campaign event in Tel Aviv, before slipping out the back to avoid a crowd of far-right protesters. Activists say protests are heavily policed – crime less so Palestinians who remained within Israel after the 1948 war surrounding its creation, and their descendants, today make up about 20% of the population. They have citizenship, including the right to vote, but their close family ties and support for Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank lead many Jewish Israelis to view them with suspicion. They face discrimination and suffer from soaring crime rates, a problem that Arab activists blame on police negligence and the police say is rooted in the refusal of community leaders to work with them. The homicide rate among Palestinian citizens is more than 22 times higher than among Jewish Israelis, while arrest and indictment rates are far lower. The Abraham Initiatives, an Israeli organization that advocates for equal rights, has tallied 184 crime-related killings in Arab communities so far this year. The group said in July that only 12% reported in the first half of 2026 had been solved. Authorities have meanwhile aggressively curtailed freedom of expression, activists say. Police have routinely broken up anti-war protests, restricted displays of Palestinian flags, and arrested hundreds of people over social media posts, according to the Israel-based rights group Adalah. "They're not writing 'Kill the Jews.' Some of them are writing, 'We pray for Gaza,'" Hassan Jabareen, its general director, said. The Israeli government says it is a Jewish state in which minorities have equal rights, and that its crackdown on certain kinds of speech and protests is rooted in security concerns.Jabareen said the perceived over-policing of protests and under-policing of violent crime leaves Palestinians feeling less like citizens and more like threats to be contained. "We have to choose between the danger of being killed and being discriminated against," he said.
A taboo was broken, and then Netanyahu returned
Arab-led parties have long served in opposition to a system they believe is fundamentally unfair. Until 2021, none had joined a coalition government. Abbas' decision to do so five years ago marked a major shift. The 52-year-old dentist argued that Arab leaders needed a seat at the table. Critics accuse him of sidestepping the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict to court potential coalition partners, while he argues that focusing on local issues is the best way to serve his constituents. "Crime and murder are issues linked to people's lives and there is no value higher than the value of human life. We're responsible, as representatives elected by the Arab public, to serve this public," he said at a campaign event in northern Israel last week. The government he joined lasted a little over a year, until new elections in 2022 returned Netanyahu to power at the head of the most nationalist and religious government in Israel's history.
Far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has described Palestinian citizens of Israel as an "internal front" in the war and "an existential threat to the state." With the far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir in charge of law enforcement, at least 200 Palestinian citizens indicted for speech-related offenses have been classified as security prisoners, according to Adalah. They've been subjected to brutal conditions, including overcrowding and severe restrictions on food, often in the same facilities as suspected militants from Gaza.
In theory, they could be kingmakers
Multiple parties compete for the 120 seats in Israel's national assembly, known as the Knesset. None is expected to win anywhere near 61 seats, so whoever succeeds in cobbling together a majority coalition will be the next prime minister. That can give small parties outsized influence. Netanyahu won't work with the Arab-led parties, and they have also ruled that out. Netanyahu's main opponent, the centrist retired general Gadi Eisenkot, also says he won't ally with Arab-led parties. Even Yair Lapid, a center-left leader of the 2021 government, told The Associated Press in May that he would not form another coalition with Ra'am. They could change their minds, or form a minority coalition backed by Arab-led parties from the outside. Otherwise, a big win for the Arab-led parties would likely lead to another round of elections, with Netanyahu's government staying on as a caretaker.
Tensions have worsened since Oct. 7
The vast majority of the roughly 1,200 people killed and 251 taken hostage in the Oct. 7 attack were Israeli Jews, but Palestinian citizens of Israel were also among those killed and abducted. Israel's retaliatory offensive has killed over 74,000 Palestinians in Gaza, according to local health authorities. Mohammad Darawshe is a director at the Givat Haviva Center for a Shared Society, a decades-old organization that campaigns for Jewish and Arab equality. His nephew, a Palestinian citizen of Israel and a paramedic, was killed in the Oct. 7 attack. He said there was a brief moment of solidarity between Jewish and Palestinian citizens after the attack, but it soon faded as Israel's military response alienated many Palestinians. Rather than work to heal divisions, Netanyahu and his ministers have fed them, Darawshe said. "This government provides the ecosystem for racism," he said. Still, some Palestinian citizens see it as a duty to participate and vote, even when the government makes them feel like outsiders. Ahmed Kadan, a 50-year-old guidance counselor in the Arab town of Baqa al-Gharbiyye, said he plans to vote for Ra'am. Palestinian citizens have a huge presence in Israel's medical community and other professions, and they pay taxes, but he said the government ignores their needs. Last month, three young men were found dead in a burning car on the outskirts of the town – apparently a criminal attack. Police have yet to identify any suspects."We live in this state and not in any other place," Kadan said. "We're doing our duty but not getting what we need."

Commercial goods are no longer entering Gaza, raising fears of worsening shortages
The Associated Press/16 October/2026
No commercial goods have entered the Gaza Strip for two days, Israeli authorities said Thursday, blaming the suspension on merchants angered by taxes imposed by Hamas — a claim that Palestinian importers deny. The halt to commercial shipments, including fruit and winter clothing, cuts off a key source of food and other critical supplies as fears grow about procuring supplies needed to get through winter in the territory. The move stands to immediately reduce Gaza’s supplies, because the closed-off territory is completely reliant on whatever goods Israel allows in through border crossings. Aid groups generally bring in staples such as flour, while merchants import more perishable foods like fruits and meat, according to data released earlier this year by COGAT, the Israeli military body that oversees humanitarian affairs in Gaza. The suspension is raising fears about affordability, with humanitarian workers saying a combination of aid and a robust commercial market is needed to keep prices under control. “The humanitarian sector on its own cannot meet the needs of all the people,” said Shaina Low, a spokesperson for the Norwegian Refugee Council, an aid group. “The markets need to be functioning.”COGAT announced the suspension of commercial shipments Wednesday. Its deputy spokesperson, Lt. Daniel Kantorovich, said the agency was acting on a decision made by Palestinian merchants a day earlier and could reverse it at their behest.
“We were prepared to coordinate the entry of their trucks as usual, but the vendors informed us that they were cancelling the coordination due to Hamas’s taxation mechanism and threats against them,” Kantorovich said. “The merchants don’t want to bring goods into Gaza.”
The world’s leading authority on food insecurity reported earlier this year that conditions in Gaza had improved since famine was declared in the territory in August 2025, but were still at crisis levels. Most families in the war-battered enclave weren’t getting nearly enough to eat, said the report, adding that “even small disruptions to humanitarian access could rapidly reverse recent gains.”
Merchants in Gaza coordinate directly with vendors outside the territory, whose shipments are examined by Israel’s military before entering Gaza. In announcing the measure, COGAT claimed to be communicating a decision made by local merchants in Gaza who had grown tired of Hamas taxing their trucks and threatening them. Israel has long accused the militant group of levying fees on imports to fund its operations. COGAT said no private-sector vendors had attempted to import goods to Gaza since the merchants alerted Israel on Tuesday. But the head of Gaza’s private truckers union, Nahed Sheheiber, disputed Israel’s account, saying they were the ones who had made the decision. “The merchants are not the ones who stopped the shipments,” he said. “The Israeli coordinator is claiming that Gaza’s merchants are responsible, but the truth is that the Israelis are the ones who imposed the restrictions.”Following COGAT’s announcement, Sheheiber’s union met with Gaza’s Ministry of Economy to express concern and say Israel was citing fees levied by the ministry as a pretext to cut off commercial goods. The ministry had been asking merchants to pay 10,000 shekels (about $3,226) per truck entering Gaza, Sheheiber said. At the meeting, ministry Undersecretary Khaled al-Raqab told the union that the amount was not a tax, but rather a donation sought by the ministry to help pay civil servants in the strip. It was not clear from the COGAT announcement if aid agencies would be allowed to increase shipments into Gaza to compensate for the loss in commercial goods. The agency claimed that Gaza’s population — of roughly two million people — required approximately 250 truckloads of goods each day. That’s far below the minimum of 600 trucks a day stipulated by a ceasefire brokered by the US a year ago. The war started when Hamas-led militants killed some 1,200 people on Oct. 7, 2023, and took 251 hostages. Israel responded with a massive bombardment and a ground invasion that has killed more than 74,000 Palestinians, according to the Gaza Health Ministry. That includes over 1,400 Palestinians killed since the ceasefire took effect, the ministry says. Sporadic attacks have killed five Israeli soldiers in Gaza in the same period.The ministry, part of the Hamas-run government, maintains detailed records and is seen as generally reliable by UN agencies and independent experts. It does not distinguish between civilians and militants in its toll but says women and children make up around half the dead.

Pope Leo Celebrates Mass in Hospital After Cancer Surgery
Asharq Al-Awsa/October 16, 2026
On Friday, Pope Leo XIV celebrated Mass at the hospital where he is receiving treatment, following surgery to remove a cancerous lung tumor. The Vatican released the first photos of the Pontiff since the procedure, showing the 71-year-old Chicago-born Pope standing before an altar in a Rome hospital room, clad in green liturgical vestments. According to Agence France-Presse (AFP), the Pope appeared to be in good health, accompanied by his private secretary, Peruvian priest Edgard Rimaconia. The Vatican press office stated that the Mass was attended by medical and nursing staff from Gemelli Hospital, as well as off-duty personnel and police officers present at the facility. The Pope expressed his gratitude to all staff—doctors, nurses, and support personnel—for their dedication, their closeness to the people, and their compassion for human frailty, specifically acknowledging the care and treatment he had personally received over the past few days.The Pope is expected to lead the traditional Angelus prayer on Sunday; however, a Vatican source did not clarify whether the prayer would take place from the hospital or the Vatican. The Pope customarily leads the Angelus prayer every Sunday from the window of the Apostolic Palace overlooking St. Peter's Square, addressing the crowds gathered below. On Tuesday, the Pope was admitted to Rome’s Gemelli Hospital—located north of the Vatican—where he underwent surgery to remove a cancerous tumor from his right lung. Doctors reported that he is recovering normally, though ongoing tests will determine the next steps of his treatment. On Thursday, his medical team stated that a chest X-ray showed "good recovery of the operated lung." By Friday, they reported "continued improvement in his general condition," noting that he is now carrying out his "usual daily activities completely independently." Results from tests to determine whether the cancer has spread are not yet available. A Vatican source remarked, "The Pope’s spirits are high—that is evident. His recovery is proceeding well, as demonstrated by the fact that he was able to celebrate Mass." Regarding "better days" ahead, the office provided no information on a potential discharge date, simply reiterating the doctor's earlier statement that recovery would take about a week. Should the Pope lead the Angelus prayer from the window of Gemelli Hospital, it would not be unprecedented in the history of the Catholic Church. On February 6, 2005, Pope John Paul II—then 84 years old—appeared at his hospital window while recovering from respiratory issues caused by the flu; an aide stood beside him and recited the Angelus prayer. Pope Francis also led the same prayer from his hospital window on July 11, 2021—also at the age of 84—following colon surgery. He told the gathered crowds that day: "I am happy to have been able to keep the Sunday Angelus appointment, even from here." On Friday, the Vatican released a collection of drawings and messages sent by children in the hospital, as well as a note from an 18-year-old woman who wrote, "We will see better days." A seven-year-old boy named Angelo—who had been admitted to the tenth floor of Gemelli Hospital 36 days earlier for head surgery—wrote: "My mom and I pray for you every night. I hope you get well soon."

The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on October 16-17/2026
Do Not Provoke Us!': The Extremist Persecution of Christians, June 2026
Raymond Ibrahim/Gatestone Institute/October 16, 2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/10/158337/
"Witnesses said Ahmad confronted Siddique and objected to his drinking water from the same cooler because he was a Christian.... Ahmad... grabbed Siddique from behind and slit his throat." — Morning Star News, June 24, 2026, Pakistan.
"Sadique's murder is another example of how Muslims in Pakistan look down on Christians and treat them as 'Achhoot,' or untouchables. Christians in Pakistan are often forced into the back-breaking work of making thousands of bricks a day. A system of greed keeps their families trapped in these horrible conditions for generations." — International Christian Concern, July 20, 2026, Pakistan.
Ahmed Yetrib, a Muslim who converted to Catholicism, reported receiving death threats on social media, partly because he was sharing his reasons for converting. — Tribune Chrétienne, June 20, 2026, Belgium.
"[T]he court sentenced him in January, without ever allowing his defense to see his case file. He was convicted under Article 98(f) of the Egyptian Penal Code, which penalizes 'extremist thoughts....'" — International Christian Concern, June 19, 2026, Egypt.
"We reject [the construction of the church] so that nearby residents also know that if a rule is violated, then there must be an evil plan...." — Morning Star News, June 23, 2026, Indonesia.
On June 30, Ahmed Yetrib, a Belgian Muslim who converted to Catholicism, reported receiving death threats on social media, partly because he was sharing his reasons for converting. His ordeal began in 2018, when he was baptized, at which point his entire family ostracized him. Pictured: Charleroi, Belgium, where Yetrib was working as a teacher when the threats began.
The following are among the murders and abuses Muslims inflicted on Christians throughout the month of June 2026.
The Muslim Slaughter of Christians
Democratic Republic of Congo: Islamic terrorists slaughtered hundreds of Christians in separate attacks. Then, on June 3, and again on June 24, Muslim militants beheaded a total of 14 Christians.
Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) claimed the slayings, which took place in the village of Mungbere.
In attacks on June 11 and June 13 in Beni Territory, 11 other Christians were shot and killed, and one was beheaded in Mayangose on June 20. Also, in early June, the Muslim terrorists burned down 80 Christian homes in separate attacks in Haut-Uélé. According to the report:
"ISCAP has now claimed the killing of around 1,155 Christians in north-eastern DRC since its campaign of jihadi violence escalated in December 2024. Its fighters will typically demand that communities convert to Islam, accept dhimmi status as subjugated (supposedly "protected" people), or face death. In classical Islam, Christians and Jews ("people of the book") have the option of becoming dhimmis – lower-class, conquered non-Muslims -- and living under Islamic rule. Accepting such a status involves following many humiliating rules and regulations, including paying the jizya [protection] tax."
According to a separate report: "During the night of June 2, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) attacked the village of Mbau, located about 12 miles from Beni City in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), leaving at least 24 Christians dead... Among the victims were a local pastor and his wife. The attack occurred just days after another brutal overnight attack nine miles away on May 30, which left 15 dead in the village of Ngadi."
Ethiopia: In early June, "Islamists" attacked and killed "37 peaceful Orthodox Christians" across several communities. Later reports put the number of slain over 50 and indicate that some Christians were beheaded. According to one report: "the death toll may rise as many residents are still listed as missing since the violence began... Extremists completely burned down the century-old Church of Archangel Gabriel in the village of Tefa Kebele. In a letter to the Ethiopian Patriarchate, local clergy confirmed the fact of massive destruction and human casualties. As a result of attacks on villages, militants burned houses and forced more than 280 Orthodox families to flee. Attacks were also recorded in neighboring settlements... Witnesses report mass looting of property and cattle theft. In Kore Kuftele, radicals damaged the building of the Church of the Holy Savior, which the community used for receiving guests and conducting religious events. Church representatives criticized the slow response of local law enforcement, who failed to protect the civilian population from massacre in time. Government authorities, for their part, decided that the attacks had no religious or ethnic undertones."
Another report notes: "These latest attacks are not isolated incidents. In March 2026, Borkena reported that 34 Orthodox Christians were killed over a four-day period in the Sherka and Merti districts, while others were injured, reported missing, or abducted... [A]ttacks in East Arsi in late-February claimed nearly 30 lives, including Orthodox Christians killed at a marketplace and inside a church. The organization further described a pattern of violence specifically targeting Orthodox Christian communities... [These] repeated attacks appear to target civilians on the basis of their religious identity..."
Sudan: On June 19, a terrorist group murdered Fr. Youhana al-Amin, a priest. On the previous day, they had stormed his church and seized some of its contents for their own use. When they returned, and suspecting that he had reported them, they opened fire and killed him.
Nigeria: The following were among the Muslim massacres of Christians throughout the month of June:
On June 10-12, Fulani herdsmen killed four Christians in Plateau State.
On June 16, Fulani herdsmen killed nine Christians, including women and children, and wounded 11 others in a night attack in Kaduna state.
On June 16, Fulani herdsmen killed five Christians in a mining site Plateau state, central Nigeria, sources said.
On June 22, Fulani herdsmen killed 28 Christians, including a pastor, in a raid on a village in Plateau state.
On June 25, Fulani herdsmen raided two Christian villages in the same area of Kaduna state, Nigeria, killing two Christians, kidnapping seven others and injuring dozens of others.
Pakistan: On June 10, Muslim men shot dead a young Christian man, Prem Masih, 22, after a series of attacks and threats targeting his family. Two days earlier, the men, led by Muhammad Habib and Muhammad Rizwan, arrived at the family house where they began to shout abuse and threats over a work-related dispute, including by subjecting the mother and sister to "degrading verbal abuse." According to the report:
"The attackers allegedly threatened to publicly humiliate the Christian women and demanded that family members come outside to face the consequences for refusing to continue working at their shoe factory. When the family attempted to calm the situation and asked the men to return later for peaceful discussions, the group reportedly opened fire in the street. Despite repeated calls to Rescue 15 [equivalent to 911], the family says no police assistance arrived during the attack. The men eventually left, threatening to return."
Two days later, on June 10, the Muslim group did return -- in the middle of the night.
"During the second attack, Prem Masih was shot in the back, with the bullet entering between his right shoulder and chest. He collapsed immediately as the attackers fled the scene while continuing to issue threats against the family."
Although the young Christian was rushed to a hospital, he succumbed to his injuries by 4 am. The dispute traces back to Prem's older brother, who worked for both Muhammads, who cheated him out of his wages. After he quit, they demanded that he return. His compliance led to the harassment of his family and murder of his brother. Discussing this incident, Juliet Chowdhry, a Pakistani human rights activist, said:
"The murder of Prem Masih is a heartbreaking reminder of the vulnerability many Christian families face when seeking fairness, dignity, and equal protection under the law."
Separately, on June 22, a Muslim man killed a Christian co-worker for drinking from a water fountain as an unclean infidel. Siddique Masih, 40, was a Catholic father of four who worked with his brother, Rafique, as daily wage brick loaders. According to his brother: "Siddique and a Muslim laborer identified as Ahmad Varyam had a brief argument over a wage-related issue. The dispute appeared to have been resolved after other workers intervened, and both men returned to work." A few hours later, Siddique approached a water cooler installed for laborers at the kiln. "Witnesses said Ahmad confronted Siddique and objected to his drinking water from the same cooler because he was a Christian. Siddique responded by comparing Ahmad's conduct to that of Yazid, whose forces denied water to Islam's Prophet Muhammad's grandson Imam Hussain and his family before the massacre at Karbala. According to witnesses, Ahmad then pulled out a knife, grabbed Siddique from behind and slit his throat. He died at the scene."
Rafique, who was working when his brother was stabbed, added: "A few minutes later, I heard shouting, and someone told me that Ahmad had attacked him with a knife. When I reached the spot, other workers had restrained the attacker, and my brother was lying on the ground, blood gushing out of his throat. I was in complete shock.... Even if there had been a disagreement, nothing could justify such violence. My brother was a devoted Christian, a loving father and a hardworking man whose only concern was providing for his family and ensuring medical treatment for his sick son. We are placing our trust in God and praying for justice."
The brother said that the murder has devastated Siddique's family: "Siddique was the sole breadwinner for his wife and four minor children. One of his sons suffers from thalassemia and requires regular blood transfusions every two to three weeks. The family lives in rented accommodation and was already struggling financially. His death has left them facing an uncertain future."
The report notes several other recent cases highlighting violence against vulnerable Christians in Pakistan:
March 2025: Muslim employers allegedly tortured a Christian farmworker to death, then staged his death as a suicide.
May 2025: A group of Muslim men allegedly tortured and killed a Christian laborer over an unproven accusation of theft.
March 2025: A Muslim co-worker allegedly slashed a Christian factory worker's throat after accusing him of touching an Islamic textbook with "unclean hands"; the worker survived.
February 2025: Muslim landowners allegedly abducted a Christian laborer, publicly humiliated him, and paraded him on a donkey over an accusation of stealing wood.
June 2024: A young Catholic worker allegedly died after his employer and others tortured him with electric shocks for leaving his job without permission.
Another report covering the same story notes: "Sadique's murder is another example of how Muslims in Pakistan look down on Christians and treat them as 'Achhoot,' or untouchables. Christians in Pakistan are often forced into the back-breaking work of making thousands of bricks a day. A system of greed keeps their families trapped in these horrible conditions for generations. These brick kiln laborers, often unseen and unheard, are among the most marginalized and vulnerable in Pakistan."
Muslim Abduction and Forced Conversion of Christian Girls
Pakistan: Christian relatives of Maryam Asif Masih, a 13-year-old girl who was abducted, forcibly converted to Islam, and married to an older Muslim man fear, as they continue efforts to recover her, that she could have been trafficked. According to a June 18 report, Maryam's mother said that Muhammad Kashif, a 41-year-old married man and father of four children, abducted the child, after promising to teach the girl a useful trade:
"Kashif offered to teach Maryam skills that could help support the family. I had no reason to suspect his intentions and agreed to send her to learn the work two months before the occurrence of this incident."
The mother returned home from work on April 23 to learn from Kashif's wife that he had disappeared with her daughter. Local police were notified but failed to act:
"Frustrated by the lack of progress, we submitted an application to the Vehari District Police Officer, who instructed local police to locate my daughter and arrest the accused. After that, the police became hostile toward us. The investigating officer, Sub-Inspector Muhammad Shafique, abused and cursed me and told us that no matter what we did, we would not get our daughter back."
The family later learned that Muhammad had previously abducted other girls and sold them to traffickers:
"We are desperate to recover Maryam because she is just a child. If she is sold to a criminal network, it may become impossible to trace her and bring her back home."
When Maryams's mother tried to contact the abductor's wife, she said that her husband had "threatened to kill her if she shared any more information about him."
The family's attorney, Zunaira Patrick, said: "Timely intervention could have prevented the accused from fleeing with the child. Unfortunately, law enforcement agencies often move slowly in cases involving the abduction of girls from religious minority communities."
Muslims Attacks on Apostates, "Blasphemers," and Evangelists
Sudan: According to a June 15 report, "a group of Muslims" tracked down and beat a Haron, a Muslim convert to Christianity, inside a church in the Gorom Refugee Camp. The attackers "remain unidentified. The attack was unprovoked and carried out in what should have been, by every standard of human decency and international norms, a protected space." In an interview afterwards, Haron said he was expecting the violence: "Becoming a Christian from a Muslim background puts me and many others at risk, but where God has delivered me is worth the risk. From a flesh standpoint, there is fear, but when I remember the promises of God in Jesus Christ, I become bold and strong. But those threats have never made me change my mind to be a Christian."
Egypt: According to a June 19 report:
"Egyptian Christian Augustinos Samaan was sentenced to five years of hard labor after he was convicted of 'contempt of religion' and 'misuse of social media.' Samaan has a YouTube channel on which he posts apologetics videos comparing Christianity and Islam. Because of these videos, he was arrested on Oct. 1, 2025, and his pre-trial detention was extended in 15-day increments until the court sentenced him in January, without ever allowing his defense to see his case file. He was convicted under Article 98(f) of the Egyptian Penal Code, which penalizes 'extremist thoughts with the aim of instigating sedition and division or disdaining and contemplating any of the heavenly religions or the sects belonging thereto, or prejudicing national unity or social peace.' A five-year prison sentence is the maximum punishment under Article 98(f)."
Although Article 98 (f) is worded in a way that supposedly guards all "heavenly religions"—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—in practice, the report notes, it is primarily used against Egypt's Christian minorities:
"Dozens of other Egyptian individuals of minority faiths have been imprisoned for their 'blasphemous' online content since August 2025, demonstrating a trend away from equal protection under the law in Egypt. The broad language of Article 98(f) grants the Egyptian government too much discretion to suppress the expression of minority religions.... In practice, blasphemy laws like Article 98(f) consistently discriminate against Christians."
Bangladesh: On June 5, a group of Muslim men severely beat Arif Salam, 55, a Christian husband and father, after he answered a knock on his front door. According to the report,
"a group led by a local Islamist arrived at his home and questioned him about why he did not perform Namaz (Islamic prayers). In response, Salam says he calmly explained that he is a follower of Jesus Christ. Immediately after making this statement, Salam was physically assaulted by the group whose leader he identified as belonging to Jamaat-e-Islami, a radical political party associated with the global rise of political Islam. "In addition to physical injuries, including to his head, the attack left Salam severely traumatized. He and his family are now living in a state of fear, anxiety, and insecurity."
Uganda: On Sunday, June 14, a group of Muslims beat a Christian preacher after he participated in an evangelistic outreach. According to the report, as he and his wife were walking back to their lodging,
"about nine Muslims approached at about 7 p.m. and questioned their presence in the area and distribution of Christian materials. The group objected to their preaching about Christ and the use of the cross in worship, and an altercation ensued.... The assailants struck him on the head with blunt objects."
Then, according to his wife, Elizabeth, "Others grabbed him, pushed him to the ground, and he was then stomped on and kicked while the assault continued with various objects. My husband sustained fractures to his left leg and right hand." The Muslims tore his Bible and beat him until he lost consciousness, she said, adding, "I thank God that the attackers did not attack me." The assailants fled when a passing sugarcane truck approached.
Belgium: On June 30, Ahmed Yetrib, a Muslim who converted to Catholicism, reported receiving death threats on social media, partly because he was sharing his reasons for converting. His ordeal began in 2018, when he was baptized, at which point his entire family ostracized him. Even so, he has "never been so worried" as he is now, the report states.
Muslim Attacks on Christian Churches
France: On Friday, June 5, a group of Muslims stormed a Catholic service at a church in Beauregard. They shouted obscenities such as "F*ck your mothers, you Christians!" and "Allah Akbar." A parishioner described this incident on social media:
"I attend Mass and prayer services every week at Saint-Louis de Beauregard Church. I was deeply shocked by the shouting I heard from outside the church last night. I distinctly heard 'Allahu Akbar,' followed by 'F*ck your mother, Christians.' I feel sadness, disgust, and genuine concern. I never imagined hearing such words directed at people gathered simply to pray. I ask the authorities and the city to take this situation seriously and ensure that places of worship receive the protection they need. Everyone should be able to practice their faith freely, with respect, safety, and peace of mind."
Iraq: A June 18 video showed how the Mar Kiryakos Church in the historic Assyrian village of Sharanish was heavily vandalized. Pews are disturbed, items smashed and strewn on the ground. According to one report:
"The Assyrian villages of northern Iraq have endured decades of conflict, displacement, and demographic change. Many churches and monasteries across the region have suffered damage throughout the years, whether from warfare, neglect, or forced displacement. Historic sanctuaries that once served thriving communities are increasingly maintained by smaller populations or diaspora families seeking to preserve their ancestral heritage. For Assyrians and Chaldeans, churches such as Mar Kiryakos represent far more than architectural landmarks. They embody centuries of faith, memory, and communal identity in a region that has witnessed repeated waves of upheaval."
Indonesia: On June 11, Muslims, for the second time, protested the planned construction of the Java Christian Church, in part due to "fear of proselytizing" and because it was too near to a mosque. They crowded a narrow road near the planned worship site, with banners and a Taliban flag. Two of the banners read, "Do not provoke us – Banyuanyar residents are already peaceful; we reject the attempt to build a church. Reject, reject, reject," and, "Beware!!! Watch for proselytizing in Banyuanyar. Reject the church construction." A demonstrator leading the rally said: "We reject [the construction if the church] so that nearby residents also know that if a rule is violated, then there must be an evil plan, a plan for proselytizing, a missionary agenda. There is a plan to convert the Muslims living around this place." Separately, on June 24, dozens of Muslims demonstrated against the presence of a church in the Hegarmanah Indah housing complex. "At one point the group chanted the jihadist slogan 'Allahu Akbar [Allah is the greatest]' and announced they would say Islamic prayers. The protestors were not local residents and were unknown to neighborhood inhabitants, according to eyewitness testimony... The demonstrators claimed the church endangered the Muslim faith of youth. They threatened violence against Christian women and warned they would burn the worship building."
Sudan: On Sunday, June 7, authorities went to the Sudan Presbyterian Evangelical Church and informed leaders that their building could be demolished at any time. They gave no specific date, only warning "Be ready."
**Raymond Ibrahim, author of Defenders of the West, Sword and Scimitar, Crucified Again, and The Al Qaeda Reader, is the Distinguished Senior Shillman Fellow at the Gatestone Institute.
**About This Series
While not all, or even most, Muslims are involved, persecution of Christians by extremists is growing. The report posits that such persecution is not random but rather systematic, and takes place irrespective of language, ethnicity, or location. It includes incidents that take place during, or are reported on, any given month.
**Follow Raymond Ibrahim on X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/22920/persecution-of-christians-june
© 2026 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. 

Les équivoques d’un pays en fin de parcours
Dr. Charles Chartouni/icibeyrouth/October 15/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/10/158335/
Aucun observateur de la scène politique libanaise ne peut survoler les contradictions d’un pouvoir qui navigue au milieu des antinomies qui pourfendent les principes mêmes de l’État de droit, voire sa possibilité. Il est légitime de se poser la question devant ce fatras de paradoxes qui dissimule les réalités d’un coup d’État à l’œuvre ? Ce dernier s’abrite depuis des décennies derrière des fictions juridiques qui dissimulent une mainmise de fait qui a transformé ce faux semblant institutionnel en acte de supercherie monumentale, enveloppant de part en part les réalités d’un État en décomposition.
Comment est-ce possible de concilier les réquisits de l’État de droit avec ceux d’un coup d’État? La structure duale de l’État libanais dévoile les réalités d’une colonisation de fait et d’un coup d’État qui progresse de manière insidieuse sous des apparences de normalité juridique et constitutionnelle. Ce faisant, le travail de sape avance dans tous les sens.
Le cas de la reconduction du mandat de la FINUL est particulièrement instructif dans la mesure où il illustre de manière dramatique l’abdication du pouvoir au profit des extraterritorialités de fait. Celles-ci ont valu au Liban des cycles de violence récurrents qui l’ont détruit tout au long des sept dernières décennies. Il est inconcevable de voir un gouvernement concéder ses prérogatives constitutionnelles à un mouvement terroriste qu’il conspue d’une part et auquel il cède de manière délibérée. Le paradoxe du gouvernement libanais est celui de se poser en intermédiaire entre le Hezbollah et l’État d’Israël alors qu’il est signataire de deux accords auxquels il s’est dérobé de manière systématique.
Il est complexe pour un observateur de l’extérieur d’en comprendre la raison. L'atteinte de cet objectif dépend en revanche de sa capacité à saisir les ressorts d’une dynamique politique hybride où les cultures de l’État de droit et du néoféodalisme produisent des monstruosités qu’il faudrait apprendre à scruter. Comment peut-on s’engager dans des négociations internationales sans avoir effectué le balisage politique et institutionnel nécessaire ? Un tel balisage permet d’avancer de manière conséquente sur des dossiers aussi complexes que la fin des conflits, leurs conditions préalables, la reconnaissance mutuelle, et la sortie progressive et ferme de préjugés dirimants qui empêchent l’évolution sur la voie des négociations?
Paradoxalement, on s’engage dans des négociations aux prémisses vagues et un rejet de principe de toute démarche de paix. Plus de deux ans se sont écoulés depuis la mise en place des mécanismes de négociation, tandis que les déclarations de principe sont alternativement rejetées et déboutées sur le terrain. L’emprise de l’idéologie dans la mise en œuvre d’un processus truffé de contradictions n’est pas un effet du hasard, il s’agit d’une culture où l’ambivalence est résolument invoquée en vue de légitimer les préjugés idéologiques et les distortions qui en émanent. Or le Liban n’est pas en mesure de perpétuer ces paradoxes à moins d’en faire les frais au niveau de la destruction de sa paix civile et de la remise en question de sa viabilité nationale.
La continuation des cycles de violence au Sud-Liban et leur impact ravageur nous mettent devant des réalités peu réjouissantes. Il s'agit notamment des bouleversements géostratégiques et géologiques, de la destruction des assises anthropologiques d’une démocratie en état de dissipation totale, des aléas d’une paix civile vouée aux turpitudes des politiques de puissance régionales, des contrats sociaux caducs et de la mise à mort de la civilité démocratique dans un pays où la violence, le diktat idéologique et les conséquences d’un naufrage de longue durée ont laissé ce pays en proie à la politique de domination chiite et de ses émules régionaux.
Il faudrait se poser, à juste titre, la question du rapport entre paix civile, stabilisation géopolitique et réformes de gouvernance et de leurs relations dialectiques avec la paix régionale. Il est impossible de s’extraire des dynamiques guerrières à moins de réengager le processus de paix et de mettre fin aux élucubrations idéologiques et aux entreprises impériales qui en dérivent. La défaite du régime iranien et l’endiguement de ses dérives corollaires au niveau régional sont incontournables pour mettre fin aux cycles de violence et à leurs figurations multiples.
La survie du Liban, l'avenir de la concorde civile et les chances d'un réformisme d'ensemble dépendent largement de la poursuite inconditionnelle des négociations internationales visant à stabiliser le pays et la région. Cela nécessite également un engagement sincère et résolu de la part des acteurs locaux pour favoriser le dialogue et promouvoir des solutions durables aux conflits persistants. Les compromissions idéologiques du Hezbollah et de ses alliés, ainsi que les politiques de subversion islamiste et de gauche dans leurs diverses modulations, constituent des facteurs de sabotage qui compromettent les chances d’aboutissement des négociations en vue de mettre fin au conflit.
Les États-Unis nous ont offert l’unique plateforme qui va nous aider à nous extraire des dynamiques conflictuelles vieilles de plus de soixante-dix ans. Le pouvoir en place timoré fait preuve de complicité objective et hésite à s’engager de manière résolue en faveur de l’option américaine qui demeure notre unique planche de salut. La survie du Liban et les réformes institutionnelles requises en dépendent.

The Ambiguities of a Country at the End of Its Road
Dr. Charles Chartouni/icibeyrouth/October 15, 2026 (Translated from French by AI)
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/10/158335/
No observer of the Lebanese political scene can overlook the contradictions of a power that navigates amid antinomies that rend the very principles of the rule of law, if not its very possibility. It is legitimate to ask the question in the face of this jumble of paradoxes that conceals the realities of a coup d'état in progress? The latter has for decades sheltered behind legal fictions that conceal a de facto takeover that has transformed this institutional sham into an act of monumental deception, enveloping from end to end the realities of a decomposing state.
How is it possible to reconcile the requirements of the rule of law with those of a coup d'état? The dual structure of the Lebanese state reveals the realities of a de facto colonization and a coup d'état that is insidiously progressing under appearances of legal and constitutional normality. In doing so, the work of undermining advances in every direction.
The case of the renewal of UNIFIL's mandate is particularly instructive insofar as it dramatically illustrates the abdication of power in favor of de facto extraterritorialities. These have cost Lebanon recurring cycles of violence that have destroyed it throughout the last seven decades. It is inconceivable to see a government concede its constitutional prerogatives to a terrorist movement that it denounces on the one hand and to which it deliberately yields on the other. The paradox of the Lebanese government is that it poses as an intermediary between Hezbollah and the State of Israel while it is a signatory to two agreements from which it has systematically defaulted.
It is complex for an outside observer to understand the reason. Achieving this objective depends, however, on its ability to grasp the inner workings of a hybrid political dynamic where the cultures of the rule of law and neo-feudalism produce monstrosities that must be learned to scrutinize. How can one engage in international negotiations without having carried out the necessary political and institutional groundwork? Such groundwork makes it possible to make substantial progress on issues as complex as ending conflicts, their prerequisites, mutual recognition, and the progressive and firm exit from crippling prejudices that prevent evolution on the path of negotiations?
Paradoxically, we are engaging in negotiations with vague premises and a rejection on principle of any peace process. More than two years have elapsed since the establishment of negotiation mechanisms, while declarations of principle are alternately rejected and dismissed on the ground. The hold of ideology in the implementation of a process riddled with contradictions is not a matter of chance; it is a culture where ambivalence is resolutely invoked in order to legitimize ideological prejudices and the distortions that emanate from them. Yet Lebanon is not in a position to perpetuate these paradoxes without paying the price in terms of the destruction of its civil peace and the questioning of its national viability.
The continuation of cycles of violence in South Lebanon and their devastating impact confront us with unpleasant realities. These include geostrategic and geological upheavals, the destruction of the anthropological foundations of a democracy in a state of total dissipation, the vagaries of a civil peace doomed to the turpitudes of regional power politics, obsolete social contracts, and the putting to death of democratic civility in a country where violence, ideological diktat, and the consequences of a long-term shipwreck have left this country prey to the politics of Shiite domination and its regional emulators.
One should rightly ask the question of the relationship between civil peace, geopolitical stabilization, and governance reforms and their dialectical relations with regional peace. It is impossible to extricate oneself from warlike dynamics unless the peace process is re-engaged and an end is put to ideological lucubrations and the imperial enterprises that derive from them. The defeat of the Iranian regime and the containment of its corollary excesses at the regional level are unavoidable to put an end to cycles of violence and their multiple figurations.
The survival of Lebanon, the future of civil concord, and the chances of overall reformism depend largely on the unconditional pursuit of international negotiations aimed at stabilizing the country and the region. This also requires a sincere and resolute commitment on the part of local actors to foster dialogue and promote sustainable solutions to persistent conflicts. The ideological compromises of Hezbollah and its allies, as well as the policies of Islamist and leftist subversion in their various modulations, constitute sabotage factors that compromise the chances of successful negotiations to end the conflict.
The United States has offered us the only platform that will help us extricate ourselves from conflictual dynamics that are more than seventy years old. The timid power in place shows objective complicity and hesitates to commit resolutely in favor of the American option, which remains our only lifeline. The survival of Lebanon and the required institutional reforms depend on it.

Question: What is Moralistic Therapeutic Deism?
GotQuestions.org//October 16, 2026
Answer: The term Moralistic Therapeutic Deism was first coined by sociologists Christian Smith and Melina Lundquist Denton in their 2005 book Soul Searching: The Religious and Spiritual Lives of American Teenagers (Oxford University Press). Based on extensive research, they identified the predominant beliefs of American teenagers, even those that claim to be Christians. They named the core beliefs Moralistic Therapeutic Deism or MTD. The five core beliefs of MTD are as follows:
1. A god exists who created and ordered the world and watches over human life on earth.
2. God wants people to be good, nice, and fair to each other, as taught in the Bible and by most world religions.
3. The central goal of life is to be happy and to feel good about oneself.
4. God does not need to be particularly involved in one’s life except when God is needed to resolve a problem.
5. Good people go to heaven when they die.
The beliefs of Moralistic Therapeutic Deism are “moralistic” in that they place a high value on “being good” as found in #2 and #5, above. Good is really defined by popular culture rather than the moral imperatives of the Bible. So tolerating behaviors the Bible calls sin might be seen as “good” while calling those behaviors “sin” might be seen as intolerant or hateful, which is bad.
The beliefs of Moralistic Therapeutic Deism are “therapeutic” in that the primary value is feeling good about oneself as articulated in beliefs #3 and #4, above. God’s “job” is to take care of us.
The authors used the word deism because, in Moralistic Therapeutic Deism, God exists as the Creator, but He is relatively uninvolved (beliefs #1 and #4, above). Deists have objected to this use of the term because, in true deism, God never intervenes in human affairs. He created us, but He leaves us alone. For this reason, some have suggested that theism would be a better term. Theists believe that God exists and that He can and does intervene from time to time when needed, in answer to prayer, etc.
The most important point concerning Moralistic Therapeutic Deism, however, is not the difference between theism and deism, but how far removed from biblical truth some young people are. The beliefs of MTD are not isolated to Millennials, either. It seems that many people simply view God as a “cosmic genie,” a “divine bellhop,” or a roadside assistance mechanic—you don’t know Him or need to, but you can call Him when you are broken down and He will come and get you going again. The most important thing, according to MTD, is to be good, nice, and tolerant, and God will ultimately receive you into heaven. This view is probably held by a lot of Americans and seems to be becoming the dominant “civic religion,” which emphasizes the horizontal relationships with other people but minimizes a relationship with God. In short, MTD puts humanity at the center and, ultimately, each individual at the center of his or her own belief system.
Biblical Christians will have problems with all 5 key points of Moralistic Therapeutic Deism:
1. Not just “a god” exists, but the God of the Bible, who has revealed himself as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Whoever does not honor Jesus Christ as God does not honor God (see John 5:23).
2. God does not just want people to be “nice” but commands that they obey Him. He is the One who defines good and nice. He calls sin “sin” and promises to judge it (see Romans 1:18–32).
3. The central goal of life is to give glory to God. A by-product may be that we feel good about ourselves, but that is not the goal (see Romans 11:36).
4. Our primary goal as believers is to be constantly in tune with God, following His leading and in daily fellowship with Him. We are to “pray without ceasing” (1 Thessalonians 5:17).
5. No one is good enough to go to heaven. All have sinned and fall short of God’s glory (Romans 3:23); no one is good enough, and that is why we need Jesus, God in the flesh. He lived the perfect life that we could not, and He died to pay for our sin so that we might be made acceptable to God. “‘He himself bore our sins’ in his body on the cross, so that we might die to sins and live for righteousness; ‘by his wounds you have been healed’” (1 Peter 2:24).
Moralistic Therapeutic Deism is not an official religion. Probably no one would ever identify himself as a “Moralistic Therapeutic Deist.” The real problem is that moralism is not Christianity, and most people who hold these beliefs are likely to identify themselves as Christians when in fact they are living to glorify themselves!

The Next War of Attrition is in Yemen
Ari Heistein and Edmund Fitton-Brown/The Cipher Brief/October 16/2026 |
Battlefield dynamics in Yemen shift quickly, but Houthi aims do not. A movement organized around radical ideology and perpetual conflict now shares a border with a state organized around modernization and prosperity. Saudi Arabia and the Houthis both have formidable but very different military capabilities, and neither can force a quick decision on the other. That is the recipe for a long war of attrition. The closest precedent is the war in Ukraine, to which the Yemen war is increasingly linked, and which may be instructive for the Kingdom on how best to prepare.
There is also a parallel to be made with the related conflict between Iran and the United States, the fallout from which has severely affected the GCC countries, including Saudi Arabia. Essentially, we are witnessing the leverage of a lesser military force when that party has a much higher threshold for pain and disruption than the stronger party. Iran and the Houthis are both betting that the Saudis are sufficiently anxious to hold on to their peaceful model of business, tourism, energy and investment to settle at almost any price and end the present conflict.
The Houthi mindset
The Houthi ideological program is anti-Saudi, anti-American, anti-Israel, anti-democratic, anti-liberal and antisemitic. It has long cast the Saudi monarchy as an American-Israeli puppet unworthy of the title Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. Some of this is personal: The father of Abdelmalek al-Houthi, the group’s leader, clashed for years with Saudi-backed clerics and was rumored to have been targeted for assassination at their behest. But the grievances against the Kingdom also has a territorial dimension. In the 1934 Treaty of Taif, Imam Yahya of northern Yemen settled the border with the Saudi state and ceded Jizan, Asir, and Najran provinces. The Houthis, who present themselves somewhat ambiguously as heirs to the imamate, have revived claims to all three provinces. The purpose is to stoke resentment of the Saudis and to leave the Kingdom’s southern border unsettled. This territorial dimension intersects with the allegation that the Saudis are not fit to control Mecca and Medina: Abdelmalik recently reiterated that Mecca belongs to the Islamic Umma, rather than being a province of Saudi Arabia. The Houthis implicitly – and sometimes explicitly – claim the whole of the southern half of the Arabian Peninsula, “from Mecca to Mahra”.The deeper reason the Houthis cannot stop is structural. The Houthis depend on mobilization, and for a movement of that kind peace is a threat rather than a reward. Conflict is what holds the project together, as it justifies extracting resources from an impoverished population, excuses unpaid salaries and collapsed services, and lets the security apparatus treat every critic as a collaborator. For a deeply unpopular regime, war with Saudi Arabia and its local Yemeni partners is the most useful conflict available and could yield significant returns if the Houthis can extract concessions at the negotiating table. It was already clear during Ambassador Fitton-Brown’s period of responsibility for Yemen that the perverse incentives of the war economy meant that Houthi negotiator Muhammad Abdelsalam was viewed with suspicion by Houthi field commanders, who were benefitting from the war economy and associated “respect”, and had no interest in being transformed into administrators with responsibility to balance their power.
The Houthi menu
The Houthis approach is predatory: isolate each victim and deal with it alone. They pursue bilateral deals that peel off potential adversaries, and calibrate each attack so the victim would conclude that a limited response is cheaper than a sustained one. They have cultivated the sense that they are somebody else’s problem, Israel’s when they fire missiles at Eilat, Riyadh’s when they strike Abha, etc. A decade on, the Houthis have have attacked many different states, and yet no one has owned the problem.
It is troubling that US negotiators have recently sat with the Houthis in Muscat and apparently taken at face value Houthi assurances that their quarrel is only with the Saudis, not with American – or even the Israelis! All this while threatening the US economy and risking the lives of US nationals at civilian infrastructure in the Kingdom.
In the current round of fighting, the Houthis have three key options for escalation. The first is domestic expansion within Yemen. It is the least risky for the regime because it stays within a conflict the world has learned to ignore. New territory brings new populations to tax, new ports and crossings to control, and new momentum to display at home. The drawback is that this also pushes the Zaidi Houthis deeper and deeper into Shafa’I (Sunni) territory, where the population is hostile to their agenda. The second option is maritime. Attacks on commercial vessels and Saudi tankers in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab inflict harm, especially in the economic realm, and they are extremely difficult to deter and defend against. The drawback is that shipping is a global interest, albeit somewhat elastic, and so a sustained campaign against it may invite the involvement of states with maritime commercial interests that would otherwise stay out of a Saudi-Houthi war. It also, by violating the Law of the Sea, provides an unimpeachable legal basis to build an international military coalition against them. The third option, targeting civilian aviation, is the riskiest. A recent Houthi attack, on October 10, killed at least twelve people in the deadliest attack on the Kingdom in more than a decade. One US national was among the dead. The strikes came with a threat to airlines, “for the last time,” to stay out of Saudi airspace. This type of attack is probably the most likely to galvanize an international coalition and demonstrates that the Houthis have an extremely high appetite for risk. The Houthis are testing how far they can take this. Downing a passenger aircraft would almost certainly bring the overwhelming response, including direct American strikes, that the Houthis have spent recent decades seeking to avoid (albeit with an imperfect record). The threat alone can inflict some damage to Saudi Arabia, so the threats will continue. Whether the Houthis will continue or even take escalation in this realm even further will depend on whether they believe anyone would make them pay.
The wars are already connected
It might be tempting to treat the Russia-Ukraine and Houthi-Saudi comparison as merely illustrative, but the two wars are materially linked in both directions. Russia’s involvement with the Houthis is the most direct link thus far. By mid-2024, Russia had recruited hundreds, possibly even thousands, of Yemeni men for the Ukrainian front through a Houthi-linked network operating out of Oman. Also, during the Houthi Red Sea campaign of 2023 to 2025, Russia reportedly passed satellite targeting data to the Houthis. And the Shahed-136 that Iran supplied to Russia, which Russia now mass-produces and improved upon, belongs to the same family of weapon the Houthis fire at Saudi infrastructure. Russian innovation may yet flow back through Tehran to Sanaa. Russia’s public posture toward the Houthi problem has been one of ostensible concern. In September, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called Houthi attacks on Saudi civilian targets “unacceptable,” and President Putin and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman discussed freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandab by phone. Riyadh should not mistake this for neutrality: Moscow treats the Houthis as a pawn in a larger game. The mechanism is not complicated. A crisis on the Arabian Peninsula drains Western attention and, perhaps more importantly, Western munitions. In late March, the Pentagon was reported to be weighing whether to divert air defense interceptors bought for Ukraine to the Middle East, because the war with Iran was straining stocks of critical American munitions. This is the outcome Moscow has been working toward since it abstained on the 2015 arms embargo against the Houthis and then spent a decade obstructing the UN panel that documented its violations. Russia does not need the Houthis to win; it needs them to keep fighting. It makes a similar calculation over supporting continuing Iranian resistance to the Americans. The link is starting to run the other way too. Kyiv’s growing ties with Saudi Arabia are more recent but no less consequential. On March 27, the two countries signed a defense cooperation agreement centered on counter-drone expertise. More than two hundred Ukrainian anti-drone specialists are now deployed in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, and Riyadh is reportedly negotiating a large purchase of Ukrainian interceptor drones that cost between one and three thousand dollars each. Until recently Riyadh was deepening ties with Moscow through OPEC+ and BRICS, and yet it is now importing Ukrainian expertise to defend against weapons Moscow helped perfect.
Saudi Arabia’s dilemma
As in Eastern Europe, no quick decision is likely in the Saudi-Houthi conflict. The Houthis cannot be bombed out of Sanaa, as the coalition learned between 2015 and 2022. While the Yemeni government’s counteroffensive along the coast has stabilized the front and claimed gains around Mokha, it remains a long way from the capital. That leaves Riyadh with three paths, none of them are likely to be easy. The first is appeasement, which would feed the movement. Since June, the Houthis have demanded a deal that lifts the blockade on their ports and airports and restores the flow of cash into Sanaa. Such a deal would ease the regime’s revenue crisis and pay for its next tranche of weapons. The Kingdom tried a version of this approach after 2022, and the result is the war it is fighting now. The second is deterrence, which fails against an adversary that seeks out perpetual conflict. Deterrence assumes an enemy that weighs costs and benefits in measurements that the Saudis understand, and that appears not to be the case. For a movement like the Houthis whose legitimacy rests on “resistance,” conflict is not only a hazard but also a realization of an extremist aspiration. The third is defeating the Houthis outright, which means returning to a war Saudi Arabia already fought and abandoned. A strategy that could succeed does exist: cut Houthi supply lines of cash and other material while backing a unified Yemeni ground campaign under a single command. But this will require sustained pressure over time in order to crack the Houthi defenses and then ultimately the regime.Attrition, then, is the most reasonable path forward. The question is not whether Saudi Arabia will be in a long war but whether it will be prepared for one. Attrition is survivable for the side that innovates and devastating for the side that assumes the war will end in a quick and decisive maneuver. The length of the war also introduces uncertainties about changes in the posture of allies, especially the US. There is a need to bake in bipartisan agreement in Washington, DC, that it is a US national security interest to ensure that the Saudis, and the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen, and the Law of the Sea prevail in this conflict.
Two Ukrainian lessons
Ukraine survived attrition against a far larger adversary for two reasons, and both apply to Riyadh. The first is adaptation. It built a drone industry from almost nothing into one producing millions of systems a year, fielded interceptor drones costing a small fraction of a Patriot missile, and compressed production and procurement timelines. The Saudi-Ukranian March agreement imports some of that expertise but may not necessarily transfer all of the knowledge necessary to built its own industry. A defense that depends on imports from a country at war is precarious at the best of times.
Riyadh has the money and the stated intent, and Vision 2030 set a goal of localizing half of military spending by the end of the decade. But localization so far has meant licensed assembly of foreign designs rather than innovation under fire. The Kingdom has not reached a wartime tempo in which a new counter-drone system is conceived, tested against live Houthi attacks, and fielded within weeks. That is the capability Ukraine built and Saudi Arabia lacks. The second lesson is diplomatic. Ukraine did not survive alone. It built a coalition of dozens of states that supplied weapons, trained its forces, financed its budget, and shared intelligence. For the Houthis, a coalition of this kind is the worst possible development, and it is exactly what their strategy of isolating victims and claiming false symmetry is meant to prevent. The current war gives Riyadh the chance to build one, but the pieces remain fragmented. Ukraine’s example is that a coalition does not assemble itself. It must be rallied, placed under a single command, and given a shared objective beyond absorbing attacks. The Houthis’ own escalation, which has now killed citizens of a dozen countries at a single airport, is doing part of that work for Riyadh. The Kingdom’s task is to turn condemnation into commitment before the moment passes. So what would this coalition look like? The Saudis already have a maritime group of 14 that opposes Houthi blackmail against them in the Red Sea. But the US, UAE, UK and the other European powers are not part of it. With US leadership and assistance, this needs to be remedied. This is achievable, on the basis of three compelling legal bases: enforcement of the Law of the Sea; the legitimacy of the Yemeni government (and illegitimacy of the Houthis); and the legitimate defense and self-defense of Saudi Arabia.
*Ari Heistein is a veteran Yemen analyst who advises corporations and institutions on the Houthi threat, and works with Israeli UxS startups to bring defense and dual-use technologies to the U.S. Department of War. Edmund Fitton-Brown is the Former British Ambassador to Yemen and Senior Fellow at FDD.

Iran: A Cluster of Problems
Amir Taheri/Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
“What is the Iran problem that analysts and policymakers often talk about?” This was the question fired at me at a recent brain-storming session with a number of political commentators in London.
The short answer is that, depending on who is looking, Iran is made of a cluster of problems.To some, like successive US administrations, the core of the problem is the current regime’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Never mind that for the past quarter of a century US intelligence services have regularly reported that Iran wasn’t doing so every US president presented “tackling the Iranian nuclear problem” as a priority. Under President Barack Obama that “problem” consumed almost all the four years of John Kerry as Secretary of State. The US wasn’t alone in that context. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw visited Tehran five times to “solve” the “nuclear problem.” All German and most French foreign ministers did the same. In a different context the, “Iran problem” has been defined as “exporting terrorism” with cases concerning over 30 countries –from Kuwait to Argentina and passing by Türkiye, Switzerland and many members of the European Union. To that must be added financial, arms and political support that Tehran has given to almost all Palestinian groups fighting Israel not to mention guerrilla outfits in Latin America. Setting up “proxies” in a number of countries, notably post-Saddam Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and west Yemen has also been cited as another facet of the “Iran problem” with the killing of untold numbers of Iraqi, Syrian, Lebanese and Yemenis by the Quds Force and its local mercenaries. Interestingly, the outside world has seldom seen the “Iran problem” in terms of what the regime has been doing to the Iranian people for more than four decades. That includes tens of thousands of executions, several instances of massacring unarmed protestors and dissidents and Iran topping the world in number of political prisoners. And that is not to mention transforming a more or less developed economy into what resembles a poor house lorded upon by an ultra-rich minority.
Well, all that may sound like a litany of woes part of which may describe a few other countries. So what is the core of the “Iran problem”? Without answering that question, no solution to the problems paraded above is conceivable. Although the concept of original sin doesn’t exist in Iranian culture I think we could use it to describe what happened in 1979. At that time part of the clergy in alliance with a variety of leftist and tier-mondiste groups seized power and transformed Iran from a normal nation-state into a vehicle for an ideological cocktail made of a localised version of Muslim Brotherhood narrative and misunderstood Marxist-Leninist-Maoist tropes. The mistake the outside world made was to ignore that transformation and continue with the assumption that they were dealing with a normal nation-state with regular interests, aspirations and ambitions of normal nation-states.
Falling for that illusion was facilitated by the fact that part of the pre-1979 Iranian nation-state had survived and could be used as a façade for the new Khomeinist regime. The bureaucracy was functioning more or less as before while there were enough characters with American and European education to play the role of ministers, diplomats and business negotiators.
This is how Chris Patten, then the European Union’s foreign affairs spokesman, put it: Dealing with Tehran we meet talented actors who know the diplomatic and political jargon as good as anyone. What we find out however is that they are just playing diplomat or minister while others wield the real power. To complicate matters further the powers that dealt with Iran gradually formed alliances with parts of the cartel that dominated the fragmented political structure in Tehran. Russia focused attention on the “Leader’s House” (beyt) and the person of “Supreme Guide” Ali Khamenei and chunks of the Revolutionary Guard Corps under his control. China put its chips on the faction led by Ali-Akbar Rafsanjani and his business associates. The US forged close ties with so-called “Reformists” such as ex-Premier Mir-Hossein Mousavi and later the group known as “New York Boys” that acted as the local branch of the US Democrat Party. The British and to a lesser extent the French identified Mohammad Khatami and later Hassan Rouhani as “the man we could do business with.”
Other nations interested in Iran or fearing it secured their own niches of influence within the perimeters set by the big powers mentioned above. In every case the outside players made sure that they could reap maximum benefit from minimum economic and political investment in the fragmented power-structure in Tehran while making sure that rival powers didn’t expand their sphere of influence. Russia refused to sell to IRGC weapons it sold to others including India and Türkiye. China bought Iranian oil with a hefty discount but didn’t pay cash to force its own products on Iranian market. The EU promised moons and marvels by signing contracts but never delivered.Thus, maintaining the status quo became the un-admitted priority of all players. That means keeping Iran on the wrong train it boarded in 1979 instead of helping it to get off at the first stop. Thus, for Iran to help solve any of the problems mentioned above, it is imperative that Russia, China, the US, the EU and half a dozen smaller regional players sing from the same hymn-sheet. The fact that they didn’t in almost half a century may mean that they can accommodate themselves with what President Bill Clinton described as “containment” of Iran.
Iran stands at a point at which rival internal and external factions counter each other. It cannot change the environment around it while it is incapable of changing itself to suit that environment. It cannot wage war in a meaningful way but is also unable to seek peace. The result is what is called Zugzwang in German, which means being stuck in an unenviable position.

Why Not Deal With the Houthis Instead of Fighting Them?
Abdulrahman Al-Rashed/Asharq Al Awsat/16 October 2026
With the conflict in Yemen against the Houthis having dragged on for a decade and a half, some are inclined to deal with the group as the de facto authority rather than continue fighting it. After all, those who ruled Sanaa in the past were generally dealt with regardless of their identity or ideology.
This is a pragmatic proposition. The problem, however, lies in the Houthi project itself. The group is fundamentally at odds with the very idea of the state, and its conduct has revealed its determination to preserve the authority of the “organization.”
The Houthis want to benefit from the state’s resources and institutions, as well as the recognition afforded to it by others, while retaining their weapons as an armed group and waging wars in accordance with their external alliances. From this perspective, attaining power becomes a means of advancing the group’s own project. The events beginning in 2013 and continuing over the following two years provide a clear test case. The Houthis were invited to participate in the National Dialogue Conference and signed the Peace and National Partnership Agreement, under which they were rewarded with seats and special privileges for Saada and given the opportunity to participate in the executive branch. In return, they were required to hand over their medium and heavy weapons to state institutions.
Instead, the process ended with their seizure of state institutions, the detention of President Hadi and the dissolution of parliament, among other developments. They then proceeded to absorb state institutions and exclude everyone else. It was only natural that war would erupt among Yemenis.
After establishing its dominance, the group expected to become the state, and for the state to become synonymous with the Houthis. But that was not quite what happened. Instead, it established a network of supervisors who wielded actual authority parallel to official government positions.
The second experiment came when former President Ali Abdullah Saleh allied himself with the Houthis in a governing “partnership.” At the time, despite being out of power, Saleh still controlled most of the armed forces. Yet even Saleh misjudged the group, and he ultimately ended up being killed in the street in 2017. Some may regard this simply as a struggle for power that ended with Houthi supremacy and argue that the new reality should therefore be accepted and dealt with accordingly. Once again, why not be pragmatic and deal with whoever has come to rule Sanaa, just as was done in the past, from Imam Yahya to President Judge Abdul Rahman al-Iryani and ultimately President Ali Abdullah Saleh? The truth is that this has already been tried. But the Houthis, as an ideological group, refused to transform themselves into a state. They continued to wage wars against neighboring Saudi Arabia and the wider region, and before that against the Yemeni people. They remained an armed organization with their own parallel institutions.
This is where comparisons with ISIS and Hezbollah arise, not because their ideologies and experiences are identical, but because of the nature of their relationship with the state. ISIS represents a more extreme case: it rejected existing states and sought to establish a caliphate extending beyond its borders. It wanted a state fashioned according to its own ideological principles. Hezbollah, by contrast, created a model that combines participation in state institutions with the retention of an independent armed force beyond the state’s accountability, while operating as a group whose ultimate point of reference lies abroad.
We cannot describe the Houthis as a Yemeni state, or speak of a “Yemeni Houthi Imamate,” in the way one might refer to Yemen’s former Mutawakkilite Kingdom or the Republic, because they are a group subordinate to Iran. The Houthis in Sanaa have, to some extent, resembled ISIS in Mosul or Hezbollah in southern Lebanon: they designed a state according to the dictates of their ideology.
Is this rebellion the result of the Houthis never having been given a chance by their neighbors and the international community? In reality, the opposite is true. The Americans, Europeans and the United Nations gave the Houthis an opportunity unlike anything other armed groups in the region could have dreamed of. The Stockholm Agreement came to rescue them from defeat and collapse. Yet Western governments that sought to accommodate the group failed to turn it into a more civilian political actor or transform it into a conventional governing system.
Riyadh then tried, with Muscat’s participation and in coordination with the UN envoy at the time, to entice the Houthis into becoming a peaceful neighbor through an agreement to step away from war. Salaries for their employees were paid, the airport and port were reopened to them, and a delegation was sent to visit them in their “capital,” Sanaa, a gesture carrying significant political recognition. The Houthis made full use of the visit for high-profile propaganda purposes and reaped both political and material gains from it.
During the period in which efforts were being made to rehabilitate the Houthis into a respectable neighboring “state,” the group was simultaneously working with Iran, largely out of sight, to build offensive military capabilities. Before 2023 was over, it had resumed operating as a cross-border armed group. Contrary to what some researchers believe, the Houthis are yet another Iranian proxy in the region, not the nucleus of an ordinary Yemeni system of government. There is a clear distinction between an ally and a subordinate. An ally is someone whose interests coincide with yours; a subordinate is someone whose will is constrained by yours. The group’s extremist ideology is ultimately less important than understanding its intentions when it gains control of a country such as Yemen.

Selected Face Book & X tweets on October 16/2026
Ronnie Chatah
When Michel Samaha was arrested & exposed for transporting explosives into Lebanon, the man that played a central role in his arrest - Wissam al-Hassan - was assassinated two months later.
Wissam al-Hassan had warned my father that he was under surveillance. Only to be killed by the same group that recently smuggled 800kg of the same explosives.
The threat remains. And until they are divorced from Iran & disarmed, Hezbollah will target anyone that stands in their way. See less

Ghadi Sary
Paula Kasparian and the Young Turks of Achrafieh.
It will be a failure, particularly for Antoine Sehnaoui, if the constituents in his district would again vote for this antisemite. The move by Ambassador Issa was a class act @usembassybeirut and should be followed, as early as the next cable, with a report into this MP’s EU funding, position from Hezbollah including weeping on Nasrallah’s teenage socks, and overall positioning against US interests. It would be a very good example for secretary Rubio’s case to our European partners bemoaning US lack of support. For the last few years this Lebanese Rima Hassan and her seven MBs have done nothing but advance socialist french policies in Lebanon and promote anti Americanism, and it was a stroke of genius to expose that. They were supposed to represent change, yet they fit hand in glove with the current Loya Jirga. There are many coincidences in Life, but it is in fact a true sign that her actual last name corresponds to anti-semite Alaa Al Aswani’s choice for his book name. Would ring a bell even with state department’s most pro MB orientalists. Truly not a coincidence. Dance for a minute, literally.

Political Pen
Father Tony Khadra: Achrafieh Will No Longer Belong to Christians
In an episode of “Bi Arda" program on Pen Media, Head of Labora Foundation Father Tony Khadra revealed that “a vast number of properties in Achrafieh have recently been sold to non-Christians.”

Hussain Abdul-Hussain
IRGC still receives the $3 billion allocated for PMU militias annually, mainly through salaries to ghost warriors and scam arms deals. That’s a lot of money that IRGC then sends part of it with Shia pilgrims to Lebanon, each carrying $10k cash, which legally crosses the Beirut airport check. Iraq and Turkey continue to be a problem in undermining sanctions on Iran.
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Miad Maleki
In September, when @SecScottBessent teased a "large bank," I noted the place to watch was Iraq's banking sector and pointed to Bank Melli's Iraqi footprint. Today @USTreasury designated Iraq's International Development Bank (IDB), the country's self-described largest private x.com/miadmaleki/sta…