English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For July 17/2026
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news

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Bible Quotations For today
The Gospel Parable of the Wise and Foolish Virgins
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Matthew 25/01-13: “‘Then the kingdom of heaven will be like this. Ten bridesmaids took their lamps and went to meet the bridegroom. Five of them were foolish, and five were wise. When the foolish took their lamps, they took no oil with them; but the wise took flasks of oil with their lamps. As the bridegroom was delayed, all of them became drowsy and slept. But at midnight there was a shout, “Look! Here is the bridegroom! Come out to meet him.” Then all those bridesmaids got up and trimmed their lamps. The foolish said to the wise, “Give us some of your oil, for our lamps are going out.” But the wise replied, “No! there will not be enough for you and for us; you had better go to the dealers and buy some for yourselves.” And while they went to buy it, the bridegroom came, and those who were ready went with him into the wedding banquet; and the door was shut. Later the other bridesmaids came also, saying, “Lord, lord, open to us.” But he replied, “Truly I tell you, I do not know you.”Keep awake therefore, for you know neither the day nor the hour.”

Titles For Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on 16-17 July/2026
They falsely claim to be Christians for Lebanon while they are practically Christians for the Mullahs’ Iran and Hezbollah/Elias Bejjani/July 15/2026
Israel is a neighboring, friendly state, not an enemy/Elias Bejjani/July 14/2026
Steadfastness in Truth and Faith: The Path to Freedom and Dignity/Elias Bejjani/July 14/2026
Israel says killed three Hezbollah members in south Lebanon
Israel presses ahead with new military positions in south Lebanon amid withdrawal pressure
Virtual Israeli-Lebanese-US meeting to be held Friday
Israel tells Pentagon chief will keep troops in Lebanon, Syria, Gaza 'security zones'
Lebanon, Syria to reset trade ties, economy minister tells Reuters
Hezbollah denies claims of activity inside Syria, calls allegations ‘fabricated’
Syrian Interior Ministry source tells LBCI: Weapons shipment allegedly destined for Hezbollah intercepted
Syria says seized weapons bound for Hezbollah at Iraqi border
Syria says seized Hezbollah-bound arms on Iraq border
Baabda strongly denies 'rumors' about possible Aoun-Netanyahu meeting
Hezbollah MP blasts Aoun over 'bias, broken promises and fueling division'
South Lebanon’s pilot zones: Between military arrangements and hopes for stability
Hajj Hassan says pilot zone 'achievement' is 'Don Quixotic'
The Agents’ Brigades” After the “Resistance Brigades/Jean Al-Faghali/Nidaa Al-Watan/July 17, 2026
The Curse of Civil War: Entrenchment Behind Sectarianism/Rafiq Khoury/Nidaa Al Watan/July 17, 2026
Jumblatt Between Baabda and the Grand Serail: Containment Here, Cooling There/Clara Jaha/Nidaa Al Watan/July 17, 2026
The Weapon of “Racism”/Joseph Habib/Nidaa Al Watan/July 17, 2026
Lebanon’s battle is Israeli withdrawal, not internal disputes… Opening a new front means destroying what remains and threatens the last chance to save Lebanon/Daoud Rammal/Nidaa Al Watan/July 17, 2026

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on 16-17 July/2026
Drone strikes ship off southern Iraqi port: Official
Trump ‘open to diplomacy’ with Iran: White House
Iran and US step up attacks, though release of American may signal path to climbdown
US expands strikes into northern Iran and disables ship trying to run blockade
Tehran threatens regional infrastructure if US attacks Iran's
US strikes in Iran hit airport, bridges and railway station
Trump to attend World Cup final on Sunday: White House
Iran judiciary denies Trump statement that American prisoner was freed
Iran judiciary denies Trump statement that American prisoner was freed
Mediator Pakistan Says Encouraging US, Iran to Resume Talks
Global Economy Faces Fresh Supply Shock as Hormuz Crisis Escalates
Saudi Arabia: Iranian Attacks on Kuwait, Bahrain and Jordan Threaten Regional Security
Iranian Attacks on Gulf Intensify, Kuwait Bears Brunt
Houthi Escalation Threatens Yemen's Imports, Deepens Humanitarian Crisis
Trump Hails Release of US Citizen Held in Iran as 'Goodwill' Gesture
Trump’s Remarks on Soleimani Spark Debate in Iraq
Iraq Investigates Foiled Attempt to Smuggle Missiles, Drones into Syria
Syria Says Arrested Assad-Era Officer Specializing in Chemical Weapons
Escalating Israeli strikes kill five people in Gaza, medics say
Herzog says Israel backs diplomacy with Iran but welcomes ‘firm’ US response
Vance Says Some in Israeli Government Sought to Sway US on Iran Deal
Israeli Families Move into New West Bank Settlement Near Nablus
Colombia President-elect to Open Israel Embassy in Jerusalem
Türkiye: Egypt Defense, Security Ties Bolster Regional Stability

Titles For The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on 16-17 July/2026
Previewing the Trump-Aoun Meeting: A Make-or-Break Moment for the Israel-Lebanon Agreement/Robert Satloff/The Washington Institute/July 16/2026
Hizballah’s Deep State: The Real Challenge of Disarmament in Lebanon/Hanin Ghaddar/Washington Insitute/July 16/2026
The Iran-Backed 'Decisive Campaign' To Destroy Israel and the West/Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/July 16/2026
L’Iran et le compte à rebours/Dr. Charles Chartouni/Ici Beyrouth/16 juillet
Iran and the Countdown/Dr. Charles Chartouni/Ici Beyrouth/July 16/2026
But What Was the Old Order?/Samir Atallah/Asharq Al Awsat/July 16/2026
Iran Does Not Want the Negotiations to Come to an End!/Huda al-Husseini/Asharq Al Awsat/July 16/2026
The Dilemma of the American Initiative in Sudan/Osman Mirghani/Asharq Al Awsat/July 16/2026
The US and the Middle East Dilemma/Dr. Abdel Monem Said/Asharq Al Awsat/July 16/2026
Selected Face Book & X tweets on 16 July

Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on 16-17 July/2026
They falsely claim to be Christians for Lebanon while they are practically Christians for the Mullahs’ Iran and Hezbollah
Elias Bejjani/July 15/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/07/155944/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=epzG5HwKp3k&t=118s
The meeting held at the “Saydet al-Bir” monastery under the title “Christians for Lebanon” raises deep questions and doubts regarding the identity of the organizing body, its legal status, and the names of its founders and those responsible for it, as there is no clear or public information available regarding any of these. As for the statement issued by the meeting (found at the bottom of the page), particularly the parts regarding considering Israel an enemy and an existential threat and regarding “resistance” as a sacred right of peoples, these are blatant political heresies. The participants in the meeting do not necessarily represent the entities and institutions to which they belong, noting that some figures whose names were listed in the statement as attendees or supporters were quick to deny their responsibility for the statement and its entire content.
Mysterious Identity and Unanswered Questions
When I attempted to search for and verify information regarding this group—especially since its name was not familiar to the majority of the Lebanese people before the issuance of its “un-Lebanese” and “un-Christian” statement, which is hostile to peace—a set of fundamental questions arose for which I found no answer:
Who are the founders of the “Christians for Lebanon” group?
Is this group officially registered with the relevant authorities?
Does it possess a license (“Ilm wa Khabar”) from the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities?
Who are the members of its administrative or executive body?
Who is its president or secretary-general?
Who is in charge of its media and organizational affairs?
According to the available data, no clear statements answering these questions have appeared, nor did the text of the statement itself contain any official definition of the group or its organizational structure.
Content of the Statement: A Blatant Intersection with the “Resistance Axis”
The political content of the statement reflects total bias toward the Iranian Mullahs, Hezbollah, and all terrorist groups, which is clearly evident in the following points:
Considering Israel an enemy and an absolute existential threat.
Considering “resistance” (in its militia concept) a sacred right of peoples.
Rejecting what is called the “Abrahamic Project.”
Emphasizing Lebanon’s religious and pluralistic identity in a fragmented way to serve a specific agenda, ignoring the danger of the religious identity that Hezbollah has sought to impose on the Lebanese by force of arms.
These positions intersect completely and blatantly with the political discourse supporting the “Iranian terrorist resistance axis” and its local arm represented by “Hezbollah” (Iran’s destructive army in Lebanon).
Questions Regarding the “Saydet al-Bir” Monastery and the Exploitation of Names
A question directed to the ecclesiastical authorities: What entity permitted this meeting to be held at the “Saydet al-Bir” monastery, which is a monastery belonging to the Congregation of the Sisters of the Cross founded by Saint Yaacoub Haddad (Father Yaacoub the Capuchin)? Does hosting the meeting necessarily mean that the monastery or the order adopts its content and political positions?
There is no doubt that some entities and figures associated with the participants, or whose names were mentioned in the report, were quick to clarify later that they are not responsible for the statement and do not adopt its content. Here we ask the fundamental question: Who is the actual hidden party that drafted the statement and issued it in the name of this hybrid meeting?
Conclusion: Hiding Behind Christianity to Justify Terrorism
It remains to be said that the content, approach, and objectives of this statement do not serve the interest of Lebanon or the Lebanese, nor do they fall within the scope of striving for peace, stability, and the restoration of the state and sovereignty. Rather, the statement brazenly expresses support for “Hezbollah” and justifies its military, security, and terrorist role, which is totally contradictory to the concept of the state.
As for hiding behind Christianity, this is a behavior that fundamentally contradicts true Christian faith. Christianity is based primarily on the values of love, peace, reconciliation, and justice, not on the discourse of axes, conflict, division, and the justification of wars, killing, and destruction for the benefit of foreign agendas.
The fundamental problem with this meeting is not only related to the content of its suspicious statement, which is hostile to peace and everything that is Lebanese, but also to the legitimate doubts and many questions surrounding the authority and motives of the party that called for it, in light of the complete absence of any transparency or legal and organizational existence for it.

Israel is a neighboring, friendly state, not an enemy
Elias Bejjani/July 14/2026
To the hypocrites and 'Christian' opportunists of the 'LaCiforce' group, and to all those who cloak themselves in a Christian guise of which they are innocent: Israel is a neighboring, friendly state, not an enemy. You are the devils and the enemies of Lebanon and the Church.

Steadfastness in Truth and Faith: The Path to Freedom and Dignity
Elias Bejjani/July 14/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/07/155927/
Jesus Stresses the Importance Of persistence in life
Luke 11/05-08: “And he said to them, ‘Suppose one of you has a friend, and you go to him at midnight and say to him, “Friend, lend me three loaves of bread; for a friend of mine has arrived, and I have nothing to set before him.” And he answers from within, “Do not bother me; the door has already been locked, and my children are with me in bed; I cannot get up and give you anything.”I tell you, even though he will not get up and give him anything because he is his friend, at least because of his persistence he will get up and give him whatever he needs.”
In ordinary times, holding fast to principled positions may seem easy. However, in times of pressure, threats, terrorism, and occupation, standing firm for the truth becomes an act of courage and faith. This highlights the necessity for every individual, and the people as a whole, to remain anchored to their national and humanitarian convictions, no matter how difficult the circumstances or how great the dangers. True faith is not limited to prayer and worship; it is embodied in the rejection of injustice and subjugation, and in the defense of freedom, sovereignty, and human dignity.
In the Lebanese context, rejecting terrorism and all forms of guardianship, occupation, or foreign hegemony—foremost among them being Iranian hegemony over Lebanese decision-making—should not be a situational stance dictated by the balance of power. Rather, it must be a firm, principled position rooted in the belief in justice and the right of peoples to determine their own destiny freely. A person with a just cause does not retreat because the road is difficult, does not remain silent because the price is high, and does not compromise because the pressures are immense. Instead, they continue to carry their national message, advocate for it, and defend it, because the truth is not measured by the number of its supporters nor by the magnitude of the force opposing it.
Experience has taught us that falsehood may swell and exert power for a time, but it can never transform into truth. Power may impose a temporary reality, but it cannot bestow legitimacy upon what is illegitimate. This is why free peoples have struggled, generation after generation, in defense of their homelands, believing that "the truth rises above and cannot be surpassed," and that "no right dies so long as there is someone demanding it." The victory of truth may be delayed, but it is never defeated. Its advocates may face persecution, character assassination, or isolation, but the truth remains alive in the conscience until it is realized.
From this perspective, steadfastness in the truth becomes a moral, spiritual, and national virtue all at once. True persistence is not "blameworthy obstinacy," such as insisting on an error; rather, it is a "sacred persistence" that expresses firm faith, deep conviction, and a readiness to bear the consequences of defending one's principles. Not every act of holding fast is mere stubbornness or pride; it is loyalty to the truth. It requires moral courage that makes one ready for confrontation when confident in the justice of their cause. History has not progressed thanks to the hesitant or those who surrender their principles, but thanks to the men and women who believed in the truth and held onto it to the very end.
The Holy Bible has repeatedly emphasized the importance of perseverance—not only in seeking material things, but in faith, prayer, and the defense of truth. The Lord Jesus taught His disciples that a believer should not surrender at the first obstacle, but should persist and knock until the door is opened. In the Gospel of Luke, the Lord says: "Which of you who has a friend will go to him at midnight... I tell you, though he will not get up and give him anything because he is his friend, yet because of his impudence [persistence] he will rise and give him whatever he needs." (Luke 11:5-8). In this parable, Jesus praises "sacred persistence." The friend received what he asked for not only because of their relationship, but because of his insistence and refusal to give up. This teaches us that steadfastness in asking is a sign of faith, not a sign of weakness.
The Gospel provides vivid examples of this perseverance:
The Canaanite Woman: Who did not retreat despite the apparent silence, continuing to plead until she earned Christ’s admiration for her faith: "O woman, great is your faith! Let it be to you as you desire."
The Blind Man on the Roadside: Who did not allow the rebukes of the crowd to extinguish his hope, but cried out all the more until he stopped Jesus and regained his sight.
The Persistent Widow: To whom the judge responded because of her perseverance, leading Christ to emphasize that believers "ought always to pray and not lose heart."
The actions urged by Christ: "Ask, and it will be given to you; seek, and you will find; knock, and it will be opened to you" (Luke 11:9-10), are expressed in a tense that implies continuity and persistence. It is a clear teaching that a believer does not stop at the first obstacle but continues to strive toward the truth until the goal is achieved.
The supreme example remains in the person of Jesus Christ Himself. When He stood before Pilate and the religious and political authorities who sought to condemn Him, He did not retreat from His mission nor compromise the truth He came to testify to. He stood firm in declaring that His kingdom is not of this world, and He accepted the suffering and the Cross without denying the truth He bore.
The world today needs people of principle, whose positions do not shift with changing interests and whose convictions do not change under the pressure of fear or temptation. Steadfastness in the truth is not fanaticism; it is moral and spiritual commitment. When this steadfastness is built upon faith in God and trust in His promises, it transforms into a power capable of changing reality and shaping history. The believer is called to hold fast to the truth, for truth does not triumph except through those with steadfast hearts who understand that sacred persistence in the path of truth is the way to blessing and victory.

Israel says killed three Hezbollah members in south Lebanon
Agence France Presse/16 July 2026
The Israeli military said it killed three Hezbollah members in south Lebanon, shortly after U.S.-sponsored Israel-Lebanon negotiations were held in Rome. "Earlier today, IDF soldiers identified three armed Hezbollah terrorists in the area of Beit Yahoun, located within the Security Zone in southern Lebanon," the Israeli military said Wednesday in a statement. "Following the identification, the IDF eliminated the three terrorists, who were carrying combat equipment, in order to remove the threat posed to IDF soldiers operating nearby," it added. Israeli forces remain deployed in what the military describes as a security zone extending roughly 10 kilometers into Lebanese territory. Israel and Lebanon on Wednesday concluded two days of talks aimed at reaching a permanent peace deal in Rome, with Washington describing the discussions as "productive and positive".
The U.S.-brokered negotiations took place in the Italian capital over the framework agreement sealed last month after five rounds of talks in Washington, with Lebanese negotiators hoping for progress on an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The deal seeks an end to the state of war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, disarmament of the Iran-backed militant group, the deployment of Lebanese troops in the south and for Israeli forces to steadily withdraw from the country, starting with two "pilot zones".Despite a ceasefire, Israel still launches occasional strikes in southern Lebanon and carries out detonations in villages it occupies near the border.

Israel strikes Baraashit, Nabatieh al-Fawqa and Beit Yahoun in south Lebanon
Naharnet/16 July 2026
Israeli warplanes targeted Nabatieh al-Fawqa and the outskirts of Baraashit and Beit Yahoun in southern Lebanon on Thursday, while artillery shelled Rshaf. The National News Agency said two strikes targeted Nabatieh al-Fawqa and a third strike targeted Ali al-Taher hill on the outskirts of the town. Meanwhile, Israeli forces set fire to homes and land on the outskirts of Beit Yahoun. The strikes follow an announcement by the Israeli military on Wednesday claiming it killed three Hezbollah members in the border village. Lebanon and Israel announced a framework agreement on June 26, laying out a plan for Israeli forces to withdraw from southern Lebanon, in exchange for the disarmament of Hezbollah. It also envisions steps toward an eventual peace agreement. Despite a ceasefire, Israel still launches occasional strikes in southern Lebanon and carries out detonations in villages it occupies near the border.

Israel presses ahead with new military positions in south Lebanon amid withdrawal pressure
LBCI/16 July 2026
Israel is pursuing a policy of maneuvering on the Lebanese file. It claims to support U.S. demands for a withdrawal from southern Lebanon while simultaneously working to create facts on the ground that would entrench its military presence there.In this context, reports indicate that the Israeli military is currently building a new line of military positions that would reinforce its presence along the Yellow Line, strengthening its control over southern Lebanon, according to information cleared for publication by the Israeli military censor. If completed, the new line would not only escalate tensions over the Lebanese file but also strain relations with U.S. President Donald Trump, who has been working to secure calm along the Lebanese front despite opposition from Tel Aviv. At the same time, the Israeli military has intensified its challenge by choosing Bint Jbeil to promote the continuation of its presence in southern Lebanon and in what it described as defensive areas extending 10 kilometers from the border. Although Washington has announced that no meeting is currently scheduled between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel insists that the summit will take place, even if it has been postponed because of the funeral arrangements for U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham. It also maintains that reports suggesting otherwise are part of U.S. pressure aimed at securing an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and Syria.

Virtual Israeli-Lebanese-US meeting to be held Friday
Naharnet/16 July 2026
An Israeli-Lebanese-U.S. military meeting will be held electronically on Friday to discuss military details, finalize the two pilot zones, and determine the start date for implementation. Lebanon and Israel concluded two days of talks in Rome on Wednesday, with a U.S. State Department official describing the discussions as “productive and positive.”"Talks concluded after two days of productive and positive discussions," a U.S. official said, adding that the participants "agreed on the structure and guidelines for the pilot zone process, to be finalized and implemented in the coming days."
The U.S. official said they will now "move to expanded technical talks, which will focus on implementing all areas of the Trilateral Framework with the aim of reaching a comprehensive agreement between Israel and Lebanon."The U.S.-brokered negotiations took place in the Italian capital over the framework agreement sealed last month after five rounds of talks in Washington, with Lebanese negotiators hoping for progress on an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The deal seeks an end to the state of war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, disarmament of the Iran-backed militant group, the deployment of Lebanese troops in the south and for Israeli forces to steadily withdraw from the country, starting with two "pilot zones". But the agreement, rejected by Hezbollah, does not set a timetable for Israel's withdrawal. Israeli officials have also vowed that their forces will remain in a "security zone" 10 kilometers deep along the frontier for as long as Hezbollah remains armed. On Tuesday, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar said his country was "ready to move forward implementing these two pilot zones". A Lebanese military source meanwhile told AFP that the Lebanese army has begun intensifying patrols in several villages adjacent to areas occupied by Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, including Froun in the Bint Jbeil district, in preparation for implementing the pilot zones provision.

Israel tells Pentagon chief will keep troops in Lebanon, Syria, Gaza 'security zones'
Agence France Presse/16 July 2026
Israel's Defense Minister Israel Katz told his U.S. counterpart Pete Hegseth early Thursday that Israel is determined to keep its forces in "security zones" it has carved out inside Lebanon, Syria and the Gaza Strip. In a statement, Katz's office said the two men spoke overnight and the minister "emphasized Israel's determination to remain in the security zones in Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon in order to protect Israel's borders and the communities near the border from the threats posed by jihadist forces".

Lebanon, Syria to reset trade ties, economy minister tells Reuters
LBCI/16 July 2026
Lebanon and Syria will in the coming months begin revising decades-old trade agreements to revive their economic relationship following the ouster of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad in 2024, Lebanon's ‌economy minister told Reuters on Thursday. Amer Bisat, who said the countries could eventually aim for a larger bilateral trade deal, spoke a day after holding talks with his Syrian counterpart in Damascus. "That economic relationship needed to be reset, and it has the potential of being the most important bilateral relationship for both countries," Bisat said. Bisat said the review could take several months but that a bigger trade deal could take longer. Such a ⁠deal would need to address logistical hurdles to land transport and tackle tariffs that are "not uniform," Bisat said. "Lebanese exporters pay an export tariff and the Syrians don't," he added. Reuters

Hezbollah denies claims of activity inside Syria, calls allegations ‘fabricated’
LBCI/16 July 2026
Hezbollah’s media relations office on Thursday denied allegations that the group is conducting activities inside Syrian territory, saying such claims are “baseless” and “entirely false.”In a statement, Hezbollah said accusations regarding its presence or operations in Syria have repeatedly been denied, describing them as “fabricated narratives” aimed at harming the group. The statement added that these allegations “serve the Israeli-American project in the region.”

Syrian Interior Ministry source tells LBCI: Weapons shipment allegedly destined for Hezbollah intercepted
LBCI/16 July 2026
A source at Syria's Interior Ministry told LBCI that specialized units had foiled an attempt to smuggle a shipment of advanced weapons and missiles across the Syrian-Iraqi border. According to the source, preliminary investigations indicate that the seized shipment was intended to transit through Syrian territory for Hezbollah.

Syria says seized weapons bound for Hezbollah at Iraqi border
Al Arabiya English/16 July ,2026
Syria said Thursday it had foiled an attempt to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon by seizing a shipment that included missiles at its border with Iraq. “Specialized units thwarted an attempt to bring in a shipment of sophisticated weapons and missiles through the Syrian-Iraqi border,” a source from the interior ministry was quoted as saying by Syria’s official Sana news agency. “Initial investigations established that the shipment was intended to transit through Syria for the benefit of the terrorist militia Hezbollah,” the source added. The Iran-backed militia in a statement dismissed the accusations as “fabricated narratives with no basis in fact, aimed at harming Hezbollah.”Syrian authorities are hostile to the militia, which was an ally of former president Bashar al-Assad before he was ousted in 2024. They have previously announced several other seizures of weapons they say were bound for Hezbollah, but Thursday’s announcement is the first involving the border with Iraq. According to Syria’s customs authority, the shipment was seized inside an oil tanker truck at the al-Tanf border crossing. The tanker was heading to Baniyas city, whose port Iraq has been using in recent months to export limited amounts of oil after its main route through the Strait of Hormuz was disrupted by the Middle East war. The interior ministry said the shipment included long-range and anti-tank missiles, as well as drones. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi ordered the formation of an inquiry commission and Iraqi authorities will “coordinate” with Syria on the matter, the Iraqi government’s security media cell said in a statement. The statement said Iraqi authorities would “hold those responsible for any negligence accountable, in order to ensure the safety and security of the shared border and prevent any attempt to undermine national security.” Since the new government took power in Syria in 2024, the authorities say they have dismantled several Hezbollah-linked cells preparing attacks in Syria, but Hezbollah has denied the accusation. The militia has been weakened by the war it has waged against Israel since March in support of Iran. US President Donald Trump has recently floated the idea of Syria intervening in Lebanon against Hezbollah. But Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has said he has no interest in taking military action, despite Trump’s suggestions.With AFP

Syria says seized Hezbollah-bound arms on Iraq border
Naharnet/16 July 2026
Syrian authorities have foiled an attempt to smuggle a shipment of advanced weapons and missiles through the Iraqi-Syrian border, the Syrian interior ministry has announced. The ministry added that “investigations confirmed that the shipment was intended to pass through Syria to Hezbollah.”Sources told Al-Arabiya television that the shipment contained "missiles, 150 booby-trapped drones, shells, and explosives" that were "skillfully hidden in oil tankers headed from Iraq to Syria's Banias oil refinery." Syrian authorities are hostile to Hezbollah, which was an ally of former president Bashar al-Assad before he was ousted in 2024. They have previously announced several other seizures of weapons they say were bound for the Iran-backed group, but Thursday's announcement is the first involving the border with Iraq. It comes after U.S. President Donald Trump floated the idea of Syria intervening in Lebanon against Hezbollah. Since an Islamist coalition took power in Syria in 2024, the authorities claim they have dismantled several Hezbollah-linked cells preparing attacks in Syria, but Hezbollah has repeatedly denied the accusation. The group has been weakened by the war it has waged against Israel since March in support of Iran. Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has said he has no interest in intervening militarily in Lebanon despite Trump's suggestions.

Baabda strongly denies 'rumors' about possible Aoun-Netanyahu meeting
Naharnet/16 July 2026
Baabda sources on Thursday categorically denied rumors circulating about a possible meeting between President Joseph Aoun and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, stressing that this matter is “completely off the table, even if they happen to be in Washington at the same time.”
The sources added, in remarks to Al-Jadeed TV, that Aoun's visit to Washington on Saturday will be brief and limited to a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump, in addition to some meetings with officials in the U.S. administration.

Hezbollah MP blasts Aoun over 'bias, broken promises and fueling division'
Naharnet/16 July 2026
Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah lashed out Friday at President Joseph Aoun for playing "partisan" politics and "fueling division" instead of uniting the war-torn country. Fadlallah accused Aoun of "turning the presidential palace into a partisan platform for factions whose history and alignments are well-known."Fadlallah said Amal and Hezbollah had voted for Aoun after he gave his 'word of honor' to protect the right of the Lebanese people to resist and to discuss Hezbollah's weapons domestically after Israel's withdrawal. "While the Resistance facilitated the army’s mission south of the Litani River, the government failed to honor its commitments," Fadlallah said, noting that Israeli attacks continued for 15 months. Meanwhile, he claimed, the President's sole focus during meetings was demanding that Hezbollah hand over its heavy missiles to appease the United States and Israel. Fadlallah slammed Aoun for the cabinet's decisions to disarm Hezbollah and to consider its activities illegal, calling these decisions "unjust, invalid, and unconstitutional." He also lambasted the framework agreement with Israel, describing it as an "ill-fated, unviable agreement" that stunned the enemy with the free concessions Israel had failed to achieve throughout all its wars against Lebanon and the Arab states. "The agreement legitimizes the occupation and replaces a full withdrawal with pilot zones. It subjects our national army to testing by the enemy's military, while blocking the return of displaced people and reconstruction efforts. This is an unviable agreement that the Zionists will never successfully enforce, and our people will nullify its effects on the ground." Fadlallah also condemned the suspension of Iranian civil aviation flights and the "convoluted and biased" decision against the Iranian Ambassador, calling it a "shameful and unprecedented move in diplomatic history." The Hezbollah MP concluded his speech by urging President Aoun to "retreat from this dangerous path" and to return to a state framework built on partnership, consensus, and adherence to the constitution.

South Lebanon’s pilot zones: Between military arrangements and hopes for stability
LBCI/16 July 2026
Cars pass along this road near Srifa, residents move in and out, and Lebanese army patrols are deployed at intersections. But what is happening here goes beyond routine security measures. The area lies at the center of discussions over what are known as “pilot zones.The Lebanese-Israeli agreement is based on two pilot zones. In the first, the Lebanese army would maintain control over areas where it is already deployed south of the Litani River. The initial pilot area includes the villages of Froun, Ghandouriyeh, Srifa, Qalaouiyeh, and Borj Qalaouiye, where weapons would be cleared. In the second zone, the Israeli military would withdraw from villages it occupies, beginning with Zawtar el-Gharbiyeh, allowing the Lebanese army to redeploy there. The scene reflects the role that the Lebanese state says it is prepared to assume if these understandings move from paper to full implementation. However, the path forward remains complicated. Lebanon is demanding a full Israeli withdrawal from areas that remain occupied before expanding any further steps, while Israel is linking any withdrawal to security guarantees and assurances that there will be no armed presence outside state control. Amid these two positions, technical and military meetings continue, while discussions over the “pilot zones” intensify. Israel views them as a test of the Lebanese state’s ability to fully assert its authority in the south. For residents of these villages, however, the situation is different. They are not waiting for a new name for a political plan or another round of negotiations abroad. They want this fragile calm to become lasting stability and for the military checkpoints seen today to become a symbol of the state embracing its people, rather than a reminder that the border remains vulnerable to every new escalation or round of negotiations.

Hajj Hassan says pilot zone 'achievement' is 'Don Quixotic'
Naharnet/16 July 2026
MP Hussein al-Hajj Hassan of Hezbollah stressed Thursday that Hezbollah “will not hand over the weapons.”“They will not be able to remove them,” he told Al-Jadeed television.“The villages located within the pilot zone are not occupied except for one village, and the Lebanese state's achievement is Don Quixotic,” Hajj Hassan added. “The huge mistake made in the framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel is the absence of a timetable for withdrawal,” the lawmaker said. Al-Jadeed reported Wednesday that "the pilot zone that has been agreed on, in principle, contains Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh, Zawtar al-Sharqiyeh, al-Ghandouriyeh, Burj Qalaway, Srifa and Froun.""These are mixed areas -- some occupied, others under Israeli fire, and others on the borders of occupied territory," it explained. Separately, Hajj Hassan said Hezbollah rejects any attack on Arab countries, “even if it comes from Iran.”

“The Agents’ Brigades” After the “Resistance Brigades”
Jean Al-Faghali/Nidaa Al-Watan/July 17, 2026 (Translated from Arabic)
Hezbollah has always presented itself as the most disciplined and cohesive organization in Lebanon and the region in terms of security. For decades, the image it cultivated of itself as an impenetrable organization has been a fundamental part of its political and military narrative. However, the developments that accompanied the recent war, and the series of assassinations targeting leaders, cadres, and field commanders, have raised difficult questions about the extent of the security breaches the party has suffered, even if it continues to avoid directly acknowledging them. In recent years, Hezbollah has spoken of the “Resistance Brigades” as an organizational framework that includes volunteers and supporters from outside its immediate party environment, contributing to its “resistance” project. Today, with increasing talk of spy networks, informants, and sources of information that contributed to uncovering the movements and locations of its leaders, it seems as though another, undeclared framework has emerged within the scene, which can be metaphorically described as "agent brigades." This doesn't refer to an actual organization by that name, but rather a phenomenon that has become increasingly prominent. Israel's success in carrying out precise and repeated operations against prominent figures raises an obvious question: Where did the information come from? How was it possible to pinpoint the locations and times of these figures with such accuracy? Can all of this be explained by technological superiority alone, or did human intelligence play a decisive role?
Ironically, the party that has always accused its opponents of collaborating with Israel now finds itself facing a more complex reality. Every successful assassination reinforces the impression that infiltration is no longer an isolated or exceptional incident, but has become a structural problem. The more people arrested or suspected of involvement in leaking information, the wider the circle of doubt grows regarding the effectiveness of the security apparatus, which has long been considered a source of pride for Hezbollah. But when assassinations become frequent and prominent figures fall one after another, it becomes difficult to convince people that technology alone explains everything. Therefore, talk of "agent brigades" is no longer just a political joke or a subject of ridicule; it now reflects a genuine crisis of confidence in Hezbollah's ability to protect itself, let alone its project. While the "resistance brigades" were established to broaden the base of support, the metaphorical "agent brigades" now appear to be the epitome of one of the most serious crises facing Hezbollah: the crisis of internal infiltration, a crisis that may be more dangerous than any direct military confrontation.

The Curse of Civil War: Entrenchment Behind Sectarianism
Rafiq Khoury/Nidaa Al Watan/July 17, 2026 (Translated from Arabic)
Sheikh Naim Qassem speaks with the authority to dictate what he wants President Joseph Aoun to do. No one understands how someone seeking to reclaim land can be labeled a "traitor" in Hezbollah's rhetoric, while someone who launched a war to support Iran—a war that allowed Israel to obliterate villages in the south and occupy land up to the Litani River—is considered a "victor" and a monopoly on "patriotism." There seems to be no qualms about rejecting direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel under American auspices, while insisting on direct negotiations between America and Iran mediated by Pakistan and Qatar. The issue isn't the principle of negotiation itself, as evidenced by the state's demand for indirect rather than direct negotiations, but rather what the negotiations will lead to. The stakes are clear.
The success of negotiations on a final agreement based on the "tripartite framework" hinges on one fundamental point: disarming the "Islamic Resistance" and dismantling its infrastructure. The success of negotiations on a final status agreement following the "Memorandum of Understanding" is linked, in Tehran's view and that of its proxies, to strengthening the "resistance front" as a key element in protecting Iranian national security. Even the failure of negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, and between Iran and the United States, will allow Hezbollah to retain its weapons, regardless of whether Washington and Tel Aviv resume hostilities with Iran or the region remains in a state of neither war nor peace. There is no need to threaten civil war to justify this continued possession of arms. Hezbollah accuses its opponents and those negotiating with Israel of "inciting sedition" and causing a civil war. However, no civil war is instigated by a local decision from one side, or even more than one. What the Lebanese civil war, and the regional and international conflicts in particular, have taught us is that no civil war occurs without powerful external actors with vested interests, pursuing agendas unrelated to any Lebanese faction's wishes, agendas that transcend any purely Lebanese issue. Moreover, civil wars are not waged by the people of all political and sectarian persuasions, but rather are initiated by an organized group, however small, which then forces the masses, through actions and reactions, to join the conflict. As Lenin said, "What is needed to overthrow a regime is not a revolutionary organization, but an organization of revolutionaries." Furthermore, the Lebanese war dragged on for so long because insecurity in the small country served regional and international security interests. When the interests of the major powers shifted, the war ended because insecurity in Lebanon no longer served any external agenda, and because all local factions were exhausted and unable to continue. Those who are now calling for a return to the "cessation of hostilities" agreement of autumn 2024, following the Gaza war, are the same ones who imagined that the difficult circumstances that led Hezbollah to accept it had changed, necessitating a different formula that would not require the disarmament of all of Lebanon, "starting with the Litani War." Those who insist on a return to the 1949 Armistice Agreement know that were it not for the Cairo Agreement, the wars waged by Palestinian organizations on Lebanese soil, and the wars fought by Hezbollah, which is linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, the Armistice Agreement would have remained in effect. The game between America and Iran, whether in war or negotiations, is far more complex than the assumption that the other side of Iran's war is supporting Lebanon in negotiations to guarantee a complete Israeli withdrawal. The militarization of a sect is a real problem for that sect itself, for Lebanon, and for the other sects. And entrenching oneself behind a sect in rejecting the state's position, and what resembles its separation from the popular and official majority, is not the path to national agreement. Nor is there an agreement based on the sects submitting to the position of one sect, even if the connection to Iran is merely nominal. The division is more dangerous than ever, to the point that the discourse between partners in the nation sounds like that between enemies. There is no point in minimizing the problem; it is enormous. But the question is: Will President Eisenhower's saying, "To solve a problem, make it bigger," be successful?

Jumblatt Between Baabda and the Grand Serail: Containment Here, Cooling There
Clara Jaha/Nidaa Al Watan/July 17, 2026 (Translated from Arabic)
The leader of Mukhtara, Walid Jumblatt, went further in his criticism of the "framework agreement" between Lebanon and Israel, brokered by the United States, perhaps even more so than the positions of his historical ally, Nabih Berri, to the point that some considered it a direct attack, specifically on President Joseph Aoun. Despite what appeared to be a "cooling-off" after the Democratic Gathering meeting and the dispatch of MP Wael Abou Faour to Baabda, the memorandum submitted by the former head of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt, to the Druze Religious Council continues to cast a shadow over the Lebanese political scene, especially since Jumblatt's positions are often interpreted through a predictive lens. Since assuming leadership of Mukhtara in 1977, the Lebanese have come to regard Walid Jumblatt's pronouncements as an early indicator of shifting regional and international power dynamics, and a repositioning aimed at safeguarding the Druze community's political role and maintaining Mukhtara's position as a key player in the Lebanese equation. But can Jumblatt's stance on the "framework formula" be placed within this context?
According to informed sources, Jumblatt's position cannot be separated from the broader Druze landscape in the region, particularly in Syria. The Druze leader does not interpret Lebanese developments in isolation from Suwaida, where the Druze of Syria stand at a highly sensitive crossroads with the rise of separatist movements. This could impact the historical role played by Mukhtara and push Jumblatt to take a firm stance against any course of action that might displace the community from its historical position.
A step backwards
These “very harsh” positions, according to the sources, created a rift between Jumblatt on one hand and President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam on the other. But what is striking is that Jumblatt’s positions also did not receive Druze support, neither from the party, nor within the religious council, nor from the public, as, according to the information, advice was pouring in for Mukhtara to calm the atmosphere, and the reason is “We are tired, Bey, we want a different picture!”
These recommendations do not appear to be separate from the general Druze sentiment. Recent opinion polls conducted by "International Information" indicate that the Druze have the highest support for a peace agreement with Israel, at 84%, followed by the Maronites at 77%. Therefore, after a series of consultations, the "Democratic Gathering" bloc, headed by MP Taymour Jumblatt, convened in Mukhtara to take a step back by removing the negative aspects of the memorandum, without abandoning the Druze leader's reservations. And so it was. The meeting reviewed the memorandum and its observations, fully endorsing it as stemming from a national approach aimed at protecting Lebanon's stability. It reaffirmed its commitment to the ministerial statement regarding the state's monopoly on weapons, and its support for the government's decisions in this regard, which emphasize extending state authority over all Lebanese territory, the state's exclusive right to decide on war and peace, and restricting the carrying of weapons to legitimate institutions. This step succeeded in calming tensions and opening channels of communication with Baabda Palace. Jumblatt tasked MP Wael Abou Faour with conveying a message to President Aoun confirming that there was no break in relations, despite continued differences on some points within the framework. He proposed the possibility of introducing amendments, particularly concerning the timetable for Israeli withdrawal, and stressed the importance of the 1949 Armistice Agreement and UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Jumblatt also rejected normalization or peace with Israel before a complete withdrawal and the resolution of all outstanding issues. Sources confirm that, despite Jumblatt's reservations about the framework's wording, his position remains unchanged, and he has not altered his stance. The politician, in particular, rejected the unification of the squares, Iranian interference, and linking Lebanon to Iran. Furthermore, the Democratic Gathering was the first group the President informed of his proposal for direct negotiations with Israel, and it supported this step, just as it had previously supported the necessity of limiting Hezbollah's weapons and all decisions issued by the Council of Ministers, including imposing a ban on the party's military wing. However, it seems that Abu Faour's move towards Baabda Palace did not succeed at the Grand Serail, as Prime Minister Salam remains upset. According to information obtained by Nidaa Al-Watan, communication lines remain severed despite Abu Faour's repeated attempts to contact Salam by phone. Nevertheless, Nidaa Al-Watan sources confirm that the coolness will not last long, as the relationship between the two men is not circumstantial, and Jumblatt was among the first to support Salam's nomination for the premiership in 2022 and afterwards. Is Jumblatt's retreat and the coolness at the Grand Serail limited to the repercussions of the recent dispute, or does it extend to broader Arab considerations?

The Weapon of “Racism”
Joseph Habib/Nidaa Al Watan/July 17, 2026 (Translated from Arabic)
Those who are intellectually bankrupt know nothing but how to hurl baseless accusations at anyone who disagrees with them, in a desperate attempt to prove that they can counter others with a counter-argument. And what is the most effective weapon, in their view, for launching malicious campaigns against their opponents? The answer is simple: parrot-like accusations of racism! It is true that the viewpoint that these shallow individuals despise is based on irrefutable facts and solid evidence, but their ideological alignments, inherited grudges, and sinister intentions prevent them from escaping their deadly cages, which, due to their illusory fantasies, appear to them adorned with bright colors. For example, when distinguishing between deserving and undeserving refugees, or when refuting common political errors, or correcting a falsified historical narrative, the true racists bare their teeth in defense of their exclusionary ideas. Those who are truly deserving are the first to be harmed by undeserving refugees; and the first to defend irregular and illegal immigration are those who rush into civilized countries with the mentality of an "invader," not with the mindset of a human being striving for freedom, dignity, and justice. The accusation of racism is nothing new when used as a weapon against those with critical perspectives. How can ideologues mired in their own misery expect host societies to accept waves of people who refuse to integrate into their legal and value systems, and who are hostile to their culture, heritage, and everything they represent, while these same ideologues cannot tolerate any dissenting voice and are quick to brandish the sword of "racism"—sometimes naively, often maliciously—against anyone who adopts a different stance? The problem with the distorted and repetitive use of the accusation of "racism" is that it harms the issues actually related to this scourge and weakens the effectiveness of addressing sensitive dilemmas and proposing solutions when racism is at the heart of the discussion. Thus, racists attempt to downplay its abhorrent dangers by turning the accusation into a dagger aimed at those who fight against it. The behavior of such people is not surprising, but what is truly sickening is their success in luring "useful idiots," especially in the West, into their putrid swamp, exploiting and recruiting them as pawns on the front lines of the raging culture war. These "useful idiots" only scratch the surface of the issue, without delving into its core, thus becoming mere puppets serving corrupt agendas. The cunning ones resort to the pretext that despicable acts are not exclusive to immigrants, but are also committed by citizens of the destination countries. Consequently, they criticize discussions about the transgressions of rogue immigrants and warnings about the dangers of an "open door" policy. What kind of twisted logic is this? The presence of a few scoundrels in any country does not justify bringing in more of their ilk. Regulating and organizing asylum is essential to closing the doors to intruders and riffraff, and to providing opportunities for deserving individuals seeking a better future. This issue has nothing to do with racism. Stable societies are not obligated to tolerate immigrants who embrace reactionary and racist ideologies. I am not trying to fabricate a phantom enemy. Quite simply and objectively, the invaders, their sponsors, and the gullible fools who are captivated by them, constitute an existential threat to all free people, wherever they may be.

Lebanon’s battle is Israeli withdrawal, not internal disputes… Opening a new front means destroying what remains and threatens the last chance to save Lebanon.
Daoud Rammal/Nidaa Al Watan/July 17, 2026 (Translated from Arabic)
As internal positions escalate regarding the “framework formula” governing the current negotiation process, attention is turning to what President Joseph Aoun’s visit to Washington and his meeting with US President Donald Trump on the 21st of this month will bring. There is a growing conviction that the current phase can no longer tolerate constitutional or political debates that could disrupt the process aimed at establishing Lebanese sovereignty and ending the Israeli occupation of large parts of Lebanon. A high-ranking political source confirmed to Nidaa Al Watan that “the ongoing debate about whether the “framework formula” should be presented to the Cabinet has no constitutional basis,” explaining that “what has been agreed upon does not constitute an international agreement or a binding treaty, but rather a political and executive framework to regulate the negotiation mechanism. Therefore, the Constitution does not require it to be presented to the Cabinet or voted on.” He added that "President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam are avoiding including this file on the government's agenda, not out of fear of any political backlash, but because it is not constitutionally required, and because opening a ministerial debate on it would not bring any benefit to the state. On the contrary, it would lead to unwarranted embarrassment, further isolate Hezbollah, and place Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri in a very sensitive position." He pointed out that "talk about the necessity of presenting the formula is mostly voiced through the media, while there is no official demand in this direction from the Shiite duo." The source considered that "the absolute priority today is not engaging in formal debates, but rather achieving the fundamental goal upon which this process was founded, which is the complete Israeli withdrawal behind the international borders, and enabling the Lebanese state to extend its full operational authority to the southern borders with its legitimate forces." He revealed that "this file will be at the forefront of the talks that President Aoun will hold with US President Donald Trump at the White House, as it is the actual gateway to restoring stability to the south, creating the conditions for the return of residents, launching the reconstruction process, and restoring international confidence in Lebanon." The source argued that "the initial objection to direct negotiations lacks political realism," noting that "Iran itself, just thirty-five days after the assassination of its Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, sat down at the negotiating table with the United States, despite Washington being its strategic adversary." The source added that "any country has the right to adopt the means that secure its national interests. Therefore, Lebanon, which is engaged in negotiations related to ending the Israeli occupation and restoring its rights, should not become an exception or be prevented from using the same means to achieve its sovereign goals, because the measure of success for any negotiation lies in its results, not in the slogans that precede its commencement."
In a related context, the religious authority called on Hezbollah to "carefully analyze the Iraqi situation," considering that "Baghdad presents a clear model of the transformations taking place in the region, where the Iraqi state is moving towards consolidating the monopoly of arms in the hands of official institutions, coinciding with a broad anti-corruption campaign that has targeted influential figures and major financial cases within institutions linked to the Popular Mobilization Forces, all under the leadership of a prime minister belonging to the Shiite political establishment." He added that "what is happening in Iraq reflects an understanding that the continued presence of weapons outside the control of the state threatens the future of the political system itself, and that protecting the Shiite community's position within the state requires strengthening its institutions, not multiplying power centers." He pointed out that "Lebanon faces a similar opportunity that must be seized before it is too late, because any new military adventure or any decision that bypasses the state could lead to widespread destruction, setting the country back many years, especially if the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, in a moment of escalation, resorts to using what remains of Hezbollah's missile arsenal, thus provoking a broad and devastating Israeli response that makes no distinction between people and infrastructure." The source stressed that “positions on the ‘framework formula’ should not be subject to ideological considerations, because experience has proven that many of the forces that oppose this path today would have adopted the opposite position if the negotiations had taken place under Iranian auspices or ended in an understanding that had Tehran’s approval, even if it was a very bad agreement, which confirms that what is required at this stage is a national approach that stems from the interest of Lebanon, its sovereignty and stability, far from regional calculations and internal divisions.”

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on 16-17 July/2026
Drone strikes ship off southern Iraqi port: Official
AFP/16 July/2026
A drone struck a ship off the port in Iraq’s southern province of Basra on Thursday, a security official told AFP, while the country’s oil ministry said an unspecified object fell near a tanker.
This is the latest drone-related incident in Iraq, coming against the backdrop of renewed military escalation between the United States and Iran, Iraq’s main allies. A security official told AFP that a drone struck a ship “carrying American-branded cars” near an oil terminal after it had arrived from the United Arab Emirates. Iraq’s oil ministry said that “the incident involved a tanker reporting a sighting of a foreign object in its vicinity. However, no fire or damage to the vessel has occurred.”The ministry added that “loading operations are continuing as normal,” without mentioning the cargo ship with cars onboard. On Wednesday evening, the US-led anti-jihadist coalition shot down eight explosive-laden drones over Erbil, the capital of Iraq’s northern Kurdistan region. AFP journalists reported seeing several drones over Erbil. The drones were then hit by air defenses near the US consulate, they said, which was a target of repeated drone and rocket attacks launched by pro-Iran armed groups during the Middle East war.No group has claimed responsibility for Wednesday’s attacks. The US embassy in Baghdad warned Thursday that “following Iran-enabled drone attacks in Erbil... US citizens in Iraq are advised to maintain heightened readiness.”The mission reminded US nationals of its travel advisory to avoid all travel to Iraq “for any reason.”The attacks coincided with Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s one-week visit to Washington, where he met President Donald Trump. Al-Zaidi denounced the drone attacks, and said his government “will not tolerate these malicious attempts, which seek in vain to undermine the stability of our people.”He directed security forces to “take all necessary measures to prevent the recurrence of such attacks.”During the Middle East war, the Kurdistan region, which hosts US troops and foreign oil companies, was a primary target for drone attacks, carried out mostly by pro-Iran Iraqi armed groups. Al-Zaidi has given those groups, which Washington designates as terrorist organizations, until September 30 to disarm, coinciding with the end of the US-led coalition’s mission.
While some armed groups have said they would cooperate, others remain firm in their refusal to disarm.

Trump ‘open to diplomacy’ with Iran: White House
AFP/16 July ,2026
US President Donald Trump remains open to diplomacy with Iran, the White House said Thursday, adding that Washington is still talking to Tehran despite the renewal of hostilities. The comments come a day after Trump thanked Iran for freeing a US citizen detained since December 2024, in a move seen as a possible diplomatic opening. “The president will hold them accountable when they turn their back on the words that they state to the United States. But he is always open to diplomacy at the very same time,” White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt told reporters. “They have expressed they still want to make a deal to the president. We’re talking to them, but again, the president is not going to allow them to fire on ships in the Strait without paying a consequence for that.”A fragile ceasefire agreed in June is on the rocks after the United States launched several rounds of strikes in recent days in a bid to curb Iran’s ability to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.Trump has also warned he could widen attacks to target power plants and bridges unless Tehran returns to talks.

Iran and US step up attacks, though release of American may signal path to climbdown
Reuters/16 July ,2026
Iran and the United States exchanged intensified fire on Thursday in a week-long escalation that has all but torn up last month’s truce, though Iran’s release of a US citizen pointed towards a path to avert the resumption of all-out war. For the first time since a memorandum of understanding paused fighting last month, the United States launched two big waves of air strikes in a single day on Wednesday, mostly on targets near Iran’s southern coast, and kept firing on Thursday. Tehran responded with missiles and drones targeted at US military bases in neighboring states, including a barrage at a recently expanded air base in Jordan. After Tehran resumed its blockade of the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, Washington again blockaded Iranian ports from Wednesday. The US military said it fired on a tanker near Iran’s Kharg Island, with Hellfire missiles hitting its smokestack. On Thursday evening, US projectiles struck Qeshm Island and near Bandar Abbas — home to Iran’s largest port and key navy and Revolutionary Guards facilities — both on the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian state media said. For one of its next moves, Iran has signaled it could prod its Houthi allies in Yemen to close another key strait: the Bab al-Mandeb at the mouth of the Red Sea. Sources told Reuters Iran had already told the Houthis to shut it if Washington carries out threats to attack Iran’s infrastructure. The week of increasingly intense fire has tested the limits of escalation that both sides set during four months of fighting before last month’s truce. But as the attacks unfurled, US President Donald Trump hailed the release of a US citizen in Iran as a “gesture of goodwill.”Human rights lawyer Jared Genser identified her as Dena Karari, who he said had been “trapped in Iran since December 2024 on bogus charges” and was “now safe and traveling back to the United States.” There was no comment from Iran on the case. The re-escalation has once again largely halted traffic through Hormuz, the world’s most important shipping route for oil and gas, pushing up global energy prices. Iran triggered the renewed fighting last week by striking ships moving through a corridor in the strait, provoking a dangerous fire on board a Qatari tanker filled with liquefied natural gas.Iranian sources told Reuters that Iran’s aim was to establish its authority over the strait, although otherwise Tehran is not keen on a wider escalation that would torpedo June’s preliminary deal, which it still regards as giving it most of what it sought. Within Iran, the renewed bombing has left residents anxious, following huge week-long memorial events for slain Ali Khamenei that the authorities depicted as a demonstration of victory and national solidarity. “Living with this fear that war could start again is very exhausting. You cannot live like this ... Personally, I want diplomacy to prevail,” Mahlegha, 46, a government employee, told Reuters by phone message from Tehran.
Iran wants all ships using the Strait of Hormuz to travel through a channel close to its shores, and has made no secret that it intends to charge passage fees at the end of a 60-day negotiation period set in last month’s memorandum. Washington had encouraged ships to use an alternative route to the south, along the Omani coast.US forces say their airstrikes have hit Iranian military targets along the coast to cripple its ability to control the strait. Iranian military spokesperson Brigadier General Mohammad Akraminia said on Thursday this would never work because Iran can strike the strait from anywhere on its territory. Three US officials told Reuters that US strikes could also serve as “shaping operations,” giving Trump more options by targeting Iranian military capabilities that the US would want to have destroyed before taking bigger steps. “This is helping set the stage, if needed,” one of the officials said. Trump has not ruled out the possibility of using ground forces, including to seize Kharg Island, site of Iran’s main oil export terminal. He has repeated threats to hit Iranian power plants and bridges next week unless Tehran resumes negotiations. Alex Vatanka, senior fellow and director of the Iran program at the Middle East Institute in Washington, said the warring sides were “back to square one,” reaching the limits of what they could achieve in the context of limited war and would eventually face a choice of whether to back down or escalate. The United States could not continue its limited strikes indefinitely because “at some point people are going to ask what is there left to hit,” he said. For now, Iran’s retaliatory strikes have been focused on US bases in neighboring countries. Iran said on Thursday it had fired on a Jordanian air base that Washington has upgraded in recent years into a regional headquarters. It said the Jordanian base had been used to launch an attack on a children’s cancer hospital in the city of Ahvaz on Wednesday night. Staff there said the hospital was evacuated after a missile hit 200 meters (yards) from the main building. “Some patients had to return this morning because we can’t interrupt their treatment,” said Amin Goodarzi, director of public relations at the Ahvaz Jundishapur University of Medical Sciences, which oversees the Shahid Baghaei hospital. “The majority have yet to return,” he added.

US expands strikes into northern Iran and disables ship trying to run blockade
Associated Press/16 July 2026
The United States intensified its strikes targeting Iran early Thursday, hitting targets further north as American forces also fired into a ship it accused of trying to break its naval blockade on the Islamic Republic. Iran retaliated with missile and drone fire targeting Bahrain, Jordan and Kuwait before dawn and warned its attacks may escalate. Days of back-and-forth strikes by the U.S. and Iran across the Middle East — and renewed threats to the Strait of Hormuz — have shredded the interim deal to end the Iran war and could tip the region back into all-out war. Already, Iranian officials say U.S. strikes have killed more than 35 people and wounded over 300 others. Strikes also reached into areas around Iran's capital, Tehran, for the first time in this latest round of violence, showing a widening set of targets for the Americans. When the U.S. and Israel launched the war on Iran on Feb. 28, Tehran effectively closed the strait to shipping traffic, a move that sent the price of oil, fertilizer and many other goods soaring far beyond the region and gave Iran major leverage in negotiations.
Col. Ebrahim Zolfaghari, a spokesperson for the Iranian military's Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, escalated Iran's threats by referencing U.S. President Donald Trump's repeated warning America could hit Iranian bridges and power plants. "All the infrastructure in the region will be crushed under the steel blows of the powerful armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran" should Trump's threat be carried out, Zolfaghari said. "Under no circumstances and in no way will we allow America, as a foreign and extra-regional country, to interfere in the Strait of Hormuz," he added. "This is Iran's invincible red line."
US and Iran trade threats as attacks intensify
Those rising prices pose a particular challenge to Trump and his Republican Party, which hopes to retain control of Congress in elections in November. But Washington has struggled to successfully reopen the waterway, leading to Trump reimposing the naval blockade Wednesday. Mediators have sought to calm the tensions, but so far have been unsuccessful. Trump again insisted Iran was ready to strike a peace deal, but he did not elaborate. "They don't like what we're doing, and they do want to settle. We'll find out whether or not we settle with them, or we just finish it off," he said Wednesday at the U.S. Army War College in Pennsylvania. Trump separately said on social media that Tehran made a goodwill gesture by releasing an American citizen wrongly detained in Iran since 2024. He didn't release further details. Human rights lawyer Jared Genser released a statement identifying the detainee as his client Dena Karari, a U.S.-Iranian citizen who runs a nonprofit and was charged with espionage. Iran did not immediately acknowledge the release and her case was not publicly known, as is sometimes the case with detentions in the Islamic Republic. Both the US and Iran launch attacks as blockade is reimposed. The U.S. strikes early Thursday hit around Tehran, state media reported. It also reported that American attacks targeted Semnan province, home to Iran's ballistic missile production and space program. Iranian media also reported strikes Thursday morning around the provinces of Hamedan, Hormozgan, Khuzestan, Lorestan, Markazi, and Sistan and Baluchistan.
On Wednesday, the U.S. resumed striking Iran during daylight, further showing the increasing tempo of the attacks. An attack on Greater Tunb Island, a strategic point in the Strait of Hormuz, targeted Iranian defense and missile sites, Central Command said. Meanwhile, the U.S. military said it opened fire on the Curacao-flagged oil tanker Belma sailing toward Kharg Island, Iran's main oil export terminal in the Persian Gulf. After the ship "ignored multiple warnings," a U.S. aircraft disabled the merchant vessel by firing a missile into the ship's smokestack.
Another American strike Wednesday targeted a barracks for Iran's 388th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, which operates tanks and armored vehicles, in Sistan and Baluchestan province, Iranian state television reported. The report said Americans fired at least 13 missiles in the attack and the seven dead included conscripts and career soldiers. A number of troops were wounded. Iran retaliated Thursday with missile and drone attacks on Bahrain, Jordan and Kuwait, authorities in those countries home to U.S. forces said. There was no immediate acknowledgment of damage or casualties from the attacks. Meanwhile, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi condemned an overnight drone attack on the city of Irbil in Iraq's semiautonomous northern Kurdish region. The drone, which authorities said had been intercepted, came during his trip to the U.S. in which he said Iraq would work to disarm non-state armed groups, including those backed by Iran. The Strait of Hormuz remains at the heart of the fighting. The latest round of fighting is focused on the Strait of Hormuz. How to reopen the strait has bedeviled the U.S. since Iran choked it off in the early days of the war.
During the interim deal, some ships began moving through the passage using a route near Oman overseen by the U.S. military that is outside Tehran's control.
In recent days, Iran attacked ships using that route and back-and-forth attacks ensued. The U.S. has threatened to reopen the strait by force, but experts say that would require a much bigger armada if not tens of thousands of ground troops. Imposing the blockade is another way to put pressure on Iran. But in the meantime, oil prices are rising. The price for Brent crude oil, the international standard, traded above $85 a barrel on Thursday, more than 15% higher than the price before the war, but still well below the nearly $120 reached at the height of the conflict.

Tehran threatens regional infrastructure if US attacks Iran's
Agence France Presse/16 July 2026
Tehran warned Thursday it would target regional infrastructure if the United States carried out threats to attack Iran's infrastructure, as the war in the Middle East resumed. The spokesman for Iran's military headquarters said that if the U.S. followed through on its threats, "all infrastructure in the region" would be "crushed under the steel blows" of Iran's armed forces.

US strikes in Iran hit airport, bridges and railway station
Agence France Presse/16 July 2026
Deadly U.S. strikes overnight hit an airport, a railway station in the port city of Bandar Abbas and two bridges in southern Iran near the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian state media said Friday.
"Three explosions were heard around the airport and at least one American enemy projectile hit Iranshahr airport," in the southeast, state television IRIB said on Telegram. "A few minutes ago, the Bandar Abbas Railway Junction Station was targeted by the American enemy. According to this report, two Iranians were injured in the attack," Mehr said on Telegram. An official report spoke of airstrikes on two bridges Hormozgan Province and cited IRNA as saying that two people had died and four were injured.

Trump to attend World Cup final on Sunday: White House
LBCI/16 July 2026
U.S. President Donald Trump will attend Sunday's World Cup final between Spain and Argentina, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said Thursday. "His attendance will cap what has been the most watched, most secure, and most successful World Cup in American history," Leavitt told reporters. AFP

Iran judiciary denies Trump statement that American prisoner was freed
Agencies/16 July ,2026
Iran’s judiciary said that no American prisoner had been released or exchanged from its prisons, Iranian state media reported on Thursday, after US President Donald Trump said a US citizen detained during the Biden administration in 2024 had been freed.
The judiciary said checks showed no convicted American prisoner, person accused of spying for the United States matching Trump’s description, or any other American detainee had been released from Iranian prisons or exchanged. Trump had said Iran had released an American citizen who had been detained since December 2024, allowing her to leave the country. “She is now safely outside of Iran, and in good condition,” Trump posted on his Truth Social platform, adding: “The United States of America appreciates this gesture of Goodwill by Iran!”Trump did not name the woman or describe why she had been held, other than to say she had been “wrongfully detained.”

Mediator Pakistan Says Encouraging US, Iran to Resume Talks
Asharq Al Awsat/16 July 2026
Pakistan said on Thursday it would encourage the United States and Iran to stop violence and resume talks under a memorandum of understanding (MoU) it helped mediate last month. "While the implementation of the MoU is facing challenges, Pakistan will continue to encourage all sides to end violence and resume technical-level talks in accordance with the MoU," Tahir Andrabi, Pakistan's foreign office spokesman, told reporters in Islamabad. "We express the hope for an early normalization of the situation in Strait of Hormuz and underscore the importance of ensuring the continued safety, security and freedom of maritime navigation," he added. The United States has this week been striking Iran, drawing retaliatory Iranian attacks on US interest in the Gulf as they battle over the strategic Hormuz shipping route. That sent global oil prices soaring and led to concerns of spikes in inflation even in nations far from the conflict. The key oil and gas artery, which Iran insists it controls, is central to the rekindled fighting that has entered its sixth day despite a preliminary deal in June aiming to end the war. "Pakistan recognizes the urgent need to address the impact of the current situation on global energy supplies and other economic commodities including trade and food security," Andrabi said.

Global Economy Faces Fresh Supply Shock as Hormuz Crisis Escalates
Riyadh: Fatehelrahman Yousif
A fresh escalation in US-Iranian tensions has plunged global trade and financial markets back into deep uncertainty, threatening to slow economic growth and drive shipping and marine insurance costs to record highs.With the conflict hanging over vital sea lanes, the global economy is also grappling with mounting structural strain. Strategic oil reserves are lower, while investors are increasingly reluctant to commit to long-term plans, leaving markets exposed to the sharpest supply shock since the start of the year.Fadl bin Saad al-Buainain, a member of Saudi Arabia’s Shura Council, said the renewed tensions were gathering force like a “snowball,” with the risks growing steadily. He said rising uncertainty would weigh particularly heavily on regional economies, disrupting foreign investment flows and undermining government spending on development projects. Al-Buainain said any direct confrontation would hit critical sectors immediately. Energy supplies could be disrupted by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz or attacks on oil facilities, sending prices sharply higher. Major shipping routes could be cut, paralyzing supply chains. Government budgets would also come under pressure, especially in countries without alternative routes for crude exports, threatening both revenues and imports. He warned against allowing the political deadlock to drag on and urged the activation of serious diplomatic channels. Without genuine diplomacy, he said, proposed negotiations and agreements risk becoming little more than a means of buying time and preparing for a wider military confrontation. Al-Buainain also called on the international community, through the United Nations and the Security Council, to adopt a clear resolution guaranteeing freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. He said an international force should be formed to protect oil tankers and cargo vessels from continued Iranian threats to civilian assets and economic facilities.
Economy caught in the ‘Hormuz vise’
Abdulrahman Baeshen, head of the Al-Shorouq Center for Economic Studies in Jazan, said recent US statements that memorandums of understanding with Tehran were no longer in effect, combined with renewed strikes on Iranian ports and cities, had piled further pressure on global markets already under strain for months. The impact was immediate, with oil prices rising by more than $4 a barrel. Baeshen warned that the continued militarization or closure of the Strait of Hormuz would deliver a series of severe shocks to the global economy. Energy, food, agriculture, pesticides and fertilizers would be among the first sectors hit, he said. He said a return to economic stability and market certainty depended on the parties resuming serious negotiations and halting reciprocal attacks, allowing the strategic waterway to reopen and shipping to resume safely.
Supply shocks return as recovery falters
Khaled Ramadan, head of the International Center for Strategic Studies in Cairo, said renewed military conflict around the Strait of Hormuz threatened to revive the supply shock that hit the world in early 2026. He said the escalation could push crude prices close to $100 a barrel in the near term, disrupt petrochemical and food supplies and trigger a renewed surge in energy inflation. The global economy had only begun to recover from the spring crisis, Ramadan said, but was now entering another period of instability. The risks are greater because major economies have already drawn down part of their strategic petroleum reserves, he added.
Ramadan said the sectors most at risk were:
Shipping and maritime transport: Hit by record bunker fuel prices and soaring war-risk insurance costs.Agriculture and fertilizers: Pressured by an expected rise in natural gas prices, raising the risk of a global food crisis that would hit developing countries hardest. Heavy and energy-intensive industries: Including aluminum, steel, cement and chemicals. Aviation and tourism: Exposed to higher jet fuel prices and rising airfares.
Options for confronting the crisis
Ramadan said the deep imbalances caused by tensions in the Strait of Hormuz required a two-track response to the cumulative strain. The first track would focus on urgent action. That would include immediately activating alternative pipelines, such as Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline and pipelines in the United Arab Emirates, increasing production from independent producers including the United States, Brazil and Canada, and redirecting trade through alternative logistics networks.
The second track would focus on longer-term structural measures. These would include accelerating energy diversification, building larger strategic reserves capable of absorbing prolonged shocks and creating strong regional energy alliances linking Gulf producers with consumers in fast-growing Asian markets.

Saudi Arabia: Iranian Attacks on Kuwait, Bahrain and Jordan Threaten Regional Security
Asharq Al Awsat/16 July 2026
Saudi Arabia strongly condemned Iran's continued "unjustified attacks" on Kuwait, Bahrain and Jordan, reaffirming its full support for the measures taken by the three countries in response to what it described as Iran's blatant attacks. In a statement, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated its condemnation of what it described as Iran's actions threatening regional security and stability and violating the principles of international law and good-neighborliness. It stressed the importance of an immediate halt to all forms of military escalation and called for a return to dialogue and the resolution of disputes through diplomatic means.

Iranian Attacks on Gulf Intensify, Kuwait Bears Brunt
Riyadh: Ghazi al-Harthi/Asharq Al Awsat/16 July 2026
Iranian attacks on Gulf states have intensified sharply in recent days, with Kuwait bearing the brunt as fighting between the United States and Iran resumed and tensions rose in the Strait of Hormuz. From the renewed escalation last Wednesday through early Thursday, Kuwaiti forces detected about 77 hostile drones and 18 missiles in the country’s airspace, according to an Asharq Al-Awsat tally. The missiles included eight ballistic missiles and 10 cruise missiles. Kuwaiti forces intercepted or otherwise dealt with the threats.The latest attacks stood out for causing casualties and damage.
Kuwait said several Iranian strikes targeted vital facilities and scattered debris across multiple locations, causing material damage and injuring six people, including four members of the Kuwaiti armed forces. Three land border posts in northern Kuwait were also attacked, causing further damage and one injury. Kuwaiti Defense Minister Sheikh Abdullah Al-Sabah checks on the health condition of those injured as a result of the Iranian aggression. KUNA. Kuwait’s consulate general in the southern Iraqi city of Basra was targeted again on Monday.Kuwait condemned the attack and acknowledged the Iraqi government’s efforts to confront such incidents. It also called for “immediate and decisive” action to hold those responsible accountable and prevent a recurrence.The continued attacks drew broad condemnation and expressions of solidarity from Gulf states.
Calls to strike back at launch sites
Academic and political researcher Ayed al-Manaa said Gulf Cooperation Council states should prepare for further Iranian retaliation following US attacks. Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, al-Manaa urged Gulf states to respond to the sources of fire rather than remain on the defensive.
He said the escalation showed that Tehran had gone too far, particularly during the 40-day war. Iran, he added, could retaliate against nearby US forces or Israel instead of targeting Gulf states. Al-Manaa said Iran’s conduct reflected a lack of respect for Gulf sovereignty and a disregard for fraternal ties, neighborly relations and shared religious bonds. Gulf states are peaceful countries that maintain normal relations, trade and neighborly ties with Iran, he said. Tehran had treated that position with disdain, he added, making it necessary for Gulf states to raise their level of readiness and prepare to confront and respond to further attacks.
Fragile truce, vague memorandum
Political analyst Khaled al-Habbas said the renewed fighting between Washington and Tehran, and the failure of the ceasefire to hold, showed that the memorandum of understanding reached in mid-June was broad and highly ambiguous. He said the uncertainty was most evident in provisions dealing with the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions on Tehran and its frozen assets. Al-Habbas said other factors were also driving the crisis. These included “the deep hostility and mistrust between the two sides, the aggressive nature of the Iranian regime and the sharp divisions between hardline leaders within the Revolutionary Guards and other officials who support negotiations with the United States.”
Doubts over Iran’s commitment to a deal
“The continuation of Iranian aggression against some Gulf states, alongside attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, indicates that the Iranian side is not serious about reaching a final agreement,” al-Habbas said. He said the negotiations also faced major obstacles, while the ceasefire remained fragile.
Tension and instability would therefore continue to define the regional landscape for now, he added. Al-Habbas did not rule out further exchanges of military action in the region, although he said both sides appeared keen to avoid a return to full-scale war. “The danger remains, however, and all possibilities are still open. This is why Gulf states are following these developments with concern,” he said. He praised Gulf states for successfully confronting Iranian attacks while continuing to support diplomatic efforts to prevent a return to war and the risks it would pose to the region.
Al-Habbas called for greater regional and international diplomatic pressure on Iran to isolate it politically and expose what he described as its aggression. He said Iran should be held responsible for the damage caused by “this blatant aggression,” while Gulf states retained the right to defend themselves at a time and place of their choosing.

Houthi Escalation Threatens Yemen's Imports, Deepens Humanitarian Crisis
Aden: Asharq Al Awsat/16 July 2026
Concerns are mounting over a worsening humanitarian crisis in Yemen as renewed military escalation by the Houthis coincides with the fallout from the resumption of the war involving Iran, which has begun to disrupt trade flows and commodity supplies to the country. At the same time, the United Nations has warned of expanding hunger and a declining ability of aid agencies to respond because of severe funding shortages. Government and commercial sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that importers are facing growing difficulties in delivering shipments to Yemen as disruptions to regional maritime traffic persist.
The sources said hundreds of containers have remained stranded at regional ports for months due to disruptions affecting shipping routes linked to the Strait of Hormuz, while concerns are growing over delays to new shipments and further increases in freight costs.
The situation is directly affecting commodity prices in a country that relies on imports for about 90 percent of its food needs, at a time when Yemenis are already grappling with declining purchasing power, currency depreciation, and rising poverty.
According to the sources, prices of several essential goods rose by more than 20 percent during the first round of the war. Price increases were even steeper in Houthi-controlled areas after the group imposed customs duties exceeding 100 percent on wheat and flour shipments entering through government-controlled ports. The measures drove up flour prices, despite flour being the main staple for most Yemenis, particularly in the country's mountainous governorates.
UN Warnings
These developments come as the United Nations says Yemen continues to face one of the world's worst humanitarian crises amid the ongoing conflict, worsening economic conditions, and expanding food insecurity. According to a recent UN report, the continuation of the conflict, declining funding, deteriorating infrastructure, and rising import costs are pushing millions of Yemenis toward deeper poverty and hunger unless additional resources are secured to sustain humanitarian operations. The report said 18.3 million people are experiencing acute food insecurity, with more districts expected to slip into the emergency phase of food insecurity and some areas facing catastrophic levels of hunger. It also estimated that 22.3 million people, more than two-thirds of Yemen's population—will require humanitarian assistance and protection services this year, including 5.2 million internally displaced people, as well as migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.
Funding Shortfall
The United Nations warned that Yemen's humanitarian response is facing an unprecedented funding crisis. As of the end of May, only 12.7 percent of the $2.16 billion required under the 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan had been secured, forcing aid agencies to scale back operations and focus assistance on those with the most urgent needs. The report said children and women remain the hardest-hit groups. It projected that 2.2 million children under the age of five will suffer from acute malnutrition, including more than 500,000 with severe acute malnutrition. Another 1.3 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are also expected to face malnutrition. The UN report added that around 40 percent of Yemen's health facilities are either completely or partially out of service. It warned that continued outbreaks of cholera, measles, and diphtheria, coupled with deteriorating water and sanitation services, are increasing the risk of large-scale public health emergencies. Meanwhile, 14.4 million people require water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) services.

Trump Hails Release of US Citizen Held in Iran as 'Goodwill' Gesture
Asharq Al Awsat/16 July 2026
US President Donald ‌Trump has called the release of a US citizen held in Iran a "gesture of goodwill", even as conflict raged for a fifth night across the Middle East. Trump said in a post on Truth Social on Wednesday that an American who was "wrongfully detained" under the Biden administration in 2024 had been allowed to leave Iran, Reuters reported. "She is now safely outside of Iran, and ‌in good ‌condition. The United States of America ‌appreciates ⁠this gesture of Goodwill ⁠by Iran," Trump wrote. Human rights attorney Jared Genser identified the American as Dena Karari. "Dena is now safe and traveling back to the United States," Genser wrote on X, thanking Trump for his efforts to free her.Iran has ⁠neither confirmed nor denied that ‌Karari has been released. The ‌release came despite US military strikes across Iran aimed at ‌reopening the vital Strait of Hormuz ‌shipping lane, and amid escalating threats from Trump that he will bomb Iran's power plants, bridges and energy infrastructure. Three US officials told Reuters that US ‌strikes aimed at forcing open the strait are also targeting Iranian military capabilities the ⁠US ⁠would want to destroy before executing more complex operations.
Iran has hit back with what it said were strikes targeting US bases in Kuwait and Jordan. According to the New York Times, Karari, 53, is a resident of California. She had her passport seized as she visited relatives in the southwestern city of Shiraz in December 2024.
She was not detained, but was interrogated on various occasions by the authorities, the newspaper said, citing her lawyer, Genser.

Trump’s Remarks on Soleimani Spark Debate in Iraq
Baghdad: Fadhel al-Nashmi/Asharq Al Awsat/16 July 2026
Despite US President Donald Trump’s praise for Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi during their White House meeting on Tuesday, remarks about the 2020 killing of Iranian Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani and former Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) deputy chief Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis triggered a broad political debate in Iraq. Greeting al-Zaidi at the White House, Trump described him as “a warrior” and praised the “tremendous chemistry” between them, predicting that the Iraqi premier would remain in office “for a long period of time.”Turning to the January 2020 US drone strike near Baghdad International Airport, Trump again defended the operation, saying: “And I killed him in my first administration. Had I not, it might be a different story today... I actually think the leaders of Iran were afraid of Soleimani.” Without mentioning al-Muhandis by name, Trump added: “By the way, a very bad person went with him. They happened to meet at the airport, and a very bad person from Iraq, a leader there, was killed in the same incident.”He then turned to al-Zaidi with a smile and asked: “So, I don’t know if I did you a favor or not. I’ve never asked you that question before. Maybe you know the answer better than I do.”Al-Zaidi replied: “At that time, I wasn’t working in politics. This visit is about the future and what we can do together. We’re not concerned with the old past. We’ve had enough of the suffering it caused.”Munqith Dagher, head of the Independent Institute of Administration and Civil Society Studies (IIACSS) research group, said al-Zaidi had handled the exchange better than many had expected. Writing on X, he argued that, whether instinctive or the product of media training, the prime minister’s body language and responses spared both himself and Iraq unnecessary embarrassment during one of Trump’s characteristic attempts to put visiting leaders on the spot. Dagher added that al-Zaidi’s answer could have been even stronger had he delivered it with greater seriousness. Writer and researcher Adnan Tomeh offered a different assessment, arguing that politics is measured first and foremost by the careful choice of words. He said al-Zaidi could have given a more diplomatic answer that preserved room for maneuver but instead appeared to sidestep the question. The strongest criticism came from Iran-aligned factions. Al-Muhandis’ family issued a sharply worded statement accusing Trump of revealing his fear of the consequences of his “crimes,” particularly in Iraq, while rebuking al-Zaidi for distancing himself from the country’s past. The family also claimed the Washington visit was intended to dismantle the PMF as an “ideological force,” to further US efforts aimed at controlling Iraq’s oil wealth, and to advance calls for disarming armed groups under the slogan of restricting weapons to the state. Akram al-Kaabi, secretary-general of the US-designated Harakat al-Nujaba, also condemned Trump’s remarks, describing Soleimani and al-Muhandis as “symbols of the resistance.”

Iraq Investigates Foiled Attempt to Smuggle Missiles, Drones into Syria
Baghdad : Asharq Al Awsat/16 July 2026
Iraq's Joint Operations Command announced on Thursday that it had formed an investigative committee to examine the circumstances surrounding the foiled attempt to smuggle a shipment of weapons and missiles across the Iraqi border into Syria. Sources familiar with the matter said the Iraqi government intends to hold officials at a border crossing with Syria accountable if they are found to have facilitated the shipment's passage into Syria. The developments come amid growing scrutiny of cross-border overland freight traffic between the two countries, including routes used to transport goods and fuel, as well as heightened monitoring of weapons supply routes to Lebanon's Hezbollah. The Joint Operations Command said the committee was formed under an urgent directive from armed forces commander-in-chief Ali al-Zaidi and included security agencies and specialists to investigate the operation. Baghdad would coordinate with Damascus to establish what happened and hold accountable any party found to have been negligent, it said. The measures were aimed at strengthening security along the shared border and preventing Iraqi territory from being used for activities that threaten national security or regional stability, the statement added. The Iraqi announcement came hours after Syrian authorities said they had intercepted a shipment of weapons and missiles at the Syrian-Iraqi border. The cargo was hidden inside an oil tanker and, according to the Syrian account, was intended for Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Syria’s state news agency SANA quoted an Interior Ministry source as saying specialized units had seized what it described as a shipment of advanced weapons entering Syrian territory. The source said the cargo appeared to be bound for the Lebanese group.
Syria’s General Authority for Land and Sea Ports said an inspection at the al-Tanf border crossing uncovered large quantities of missiles, weapons, and drones inside an oil tanker heading to Banias.
Weapons hidden in an oil tanker
Iraqi security sources said the tanker left Iraq about nine days earlier after being officially registered as carrying fuel. It completed customs procedures and was sealed before crossing the border, they said.
The tanker was moving as part of Iraqi fuel traffic to Syria, including shipments linked to supplying the Banias refinery with crude oil or petroleum products under commercial arrangements between the two countries. The sources said fuel tankers could be harder to inspect than ordinary cargo, particularly when authorities relied on conventional screening methods. The investigation would determine how the shipment passed through Iraqi checkpoints, including the al-Waleed border crossing, before it was seized at al-Tanf on the Syrian side, they said. An Iraqi government source said the authorities were considering action against officials at al-Waleed if investigators found evidence of collusion or negligence. Media reports citing sources said Syrian authorities did not inform Iraq of the seizure until after they had completed their investigation. The reports said the detained driver had given statements indicating that employees at al-Waleed helped shipments pass through to Lebanon’s Hezbollah.
Sensitive frontier
The Iraqi-Syrian border is one of the region’s most sensitive security zones. Stretching more than 600 km, it cuts through vast desert areas that have long complicated efforts to monitor the movement of people and goods. Armed groups and smuggling networks have used the area in recent years to move fighters, weapons and prohibited materials, particularly during the war against ISIS, which controlled large parts of Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2017. Although Baghdad and Damascus have moved to strengthen border cooperation, smuggling remains a complex security challenge because of the terrain and the number of armed groups operating near the crossings. The seizure comes as Iraq seeks to balance stronger economic ties with Syria with its security and diplomatic commitments to the United States and other Western countries that have imposed sanctions on networks linked to armed groups in the region. The disclosure also coincided with Iraqi financial institutions beginning to enforce a new package of U.S. sanctions targeting financing and logistical support networks linked to Hezbollah. The measures included asset freezes and restrictions on several individuals and companies.
Hezbollah has not commented on the Syrian allegations. Iraqi authorities have yet to release final findings or identify those behind the attempted shipment. The case comes amid continued international pressure on supply routes used by Iran-aligned armed groups, including overland corridors running from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon. Iraqi and Syrian investigations are continuing into how the tanker crossed the border, who organized the shipment and how the fuel route to the Banias refinery was used. Banias is economically important to both countries. It is home to one of Syria’s main oil refineries and provides access to the Mediterranean. Iraq has recently sought to expand options for moving oil and petroleum products through Syria as part of efforts to diversify transport routes and reduce reliance on a single export corridor. Reuters previously reported that Baghdad was seeking to increase oil shipments to Banias by road through Syria under existing agreements between the two countries. Iraqi officials say the routes could bring economic gains, but border security and logistical concerns may require tighter controls on freight traffic.

Syria Says Arrested Assad-Era Officer Specializing in Chemical Weapons
Asharq Al Awsat/16 July 2026
Syrian authorities announced on Wednesday the arrest of a former officer they say was a chemical weapons specialist in charge of sarin gas depots and chemical weapons manufacturing during ousted President Bashar al-Assad's era. Since Assad's fall in December 2024, authorities have arrested dozens of people they say committed crimes during the country's 13-year civil war, and started trials in April. The interior ministry said security forces had arrested Colonel Ahmed Habib Ali, calling him "a chemical weapons expert".
It also said he "was responsible for sarin gas storage facilities and chemical manufacturing within Unit 417", a key chemical weapons storage facility near the capital, Damascus. According to the ministry, Ali was "one of the officers who supervised the manufacture of about 20 bombs loaded with sarin gas, each weighing 250 kilograms, which were used in attacks targeting Syrian cities and towns in 2013 and 2017".In the first and deadliest instance in August 2013, the army was accused of using chemical weapons to target areas then under opposition control, killing more than 1,400 men, women and children, according to US intelligence and rights groups.An aerial view shows a mass grave where are buried those who were killed by the sarin struck during a 2013 chemical weapons attack that was blamed on then President Bashar al-Assad's forces, in Zamalka neighborhood, on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria, Wednesday, Dec. 25, 2024. (AP)
With Syria at the height of its civil war, the Assad government agreed to hand over its chemical arsenal in order to avert US strikes. Between 2014 and 2017, Damascus was accused of launching four further attacks on towns controlled by opposition factions, using sarin and chlorine gas.
Ali's arrest comes after Syria was reinstated into the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) last week. The OPCW had stripped Syria of its voting rights in 2021 after finding its air force had used sarin and chlorine gas on its own people. In April, Syria's judiciary began a series of public trials for former officials on various charges, some of which amount to war crimes committed after the outbreak of popular protests in 2011, which were violently suppressed by the authorities.

Escalating Israeli strikes kill five people in Gaza, medics say
Reuters/16 July ,2026: 02:58 PM GST
Israeli strikes killed at least five Palestinians in the Gaza Strip on Thursday, Palestinian health officials said, as a US-based research group reported a surge in Israeli attacks to levels not seen since the latest truce took effect in October. Medics said an Israeli airstrike killed two people near the Tuffah neighborhood in the north of the enclave, while a third person was killed in Israeli tank shelling in the Zeitoun suburb in eastern Gaza City. Another airstrike at a tent encampment for displaced people in western Gaza City killed one person and wounded several, while an attack on a vehicle in Khan Younis, in the south, killed another, medics said. Witnesses also reported that an airstrike hit a residential building in Deir al-Balah in central Gaza. The Israeli military had no immediate comment on any of the incidents. The deaths add to a toll of more than 1,100 Palestinians, mostly civilians, killed by Israeli attacks since an October ceasefire between Israel and Hamas to end the war took effect, according to Gazan health officials. Hamas does not usually disclose its losses. The truce halted major fighting but has failed to stop near daily Israeli strikes. Four Israeli soldiers have been killed by militants in Gaza over the same period. Conflict monitor ACLED, which tracks Israeli attacks in Gaza, said air- and drone strikes against Hamas and other militants increased to more than 40 in June, the highest monthly total since the ceasefire. “With polls showing the opposition in the lead, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is facing growing domestic pressure to take a tougher security position against Hamas,” ACLED Middle East Assistant Research Manager Nasser Khdour said, referring to Israel’s legislative election in October. Israel says its strikes aim to thwart attacks by Gaza militants.Nearly all of Gaza’s 2 million people now live on a tiny strip of land along the coast, mainly in makeshift tents or damaged buildings, under Hamas control. Hamas-led fighters killed 1,200 people during their cross-border attack into Israel on October 7, 2023, according to Israeli tallies. The Gazan health ministry said Israel’s subsequent offensive killed more than 73,000 Palestinians.

Herzog says Israel backs diplomacy with Iran but welcomes ‘firm’ US response
Al Arabiya English/16 July ,2026
Israeli President Isaac Herzog said he still believes a diplomatic solution is the best path to resolving the conflict with Iran, while welcoming what he described as a “firm and clear” US response.
Speaking in an exclusive interview with Al Arabiya English from Jerusalem on Thursday, Herzog said he was “not surprised” by the latest developments, arguing that Iran has a long history of violating agreements and acting through regional proxies. He said Israel had repeatedly raised legitimate concerns about Iran’s behavior, adding that recent events demonstrated those concerns. “I believe in a diplomatic solution to the conflict,” Herzog said. “I think this is absolutely what needs to be done, and I actually know that this is the clear Israeli position.”At the same time, Herzog said Israel had legitimate concerns over Iran’s conduct and welcomed Washington’s response. “I’m happy that the American reaction is firm and clear, so that everybody understands, especially the Iranians, that they cannot goof around here,” he said, adding that Tehran must “go back on track” if it wants to pursue a path out of the conflict.
Asked whether the war with Iran had been a strategic failure, Herzog declined to draw conclusions, saying diplomatic efforts could still resume. He said he was not in the room and Israel was not involved in the negotiations, so he did not want to make definitive judgments while efforts to return to talks were ongoing. However, he said any future agreement should ensure Iran is prevented from obtaining nuclear capabilities and cannot “blackmail” the international community. Herzog also said any closure of the Strait of Hormuz would amount to “blackmail” and an “extorting” of the international community.
Turning to regional diplomacy, Herzog reiterated Israel’s desire to reach agreements with additional Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, saying any future normalization should be dealt with directly between the two countries, with US support, rather than under any particular formula or definition. He praised the Abraham Accords and Israel’s ties with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco as examples of successful regional cooperation, but stressed that Saudi Arabia is “a very important country” and “a major leader in the Muslim world.”

Vance Says Some in Israeli Government Sought to Sway US on Iran Deal
Asharq Al Awsat/16 July 2026
US Vice President JD Vance said some members of the Israeli government had tried to influence US public opinion to oppose a deal by the US to end the war with Iran, in a podcast episode with host Joe Rogan posted on Wednesday. The comments echoed earlier criticism of Israeli government policy by Vance, whom many view as a potential future presidential candidate, in a widening public rift between the two countries, Reuters reported. Vance defended a deal reached last month to end the war with Iran, which critics in the US and Israel have slammed for failing to curb Iran's missile program and providing no clear path to dismantling its nuclear facilities, while constraining Israel in its war with Hezbollah militants in Lebanon, Reuters reported. "I know beyond a shadow of a doubt that there have been people within the Israeli government who are trying to, like, actually shift us away from that policy because they want to continue the military campaign," Vance said. The vice president said that, while he has "good relationships" with some members of the Israeli government, "there are some people within their system that we know beyond a shadow of a doubt that are manipulating and trying to change American public opinion to keep the war going on indefinitely". Vance said that many countries, allies and adversaries try to influence American policy and that "it doesn't bother me that Israel tries to do this, it frankly doesn't even bother me that Russia or some of these other countries do it". He said it was "just the nature of being a political leader in 2026". "What does bother me is when those operations, those influence campaigns, actually affect American political judgment," said the vice president. Vance lashed out at Israeli critics of the Iran deal in June, saying President Donald Trump is Israel's only ally, in a sharp rebuke that referenced the billions in US defense aid the country receives. Israeli senior officials, speaking anonymously, have said the deal's terms were bad for Israel because they failed to address concerns over Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program, a view they say is shared across Israel's leadership. When asked if he thought the US would have engaged in the most recent war with Iran were it not for Israeli influence, Vance said, "yes, yes I do." "I think the president, separate from any influence from Israel, believes very strongly, and again I agree with this, that Iran should not have a nuclear weapon," Vance said.

Israeli Families Move into New West Bank Settlement Near Nablus
Asharq Al Awsat/16 July 2026
Israeli families moved into a new settlement on a mountain towering over the city of Nablus in the occupied West Bank on Thursday, the settler regional council for the area said. "This morning, families from the Ebal founding group are transferring their equipment and moving into caravans in the new Ebal settlement, established in Samaria," the Samaria Regional Council said, using the Biblical name for the north of the West Bank. Excluding east Jerusalem, more than 500,000 Israelis live in settlements in the West Bank, which Israel has occupied since 1967, among some three million Palestinians. All Israeli settlements are illegal under international law. In a video shared by the council, a dozen Israeli settlers were seen carrying moving boxes and furniture into mobile-homes typical of new settlements. A newly paved road lined with Israeli flags on the mountain was lined with around 10 mobile homes. Mount Ebal is one of the highest peaks in the West Bank. In the valley below, residents of Nablus' Old City told AFP they could see the settlement's homes. "Palestinian citizens used to go to Mount Ebal to stroll and breathe fresh air, but today they have cut off our air by encircling Nablus from all sides with settlements and attacks," said Ghassan Daghlas, governor of the Nablus region. He said that a military camp and parts of a settlement on the other mountain near Nablus, Mount Gerizim, had already made Palestinian residents feel encircled. Samaria Regional Council head Yossi Dagan said that 600 families were expected to live at Ebal settlement in the future. "We are establishing here a thriving settlement that will illuminate the entire region, and this is a huge step on the way toward expanding our presence throughout the northern Samaria area," Dagan said at the site. Since taking office, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government, one of the most right-wing in the country's history, has approved the establishment of 102 settlements in the West Bank, according to Israeli anti-settlement watchdog Peace Now.

Colombia President-elect to Open Israel Embassy in Jerusalem
Asharq Al Awsat/16 July 2026
Colombia's hard-right president-elect plans to open an embassy in Jerusalem as he seeks to restore and strengthen ties with Israel, his office said Thursday. Abelardo de la Espriella won last month's presidential runoff by less than a percentage point and has promised to clamp down on Colombia's myriad armed groups -- partly by forging a military alliance with the United States and Israel. In 2024, leftist President Gustavo Petro severed ties with Israel, one of Colombia's key security partners, over its offensive in the Gaza Strip. De la Espriella, backed by US President Donald Trump, will take office on August 7 and has pledged to restore ties with Israel. The incoming government is moving forward with "the opening of the Colombian Embassy in Jerusalem, the capital of Israel," his office stated Thursday. Israel regards Jerusalem, including the occupied eastern part, as its capital, although this is not recognized internationally and most countries conduct their diplomatic missions from Tel Aviv. The United States in 2018 moved its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem during Trump's first term. Colombia is also set to withdraw its support for South Africa's case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which accuses Israel of committing genocide in Gaza. Incoming foreign minister Omar Bula on Wednesday met with his Israeli counterpart Gideon Saar in Washington, where the pair agreed on a roadmap to restore diplomatic relations and eliminate travel visas. "The historical relationship that the Petro administration unilaterally severed will be strengthened once again," AFP quoted the statement as reading. Petro had backed the ICJ case, while also halting coal exports to and arms imports from Israel. He also once said he intended to open a diplomatic mission in Ramallah, the West Bank, which is occupied by Israel, but the project never materialized.

Türkiye: Egypt Defense, Security Ties Bolster Regional Stability
Ankara: Said Abdel Razzak/Aden: Asharq Al Awsat/16 July 2026
Türkiye emphasized that strengthening defense and security cooperation with Egypt, based on mutual trust and shared interests, would help advance peace and reinforce regional stability and security. The Turkish Defense Ministry said a letter of intent on defense cooperation, signed during Egyptian Minister of Defense and Military Production Ashraf Salem Zaher’s visit to Ankara on Monday, reflected both countries’ determination to place their defense and security partnership on an institutional footing. Ministry spokesman Zeki Akturk said on Thursday the document also reflected a strong desire to deepen ties rooted in history, while opening new areas of cooperation that could support peace, stability and security across the region. Türkiye and Egypt share a strong legacy shaped by deep historical and cultural ties, Akturk said, adding that recent high-level visits had given military cooperation fresh momentum.
Cooperation expands
Akturk said contacts between military delegations had expanded as the two sides sought to deepen defense and security dialogue. He said concrete steps had also been taken in military training, joint operations and defense industries. Zaher’s visit, his first since taking office in February, was the first by an Egyptian defense minister since President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi visited Türkiye on May 8, 2013, while serving as defense minister. It followed a late-April 2024 visit to Ankara by former Egyptian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Osama Askar, the first senior Egyptian military official to travel to Türkiye after relations began a gradual return to normal following years of tension and stagnation since the fall of Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt in 2013. Egypt’s current Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Ahmed Khalifa, made an official visit to Türkiye on May 8, 2025, when the two countries held their first high-level military dialogue. They agreed to hold the dialogue annually at the level of the two chiefs of staff. The talks focused on strengthening military cooperation, particularly in training and the exchange of expertise. Egypt and Türkiye later signed a military cooperation agreement during Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Cairo on Feb. 4. The visit also included the second meeting of the Strategic Cooperation Council, following its first session in Ankara during Sisi’s visit on Sept. 4, 2024.Akturk also cited exercises held in June, first in Egypt and then in Türkiye, with participation by the air force. He said they had significantly improved interoperability between the two armed forces, strengthened their joint operational capabilities, and expanded the exchange of expertise. Talks in Ankara on Monday between Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler and Zaher covered bilateral defense and security issues, as well as ways to deepen cooperation, Akturk said.The two sides signed the letter of intent at the end of the meeting.
Defense industry push
Zaher and his delegation also met Haluk Gorgun, head of Türkiye’s Defense Industries Agency, to discuss defense industry cooperation and the development of joint capabilities. A letter of intent was signed during the meeting. Zaher also visited Turkish defense electronics company Aselsan, where Chief Executive Ahmet Akyol received him. The two sides discussed the company’s office in Egypt and new opportunities for defense industry cooperation.The Egyptian delegation also visited the Ozdemir Bayraktar National Technology Center, where it was briefed on Turkish drone manufacturing technology during a meeting with Selcuk Bayraktar, chairman of Baykar, maker of the Bayraktar drone. Turkish sources told some media outlets that Ankara had presented plans for joint production and technology transfers covering unmanned ground and aerial systems, armored combat vehicles, warships, naval platforms, electronic warfare technology and ammunition of various calibers. The sources said the most significant step in the aviation talks was Egypt’s agreement to join Türkiye’s fifth-generation KAAN fighter jet production program. They also said the two countries had made notable progress on plans for a local production line in Egypt for Bayraktar TB2 drones. The project would aim to meet the needs of Egypt’s armed forces and turn the country into a regional production hub serving global export markets, particularly in Africa, the sources said.
Strategic ties
Egypt’s ambassador to Ankara, Wael Badawi, said the strategic partnership between Egypt and Türkiye rested on longstanding historical, cultural, commercial and humanitarian ties. Speaking at a ceremony in Ankara on Tuesday marking Egypt’s national day and the anniversary of the July 23, 1952 revolution, Badawi said cooperation spanned several strategic sectors.These included defense and military industries, construction, tourism, healthcare, transport, energy, mining, and air and maritime links. Badawi said Egypt and Türkiye would continue to coordinate on regional and international issues, with the Palestinian issue leading the way, while supporting efforts to end the war in Iran and strengthen regional stability. The deepening military relationship has stirred concern among some parties, particularly Israel and Greece. Greek newspaper Kathimerini reflected those concerns, saying the recent growth in Turkish-Egyptian defense ties was causing unease in Greece. In a report titled “Türkiye and Egypt Draw Closer on Defense,” the newspaper examined Zaher’s talks with the head of Türkiye’s Defense Industries Agency and the letter of intent signed at the close of the meeting. It said the document could lay the groundwork for broader defense industry cooperation between the two countries. The report also highlighted Zaher’s meetings in Türkiye, noting that Egypt was seeking to become a center for drone production, a leading export of Türkiye’s defense industry. Kathimerini said the rapprochement did not currently pose a direct threat to Greek interests, but added to concerns at a time of shifting geopolitical balances across the region.

The Latest LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on 16-17 July/2026
Previewing the Trump-Aoun Meeting: A Make-or-Break Moment for the Israel-Lebanon Agreement
Robert Satloff/The Washington Institute/July 16/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/07/155982/
Circumstances are ripe for a successful visit, but both presidents are looking for more than bonhomie—Aoun needs practical U.S. commitments of operational and financial support, while Trump needs additional evidence of Beirut’s seriousness on disarming Hezbollah.
Stakes are high for the fledgling Israel-Lebanon framework agreement as President Joseph Aoun prepares to make his first-ever White House visit on July 21. The former army commander’s Washington meeting with President Trump—the first for a Lebanese president since 2009—is an opportunity for each leader to determine whether the other is serious enough to merit the substantial investment and risk needed to sever Lebanon from Iran’s orbit, disarm Tehran’s proxy Hezbollah, and pave a way toward Lebanon-Israel peace.
Diplomatic Context
Despite a history of U.S. assistance going back seventy-five years, close bilateral military ties, and a strong expatriate community in America, Lebanon was an afterthought for high-level White House engagement prior to the Iran war. During Aoun’s first year in office, Trump had no communication with him—no meetings, no phone calls, no letters. Aoun was granted just one high-level U.S. meeting—with Secretary of State Marco Rubio on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly last September. By contrast, Trump has had three face-to-face meetings with Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former jihadist who is now president of Syria.
Meanwhile, State Department officials and U.S. Central Command officers were facilitating the slow-moving process of implementing the November 2024 Israel-Lebanon “cessation of hostilities” agreement, a process that had stalled by the time the Iran war broke out this February. Two days after that eruption, Hezbollah launched a wave of missiles into northern Israel, opening a new front to support Tehran. In response, the Israel Defense Forces—which had until then limited their presence in Lebanon to five points near the international boundary—began a more extensive military operation.
Over the next three months, Hezbollah attacked Israeli communities and troops with more than 7,000 rockets, missiles, and drones, killing thirty-one people and wounding dozens more. Israel sent thousands of soldiers across the border and eventually created a buffer zone eight to ten kilometers deep into Lebanon. In addition to attacking Hezbollah weapons caches and facilities in the Beqa Valley and Beirut’s suburbs, Israeli forces fought to clear a broader area in the south up to and even beyond the Litani River. These operations left dozens of villages in ruins, thousands of Hezbollah fighters and civilians dead, and more than a million Lebanese displaced.
The focus turned to diplomacy shortly after a U.S.-Iran ceasefire was announced in April, with Washington brokering the first direct, public meeting between Lebanese and Israeli representatives. This was an unusual initiative from the beginning, since the government of Lebanon was not itself a combatant. Yet through diplomacy, Beirut hoped to reclaim from Hezbollah and Iran the capacity to make sovereign decisions about war and peace.
Subsequently, five rounds of talks produced the breakthrough “framework agreement” on June 26, thanks in part to Rubio’s personal intervention. The cornerstone of that deal is Lebanon’s agreement to disarm and dismantle all nonstate armed groups—code for Hezbollah—in exchange for Israel progressively redeploying from Lebanese territory. These efforts are expected to begin in “pilot zones” to be controlled by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and are wrapped in a broader commitment to reach full bilateral peace in the longer term.
The framework agreement was further complicated by the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding signed on June 17, which included an alternative path whereby Tehran and Washington could reach a “permanent termination” of the fighting in Lebanon while Israel played no role whatsoever. Hezbollah and its allies—including Lebanese Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri—jumped on the MOU option, since it envisioned unconditional Israeli withdrawal and had no hint of broader peace between Beirut and Jerusalem.
Since then, President Trump has been silent on which path he personally endorses: the framework agreement or the MOU. While he called Aoun on June 27 to congratulate him on the deal with Israel and to extend the invitation to Washington, there was no White House readout of their conversation, nor any other public statement by Trump on the framework agreement.
Sizing Each Other Up
This muddied state of affairs will presumably be clarified once Aoun arrives. His visit will be a make-or-break moment for the framework agreement, an opportunity to evaluate each leader’s commitment to the deal, and a test of whether this path to security and peace is worth pursuing.
Trump already knows that Aoun “talks the talk” on bucking Iran and embracing the idea of eventual peace with Israel, which is what earned the Maronite president—the only Christian head of state in the Middle East—a meeting. Aoun’s path of least resistance would have been to close ranks with Berri and let Tehran carry Lebanon’s water by attempting to secure an Israeli withdrawal through U.S.-Iran talks. But that would have left the president a powerless figurehead in a Hezbollah-dominated political system, which he refused to accept.
At the same time, however, U.S. officials have legitimate doubts about Beirut’s willingness to follow through on promises to disarm and dismantle Hezbollah. The first round of such efforts—the LAF’s assertion of “operational control” over the sector south of the Litani in late 2025—was found to be insufficient following the subsequent discovery of substantial Hezbollah assets and infrastructure there. Since then, LAF commander Gen. Rodolphe Haykal has repeatedly prioritized “civil peace” over any showdown with Hezbollah, while Aoun has talked in general terms of disarmament having political, economic, and military components. Given that Lebanese leaders have promised and failed to disarm Hezbollah multiple times over the past thirty-five years—from the Taif Accord through the 2024 ceasefire—Trump will want Aoun to explain how this time is different and when Beirut will start “walking the walk” by using all means against the group, including military coercion.
For his part, Aoun is eager to learn whether the White House will be a reliable backstop as he pushes back on pressure from Iran’s allies inside Lebanon, who seek to jettison the framework agreement in the name of “national consensus.” In practical terms, Aoun will want to hear whether Trump will invest substantial resources to develop the LAF’s capabilities, organize international support for Lebanon’s reconstruction, and press Israel to help empower him through incremental withdrawals. Aoun also comes with a historical shadow—he is keen to avoid becoming a latter-day Amin Gemayel, the president under whom Beirut signed the U.S.-brokered May 17, 1983, peace accord with Israel that collapsed ten months later under Syrian pressure. He is likely wondering about the U.S.-Israel relationship as well, given the Trump administration’s willingness to negotiate an Iran MOU without Jerusalem’s input or approval. On all these points, Aoun will want to have his concerns allayed.
What to Expect
Circumstances are ripe for a successful meeting—the U.S.-Iran MOU is in tatters, leaving critics of the Israel-Lebanon agreement with no easy alternatives. Because Aoun rejected Tehran’s control over Lebanon’s fate, the country did not automatically revert to a major combat zone when fighting resumed between the United States and Iran last week. Instead, Beirut and Jerusalem set the table for the White House get-together with a round of “fruitful and positive” technical talks in Rome this week to prepare for the launch of two LAF-controlled pilot zones, as envisioned in the framework. On a personal level, Trump will likely warm to Aoun, a battle-tested, war-weary Lebanese patriot who has taken a strong stand against Iran’s regional ambitions for the sake of national honor and the pursuit of peace—just the type of national leader Trump admires.
But both presidents are looking for more than bonhomie. Operationally, Aoun needs practical U.S. commitments of support to complement a personal embrace and a strong endorsement of the framework agreement. These could include:
offering to supply and train a Delta Force-style unit within the LAF that can conduct special operations against Hezbollah
providing drones, sensors, and other tools to enhance Lebanon’s border security against Hezbollah’s rampant smuggling of weapons, drugs, and people
organizing an international fundraising effort, both to begin the reconstruction of war-battered areas and to supplement the salaries of LAF troops so they are not woefully underpaid compared to Hezbollah fighters
initiating a planning process for significant business-sector initiatives to rebuild Lebanon’s shattered economy, and to take advantage of the opportunities presented by potential peace with Israel
Such visible U.S. support could help convince Aoun that Trump is invested in both him and the strategy of direct talks with Israel. Moreover, it would solve the problem of how to show near-term benefits of the framework agreement at a time when Israelis are consumed with their upcoming domestic election—a political circumstance that will make Jerusalem even more likely to push back on any suggestion (even from Trump) of significant Israeli redeployments beyond the pilot zones.
In exchange for this package of incentives, however, Trump will no doubt want to hear additional evidence of Aoun’s seriousness. This could include specific details of his plan to disarm and dismantle Hezbollah; promises to cashier LAF officers found to be complicit with Hezbollah, especially in military intelligence; and a commitment to suspend draconian laws banning all civilian contact between Lebanese and Israelis. Most of all, Aoun will need to reaffirm that peace with Israel is his strategic objective—indeed, the more he highlights his commitment to peace, the more time, space, and support Trump will likely give him.
Finally, the White House meeting will also give Aoun an opportunity to put a stake through the heart of a dangerous idea that seems to have grabbed Trump’s imagination: empowering Syria to dispatch troops into Lebanon to supposedly quash Hezbollah. Aoun is all too aware that any Syrian military intervention would revive memories of the horrors committed during the Assad regime’s iron grip on his country, in the process igniting sectarian divisions and boosting Hezbollah’s popular support. Despite Sharaa himself ruling out the idea, Trump keeps returning to it. Hopefully, Aoun will present such a convincing case of his own commitment to dismantling Hezbollah that Trump will finally let the Syria option go.
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/previewing-trump-aoun-meeting-make-or-break-moment-israel-lebanon-agreement
*Robert Satloff is the Segal Executive Director and Howard P. Berkowitz Chair in U.S. Middle East Policy at The Washington Institute.

Hizballah’s Deep State: The Real Challenge of Disarmament in Lebanon
Hanin Ghaddar/Washington Insitute/July 16/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/07/155977/
As long as the group’s economic, political, and institutional ecosystem remains intact, officials will need to pair disarmament efforts with a sustained strategy to target financial networks, political influence, and judicial infiltration.
This essay was originally published as part of the Middle East Institute report A Strategy to Win in Lebanon.
In June, the United States signed two documents bearing on Lebanon: a memorandum of understanding with Iran, and a Trilateral Framework Agreement with Israel and Lebanon. Both included a cease-fire commitment between Israel and Lebanon, but the first emboldened the Iranian regime, while the second empowered the Lebanese state. Only one of these initiatives can prevail. The chances of Lebanon’s sovereignty triumphing over Iranian hegemony have increased with the signing of the June 26 framework agreement; however, the Lebanese state has a long fight ahead, and the Trump administration needs to help.
To successfully weaken Iran in Lebanon, all of Hizballah’s pillars of power must be targeted. The framework agreement largely focused on its weapons and military infrastructure—which present an immediate threat to the security of both countries—by establishing pilot zones and linking Israeli withdrawal to the disarmament of the Iran-backed group.
But Hizballah is not just a military structure. It survives because of a strong and sustainable financial and political ecosystem embedded deep within state institutions that ensures cash flow from Iran and, if left unchecked, will support the rebuilding of its arsenal and military infrastructure. Even in the best-case scenario, one in which Hizballah surrenders all its arms, the group will still have the capacity to rebuild because of its power system within the state. Dismantling Hizballah’s economic ecosystem is the key to sustainable disarmament and the establishment of an enduring peace—the strategic goal of the agreement. Achieving it would consolidate the end of the Iranian militia.
On this issue, point 11 of the 14-point framework agreement states that “Lebanon and the United States commit to preventing funds from flowing to any entity, organization, or individual affiliated with non-state armed groups and to take available legal measures to proscribe the activity of any such entity, organization or individual.”
Despite its military losses since October 2023, Hizballah has still managed to protect its cash flow and power structure within state institutions. According to the US Treasury, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) managed to transfer over $1 billion to Hizballah in 2025, mostly through money exchange companies. The group used this money to import military materiel, produce more missiles and cheap drones, recruit more fighters, and pay salaries to its existing fighters and staff. 
According to sources in Lebanon, it was Hizballah’s access to security and financial institutions that enabled these imports—and as long as Iran sells oil, Hizballah will use its institutional power to keep the cash flowing.
Disarmament vs. Dismantlement
The framework agreement conditions Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon on the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deploying throughout the country and verifiably disarming Hizballah, an effort that will require a political decision by the Lebanese government that could lead to confrontation with the group. The US would oversee and support implementation, with future assistance to Lebanon tied to measurable progress, transparency, verified milestones, and ongoing oversight. (For more on US support for implementation and verification, see “Operationalizing the Trilateral Agreement.”) Lebanon must fulfill its commitment to disarm the militia, and US assistance should translate into more effective LAF operations. This is not a small task. It requires more than just a robust assistance program or a verification mechanism; it calls for institutional reform of the LAF, including the demotion and removal of officers who coordinate with the militia and help protect its interests. Currently, the LAF is infiltrated by Hizballah operatives, who share intelligence with the group and hinder the process of disarmament. (For more on assistance and support for LAF reform, see “Setting the Lebanese Armed Forces up for Success.”)
To make sure the group does not regenerate and rearm, Hizballah must be purged from the deep state—the institutions it inherited when Syria withdrew from Lebanon in 2005, and which are still run by its allies. The Trump administration could condition assistance to the LAF on benchmarks related to this process. Beirut, in turn, must implement the framework agreement in coordination with Washington, and most importantly, cooperate closely with the US and Israel to dismantle the IRGC’s ecosystem of military, financial, and political power in Lebanon.
Hizballah’s Non-Kinetic Pillars of Power
In addition to infiltrating the LAF and exploiting its capabilities, Hizballah has sustained its power and control through state financial, security, and judicial institutions:
Lebanon’s Cash Economy: Since the country’s financial crisis in 2020, the banking sector has been replaced by an unregulated, cash-based financial system, dominated by money service businesses (MSBs), exchange houses, and informal transfer networks. This transformation has been extremely useful to terrorist networks and has made counterterrorism efforts more difficult. Cash is harder to trace and regulate than the formal banking system and much easier to launder and circulate.
Hizballah has been exploiting this new system to move cash from Iranian oil sales through front companies and private networks in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region. The currency exchange network used by the group and its allies has helped circulate money in Lebanon without effective financial oversight, which collapsed along with the banking sector in 2019.
This cash system is protected by Hizballah’s allies in the state’s financial institutions, from the Ministry of Finance to the Council of the South to customs and public spending. Even as weapons were being collected and destroyed, cash to Hizballah was still flowing.
Lebanon committed to obstruct this flow by signing the framework agreement.
To counter Hizballah’s capture of the cash economy, the US should treat Lebanon’s economy as a national security battlefield. Escalating Treasury advisories and sanctions should be imposed on individuals and businesses facilitating the flow of cash to the group, and more pressure should be exerted on Lebanon to limit these illicit activities.
Bayt al-Mal and al-Qard al-Hassan (AQAH) are Hizballah’s core financial institutions—both sanctioned—but the group has been making extensive use of the MSB sector, such as Whish Money and OMT (Western Union). Whish Money transactions are mostly unregulated but operate under an informal agreement with Lebanese authorities, enabling it to act as a collection agent for various public sector dues, such as tax payments and utility bills, settled in Lebanese pounds (LBP). The collected LBP funds are exchanged for dollars on the black market on behalf of Hizballah or affiliated networks. The group also relies on individuals operating outside the formal financial system to conduct currency exchange and transfers. This system helps Hizballah to circulate cash to its members and institutions without hindrances.
The Judicial Sector: Impunity is Hizballah’s greatest political asset, and the militia’s deep reach into the state is protected by a thorough infiltration of the judicial system. Since its inception, Hizballah has enjoyed immunity from prosecution for every one of its crimes, including the assassination of opponents. The military court plays a significant role in targeting anti-Hizballah activists and journalists, with no oversight or legal protection for victims. A recent example is the prosecution of journalist Maria Maalouf and anti-Hizballah activists Joumana Gebara and Ahmad Yassine.
Since 1982, Hizballah has killed opponents, threatened adversaries, and used street violence to coerce political outcomes it could not achieve democratically. Most notably, it launched a military takeover of Beirut in May 2008 to defy the government’s decision to dismantle its communication network, forcing it to sign the Doha Agreement. This document, tantamount to a surrender, granted Hizballah minority veto rights within the Lebanese government, effectively handing over the state’s power to the militia. In 2019, the group again mobilized street violence to suppress widespread protests against economic mismanagement and to protect its corrupt allies.
Today, as Hizballah fights for its survival, many Lebanese fear the return of violence. Without judicial reform, Hizballah will keep calculating that it can coerce Lebanese and get away with crime and terror.
Sanctioning judges who are complicit in protecting the group and attacking its opponents can help change this dynamic, especially if it occurs in parallel with efforts by the Lebanese state to remove these judges and reform the military court to end civilian prosecutions. Once freed from the grip of the military court and the oppressive judiciary, Lebanese—and especially the Shi’a—will speak out openly against the group.
The Security System: Hizballah inherited the Assad regime’s capture of state institutions and the collusion of their allies when Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon in 2005. Despite changes in government and parliament, these state institutions were never cleansed. Even after the formation of the new government in February 2025, Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, a key political ally of the group, managed to secure many vital appointments in security institutions.
The Lebanese General Directorate of General Security has historically been linked to Hizballah, and its close coordination with the group on domestic security, borders, and points of entry was underscored in May 2026 when the US Treasury Department sanctioned Brig. Gen. Khattar Nasser Eldin, a top security official, for sharing vital intelligence with the militia.
The Shi’a Community: Hizballah would have no fighters, no voters, and no political representation without the support of the Shi’a community. That backing has eroded sharply as it became clear that the “resistance” has failed to liberate their land or protect them—dragging them instead into repeated wars with Israel, most recently in March 2026, that brought destruction, displacement, and occupation.
Reconstruction is not guaranteed, and Iran failed to save them. Not only was their father figure, Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, killed, but much of the Shi’a community now realizes that the group cannot protect them. Yet dissent is still discreet and gradual, because there is no political force offering an economic and political alternative to Hizballah. Shi’a opposition groups are still politically immature and divided, and the state remains too weak to constitute an alternative.
That being said, the opportunity to support an economic alternative that would encourage and empower independent Shi’a businesspeople to invest in their communities is stronger today. Economic development in the south will require dismantling the Hizballah-Amal control of the Shi’a private sector and guaranteeing stability and peace between Lebanon and Israel.
The Hizballah-Amal Alliance
The Amal movement, headed by Speaker Nabih Berri, has been Hizballah’s main strategic ally since the end of the civil war in Lebanon. Without Amal, Hizballah would not have had sufficient access to state institutions, and without Hizballah, Amal would lose municipal and parliamentary elections and have limited access to Hizballah’s financial networks.
The speaker of parliament since 1992, Berri gives Hizballah critical political cover—blocking appointments and parliamentary decisions it opposes, securing ones it benefits from, and lending it institutional legitimacy.
However, Berri has presented himself to the international community as a mediator and an intermediary, a role he has used to empower his and Hizballah’s interests. For example, in 2025, he blocked efforts in parliament to address the group’s weapons and helped, via Amal ministers (such as Minister of Finance Yassine Jaber), to earmark $130 million for the Council of the South—a corrupt organization well-known for being controlled by Amal and Hizballah.
Following the 2020 Beirut port explosion, Berri publicly criticized and stymied the investigation into responsibility for the disaster. He also supported efforts to replace the supervising judge, Tarek Bitar, directing Amal to demand his removal. Amal politicians filed legal complaints that suspended Bitar’s investigation for more than a year.
Berri’s role grew exponentially after Nasrallah was killed. Militarily, the IRGC took over Hizballah’s command, but politically and financially, Berri was given a higher-profile leadership role, gaining many benefits in return. He is the only Lebanese figure who communicates with Iranian leadership, and therefore, he is the leader orchestrating Hizballah’s campaign to abolish or counter the framework agreement and help Iran take over the Lebanon file.
Speaking to the pro-Hizballah newspaper al-Akhbar, Berri said that the US-Iran talks are the only realistic opportunity to secure an Israeli withdrawal from the country and that any bid to separate Lebanon from the US-Iran track would sustain Israeli occupation. This followed a phone call with Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who told Berri that “a cease-fire in Lebanon is of the same importance to us as a cease-fire in Iran.”
Hizballah-IRGC Tools
Without Berri and the IRGC, there is not much left of Hizballah today in Lebanon. Israel destroyed much of its military infrastructure and degraded its command structure significantly.
Hizballah has always been a de facto arm of the IRGC, in part because Iranian military leaders regard Lebanon as a central component of their strategic depth in the region. Yet the IRGC dramatically tightened the leash after Israel killed Nasrallah. According to sources close to the group, the IRGC began deploying hundreds of commanders to Lebanon in November 2024 to rebuild and restructure Hizballah. Israel has released the names of dozens of IRGC officers killed in action throughout Lebanon, and social media obituaries reveal various Syrian and Iraqi fighters killed there while operating in Hizballah units.
Meanwhile, the Iranian regime is trying to regain control of the Lebanese file and keep it on the negotiating table with the US in Switzerland—part of its strategy to empower Hizballah, its allies, and other regional proxies. Iran wants to ensure that Lebanon does not disarm its leading proxy and that Hizballah does not lose its financial, political, and security power. It is trying to regenerate the organization quickly to maintain a critical level of threat against Israel.
For now, the IRGC’s main priority is to ensure Hizballah’s survival and its financial capacity to rearm; that is, having sufficient funds to import material to rebuild its infrastructure, produce drones and missiles, pay fighters’ salaries, provide some social services, and resume compensations to those who lost homes and properties. For the Iranian regime, Hizballah’s financial infrastructure, 90% of which comes from Iranian oil sales, is of utmost importance.
The challenge—besides disarmament—is to stop this cash flow. Without it, Hizballah cannot rebuild, rearm, or regain the support of the Shi’a community.
Lebanon-United States Tools
The Trump administration must look beyond the issue of disarmament and address the group’s broader ability to restore itself. Several steps will be crucial to this effort:
Diplomatically, it will be important to maintain the separate diplomatic tracks between Lebanon and Iran. The Iranian regime may try to jeopardize the Lebanon-Israel framework agreement and put the Lebanese file back on the table as a condition to continue the talks to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. However, it is vital to empower the Lebanese state in its efforts to regain its sovereignty and agency over decisions of war and peace. Iran has always viewed Lebanon as its regional battlefield, but this agreement is the best chance to achieve lasting peace between Lebanon and Israel.
Financially, Lebanon should do more to rein in Hizballah’s control of the cash economy, restore trust in the banking sector, implement overarching financial and economic reforms, and cut its access to funds. The US Treasury Department could issue warnings or advisories—backed up by the threat of sanctions—to the companies facilitating Hizballah’s shadow economy and illicit finance network. Sanctions should target the officials and individuals helping the group raise, move, and store funds.
It should be communicated clearly to the Lebanese government that reforms must be comprehensive, directed at all state entities (such as the Council of the South), the judicial system (to preserve financial accountability), and the Customs Administration (to limit smuggling). Meanwhile, Washington should ensure all actors implicated in the financial collapse are held accountable.
Washington should also target Hizballah’s allies. Berri, in particular, should be made to understand that the risks of supporting Hizballah outweigh the benefits. The Trump administration’s most effective tool for swaying Berri and his circle is targeted sanctions—progressing from Amal officials to their family members and including personal financial assets. (For more on dismantling illicit networks and the current predatory economic system, see “From Player to Referee: Dismantling the Culture of Entitlement and Cartelization in Lebanon.”)
Politically, Washington and its allies should find ways to empower the Shi’a community by supporting economic alternatives to dependency on Hizballah and encouraging independent Shi’a businesspeople to invest in Lebanon. This is important because Hizballah is already starting to prepare for the parliamentary elections in May 2028, and without a strong alternative, it (along with Amal) could regain a monopoly on Shi’a seats in parliament and maintain their ecosystem of political and financial power.
In addition, Washington should thwart plans to integrate Hizballah within Lebanese state institutions or provide it with more political power in return for disarmament. This kind of Faustian bargain would only strengthen its position and allow the group to rearm in the future.
To prevent Hizballah’s reconstitution, the group’s commanders and fighters should not be integrated into the LAF, and its social organizations should not be absorbed into state institutions, as militias were after the civil war. Iraq shows the cost: absorbing Shi’a militias into the army failed, and disarming them has only grown harder as the line between militias and state forces blurred. Integrating the IRGC within state institutions would only empower Iran and weaken the state. Hizballah must not be allowed to win politically what it failed to achieve militarily, thereby strengthening Iran’s control of Lebanon’s institutions.
Both Amal and Hizballah leaders have argued that the Shi’a community, widely considered Lebanon’s largest sect, is underrepresented in the political system. Over the years, they managed to increase Shi’a institutional sway by expanding the power of the speaker of parliament, putting the position on an equal footing with the president and the prime minister, and securing greater influence over government decision-making and major state appointments. This institutional power should not be unduly increased, as it would only solidify Iranian control of Lebanon.
Finally, reaching a peace deal is in the interest of both Lebanon and Israel, but it would also align with the Trump administration’s policy objectives. The framework agreement stresses peace as the ultimate goal and therefore confirms that an end to the conflict between Lebanon and Israel should not be separate from disarmament efforts.
Dismantling Hizballah’s economic ecosystem is the key to sustainable disarmament—and peace will consolidate the end of this Iranian militia. Lebanon is closer to achieving that objective, but will succeed only if US policy is firm, comprehensive, and willing to raise the cost of obstruction.
Ultimately, lasting disarmament depends on dismantling Hizballah’s entire ecosystem of power—not only its weapons, but also its financial networks, parallel institutions, political leverage, and illicit economic infrastructure that sustain its military capabilities. A credible path toward peace between Lebanon and Israel would reinforce these efforts by strengthening the state, supporting economic recovery, and making disarmament politically and strategically sustainable.
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hizballahs-deep-state-real-challenge-disarmament-lebanon
NB: This essay was originally published as part of the Middle East Institute report A Strategy to Win in Lebanon.
https://mei.edu/report/a-strategy-to-win-in-lebanon/
*Hanin Ghaddar is the Friedmann Senior Fellow in The Washington Institute’s Rubin Program on Arab Politics.

The Iran-Backed 'Decisive Campaign' To Destroy Israel and the West
Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/July 16/2026
The documents, recovered by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the Gaza Strip and published by the Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute, reveal that Hamas had meticulously planned the October 7 massacre more than a year before it was carried out. They also expose Sinwar's unwavering commitment to Hamas's founding objective: the destruction of Israel through mass murder and conquest.
The operational planning was astonishingly detailed. Sinwar envisioned breaching the border simultaneously at 25 locations using approximately 2,500 terrorists in the opening assault.
Sinwar estimated that approximately 10,000 "well-trained fighters" would eventually be required to carry out the operation successfully. Each Israeli community was assigned specific assault teams. Military bases were designated for destruction. Strategic road junctions were mapped and allocated to specialized units. Every aspect of the operation had been carefully calculated.
These were not defensive plans. They were invasion plans.
Perhaps the most disturbing revelation concerns Sinwar's own understanding of the consequences of his actions. He fully anticipated that Israel would respond with overwhelming force. "The enemy will not hesitate to use all the means and weapons at its disposal," he wrote. "It may even use a nuclear bomb."
Despite this extraordinary assessment, Sinwar concluded that the invasion should proceed because "this campaign is a battle of life or death."
He deliberately chose to launch the attack because advancing Hamas's ideological objective – the destruction of Israel – was more important to him than the lives of the Palestinians under his rule.
This is perhaps the clearest evidence yet that Hamas has never been a national liberation movement primarily concerned with improving the lives of Palestinians. Rather, it is an Islamist terrorist organization prepared to sacrifice its own people in the pursuit of its ideological war against Israel.
The lesson from these documents is that Hamas remains committed to the same objectives that guided its founders nearly four decades ago: eliminating Israel through violence and replacing it with an Islamist state.
Hamas is but one component of a broader Iranian strategy aimed at undermining American influence and destabilizing pro-Western Arab governments throughout the region, apparently to drive US forces out of the region, thereby leaving the run of the Middle East, unimpeded, to the ruthless Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps now ruling Iran.
The October 7 massacre was not an aberration. It was the realization of a strategy, reportedly conceived seven years in advance. Preventing another October 7 requires more than temporary ceasefires or diplomatic initiatives. It requires ensuring that Hamas can never again function as either a military force or a political authority.
Anything less invites more catastrophes, as we have seen for 47 years, from Iran's attacks on Israel, Arab neighbors, brutalized citizens, the United States, and the West.
Perhaps the most disturbing revelation of recently published internal Hamas documents concerns its late leader Yahya Sinwar's own understanding of the consequences of his actions. He fully anticipated that Israel would respond to the October 7 massacre with overwhelming force. "The enemy will not hesitate to use all the means and weapons at its disposal," he wrote. "It may even use a nuclear bomb." He deliberately chose to launch the attack because advancing Hamas's ideological objective – the destruction of Israel – was more important to him than the lives of the Palestinians under his rule.
Many Western politicians, diplomats, academics and media commentators have argued that the Iran-backed Hamas terrorist group launched its October 7, 2023 invasion of Israel because of the Israeli "blockade" on the Gaza Strip, from the necessity by Israel to prevent Hamas from smuggling in weapons with the sole purpose of destroying its Jewish neighbor.
Others claimed that economic hardship and humanitarian conditions had driven Hamas to carry out the deadliest attack against Jews since the Holocaust. Some argued that Hamas had by then evolved into a pragmatic movement interested in governing the Gaza Strip and finally willing to coexist with Israel.
Recently disclosed documents handwritten by the late Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar have irrefutably demolished these claims.
The documents, recovered by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the Gaza Strip and published by the Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute, reveal that Hamas had meticulously planned the October 7 massacre more than a year before it was carried out. They also expose Sinwar's unwavering commitment to Hamas's founding objective: the destruction of Israel through mass murder and conquest.
These documents should at last put an end to the fantasy that Hamas could ever be transformed into a moderate political party or persuaded to abandon its jihad (holy war) against Israel.
Far from seeking to ease the suffering of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, Hamas knowingly launched an operation that it understood would bring unprecedented destruction upon the territory it claimed to govern.
Hamas simply did not care.
The captured documents show that October 7 was not a spontaneous outburst of violence or a desperate reaction to economic conditions. It was a carefully designed military campaign whose objectives included capturing territory, overrunning military bases, seizing more than 220 Israeli communities, taking hostages, and inflicting maximum casualties on Israeli civilians.
One handwritten document dated August 24, 2022 outlines Sinwar's instructions for launching what he called the "decisive campaign." It includes detailed operational directives covering every stage of the invasion, from deception measures designed to lull Israel into complacency to the breaching of the border fence, psychological warfare, and the documentation of atrocities committed against Israeli civilians and soldiers.
The deception phase alone exposes the calculated nature of Hamas's preparations.
Sinwar instructed his operatives to conduct "intensive" activities in the Gaza Strip during the weeks preceding the attack while ensuring that these movements appeared routine so Israel would not suspect that an unprecedented invasion was imminent.
These measures included directing Hamas forces to train for operational readiness but to do so openly and document it with television crews. Sinwar believed concealing the exercises would alert Israeli security, whereas doing them openly would create the illusion that the drills were "just for show."
Sinwar also ordered the resumption of violent confrontations with Israeli troops along the border in the weeks before the attack under the guise of a crisis related to the economic situation in the Gaza Strip.
"Deception was central to Hamas' strategic preparations for the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre," according to the Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute.
"[T]he combined elements of the plan were intended to create the false impression that Hamas had been deterred, especially since Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021, and that it neither wanted nor was capable of launching an offensive attack on Israeli territory. Ultimately, the plan successfully misled Israel's security establishment and decision-makers, who believed Hamas had indeed been deterred and was focused on governance in the Gaza Strip and improving the Gazans' living conditions, and its public military exercises were nothing more than a demonstration of strength."
Hamas was not reacting impulsively to political developments. It was patiently preparing for one of the most sophisticated terrorist operations in modern times.
The operational planning was astonishingly detailed. Sinwar envisioned breaching the border simultaneously at 25 locations using approximately 2,500 terrorists in the opening assault. The objective was not just to penetrate Israeli defenses but to seize strategic road junctions and military installations, disrupt Israeli military reinforcements, and provide Hamas fighters with freedom of movement deep inside Israeli territory. Additional assault waves would follow according to detailed operational maps prepared long in advance.
Another document written on the same day expands the invasion plan even further. It calls for the seizure of more than 220 Israeli communities, including kibbutzim, towns and cities. Sinwar estimated that approximately 10,000 "well-trained fighters" would eventually be required to carry out the operation successfully. Each Israeli community was assigned specific assault teams. Military bases were designated for destruction. Strategic road junctions were mapped and allocated to specialized units. Every aspect of the operation had been carefully calculated.
These were not defensive plans. They were invasion plans.
Also revealing are Sinwar's instructions concerning Israeli civilians. The documents call for the "expulsion" of Israeli residents, prioritizing women and children, while men between the ages of 17 and 50 were to be taken hostage. Terrorists were instructed to confiscate telephones and personal documents. Entire communities were to be emptied. Large Israeli cities were to be evacuated "toward the sea."
The intention was not simply to attack Israel but to conquer territory and remove its population.
The reality proved even more barbaric. During the October 7 massacre, Hamas terrorists ignored even these written instructions. Instead of limiting hostage-taking to military-age men, they abducted babies, children, women, and elderly civilians. Those who were not kidnapped were often murdered in cold blood. Entire families were slaughtered in their homes, and many of the atrocities were filmed and broadcast by the terrorists themselves.
Perhaps the most disturbing revelation concerns Sinwar's own understanding of the consequences of his actions. He fully anticipated that Israel would respond with overwhelming force. "The enemy will not hesitate to use all the means and weapons at its disposal," he wrote. "It may even use a nuclear bomb."
Despite this extraordinary assessment, Sinwar concluded that the invasion should proceed because "this campaign is a battle of life or death."
This single passage destroys another widespread misconception – that Hamas was acting in the interests of Gaza's civilian population.
The Hamas leader knew that the invasion would likely trigger massive destruction in the Gaza Strip. Nevertheless, he deliberately chose to launch the attack because advancing Hamas's ideological objective – the destruction of Israel – was more important to him than the lives of the Palestinians under his rule.
This is perhaps the clearest evidence yet that Hamas has never been a national liberation movement primarily concerned with improving the lives of Palestinians. Rather, it is an Islamist terrorist organization prepared to sacrifice its own people in the pursuit of its ideological war against Israel.
Hamas leaders continue publicly to praise the October 7 massacre and repeatedly promise to carry out similar attacks in the future.
"We are called a nation of martyrs, and we are proud to sacrifice martyrs," said senior Hamas official Ghazi Hamad. "We must teach Israel a lesson and we will do this again and again. The Al-Aqsa Flood is just the first time, and there will be a second, a third, a fourth because we have the determination, the resolve, and the capabilities to fight."
More importantly, the organization has not abandoned its strategic alliance with Iran, which continues to finance, arm, and train Hamas as part of Tehran's long-term effort to surround Israel with terrorist proxies.
This is why Hamas represents a threat not only to Israel. The Iranian regime and its network of proxies have repeatedly targeted American forces in the Middle East, attacked international shipping lanes, and launched missiles and drones against several Arab Gulf states. Hamas is but one component of a broader Iranian strategy aimed at undermining American influence and destabilizing pro-Western Arab governments throughout the region, apparently to drive US forces out of the region, thereby leaving the run of the Middle East, unimpeded, to the ruthless Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps now ruling Iran.
The newly uncovered documents also raise an uncomfortable problem for the Trump Administration. More than six months have passed since President Donald J. Trump announced his plan for ending the war in the Gaza Strip and called for the demilitarization of the Strip. Yet Hamas remains in power. The terrorist organization has tightened its grip on much of Gaza, restored command structures, recruited thousands of new fighters, and resumed manufacturing weapons while rebuilding parts of its tunnel network.
The lesson from these documents is that Hamas remains committed to the same objectives that guided its founders nearly four decades ago: eliminating Israel through violence and replacing it with an Islamist state. So long as this ideology survives, Hamas will remain a mortal threat not only to Israel but also to regional stability, America's Arab allies, and the broader interests of the United States.
The October 7 massacre was not an aberration. It was the realization of a strategy, reportedly conceived seven years in advance. Preventing another October 7 requires more than temporary ceasefires or diplomatic initiatives. It requires ensuring that Hamas can never again function as either a military force or a political authority.
Anything less invites more catastrophes, as we have seen for 47 years (here, here, here and here), from Iran's attacks on Israel, Arab neighbors, brutalized citizens, the United States (here, here, here and here), and the West.
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/22705/iran-hamas-campaign-to-destroy-israel
**Khaled Abu Toameh is an award-winning journalist based in Jerusalem.
**Follow Khaled Abu Toameh on X (formerly Twitter)
© 2026 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute.

L’Iran et le compte à rebours
Dr. Charles Chartouni/Ici Beyrouth/16 juillet
Les négociations entre les États-Unis et l’Iran arrivent à leur terme. Il serait illusoire d’attendre, dans les semaines à venir, un revirement spectaculaire. Les principaux désaccords portent sur la gestion du détroit d’Ormuz, le respect du droit international de la mer, les attaques menées contre les États voisins, la fiabilité des accords bilatéraux signés entre eux, les sanctions financières, ainsi que les programmes de militarisation conventionnelle et nucléaire. Ces différends traduisent des incompatibilités de fond qui rendent toute réconciliation durable improbable. Ce constat ne surprend guère: il s’inscrit dans la continuité des quarante-sept années de la République islamique.
Chaque président américain a tenté de résoudre ce dossier sans parvenir à un règlement durable. Au terme de chaque mandat, les conflits ont été différés plutôt que résolus. Donald Trump reprend aujourd’hui ce dossier après deux séquences de confrontation militaire et une politique d’endiguement menée entre ses deux mandats. Les États-Unis semblent désormais réduits à une stratégie d’usure, combinant sanctions, pressions et frappes ciblées contre les infrastructures stratégiques permettant à l’Iran de poursuivre sa politique de coercition.
Quelle que soit l’évolution du conflit, la question centrale demeure celle du régime lui-même. La République islamique revendique une forme d’exception idéologique qui la place, selon sa propre logique, au-dessus des règles communes, aussi bien à l’intérieur qu’à l’extérieur de ses frontières. Cette posture explique sa politique régionale et internationale, fondée sur la subversion, l’intimidation et la projection de puissance.
L’état de terreur imposé à la société iranienne trouve son prolongement dans les réseaux de déstabilisation que le régime entretient au Moyen-Orient et au-delà. Les négociations actuelles ne font finalement que confirmer ce que l’expérience des quatre dernières décennies a déjà démontré.
Les accords conclus avec les États voisins n’ont jamais eu d’effet dissuasif sur un pouvoir résolument expansionniste. Les tensions autour du détroit d’Ormuz, les violations répétées du droit maritime et les attaques menées contre les pays de la région en témoignent. Plus révélateur encore est le fait que le régime continue de négocier le maintien de ses «plateformes opérationnelles intégrées», pourtant largement détruites par les opérations israéliennes consécutives au pogrome du 7 octobre 2023. L’objectif paraît être moins la recherche d’un compromis durable que la reconstitution du rapport de forces antérieur, au prix de compensations financières et d’allègements des sanctions. Dans cette logique, les capacités balistiques demeurent au cœur des négociations, alors même que le régime porte la responsabilité de plusieurs décennies de déstabilisation régionale.
Cette stratégie s'inscrit dans un continuum où les conflits conventionnels se prolongent par le terrorisme, les guerres par procuration et la criminalité organisée. À cela s'ajoutent des alliances de circonstance avec les puissances néo-totalitaires et plusieurs régimes latino-américains, notamment le Venezuela, Cuba et le Nicaragua, afin de multiplier les foyers de tension dirigés contre les États-Unis. Ces partenariats illustrent les nouvelles formes de confrontation stratégique qui caractérisent l'après-guerre froide.
Les opposants à une intervention militaire invoquent principalement les risques d'une nouvelle guerre et ses conséquences géopolitiques dans un Moyen-Orient déjà profondément déstabilisé. Reste cependant une question essentielle : le refus de la guerre permettra-t-il réellement d'éviter un conflit, ou ne fera-t-il que reporter une confrontation devenue inévitable?
Au-delà de cette interrogation se pose celle de la possibilité même d'une paix régionale durable. La crise iranienne n'est peut-être que le symptôme d'un déséquilibre plus profond, marqué par des États fragiles, des régimes autoritaires et des équilibres fondés exclusivement sur les rapports de force. Toute stratégie de stabilisation devra partir de ce constat. Dans cette perspective, le maintien du régime iranien apparaît difficilement compatible avec une véritable pacification régionale.
Le Liban illustre explicitement cette problématique. Depuis des décennies, il constitue l'un des principaux instruments de projection de l'influence iranienne. Son inclusion dans les négociations révèle les véritables objectifs de Téhéran: préserver ses relais régionaux, conserver sa capacité de nuisance et gagner du temps plutôt que rechercher un règlement définitif. La stratégie du chaos institutionnalisé demeure au cœur de son action. Tant que cette logique prévaudra, les perspectives de stabilisation resteront limitées. La région continuera d'évoluer dans un équilibre instable, où chaque crise porte en elle les germes de la suivante.

Iran and the Countdown
Dr. Charles Chartouni/Ici Beyrouth/July 16/2026  (Translation from French)
The negotiations between the United States and Iran are coming to an end. It would be illusory to expect a spectacular turnaround in the coming weeks. The main disagreements concern the management of the Strait of Hormuz, compliance with international maritime law, attacks against neighboring states, the reliability of bilateral agreements signed between them, financial sanctions, and conventional and nuclear militarization programs. These disputes reflect fundamental incompatibilities that make any lasting reconciliation unlikely. This finding is hardly surprising: it is part of the continuity of the forty-seven years of the Islamic Republic.
Every American president has tried to resolve this file without reaching a lasting settlement. At the end of each term, conflicts have been deferred rather than resolved. Donald Trump is taking up this file again today after two sequences of military confrontation and a policy of containment carried out between his two terms. The United States now seems reduced to a strategy of attrition, combining sanctions, pressure, and targeted strikes against the strategic infrastructure that allows Iran to pursue its policy of coercion.
Regardless of the evolution of the conflict, the central question remains that of the regime itself. The Islamic Republic claims a form of ideological exception that places it, according to its own logic, above common rules, both inside and outside its borders. This posture explains its regional and international policy, based on subversion, intimidation, and power projection.
The state of terror imposed on Iranian society finds its extension in the destabilization networks that the regime maintains in the Middle East and beyond. The current negotiations ultimately only confirm what the experience of the last four decades has already demonstrated.
Agreements concluded with neighboring states have never had a deterrent effect on a resolutely expansionist power. The tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, repeated violations of maritime law, and attacks carried out against countries in the region bear witness to this. Even more revealing is the fact that the regime continues to negotiate the maintenance of its "integrated operational platforms," despite them being largely destroyed by Israeli operations following the October 7, 2023, pogrom. The objective seems to be less the search for a lasting compromise than the reconstitution of the previous balance of power, at the cost of financial compensation and sanctions relief. Within this logic, ballistic capabilities remain at the heart of the negotiations, even as the regime bears responsibility for decades of regional destabilization.
This strategy is part of a continuum where conventional conflicts are prolonged through terrorism, proxy wars, and organized crime. Added to this are alliances of circumstance with neo-totalitarian powers and several Latin American regimes, notably Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, in order to multiply the hotbeds of tension directed against the United States. These partnerships illustrate the new forms of strategic confrontation that characterize the post-Cold War era.
Opponents of military intervention mainly invoke the risks of a new war and its geopolitical consequences in an already deeply destabilized Middle East. However, an essential question remains: will the refusal of war really make it possible to avoid a conflict, or will it only postpone a confrontation that has become inevitable?
Beyond this questioning arises that of the very possibility of a lasting regional peace. The Iranian crisis is perhaps only the symptom of a deeper imbalance, marked by fragile states, authoritarian regimes, and balances based exclusively on power relations. Any stabilization strategy must start from this observation. From this perspective, the maintenance of the Iranian regime appears difficult to reconcile with true regional pacification.
Lebanon explicitly illustrates this problem. For decades, it has been one of the main instruments for projecting Iranian influence. Its inclusion in the negotiations reveals Tehran's true objectives: to preserve its regional relays, maintain its nuisance capacity, and buy time rather than seek a definitive settlement. The strategy of institutionalized chaos remains at the heart of its action. As long as this logic prevails, the prospects for stabilization will remain limited. The region will continue to evolve in an unstable equilibrium, where each crisis carries within it the seeds of the next.

But What Was the Old Order?
Samir Atallah/Asharq Al Awsat/July 16/2026
Talk of the New World Order has dominated almost every other topic in recent years. But what was the old order - the system that ruled the world after the end of World War II – that we are saying goodbye to? Historians agree that it was built on five myths: the imminent end of the world, the idea of the hero, the monster, the martyr, and the final resurrection. World War II was one of the most destructive events in human history. For the men and women who lived through it, the experience was often too overwhelming for conventional language to describe.
Instead, they turned to religious or mythological imagery to understand the incomprehensible. These images and ideas have remained deeply rooted ever since, forming the foundation upon which the post-war order was built. But now, with the passing of the generations that lived through the war, the myths they lived by have begun to fade. Perhaps the most powerful image to emerge in 1945 was the myth of "Armageddon." Victor Klemperer noted that the ruins of Munich in 1945 reminded him of Judgement Day.
Eyewitnesses from Warsaw, Manila, and Hiroshima used similarly apocalyptic language because they could find no other way to express the sheer enormity of what they witnessed. Even historians sometimes use the same metaphors; for example, Max Hastings' bestselling history on the end of the war is titled Armageddon. For the war generations, this myth represented a valuable warning: "We must never allow ourselves to slide into a world war."
Amidst that catastrophic landscape of 1945, there were three other myths: the hero, the martyr, and the monster. Every nation had its own version of this trilogy, but the stereotypes endured. Out of all the myths that emerged from 1945, this one is perhaps the most important because it gave the war its meaning. It was the prize awarded to heroes and martyrs, making their sacrifices feel worthwhile. It was also the idea that gave the perpetrators of the war a chance to atone for their sins.
These five myths (the imminent end of the world, the idea of the hero, the monster, the martyr, and the final resurrection) yielded the overarching narrative upon which the post-war world was built. Today, the generations that constructed these myths are passing away. With their departure, we are losing the bond that held the international order together.
Over the past twenty years, each of these myths and archetypes has lost its grip on the global consciousness. Take the archetype of the hero, for example. No one truly believes in the Soviet war hero anymore, and the image of the British war hero has been tarnished by its colonial past. Even the American soldier is subject to constant criticism. The respect that Europeans once held for the "Greatest Generation" has dwindled due to recent American behavior, particularly threats to invade European territories like Greenland. In short, the hero is dead. Did he ever even exist?
The same applies to the martyrs of the war. For decades, "the Jew" was the universal martyr, but this symbol is now also being undermined by critics of events in the Middle East. Criticism of Israel now regularly morphs into a renewed hatred of Jews, with devastating consequences for Jewish communities worldwide. While historians tirelessly attempt to remind people that "Israel" and "Judaism" are not the same thing, much of the world has stopped listening. Just as the image of the global martyr is being distorted, the global "monster" is also being rehabilitated. Nazis and their symbols are no longer ostracized as they once were. Extreme right-wing ideology has witnessed a rise across the globe over the past twenty years.
Farewell.

Iran Does Not Want the Negotiations to Come to an End!
Huda al-Husseini/Asharq Al Awsat/July 16/2026
Whenever the United States and Iran draw closer to the negotiating table, the same question resurfaces: Can a lasting agreement be reached with the Islamic Republic of Iran, or do negotiations simply turn into a new pitstop in a long, never-ending conflict? Indeed, the experience spanning since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 indicates that the relationship between the two parties has never known true stability; rather, it has moved from one crisis to another, and from one round of negotiations to a new, more complex one.
Today, escalation is returning, and contacts between Washington and Tehran are resuming through the mediation of several countries - most notably the Sultanate of Oman, Qatar, Türkiye, Pakistan, and Egypt - in an attempt to contain the tension and prevent the region from sliding into a wider confrontation. However, the path does not seem easy, as each party enters negotiations with entirely different goals from the other. Many experts believe that negotiating with Iran differs from conventional diplomacy, not only because of the issues on the table, but also due to the very nature of the regime itself, which blends religious, political, military, and security considerations, alongside distinct cultural temperaments. Therefore, any agreement is not confined to a single issue but extends to a broad network of regional and international interests.
The late Israeli diplomat Uri Lubrani, Israel’s last ambassador to Iran before the Islamic Revolution, was among those who warned most strongly against underestimating the Iranians' negotiating skills. He famously described Iranians as "a nation of carpet weavers and chess players," referring to their immense patience and their ability to think several moves ahead. He believed that Tehran does not treat negotiations as a fast track to an agreement, but rather as a tool to improve its political posture and buy time, even calling their style of managing negotiations "a masterpiece in misleading the world."
Whether one agrees or disagrees with this assessment, it reflects the prevailing impression among many diplomats who have dealt with Iran over the past decades.
Perhaps the most defining feature of Iranian policy is its ability to pursue multiple tracks simultaneously. It negotiates, but at the same time, it maintains various leverage points - whether through its regional influence, military and security files, or its ability to impact maritime navigation and energy flows in the Gulf. Consequently, observers note that Tehran always makes sure never to enter any negotiations stripped of its pressure cards.
The role of mediating countries is particularly prominent at this stage. These countries do not merely pass messages between the two sides; they play a larger role in aligning positions, opening backchannels, and defusing tension when negotiations hit a dead end.
In recent years, Türkiye has gained extensive experience in this field, leveraging the role of its security and diplomatic apparatuses in managing complex regional crises. Pakistan has also bolstered its presence by hosting meetings and helping the parties keep the dialogue alive despite major disagreements.
These countries do not view mediation solely as a diplomatic chore, but also as an opportunity to enhance their regional and international standing. Every success in bridging viewpoints grants them greater political weight and increases their influence over other dossiers within the region.
As for Iran, it realizes that time may be one of its most critical elements of strength. The longer negotiations drag on, the more pressure builds on the other parties - whether due to security concerns, volatility in energy markets, or domestic political calculations. For this reason, several analysts believe that the Iranian leadership does not view the time factor as a burden, but rather as a card that can be capitalized on to secure better terms.
In contrast, the US administration faces different pressures. It is expected to demonstrate its ability to prevent military escalation while simultaneously avoiding concessions that might appear too significant to the American public.
Furthermore, any developments on the ground in the Middle East could directly impact domestic US politics, especially with upcoming elections, a factor that narrows Washington's margin of maneuver.
The difficulty of the negotiations is not limited to nuclear issues alone; it also encompasses the future of economic sanctions, Iran's regional role, maritime security in the Gulf, and relations with US allies in the region. Consequently, reaching a comprehensive agreement requires addressing deeply intertwined files, each with its own calculations. At the same time, Iran faces internal challenges that cannot be ignored. The economy has been suffering for years under sanctions, foreign investments remain limited, and inflation and rising prices are squeezing citizens. Meanwhile, the state requires substantial resources for reconstruction and to offset the losses left by the recent war. Therefore, while Tehran needs to ease economic pressures, it seeks to do so without appearing to make concessions that compromise its standing or influence.
Conversely, policymakers in Washington realize that any agreement lacking clear guarantees could turn into a temporary truce rather than a permanent solution. Hence, negotiations continue with a high degree of caution, as each side tests the other's intentions before moving toward more significant steps.
The fundamental question remains: Can diplomacy end this long conflict? So far, there is no definitive answer. History shows that relations between the United States and Iran have gone through several phases of rapprochement and tension, and that previous agreements did not prevent the return of new crises.
Thus, the current phase looks like a new test of diplomacy's capacity to achieve a genuine breakthrough. Success will depend not only on what is said inside the negotiation rooms, but also on the political, security, and economic developments taking place outside them.
In the end, the biggest challenge may not be signing a new agreement, but rather the ability to sustain it and turn it into lasting stability in a region accustomed to seeing temporary settlements morph into new crises shortly thereafter.

The Dilemma of the American Initiative in Sudan
Osman Mirghani/Asharq Al Awsat/July 16/2026
Sudanese people never tire of debating politics, nor do they stop doing so. This may well be one of the afflictions of political life - if not one of its curses. The constant debate over every issue and every detail has made politics an exhausting endeavor in Sudan, complicating consensus-building to the point where wrangling has become a defining feature of political work and an obstacle to dialogue and stability. It was therefore unsurprising to see the intense controversy surrounding the leaks related to the American proposal to end the war, the government's response to it, and the web of conflicting narratives about a meeting in Cairo between US envoy Massad Boulos and Sovereign Council member Lieutenant General Shams al-Din Kabbashi. Even after the United States denied reports that most elements of the plan had been accepted or that disagreements were limited to one or two points, the rumor continued producing new versions of events. The government's silence undoubtedly created fertile ground for speculation. Transparency is necessary, even when the nature of negotiations requires a degree of confidentiality regarding details. Had the state simply announced that it had received the American proposals and was studying them, it could have curtailed much of the speculation.
In truth, what has been leaked about the initiative has nothing new in its broad headlines. Most of the provisions have been previously proposed, and the American envoy himself has discussed them in media interviews. If there is anything new, it lies in certain details or in aspects of the responses to the proposals—matters that none of the parties has officially disclosed. The central pillar of the American plan is a 90-day humanitarian ceasefire. Under this framework are proposals for mutual military withdrawals to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, protect civilians and infrastructure, and establish mechanisms for monitoring and ensuring implementation. The plan envisions using the ceasefire’s timeframe to pave the way for negotiations on a permanent ceasefire, followed by a political process and national dialogue, leading to the formation of a civilian government to oversee the transition and prepare for elections.
It is clear that the dispute does not concern the duration of the ceasefire or its broad objectives, but rather what would take place during it, specifically the arrangements for withdrawals, redeployments, and control of territory. As Massad Boulos has explained on several occasions, the American proposal calls for implementing the ceasefire first and then discussing withdrawal and redeployment arrangements during the truce. The Sudanese position, however, as articulated by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and reflected in the government's peace plan, insists that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) must first withdraw from all cities and locations they occupied after the Jeddah Platform of May 2023. These forces would then be concentrated in designated areas to prevent the ceasefire from becoming an opportunity for them to consolidate their positions, receive new supplies, and reorganize their ranks.
For its part, the RSF, while accepting most elements of the plan, appears determined to reject any withdrawal from its current positions, viewing its presence on the ground as the key guarantee of a role in any future arrangements.
How does the American plan differ from the Quad initiative?
Although US efforts have dominated the spotlight, the proposed plan appears more an extension of the Quad's initiative than a separate undertaking. The United States led the drafting of the proposal and conducted direct negotiations with the Sudanese parties, but it has continued to coordinate closely with the other members of the Quad. As a result, the general principles have remained the same, while US efforts have focused on refining the details and attempting to bridge differences.
What are the chances of success?
Four scenarios can be envisioned.
The first scenario is that developments emerge which make the current plan acceptable as it stands. This appears highly unlikely given the complexities surrounding military withdrawals, as well as the more sensitive issue of the RSF’s future and whether any role for the group could be accepted.
The second scenario involves introducing amendments that would make the plan acceptable to all sides. However, this seems akin to squaring the circle in light of the wide gap between the parties regarding military arrangements.
The third scenario is the adoption of a gradual approach, beginning with a limited ceasefire in certain conflict hotspots, such as the city of El Obeid, while opening safe corridors for humanitarian aid and implementing confidence-building measures. This scenario may be plausible given growing humanitarian and international pressure. However, it would not achieve the breakthrough Washington hopes for, and the continuation of military operations would remain a factor undermining its prospects for success.
The fourth scenario is the failure of the initiative, as happened with previous efforts. In that case, the question becomes whether the US administration possesses the desire and determination to continue mediation efforts and search for new formulas, or whether its attention will shift to other international crises and the approaching US midterm congressional elections, pushing the Sudan file lower down the list of priorities. In any event, the future of the initiative will not be determined solely by developments in Washington. It will also depend on events on the battlefield, where military developments could reshape the balance of power and impose entirely different equations.

The US and the Middle East Dilemma
Dr. Abdel Monem Said/Asharq Al Awsat/July 16/2026
I ask the kind reader's indulgence to reuse the exact title I previously employed in this space on December 23, 2009. At that time, speaking of the "perplexity" of a superpower like the United States was considered a form of intellectual recklessness, especially given the well-known wealth of intellect generated by institutions dedicated to preserving the global status that rendered Washington a sole superpower after the end of the Cold War. We were still in the first decade of the 21s century, two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union and Fukuyama’s prophecy of the "End of History" at the American stage of liberal democratic state ideals. "Globalization" became an approach linking the human race to a planet whose outlook on the universe was rendered tangible through unprecedented technological forms. Although the dawn of the new millennium witnessed the first signs of the "Clash of Civilizations" when the September 11, 2001, attacks took place, the American response in Afghanistan and then Iraq revealed a certain lack of wisdom within the United States' policymaking.
Over the course of a quarter-century, four leaders alternated in steering the United States: George W. Bush for two consecutive terms, Barack Obama likewise for two terms, Donald Trump for a first term interrupted by Joe Biden’s single term, until Trump returned once again.
The focus on leadership here is because the "individual" and their ideologies have come to play central roles in strategic decisions regarding the management of international relations, including decisions of war and peace. At the start of the third millennium, the US president was not leading the United States alone; alongside and around him was the "Neoconservative" camp, whose slogan was for the 21st century to be an American century, just as the 20th had been. All elements of American power attested that "globalization" had become an open global system for innovation, communication, and openness, revolving in various ways around Washington. The collapse of the World Trade Center in New York on September 11 was enough to make the elite surrounding the president lose their bearings, leading to the consecutive decisions to invade Afghanistan and then Iraq. Reshaping and molding political systems became an end in itself; ignoring the capacity of nations and peoples to shape themselves through genuine organic development drove negative, and in many cases, catastrophic outcomes. The eruption of the so-called "Arab Spring" was fueled by the "creative chaos" once spoken of by Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State at the time.
The situation back then was not much different from what is happening these days under Trump’s leadership. Here, the simplicity once held by the Neoconservatives, who believed that America must lead and the world would follow, grows more complicated. In their view, Washington should never have to ask anyone's permission for its actions; as long as it foots the political bill, those who do not pay should keep their advice to themselves.
It was not known at the time whether any of these actors actually possessed viable solutions to the dilemmas and intricacies of international relations, including untangling the Middle Eastern "dilemma", which has remained untouched since the "Clinton understandings" before he left the stage.
Then came Obama, riding a wave of European, Asian and broad global admiration unseen for an American president since John F. Kennedy. Yet, this admiration did not grant the new president winning cards, even after he explicitly declared that the US could no longer act alone and indeed, that no one could lead the world without cooperating with others. There was much of that classic American idealism in his approach, which inadvertently opened the door to a crude form of "realism" that arrived with the first Trump administration. That term ultimately culminated in a clash with Congress, the sidelining of institutions leading the fight against COVID-19, and accusations of election rigging levied against American institutions - an act that compromised the legitimacy of the American system in the eyes of the public and new American generations.
The inherent tension between these two pillars of thought - idealism and realism - within the American intellectual apparatus is precisely what led to the election of Biden, followed immediately by the return of Trump. The profound perplexity felt by both American public opinion and the global community when dealing with the US has triggered a severe intellectual upheaval within the country. This uncertainty has manifested itself most forcefully in how Washington deals with the Middle East.
Resolving the Middle Eastern "dilemma" became an impossible task, given a US that is deeply torn between its strategic interests across Arab nations and, at the same time, its absolute inability to distinguish between Israel as a state defined by the UN Partition Plan, and the imperialist Israeli impulse bent on expanding territory while subjugating the Palestinians. The spectacle of the current war in the region is a direct consequence of both regional frailty in managing its own affairs peacefully, and a weakened US unable to handle it effectively.

Selected Face Book & X tweets on 16 July
Benjamin Netanyahu - בנימין נתניהו
https://x.com/netanyahu/status/2077758905015320599/video/1
Tell me, Eizenkot, did you really compare IDF soldier Yosef Haddad to Mansour Abbas of the Muslim Brotherhood—just to justify the fact that you don’t have a government without the Arab parties?

Tom Harb
With President Aoun’s upcoming visit to the White House on July 21, I hope it’s a serious working meeting, not just a photo op.
If the Foreign and Defense Ministers are in the delegation, it shows real intent to follow up on key issues important to President Trump and the Lebanese people: normalization with Israel and the disarmament of Hezbollah, paving the way for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Without concrete follow-up, it risks being another symbolic visit.

Michael Oren
https://x.com/DrMichaelOren/status/2077837240353312844/video/1
The United States has one—and I stress one—military ally willing to fight shoulder to shoulder with America, with military and technological capabilities equal to, if not surpassing, its own. Why would anyone who cares about American security weaken that alliance?

Secretary Marco Rubio
Today, I designated two additional Mexican cartels, the Juárez Cartel and Los Viagras, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Under President Trump’s leadership, we will never stop fighting against violent narco-terrorists from flooding our nation with deadly drugs.

Hiba Nasr
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has announced a $10 million reward for anyone who kills President Trump.
The statement says the reward was announced in response to President Trump’s praise for the killing of Qassem Soleimani during his WH meeting with the Iraqi prime minister.
Full Statement:
In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful
“And there is life for you in legal retribution (qisas), O people of understanding, so that you may become righteous.” (Qur’an 2:179)
The clearest evidence of the moral collapse of the U.S. administration is the brazen boasting of the criminal Trump about his treachery and aggression in targeting the leaders of victory, the martyred commanders Hajj Qassem Soleimani and Hajj Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (may God be pleased with them). This shameless arrogance has only elevated their pure blood, granting them greater honor and eternal remembrance, while leaving their killer with everlasting disgrace and shame that will haunt him and his administration for as long as life endures.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq announces a $10 million reward, collected through donations from its loyal members and steadfast supporters, to be awarded to anyone who kills the criminal Trump, or to whomever decides to allocate or direct the reward to an individual, a group, an entity, or an institution.
The free people of the world will continue to pursue the killer of children and scientists. Tyrants shall never know peace, nor will the criminal find a safe haven to shield himself from the wrath of honorable people. Retribution remains a solemn pledge upon the necks of the mujahideen, and the blood of the martyrs will remain a curse that shakes the thrones of the arrogant until the aggressors are defeated and the strongholds of tyranny collapse.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq

Israel-Alma
Weapons Smuggling Attempt Foiled at al-Tanf Crossing (July 16) – Southeastern Syria: Iran's Land Corridor to Lebanon Remains Active
Today (July 16), the Syrian authorities announced that they had foiled an attempt to smuggle weapons intended for Hezbollah through the al-Tanf border crossing on the Iraq–Syria border (the Iraqi side of the crossing is known as al-Waleed).
The Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon land corridor continues to serve as a route for transferring weapons even after the fall of the Assad regime.
The weapons were concealed inside an oil tanker truck that was reportedly en route to the city of Baniyas in northwestern Syria. This route is routinely used to transport fuel from Iraq through the al-Tanf crossing to Baniyas, likely for refining or export via the Mediterranean Sea. Hezbollah exploited this legitimate civilian route and the truck's cover story to smuggle the weapons. The shipment was likely intended to be unloaded at one of the smuggling hubs along the Syria–Lebanon border and then transferred into Lebanon.
The al-Tanf crossing is of strategic importance. It constitutes the shortest and fastest overland route from Iran, through Iraq, into Syria, and onward to Lebanon. During the U.S. military presence in the area, alongside the activities of the opposition force Maghawir al-Thawra, Iran's ability to use this route was significantly constrained. Following the U.S. withdrawal and the transfer of security responsibility to the al-Sharaa government, Iran has likely resumed its smuggling efforts along this route while exploiting the cover of legitimate civilian truck traffic.
Among the items visible in the images released by the Syrian authorities are:
- At least 100 UAVs (drones).
- Optical fiber spools.
- RPG warheads that appear to have been factory-prepared for mounting on UAVs, equipped with dedicated electrical release mechanisms and mounting bolts, rather than improvised adaptations as seen in the past.
- Anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs).
- And, most likely, Paveh-family cruise missiles.
This shipment is consistent with Hezbollah's current force build-up priorities, particularly the strengthening of Unit 127 (the aerial unit), alongside the Radwan Force and its weapons production, logistics, and supply networks.