English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For October 09/2026
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news

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Bible Quotations For today
And when day came, he called his disciples and chose twelve of them, whom he also named apostles
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Luke 06/12-19/:"Now during those days he went out to the mountain to pray; and he spent the night in prayer to God. And when day came, he called his disciples and chose twelve of them, whom he also named apostles: Simon, whom he named Peter, and his brother Andrew, and James, and John, and Philip, and Bartholomew, and Matthew, and Thomas, and James son of Alphaeus, and Simon, who was called the Zealot, and Judas son of James, and Judas Iscariot, who became a traitor. He came down with them and stood on a level place, with a great crowd of his disciples and a great multitude of people from all Judea, Jerusalem, and the coast of Tyre and Sidon. They had come to hear him and to be healed of their diseases; and those who were troubled with unclean spirits were cured. And all in the crowd were trying to touch him, for power came out from him and healed all of them.

Titles For The English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on October 08-09/2026
A Critical Reading of Naim Qassem’s Speech: Between the Myth of Steadfastness, the Doctrine of the Unity of Arenas, and the Futility of Dialogue/Elias Bejjani/October 07, 2026
The Third Anniversary of the Jihadist and Barbaric Raid of October 7th/Elias Bejjani/October 07, 2026
Etienne Saqr (Abou Arz): October 7
Bachir Gemayel Academy
Israeli army says one soldier killed, three wounded in south Lebanon
What if Nasrallah had chosen Lebanon?/Makram Rabah/Al Arabiya English/08 October/2026
South Lebanon: Latest developments
Reports: No escalation in south in coming period
Kallas says EU preparing 'support mission' for Lebanese army, in favor of UNIFIL extension
US dismisses claims of Iranian cash transfers to Hezbollah as fake
More than $200 million? Hezbollah sources challenge US denial of Iranian funds
Solar power within reach: Lebanon plans three-year solar loans under 2027 budget
Kaja Kallas tells LBCI about Europe’s planned mission in Lebanon — interview
EU top diplomat to AFP: Bloc in favor of UN Lebanon peacekeepers' extension
Aoun says Lebanon's stability key to that of region and Europe
Aoun tells US senator southerners eager for state to exert its authority
Salam stresses commitment to 'protecting monetary stability, purchasing power of citizens'
Berri says problem is Israel's failure to abide by any agreement
Lebanon to turn clocks back one hour on Oct. 24-25
Shiites in Lebanon – 6/Colonel Charbel Barakat/October 09/2026

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on October 08-09/2026
Iran’s Last Supreme Leader: When the Republic Becomes a Networked Organization
Trump says US will not attack Iran before midterm elections in November
US House Speaker Johnson weighs ‘next chapter’ if Republicans lose majority
US tells citizens to 'exercise heightened vigilance' after Riyadh airport attacks
Iran will not abandon uranium enrichment or hand over its uranium, nuclear chief says
US imposes fresh sanctions on Iran's shadow fleet
Houthi missile debris damages kindergarten, medical clinics in Riyadh
Gulf countries shipped over 1.25 bln barrels of crude oil through Hormuz: CENTCOM
Saudi Arabia, UAE sign MoU to boost power grid interconnection, rail connectivity
Saudi-led coalition intercepts Houthi missiles targeting Riyadh, Khamis Mushait
Explosions heard in Saudi capital Riyadh
Yemen's Houthis warn staff to leave Saudi oil sites
Houthis Accused of Stripping Western Yemen of Power Equipment, Property
Iraq Warns of ISIS Resurgence after Attacks North of Baghdad
Arab Parliament President Stresses Houthi Attacks on Saudi Arabia Pose Direct Threat to Regional Security
Iraq Rejects Syrian Request to Repatriate 4,000 Suspected ISIS Detainees
Israel Drastically Reduces British Diplomatic Presence in Jerusalem
Police Fire Tear Gas at a Barricaded High School in Paris as School Protests Show No Sign of Ending
Death Toll from Russian Bus Strike in Eastern Ukraine Jumps to 30
Rubio says Ukraine war stalemate ‘very dangerous’
Putin tells Iran president will ‘do everything’ to help end Middle East war
Ukraine team to meet in US with Trump envoys on Friday, Saturday: Zelensky

Titles For The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on October 08-09/2026
Iran Fueling Palestinian Jihad, Preventing Terrorists' Disarmament/Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/October 08/2026
The West Confronted with Two Islams/Bat Ye'or/Gatestone Institute./October 08/2026
The Role of Society in Development/Tawfiq Alsaifr/Asharq Al-Awsat/October 08/2026
Sudan… From the Jeddah Declaration to a Sustainable Peace/Dr. Abdulaziz bin Othman bin Sager/Asharq Al-Awsat/October 08/2026
A Promised Word and a Desired Deed/Turki al-Faisal/Asharq Al-Awsat/October 08/2026
Not Saudi Arabia’s Battle Alone/Suleiman Jawda/Asharq Al-Awsat/October 08/2026
Selected Face Book & X tweets on October 08/2026

Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on October 08-09/2026
A Critical Reading of Naim Qassem’s Speech: Between the Myth of Steadfastness, the Doctrine of the Unity of Arenas, and the Futility of Dialogue
Elias Bejjani/October 07, 2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/10/158112/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KaAtQY_qzzY
Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem’s speech on October was not Speaking About Lebanon, But About a Battlefield: Deconstructing the Doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih and the Myth of Steadfastness.
The speech was not the address of a Lebanese leader speaking to the Lebanese people, nor was it a political speech aimed at addressing the crises of a country suffering from collapse, occupation, poverty, and isolation. Rather, it was, quite plainly, a declaration of ideological and political allegiance to the Iranian project and a comprehensive defense of the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, an ideology that does not recognize Lebanon as a sovereign and independent state, but instead views it as merely one “arena” within a broader transnational project.
Anyone who listens carefully to the speech will quickly realize that it revolves around two dangerous narratives: the myth of “steadfastness” and the doctrine of the “Unity of Arenas.” These two concepts explain everything Hezbollah has done since its founding and reveal its true position toward Lebanon, its identity, and its future.
First: The Myth of “Steadfastness” and the Illusion that “Wars Come in Rounds”
Qassem repeatedly spoke about “legendary steadfastness” and insisted that “wars unfold in rounds,” as though simply continuing a conflict constitutes victory. In the normal national sense, steadfastness is a means to protect a people, defend territory, preserve sovereignty, and achieve specific national objectives. In the ideology of Wilayat al-Faqih, however, steadfastness is not a means but an end in itself, even if it results in the destruction of cities and villages, the displacement of populations, economic collapse, and the deaths of thousands. Under this ideological framework, wars are not measured by their tangible outcomes but by the continuation of what is deemed a “religious obligation.” Defeat is never acknowledged as defeat, devastation is never considered a loss, and human lives are treated as expendable fuel for an endless project that recognizes neither borders nor national sovereignty.
This explains how Qassem can speak of a “legend of steadfastness” while southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and Beirut’s southern suburbs have suffered immense destruction. It explains how he can proclaim that “liberation is before our eyes” while realities on the ground tell a very different story. This is not national steadfastness. It is the denial of reality and the marketing of an ideological illusion designed to keep Hezbollah’s support base captive to slogans disconnected from Lebanon’s national interests.
Second: The “Unity of Arenas” and the Denial of Lebanon.
If the myth of steadfastness explains the continuity of Hezbollah’s project, the doctrine of the “Unity of Arenas” reveals its true nature. The speech was not about Lebanon. It was about Iraq and the Popular Mobilization Forces, Gaza and the West Bank, Jerusalem, the United States, and the so-called struggle against global arrogance. Lebanon was largely absent. This is the fundamental problem. Hezbollah does not view Lebanon as the final homeland of its citizens but as one battlefield among many within Iran’s regional project. Consequently, national sovereignty occupies no meaningful place within its ideological framework.
In the worldview of Wilayat al-Faqih, nation-states are not the ultimate reference point. The constitution, state institutions, and national interests are subordinate to a transnational ideological mission. Lebanon thus becomes merely a jihadist arena within a wider network stretching from Tehran to Baghdad, Damascus, Sana’a, and Gaza. This explains why Hezbollah does not treat Lebanon as a sovereign state with independent interests, but rather as one front in a broader regional struggle. Today the arena may be Lebanon; tomorrow it may be Iraq, Yemen, or any other location that serves the objectives of the project.
Third: The Six Pillars of Nasrallah’s Legacy
A Declaration of Separation from Lebanon
The true significance of Qassem’s speech lies not in his discussion of current events, but in his summary of what he described as Hassan Nasrallah’s “legacy” through six foundational themes.
These six themes effectively constitute an ideological charter proving that Hezbollah’s ultimate reference point is not the Lebanese state.
1. “Authentic Muhammadan Islam”
Qassem spoke not about Lebanon, the constitution, citizenship, or statehood, but about a religious-ideological project that presents itself as a comprehensive authority over political, social, and cultural life.
2. Education Through Jihad and the Karbala Paradigm
Here the intention becomes unmistakable: transforming society into one of permanent mobilization and perpetual martyrdom. Instead of building a state based on knowledge, economic development, and prosperity, Hezbollah promotes a culture of endless warfare and continuous sacrifice, tying Lebanon’s future to the narratives of Karbala and Ashura.
3. Wilayat al-Faqih
This is the heart of the matter.
Qassem openly declared that authority extends from God to the Prophet, to the Imams, and ultimately to the Supreme Jurist — the Iranian Supreme Leader. In other words, Hezbollah’s highest authority is neither the Lebanese Constitution nor the Lebanese State, but the Supreme Leader in Tehran. This is a direct admission that Hezbollah’s ideological, political, and military decision-making is linked to an authority outside Lebanon’s borders, rendering talk of sovereignty and independence meaningless.
4. The Connection to the Mahdi
Hezbollah ties its political and military project to messianic expectations and eschatological beliefs that transcend the logic of the modern state. The future of an entire nation is thus linked not to constitutional institutions or democratic choices but to a theological vision centered on the awaited Mahdi.
5. Islamic Unity
Although Qassem spoke of Islamic and national unity, experience has demonstrated that such unity is conditional upon acceptance of Hezbollah’s project and ideology. Those who oppose it are frequently branded as traitors, agents, or enemies of the resistance.
6. Defense and Resistance
Even when discussing resistance, Qassem directly linked it to Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei, and Qassem Soleimani. At no point did he identify the Lebanese state as the source of legitimacy for this resistance. Instead, the state appears secondary to, or dependent upon, Hezbollah’s armed project.
Fourth: Why Dialogue with Hezbollah Is a Political Illusion
After all of this, Qassem concludes by claiming that Hezbollah is prepared to cooperate domestically within constitutional frameworks. But which constitution is he referring to? How can one reconcile declared allegiance to Wilayat al-Faqih with loyalty to a sovereign national state? How can meaningful national dialogue take place with an organization whose ultimate authority lies outside Lebanon?
Dialogue presupposes common ground, shared national principles, and a collective belief in the legitimacy of the state, its constitution, and its sovereignty. The problem is that the project outlined by Qassem is built upon entirely different foundations. It is a transnational ideological project that views Lebanon as an arena rather than a homeland, weapons as a creed rather than a defensive necessity, and external allegiance as a religious duty rather than a political choice. For this reason, the repeated calls for “dialogue” and a “defense strategy” have become little more than recycled slogans that have produced no results over decades. The issue is neither technical nor administrative; it is a clash between two fundamentally incompatible visions: the vision of a free, sovereign, and independent Lebanese state, and the vision of Lebanon as an Iranian-controlled arena governed by the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih.
Conclusion
Naim Qassem’s speech was not a Lebanese national address. It was a renewed declaration of the ideological identity of Hezbollah’s project — a project that does not genuinely recognize Lebanon’s borders as final, the state as the sole legitimate authority, or citizenship as the unifying identity of the people. The “steadfastness” celebrated by Hezbollah is, in reality, the continued sacrifice of Lebanese lives — particularly those of the Shiite community — in service of a project that has little to do with Lebanon’s interests. States are not built on the concept of battlefields and arenas. They are not built through perpetual wars or loyalties that transcend national borders. History consistently demonstrates that armed ideological organizations that place themselves above the state and answer to external authorities do not build nations; they undermine them.
Therefore, addressing the Hezbollah problem cannot be achieved by granting new legitimacy to its weapons or by endlessly recycling failed dialogue initiatives. It can only begin with a return to the Constitution, the rule of law, and the exclusive right of the Lebanese state to bear arms and defend the nation, as the sole legitimate authority entrusted with protecting Lebanon and its citizens.
The author, Elias Bejjani, is a Lebanese expatriate activist
Author’s Email: Phoenicia@hotmail.com
Author’s Website: https://eliasbejjaninews.com

The Third Anniversary of the Jihadist and Barbaric Raid of October 7th
Elias Bejjani/October 07, 2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/10/158118/
On October 7th, we remember the black and bloody day that revealed the true face of jihadist barbarism and of political Islam in both its Sunni and Shiite branches, represented by Hamas, the Iranian mullah regime, and all of its terrorist proxies, foremost among them the satanic Hezbollah.
Three years ago, on the morning of a holiday and a day of peace, jihadist Hamas and its allies launched a savage terrorist raid unparalleled in its brutality in our contemporary history. It was not an act of resistance, nor a military operation, but an organized massacre targeting unarmed civilians in their homes, at a music festival, and in the streets – children, women, and the elderly, who were killed, their bodies mutilated, and kidnapped into the tunnels of Gaza as hostages.
What happened on that day was not a victory, but a resounding moral and human downfall for Sunni and Shiite political Islam. That barbaric raid sought to kill the hope for peace and to plunge the entire region into a vortex of blood and destruction, and the peoples of the region, first and foremost the Palestinians themselves, have paid a heavy price for this insane jihadist adventure.
On this third anniversary, we stand in reverence for the souls of the innocent victims, in solidarity with their families and with the hostages who are still suffering, and in affirmation that savagery cannot make a cause, and that terrorism can never be a path to freedom.
These words of ours are a cry against oblivion, a promise never to forget, and a serious endeavor to prevent that barbaric raid from recurring in any country in the world.
We raise our prayers for the repose of the victims’ souls and that their families may be inspired with patience and solace.
The author, Elias Bejjani, is a Lebanese expatriate activist
Author’s Email: Phoenicia@hotmail.com
Author’s Website: https://eliasbejjaninews.com

Etienne Saqr (Abou Arz): October 7
October 08/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/10/158146/
President of the Guardians of the Cedars Party – The Lebanese Nationalist Movement, issued the following statement:
On the third anniversary of the October 7 massacre, we watched yesterday the video footage of the barbaric slaughter carried out by the executioners of Hamas, whose brutality surpassed the crimes of the Tatars, the Mongols, and all the barbarians of history.
These horrifying scenes help us understand two fundamental realities:
First: The magnitude of the harsh Israeli response to these crimes and the drive to avenge their innocent victims.
Second: The impossibility of achieving the two-state solution advocated by Western countries, given the growing Israeli security concerns and the need to prevent the recurrence of such savage massacres.
Conclusion: These scenes brought back to our memory the wounds left by the massacres of Damour, Chekka, Aishiyeh, and many others, which were marked by killing, abuse, and boundless hatred. They remain bloody chapters in Lebanon’s history, committed by Palestinian factions and their followers. This led us at the time to proclaim the slogan:
“No Palestinian will remain on Lebanese soil.”
At Your Service, Lebanon

Bachir Gemayel Academy
October 08/2026
Most of us know who President Bachir Gemayel is, from the beginning of his journey to being president until his assassination, but few of us know the details of his beliefs, his line of thinking, his cause and struggle, as well as Bachir's vision which was taken away after his martyrdom.
If you have the desire to know, especially during these challenging times and the difficulties that we are facing in this country, what the real leader did to protect his country,
Join us at Bachir Gemayel Academy to live the dream and learn how President Bachir Gemayel gave hope to Lebanon in just 21 days.
Register for the 13th round of the Academy, which begins on November 3th, 2026!
The Academy opens its doors once again for a new course filled with historical information and unknown details about Bachir, in a series of around 11 lectures,
To be given twice a week on Tuesday and Thursday from 6:00
pm to 7:30 pm.
Register now and before the 29th of October at midnight, using the link below:
https://docs.google.com/.../1FAIpQLScSRRlGPnp.../viewform...
Notes:
* Once registered, you are expected to attend.
* This round is free of charge and welcomes everyone.
* The courses will be given remotely via Zoom application
* For further details, everyone will be added to a WhatsApp Group after the registration deadline, where we will share all the needed details to participate in the Round. Please regularly check the email you entered in your registration application for contact in case we were not able to add you to the group. Also, make sure that you write correctly your personal information, especially your email and phone number that you use for WhatsApp, along with the correct country code, if you live outside Lebanon.
* For more information, call us at: 71 155 920
* or via email at bachirgemayelacademy@gmail.com

Israeli army says one soldier killed, three wounded in south Lebanon
AFP/08 October/2026
The Israeli army said Thursday that one soldier was killed and three others were slightly wounded in south Lebanon, where the military has occupied a band of territory since invading in March in response to Hezbollah attacks. “Captain Eliav Haim Tzapalamus, aged 21, from Haifa, a combat officer in the 603rd Battalion, 7th Brigade, fell in combat in southern Lebanon,” the army said. Tzapalamus is the 17th Israeli soldier to be killed since a ceasefire was reached in June between Israel and Hezbollah. Israel and Lebanon have agreed to a framework deal that involves the disarmament of Hezbollah, a gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces and the deployment of the Lebanese army to the region. On Thursday, visiting EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas told AFP in Beirut that the bloc favored avoiding a security vacuum and extending a UN peacekeeping mandate in south Lebanon. The EU’s top diplomat also said that the bloc would soon be launching a training mission for the under-resourced Lebanese army.
Israeli airstrikes and ground operations in Lebanon have killed more than 4,300 since March, according to Lebanese official figures.

What if Nasrallah had chosen Lebanon?
Makram Rabah/Al Arabiya English/08 October/2026
What if Hassan Nasrallah had kept Hezbollah out of the war Hamas unleashed with its October 7, 2023 attack on Israel? What if he had offered his Palestinian allies another televised speech and spared Lebanon the privilege of becoming a “support front”?
For families who lost their homes, their villages and their loved ones, this is hardly an academic exercise. It asks whether their suffering was unavoidable, as Hezbollah’s apologists insist, or the consequence of a decision taken by a man who believed he could gamble with an entire country and dictate when the gambling would stop.
Restraint could have spared Lebanon enormous destruction. Hezbollah opened fire on October 8 and subsequently tied its campaign to Gaza. Had Nasrallah declined to participate, Israel would have faced a different military and diplomatic calculation. Lebanon would have had a stronger case for international pressure to keep it outside the conflict. None of this guarantees peace. It establishes that there was a choice.
Yet what would have happened afterward? Would Hezbollah have accepted a quiet border indefinitely? Would its Iranian sponsors have maintained this immense military investment merely to let Nasrallah congratulate himself on his wisdom?
Hezbollah had become the most powerful armed instrument of Iran’s regional project. Its arsenal gave Tehran leverage on Israel’s border, while its independent command deprived Lebanon of authority over war and peace. The country remained exposed to a confrontation whose objectives it did not determine. Staying out of Gaza might have postponed that confrontation. It would not, by itself, have removed its causes.
Hezbollah’s defenders turn the prospect of a future war into an alibi for starting one immediately. Israel, they tell us, intended to attack anyway. But military preparations do not prove that every alternative would have produced the same war. The claim of inevitability conveniently relieves Nasrallah of responsibility for choosing the circumstances.
Israel had, nevertheless, prepared extensively. After the shortcomings exposed in 2006, its military and intelligence services spent years studying Hezbollah, accumulating targets and penetrating the organization. While Nasrallah cultivated the mythology of his previous “divine victory,” his enemy was working through the practical requirements of the next confrontation.
September 2024 exposed the distance between that mythology and reality. The exploding communications devices, the successive killings of senior commanders and finally Nasrallah’s assassination revealed an organization penetrated at levels its leadership had failed to grasp. These capabilities had taken years to develop. Hezbollah’s decision to open the front supplied Israel with the immediate pretext to put that preparation into action.
Nasrallah assumed that he could initiate hostilities while retaining control over their ceiling. He could call the exchanges limited, measured or supportive. Israel could escalate beyond the limits he imagined he had set. Hezbollah’s culpability does not erase Israel’s responsibility for its own attacks. It exposes the recklessness of entrusting Lebanon’s survival to an adversary’s willingness to exercise restraint.
His death also stripped away much of the Lebanese identity Hezbollah had cultivated around his personality. Nasrallah’s speeches, political relationships and familiarity with Lebanese society had helped market an Iranian strategic project as a national cause. His presence allowed supporters to imagine that somewhere between Beirut and Tehran there existed an independent Lebanese decision. What followed his elimination made that fiction considerably harder to sustain. Established in 1982 with the central involvement of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hezbollah returned more openly to its founding function as the IRGC’s Lebanese arm. Iranian officers helped rebuild its shattered military command, reorganize its units, supervise rearmament and prepare operations. The relationship became more directly operational. Beneath the Lebanese branding stood a military apparatus whose reconstruction and strategic direction depended on the IRGC. Lebanese fighters and Lebanese casualties did not make the decision Lebanese. This was the deeper problem with Nasrallah’s mission. His authority depended on maintaining an armed cause above the state and a regional allegiance beyond it. A Lebanon capable of securing its borders and deciding its foreign policy would have forced Hezbollah to justify its separate army. Permanent confrontation postponed that reckoning. Chaos had become essential to the movement’s claim to power.
Staying out therefore required Nasrallah to place Lebanese lives above the expectations and prestige of the Iranian axis. He could have made that choice. His political identity made it profoundly unlikely. Describing him as trapped by his mission should deepen the indictment, never excuse the decision.
Then there is the fraud sold to the Lebanese as deterrence. Hezbollah possessed real weapons and could inflict real damage. The fallacy was that these capabilities guaranteed Lebanon’s protection while the party freely exposed it to war. Families were invited to confuse the size of an arsenal with the security of their homes. They discovered the difference beneath the rubble, while those who had promised protection explained why further sacrifice was necessary.
The question extends beyond whether Nasrallah should have remained silent on October 8. It concerns why Lebanon ever accepted that his decision alone could determine its future. A country cannot organize its survival around the occasional prudence of a militia leader, much less the calculations of the foreign officers who rebuild his organization after his death.
Nasrallah could have spared Lebanon the support front. Sparing it the next catastrophe requires taking the decision away from Hezbollah altogether.

South Lebanon: Latest developments
Naharnet/08 October/2026
Israeli artillery shelled overnight into Thursday Wadi Zebqine, al-Mansouri and Hadatha, while strikes targeted Baraashit, Kounine, Kfartebnit, Wadi Slouqi, Bani Hayyan and al-Mansouri.
Israeli forces also carried out on Wednesday night a massive detonation in Kounine. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon said one of its posts was targeted on Wednesday near the border with Israel by small-arms fire, but there were no casualties.

Reports: No escalation in south in coming period
Naharnet/08 October/2026
There will be no Israeli escalation in south Lebanon in the coming period, a media report said. "Lebanese lobbying groups have managed to reach an assessment that the South will not come under escalatory attacks in the coming period," al-Liwaa newspaper reported on Thursday, citing “reports that have been sent to Beirut.”

Kallas says EU preparing 'support mission' for Lebanese army, in favor of UNIFIL extension
Agence France Presse/Associated Press
European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said Thursday that the bloc is preparing a "support mission" to train and advise Lebanon’s army and security forces, though that won't replace U.N. peacekeepers in southern Lebanon whose mandate expires at the end of the year.
Kallas said during a visit to Beirut that Lebanese authorities formally asked the EU for this. She added that she expects the mission to be set up by EU foreign ministers on Monday. Lebanese officials have previously pushed to extend the mandate of the U.N. force known as UNIFIL, but extension seems unlikely to pass a vote at the U.N. Security Council. After the latest Israel-Hezbollah war, much of southern Lebanon is now occupied by Israeli forces, and an agreement to transfer control from Israel to the Lebanese army has largely stalled. The exit of U.N. peacekeepers has raised concerns that Israel might extend its occupation and that the Iran-backed Hezbollah militants could exploit the security vacuum. Kallas told AFP on Thursday that the bloc favored extending the mandate of United Nations peacekeepers in south Lebanon. "Our member states have been saying that there can't be any security vacuum in southern Lebanon, so everybody is worried about the UNIFIL mandate ending," she said in an interview during a visit to Lebanon, adding that "it would be most welcomed if this mandate is extended, so that is the position of the member states."

US dismisses claims of Iranian cash transfers to Hezbollah as fake
Naharnet/08 October/2026
State Department Spokesman Tommy Pigott dismissed reports that Hezbollah is receiving fresh cash from Iran, describing the militant group as "decimated" and accusing it of attempting to cover up its financial plight through propaganda. Pigott said Hezbollah’s claims of financial backing are unfounded given Tehran’s ongoing economic crisis. "Hezbollah has been decimated and caused misery for hundreds of thousands of innocent Lebanese. It is now trying to save face with fake stories about cash influxes from Iran," Pigott said. "It can claim whatever it wants, but the money is not there."The spokesman pointed to broader economic pressures on Iran as the primary reason for Hezbollah's dwindling resources, noting that the Islamic Republic is currently incapable of sustaining its regional proxies at previous levels. "Iran's oil exports are blockaded, its currency is in free fall, and the regime is looking behind its shoulder," Pigott stated. He added that even if Tehran attempted to provide financial assistance, it would fail to offset the extensive destruction resulting from recent hostilities. "Hezbollah started a war on behalf of Tehran, leading and causing billions in damages. Even if this consolation payment were real, it would not be enough." Pigott stressed that the United States intends to maintain maximum financial pressure while backing official state institutions in Beirut to facilitate recovery efforts. "The United States will continue to strangle Hezbollah's finances through sanctions while supporting the ability of Lebanon's legitimate government to rebuild the South," Pigott said. "Under the Trump Administration, Hezbollah will never recover or rebuild its terrorist infrastructure." Reuters reported on Wednesday that Hezbollah had received last month $200 million from Iran to help Lebanese displaced by the war with ​Israel. Hezbollah would use the funds to pay an initial $3,000 per family, and ​priority would go to those whose villages have been destroyed or are inaccessible due to Israeli occupation, sources told Reuters.

More than $200 million? Hezbollah sources challenge US denial of Iranian funds
LBCI/08 October/2026
“Where there's a will, there's a way.” That is how sources close to Hezbollah responded to questions about the channel Iran used to send money to the group, following a Reuters report on Wednesday that Iran had sent $200 million to Hezbollah.
The report prompted a response from the U.S. State Department, which denied that such a transfer had taken place. LBCI asked sources close to Hezbollah about the U.S. response. Their answer went beyond explaining how the money was transferred, with the sources confirming that the funds had arrived and that the amount exceeded $200 million.
According to the sources, the funds are intended for housing and reconstruction, in line with remarks made by Hezbollah chief Naim Qassem on the second anniversary of Hassan Nasrallah’s death. LBCI also learned that Hezbollah official Ali Damoush is expected to hold a news conference in the coming days to announce the project and provide further details.
The sources said the assistance would be based on criteria that take each case into account individually and would form part of a long-term project. Hezbollah’s position is that the group is doing what the state has failed to do, viewing residents’ resilience as part of the war it is waging.
However, the issue extends beyond aid, housing, and reconstruction, becoming part of the broader U.S.-Iran confrontation, as reflected in the U.S. State Department’s response.
Washington said Hezbollah had leaked the report and that the money was not there, at a time when Iranian oil exports are under sanctions, the Iranian currency is collapsing, and the United States continues to restrict the group’s financial resources through sanctions.
The U.S. response sought to underscore Washington’s ability to track Iran’s financial channels and capabilities, including those of its allies in the region. LBCI asked sources close to Hezbollah about this point. Their response was: “Even if you cut off our air supply, we will remain standing.”
 October/2026
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon said one of its posts was targeted on Wednesday near the border with Israel by small-arms fire, but there were no casualties. "This morning, several rounds of small arms fire impacted a UNIFIL position near Kfarshouba along the Blue Line in Sector East," the U.N. force said in a statement, referring to the de facto border between Israel and Lebanon.The blue helmets described the shooting as "unacceptable". "Such deliberate attacks gravely endanger the lives of peacekeepers," it said, adding that it was investigating the incident. Under U.S. pressure, the U.N. Security Council decided in August to fix December as the end of the mandate for UNIFIL, which has been deployed since 1978. Last month, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam insisted at the U.N. on the need to "avert the vacuum" that would be caused by withdrawing the peacekeeping mission deployed in the country's south without a viable replacement. UNIFIL currently has 7,500 blue helmets from around 50 countries. Violence has decreased since a ceasefire following a memorandum of understanding in the U.S.-Iran war struck in June, while Lebanon and Israel concluded a U.S.-sponsored framework agreement later that month. The Israel-Lebanon deal involves the disarmament of Hezbollah, a gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon's south and the deployment of the Lebanese army to the region, starting in test areas known as "pilot zones".

Solar power within reach: Lebanon plans three-year solar loans under 2027 budget
LBCI/08 October/2026
Households looking to install solar power to reduce their electricity generator bills but unable to afford the upfront cost may soon have access to low-interest loans under Lebanon's 2027 budget. The government has allocated $11 million to the Social Affairs Ministry, specifically for the Public Corporation for Housing (PCH), to provide loans to citizens seeking to purchase solar power systems for electricity generation. The allocation is expected to finance about 4,400 loans, with each loan averaging $2,500. PCH Director General Rony Lahoud told LBCI that the institution will not impose complicated requirements on applicants. Applicants will only need to provide a salary certificate or secure a guarantor to ensure repayment of the loan. Lahoud said applicants will not be required to mortgage their cars or homes to obtain the financing. Priority will be given to people with limited incomes. The loans will be repaid over three years, with monthly installments set at $75. After 36 months, borrowers will have repaid the full amount along with $200 in interest, bringing the total repayment to $2,700. According to a study by the PCH, a $2,500 loan would allow a household to install a solar power system providing between 10 and 13 amps, along with an inverter and battery. The system would significantly reduce the amount households pay to neighborhood generator operators while also lowering demand for electricity supplied by Électricité du Liban (EDL) and private generators through the use of cleaner energy. Finance Minister Yassine Jaber told LBCI that the project is only the beginning, adding that the allocated amount is expected to increase gradually to expand the number of citizens able to benefit from solar energy loans. Applications will open once Parliament approves the 2027 budget. The PCH will then announce the full details and conditions of the loans and launch the application process.

Kaja Kallas tells LBCI about Europe’s planned mission in Lebanon — interview
LBCI/08 October/2026
Kaja Kallas, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, spoke to LBCI about Europe’s plans for Lebanon following the end of UNIFIL’s mandate, the proposed EU mission to support the Lebanese army and security forces, and the need for a U.N.-mandated international force. She also discussed Lebanon’s role in IMEC, restoring investor confidence, and the importance of reforms and the rule of law.

EU top diplomat to AFP: Bloc in favor of UN Lebanon peacekeepers' extension
LBCI/08 October/2026
Visiting EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas told AFP on Thursday that the bloc favored extending the mandate of United Nations peacekeepers in South Lebanon, where Israeli troops invaded during the latest war with Hezbollah. "Our member states have been saying that there can't be any security vacuum in South Lebanon, so everybody is worried about the UNIFIL mandate ending," she said in an interview during a visit to Lebanon, adding that "it would be most welcomed if this mandate is extended, so that is the position of the member states." AFP

Aoun says Lebanon's stability key to that of region and Europe
Naharnet/08 October/2026
President Joseph Aoun met Thursday in Baabda with EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas and told her “there is an interconnected link between the stability of Lebanon and the stability of Europe and the region.”“The Lebanese Army is fully carrying out its duty in the areas where it has deployed south of the Litani River in implementation of the framework agreement, while Israel continues to refrain from implementing its provisions,” Aoun added. “Negotiation is the alternative to war, and an agreement is the only means to end the state of hostility between Lebanon and Israel,” the president stressed. Separately, he said that Lebanon is committed to implementing economic reforms and passing the financial gap law, paving the way for signing an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Kallas for her part said “the European Union is ready to provide the necessary assistance to Lebanon, particularly to the army, the Internal Security Forces, and entities focused on social and humanitarian aspects.”

Aoun tells US senator southerners eager for state to exert its authority
Naharnet/08 October/2026
President Joseph Aoun met Thursday in Baabda with U.S. Senator James Lankford in the presence of U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa. “They discussed the latest developments regarding the situation in the South, the continuation of Israeli aggression, and the progress of the framework agreement," the Presidency said. “Israel is continuing its acts of aggression in the southern villages and towns from which it has not yet withdrawn, thereby violating the provisions of the framework agreement signed between the two countries under U.S. sponsorship,” Aoun told Lankford. “We are applying pressure in every direction to stop Israel from destroying homes and civilian properties in the occupied villages and towns, and to complete the return of captives,” the president added. “The people of the South are eager for the state to exert its authority and deploy the army up to the recognized borders. The army is carrying out its assigned tasks in the South as across all of Lebanon, and it requires support through the provision of essential equipment and vehicles to execute its mission,” Aoun went on to say.

Salam stresses commitment to 'protecting monetary stability, purchasing power of citizens'
Naharnet/08 October/2026
Prime Minister Nawaf Salam on Thursday delivered a speech to the Lebanese people from the Grand Serail, addressing the current economic situation and the challenges facing citizens amid rising prices and living burdens. Salam began his address by acknowledging the burdens borne by citizens, particularly the increase in private electricity generator bills over the past two months, as well as the pressures imposed by rising fuel prices that force some families to choose between securing fuel and meeting other household needs. He explained that certain factors affecting prices, such as global oil prices, fall outside the government’s control. He however noted this does not absolve it of its responsibilities and duties toward its citizens. Salam announced that "the government is working in cooperation with the Ministries of Energy and Finance on sustainable solutions for the electricity sector, aiming to increase power supply and secure it regularly at a lower cost, with additional details to be announced in the coming weeks."He also declared "allocating funds in the 2027 draft budget for the Public Corporation for Housing to provide loans for families to purchase solar energy systems, reducing their reliance on private generators and lowering monthly bills."On the public transit front, Salam revealed "the preparation of a comprehensive public transportation plan between regions and within major cities, which includes more than 250 new buses to provide a lower-cost means of transport and ease traffic congestion, with the Minister of Public Works and Transport set to announce its details before the end of next week."On the economic front, Salam revealed that the Lebanese economy grew by 4.2 percent last year after years of decline, forming the beginning of a recovery and an opportunity to build upon. However, the Israeli war on Lebanon halted this trajectory and set the economy back, Salam said, noting that the estimated economic contraction for the current year stands at 6.4 percent. He stressed the necessity of preventing certain generator owners, merchants, and importers from exploiting rising costs to generate illicit profits at the expense of citizens, whether through unjustified price increases or by imposing additional charges. Salam also emphasized that any drop in import or transportation costs must be reflected in the prices of goods and services, rejecting the continuation of elevated price levels after costs have decreased. Regarding the draft budget for 2027, Salam explained that its expansion to approximately $7 billion reflects a significant improvement in the state's capacity to finance its projects and services. However, he noted that this does not imply a financial surplus sufficient to meet all legitimate citizen needs. Salam also underscored the government's commitment to “protecting monetary stability and the purchasing power of citizens,” stressing that it will not spend money it does not possess and will work to optimize revenue usage toward priorities that matter to citizens. Regarding taxes, Salam confirmed that the 2027 draft budget does not introduce any new taxes, contrary to rumors. He clarified that modifications were limited to certain fees that were still calculated at outdated exchange rates, along with new fees targeting yachts and private jets. He revealed that the Ministry of Finance has begun prosecuting companies evading Value Added Tax (VAT) payments, having issued warnings to 107 companies, while additional files involving estimated sums between $200 million and $250 million remain under review, with preparations underway to issue a new batch of warnings. He explained that the VAT being pursued from these companies is not a new tax, but rather funds already paid by citizens when purchasing goods and services, which companies collected without remitting to the state treasury.
He stressed that it is unacceptable for these funds to remain with companies at a time when hospitals, schools, and public administrations urgently require funding. As for corporate profit tax, Salam announced that the government has decided to start with large corporations, noting that 64 major companies currently have their files under review and audit after the administration organized the workload by sector.

Berri says problem is Israel's failure to abide by any agreement
Naharnet/08 October/2026
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri accused Israel on Thursday of never abiding by its agreements, in a meeting with U.S. Senator James Lankford in Ain el-Tineh.Berri told Lankford as they met Thursday that "at no point has Israel abided by any of the agreements reached, from Resolution 425 to Resolution 1701, the November 2024 agreement, and up to the tripartite framework agreement."Berri said the problem remains the same: "Israel's failure to adhere to its obligations under all of these agreements." The Speaker also met Thursday with High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, to whom he emphasized the need to find an alternative to the UNIFIL force once its mandate ends in south Lebanon. "Reaching a stage where UNIFIL's mandate ends without finding an alternative is a grave error and a direct blow to international legitimacy and its U.N. resolutions, chief among them Resolution 1701," he said.

Lebanon to turn clocks back one hour on Oct. 24-25
LBCI/08 October/2026
Lebanon is set to turn clocks back one hour later this month as the country marks the end of daylight saving time. The Cabinet said the time change will take effect at midnight on Oct. 24-25, in line with Lebanon’s annual shift between summer and winter time.

Shiites in Lebanon – 6/
Colonel Charbel Barakat/October 09/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/10/158164/
The Shihab Princes
Bashir I (1697–1706)
The most significant action he undertook in his first year of rule was a military campaign to support the Governor of Sidon against a rebellion led by the Shiites of Jabal Amel under the leadership of Sheikh Mushrif of the Al Ali al-Saghir family. Sheikh Mushrif had declared defiance against Governor Qablan Pasha and withheld taxes, prompting the governor to organize a punitive campaign. However, Sheikh Mushrif ambushed him at the Qasmiyeh Bridge in 1698, inflicting heavy losses and forcing the governor to seek assistance from the Shihab Prince Bashir I. Bashir I had assumed power on behalf of his underage nephew, Haydar, following the death of Prince Ahmad (the last Ma’nid prince, who died without a male heir). Unwilling to displease the Ottoman Sultanate by refusing aid to the governor, Prince Bashir mobilized approximately 8,000 fighters, captured Sheikh Mushrif, and handed him over to the governor, significantly raising his standing with the Ottomans.
After quelling Sheikh Mushrif’s rebellion, Prince Bashir assigned Mahmud Abu Harmoush—one of his senior elite commanders—to oversee security on the roads in the Shiite regions of Bilad Bishara and collect taxes, granting Abu Harmoush direct authority (the effects of which would manifest later). Consequently, Prince Bashir’s influence expanded to Safed in 1700 as a reward for securing order. During his governance of Safed, he appointed his cousin, Prince Mansur, as the local governor. Prince Mansur, in turn, appointed Umar al-Zaydani (from a local Bedouin tribe and father of Dahir al-Umar) to collect taxes in Safed and its surrounding areas, granting him the title of “Sheikh.” This paved the way for the later rise of his son, Dahir al-Umar. Prince Bashir I passed away in Deir al-Qamar in 1706, and Prince Haydar succeeded him to the Emirate upon reaching adulthood. It was during Haydar’s reign that the famous Battle of Ain Dara took place in 1711.
Note: There is a confusion of names among Shiite historians. However, by analyzing research and correlating it with known historical dates, it can be concluded that Sheikh Mushrif was a grandson of Ali al-Saghir, not his son, and that Ali al-Saghir lived during the era of Prince Fakhr al-Din II and undoubtedly cooperated with him. Furthermore, Ahmad (son of Ali al-Saghir)—who held the title of Sheikh of the Sheikhs of Bilad Bishara—was a contemporary of Prince Mulhim and may have collaborated with the Alam al-Din clan against Prince Mulhim, believing that Alam al-Din was backed by the Ottoman governor and wishing to avoid a confrontation with the Ottomans (especially after what happened to Prince Fakhr al-Din).
As for Sheikh Mushrif, he was the brother of Hussein and Hamdan (if they existed); they were not his sons, but rather brothers to his son Nassar, the father of Nassif. Some sources claim Nassif was born in 1713, while others state that he was nearly ninety years old when he was killed in the Battle of Yaroun (making his birth year around 1690). The latter claim is unrealistic, as a ninety-year-old man could not fight on horseback, even if he had been a lifelong warrior. Therefore, we lean toward his birth year being 1713, making him around 68 years old during the Battle of Yaroun in 1781—which makes his death by falling off his horse during battle far more plausible. Nassif grew up in an environment familiar with warfare, opposition to Ottoman rule, and shifting loyalties among Lebanese factions. Being raised in a leadership household where major developments influenced political conduct, he undoubtedly witnessed how alliances and loyalties shifted between Lebanese forces and the Ottomans during the era of Prince Haydar.
Haydar (1706–1732)
Prince Haydar is considered the actual founder of the Shihab dynasty in Mount Lebanon. He ended the local internal conflict—fueled by Ottoman governors through the Qaysi and Yamani factions—and reshaped the political and social landscape of the mountain. Like his Ma’nid predecessors, the Prince backed the “Qaysi” faction, while the Ottoman governors supported the opposing “Yamani” faction (just as they had done after the disappearance of Prince Fakhr al-Din by appointing Ali Alam al-Din to collect taxes, which caused prolonged disputes before the Ma’nids regained control). The governors tried once again to incite discord against Prince Haydar. Mahmud Abu Harmoush, who had turned against the Shihab prince, allied with the Alam al-Din clan and was backed by the Governor of Sidon to oust Prince Haydar. They forced Haydar to flee his seat of power in Deir al-Qamar, driving him to Wadi al-Taym and then to Baalbek to seek refuge with the Harfush family, who provided him with 2,500 men. Returning to the Chouf, he joined forces with his supporters from the Lam’i princes, Talhuq, Jumblatt, Nakad, and Maronite allies (especially the Khazen family), assembling a force exceeding 4,000 men.
Prince Haydar launched a surprise night attack on Abu Harmoush and the Alam al-Din princes before Ottoman reinforcements could arrive. The opposing forces were shattered; five princes of the Alam al-Din family were killed, and Mahmud Abu Harmoush was captured (his tongue was cut out by the prince to prevent him from leading or making speeches ever again). The prince’s enemies were forced into permanent exile from Lebanon, ending their political involvement. Prince Haydar subsequently distributed fiefs among his Qaysi allies (elevating the Lam’is, Jumblatts, Nakads, Talhuqs, as well as the Maronite Khazen and Hubaysh families to feudal prominence), who ruled Lebanon throughout the 18th century.
Mulhim (1732–1754)
Prince Mulhim assumed power following his father’s death in 1732. His reign was marked by economic stability and sectarian balance. He acknowledged the assistance provided to his father by the Shiite Harfush family of Baalbek, renewed agreements with the Shiites of Jabal Amel, and encouraged the southward expansion of Maronite settlements to boost tax revenues and national cohesion. This made him one of the most successful princes, fostering inter-community understanding and practical administrative stability. His era witnessed a boom in silk production and exports (particularly to Europe), reviving the mountain’s economy and enriching both the feudal lords and local farmers. He encouraged foreign and local merchants, turning Deir al-Qamar and Bshamoun into major trade hubs. He built palaces and agricultural estates and secured trade routes against bandits. Politically, he adopted a flexible approach toward the Ottoman governors, consistently paying taxes on time and using diplomacy to earn the Porte’s trust, allowing him to manage the country with minimal external interference.
His reign was free of religious fanatism; though a Sunni Muslim, he was tolerant toward the Shiites and collaborated closely with the Maronites, recognizing their economic contributions. He allowed the construction of monasteries and churches, helped rebuild some of them, and appointed Maronite advisors and physicians. In late 1754, severe illness prompted Prince Mulhim to abdicate in favor of his brothers, Princes Mansur and Ahmad. He passed away shortly after his retirement in 1759.
Mansur and Ahmad (1754–1770)
Following Prince Mulhim’s departure, the joint rule of Princes Mansur and Ahmad caused internal divisions and rivalry among feudal lords. The Jumblatts supported Prince Mansur, while the Nakad and Talhuq families backed Prince Ahmad, dividing the country into two competing factions. Prince Mansur eventually settled the dispute in his favor, assuming sole leadership in 1763. Meanwhile, Dahir al-Umar (son of Sheikh Umar al-Zaydani, who had taken over tax collection from his father) secured control of the Galilee and established trade links with European merchants (especially the French) to export wheat and cotton from the plains of Acre and Tiberias. He began clearing Acre’s harbor and fortifying the city as his main base. During his expansion, he collided with Sheikh Nassif al-Nassar, the leader of the Shiite Metwalis in Jabal Amel. After engagements at al-Bassa, Tarbikha, and Meyron, the two leaders chose peaceful coexistence and an alliance over conflict. Their alliance endured for the rest of their lives. They joined forces against the Governor of Damascus, routing his army in the Hula Plain. Following Dahir’s example, Sheikh Nassif cleared the port of Tyre to encourage maritime trade.
A decisive political move was Prince Mansur’s decision to join the alliance of Ali Bey al-Kabir (ruler of Egypt) and Dahir al-Umar (ruler of Acre and Safed) in their rebellion against the Ottoman Empire, uniting various Lebanese factions behind the cause. In 1770, Ali Bey launched a campaign that captured the Hijaz and Mecca, where prayers were recited in the Holy Sanctuaries in the names of the Shihabs and Ali Bey. In response, the Ottomans launched a massive military campaign against Mount Lebanon, ousting Prince
Mansur from power in 1770. He was replaced by Prince Yusuf, son of the late Prince Mulhim.
Yusuf (1770–1789)
Prince Yusuf succeeded his uncle, Prince Mansur. His era saw a decline in the influence of the Druze factions (Yazbaki and Jumblatti). Meanwhile, Ottoman anxieties grew over independence movements in Egypt and Safed. The Ottoman campaign against Mount Lebanon was somewhat constrained because the Sultanate was engaged in the Russo-Turkish War (Russo-Crimean War) under Catherine II. During this war, the Russian Baltic Fleet entered the Mediterranean via Gibraltar and destroyed nearly the entire Ottoman fleet at the Battle of Chesma (burning 69 out of 72 ships), ending Ottoman naval dominance in the Mediterranean.
In 1771, Dahir al-Umar supported the Egyptian expedition against Damascus led by Abu al-Dhahab, which successfully captured the city. Ali Bey now controlled the Hijaz, Egypt, and the Levant. However, the Ottoman Grand Vizier persuaded Abu al-Dhahab on religious grounds that Ali Bey was rebelling against the Commander of the Faithful and serving Russian interests, promising Abu al-Dhahab the governorship of Egypt if he turned on his master. Abu al-Dhahab agreed, withdrew from Damascus, and returned to Egypt to confront Ali Bey. Defeated, Ali Bey fled to Acre to seek refuge with Dahir al-Umar.
Prince Yusuf had appointed an Ottoman officer, Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar, to govern Beirut. Impressed by the city’s fortifications, al-Jazzar turned against Prince Yusuf and seized Beirut in 1773. Unable to expel him, Prince Yusuf allied with Dahir al-Umar (who had ties to Russia through Ali Bey). A Russian naval squadron of 17 warships blockaded and bombarded Beirut’s fortresses, cutting off supplies and forcing al-Jazzar to surrender and retreat to Acre under Dahir’s protection. Russian troops briefly occupied Beirut and raised their flag for a few months until Prince Yusuf ransomed the city by paying the Russian admiral 300,000 piasters.
In 1774, following the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, Russian naval forces withdrew from the Mediterranean. Fearing Ottoman retaliation, Prince Yusuf reaffirmed his loyalty to the Empire. France assisted in modernizing Ottoman defenses in the Dardanelles to prevent Russian expansion, while Britain offered logistical support to the Russian fleet to counter French influence. Meanwhile, Austria and Prussia sought to maintain the balance of power in Eastern Europe by supporting the Ottomans against Russia.
With their fleet rebuilt, the Ottomans launched an expedition against Dahir al-Umar, led by Kapudan Hassan Pasha from the sea and supported by Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar on land. Dahir al-Umar was killed during the siege of Acre in 1775, and al-Jazzar took control of Acre and the Eyalet of Sidon.
After consolidating power in Acre, al-Jazzar targeted Sheikh Nassif al-Nassar in Southern Lebanon. Though advanced in age, Sheikh Nassif led his cavalry into the Battle of Yaroun (1781). The battle was heavily asymmetrical: al-Jazzar fielded nearly 15,000 soldiers against roughly 700 Shiite horsemen led by Sheikh Nassif. Sheikh Nassif fell in battle, after which al-Jazzar occupied the region and destroyed the fortresses rebuilt by Sheikh Nassif (including Tibnin, Hunin, Shamaa, and Mayroun).
The defeat dispersed the Shiite cavalry, and al-Jazzar imposed direct rule, enforcing mandatory conscription. Many residents fled into forced displacement (Tayaha), while others were subjected to forced labor (Corvée), particularly in constructing the aqueduct bringing water from Kabri to Acre. Consequently, Bilad Bishara and Jabal Amel experienced severe economic decline throughout al-Jazzar’s rule until his death in 1804. This period is regarded as a major calamity for Jabal Amel, comparable to the devastation suffered by the Maronites under Qalawun, the Mamluk campaigns in Keserwan and Metn, or the Ottoman campaign against Prince Qurqmaz in the Chouf in 1585.
Having neutralized the immediate threats (the Bedouin tribes loyal to Dahir al-Umar around Tiberias and Hula, and the Shiite clans of Jabal Amel), al-Jazzar pressured Prince Yusuf over tax revenues using “divide and rule” tactics. He found an ally in the young Prince Bashir (Bashir II), who had been raised under Prince Yusuf’s care. Despite coming from a relatively poor branch of the Shihab family, Bashir held strong political ambitions. Al-Jazzar exploited this by playing Prince Bashir and Prince Yusuf against each other, alternating appointments to maintain instability in the mountain and prevent a unified threat to his authority. During these political upheavals—and influenced by his upbringing among the Maronites—Prince Yusuf secretly converted to Christianity while publicly maintaining his Islamic faith to avoid Ottoman retribution. Eventually, al-Jazzar decided to eliminate Prince Yusuf; he lured him to Acre under the pretext of a meeting, imprisoned him, and executed him in 1790.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on October 08-09/2026
Iran’s Last Supreme Leader: When the Republic Becomes a Networked Organization
London: Ali Saray/Asharq Al Awsat/October 08/2026
The bomb was hidden in a tape recorder at Tehran’s Abu Dhar mosque. Ali Khamenei was addressing worshippers in June 1981 when it exploded. Several people were injured. He suffered the worst wounds.“I went to the brink of death, but God brought me back ... I felt he was waiting for me to fulfill a great duty,” Khamenei later recalled. He survived with a paralyzed right hand, convinced that this “duty” awaited him. Khamenei ruled as Iran’s supreme leader for nearly 37 years, succeeding its first leader, Ruhollah Khomeini. At the height of his power, he sat at the center of complex networks and far-reaching mechanisms for controlling the “Islamic Revolution.”Then, according to some estimates, roughly 15 minutes of an Israeli air raid in late February ended a long chapter in the Iran we knew. The country appears to have changed, though the nature of that change remains unclear. Iran’s third supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, did not inherit his father’s legacy as a conventional leader. That legacy, which was divided among many “sons,” consists of absolute powers, potent religious symbolism, intertwined interests and centralized political, military and financial authority. This is how fundamentalist organizations adapt when shock and necessity force them to operate through networks of interconnected strands. Did Khamenei prepare the “Islamic Revolution” to function without a head, through multiple leaders working almost independently? Or did he never imagine his eventual fate, convinced that the “hand of God” protected him, as he repeatedly said in public? His son Mojtaba may offer an answer to the puzzle of Iran’s deep state, which prepared for the birth of a republic operating as a web of networks. Either way, Iran today is a republic of dispersed cells, working much like its own “resistance” affiliates.
“We are not talking about a battle now”
The “Islamic Revolution” built its stature on deterrence at a distance. Khamenei probably never imagined the fire of confrontation would reach him. No one articulated that approach more clearly. In March 2011, he openly welcomed the outbreak of what was then called the “Arab Spring.” “In these events, one can sense the hand of God’s power,” he said. In May 2019, supporters enthusiastically chanted a slogan calling for a “battle against America.” Khamenei stopped them. “We are not talking about a battle now. The issue is resistance.”After Oct. 7, 2023, Iran faced repeated pressure to respond to Israel and the United States. Instead, Tehran devised “strategic patience,” requiring regional proxies and affiliates to observe lengthy truces. Khamenei’s strategy clearly combined his religious view of history with Iran’s tactic of keeping the battlefield far from Tehran. That approach held even after Oct. 7, which an Iraqi cleric from Najaf described as “a cup of poison Yahya Sinwar made the supreme leader drink.”Throughout four decades at the apex of power, Khamenei avoided direct confrontation while weaving the system’s networks. He appointed loyalists to oversee vital security, political, economic and media affairs. In informed circles in Tehran, Baghdad and Beirut, the supreme leader’s office is said to be far more than “an institution in a conventional building with a guard and a gate.” It is a vast, invisible network of officials, representatives, delegates and affiliates, larger than might be expected. It even reaches into institutions overseen by Iran’s president. Everyone’s task is to ensure that “the supreme leader sees, hears and decides everything.”A former official in Baghdad, who asked not to be named, described one example of that reach. “An Iranian cleric scrutinized Iraqi oil policy every day, on personal orders from the supreme leader,” he said. “Khamenei, or his office, was keen to receive daily updates on strategic matters.”
Red lines remain red
Khamenei’s position exceeded the constitutional limits of the supreme leader’s office.“Over many decades, stretching back to before the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Khamenei accumulated factors and resources beyond the conventional limits of the office’s constitutional powers,” Iraqi researcher Ali al-Madan said. “Alongside his political experience, he brought together his presidency, his religious standing and a broad network of relationships and loyalties within institutions.” Madan, an Islamic philosophy researcher with more than three decades of study and residence in Qom, believes the elder Khamenei’s position rested on more than his constitutional powers. It also reflected “his accumulated experience and ability to balance different institutions and centers of power.”The unconventional authority Khamenei built was probably protected by deterrence. Whenever he appeared in public, whatever the occasion, he infused it with a “divine dimension.” In 2018, worsening US sanctions squeezed Iranians’ livelihoods. Thousands gathered around his podium that August to hear him say: “I feel the powerful hand of God manifesting itself and taking shape in the strength of the people.”The message filtered through to his supporters in Iran and the countries of the so-called “axis of resistance”: red lines were red. They could not be breached. An Iraqi politician who spent years dealing with politicians close to the elder supreme leader’s office said they shared Khamenei’s certainty that the “hand of God” protected him, the “Islamic Revolution” and themselves. Even their most extreme scenario for direct confrontation was that it “might hit the man sitting next to the supreme leader, but not the supreme leader,” as one of them put it. Was Khamenei certain US President Donald Trump or Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would never order his assassination? A definitive answer is hard to obtain. But even when Khamenei anticipated events turning upside down, he pointed to others. On June 10, 2005, marking the anniversary of the first supreme leader’s death, he said: “This powerful hand, the hand of God, may sometimes turn into a fist and strike a person on the head.”The Iraqi politician believes Khamenei wanted to avoid confrontation and prolong the conflict “at least until his life ended naturally, rather than as the Israelis and Americans imposed.”In his view, “for the conflict to reach the point of killing the supreme leader means that a long era in Iran’s history has reached its twilight.” Khamenei’s son: the Guards’ supreme leader?
Many favor the view that Khamenei opposed passing the leadership to Mojtaba. Yet the father allowed his son, early on, to stay out of sight while extending his reach into society and institutions through the Revolutionary Guards. Iraqis and Lebanese who witnessed Iran’s changes in the 1990s, and who asked not to be named, said Mojtaba exploited “the flexibility of Hashemi Rafsanjani,” who was Iran’s president when he played a pivotal role in the father’s election as supreme leader in 1989. Mojtaba then “immersed himself in building relationships with everyone: the Guards, the seminaries, the bazaar, the army, the Basij and the judiciary.”One of them said the younger Khamenei “put Mirhossein Mousavi in prison, crushed political movements in their infancy or as they were taking shape, engineered Ebrahim Raisi’s rise to the presidency and established a new philosophy under which state institutions became something resembling Hezbollah at the heart of the state.”
He learned the principles of the “deep state” early.
Did the elder Khamenei oppose hereditary succession because it contradicted the “Islamic Revolution,” which arose from the ruins of the shah’s system? And did he nevertheless allow his son to inherit the deep state that appointed him supreme leader; or its “public face,” as the Najaf cleric described him? “Mojtaba Khamenei is a son of the system; he was born and grew up within it ... He is a product of its institutions, rather than one of its founders,” Madan said. “He has never held a public political office comparable to those his father held before assuming the leadership. Nor does his standing within the religious establishment yet have the same reach his father acquired over decades of scholarly formation and the exercise of power.” “Passing the office to him therefore does not necessarily mean transferring all the personal and political resources concentrated in his father.” Specialists see a vast gulf between father and son. For the Najaf cleric, that leads to a firm conclusion: “The elder Khamenei was the last supreme leader to meet the minimum requirements of Islamic jurisprudential qualification. He was also the last to exercise real dominance over the Revolutionary Guards, unlike the younger Khamenei, whom the Guards dominate and whose affairs they manage.”That does not mean the supreme leader’s office has become symbolic or that its powers have passed to another institution.Madan distinguishes between “the supreme leader’s constitutional authority and his practical ability to concentrate decision-making in his own hands.”
A republic of dividing cells
If power did not pass from the elder Khamenei to his son, who remains out of sight, where did it settle? The ready answer is that the Revolutionary Guards control everything. At the very least, the Guards oversaw and managed his election by the Assembly of Experts on March 8, 2026. Their influence and security and economic networks extend into Middle Eastern capitals, parts of West Asia and farther afield. Assembly members arrived at the election venue accompanied by Guards personnel. The dramatic scene recalled World War Two, when the British government met in Westminster shelters as German aircraft rained bombs on London.“The latest war against Iran is the largest military confrontation the region has seen, almost surpassing the eight-year war with Iraq,” the Iraqi politician said. Madan resists describing events in Iran as a smooth process of replacing one leader with another. He also resists describing the change as a shift from “rule by the supreme leader” to “rule by the Revolutionary Guards.”That assumes a direct transfer that neither the system’s internal structure nor the challenges of war yet permit. Wartime conditions may themselves be the key to understanding what has changed. Most likely, the “Islamic Revolution” system that existed under Khomeini and Khamenei has dispersed without disintegrating, becoming a republic of interconnected organizations. “Iran today does not need a supreme leader, but operational commanders who act like leaders of clandestine cells, whose sole task is survival,” the Iraqi politician said.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi described Iran’s strategy during the latest war as “decentralized defense.” He was seeking to explain a shift from protecting senior leaders to ensuring survival during wartime. That appears to involve multiple combat structures that are difficult to control or track. There is no evidence that the elder Khamenei planned this organizational division. But the result is the same: Iran today is both “the state and the revolution.”An Iranian reflection always emerges in Baghdad. This time, it reflects fragmentation.
In March 2016, the Iraqi government was negotiating a short, two-day truce with a faction. The Americans had secured a promise that attacks on their embassy in Baghdad would stop. Explosive-laden drones kept striking their facility. Sources said communications between US and Iraqi officials were strained “because of the government’s failure to reach an agreement with a faction.” Reliable sources said “a Revolutionary Guards officer working in Iraq did not respond to a senior Iraqi official’s inquiries about why the attacks continued despite the agreement.”
“One center and many strands”
From this sharp angle, the real changes become visible. Under Khamenei, Iran had multiple institutions and centers of power. The Revolutionary Guards were among the most prominent. But the elder Khamenei’s experience and attributes allowed him to centralize their management and settle disputes among them. After his departure, “decision-making appears to depend more heavily on interaction among the supreme leader’s office, the Supreme National Security Council, military and security leaders, the Revolutionary Guards and other state institutions,” Madan said. He sees “a relative shift in Iran from highly pronounced personal centralization to a more complex institutional centralization.” Within that structure, “security and military institutions have gained importance because of the war and the circumstances surrounding the succession.”
The Revolutionary Guards, for example, have shifted toward operating as separate “units.” Local and regional commanders enjoy a degree of operational autonomy, as though the “supreme commander” were perpetually dead. For Madan, the question today is no longer who rules Iran. It is how decision-making is distributed after the disappearance of the figure who held all the strands together at one center. It is “a stage of redefining the relationship between the leadership institution and the centers of power, a process still taking shape whose chapters remain unfinished.” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian makes no secret of his concern about an “Iran of cells.” “No group will be allowed to take Iran in any particular direction,” he said recently. Many analysts see such statements as an Iranian tactic to construct a “good cop, bad cop” narrative. But developments on the ground reflect a country operating as separate parts.
Will Iran continue in this networked form, able to operate ambiguously, without a clear central head whose loss in half an hour could paralyze the whole system? Different answers circulate among those following the issue. The more pressing question is whether Tehran can coordinate its separate “units.” Has their autonomy within the system become excessive? More troubling still, has their autonomy become more frightening than external attacks; beyond anything the elder Khamenei would have accepted or endured?

Trump says US will not attack Iran before midterm elections in November
Reuters/08 October/2026
US President Donald Trump said on Thursday the United States is having productive discussions with Iran and will not launch an attack on the country before US midterm congressional elections in November. “We are having productive discussions with the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Trump wrote in a post on Truth Social. He said the US blockade of Iranian ports remains in effect and that oil is flowing through the Strait of Hormuz. “We will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the United States on November 3rd,” Trump said. The United States and Israel launched strikes on Iran in February and the war — and its $3 billion monthly price tag — has become a key issue on the US campaign trail. Trump has repeatedly said he expected oil prices to drop sharply after the elections, but high gas prices and the Iran war are weighing heavily on Republican candidates and threatening their congressional majority. Iran and the US have exchanged proposals in recent weeks aimed at ending the war and reopening the Strait of Hormuz, a vital global energy shipping route. Trump rejected Tehran’s latest offer.

US House Speaker Johnson weighs ‘next chapter’ if Republicans lose majority
Reuters/08 October/2026
Republican US House of Representatives Speaker Mike Johnson told Fox News he does not know if he will remain in politics if his party loses control of the chamber in next month’s congressional election even as he insisted his focus was on protecting the party’s majority.
“Heaven forbid, if we lose this majority or whatever, I don’t know what my next chapter of life is,” the Louisiana lawmaker told Fox News. Johnson has repeatedly predicted that Republicans would defy history and grow their House majority in the upcoming election. But he has on occasion held out the possibility of a Republican loss in efforts to raise money and turnout, predicting that a Democratic majority would mean another Trump impeachment. The latest comments appeared to be his public acknowledgment that his caucus could face defeat in November. “If God moves on our hearts and says we should, you know, go back to my hometown of Shreveport and start a lawn business, I’ll do that with equal fervor. I mean, I just want to be of my highest and best use ... to God and to my country,” Johnson said, Fox News reporter Aishah Hasnie said on X. His comments come as US voters are already heading to the polls in a number of states to vote early ahead of the November 3 election day, with rising prices and the Iran war looming large as Americans weigh Republicans’ grip on Congress and fellow Republican Donald Trump in the White House.
Reuters/Ipsos polling shows 44 percent of registered voters saying they would vote for Democrats while 37 percent say they would vote for Republicans and 13 percent undecided. Nearly two-thirds of US adults nationwide, or 65 percent, said they disapprove of Trump’s term since taking office for a second time in January 2025, compared to 32 percent who said they approve. Johnson said he was not to blame if Republicans lose their legislative majority, telling Fox: “If we lose the House, it will be because the people were misled.”“I’m traveling nonstop,” added Johnson, who scheduled the House to be in recess until after the election. Trump has also begun campaign-trail rallies.

US tells citizens to 'exercise heightened vigilance' after Riyadh airport attacks
LBCI/08 October/2026
The United States urged its citizens in Saudi Arabia to "exercise heightened vigilance" Thursday following Houthi attacks targeting Riyadh's airport, which U.S. government employees now need special authorization to use. "The U.S. Mission is aware of attacks on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh as of October 8 and reminds all U.S. citizens to exercise heightened vigilance," the State Department's consular affairs arm said on X, adding that "U.S. government employees working in Saudi Arabia now require special authorization" to use the transit hub. AFP

Iran will not abandon uranium enrichment or hand over its uranium, nuclear chief says
Reuters/08 October/2026
Iran will not abandon uranium enrichment or hand over its uranium, state media reported on Thursday, citing the head of the country’s Atomic Energy Organization Mohammad Eslami, after the US said Iran must make “meaningful” reductions in its enrichment capacity.
Dismissing renewed US threats against Iran’s nuclear facilities as “nothing new”, Eslami said enrichment was “an inseparable part” of the nuclear process. Eslami’s comments come as Iran and the United States exchanged proposals in recent weeks aimed at ending the war and reopening the Strait of Hormuz, a vital global energy shipping route. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Thursday that Iran could reply within days to a US response to Iran’s proposal under which the Strait of Hormuz could be reopened within seven days if necessary conditions were met. “Enrichment is an integral part of the nuclear process, and we will not abandon it in any way. How can you claim to have a nuclear industry if you don’t have the starting point of the process? The nuclear industry is the driving force of science and technology,” Eslami added. US President Donald Trump said later on Thursday that the United States is having productive discussions with Iran and will not launch any attack before the US midterm congressional elections in November. Israel, the US and other Western states have long accused Iran of seeking nuclear weapons, including pointing to its move to enrich uranium to 60 percent, far higher than needed for civilian uses and closer to the 90 percent needed for a weapon. Iran denies seeking nuclear weapons. Iranian authorities have said that Tehran could agree to dilute its most highly enriched uranium.

US imposes fresh sanctions on Iran's shadow fleet
LBCI/08 October/2026
The Trump administration imposed fresh sanctions on Iran on ‌Thursday targeting individuals, networks and 17 vessels for transporting its crude, oil products and petrochemicals, in the latest act of U.S. economic warfare on Tehran, the Treasury Department said. The sanctions are part of the ⁠department's "Operation Economic Outcast," which aims to cut Tehran's funding for the war, missile construction, cyberattacks and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or IRGC. "Today's action represents the most significant blow yet to Iran's remaining illicit maritime infrastructure by neutralizing the vast majority of the shadow fleet," a Treasury official told reporters in a call. "Treasury is ‌cutting ⁠off the regime's last major source of illicit revenue and strengthening international pressure to hold Tehran accountable."The move boosts pressure on Iranian oil sales after the U.S. re-imposed its ⁠blockade of Iranian ports on July 14 following the breakdown of a memorandum of understanding between Tehran and Washington. Iran only ⁠has about 20 million barrels of crude oil left on vessels outside of the blockade, a Treasury ⁠official said. The world uses about 100 million barrels of oil per day. Reuters

Houthi missile debris damages kindergarten, medical clinics in Riyadh
Al Arabiya English/08 October/2026
Debris from an intercepted Houthi ballistic missile damaged a kindergarten and a medical clinic complex in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh on Thursday, the Kingdom’s Civil Defense said.
The missile, launched by Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthis, was intercepted and destroyed before debris fell in the city, causing material damage to the two facilities, according to a statement carried by the Saudi Press Agency (SPA). The statement did not report any casualties or injuries. Civil Defense said authorities had implemented the standard procedures for such incidents. The incident comes amid an escalation in Houthi attacks on the Kingdom.
According to Saudi Arabia’s General Authority of Civil Aviation (GACA), two separate Houthi ballistic missile attacks targeting airports in Abha and Riyadh on Tuesday and Wednesday killed three people and injured 36 others.

Gulf countries shipped over 1.25 bln barrels of crude oil through Hormuz: CENTCOM
Al Arabiya English/08 October/2026
The US military said Thursday that American forces have supported the shipment of more than 1.25 billion barrels of crude oil from Gulf partners through the Strait of Hormuz in recent months, while preventing Iranian oil shipments under a US blockade. The announcement followed a virtual briefing by US Central Command (CENTCOM) chief Adm. Brad Cooper with international shipping industry representatives on maritime security and the growing flow of commercial traffic through the strategic waterway. Cooper highlighted progress in restoring freedom of navigation through the Strait, a vital corridor for global energy supplies, CENTCOM said. Cooper thanked shipping industry leaders and other US government agencies for their continued cooperation and acknowledged the sacrifices made by civilian crews following what CENTCOM described as unwarranted Iranian attacks.
According to CENTCOM, Iran has been unable to ship any oil through its ports because of the US blockade, while Gulf energy exports have continued with American military support. CENTCOM also said shipping routes through the Strait of Hormuz remain open to vessels that comply with the US blockade against Iran. US forces have also cleared sea mines from primary transit lanes, allowing thousands of commercial vessels to pass safely through the waterway, CENTCOM said, with a map of the open route posted to X. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most strategically important maritime chokepoints, connecting Gulf oil producers to international markets. The latest figures underscore Washington’s efforts to keep commercial shipping and energy flows moving through the region while enforcing its blockade of Iranian ports, CENTCOM said.

Saudi Arabia, UAE sign MoU to boost power grid interconnection, rail connectivity
Al Arabiya English/08 October/2026
Saudi Arabia and the UAE signed an agreement on Thursday to boost cooperation in power grid interconnection and rail connectivity. During a meeting between Saudi Energy and Industry Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman and Emirati Investment Minister Mohamed Alsuwaidi, the MoU aims to strengthen strategic cooperation between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi on power grid interconnection, electricity exchange and sales, and rail connectivity. The Saudi Energy Ministry said the goal was to maximize mutual economic benefits in these areas. Under the deal, Saudi Arabia and the UAE will also coordinate with GCC member states to expand the GCC Interconnection Grid in accordance with the GCC General Agreement for Grid Interconnection. “These efforts are intended to enhance the efficiency of energy systems and strengthen regional integration,” the Saudi ministry said. The MoU also calls for an agreement on the general principles governing rail connectivity between the two countries for the two-way transport and transit of goods and freight, helping strengthen logistics integration, improve supply chain efficiency, and support economic development and regional integration.

Saudi-led coalition intercepts Houthi missiles targeting Riyadh, Khamis Mushait
Al Arabiya English/08 October/2026
The Saudi-led coalition said Thursday it had intercepted and destroyed three ballistic missiles launched toward Saudi Arabia by Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi militia. “We intercepted and destroyed two ballistic missiles launched by the Houthi terrorist militia toward Riyadh,” coalition spokesman Maj. Gen. Turki al-Malki said.Al-Malki added that a third ballistic missile launched toward the southwestern city of Khamis Mushait had also been intercepted and destroyed. The Houthis have recently stepped up attacks on civilian targets across Saudi Arabia.
Three people were killed and 36 others injured in separate attacks targeting airports in Riyadh and Abha on Tuesday and Wednesday, according to Saudi Arabia’s General Authority of Civil Aviation.

Explosions heard in Saudi capital Riyadh
Associated Press/08 October/2026
Several explosions were heard in Saudi Arabia's capital of Riyadh on Thursday, including a large blast at the city's international airport, a witness told The Associated Press, a day after the kingdom said an attack there killed one person and wounded others. The cause of the blasts was not immediately known. There was no immediate claim of responsibility. Iran-backed Houthi rebels in neighboring Yemen have repeatedly claimed attacks against airports, military and oil facilities in Saudi Arabia in recent days. The blasts had an immediate effect on markets and oil prices as the price of crude jumped. King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh "closed again," the Flightradar24 monitor said Thursday on X. "Last landing 80+ minutes ago. Last take off 90+ minutes ago." Fire and ambulance crews were deployed and smoke was visible, the witness said, speaking on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to the media. The witness said outgoing flights were halted and passengers were instructed to leave all checked-in luggage behind and evacuate the airport. It was not immediately clear how many flights were disrupted. Saudi authorities did not respond to requests for comment.
On Wednesday, Saudi officials said two attacks on airports claimed by the Houthis had killed three people, as the kingdom was pulled deeper into the latest front in the Iran war. The attack on King Khalid airport killed a Sudanese national and wounded eight other people, and the attack on Abha airport killed Moroccan and Algerian residents and wounded 28 others, officials said. Attacks on the kingdom, the world's top oil exporter, have raised alarm. Over the weekend, Saudi Arabia and allied Yemeni forces launched a major ground and air offensive aimed at retaking territory that the Houthis seized a month ago along Yemen's western Red Sea coast and on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The rebels' presence on the waterway poses a threat to the crucial shipping alternative to the Strait of Hormuz, where traffic has been curtailed due to the Iran war. Also Wednesday, the spokesperson for the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthis, Maj. Gen. Turki al-Malki, said forces destroyed a platform in Yemen's rebel-held capital of Sanaa that had been used to launch attacks on the Saudi capital. The AP could not independently verify these claims.

Yemen's Houthis warn staff to leave Saudi oil sites
Agence France Presse/08 October/2026
Yemen's Houthis on Thursday called on staff at oil facilities in Saudi Arabia to leave to avoid being targeted as hostilities escalate with Riyadh, which backs Yemen's internationally recognized government fighting the Iran-backed group. "Employees at all oil facilities must leave areas that are targets for our forces, so as not to endanger their lives," Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree wrote on X, while also issuing a warning "to airlines, airports, travelers and their staff".

Houthis Accused of Stripping Western Yemen of Power Equipment, Property
Sanaa/Asharq Al Awsat/October 08/2026
The Houthis have expanded their systematic seizure of public and private property in areas under their control along Yemen’s western coast, including Hodeidah province and parts of Taiz, according to local sources, who accuse the group of treating cities and public facilities as spoils to be transferred to their strongholds. The latest reported seizures involved equipment and solar panels from two power stations in the Hays and Al-Khawkhah districts of Hodeidah province. The installations were dismantled and their components transported to Saada, the group’s main stronghold, depriving thousands of residents of electricity and worsening hardship amid deteriorating services and high temperatures in coastal areas. Informed sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Gharsan al-Matari, a Houthi leader acting as Hodeidah’s electricity director, instructed members of the group several days ago to dismantle both solar power systems and transport all their components, equipment and technical supplies to Saada aboard large trucks. The two installations had supplied approximately 20 megawatts of electricity, helping power homes and ease hardship for residents, particularly in coastal communities where temperatures are high. According to the sources, the incident reflects a broader pattern of seizures targeting public utilities and private property in areas brought under Houthi control. Other service infrastructure, equipment and networks are also being dismantled and transferred to Saada and Sanaa rather than remaining in the communities they were intended to serve, they added.
An economy of spoils
Activists from Hodeidah described the transfer of electricity equipment from Hays and Al-Khawkhah as an example of what they called an “economy of spoils,” accusing the Houthis of treating areas under their control as sources of assets to be appropriated.
Residents are paying the price through the loss of essential services, they argued, while resources are concentrated in the group’s centers of power. In the coastal district of Mokha, local sources reported continuing seizures and looting that began within hours of the Houthis taking control of the city, targeting homes, government facilities, humanitarian organizations and charitable associations. Sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Houthi members raided dozens of houses and apartments, particularly in the Al-Hali neighborhood and December 2 City, removing furniture, household appliances and other belongings before loading them onto trucks and transporting them out of the city. Government premises were also targeted, including the local authority headquarters and the city’s branch of the Central Bank of Yemen. The reported looting extended to commercial establishments. Eyewitnesses recounted seeing Houthi patrols repeatedly transporting food supplies and consumer goods from wholesale stores in central Mokha to locations outside the city. Local activists indicated that the seizures took place under the supervision of unidentified individuals believed to be linked to the group’s security and intelligence agencies.
Shops broken into in Al-Turbah
In Al-Turbah, the administrative center of Al-Shamayatayn district in southwestern Taiz province, local sources accused the Houthis of following the same pattern, targeting government institutions, private homes and figures associated with the Yemeni government.
Several shopkeepers closed their businesses as the group entered the city, fearing looting. But residents reported that some of the shuttered premises were forcibly broken into.According to their accounts, Houthi members broke down the doors of several shops and seized merchandise, apparently in retaliation for the owners’ decision to close their businesses during the group’s entry into the city. The successive incidents point to what residents and activists describe as a recurring pattern of seizures extending beyond damage directly caused by fighting.They accuse the Houthis of stripping cities of essential infrastructure and economic assets and transferring them to areas under the group’s control, further undermining public services and worsening living conditions.

Iraq Warns of ISIS Resurgence after Attacks North of Baghdad
Baghdad: Hamza Mustafa/Asharq Al Awsat/October 08/2026
Iraqi officials warned Wednesday of an ISIS resurgence after a series of attacks on security forces in rural areas north of Baghdad left several personnel dead or wounded, prompting authorities to impose a nighttime curfew in parts of Kirkuk province. Security sources said the second battalion of the Popular Mobilization Forces’ 61st Brigade came under armed attack late Tuesday in the village of Al-Barghaliya–Al-Dandish in Hawija district, southwest of Kirkuk. A sniper disabled a thermal imaging camera at a military position, triggering search operations in the village and surrounding areas to track down the attackers. The assault came a day after an attack on the Federal Police’s Ninth Brigade in the same village killed one person and wounded four others. Several thermal imaging cameras were also destroyed, according to a security source. The Federal Police Command identified the slain officer as Bakr Majid Mohammed, who was killed while confronting ISIS militants attempting to storm his guard post in Al-Barghaliya in Hawija district. The position falls within the operational area of the third battalion of the Ninth Brigade, Federal Police Third Division.
Nighttime curfew
In response to the attacks, Federal Police authorities imposed a curfew across Hawija and its villages from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. The restrictions prohibit movement during those hours, with tighter controls on motorcycles, cars and cargo motorcycles. The latter may operate only in essential cases with official authorization. Residents were urged to comply with the measures and cooperate with security forces, while authorities warned that violations could result in legal action. Security was also tightened around farms and villages near Federal Police positions, with restrictions on the movement of farmers whose land lies close to security deployments.
Ahmed Ramzi Koprulu, chairman of the Kirkuk Provincial Council’s Security and Defense Committee, said that the Hawija attack underscored the continuing threat posed by ISIS sleeper cells. He called for stronger intelligence gathering and intensified security operations to prevent further attacks. Speaking to Shafaq News, Koprulu stressed the need to prevent militants from regrouping or exploiting remote areas to target security forces and civilians. He also urged closer coordination and intelligence-sharing among security agencies. On Monday, ISIS claimed responsibility for an attack southwest of Kirkuk city that killed an Iraqi police officer and wounded others. It was the group’s first attack on Iraqi security forces since US troops completed their withdrawal from Iraq on Sept. 30, bringing their military mission in the country to an end. On the day of the withdrawal, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi called for heightened vigilance, constant readiness and closer coordination among security forces.He also asked security agencies to update their operational plans, procedures and databases and make greater use of modern technology to maintain stability nationwide.
How serious is the threat?
Despite the recent violence, security experts played down ISIS’s ability to regain control of territory. Security analyst Sarmad al-Bayati told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group, or what remains of it, could still threaten military units in some areas because it possesses weapons and explosive belts. However, he argued that it no longer poses a threat to Iraq’s overall national security. Bayati described the Hawija incidents as limited attacks by sleeper cells, suggesting they could nevertheless be used for political purposes amid the debate over the US withdrawal and efforts to disarm armed factions. Security expert Mukhlid Hazem also dismissed the prospect of ISIS staging a resurgence on the scale of its 2014 offensive. He said the group’s capabilities were now largely confined to deploying small armed units in scattered areas, while Iraqi security forces worked to contain them through preemptive operations. “The organization’s attacks coinciding with the US withdrawal are merely an attempt to demonstrate that it still exists,” Hazem told Asharq Al-Awsat. He added that ISIS was no longer capable of carrying out attacks in city centers, even where it retained local support networks. Still, he urged caution over the possibility of larger militant groups attempting to mobilize. Political science professor Abbas Abboud pointed to significant improvements in Iraq’s intelligence capabilities compared with previous years, arguing that these advances reduced the likelihood of ISIS expanding its operations. He cautioned, however, that threats could also emerge from other terrorist groups enlisted by various parties to advance specific objectives.

Arab Parliament President Stresses Houthi Attacks on Saudi Arabia Pose Direct Threat to Regional Security
Asharq Al Awsat/October 08/2026
President of the Arab Parliament Mohammed bin Ahmed Al-Yamahi stressed that repeated terrorist attacks by the Houthi militia against Saudi Arabia and its civilian and oil facilities pose a direct threat to regional security. During his speech at the 153rd Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, Al-Yamahi addressed Iranian attacks that targeted several Arab countries and threatened civilians, infrastructure, and vital facilities, SPA reported. He also discussed regional escalation and related threats to the security of Arab countries. He called on the international community to move beyond condemnation and take measures to protect states and their sovereignty and compel the parties to respect international law.

Iraq Rejects Syrian Request to Repatriate 4,000 Suspected ISIS Detainees
Asharq Al Awsat/October 08/2026
Iraq has rejected Syria's request to repatriate thousands of suspected ISIS members transferred from Syrian detention centers to Iraqi custody earlier this year, a senior Iraqi security official said on Wednesday. Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al-Aboudi said that a meeting had been held recently between Syria, Iraq and the United States to discuss the fate of the prisoners. Al-Aboudi said Syria had requested that the 4,000 Syrian prisoners be handed over to be tried in Syria, but Iraq refused. Iraq has repatriated about 50 Syrian detainees who were determined not to be ISIS members, he told The Associated Press, while the Syrian prisoners remaining in Iraq include about 400 who are believed to be high-level members of the extremist group. “Iraq is conducting investigations, and anyone proved to have committed crimes in Iraq will be tried under Iraqi law,” he said. Some prisoners could later be transferred to their home countries to complete their sentences, he said. Syria did not immediately respond to requests for comment. More than 5,700 prisoners with alleged ISIS ties — including some 4,000 Syrians — were transferred from northeast Syria to Iraq after fighting broke out in January between Syrian government forces and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, which had long guarded the detention centers where they were held. Some ISIS-linked prisoners managed to flee during the chaos of the clashes, and there were fears that a larger-scale escape would take place. While the extremist group lost control of the territory it once seized in Iraq and Syria years ago, its cells still periodically carry out attacks in both countries. The discussions about the prisoners' fate come as the United States has ended a 12-year mission to fight ISIS in Iraq, with the last US troops withdrawing from the country last month. Al-Aboudi said Iraq has asked for financial support from the US and other countries taking part in the global coalition against ISIS to help with the costs of housing the prisoners. “Iraq asked for an allocation of $500 million. The coalition promised support, but Iraq is still waiting,” he said. A US defense official and the office of Tom Barrack, the US envoy to Syria and Iraq, referred questions about the prisoners to Iraqi and Syrian authorities. Many of the prisoners transferred to Iraq had been held in Syria for years without charges. Rights groups have raised concerns about detention conditions in both countries.

Israel Drastically Reduces British Diplomatic Presence in Jerusalem
Asharq Al Awsat/October 08/2026
Israel said the British consulate in Jerusalem ended its functions on Thursday but that seven diplomats would be allowed to remain in a limited capacity, with the UK saying it would continue to offer "vital services".The move comes after Israel ordered the closure of the consulate in September as retaliation after London led Western sanctions over violence by Israeli settlers against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar said Thursday's move to downsize the UK presence had followed a dialogue with the British government in order to avoid an escalation of tensions between the two countries."As I announced, the British consulate in Jerusalem ended its role today," Saar said in a statement, adding that 20 diplomats including the consul general were ending their missions and leaving the country. Saar said the building is the property of the British government and that a "task force of only seven diplomats" would be allowed to operate from the premises, "which ceased to function as a consulate today"."Their scope of activity will be very limited," Saar said. Britain and Israel have "agreed on the continuation of dialogue between the governments, within which both sides will be able to raise issues important to them", he said.The UK government pledged to continue delivering "vital services" in Jerusalem, saying the consulate general building would remain open and would "be known as the UK Mission, Jerusalem"."The UK Mission, Jerusalem is independent, operational and will continue to deliver vital services and our work with the Palestinian people," Foreign Minister Ed Miliband said in a statement.
Israeli settlements -
An AFP photographer on Thursday saw that the diplomatic emblem and a plaque that adorned the consulate's facade had been removed.It was not immediately clear whether new plaques would be put up. On September 8, Saar ordered the British consulate to close.
At the time, he said Israel would also expel British representatives at a center monitoring the US-brokered ceasefire plan in Gaza, bar British training for Palestinian Authority forces and ban 12 Britons, mostly members of parliament, from visiting. Saar on Thursday said the measures had been implemented. The retaliation came after 12 countries including Britain, Canada and France announced they would sanction trade with Israeli settlements in the West Bank, following a surge in settler attacks against Palestinians in the occupied territory. The British consulate in Jerusalem was founded nearly 200 years ago. It lies in east Jerusalem, part of the historically Palestinian area that Israel captured in 1967. Israel later annexed east Jerusalem and considers the holy city its undivided capital. While Israel controls east Jerusalem, most countries including Britain do not recognize its sovereignty over the whole city. The British consulate handles "political, commercial, security and economic interests between the UK and Palestine", according to its website as well as providing consular services to British nationals in Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza.

Police Fire Tear Gas at a Barricaded High School in Paris as School Protests Show No Sign of Ending
Asharq Al Awsat/October 08/2026
Dozens of students dragged rubbish bins into position outside a high school in northeastern Paris early on Thursday, erecting fresh barricades before police moved in with tear gas as France’s nationwide protests show few signs of ending. The Helene Boucher Lycee has been a flashpoint for clashes in the French capital, and is one of hundreds of schools disrupted by protesters Thursday. At least a dozen demonstrations in support of the high school students' movement are planned around France later in the day. Riot police gathered in side streets as students converged on the school. Many protesters wore surgical masks or hoodies, apparently afraid to be recognized. Police have made more than 6,600 arrests since late September, when students, most of them under 18, started protesting to demand more education funding, according to the Interior Ministry. The Education Ministry said that 375 schools were either fully or partially closed on Thursday. Pressure mounts on an embattled administration. While the number of school closures was down compared to Tuesday, pressure is mounting on the government of outgoing President Emmanuel Macron. The protests against the under-funding of schools — many of them struggling with dilapidated facilities and insufficient staff — have drawn troublemakers not concerned about the aims of the protest movement as well as unions and political groups. In a TV address, Prime Minister Sebastien Lecornu lamented the “violence, students and staff being attacked, police officers and gendarmes injured, schools set on fire or vandalized, thousands of hours of classes lost, not to mention threats and insults.”He took aim at “political leaders who use this anger to conduct their electoral battles." France goes to the polls for a presidential election in April. “We cannot play with the safety of France’s youth,” Lecornu said. At the Lycee, 18-year-old university student Emma Khelil came to offer support to those at the barricades at her former high school. She told The Associated Press that she’s really concerned about police violence. “We’re here to defend our rights, not to lose an eye or a hand,” Khelil said. She also said that she had noticed insulation problems and water leaks in the school building and had even seen rats on occasion. Other students confirmed that they’d seen rats too. She was not convinced by Lecornu’s efforts to calm the situation. “I don’t think the movement is going to lose momentum. As long as things don’t change, we’re going to see the movement grow stronger, and potentially a convergence of struggles, especially with the next presidential election coming up,” she said. Not long after she spoke, police surrounded a nearby square. The crowd surged, and tear gas was fired. The protest movement crosses borders
The impact of France's protests is also being felt north of the border, in Belgium. Liege Mayor Willy Demeyer issued a ban on public gatherings until midnight on Oct. 16, given what he described as the “real, serious and imminent risk” of repeated clashes and vandalism that authorities expected in coming days. City police said they used water cannon and tear gas on Wednesday to keep several hundred protesters at bay. Authorities sent emergency mobile text messages warning shopkeepers to close their premises due to rioting. Almost 90 people were arrested and several police were injured. Police reinforcements were sent from the capital Brussels and from Antwerp, and more are coming. Smaller protests have been held in Mons and Charleroi. In a post on social media, Belgium’s Interior Minister Bernard Quintin said the “perpetrators will have to answer for their actions before the courts.”The Belgian protests, organized through social media chat groups, include demands for more teachers and smaller classes as well as complaints about education reform in Belgium, but are also likely inspired by events in France.

Death Toll from Russian Bus Strike in Eastern Ukraine Jumps to 30
Asharq Al Awsat/October 08/2026
Thirty people were killed on Thursday when Russia struck two passenger buses in Kramatorsk, near the frontline in eastern Ukraine, local authorities said. "As of now, the death toll from this morning's attack on buses has risen to 30. Eighteen people were wounded," the Donetsk regional prosecutor's office said. The governor's office gave the same toll and said public transport had been suspended. Ukraine's national police said Russia had hit the buses with a glide bomb. Kramatorsk is one of the key cities that Russia has not yet captured in the eastern Donetsk region, which Moscow claims as its own. It has been a logistics and supply hub for the Ukrainian military for much of the war and is part of the so-called "fortress belt" which troops are fighting to keep hold of. Russian forces have edged close to the city's eastern edge, which has prompted calls for civilians who remain to relocate to safer regions of Ukraine.
Thursday's strike, which happened at 10:00 am (0700 GMT), came a day after a Russian missile hit an apartment block in the northern region of Chernigiv, killing 22, including five children. Kramatorsk City Council said it was "yet another horrific crime committed by the Russian army against the civilian population". "Once again, the Russians have struck a location where there are absolutely no military targets," it added.

Rubio says Ukraine war stalemate ‘very dangerous’
AFP/08 October/2026
Russia and Ukraine are at a stalemate that could see one or both sides escalate to break the impasse, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Thursday, warning of a “very dangerous” situation. Any escalation between Moscow and Kyiv, which have been at war since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, “could quickly turn what is a war between two countries into a much broader and far more dangerous regional conflict,” Rubio said during a stopover in Portugal at the end of a tour of Europe. Earlier on Thursday, Ukraine accused Russia of deliberately targeting civilians after 30 people were killed when two buses were blown up in the frontline city of Kramatorsk, in one of the deadliest single attacks for weeks. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy vowed that the attack “will not go unanswered.”Rubio said it was “an extremely dangerous war because frankly, right now, it seems to be at a stalemate.”“And stalemates are very dangerous,” he said, because either side could be tempted to escalate. Rubio said there have been attempts to reach a negotiated settlement, and “we will keep trying.”

Putin tells Iran president will ‘do everything’ to help end Middle East war
Al Arabiya English/08 October/2026
Russian President Vladimir Putin held talks with Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian on Thursday and promised to “do everything” to help end the Middle East conflict, Russian news agencies reported. “We are ready to do everything that is in our power to contribute to the settlement of this situation,” said Putin ahead of a regional summit in the Central Asian nation of Turkmenistan, adding that Iran had made “real efforts to end the war” since US-Israeli attacks started on February 28.Putin noted the “positive evolution” in relations between Iran and Russia.
The two have reinforced diplomatic and military links since Russia launched its offensive in Ukraine in February 2022, becoming increasingly reliant on each other. Both leaders arrived Thursday evening ahead of the summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) – a grouping of former Soviet nations – in the resort of Avaza on the Caspian Sea.The presidents last met on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Kyrgyzstan in September. Ukraine and Western countries have accused Iran of supplying Russia with Shahed drones and short-range missiles for use in the military campaign.
Russia has been accused of supplying targeting data to Iran for its strikes on US interests in the Middle East. The meeting came as talks between Tehran and Washington appear to be at an impasse. Pezeshkian said this week that negotiations with Washington were “meaningless.”

Ukraine team to meet in US with Trump envoys on Friday, Saturday: Zelensky
LBCI/08 October/2026
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Kyiv's negotiators would hold talks with U.S. President Donald Trump's envoys in the United States on Friday and Saturday.
"The Ukrainian negotiating team is due to meet Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff in the U.S. tomorrow...," Zelensky told reporters in a voice note Thursday. "The meeting is expected to last two days. We are also counting on a European team to join our negotiating group," he added. AFP

The Latest LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on October 08-09/2026
Iran Fueling Palestinian Jihad, Preventing Terrorists' Disarmament
Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/October 08/2026
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/22909/iran-palestinian-islamic-jihad
Palestinian Islamic Jihad [PIJ] Secretary-General Ziad al-Nakhala declared that his organization would remain committed to "the path of jihad and resistance," which would continue "by all possible means," as long as the "Zionist project" remains on supposedly Palestinian land.
PIJ's anniversary statement was explicit: the organization said it would continue, alongside other "resistance forces," on the path of jihad until it achieved what it calls its rights and had "liberated" its land. It described Israel as a "criminal Zionist entity."
US Treasury Department assessments have, for years, documented Iranian state sponsorship of Hamas amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars. The Treasury Department has also identified Iranian funding, weapons and training for PIJ through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
"Hamas continues to rely on global fundraising efforts, donations, hundreds of millions of dollars in state sponsorship from Iran, and abuse of sham charitable entities for revenue." — US Treasury Department's "2026 National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment," March 2026.
The question is not whether Hamas or the other Islamist terrorist groups will agree to a temporary pause in fighting. The real question is whether these organizations are prepared to abandon their weapons and their ideology of armed struggle.
No peace plan or diplomatic initiative will succeed so long as the Iran-backed terrorist organizations retain the ability to launch another October 7 massacre.
Three years after October 7, the international community should stop asking only what Israel intends to do next. It should ask what Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and their Iranian patron intend to do next.... They keep reminding us. They intend to continue their jihad until the elimination of Israel.
On the contrary, the Iran-backed terrorist organization is reaffirming its commitment to jihad (holy war), armed resistance, and the destruction of what it calls the "Zionist project."
That message should be taken seriously by anyone hoping that the Gaza war can end with the disarmament of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the other armed groups.
In statements marking the third anniversary of the October 7 attack and the 39th anniversary of PIJ's founding, the organization's leaders did not speak about surrendering their weapons, dismantling their military infrastructure, or transferring control of Gaza to a new Palestinian government.
Instead, they spoke about continuing the fight.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad Secretary-General Ziad al-Nakhala declared that his organization would remain committed to "the path of jihad and resistance," which would continue "by all possible means," as long as the "Zionist project" remains on supposedly Palestinian land.
He also declared that the "unity of the resistance forces in Palestine and in the region" would remain in place.
Nakhala went further, describing the October 7 attack, which he called "Battle of Al-Aqsa Flood," as a "natural response" to what he described as Israeli aggression. He portrayed the conflict as a battle between one nation and one enemy: the "Zionist project and its allies."
"The Battle of Al-Aqsa Flood came as a natural response to this ongoing aggression, and it was a natural extension of our people's struggle and resistance against the Zionist project that uprooted us from our country, Palestine."
In other words, three years after October 7, the Palestinian jihadis and their patrons in Tehran have not repudiated the attack. They have not apologized for the massacre of Israeli civilians. They have not apologized for bringing death and destruction on their own people.
Instead, they continue to celebrate October 7 as part of a purportedly legitimate historical struggle. PIJ's anniversary statement was explicit: the organization said it would continue, alongside other "resistance forces," on the path of jihad until it achieved what it calls its rights and had "liberated" its land. It described Israel as a "criminal Zionist entity." Needless to say, PIJ, Hamas, and the other terrorist groups in the Gaza Strip do not recognize Israel's right to exist.
This is exactly the issue that must not be obscured by diplomatic language about ceasefires, peace plans, and reconstruction. The question is not whether Hamas or the other Islamist terrorist groups will agree to a temporary pause in fighting. The real question is whether these organizations are prepared to abandon their weapons and their ideology of armed struggle.
The latest statements from the Islamist terrorists provide a clear answer: No.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad proudly announced that more than 2,000 of its fighters had been killed in Gaza, dozens more had been killed in the West Bank, and more than 80 were killed on the Lebanese front. According to the organization, its fighters fought alongside Hamas's Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades and other Palestinian factions.
This boast is particularly important because PIJ is not operating in isolation. The organization openly identifies itself as part of a wider regional "resistance" camp that includes Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iran.
Nakhala paid tribute to Iran's rulers, to the late Hezbollah leaders Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine, as well as to the leaders and fighters of the Houthis and Iran-backed Iraqi militias. He described them as part of the same struggle against Israel and its allies.
The message is clear: the Iranian regime and its terror proxies in the Middle East have always seen the war against Israel as part of a broader regional confrontation. This premise should concern not only Israel but also the United States and other Western countries.
The PIJ statements also demonstrate the continuing influence of Iran. PIJ openly praises Tehran and regards Iran as one of its principal supporters.
Given the documented history of Iranian funding, weapons and training for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the continuing relationship between Tehran and these groups remains an important factor in evaluating their ability and willingness to abandon armed struggle.
US Treasury Department assessments have, for years, documented Iranian state sponsorship of Hamas amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars. The Treasury Department has also identified Iranian funding, weapons and training for PIJ through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
In its "2026 National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment," the Treasury Department reported:
"Hamas continues to rely on global fundraising efforts, donations, hundreds of millions of dollars in state sponsorship from Iran, and abuse of sham charitable entities for revenue."
Statements by the leaders of the Iranian regime and their terror proxies repeatedly refer to the United States as an ally of Israel and accuse the US of complicity in Israel's actions. The rhetoric of the Islamists does not portray the conflict as a narrowly Palestinian-Israeli dispute. It portrays Israel and its allies as a single enemy camp.
This distinction matters.
Those who believe that the conflict will end simply by persuading Hamas and PIJ to accept a new political arrangement in Gaza should listen carefully to what the terrorist groups themselves are saying.
Defeating Islamist terrorism cannot be treated as a short-term diplomatic exercise. No peace plan or diplomatic initiative will succeed so long as the Iran-backed terrorist organizations retain the ability to launch another October 7 massacre.
Three years after October 7, the international community should stop asking only what Israel intends to do next. It should ask what Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and their Iranian patron intend to do next. The answer is already available. They keep reminding us. They intend to continue their jihad until the elimination of Israel.
*Khaled Abu Toameh is an award-winning journalist based in Jerusalem.
*Follow Khaled Abu Toameh on X (formerly Twitter)
© 2026 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute.

The West Confronted with Two Islams
Bat Ye'or/Gatestone Institute./October 08/2026
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/22902/west-confronted-with-two-islams
Funding from Qatar and other oil-producing states has transplanted the traditional belligerence against Judeo-Christianity from national frontiers into the very heart of these countries. Added to this innovation is that of indiscriminate terrorism, pioneered by the Palestine Liberation Organization as early as the 1960s.
The concept of dar al-harb (the "abode of war") — countries still to be conquered for Islam and regarded as the realm of absolute evil in which the injustice of infidel laws prevails — remains current and effective in Islamic theology. It is this concept that today mobilizes some Muslim immigrants in the West to reject integration into societies that do not practice sharia. In other words, the clash of civilizations persists, but now within Western civilizations themselves, which have lost their homogeneity through the demographic changes and host large numbers of Muslim immigrants imposing their own laws.
The present situation recalls the traditional waves of jihadist conquest of territories inhabited by Christians, Jews and other non-Muslims. Greek, Serbian, and Slavic historians bitterly chronicled, over the course of centuries, the internal traitors — military figures, displaced aristocrats, princes of the Church — who made pacts with Muslim conquerors and handed citadels and cities over to them.
The radical activism today of the Muslim diaspora within Western societies and its refusal to integrate... stem from directives issued by the OIC [a sort of global caliphate representing 56 Muslim countries].
In the West, jihad operates on several levels: indiscriminate terrorism, censorship of "blasphemy," changes in customs and laws, the ballot box, the adoption of Western concepts in order to turn them against Europeans, such as cancel culture (to shut out Western evil), and calls for "resistance" (against Christian laws, by holding to jihadist principles of conquest and domination) and "liberation" (meaning the replacement of infidel law by sharia).
We also see the systematic use of the reversal of accusations, in which offenders become victims; the destruction of the infidels' knowledge such as the rejection of Western culture, history and modern history, and their replacement by linguistic fabrications, such as white racism, Western colonialism and "Islamophobia."
Unfortunately, there is a lot to be "phobic" about: paedophilia, death for alleged blasphemy, death for apostasy, permitted rape of infidels, brutality to women and homosexuals, stoning to death for adultery (which includes having been raped), and so on. The principles of Islamic law, as derived from the Quran and sharia, are fundamentally opposed to Western secular laws: they do not recognize individual rights (rather than group rights), gender equality or equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. They do not accept the testimony of non-Muslims and their rights to sovereignty, property or territorial independence. The concept of justice is defined only according to Islamic parameters of justice. Hence, the same words — rights, liberation, resistance, justice, God — can be used without Westerners realizing that their meanings and implications are often quite contradictory to those assumed in the West.
This disparity, which becomes a confrontation, is particularly evident in United Nations forums, where 56 Islamic countries vote as a bloc against Israel according to a jihadist view of justice based on the concepts of harbi (non-Muslims in a state of war with Islam) and jahiliya (the "age of ignorance," referring to miscreant non-Muslim societies, including Jews and Christians). The concept is based on the supposed chaos of evil and barbarity covering the world before the advent of Islam in 622 CE).
The social and peaceful improvements against radicalism highlighted by Riboua, such as the Abraham Accords, in the foreign policies of Muslim states are encouraging, provided that they are not limited to acquiring the levers of Western power, as they increasingly seem to be.
The name "Palestine," in fact, belongs to Jewish history. It is unpronounceable in Arabic and absent from the canonical texts of Islam. Muslims received it as a gift, an act of humble allegiance from Christians who fashioned it into a weapon against Israel. Their Muslim allies then adapted it to their Islamic version of the Bible and the Gospel — a version in which, in the Quran, all Jewish figures are Islamized, including Jesus, who becomes Isa, a Muslim prophet whose mission is to abolish all infidel religions, above all Christianity.
This supposed Quranic Palestine, whose name, temporal and geographical location appear nowhere in the Quran, was claimed as Muslim ―without Jews or Christians ―because in the Quran, Islam preceded Judaism and Christianity, both of which, according to doctrine, appeared only after Islam. In Islam, it is this Palestine that must be restored. It is in this sense that Jews and Christians, are colonists, because the entirety of Biblical history, including the Gospels, is erased. It is this meaning that Christians embrace when they pride themselves on wearing the keffiyeh, the emblem of a Palestine that is a totally political artefact created to eliminate the Christian and Jewish faiths.
The crowds of Westerners who, encouraged by some Christian clergy, jeer at Israel and worship "Palestine," are unaware that they are rejecting the foundations of their own civilization. These crowds are campaigning for the Islamization of their countries and their own deaths, or else conversion or submission to Islam as inferior beings called dhimmis.
America's main challenge will not come from external jihad but from diaspora Muslims in the United States and Europe, "driven by postcolonial resentment and a politics of permanent resistance..."
This, too, is jihad: resentment at having been humiliated by the despised infidel, at having to obey him, while Islam is supposed to command and not be commanded, and while Islam rejects the testimony of the dhimmi.
Indeed, the strict prohibition against Muslims adopting the customs and practices of Jews and Christians or forming friendships with them is as old as the Quran. It lays down these principles and, since its emergence in the eighth century, is the source of endless prohibitions in Islamic jurisprudence.
Ultimately, Muslim states can sleep soundly: the conquest of the West is well under way.... Thanks to its many clueless helpers in the West, Jihad is doing just fine.
Zineb Riboua, a Moroccan-American researcher, developed an original analysis in her recent essay for City Journal, "The West Faces Two Islams." She distinguishes between an Islam in the West, infused with Third Worldism and centered on Israeli-Palestinian issues, as opposed to an Islam in the Muslim countries in the Middle East, North Africa and Asia. Many in those regions have, by and large, modernized, are enthusiastic about technology, and seek a new relationship with their former colonizers from the West.
The fault line, therefore, is said to have shifted onto Western soil, where the West now faces a new homegrown Islam that is steeped in colonial resentment and forged in the Palestinian cause.
Riboua's analysis seems correct regarding the choice made by a large number of Muslim states, such as the United Arab Emirates, in favor of modernity and international cooperation. Anti-Western Islamic hostility, as she observes, is no longer expressed in the foreign policy of Muslim countries, but rather through divisions within Western societies themselves: in demonstrations against colonialism, racism and Israel.
Riboua's observations are accurate, but they do not disprove Samuel Huntington's theory of a "clash of civilizations"; they merely reflect a change in tactics adapted to the modern shifts in population brought about by the mass immigration of Muslims to the West. Funding from Qatar and other oil-producing states has transplanted the traditional belligerence against Judeo-Christianity from national frontiers into the very heart of these countries. Added to this innovation is that of indiscriminate terrorism, pioneered by the Palestine Liberation Organization as early as the 1960s.
Denunciations of imperialism, colonialism and racism, moreover, target only the West -- never Muslim countries, all of which were Islamized through jihadist conquest, then through the racism of "dhimmitude" directed against the non-Muslim indigenous populations, who were treated as inferior, second-class citizens. Dhimmitude, it should be recalled, is the name given to the comprehensive religious Islamic system governing the non-Muslim populations that were defeated by the jihad wars. It therefore has its roots in the jihad ideology and military legal rules and is mainly responsible for the subjugation and Islamization of the native populations through mass deportation, slavery, abduction of women and children, the fiscal oppression of the jizya (obligatory protection tax from non-Muslims), and conversion to Islam.
From the 8th to the 12th century, the Muslim jurisdiction spread with the military expansion of Islam over Christian lands such as Spain, part of South Italy, Sicily, the Levant, Iraq (formerly Mesopotamia, mainly inhabited by Jews and Christians), Asia Minor and other parts of the Byzantine Empire. From there, it used a combination of Muslim sacred Scriptures, shariah law and Christian anti-Jewish laws from the fifth and six centuries, for repressing the original non-Muslim inhabitants: dhimmitude.
An anti-Jewish common ground sometimes led to a Christian-Muslim alliance for persecuting Jews in Muslim countries, especially in the Islamized Jewish homeland before the modern restoration of Israel. That relentless hatred, often stimulated by the clergy, the Catholic Church as well as the Eastern churches, intensified against the pro-Jewish evangelical Protestant churches in the nineteenth century. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Islamic-Christian alliance against the Jews, a recurring feature in the context of dhimmitude, took on a global dimension in opposition to Zionism.
As Europe in recent decades became the new continent of dhimmitude, it imported into its midst this uninhibited, triumphalist and exultant anti-Jewish hatred from the traditional world of dhimmitude. In the 20th century, that trend achieved its peak in the Holocaust in Europe.
The current antisemitic wave was programmed and planned by a campaign organized by the Islamic World Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ICESCO), one of the main institutions of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC, a sort of global caliphate representing 56 Muslim countries). The plan was laid out in a series of lectures given in Morocco (1993) and Jordan (2004) in the Framework of the Islamic-Christian Dialogue. In this context, the Jordanian Abdallah Kanaan presented an elaborate strategy for ways of infiltrating Islamic policy into all Western cultural and media sectors by invoking the Palestinian cause, and that matches perfectly the plan of activities decided upon by the "Alliance of Civilizations."[1]
Today, the anti-Israel wave sweeping across Europe, with the full support of governments, is spreading the customs of dhimmitude throughout the continent. The sooner Europeans become familiar with this civilization, which has existed for thirteen centuries in Europe, Asia, and Africa, the better they will understand present-day pitfalls and threats.
European colonialism, furthermore, may in certain instances have represented the reconquest of formerly Christian lands that were previously colonized by Islam, such as in North Africa and the Levant. The concept of dar al-harb (the "abode of war") — countries still to be conquered for Islam and regarded as the realm of absolute evil in which the injustice of infidel laws prevails — remains current and effective in Islamic theology. It is this concept that today mobilizes some Muslim immigrants in the West to reject integration into societies that do not practice sharia. In other words, the clash of civilizations persists, but now within Western civilizations themselves, which have lost their homogeneity through the demographic changes and host large numbers of Muslim immigrants imposing their own laws.
The present situation recalls the traditional waves of jihadist conquest of territories inhabited by Christians, Jews and other non-Muslims. Greek, Serbian, and Slavic historians bitterly chronicled, over the course of centuries, the internal traitors — military figures, displaced aristocrats, princes of the Church — who made pacts with Muslim conquerors and handed citadels and cities over to them.
The radical activism today of the Muslim diaspora within Western societies and its refusal to integrate, mentioned by Riboua, stem from directives issued by the OIC. This radical activism is not a new phenomenon in history. Islamic domination has always started with a small nucleus of a Muslim army occupying a conquered land that was populated by a vast majority of Christians as well as a Jewish minority. Dhimmitude is the evidence of what happens when Christian states are transformed into Islamic lands.[2]
Today, jihad is being waged mainly on Israel's borders, where Islamist terrorist organizations have built vast tunnels that are like an underground version of Islamic ribats, the military fortresses that for 13 centuries terrorized Christian countries.
In the West, jihad operates on several levels: indiscriminate terrorism, censorship of "blasphemy," changes in customs and laws, the ballot box, the adoption of Western concepts in order to turn them against Europeans, such as cancel culture (to shut out Western evil), and calls for "resistance" (against Christian laws, by holding to jihadist principles of conquest and domination) and "liberation" (meaning the replacement of infidel law by sharia).
We also see the systematic use of the reversal of accusations, in which offenders become victims; the destruction of the infidels' knowledge such as the rejection of Western culture, history and modern history, and their replacement by linguistic fabrications, such as white racism, Western colonialism and "Islamophobia."Unfortunately, there is a lot to be "phobic" about: paedophilia, death for alleged blasphemy, death for apostasy, permitted rape of infidels, brutality to women and homosexuals, stoning to death for adultery (which includes having been raped), and so on. The principles of Islamic law, as derived from the Quran and sharia, are fundamentally opposed to Western secular laws: they do not recognize individual rights (rather than group rights), gender equality or equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. They do not accept the testimony of non-Muslims and their rights to sovereignty, property or territorial independence. The concept of justice is defined only according to Islamic parameters of justice. Hence, the same words — rights, liberation, resistance, justice, God — can be used without Westerners realizing that their meanings and implications are often quite contradictory to those assumed in the West.
This disparity, which becomes a confrontation, is particularly evident in United Nations forums, where 56 Islamic countries vote as a bloc against Israel according to a jihadist view of justice based on the concepts of harbi (non-Muslims in a state of war with Islam) and jahiliyya (the "age of ignorance," referring to miscreant non-Muslim societies, including Jews and Christians). The concept is based on the supposed chaos of evil and barbarity covering the world before the advent of Islam in 622 CE).
The social and peaceful improvements against radicalism highlighted by Riboua, such as the Abraham Accords, in the foreign policies of Muslim states are encouraging, provided that they are not limited to acquiring the levers of Western power, as they increasingly seem to be.
According to Riboua, Jihad will continue for as long as Edward Said's demonizations, which inaccurately portrayed Israel as the paradigm of colonialism and have gradually been replacing the West's study of humanity. Antiquity becomes displaced under the concept of jahiliyya, the world as it looked before Islam. It is because jahiliyya replaces the Bible that the Jewish people, stripped of their 3,000-year-old national and spiritual heritage, are accused of colonialism by jihadist usurpers whose history began in the seventh century. The Israeli-Arab conflict serves as an example of this replacement: both Jewish and Christian biblical history -- and civilization-- are denied (not pointed out by Riboua), erased by the jahiliyya and nothingness awaiting Islam.
That it should have been an Egyptian Christian, Edward Said, afflicted by a paranoid anti-Jewish hatred, who, to eliminate Judaism, forged Islamic weapons for the destruction of Christianity is hardly surprising. The name "Palestine," in fact, belongs to Jewish history. It is unpronounceable in Arabic and absent from the canonical texts of Islam. Muslims received it as a gift, an act of humble allegiance from Christians who fashioned it into a weapon against Israel. Their Muslim allies then adapted it to their Islamic version of the Bible and the Gospel — a version in which, in the Quran, all Jewish figures are Islamized, including Jesus, who becomes Isa, a Muslim prophet whose mission is to abolish all infidel religions, above all Christianity[3].
This supposed Quranic Palestine, whose name, temporal and geographical location appear nowhere in the Quran, was claimed as Muslim ―without Jews or Christians ―because in the Quran, Islam preceded Judaism and Christianity, both of which, according to doctrine, appeared only after Islam. In Islam, it is this Palestine that must be restored. It is in this sense that Jews and Christians, are colonists, because the entirety of Biblical history, including the Gospels, is erased. It is this meaning that Christians embrace when they pride themselves on wearing the keffiyeh, the emblem of a Palestine that is a totally political artefact created to eliminate the Christian and Jewish faiths.
The crowds of Westerners who, encouraged by some Christian clergy, jeer at Israel and worship "Palestine," are unaware that they are rejecting the foundations of their own civilization. These crowds are campaigning for the Islamization of their countries and their own deaths, or else conversion or submission to Islam as inferior beings called dhimmis. Such is Said's legacy, revered by American academics. Riboua is correct when she writes that America's main challenge will not come from external jihad but from diaspora Muslims in the United States and Europe, "driven by postcolonial resentment and a politics of permanent resistance" ― resentment and resistance against the colonial Hebrew Bible and Christian Gospel. This, too, is jihad: resentment at having been humiliated by the despised infidel, at having to obey him, while Islam is supposed to command and not be commanded, and while Islam rejects the testimony of the dhimmi. In traditional Islamic society, Jews and Christians were segregated in their own separate quarters, forbidden to possess land, to bear arms, to dress like Muslims, and to ride on horses or camels. Their clothes, homes and houses of worship had to be shabby. They had to be humiliated in every way. In the Ottoman Empire, each year a certain number of Christian children of both sexes would be abducted, enslaved, Islamized, and dispatched to various functions — soldiers, eunuchs in harem, sex slaves, or in the Ottoman administration where they could reach the higher levels.
Indeed, the strict prohibition against Muslims adopting the customs and practices of Jews and Christians or forming friendships with them is as old as the Quran. It lays down these principles and, since its emergence in the eighth century, is the source of endless prohibitions in Islamic jurisprudence. Such prohibitions prevented Muslim countries from adopting Western scientific and technical innovations and delayed the printing of books.
In 2000, ICESCO published an important pamphlet entitled "Strategy of Islamic Cultural Action in the West." The authors, recognizing the incompatibility of Western values and laws with Islamic precepts, recommended a series of steps to prevent the integration and assimilation of Muslims into European culture. Those principles are based on Quranic precepts such as:
"O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. They are [in fact] allies of one another. And whoever is an ally to them among you—then indeed, he is [one] of them. Indeed, Allah guides not the wrongdoing people." — Quran 5:51, Sahih International translation.
Ultimately, Muslim states can sleep soundly: the conquest of the West is well under way. Muslim troops are active on the ground. Their greatest ally is a visceral Christian hatred of Jews, which leads some Christians, like Nazis, to seek tearing Judaism out of Christianity — an impossible task — and thereby to rid the West of Judeo-Christianity, just as the Nazis wanted, by Islamizing Europe[4].
Thanks to its many clueless helpers in the West, Jihad is doing just fine.
Bat Ye'or, born in Cairo, has written five major books and countless articles on the subject of non-Muslims under Islam. These include The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam (English/1985), The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam; From Jihad to Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide (2002), and Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis (2005).
[1] Dr Abdullah Kanaan, Secretary General of the Royal Committee for Al Quds Affairs, Amman, "Media Plan for Publicising the Cause of Al-Quds Al-Sharif in the West, and Mechanisms for its Implementation", in Protection of Islamic and Christian Holy Sites in Palestine, ICESCO, Nov. 23-25, 2004, pp. 187-208. For more information see, Bat Ye'or, Europe, Globalization and the Coming Universal Caliphate, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2011.
[2] Bat Ye'or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity, from Jihad to Dhimmitude. Seventh-Twentieth Century. With a Foreword by Jacques Ellul. Translated from the French by Miriam Kochan and David Littman, 1996. French publication, Le Cerf, Paris 1991.
[3] El-Bokhâri. Les Traditions islamiques, (al-Sahih). Translated from Arabic by O. Houdas and W. Marçais, 4 vols. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1903-14. Vol.2, title 60, chap. 69.
[4] David Motadel, Les musulmans et la machine de guerre nazie, trans. from English by Charlotte Nordmann, Préf. de Christian Ingrao, pp. 69-79, Editions La Découverte, Paris 2019. Title in English: Islam and Nazi Germany's War, Harvard University Press, 2014.
© 2026 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute.

The Role of Society in Development
Tawfiq Alsaifr/Asharq Al-Awsat/October 08/2026
The state is the natural administrator of everything that is public or shared among a country's people. As such, it is the natural manager of the sustainable development project. To the best of my knowledge, no society has ever succeeded in undertaking a comprehensive development project without the direct management of the state.On the other hand, the public’s understanding of the state and its role, their understanding of the political and social system as a whole, and their place within it, all play a pivotal role in shaping how they receive a development project and how willing they are to bear the costs required for its success.In this context, we need to distinguish between two models through which the state manages sustainable development:
• The model familiar in most Arab countries, particularly during the last quarter of the twentieth century, where the state carried out the entire development project from beginning to end, with little or no meaningful participation from the people, especially in sensitive areas of activity, whether financial or strategic.
• The model we advocate, in which the project is launched within the framework of a broad public discussion at the societal level, and where the role of the public, as well as the project's immediate and long-term objectives, is clearly defined from the outset.
To understand the central role of society in a development project, one must focus on the concept of sustainability itself, namely that it is a gradual, long-term transformation involving changes in culture, lifestyles, and social values.
Such changes occur through struggle and perseverance within each individual, as they weigh the choice between remaining with familiar ways of life and moving toward new ones. This raises the most important question: Is the public prepared and willing to sacrifice the quality of life to which it has become accustomed and transition to a way of life whose outcomes are uncertain, and which may at times be difficult and inconvenient?
Public acceptance of sacrifice and active participation, both emotionally and practically, in the development project depends on the existence of such readiness. In turn, this readiness is shaped by the nature of the relationship between society and the state: whether it is characterized by trust or concern, cooperation or antagonism.
Trust reinforces confidence and hope in the country's future and in its policies. Such confidence may arise from the strength and rule of law, and from the sense among even the weakest citizens that the law is a genuine refuge when needed, even if their opponent is the state itself. It may also emerge simply from citizens' belief that the state represents them and empathizes with their aspirations and concerns.
The most important incentive for investment, whether domestic or foreign, is a legal environment that supports investors. This means an environment in which capital and the proceeds of labor are protected by law, where a judicial system guarantees fair litigation, and where legal stability allows people to anticipate potential changes in laws and regulations a reasonable period before they are enacted and implemented.
Such an environment creates confidence in the future. Its obvious result is the provision of the funds necessary to drive economic activity, whether those funds flow directly into development projects or contribute more broadly to market dynamism.
Popular participation in development provides something even more important: an environment that encourages creativity, corrects mistakes, and enables society to endure the hardships that development projects may entail.
Public participation requires something broader than legal protections for capital. It requires a collective sense among citizens that they are working for themselves and for future generations, and that the state is their agent and representative rather than a dominant force standing above them and controlling their destinies. To avoid falling into ideological prescription, I should note that I regard liberal democracy as the ideal model for creating such an environment. However, it is not the only possible path.
Meaningful public participation, capable of fostering a creativity-enhancing environment, can also emerge when the people, or a significant majority of them, believe that the government represents their hopes and is capable of leading them toward the goals they aspire to achieve.
In other words, it arises when government actions, particularly within the framework of a development project, fulfill at least some of the public’s aspirations, whether short-term goals such as improving living standards or long-term ambitions such as elevating the nation's status and making it great.

Sudan… From the Jeddah Declaration to a Sustainable Peace
Dr. Abdulaziz bin Othman bin Sager/Asharq Al-Awsat/October 08/2026
Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sudan are bound by long-standing historical ties, by virtue of geographic proximity across the Red Sea, as well as by fraternal political relations dating from the dawn of Sudan's independence, by shared religious and Arab bonds and shared interests, and by common membership in the system of collective Arab security, the Red Sea security system, and African security. Sudan's stability has therefore been, and remains, among the Kingdom's foremost priorities. Saudi Arabia has stood with Sudan since it began to pass through its present crisis, with its suffocating political and military dimensions, which led to the outbreak of a wide-ranging civil war extending to nearly all of Sudan's regions and states. This has left 34 million Sudanese in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, according to United Nations estimates, as the war has made Sudan the site of one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world, with the killing, displacement, flight, refuge, and emigration it has witnessed, and the intervention of many external parties. The war has come to be called the forgotten war, coinciding as it has with a belt of major conflicts around the world: the Russian-Ukrainian war, then the American-Israeli war on Iran, and the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian territories as a whole.The importance of the Saudi role in Sudan stems from the sincerity of Saudi initiatives toward Sudan's crises, which is evident in the present Sudanese crisis. Jeddah hosted earlier negotiations between the parties to the current conflict, and the importance of the Saudi role takes shape through a set of factors that make the Kingdom capable of connecting the separated links of a peace process. Sudan today is in urgent need of rebuilding trust and establishing a new relationship among the state, the army, the politicians, society, and the regions, alongside its need for an initiative for a ceasefire between the commander of the armed forces, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Hemedti.
It is well known that Saudi Arabia has never at any time been a party to any Sudanese conflict, and that it neither adopts nor supports any factional project within Sudan at another's expense. It has rather put its wide regional and international relations to use in whatever may help resolve the Sudanese crisis, by facilitating coordination among the various initiatives and by putting forward many of those initiatives itself. This makes it capable of bringing the various estranged parties together and seating them at a table of constructive dialogue, in order to restore trust among the different components and warring parties and to begin a Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue through which the parties may discuss the various questions that trouble Sudanese and that turn this far-flung and richly endowed Arab-African country into an arena of unending conflict.
Among those questions: the form of the state and a political composition suitable for all; how the political transition is to proceed; the reform of institutions; the future of the armed forces and their relationship with their own components and with Sudan's many neighboring states; and the securing of its borders with its neighbors.Hence the prominence of the Saudi role at present, which aims not merely at mediation to end the fighting but at establishing an inclusive diplomacy that produces Sudanese consensus, by re-engineering the existing tracks and linking them to the Jeddah platform and the 2023 Jeddah Declaration. This accords with the direction that emerged on September 23, 2026, when the Quad- the United States, Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates- met for the first time in New York with the Quintet, comprising the African Union, IGAD, the United Nations, the European Union, and the League of Arab States. They agreed to activate coordination, prepare a joint road map, and link the humanitarian track, the cessation of hostilities, political dialogue, and the protection of civilians; to prepare mechanisms for monitoring and verifying any agreement; to support an inclusive Sudanese political dialogue; and to reject the fragmentation of Sudan or the creation of arrangements leading to its partition.
In light of the foregoing, the Saudi role in Sudan represents one of the most important tracks for finding common ground between the political forces and the social components, particularly if that role moves from crisis management to building a sustainable Sudanese consensus. Through its precedence, in partnership with the United States, in hosting the dialogue between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces on May 6, 2023 in Jeddah, with the aim of reaching a ceasefire and securing the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and through the Kingdom's weight and its important relations with the various parties connected to the Sudanese crisis, Saudi Arabia can establish a platform suitable to, and trusted by, all the Sudanese political and military parties. It should be noted that the two sides' signing, on May 11, 2023, of the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan produced important outcomes: the two parties' commitment to protecting civilians and respecting international humanitarian law, allowing civilians to leave combat areas safely, protecting hospitals and public facilities, refraining from using civilian facilities for military purposes, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and protecting humanitarian workers, among other provisions that the parties regrettably did not fully observe. This led to the continuation of the fighting between them, which greatly aggravated Sudan's crisis and produced humanitarian catastrophes with grievous consequences.
Even so, the Jeddah platform declaration remains a principal platform that can be built upon to restore the track of political dialogue among the Sudanese parties, with a view to any coming agreement, especially since the declaration affirmed the protection of civilians, the facilitation of aid, and commitment to the provisions of international humanitarian law- and before and after all of that, a halt to the fighting. This makes it a foundation for advancing toward an integrated platform for Sudanese peace, rather than settling for a ceasefire.
Proceeding from this, we believe the military and political parties, the social, regional, and tribal components, the leadership of the Sudanese state, and the various civilian forces associated with the democratic transition can gather again around a round table in Jeddah to discuss the frameworks of the transitional period, the constitutional form of the state, the questions of the regions and the marginalization afflicting some of them, and the rest of Sudan's principal problems. This should take place in the presence of a number of guarantor regional states, such as the Arab Republic of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, the African Union, IGAD, and the League of Arab States, as well as the United States and the European Union. All of these can contribute to halting the flow of weapons, funding assistance, and reconstruction- and, most importantly, to keeping Sudan out of range of external interventions driven by ambition and by the aim of widening the war and prolonging it. A diplomacy of building Sudanese consensus rests on rebuilding the trust that would allow the creation of a coordination group for Sudanese peace efforts, and the establishment of a Sudanese-Sudanese track made up of representatives of the military forces, the parties, the civilian forces, and the forces of civil society, with the aim of a ceasefire, the opening of humanitarian corridors, and agreement on the shape of the transitional period, leading to the approval of elections under agreed constitutional arrangements. This would be followed by a comprehensive vision for Sudan's future, to be drawn up by Sudanese themselves, away from the influence of polarization and dependency.
Finally, it is important that the Sudanese parties understand that Saudi Arabia is a sponsor of the peace process in Sudan and has no agendas, hidden or declared. All that concerns it is the stability of this important country, the safety and unity of its territory, and keeping it clear of dependency and polarization. They should also understand that the dangers capable of obstructing any constructive political dialogue that would help restore civil peace to Sudanese society are great, and that they are surrounded by watchful parties with interests of their own. They must therefore grasp the gravity of the present stage, what the conflict has done in fragmenting Sudanese society, and the divisions and damage of every kind it has suffered. They must grasp the danger of continued external interventions, of the flow of weapons, and of the funding and support of one party over another, as well as the risks of social division given the scale of the harm the Sudanese people have lived through. All of this must be recognized and confronted with discernment, determination, and responsibility, so as to bring Sudan, its people and its institutions, out of the impasse of wandering and onto safe ground.
Should the people of Sudan grasp the dangers surrounding them and resolve to rally around one homeland and one future, they will find the Kingdom, a state that loves peace, behind them and with them in pursuit of a single goal: one Sudan, owned and governed by all its people.

A Promised Word and a Desired Deed
Turki al-Faisal/Asharq Al-Awsat/October 08/2026
https://english.aawsat.com/opinion/5327343-promised-word-and-desired-deed
“In brotherly Yemen, the Kingdom reaffirms its comprehensive support, through the Coalition to Support Legitimacy, for the Yemeni government, to extend its authority throughout the country, restore stability, and confront the attacks of the terrorist Houthi militias.”
These were the words of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the speech he delivered on behalf of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques before the Shura Council a week ago.
As the leadership of this blessed country has always demonstrated, words and deeds go hand in hand, and stability remains its ultimate goal. This did not emerge out of a vacuum. In the history of the founder of this nation, may God have mercy on him, there was a similar moment more than ninety years ago, when Imam Yahya Hamid el-Din, may God have mercy on him, attacked Najran, Abha, and Jazan. The founder then made his famous declaration: “I am willing to be described as a coward if it will prevent bloodshed and destruction; but if the matter reaches the point of threatening my country’s sovereignty, I will never accept humiliation,” or words to that effect. This ultimately led to the Treaty of Taif on the border between the two countries in 1354 AH (1934 AD), and the withdrawal of Yemeni forces from Saudi territory.
Our leadership has exercised patience, and great patience at that, in the face of repeated provocations by the Houthi group over many years in an effort to avoid conflict. But when matters reached a breaking point, the signs of Yemen’s liberation from the tyranny of this renegade faction began to emerge. Their forces quickly suffered setbacks on various fronts, and President Al-Alimi declared that the liberation of Sanaa was the objective. Saudi Arabia has never coveted Yemeni land, nor has it sought war there. On the contrary, throughout the past years, it has consistently called for a peaceful solution that would restore stability and security to Yemen and its people.It worked with mediators to bring an end to the tragedy inflicted upon ordinary Yemenis by a group that has shown them neither compassion, responsibility, nor mercy. Instead, it has undermined peace and stability, oppressed the population, and subjected them to profound injustice and hardship.Now, however, as the forces of victory move forward to restore a long-denied right, congratulations are due to the people of Yemen on the prospect of seeing their country regain its happiness. May God bless our leadership, which has stepped forward with its own capabilities to deter the aggressor and uphold the cause of peace.The Kingdom remains, as it has always been, a supporter of Yemen and its people. Just days ago, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, may God preserve him, directed authorities to begin regularizing the status of all Yemenis residing in the Kingdom without legal documentation, in response to a request from President Rashad Al-Alimi. This served as further evidence that Saudi Arabia’s concern for Yemen’s welfare does not stop at the battlefield but extends to the livelihood and well-being of Yemeni citizens. It is a sword against the aggressor and a shelter for those who seek protection.

Not Saudi Arabia’s Battle Alone
Suleiman Jawda/Asharq Al-Awsat/October 08/2026
The truth is that one cannot understand how the Arabs have remained silent about the abnormal situation in which the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, has found itself for some time now. The period I am referring to dates back to 2014, when the Houthi group entered Yemen’s capital and then closed it off to the legitimate Yemeni government, recognized by the world and by Yemenis whose loyalty lies with their country and who accept no alternative to it. How have the Arabs remained silent all these years while Yemen’s capital has been held captive in the grip of a group pursuing a regional agenda, and even one with international dimensions, as became evident from the network of its communications and, more recently, from meetings involving its representatives in an Arab capital?
Of course, I understand that Yemen’s stability is primarily a Saudi concern, if only because geography has made the two countries direct neighbors. Therefore, Saudi Arabia’s interest in Yemen, its stability, and the necessity of having its government present in its own capital requires no explanation, justification, or interpretation. It is a matter directly tied to Saudi national security and is not open to bargaining or compromise. At the same time, however, I also understand that Yemen’s stability is a collective Arab concern, just as it is a Saudi concern shaped by geography. Why is it an Arab concern as well? Because the regional actor that employs, directs, and sustains the Houthis is the same actor that targets the Arab world as a whole just as much as it may target Saudi Arabia or the Gulf region in general.
When Riyadh led, and continues to lead, the coalition supporting Yemen’s legitimate government, it did so out of a firm conviction that Yemen belongs to the Yemenis, not to a group that claims to be Yemeni but whose actions demonstrate otherwise. It neither represents Yemeni national identity nor serves the interests of the Yemeni people. Rather, it acts in ways that advance the interests of the party or parties that use it as a proxy. In this regard, it makes little difference whether the driving force is a regional actor we know and can identify or an international actor we likewise recognize. The outcome, in either case, is the same. If Saudi Arabia has moved to activate the Makkah Defense Agreement as a deterrent against a reckless group, then that is a legitimate Saudi right dictated by the country’s broader interests, by necessity, and by the realities on the ground in Yemen. The Saudi government sees itself as obligated to help change those realities by supporting Yemen’s legitimate government, strengthening the capabilities of the Yemeni army, and enabling Operation Dawn of Yemen, launched by that army, to achieve its necessary objectives.
Yemen is a country with a long history, a deeply rooted civilization, and a culture that has left its mark on the past and continues to shape the face of Yemen today, regardless of how that face may appear at any given moment. Given the weight of a country like Yemen, Arabs should recognize the danger of allowing a nation of such civilizational and cultural significance to be detached from the broader Arab entity. There is a need for all Arabs to unite in resisting any assault on Yemen, its civilization, its culture, or its history, because all of these form part of our enduring Arab heritage.
One cannot help but feel sorrow when looking around and seeing the fate of a country like Yemen in the hands of a reckless group that continues to engage in childish games, despite the fact that the regional environment can no longer tolerate such behavior, nor can a region already walking through minefields in every corner. One also feels sadness when observing that Arab capitals have watched what has been happening in Yemen for more than a decade and yet have failed to take meaningful action to return Yemen to its people, free it from the recklessness of minor players, and reclaim it from a group that has overrun both the country and its citizens. If religious bonds were able to unite Riyadh, Ankara, and Islamabad along a common thread, then alongside that bond exists an Arab bond that should not disappear while witnessing criminal aggression reach the city of the Prophet, peace be upon him, on one occasion, then the city of the Holy Mosque on another, and later schools, civilians, and markets in southern Saudi Arabia.
Such recklessness cannot be allowed to continue unchecked. It requires a determined Arab response to stop it and to uproot its perpetrators from Yemeni soil, which the Houthis have turned into a platform for targeting Saudi Arabia in particular and the Arab body in general. Any harm inflicted on a single Saudi civilian in Najran, Jazan, Taif, or any other area targeted by the Houthi militia is, in essence, an attack on every Arab, wherever he or she may be between the Ocean and the Gulf.
The battle now being fought to reclaim Yemen from those who have seized it is not Saudi Arabia’s battle alone, nor should it be. It is the battle of all those who share with the Kingdom ties of language, religion, blood, and culture in the broadest sense of the word.
Sanaa is Yemen’s capital, and the seat of government belongs there. The continued presence of the Yemeni government outside its natural seat is an abnormal situation that cannot remain acceptable, no matter how long it persists. Reclaiming the capital is ultimately unavoidable.

Selected Face Book & X tweets on October 08/2026
Dov Lipman
UPDATE ON INJURED IDF RESERVIST
Thank God, Neriah Leiter is now breathing on his own!
Neriah, the son of Israel’s ambassador to the US, still needs our prayers - Neriah Dov ben Chana. But this is a positive development. May God bless Neriah with a full recovery.

Nadine Barakat
Lebanese “anti Hezbollah” liars want Unifil to stay ..
Leftists: Kulluna Irada + Samy Gemayel Kataeb signed the petition!
They want to keep Unifil ?!
I suggest they fund it … Melhem Khalaf is Nabih Berri’s little Puppy.
Samy Gemayel and Elias Hankash reported fake data on south Litani and said LAF cleaned more than 85% of weapons but Israel doesn’t like it. Turned out that IDF just finished the work last week! @IDF @IsraelMFA @yechielleiter Hezbollah useful idiots @KullunaIrada
@MelhemKhalaf @PaulaYacoubian and the clowns : Those are the same elements who planned the Eurobond default , collapse of judicial system, the financial crisis and Soros revolution (to destroy the system) , Lokman Slim assassination (unifil bldg camera hidden) , Port Explosion show, manipulated the court system, controlled the media, in order to cover up for Hezbollah … how would they explain to the Christian’s in achrafieh that Hezbollah was the reason behind the disaster in a Christian area, when they are not fighting Hezbollah…except in stupid talk shows..

Syrians love israelis
https://x.com/SY_Love_IL/status/2107906209995010388/video/1
The Druze of Bashan in Sweida stood with Israeli society on the anniversary of October 7, commemorating the innocent victims and affirming that the killing of civilians is neither forgotten nor justifiable.So proud of my people

Amir Avivi אמיר אביבי
I was delighted to meet my dear friend, Erin Molan, an Australian communications professional and journalist, one of the most prominent and courageous voices in the world in support of the State of Israel. Since October 7, Erin has been working tirelessly to amplify Israel's voice on the international stage, fighting antisemitism, exposing the true face of terrorism, and standing by the Jewish people—even when it involves criticism and a personal cost. Erin is an example of courage, moral integrity, and true friendship. Thank you, Erin, for your steadfast support of Israel and for everything you do for us. 🇮🇱🇦🇺
@Erin_Molan

Raymond Ibrahim
Heavily armed security forces arrested a Coptic Christian man at his home in Alexandria, Egypt, two days ago for the crime of "contempt of Islam." Apparently he shared social media posts deemed offensive to Muslim sensibilities.
Coptic Solidarity has more:

Céline Imart
https://x.com/CelineImart/status/2108147274937225481/video/1
It’s done. And it’s historic. The European Parliament has just adopted my resolution against Islamist entryism and the networks of the Muslim Brotherhood. I’ve broken a taboo that Europe has been dragging around like a chain: this victory signifies a major doctrinal shift in the institutions. Proud to have carried this text through to the end. Thank you to the negotiators from the other groups with whom I had the pleasure of working—excluding the socialists and the far left, who boycotted the text. We were able to transcend partisan divides on a major issue for our societies and our youth.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain
@hahussain
Christians of Lebanon complaining of Muslims (without naming them) buying, en masse, real estate in predominantly Christian districts, this one in Metn, Mount Lebanon. Christians turned from being a majority of the population in 1932 to one third in 2026. If such trend persists, they will vanish from Lebanon by the end of the century. The only country in the Levant where Christians grew on par with the rest of the population is Israel. See, the real estate and demographic problem is not about Jews and Israel. It's a race that the Muslim majority wants to win, even it means the end of diversity in the Middle East and the disappearance of ancient indigenous populations like the Christians, the Druze, the Jews and others.