English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News &
Editorials
For September 19/2026
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news
The Bulletin's Link on the lccc Site
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/aaaanewsfor2026/english.september19.26.htm
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Bible Quotations For today
My kingdom is not from this world. If my kingdom
were from this world, my followers would be fighting to keep me from being
handed over to the Jew
John 18/33-38: “Then Pilate entered the headquarters again, summoned Jesus, and
asked him, ‘Are you the King of the Jews?’ Jesus
answered, ‘Do you ask this on your own, or did others tell you about me?’Pilate
replied, ‘I am not a Jew, am I? Your own nation and the chief priests have
handed you over to me. What have you done?’Jesus answered, ‘My kingdom is not
from this world. If my kingdom were from this world, my followers would be
fighting to keep me from being handed over to the Jews. But as it is, my kingdom
is not from here.’Pilate asked him, ‘So you are a king?’ Jesus answered, ‘You
say that I am a king. For this I was born, and for this I came into the world,
to testify to the truth. Everyone who belongs to the truth listens to my voice.
’Pilate asked him, ‘What is truth?’ After he had said this, he went out
to the Jews again and told them, ‘I find no case against him.”
Titles For The English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News &
Editorials published on September 18-19/2026
Statement of Condemnation and Denunciation of the Unjust Verdict Against
Journalist Maria Maalouf/Elias Bejjani/September 18, 2027
Clownish MPs spawned by the incubators of the Iranian occupation/Elias Bejjani/September
17, 2026
Elias Bejjani/Video link and full text of my interview with journalist Joe
Ibrahim/An exposing reading of the situation and the heresies and narcissism of
the owners of our party-companies and those in charge of our Church and our MPs
and rulers... a group of scribes and Pharisees who sold our people and our
homeland for thirty pieces of silver
Video link and transcript of an English interview from the Jerusalem Post
website with former US Deputy Presidential Envoy to the Middle East, Morgan
Ortagus/An important interview confirming that Israel is the only power capable
and willing to save Lebanon, help minorities, and fight Iran
Video link, and Arabic and English text for Hussein Abdul Hussein’s commentary
on the Saudi situation in light of Houthi attacks against it, the disruption of
its oil exports, and the necessity that it defend itself
From Democracy to "Mediocracy"/Abu Arz /September 18, 2026
Ambassador Aissa’s Tour of the South: Messages to the Shiites, Iran, and
Israel!/Lara Yazbeck/Al-Markaziya/ September 18, 2026
US Department of Defense: Lebanese Army’s Poor Performance Is a Matter of Will
Israeli Army Accuses Lebanese Army of Breaching "Security Zone"; Zamir: Our
Forces Are Inside Lebanon to "Thwart Threats"
Following the Deir Mimas Incident: A Clarification from the Lebanese Army;
Israel States It Pushed Army Personnel Away from the Southern Security Zone
Received training from "Hezbollah"... The Lebanese judiciary accuses 14 people
of planning attacks in Syria
Lebanon: Israeli force retreats after advancing to an army observation point in
Deir Mimas; Lebanese Army sends reinforcements to the town amidst a state of
"high alert on both sides."
Prime Minister Chairs Meeting of the Higher Council for Privatization; Discusses
Draft Decree to Establish "Electricité du Liban" Company and Studies on the
Tripoli Economic Zone
Salam Calls Berri to Discuss Developments in the South and Agenda for Washington
Meetings
Israeli Occupation Force Approached and Threw Sound Grenades
President Aoun at St. George Cathedral to Offer Condolences to Camille Chamoun
on His Father’s Passing
President Aoun Emphasizes Realistic Solutions to IMF Delegation; Reviews Paris
Meeting Outcomes and New York Agenda with Salam
Speaker Berri Receives IMF Mission, German Ambassador, Rmeich Municipality
Delegation, and IDAL Head: Any Law Must Guarantee Depositors' Rights and Their
Deposits in Full
Mufti Qabalan: Whoever Bargains Over the Fate of the Resistance Bargains Over
the Fate of Lebanon’s Sovereignty
Ali Ammar: What happened in Deir Mimas is an attack on all of Lebanon and must
prompt the authorities to review their paths and choices.
A Message from the Fakhoury Family Following Our Return to Lebanon
Withdraw... Either from Parliament or from the Weapons/Sanaa Al-Jack/Nidaa Al-Watan/September
19, 2026
Solve It, Joe/Imad Moussa/Nidaa Al-Watan/September 19, 2026
Paris Maps Out Army Support/Joe Rahal/Nidaa Al-Watan/September 19, 2026
The Paris Conference and the Deferred Capital of "Political Logic"/Samer Zreik/Nidaa
Al-Watan/September 19, 2026
Enduring, Enduring, Enduring... Then What?/Dr. Jocelyne El-Boustani/Nidaa Al-Watan/September
19, 2026
Who sent our children to the path of death?/Retired Brigadier General Tony Abi
Samra/ Call of the Nation/ September 19, 2026
Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News
published on
September 18-19/2026
Sharaa secretly building up Syrian military, raising red flags in Israeli
security community
Trump weighs renewed major attacks on Iran: Report
Iran says struck oil tanker in Strait of Hormuz
France will convene G7 energy summit: Macron
Taliban spokesperson warns Pakistan against military action, calls for Saudi
mediation
Agency: Seoul Confirms to Washington Its Intention to Contribute to Restoring
Freedom of Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz... Diplomatic Efforts Regarding
North Korea
Al Arabiya Sources: Pakistan’s Interior Minister to Discuss Houthi Escalation in
Yemen During Upcoming Iran Visit
661 Houthi Violations Against Civilians in Taiz in 12 Days... A Scenario
Reflecting the Widening Scope of Attacks from Targeting Individuals to Striking
Homes and Facilities
Prominent Houthi Commander and Aides Killed in Yemeni Airstrike Near Bab al-Mandab
(Kahboub Front)
False US AI-generated intel report almost sparked confrontation with China:
Report
Titles For The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials
from miscellaneous sources published
on September 18-19/2026
The "Resistance"’s Copium of Denial/Makram Rabah/levanttime/18 September ,2026
Saudi Arabia Picked a Fight With the Two Nations That Could Help It the Most
Against the Houthis — Israel and the UAE/Hussain Abdul-Hussain/algemeine/September
18/2026
Don’t Let Lebanon’s Peace Agreement Prove Hezbollah Right/By Jean Aziz/Just
Security Magazine/September 16/2026
Three Things that Concern Israelis – No, It Is Not Iran, Hamas and
Hezbollah/Nils A. Haug/Gatestone Institute/September 18, 2026
Iraq’s Militia Balancing Act Gets Trickier Amid Deadlines and Saudi
Attacks/David Schenker/The Washington Institute/September 18, 2026
Extremist Settler Terrorism and Violence in the West Bank: New Data Calls for a
New Strategy/Neomi Neumann/The Washington Institute/Sep 18, 2026
The Real U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Deal Is Better Than We Thought/Richard Nephew/War On
Rocks/September 17, 2026
Selected Face Book & X tweets on September 18/2026
Latest English LCCC Lebanese &
Lebanese Related News & Editorials published
on September 18-19/2026
Statement of Condemnation and Denunciation of the
Unjust Verdict Against Journalist Maria Maalouf
Elias Bejjani/September 18, 2027
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/09/157613/
In a new disgraceful precedent confirming the extent of the degradation and
hijacking of judicial institutions in Lebanon, the so-called “Permanent Military
Court” in Beirut issued an invalid and unjust in absentia ruling sentencing
prominent journalist and activist Maria Maalouf, who resides in the United
States of America, to 15 years of hard labor under loose and fabricated charges
such as “national treason” and violating the laws boycotting Israel, against the
backdrop of her sovereign views and courageous stances opposing Iranian hegemony
and demanding peace.
In the strongest terms, this oppressive and politicized decision is condemned
and denounced, while emphasizing the following legal and rights-based constants:
The Nullity and Illegitimacy of the Court: The Military Court in Lebanon is an
exceptional, unconstitutional court that lost its judicial character since the
ominous era of the Syrian occupation, and transformed completely since 2005 into
an oppressive tool in the hands of the Iranian occupation represented by the
terrorist Hezbollah militia, entirely controlled by the dominant apparatus (the
Shiite dualism: the Amal Movement and Hezbollah) and constantly working to
terrorize Lebanon’s free people and muzzle free expression.
The Absence of Legal Effect: This verdict issued in absentia against a
journalist living outside the borders of militia authority, in a state governed
by the human rights charter, is a verdict void of legal and rights-based
validity, and represents a documented crime against freedom of opinion and
expression, and a malicious use of the judiciary as a claw to implement
occupation agendas and intellectual and political inquisitions.
The Responsibility of the Political Authority: We hold President Joseph Aoun,
Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and the Lebanese government fully and historically
responsible for the continuation of this judicial farce. The executive
authority’s failure thus far to close the Military Court, and more dangerously,
the inability to rein it in and prevent it from issuing unjust rulings against
every free-thinking voice that rejects Hezbollah’s occupation and calls for
peace, represents a implicit partnership in the horrific collapse of the rule of
law.
Accordingly, we demand the following:
The immediate and final closure of the “Military Court” and the removal of its
lawless authority over civilians and opinion writers.
The annulment and invalidation of all invalid and oppressive rulings that have
been and are being issued by this hijacked-will court.
The opening of an investigation and judicial and professional prosecution of all
judges who chaired this court, who were nothing more than cheap instruments to
execute the orders and plots of the Syrian and Iranian occupations.
Peace with Israel, and the overthrow of Lebanon’s arena being left open for the
merchants of the alleged “resistance” lie and the arms of the occupation, have
today become more than ever an urgent existential and national necessity to
restore Lebanon’s sovereignty and kidnapped identity.
Backgroung
Accused of Treason… Maria Maalouf Faces 15 Years in Prison
Janoubia/September 17, 2027 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
The Permanent Military Court in Beirut issued an in absentia ruling sentencing
media figure Maria Maalouf to 15 years of hard labor in a case filed by lawyer
Ghassan Mawla, acting on behalf of the Committee of Representatives of Released
Prisoners and a number of journalists, before the Military Public Prosecutor’s
Office. According to the ruling, Maalouf was convicted of crimes related to
‘national treason,’ calling for foreign aggression aimed at ‘displacing and
killing Lebanese, violating sovereignty, and destroying the state,’ in addition
to violating laws related to contact and normalization with Israel. The verdict
was issued against the backdrop of the lawsuit filed against her before the
military judiciary, with the decision handed down in absentia due to her failure
to attend the trial sessions.
The author, Elias Bejjani, is a Lebanese expatriate activist
Clownish
MPs spawned by the incubators of the Iranian occupation
Elias Bejjani/September 17, 2026
Clownish Lebanese so called
MPs spawned by the incubators of the Iranian occupation—men held by the throat
through dossiers involving moral misconduct, financial impropriety, corruption,
or subservience. They are utterly worthless.
Elias Bejjani/Video link and full text of my interview
with journalist Joe Ibrahim/An exposing reading of the situation and the
heresies and narcissism of the owners of our party-companies and those in charge
of our Church and our MPs and rulers... a group of scribes and Pharisees who
sold our people and our homeland for thirty pieces of silver
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AOdEG8ibka0
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/09/157518/
September 14, 2026
Christians in Lebanon, where to? Parties trading in representation and an absent
Church
Headlines:
The Christian situation is catastrophic and the Church is absent from
consciousness
Christian parties are family companies trading in representation
How they deprived expatriates of the right to vote in exchange for an MP seat in
the North?
The latest American decision on Hezbollah and pushing the buttons on the files
Who owns the decision of the Christians today?
Introduction:
In a frank and bold interview with journalist Joe Ibrahim within the program
"Pod Siyasi" on SBC LEBANON channel, Lebanese expatriate political activist and
owner of Al-Monsaqiyya website Elias Bejjani opens files that have been silenced
about the reality of Christians in Lebanon. Bejjani considers that the Christian
situation has reached a catastrophic stage, and that the Church is absent from
confronting existential dangers, while Christian parties have turned into family
companies owned by individuals and families, whose first concern is their
private interests and covering the occupation, first Syrian and today Iranian.
Summary:
Bejjani believes that Christian leaderships have abandoned Christian and
national principles and 1450 years of martyrdom history, and accepted to work
under the cloak of occupation in exchange for benefits. He describes these
leaderships as playing the role of small dictatorships, and owning mouthpieces
that attack anyone who criticizes them. He accuses the Lebanese Forces of
colluding to deprive expatriates, 90% of whom are Christians, of their electoral
right in exchange for a parliamentary seat in Tripoli or Baalbek.
And Bejjani links the recent wave of statements describing Hezbollah as a
"Lebanese party" and a "partner" to the latest American decision which
considered the party a non-Lebanese organization completely affiliated with
Iran. He says this decision frightened the Shiite duo and the deep state, so
buttons were pressed on the files they own against Christian leaders.
He cites the glorification by President of the Republic Joseph Aoun of Nabih
Berri's speech at the White House and at the Embassy, and the statement of Tarek
Mitri who considered Hezbollah Lebanese despite its connection to Iran, and
Samir Geagea sending Melhem Riachy to dialogue with Hezbollah, and the sermon of
the Maronite Patriarch who said Hezbollah is a "partner." He considers that
whoever describes the killer and the occupier as a partner commits a great sin.
He directs sharp criticism at the Patriarchate, questioning the building of a
house for Walid Ghayyad in Harissa on land where building is not allowed, and
the relationship with Abdo Abu Kasm, considering it an abnormal and un-Christian
relationship. He also strongly criticizes the method of the Lebanese Forces in
dealing with critics of Samir Geagea, such as Alfred Madi and Charles Chartouni,
where they are defamed and attacked via media machines.
He concludes that the Maronite political and religious class is the product of
the occupation's machines, citing the visit of delegations of bishops and
priests to the Mleeta museum belonging to Hezbollah. He stresses that Christians
are expelled from the state, and reports show there are no Christians in the
joints of the state, and none of the leaderships raise their voice. He considers
that Samir Geagea and Sleiman Frangieh are not fit for the presidency of the
Republic, describing Geagea as a small dictator who does not believe in
democracy and is not fit to be president.
Full text of the interview
Question: Where are the Christians from everything happening in the region and
Lebanon?
Our situation as Christians is not only miserable, it is a million degrees below
miserable. Our Church is unconscious, and when it takes a position unfortunately
it is a non-ecclesiastical, non-Lebanese, unethical and non-Christian position.
Our Christian leaders whom I have been calling for years "owners of
party-companies," because there are no parties in Lebanon but companies owned by
individuals and mostly inherited, their first concern is their personal
interests.
And since the Palestinian occupation until today where there is the Iranian
occupation, all these Christian leaderships accepted to work under the
occupation and cover it in exchange for benefits. So they deviated from the
Christian path, buried 1450 years of history, forgot the martyrs, and worked for
their interests. They covered the Syrian occupation and worked with it, and
covered the Iranian occupation and worked with it, and are still on the same
path, far from everything that is a Christian existence, and far from Lebanon as
a sovereign, free, independent state.
And more dangerous is that the majority of them play the role of small
dictators. They have a company with employees, and they have trumpets and
cymbals, and they consider that they alone have the right to speak in the name
of Christians. And when any Christian activist comes out and criticizes a
position of one of them, and in the eyes of their followers they are idols, they
attack him with their trumpets and belittle him and assault him. We are in a
catastrophic Christian situation.
I as an expatriate, the Lebanese diaspora is the hope. What did they do to us in
the last election law? The Lebanese Forces and the "Aounists" and with them the
actual ruler in Lebanon which is the Shiite duo and what is called the deep
state, deprived us of the right to vote. Imagine, in exchange for an MP in
Tripoli for the Forces or an MP in Baalbek, they deprived us expatriates, 90% of
those registered among us are Christians, of our right to vote.
I as a Lebanese-Canadian, what are my expectations from the owners of the
party-companies and from my Church? I can say with a clear conscience and based
on thousands of documented facts that these are my enemies. I as a Lebanese
expatriate Christian, these are my enemies and they work with the occupation.
Before we start, I want to raise the issue of the latest American decision
issued about 10 to 15 days ago. The decision added to the designation of
Hezbollah in America that it is not only terrorist, and it has been classified
as terrorist for years, but considered it entirely non-Lebanese and affiliated
with Iran. This decision frightened the ruling Shiite duo and all who cover it
from all sects. So the sick minds in the deep state led by the Iranian moved and
pressed the button on every Christian leadership they have a file on.
What they wanted to do and are still continuing to do is targeting everyone who
considers that Hezbollah is not Shiite, and that Hezbollah is not Lebanese, and
that Hezbollah did not liberate the South, and that Hezbollah is not
representative of the Shiite sect in parliament, and that all its wars are
absurd non-Lebanese wars.
And they started through the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council with Youssef Khoury
and filed a lawsuit against him. What is the case? That Youssef said in more
than one interview that Sheikh Naim Qassem and the rest of Hezbollah leaders
call their absurd wars "Karbalaean," and they are not Karbalaean but suicide.
And for this conspiracy to be complete, let's follow whose buttons they pressed.
Whoever presses someone's button has prepared a file for him and tells him move
or we will start. They started with President Joseph Aoun who glorified Nabih
Berri's speech on the occasion of the anniversary of Musa al-Sadr. And Nabih
Berri's speech was completely devoid of any mention of Lebanon or the Lebanese
identity of Lebanon or the non-Lebaneseness of Hezbollah and what is called the
lie of resistance.
Even Fouad Siniora, the national hero, glorified Berri's speech. And Prime
Minister Nawaf Salam does not want to talk, so he sent Tarek Mitri. This Tarek
Mitri who was denying the Damour massacre, the leftist who was fed the milk of
Arafat and Abdel Nasser, came out in a TV interview and said that Hezbollah is
Lebanese despite its connection to Iran.
And with Samir Geagea, they brought out Melhem Riachy for us. He said he wants
to have a dialogue with Hezbollah. My brother, if this is a terrorist and an
Iranian army in Lebanon and an occupier of Lebanon and assassinated all the
leaders in Lebanon and brought Lebanon to hell, do you dialogue with him? You
put him on trial.
And more dangerous than all of these, the Patriarch came out in his sermon
before last Sunday and said Hezbollah is a partner. How do you not want to upset
the partner? What is this catastrophe?
We conclude in a scientific and academic way that someone pressed their buttons
and threatened them with their files. So if our Church considers the killer and
the criminal and the occupier a partner, and if our President of the Republic
whose doors of the White House were opened to him and after two hours went to
the Embassy and criticized all the talk he said in the White House and glorified
Berri, as if he glorifies Satan in heaven, this is the interpretation of Joseph
Aoun's marketing of Berri in the White House.
And in the Embassy he repeated the same talk that Hezbollah came as a result of
occupation. My brother there are standards. On what standard was he chosen as
president? If Hezbollah in its documents and speech says I am Iranian and I am a
soldier in the army of Wilayat al-Faqih.
In 2012, I am one of the people who most carried a campaign against Patriarch
al-Rahi when he came to Canada. I personally called the Foreign Minister and
asked him not to receive him because he does not represent the Maronites. And he
came marketing in America and Canada and France that the Assad regime and Iran
are the protectors of Christians.
How did the Patriarch come? Everyone knows he came on the background of files
and buttons. And the one he placed beside him and whose reputation is bad and
gave him a piece of land and built him a house in the middle of Harissa
monastery on land where building is prohibited is Walid Ghayyad. What is his
story? Period. This is Abdo Abu Ghayyad with the Patriarch. The relationship is
abnormal and un-Christian, it is a satanic relationship.
And the same applies to Abdo Abu Kasm. I have 20 videos of them appearing on
Al-Jadeed and on LBCI, whenever someone hints that the Patriarch is against
Hezbollah they come out and say never, the Patriarch loves Hezbollah and
Hezbollah is resistance. We return to the same story of files and buttons.
As for Melhem Riachy, the Forces are on my head and my eyes, Samir Geagea is the
biggest Christian leader he has 18 MPs, but we have 64 or 65 Christian MPs, and
therefore these 18 or 20 are not all Christians. Dr. Geagea with respect to his
person, whenever someone criticizes a position of his, not a personal criticism,
they attack him. Alfred Madi, who is not only a Becharre native, this is from
the bone of Bachir and from the founders of the Lebanese Forces, when he was
beside Bachir and achieved countless accomplishments, others were still wearing
shorts and playing in front of his house. When he criticized two positions of
Geagea all the media machines attacked him.
And the same with Charles Chartouni who was a member of the Metn council and
with the rank of minister and from the founders of all the organization in the
Lebanese Forces. How do they criticize Melhem Riachy? What they do is
unacceptable.
I want to say to Dr. Geagea you are the biggest leader existing today in Lebanon
by virtue of reality. You must know that you do not represent Christians alone,
you have part of the Christian representation, but you must leave freedom for
people to criticize your positions. Whoever criticizes a position of yours you
should not betray him and consider him an agent and attack him. This is the
policy of Hezbollah and this is the policy of all owners of party-companies.
The real leader's most important quality is that he knows how to choose his
advisors. This is what distinguishes Bachir Gemayel from Samir Geagea and from
the rest of leaders and from the Patriarch and from the President of the
Republic.
Today what governs Lebanon under the Maronite presidency is the government of
advisors. Everyone knows that in the days of Elias Hrawi there was a government
in the facade, Hariri or Hoss, but the actual ruler was a government from behind
the curtain, Syrian. Today with all facts and with all of President Aoun's talk,
he has a government of advisors that sometimes speaks of things he does not
know, because they are the rulers and they are affiliated with Berri and
affiliated with Hezbollah from the remnants of the loudmouths and the uprooted
who were with Aoun and the nationalists and the rest of opportunists and
arrivistes.
This political class and religious class and especially Maronite is all the
hatching of occupation machines. Imagine a herd of bishops and priests went to
Mleeta, to Hezbollah's museum in the South and cheered for Hezbollah. These have
nothing called Christian, these are infidels. A bishop goes and glorifies the
occupier and the killer and goes to Mleeta as one dragging his cow with a rope.
Look at these bishops.
We as Christians who represents us in the government the answer is zero. We are
expelled from the government, expelled from all departments. The three reports
issued by Leila Nicola said that there are no more Christians left in the state.
Did you hear the voice of Patriarch al-Rahi? Did you hear the voice of Walid
Ghayyad? Did you hear the voice of Joseph Aoun? Did you hear the voice of Samir
Geagea? Did you hear the voice of Amin and his son? Where are we? We are not
existent, we are expelled.
Look at the officers who came in one of the dialogue sessions and refused to be
photographed with the Israeli, they are Christians and not Shiites, they are
affiliated with Michel Aoun and affiliated with Rudolph Haykal. Our Christian
situation is tragic and Lebanon cannot rise unless the Christian leadership body
is treated. From the Patriarch who should not only resign but should be tried in
the Vatican, to the rest of Christian leaders imposed on us.
Is it reasonable that the Forces supporter sees Melhem Riachy? Melhem Riachy in
92 and 94 was an advisor to Michel Samaha, and it is said, and I have no
confirmation, that he is the one who wrote Michel Samaha's statement when he was
Minister of Information dissolving the Forces. He was brought to open channels
with the Iranian and the Syrian. There are dozens of pictures of his meetings
with Ferzli and Iranian leaders existing on the internet.
To Dr. Geagea, respect the leaders, respect those who oppose you.
The Patriarch's condition is like someone who has cancer in the liver and it is
difficult to treat. If there remains something of faith he must resign and all
the entourage around him from Ghayyad to Abu Kasm must go to their homes and be
tried.
Question: Why do you attack the Patriarch despite his criticism of Hezbollah in
previous statements?
Everything if you want to start with the history of any person do not start from
above but from below. His coming as Patriarch was based on files and forgery.
May God have mercy on Patriarch Sfeir, he refused to go to Syria and said if I
want to go to Syria to bring one of the detainees. As for him, in the first week
he went to Baalbek to the official representing Hezbollah, Sheikh Yazbeck, and
was pictured under Hezbollah's rifle. And he said at the time that the
International Tribunal has no right to demand Hariri's killers, then in the
second Friday he went to Syria and returned empty-handed and came to Canada and
France and America marketing Hezbollah and Assad's rule as protector of
minorities. And not once did he criticize Hezbollah, and in my personal opinion
this is an analysis, he has files, and he considered in his last sermon that
Hezbollah is a partner. My brother how can it be a partner? Who killed Joe
Bejjani? Who killed Hariri? Who occupied Beirut? Who went up to the mountain?
Who caused three wars for Iran? Who wants to make an Islamic state in Lebanon?
Who confiscated Christian lands? Who expelled Christians from the state?
I have been an activist since 86 and I have all the documents and about 20
videos in which I criticized Melhem Riachy who was saying that Geagea and
Nasrallah meet and the Forces and Hezbollah liberated the South and Hezbollah is
Lebanese and a component of the Lebanese strata.
Question: Hezbollah has MPs and ministers in the state
This is from the narratives of distorting the truth. First election laws were
tailored by the Syrian to his measure, and the current law was tailored by
Hezbollah to its measure and gave the rest shares and by force. The MPs, ask our
free Shiite brothers who dared to run? Did they leave a delegate for any
candidate? The story of al-Sahsouh and before it and after it, who dared to run?
By force it is today.
Even to add more, when one of the poor young men is killed, sheikhs come to his
mother and sister and tell her don't you dare cry, crying is forbidden. They
prevent the mother from crying over her son and the wife over her husband and
the children over their father. This is terrorism and this is oppression and
injustice. There is nothing Lebanese in them, these are enemies of Lebanon.
Question: If you were given a choice between Samir Geagea and Sleiman Frangieh
for the presidency of the Republic?
Both are not suitable. Sleiman Frangieh is tied to the line. And Samir Geagea is
the product of the occupation situation and Samir Geagea is not suitable to be
President of the Republic. Samir Geagea is a small dictator who does not believe
in democracy and owner of a party-company and his history... who executed his
three guards on charges of conspiring against him and the head of the court was
"the cow Doni"... President Chamoun as a Christian pardoned those who tried to
kill him, the Pope pardoned, Samir Geagea executed his guards. Whoever executes
his guards is not Christian. At the time Patriarch Sfeir protested terribly
against the execution.
His problem is that he does not have the quality of leadership, all his advisors
say yes sir yes sir. And this is the reason they do not leave anyone to
criticize a position of Dr. Geagea.
All what I said exists on my websites in articles and videos, and this is my
approach to Christian topics documented since 86 and continuing and will not
change. I consider that God is pleased with me because He created me Maronite
and created me Lebanese, these are two blessings that every person from our
society must preserve and know how much God loves him.
Video link and transcript of an English interview from the Jerusalem Post
website with former US Deputy Presidential Envoy to the Middle East, Morgan
Ortagus
An important interview confirming that Israel is the only power capable and
willing to save Lebanon, help minorities, and fight Iran
September 18/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/09/157603/
The Jerusalem Post Introdution
Former US deputy presidential envoy to the Middle East, Morgan Ortagus, reveals
how she quietly pushed Israel and Lebanon toward direct talks, and why she says
Hezbollah cannot survive without Iran. Ortagus, who
oversaw the Lebanon file as Deputy US Special Envoy for the Middle East under
Steve Witkoff, sits down with The Jerusalem Post's diplomatic reporter, Amichai
Stain, to trace the behind-the-scenes effort to bring two neighbors who hadn't
negotiated directly since the 1980s into the same small room.
She describes reviving the military "mechanism," bringing US Marines back
to Beirut, and building trust one biweekly meeting at a time, while arguing the
window opened by Nasrallah's killing must not be squandered.
"Hezbollah essentially can't really exist without the Islamic Republic,"
Ortagus says, calling Iran the "thousand-pound elephant" behind every Lebanese
calculation. She insists there is "no way to have internal security and
stability with an armed Hezbollah," and makes a blunt case to Lebanon's
communities that Israel is the one neighbor willing to fight for them against
Tehran. With negotiations now led by Secretary of
State Marco Rubio and Michel Issa, her account explains what's already been set
in motion, and what still stands in the way.The conversation also turns
personal: why Ortagus wears a Star of David everywhere she negotiates, her
reflections on her late friend Senator Lindsey Graham and their final
conversation, and why she believes sanctions alone are "a tactic, not a
strategy" against Iran.
It's a candid, on-the-record look at the diplomacy shaping Israel's northern
border from one of the people who helped build it.
Chapters
00:00 - Iran's operational control of Hezbollah (cold open)
00:58 - Taking the Lebanon file: the first-weekend crisis
04:33 - The opening after Israel killed Nasrallah
14:44 - Reviving the mechanism and returning Marines to Beirut
18:30 - How the 12-Day War with Iran reshaped Lebanon
30:51 - Faith on the front line: 'I'll die a proud Jew'
Below is a summary of the interview in English; transcription, text, and
headlines by Elias Bejjani—freely produced
Introduction
The interview covers Morgan Ortagus' work as Deputy to US Envoy
Steve Witkoff in the second Trump Administration, where she was handed the
Lebanon file. She describes a historic window for peace between Israel and
Lebanon after Israel's assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and
the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. She argues the initiative was driven by
Lebanese people themselves, not Washington or Jerusalem, and details her efforts
to build trust through military-to-military talks, civilian negotiations, and
prisoner exchanges.
Headlines
1. Iran in operational control of Hezbollah: Hezbollah cannot exist without
Iran. With Nasrallah gone, autonomy is gone and the IRGC is fully in charge in
Lebanon.
2. First-weekend crisis of the Trump Administration: The ceasefire negotiated by
Biden in Nov 2024 required full Israeli withdrawal the first weekend of Trump's
term. Ortagus had to negotiate an extension while still in Navy Reserve uniform.
3. Nasrallah assassination was the turning point: Like the killing of Qasem
Soleimani in Trump 1, it shattered the idea of invincibility and created a "now
or never" moment for peace among Lebanese.
4. Lebanon is small but deeply divided: Sunnis waiting for Saudi consensus,
Christians coalescing around need for peace with Israel to preserve Christian
leadership in Lebanon, and Shia in the south frustrated with Hezbollah but
dependent on it for services the state abdicated.
5. The Mechanism and bringing Marines back to Beirut: Ortagus revived the
US-brokered military mechanism at Naqoura, pushed for meetings every two weeks,
and brought US Marines back to Beirut. That built trust for the first direct
civilian Israeli-Lebanese talks in years in Fall 2025.
6. Five Lebanese prisoners returned in March 2025: In coordination with PM
Netanyahu and Ron Dermer, Israel sent back 5 prisoners as a goodwill measure to
start negotiations. Israel had left Lebanon except for 5 points.
7. 12-Day War and maximum pressure on Iran: Everything in Lebanon is tied to
Iran. Iran sees Lebanon as a vassal state and is the only proxy it named
consistently in negotiations with Witkoff and Jared Kushner.
8. People-to-people gap: Israelis and Lebanese living 15 minutes apart don't
understand each other. A generation only knows the other through propaganda and
Hezbollah. Lebanese activists for peace risk exile and cannot return home due to
antiquated anti-normalization laws.
9. Israel's approach was too tactical: While fighting a seven-front war and
focused on Gaza and Iran, Israel missed an early chance to embrace President
Joseph Aoun, who signaled openness to history-making peace right after his
inauguration.
10. Sanctions are a tactic, not a strategy: Goal is not declared regime change
but ensuring Iran never gets a nuclear weapon. Requires unified front from Gulf
states with no cheaters.
11. Wearing Jewish identity openly: Ortagus wore a Star of David / Magen David
in Lebanon. She says it's not political but a promise after Oct 7th to her
daughter to live and die as a proud Jew.
12. Tribute to Lindsey Graham: She spoke to Senator Graham 1-2 hours before he
died after his return from Ukraine and call with Trump about Iran, Russia
sanctions, and Israel-Saudi-Lebanon peace. She continues work in his memory.
Detailed Summary
Chapter 1-2: Taking the file
Ortagus says she was part of the small Abraham Accords team under Pompeo,
Kushner, Avi Berkowitz and David Friedman. In Trump 2, Witkoff asked her to take
Lebanon while he handled hostages and Gaza. She describes total chaos at the
start of an administration and a good transition from Brett McGurk and Amos
Hochstein.
Chapter 3: The opening
The impetus for peace did not come from Israel or the US but from Lebanese
friends who were energized after Nasrallah was killed. Lebanon was also dealing
with 1.5 million Syrian refugees, a financial crisis, and no oil wealth. A
chicken-and-egg problem: Gulf donors won't fund rebuilding southern Lebanon if
Hezbollah will take over again, as after 2006. So southern Lebanon fell last on
the priority list behind Gaza and Syria.
Chapter 4: Historic meetings
Ortagus describes forcing both sides into a tiny room at Naqoura to "hold hands"
every two weeks. An Israeli officer told her he lives 15 minutes from Lebanon
and takes disarmament personally. Those meetings removed stigma and led to
direct civilian negotiations in Oct/Nov 2025. Talks shifted in Feb 2026 when the
war with Iran started. Her successor is Michelle Issa, working with Secretary of
State Marco Rubio.
Chapter 5: Strategy and what peace brings
Ortagus argues for Israel as a strategic protector for small states. Pointing to
Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia this week, she asks where the "Mecca alliance" of
Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt is, and says only Israel will actually fight Iran. She
believes future peace will require "Cyrus Accords" with a new Iranian regime.
On disarmament, she says Lebanese government has been aggressive but takes only
old weapons Hezbollah is willing to give up. She argues internal stability is
impossible with an armed Hezbollah.
On normalization law, she says it requires Parliament action led by Nabih Berri
- hard but not impossible, and Trump has set a red line that it should go.
She ends hoping the next interview will be over lunch in Beirut, saying peace is
not a 20-year conversation but possible in the Trump administration.
Video link, and Arabic and English text for Hussein Abdul Hussein’s commentary
on the Saudi situation in light of Houthi attacks against it, the disruption of
its oil exports, and the necessity that it defend itself
September 17/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/09/157610/
My name is Hussein Abdul Hussein. I am a research fellow at the
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington. I think this situation
is really precarious for the Saudis. this is the biggest threat to their
production of oil since their kingdom was founded in 1932 and this is almost
existential. we see that the Saudis are trying to shop for some force to fight
their war for them and and I think along the lines they also call President
Trump. it doesn’t look to me that Washington is going to get involved in this
one. we’ll probably offer them advice intel support but I don’t think we the
United States will get involved in this war to over Baband. Now we know that the
United States imposes a blockade on Iran. So Iran is unable to export any of its
oil listenitly or illicitly. what the Iranians are trying to do is that they’re
trying to telegraph to the other oil exporters in the region that either we
export all of us export oil or none of us will export oil. this is why you see
Iran shutting down the straight of Hormuz. This forced Saudi Arabia to switch
its oil production from east to west. from uh Hormuz to the other side to the
Red Sea. tankers started picking up oil at the port of Yanbar and Saudi Arabia
on the Red Sea and sailing south through the Babzib all the way to the Asian
markets. Iran didn’t like this because clearly the all ornone didn’t work. So
they likely instigated the Houthis to force a blockade on Saudi Arabia. Our
expectation as Washington is that the Saudis with all these arms that we’ve sold
them over the past few decades with all the military support and advice we give
them that they should be able to protect their own tankers and ships in this
waterway and keep it open. he Houthis announced that they’re only going after
Saudi ships and Saudi navigation and they made it made it clear that they’re not
going after international shipping. whether our US ships or European ships. So
this forces a choice on us. do we go to war with the Houthis out of nowhere even
though they’re not willing to or at least they didn’t wage war on our ships and
our navigations navigation through Baband or we ask the Saudis to handle this.
you know after all the Houthis are not really a state they’re a non-state actor
and Saudi Arabia should be able to deal with them.
From Democracy to "Mediocracy"
Abu Arz /September 18, 2026 (translated from Arabic by AI)
Having followed some acts of the recent parliamentary debates, it has become
evident to us that Lebanon’s democracy has morphed into a "Mediocracy"—a rule of
mediocrity.
Ironically, some historians and researchers trace the roots of democratic
governance back to our Phoenician ancestors, long before the concept migrated to
Greece as *Demos Kratos*—meaning rule of the people, by the people.
What a twist of fate: a land that helped give birth to the very idea of
democracy has today descended into a state that has mastered the art of
mediocre rule.
The bottom line: even the best systems are worthless if implemented poorly by
the worst people.
At your service, Lebanon.
Ambassador Aissa’s Tour of the South: Messages to the
Shiites, Iran, and Israel!
Lara Yazbeck/Al-Markaziya/ September 18, 2026 (translated from Arabic by AI)
U.S. Ambassador Michel Aissa visited southern Lebanon on Tuesday "to assess the
situation on the ground and gain firsthand insight into the progress made and
the challenges facing the pilot areas," according to a statement by the U.S.
Embassy. The statement affirmed that "the United States is committed to
supporting the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Army in strengthening state
authority, protecting civilians, providing services, and creating conditions
conducive to lasting peace and stability. We will continue to work with all
relevant parties to foster greater security and stability in southern Lebanon."
For his part, Ambassador Aissa said, "My visit to southern Lebanon allowed me to
see firsthand the challenges facing local communities there. I deeply empathize
with the residents who have suffered displacement and uncertainty, and I
understand their urgent desire to return home and rebuild their lives in safety
and dignity." This marks the first visit by a U.S. ambassador to the South in
decades—a visit laden with messages for Lebanon, for those involved in the
Lebanese file, and for the regional and global actors vying for influence over
it, according to informed political sources speaking to Al-Markaziya. The first
message is one of encouragement to Lebanese state legitimacy, urging it to press
ahead with extending its authority across all Lebanese territory—starting with
the South—and to advance the path of direct negotiations with Israel, the
framework agreement, and the roadmap established for liberating the land,
specifically the pilot areas. The second message is addressed to the southern
community, reassuring them that the United States is not against them but rather
against "Iranian" Hezbollah; Washington is working to return southerners to
their homes, and there is no truth to the rumors or proposals circulating in
recent months regarding plans to establish buffer zones or industrial-economic
zones in the south at the expense of people's homes and livelihoods.
Furthermore, the participation of a delegation from the Council for Development
and Reconstruction in the tour indicates that the United States is keen to
assess the damage and the cost of reconstruction, and is prepared to participate
in the process once the war concludes. The third message is directed at Israel;
its essence is that Washington does not support the continuation of either the
occupation or the destruction, and looks forward to a gradual Israeli withdrawal
from the south to pave the way for the residents' return. The fourth message is
addressed to Iran, conveying that its influence in the south has waned and is
nearing its end. It signals that, from this point forward, Washington will steer
the truce process and ceasefire negotiations—aiming for an agreement and
potentially peace—and will oversee reconstruction efforts in cooperation with
the Lebanese state. The sources conclude by stating that the era of Tehran and
its proxy, Hezbollah, dominating Lebanon in general—and the south in
particular—has come to an end.
US Department of Defense: Lebanese Army’s Poor Performance
Is a Matter of Will
Al-Markaziya/September 18, 2026 (translated from Arabic by AI)
A source at the US Department of Defense stated that the Lebanese Army’s poor
performance "is not due to a lack of resources," noting that the issue "appears
to be a matter of will." US sources further told MTV that any new support for
the Lebanese Army is now increasingly contingent upon achieving tangible,
verifiable results—alongside transparency and oversight—emphasizing that
political pledges alone are insufficient.
Israeli Army Accuses Lebanese Army of Breaching "Security
Zone"; Zamir: Our Forces Are Inside Lebanon to "Thwart Threats"
Janoubia/September 18, 2026 (translated from Arabic by AI)
Israeli Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir confirmed that Israeli forces are operating in
"forward positions" within Lebanese territory, claiming their deployment aims to
"thwart threats." This comes amidst a significant escalation on the ground in
southern villages and towns since the early hours of the morning.
Israeli Army: Lebanese Checkpoints Inside the "Security Zone" — The Israeli army
stated it had detected Lebanese Army personnel within what it described as the
"security zone" in southern Lebanon, noting that the Lebanese Army had set up
checkpoints in the area "without prior coordination." It added that the
establishment of these checkpoints "violates understandings" and confirmed that
it had informed the Lebanese Army of the need to leave the area. According to
the Israeli army, the Lebanese Army personnel were "forced out" of the area
after failing to comply with the request to leave; the army stated it expects
the Lebanese Army to refrain from entering the zone.Tension on the Outskirts of
Deir Mimas — These developments coincided with tension on the outskirts of Deir
Mimas after Israeli forces demanded that Lebanese Army personnel evacuate a
position where they were stationed. Israeli forces dropped more than six stun
grenades near the position and threatened to target the site if a withdrawal did
not occur. The Lebanese Army deployed reinforcements from its post in Burj al-Muluk
but later pulled back to the other side of the town's outskirts following
contacts with the military coordination group for Lebanon. This coincided with
an Israeli force advancing toward the vicinity of the site and searching several
nearby homes. Subsequently, Israeli forces withdrew from the forward position
they had reached near the entrance to Deir Mimas and returned to their base at
Tal al-Nahas, while the Lebanese Army remained deployed along the main road in
Burj al-Muluk.Shelling and injuries in Shaqra and Majdal Selem: According to
field reports, Israeli artillery fire targeted the outskirts of the town of
Shaqra, injuring three people; one of them was reported to be in critical
condition. The shelling also struck Wadi Nahla on the outskirts of Majdal Selem,
coinciding with machine-gun fire directed toward Baraachit and Beit Yahoun.
Zamir: Operating in forward positions inside Lebanon: Amidst these developments
on the ground, Zamir stated, "We are operating in forward positions inside
Lebanese territory to thwart threats," as Israeli forces continue their
operations and movements across several border areas. Major Israeli escalation
in the south: These events occurred amidst a broad Israeli escalation involving
artillery shelling, controlled detonations, and the movement of military
vehicles and tanks. The activity affected Hadatha, Al-Mansouri, Wadi al-Aziya,
Sarbine, Wadi al-Salouqi, Bani Hayyan, and the outskirts of Mifdoun and Nabatieh
al-Fawqa. Israeli forces also carried out controlled detonations in Beit Yahoun
and Al-Mansouri, following a night that saw more than 20 airstrikes targeting
various areas, including Al-Mansouri, Bani Hayyan, Al-Qantara, Wadi al-Salouqi,
Tallousa, Ali al-Taher, and the Al-Deir neighborhood in Nabatieh al-Fawqa.
Following the Deir Mimas Incident: A Clarification from the
Lebanese Army; Israel States It Pushed Army Personnel Away from the Southern
Security Zone
Al-Markaziya/September 18, 2026 (translated from Arabic by AI)
The Army Command – Directorate of Orientation issued the following statement:
"The Army Command wishes to clarify that, within the scope of missions carried
out by military units in the town of Deir Mimas (Marjeyoun), an army patrol
established a temporary observation post on the outskirts of the town on
September 10, 2026—in coordination with the Military Coordination Group for
Lebanon (MCG4L)—to accompany residents as they inspected their agricultural
lands. On September 18, 2026, an Israeli occupation force approached the newly
established post, located within the so-called 'security zone,' and threw sound
grenades in the vicinity. Consequently, the Army reinforced the post, and a
state of alert ensued between the two sides. Following contacts made via the
MCG4L, the Israeli occupation force withdrew from the area, and the Army
personnel subsequently returned to their main base in the town. Follow-up
actions are being conducted in coordination with the MCG4L." Earlier this
afternoon, the Israeli army announced that it had spotted "a number of Lebanese
Army soldiers in the security zone in southern Lebanon" and noted that the
Lebanese Army had set up checkpoints in the area "without prior coordination."
It indicated that the Lebanese Army's establishment of checkpoints in the
southern security zone "violates understandings." The army added: "We informed
the Lebanese Army of the need to leave the security zone in southern Lebanon and
removed their personnel from the area after they failed to comply with our
request." The Israeli army concluded: "We expect the Lebanese Army to refrain
from entering the security zone in the south." Previously, an Israeli force had
advanced toward the outskirts of the town of Deir Mimas, reaching an
intersection near a newly established Lebanese Army post, and demanded the
removal of a Lebanese Army position intended to escort the residents of Deir
Mimas. In response, the Lebanese Army dispatched reinforcements to the new post.
Later, the Israeli army declared that the Lebanese Army post near Deir Mimas was
located "inside the Yellow Line." A military coordination group intervened to
resolve the dispute. Reports indicated that Israeli forces withdrew from the
point they had reached at the entrance to Deir Mimas and returned to their
position at Tal al-Nahas. Meanwhile, the Lebanese Army remains present along the
main road in Burj al-Muluk, monitoring field developments in the area. There
were also reports of Israeli military vehicles advancing from the town of Al-Tiri
toward the outskirts of Hadatha, in the direction of Haris within the Bint Jbeil
district. Shelling and Explosions: Meanwhile, Israel continues its attacks in
the south; notably, the Israeli army set fire to the Mays al-Jabal Governmental
Hospital. The Israeli army carried out a massive explosion in Al-Mansouri, while
a drone dropped a bomb toward the outskirts of the town of Haris. Reports also
indicated the movement of military vehicles within Al-Mansouri. Additionally,
the Israeli army conducted a controlled detonation in the town of Al-Bayyadah,
while artillery shelling struck Al-Mansouri. Artillery units fired several heavy
155mm shells at the "Al-Arish" area—located within the administrative boundaries
of Hadatha, a town adjacent to Haris in the Bint Jbeil district. Concurrently, a
hostile drone dropped a bomb on a bulldozer in the town of Yatar. In Marjeyoun,
reports indicated that white phosphorus artillery shells struck Al-Qantara. A
hostile drone dropped a bomb on a building in the town of Zoutar Al-Sharqiya.
Additionally, the Israeli army carried out a controlled explosion in the
afternoon on the outskirts of Ainatha, near Aitaroun. Israeli warplanes were
also reported flying at medium altitude over the highlands of Hermel and
Akkar.Artillery shelling resumed in the morning, targeting the towns of Al-Mansouri
and Majdal Zoun, following intense bombardment both before and after
midnight—the sounds of which were audible in the city of Tyre and other southern
villages and towns. Wadi Al-Aziyah was also struck by several shells in the
morning, and artillery fire targeted Wadi Nahla on the outskirts of Shaqra.
Overnight, Israeli forces had dropped flares over the towns of Hadatha and Aita
al-Jabal in the Bint Jbeil district. Furthermore, the sound of explosions was
heard in the south at dawn, with the echoes reaching the city of Sidon and its
surrounding areas.
Received training from "Hezbollah"... The Lebanese
judiciary accuses 14 people of planning attacks in Syria
Watania/September 18, 2026 (translated from Arabic by AI)
The government commissioner before the military court in Lebanon accused 14
people, including a Hezbollah member and a Syrian intelligence officer during
the era of ousted President Bashar al-Assad, of planning to launch attacks in
Syria, according to what a judicial source told Agence France-Presse. In early
September, the Lebanese authorities arrested five people, including Syrians, on
suspicion of planning attacks on the forces of the new authorities in Damascus.
It is suspected that these people received training from Hezbollah, while the
party denied these accusations. A judicial source told Agence France-Presse that
the government commissioner at the military court charged 14 people with the
crimes of “forming a gang of villains, training in military weapons, explosives,
and sniper rifles, and operating marches, with the aim of carrying out terrorist
acts on the Syrian coast.” The source said that the initial confessions of the
five detainees stated that “more than 40 officers and members of Assad’s
remnants were brought in from the Syrian coast through illegal crossings into
northern Lebanon, in batches and at a rate of 5 people each time.” The source
explained that a “Hezbollah official” who was hidden from view, named Yasser
Alaa al-Din and nicknamed “Hajj Alaa,” was “supervising the smuggling operations
of network members and training them in party camps in eastern Lebanon.” He
added, "These operations were run by the commander of the desert forces in
Assad's army, Major General Muhammad Jaber, who is currently in the Russian
capital, Moscow, and is close to Bashar al-Assad." In this context, a judicial
source revealed to Al-Jadeed that the Syrians arrested in the Assad remnants
network in Akkar were intermediaries between a Hezbollah leader and militants,
noting that their mission included bringing in Syrian people through Wadi Khaled
in Akkar and delivering them to a safe point in the southern suburb. The source
said, based on the confessions of the detainees, that training of network
members on the use of drones and explosives was taking place in Baalbek, before
they were transferred again to the Syrian coast. The investigation was based on
the detainees’ phone data, which contained photos and evidence, in addition to
the seizure of a quantity of weapons. Earlier, the government commissioner
before the military court brought charges against Hezbollah leader Yasser Alaa
al-Din, nicknamed Hajj Alaa, in the case of the Assad remnants network in Akkar,
where he was supervising the operations of smuggling members of the network and
training them in party camps in eastern Lebanon, while he was in hiding. In
August, Lebanon handed over a former major general to the Syrian authorities,
after arresting him based on a warrant in absentia issued against him by
Damascus, accusing him of “murder and crimes against humanity” during his
military service.
Lebanon: Israeli force retreats after advancing to an army
observation point in Deir Mimas; Lebanese Army sends reinforcements to the town
amidst a state of "high alert on both sides."
Beirut (Agencies)/September 18, 2026 (translated from Arabic by
AI)
The Lebanese Army announced on Friday that an Israeli force had advanced to one
of its positions on the edge of the Israeli-occupied zone in southern Lebanon,
where it deployed stun grenades before subsequently withdrawing. The official
National News Agency had previously reported that the Israeli force advanced
"toward the outskirts of the town of Deir Mimas, reaching a point near a
Lebanese Army position," and dropped "six stun grenades in the vicinity of the
point." In a statement, the Lebanese Army explained that its forces had
established an observation post on the outskirts of the town on September 10 to
accompany residents "as they inspected their agricultural lands." This move was
coordinated with the military coordination group for Lebanon, which is tasked
with monitoring the implementation of the framework agreement between Lebanon
and Israel. The army added that an Israeli force approached "the newly
established post within the so-called security zone and threw sound bombs,"
prompting it to send reinforcements amidst a state of "high alert on both
sides." The army stated that, following contacts with the coordination group,
"the Israeli occupation force left the area," and its own troops returned to
"their original position." An Agence France-Presse (AFP) photographer witnessed
two Israeli tanks advancing along a road toward the town of Deir Mimas and
stopping in front of an earthen berm, behind which Lebanese Army vehicles were
stationed. The photographer reported that the Lebanese Army vehicles retreated a
short distance but remained positioned facing the two tanks. The Lebanese Army
has been stationed in this town for some time and has remained removed from the
confrontations between Hezbollah and Israel. On June 26, Lebanon and Israel
concluded a framework agreement—following five rounds of direct negotiations
under U.S. auspices—that stipulated the disarmament of Hezbollah, the gradual
withdrawal of the Israeli army from the territories it occupied in southern
Lebanon, and the deployment of the Lebanese army, beginning with "pilot" areas.
While the intensity of hostilities in Lebanon had subsided since late
June—thanks to the Iranian-U.S. memorandum of understanding and the framework
agreement—Tel Aviv continues to occupy vast areas of southern Lebanon, where it
has announced the establishment of a "security zone" extending up to ten
kilometers deep along its border, and continues to carry out strikes as well as
massive demolition and blasting operations.
Prime Minister Chairs Meeting of the Higher Council for
Privatization; Discusses Draft Decree to Establish "Electricité du Liban"
Company and Studies on the Tripoli Economic Zone
National News Agency/ September 18, 2026 (translated from Arabic
byAI)
Prime Minister Dr. Nawaf Salam chaired a meeting yesterday of the Higher Council
for Privatization and Partnership. The meeting was attended by the following
ministers: Finance (Yassine Jaber), Economy and Trade (Amer Al-Bissat), Labor
(Mohammed Haidar), Justice (Adel Nassar), Energy and Water (Joe Al-Sadi), Public
Works and Transport (Fayez Rassamni), Interior and Municipalities (Ahmed Al-Hajjar),
and Telecommunications (Charles Al-Hajj); the Minister of the Displaced and
Minister of State for Technology and Artificial Intelligence (Kamal Shehadeh);
the Acting Secretary-General of the Higher Council for Privatization and
Partnership (Judge Mahmoud Makkiya); the Chairman of the Tripoli Special
Economic Zone (Hassan Dannawi) and his team; the Council’s legal expert
(Attorney Tarek Dandashli); and a member of the Electricity Sector Regulatory
Authority (Daniel Geha). The Council discussed the financial, technical, and
legal studies regarding the Tripoli Special Economic Zone project and referred
the project file to the Council of Ministers—which approved it—paving the way
for the selection of a private partner in accordance with the law regulating
public-private partnerships and its amendments. The Council also discussed the
draft decree aimed at establishing the "Electricité du Liban" company, valuing
its assets, unbundling its activities, and drafting its articles of association;
a decision on the project was postponed pending further study. The Council
continued its meetings today, discussing the financial, technical, legal,
environmental, and social studies submitted by the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) regarding the project to establish a Floating Storage and
Regasification Unit (FSRU) and a new power plant in Deir Ammar (Deir Ammar 2).
Following discussions, the Council approved the study findings and decided to
refer the project file to the Council of Ministers for approval, paving the way
for the process of selecting a private-sector partner in accordance with the law
regulating public-private partnerships and its amendments.
Salam Calls Berri to Discuss Developments in the South and
Agenda for Washington Meetings
NNA – September 18, 2026 (translated from Arabic bu AI)
On the eve of his departure for the United States, Prime Minister Dr. Nawaf
Salam spoke by phone with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. They discussed the
latest developments—particularly in the South—and the topics Salam is set to
address during his meetings in New York and Washington. Army Clarifies Events
Regarding the Newly Established Observation Point in Deir Mimas: '
Israeli Occupation Force Approached and Threw Sound
Grenades
National News Agency/ September 18, 2026 (translated from Arabic by AI)
The Army Command – Directorate of Orientation issued the following statement:
"The Army Command wishes to clarify that, within the scope of missions carried
out by military units in the town of Deir Mimas (Marjeyoun), an army patrol
established a temporary observation point on the outskirts of the town on
September 10, 2026—in coordination with the Military Coordination Group for
Lebanon (MCG4L)—to accompany residents as they inspected their agricultural
lands. On September 18, 2026, a force belonging to the Israeli occupation
approached the newly established point—located within the so-called 'security
zone'—and threw sound grenades in the vicinity. Consequently, the Army
reinforced the point, and a state of alert ensued between the two sides.
Following contacts made via the MCG4L, the Israeli occupation force withdrew
from the area, and the Army personnel subsequently returned to their main post
in the town. Follow-up is ongoing in coordination with the MCG4L."
President Aoun at St. George Cathedral to Offer Condolences
to Camille Chamoun on His Father’s Passing
Al-Markaziya/September 18, 2026 (translated from Arabic by AI)
President of the Republic General Joseph Aoun, accompanied by his advisor,
retired Brigadier General André Rahhal, arrived at the Maronite St. George
Cathedral in downtown Beirut. There, he offered condolences to MP Camille
Chamoun and his family on the passing of his father, Dory Chamoun—the former
head of the National Liberal Party and a former MP. President Aoun was received
by members of the late leader's family; he expressed his sympathy and
condolences, reflecting on Dory Chamoun’s national and political legacy and the
loss his passing represents for the Lebanese landscape. Condolences are being
received in the cathedral’s reception hall, amidst a significant turnout of
political figures, public figures, and citizens who have come to offer their
support to the Chamoun family.
President Aoun Emphasizes Realistic Solutions to IMF
Delegation; Reviews Paris Meeting Outcomes and New York Agenda with Salam
Janoubia/ September 18, 2026 (translated from Arabic bu AI)
President of the Republic Joseph Aoun discussed with an International Monetary
Fund (IMF) delegation—led by Ernesto Ramirez Rigo—the role the Fund could play
in supporting recovery and reconstruction efforts alongside the continuation of
economic and financial reforms. He stressed the necessity for ongoing
discussions to yield realistic and implementable solutions that take into
account the specificities of the Lebanese situation and current economic and
financial conditions. The President of the Republic received Prime Minister
Nawaf Salam and discussed the general situation in the country with him,
particularly in the South, where Israeli attacks on southern villages and towns
are ongoing. President Aoun briefed Salam on the outcomes of his meetings in
Paris with French President Emmanuel Macron and King Abdullah II of Jordan, as
well as the deliberations of the preparatory meeting for the international
conference to support the Army and the Internal Security Forces. He also
congratulated him on the renewed vote of confidence the Parliament granted the
government following the debate sessions. The two leaders discussed the agenda
for the UN General Assembly meetings in New York—which begin next Tuesday and
which Salam will attend as head of the Lebanese delegation—as well as the
meeting to be held in Washington to discuss the situation in Lebanon. They also
touched upon the Council of Ministers' ongoing review of the state budget.
Speaker Berri Receives IMF Mission, German Ambassador, Rmeich Municipality
Delegation, and IDAL Head: Any Law Must Guarantee Depositors' Rights and Their
Deposits in Full
NNA/September 18, 2026 (translated from Arabic by AI)
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri received the head of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) mission to Lebanon, Ernesto Ramirez Rigo, at the Second Presidency
headquarters in Ain el-Tineh. The meeting was attended by the IMF Resident
Representative in Lebanon, Yahya Said; IMF Advisor Maya Choueiri; and the
Speaker’s Media Advisor, Ali Hamdan. The discussion covered the negotiation
process between Lebanon and the IMF following Parliament's approval of the bank
restructuring law and the commencement of deliberations on the financial gap
law. During the meeting, Speaker Berri reiterated to the delegation the
necessity for any law to guarantee depositors' rights and the full value of
their deposits. Speaker Berri received the new German Ambassador to Lebanon,
Thomas Zahnneisen, for a protocol visit following the latter's assumption of his
duties; the meeting provided an opportunity to review the general situation in
Lebanon and the region, as well as bilateral relations between Lebanon and
Germany. Other visitors included the Chairman and Director General of IDAL, Dr.
Majed Mneimneh, who briefed Berri on the organization's work programs, and the
Mayor of Rmeich, Hanna El-Amil, accompanied by members of the municipal council;
discussions with the latter group focused on the town's situation, the needs of
its steadfast residents, and development-related matters.
Mufti Qabalan: Whoever Bargains Over the Fate of the Resistance Bargains Over
the Fate of Lebanon’s Sovereignty
Al-Markaziya/September 18, 2026 (translated from Arabic by AI)
Al-Markaziya – The Jaafari Mufti, Sheikh Ahmed Qabalan, delivered the Friday
sermon at the Imam Al-Hussein Mosque in Burj al-Barajneh. In his address, he
noted that "the history of the 'inner-circle kitchens' in this country—and
indeed in any country—lacks checks and balances; they have transformed
decision-making centers into dens of hostility, theft, plunder, and
destruction—breeding grounds for personal fiefdoms and various forms of
deception that have undermined the vital essentials upon which the causes of
this aggrieved nation depend." He added: "I wish to begin from a patriotic
standpoint by addressing the President of the Republic: The political division
within the country threatens its very existence. The regional and international
environment is leveraging all its capabilities to tear apart Lebanon’s internal
fabric, sow tension among its constituent groups, and outsource its media
landscape to the mouthpieces of sectarian strife. A country divided against
itself quickly collapses and is consumed by flames; for Washington and Tel Aviv,
there is no policy more important than 'divide and rule' to drive vertical
fragmentation and internal strife within Lebanon." He emphasized that "the
President of the Republic is capable of shutting the door on this dangerous
strife stemming from abroad; he can do so if he chooses—indeed, this is what we
expect of him—for Lebanon can neither rise nor endure without a unified national
decision and a partnership based on total consensus. Political history clearly
shows that a people consumed by grudges and animosity become easy prey for their
enemies. We do not wish to see Lebanon torn apart during the tenure of President
Joseph Aoun; yet, the country currently sits atop the fault line of such
fragmentation, teetering on the brink of a catastrophic national disaster.
Saving the nation requires safeguarding its sovereign priorities—foremost among
them the southern front—and thwarting international machinations; this
constitutes the ultimate historical test of the national will and its
seriousness. Leaving the south to its current fate erodes the very body of
sovereignty, ravages the core of national partnership, and destroys the concept
of the State itself. It is the Presidency that ultimately loses when someone
convinces it that the South, Dahiyeh, or the Bekaa are enemies of the national
presidency or of Lebanon; in such a scenario, Lebanon loses while the true
enemy—terrorist Israel—triumphs." Mufti Qabalan stressed that "what we seek is a
Lebanon defined by partnership, sovereignty, and national solidarity. Our
history and our record of sacrifice bear clear witness that we are a people who
neither surrender nor accept injustice or occupation; those who liberated
Lebanon in the past will liberate it once more, God willing. In this context,
the Resistance is the cornerstone of Lebanon’s sovereignty; to bargain over the
Resistance is to bargain over Lebanon’s sovereignty itself." He continued: "It
was here that Imam Sadr told the State: 'Your abandonment of the duty of
national defense regarding the South drove the people of the South to take up
arms to defend their region and their Lebanon.' A state that does not defend its
borders and its South does not deserve the name 'State.' Throughout its history,
the Resistance has not merely defended the South; it has fought, sacrificed, and
confronted the world's largest military alliance to defend Lebanon in its
entirety. Lebanon’s unity is inextricably linked to the history of the mosque
and the church; therefore, the church and the mosque must raise a unified
national voice so that we may rise again, together, for the sake of Lebanon’s
unity." Mufti Qabalan noted that "the time has come for all Lebanese to
understand that our interests lie here, not elsewhere, and that nothing can be
set right without respecting the principle of national partnership. No
authority, regardless of its nature, is permitted to undermine Lebanon’s
national creed under any circumstances whatsoever; Israel is absolute evil and
will remain so. Furthermore, the passing of security-related schedules and
annexes cannot be tolerated, for there is no greater betrayal than abandoning
the national defense of southern Lebanon." He concluded: "Today marks the
anniversary of the 'pager' explosions that targeted the ranks of the Resistance
fighters—the greatest defenders of national sovereignty in this country. To
them, we say: O noble Resistance fighters, it is through you that Lebanon has
triumphed and through you that it endures. Nothing in this world can truly honor
the gravity of your wounds—save for God Almighty and those who strive to serve
the sovereignty of this resisting nation. You, your Resistance, your army, and
the national unity that safeguards Lebanon represent our solemn pledge. Long
live you, and long live Lebanon, upheld by your honorable wounds."
Ali Ammar: What happened in Deir Mimas is an attack on all
of Lebanon and must prompt the authorities to review their paths and choices.
National News Agency/ September 18, 2026 (translated from Arabic by AI)
MP Ali Ammar—a member of the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc and the Defense
Committee—strongly condemned, in a statement, the Israeli enemy's attack on the
Lebanese Army in Deir Mimas. This aggression involved dropping sound bombs near
army positions and outposts, threatening to target the troops, and issuing an
ultimatum for them to withdraw from Lebanese territory. Ammar described this as
a flagrant and blatant violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and the dignity of its
national institutions, and as further proof that the Israeli enemy does not want
a strong army capable of fulfilling its national role in protecting the land and
borders. He added: "This dangerous incident—which should serve as a wake-up call
for the authorities—is the natural consequence of the misguided and humiliating
path they have pursued, and of an approach that has persisted in making
concessions to the occupation. They legitimized the occupation's presence
through the 'Framework Agreement'—an agreement the Israeli enemy tore up and
trampled upon from day one. Consequently, the enemy has become the one calling
the shots, dictating to the Lebanese Army where to deploy, which areas to enter,
and which areas to avoid, while the authorities remain powerless to make a
decision that preserves the prestige and dignity of their own army." He
continued: "What took place in Deir Mimas is an assault on all of Lebanon; it
must serve as a catalyst for the authorities to re-evaluate their paths and
choices, halt their futile negotiations with the enemy, and put an end to the
stream of concessions and the blind reliance on the United States and the
international community. They must realize that the Israeli enemy—backed by the
Americans—does not desire a strong state with an army capable of protecting its
sovereignty; rather, they seek a weak, subservient state that yields to their
dictates and is stripped of the ability to defend itself." He emphasized that
"our national army is strong thanks to its resolve, the steadfastness of its
soldiers, and the public support rallying around it. What is required is to
empower it to fulfill its true role in protecting Lebanon, its sovereignty, and
its people; to fortify it politically and militarily; and to safeguard its
national decision-making from any dictates or tutelage."
A Message from the Fakhoury Family Following Our Return
to Lebanon
Amer Fakhoury Foundation/September 18/2026
Returning to Lebanon was a decision we did not take lightly.
The last time our family traveled there was in 2019, when our father, Amer
Fakhoury, was unlawfully detained under direct orders from Hezbollah. He went to
Lebanon because of his deep love for his country and his desire to see it
thrive. Instead, he was detained and endured an experience that changed our
family forever. Going back for the first time since then carried emotions that
are difficult to put into words. After returning home, our father knew that
change had to happen. The Amer Foundation was largely his idea, born from his
belief that no family should have to endure what ours experienced and that
Lebanon’s most vulnerable communities deserved support, hope, and a path toward
a better future. The foundation became a way to turn his experience into action
and to help create the change he knew was necessary.
We returned with hope because of the changes taking place under Lebanon’s new
presidency. During our visit, we had the opportunity to meet with U.S.
Ambassador Issa and speak openly about what our family endured when Hezbollah
held enormous power over Lebanon and its government institutions.
We shared our hope for Lebanon’s future, while also emphasizing that the work is
not finished. Lebanon cannot achieve lasting peace, freedom, and sovereignty
until Hezbollah is fully disarmed and its control over the country is brought to
an end.Over the past several years, the Amer Foundation has supported families
in southern Lebanon who have suffered through war, instability, and economic
hardship. We remain committed to standing with these communities during such
difficult times and helping innocent families rebuild their lives. We are deeply
grateful to the United States government and the U.S. Embassy for their support
throughout our visit. After everything our family experienced in 2019, being
able to return to Lebanon and come home safely meant more to us than we can
express.Our father’s love for Lebanon and his experience will always guide our
mission. We will continue advocating for Americans unlawfully detained abroad,
supporting their families, standing with vulnerable communities in Lebanon, and
working toward the day when every wrongfully detained American is safely brought
home.
-The Fakhoury Family
For more information about the Amer Foundation and its mission, or to schedule
an interview with Zoya Fakhoury or Guila Fakhoury, please contact us at team@amerfoundation.org
Withdraw... Either from Parliament or from the Weapons
Sanaa Al-Jack/Nidaa Al-Watan/September 19, 2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
During the most recent parliamentary session, Hezbollah MPs raised their voices
against their colleagues, hurling accusations ranging from "baseness" and lying
to "collaboration with Israel." They cursed "the Authority," its negotiations,
and the "framework agreement," and engaged in crude, aggressive
exchanges—reminiscent of "get lost"—that prompted Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri
to exclaim, "What a disgrace." The reason for this outburst was their lack of
logical or convincing answers to refute their responsibility for the staggering
toll of the recent war: the loss of over $27 billion, nearly 9,000 martyrs, over
30,000 wounded, more than a million displaced persons at the war's peak, and the
destruction of tens of thousands of homes across more than 75 villages and
towns—residents of which remain unable to return to their homes and livelihoods.
These figures were cited by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam at the start of the
session held a few days ago, all resulting from the wars of "support for Gaza"
and "retaliation for Khamenei." Yet, the fierce rhetoric characterizing the
party MPs' language was not matched by historic, bold stances when a vote of
confidence was called for the government—a government they accuse of conspiring
against them with the Zionist enemy and of being subservient to the "Great
Satan" (the US). Instead, they walked out of the session, fleeing the
responsibility of making a decision that would have committed them either to
their public rhetoric or to granting confidence to a government in which they
themselves participate. It appears that withdrawal has become the only option
for "the Party's" officials—a means to evade confrontation, whether with the
Israeli enemy (whose brutality was fueled by the Party's own foolish actions),
with Lebanese citizens who hold opposing views, or even with their own
loyalists. Instead of being honest with their supporters about the reality of
the situation, they simply abandon them to pay the price—be it with their lives,
their livelihoods, or their land. Withdrawal has become the chosen path, with no
regard for halting hostilities, liberating territory, ascertaining the
identities and fates of prisoners, or launching reconstruction efforts to pave
the way for the return of displaced persons to their villages. They are content
to shift the blame onto the State—of which they insist on remaining a part
within both the legislative and executive branches—while refusing to accept
responsibility as a party that insists on maintaining an illegitimate arsenal
outside state control and waging wars to serve the interests of its Iranian
patron. They do this, of course, without national cover, relying instead on a
sectarian backing that is beginning to slip away. Naturally, there is no courage
in choosing withdrawal; it is not even a case of "fleeing forward." They are
left with nothing but insults and threats directed at a public that no longer
heeds their call, or a descent into a silence unable to explain their successive
defeats—leaving them on the sidelines, awaiting a miraculous shift in the
volatile regional landscape. Yet, options do exist for those who truly control
their own decisions: either withdraw entirely from the State—against which they
incite at the crack of dawn—or, quite simply, abandon their subservience to Iran
and relinquish their weapons, returning instead to the homeland through a
partnership based on transparency. Ultimately, the problem remains—as Nawaf
Salam put it—"not with those who lost their way, but with those who knew their
destination yet convinced people they were heading somewhere else."
Solve It, Joe
Imad Moussa/Nidaa Al-Watan/September 19, 2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
A few days ago, the neighborhood heard the voice of Taqla—wife of Adli "the
Philosopher"—wailing at a deafening 110 decibels: "The man is gone! Adli is
gone! Help me, for God's sake—he’s dying!" Within minutes, public-spirited
neighbors rushed the man—now in his sixties—to the hospital using the "best
available means." That "best means" turned out to be a battered, ratty 1978
Volvo; thus, the poor soul was snatched from the clutches of Azrael. What
exactly happened to Adli? According to well-informed sources, the generator fee
collector was seen ringing the doorbell just five minutes before Speaker Nabih
Berri was set to open the parliamentary session to debate—and banter with—the
government. Adli opened the door as usual, wearing an undershirt that strained
against his paunch. Taqla was in the kitchen, preparing a tray of *kibbeh* for
her well-fed husband. Shakour, the collector, handed him the August bill. Adli
said, "Thanks, Shakour," then stared at the "Amount Due" box. His eyes bulged.
He trembled like a sparrow just abandoned by its mate. He collapsed to the
floor, his head striking the "throne-like" sofa. Taqla let out a piercing
shriek, while Shakour stood there, stunned and bewildered: how could a man the
size of an elephant crumble before a bill that didn't even exceed $471? One
wonders: if "The Caesar" were in Joe’s shoes—heading the Ministry of Energy and
Water today—would Adli have suffered the same fate? Absolutely not. For
starters, "The Tsar" would have prevented the global rise in fuel prices—given
his ability to communicate with the two poles of the global conflict, the United
States and Iran—and pressured both nations to keep the Strait of Hormuz out of
their feud. He would have personally called Ansar Allah leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi
to say, "Listen, 'Aboudi, I need things calm at Bab al-Mandab." Had Nada
Boustani been at the helm of the Ministry of Energy, she would have operated the
power grid according to the plans laid out by her predecessors—plans that
represent the most significant achievement in the energy sector. I myself have
set up a system at home to power my air conditioners, washing machine, fridge,
electric oven, and TV—all so I can watch the opposition leader, Lech Wałęsa
Bassil. Had Walid Fayad—the General’s favorite—been in charge, he would have
left no borrowing avenue unexplored, piling another 3 or 4 billion dollars—drawn
from the Central Bank’s reserves—onto the existing 24-billion-dollar debt. Had
Gebran returned to the ministry he so distinctively shaped, his international
connections would have prevented the war in the South, and we would be
extracting fuel from our offshore blocks today. Ultimately, the electricity
problem began with Joe Saddy. Fix it, Joe. As for Mr. Adli, he was transferred
from the ICU to a regular room, with plans for his discharge in 24 hours. But
being a worrier, Adli called the fund to find out how much he owed as the
insurance co-pay. He received an unsatisfactory answer. Our sources report that
Adli has been returned to the ICU. Please pray for him.
Paris Maps Out Army Support
Joe Rahal/Nidaa Al-Watan/September 19, 2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
The preparatory meeting held in Paris on September 17—aimed at supporting the
Lebanese Army and the Internal Security Forces (ISF)—was not merely another stop
in the series of international gatherings dedicated to Lebanon. The timing, the
participants, and the agenda transformed it into a genuine effort to shift from
a policy of ad-hoc aid to building the Lebanese state's capacity to fully assume
its security responsibilities during one of the most critical periods in years.
Held within the framework of the "Aqaba Process," the meeting was opened by
President Joseph Aoun, French President Emmanuel Macron, and King Abdullah II of
Jordan, with representatives from the United States, Canada, Arab nations, the
European Union, and international institutions in attendance; Army Commander
General Rodolphe Haykal and ISF Director General Major General Raed Abdullah
were also present. The practical objective was clear: to identify the needs of
both institutions, coordinate supporting parties, and prepare for an
international conference intended to translate political commitment into
tangible capabilities on the ground. President Aoun presented the Lebanese
equation to the attendees in direct terms: "Lebanon and the Lebanese people have
chosen the state." For him, this choice is not limited to a political stance;
rather, it means that military and security institutions alone must be
responsible for safeguarding sovereignty and stability, and that decisions
regarding war, peace, and the bearing of arms must rest solely with the state.
Consequently, he called for the Paris meeting to produce a clear roadmap and a
specific timeline for the upcoming international conference, rejecting the
notion of support remaining a series of sporadic aid packages or temporary
fixes, and instead demanding a long-term partnership that enables the Army and
security forces to engage in strategic planning and capacity building.
Crucially, Aoun linked external support to a corresponding Lebanese
responsibility. He emphasized the need for transparency and accountability in
the use of aid, as well as Lebanon's readiness to adopt a mechanism for setting
priorities, monitoring the implementation of pledges, and measuring outcomes. He
also acknowledged that the Lebanese state—as it regains its financial
capacity—is required to shoulder an increasing share of the funding for its
military and security institutions. Through this approach, the Lebanese proposal
sought to shift the relationship with donor nations from a logic of relief to a
concept of institutional partnership. This process is becoming increasingly
significant as the current UNIFIL mandate approaches its conclusion on December
31, 2026, followed by a reduction in troop numbers and an orderly withdrawal
during 2027, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2790. This
transition places broader responsibilities on the army in the south, making the
prevention of any security vacuum a priority for both Lebanon and the
international community. Hence, Macron focused on the necessity of extending the
Lebanese state's authority and providing the resources enabling the army to
assume the primary role in the south. According to the Lebanese Presidency’s
account of his remarks, Macron announced he would contact US President Donald
Trump regarding Israel's adherence to existing understandings. Meanwhile, King
Abdullah II stressed the need to rapidly empower the army, highlighting its
requirements regarding equipment, spare parts, countering drones, aerial
surveillance, and border security. For his part, Aoun linked the success of this
process to all parties honoring the understandings concerning the south. He
emphasized that—consistent with the Lebanese position—continued Israeli
aggression and the Israeli presence on Lebanese soil hinder the consolidation of
stability, calling on international partners to treat Lebanon’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity as an inviolable principle. No final date for the
international conference has been announced yet; the French Foreign Ministry
maintains that it will convene when conditions are right, while the King of
Jordan has pointed to a follow-up meeting before year’s end to assess progress.
Thus, the true test in Paris will not lie in statements, but in the ability to
translate a roadmap of needs into sustainable commitments: training, equipping,
monitoring borders and airspace, countering drones, providing logistical and
technical support, and enhancing institutional capacity for deployment and
operational continuity. In this sense, the Paris meeting transcends support for
a specific military institution; it is a test of Lebanon and its partners'
ability to transform the restoration of state authority from a mere political
slogan into a viable, actionable project. Aoun encapsulated the urgency of the
moment by stating: "This is a moment for decision, not for waiting." If
preparations culminate in a successful conference and pledges translate into
tangible capabilities, Paris will have laid a cornerstone in Lebanon’s
transition from crisis management to the construction of state institutions
capable of independently safeguarding their own security and sovereignty.
The Paris Conference and the Deferred Capital of "Political Logic"
Samer Zreik/Nidaa Al-Watan/September 19, 2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
The coincidence of the Paris conference—held to support the army and security
forces within the framework of the "Aqaba Process"—with the publication of an
article by Jean Aziz (advisor to the President of the Republic) on the US-based
*Just Security* website, reveals that the intended goals extend beyond mere
military, security, and financial support. They highlight the importance of
shifting from treating Lebanon as a security problem to constructing a
comprehensive political path. While the army constitutes a pillar of stability
and a key element in the policy of dismantling the weapons of "the Party" and
its parallel structures, reducing the conflict and the negotiation process with
Israel to a purely security-centric issue—focusing on the army’s capabilities,
its deficiencies, its potential actions, and whether it might confront "the
Party"—comes at the expense of political logic. Furthermore, this approach
shifts the conflict dynamic into the arena where the "logic of arms" thrives—a
logic rooted in shaping political decisions through security-based actors,
ranging from "the Party" to the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij, as well as
the Houthis and the Popular Mobilization Forces. In contrast, the objective
should be to utilize military and security institutions within a broader
political framework that encompasses political and diplomatic initiatives, the
diversification of foreign relations, the forging of partnerships with key
stakeholders, and the creation of new arrangements. These measures would bolster
the state's legitimacy and its capacity to formulate a more sustainable and
credible hybrid deterrence strategy—especially given that the "Aqaba Process"
itself is an initiative launched by Jordan’s King Abdullah II in 2015, designed
to transcend the mere confrontation of security threats and instead foster
political stability and cooperation among international and regional partners.
This is precisely what General Joseph Aoun meant in Paris when he spoke of a
long-term partnership, clear commitments, and an agreement on a practical
roadmap; the conference outcomes appeared to serve as a form of "deferred
capital" for the desired political logic. International support for the army
should not be a substitute for the political track, but rather a lever for it.
Jean Aziz, an advisor to the President of the Republic, articulated this point
at length in an article addressed to the US administration—a piece that most
clearly reflects the Baabda Palace’s stance, as it shifts the debate from the
confines of the military institution to the conditions required for the state to
fully reclaim its functions. This approach is premised on the idea that the
primacy of political logic is achieved neither by disarming the party nor by
confronting those who bear its weapons, but rather by the state demonstrating
its capacity to perform the very functions that "the Party" has usurped through
its arsenal. Otherwise, Lebanon remains trapped in a zero-sum equation of
conflicting legitimacies: Israel relies on the persistence of "the Party’s"
weapons to justify its continued occupation, while "the Party" relies on that
occupation to justify maintaining its arsenal and its non-military functions.
Breaking this vicious cycle cannot be achieved through mere security-based
crisis management; Lebanon requires serious and decisive US political support to
prevent the recurrence of the political vacuum that historically allowed for the
emergence of a parallel power—ranging from the era of "Fatah-land" to the
current project of Iranian-aligned proxies. Conditioning the Israeli withdrawal
on an assessment of Lebanese performance—particularly that of the army—threatens
to keep Lebanon trapped in the same cycle. It paves the way for the emergence of
a new organization or project to inherit the influence of "the Party,"
potentially in more violent forms. Therefore, the imperative is to prioritize
political logic and act upon it; the State—through its institutions and
authority—must fill the void currently occupied by armed factions and reclaim
their political, social, and security functions, rather than merely focusing on
disarming them or pursuing them. This requires reintroducing the State into the
South through new political, security, and economic arrangements that make its
presence a genuine alternative to parallel structures. Speaking for Baabda, Aziz
outlines the "step-by-step" strategy adopted by President Joseph Aoun since his
election: the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the expansion of the army’s
authority, the return of civilians, the commencement of reconstruction, and the
State addressing the presence of weapons outside its command. While the
sequencing of this strategy is expected to spark a dual storm of objections, it
aims to dismantle the functions that justify the continued existence of these
arms, while also serving as the essential prerequisite for transitioning from
one phase to the next. Political logic is not a stage that follows military and
security logic; rather, it provides them with their purpose and direction. The
State reclaims its monopoly on force by wresting away the very functions that
allowed armed factions to establish an authority superior to that of the State
itself.
Enduring, Enduring, Enduring... Then What?
Dr. Jocelyne El-Boustani/Nidaa Al-Watan/September 19, 2026 (Translated from
Arabic by AI)
"The Resistance is enduring, enduring, enduring as long as a single inch of our
land remains occupied," MP Ali Ammar recently declared during a parliamentary
session. At first glance, the phrase might seem like a mere reiteration of
Hezbollah’s well-known stance. Yet, why did the MP feel the need to repeat the
word "enduring" three times? In politics, repetition is not always just for
emphasis; sometimes, it serves to cement an idea in the public consciousness. At
other times, it indirectly reveals that the very idea itself has come to require
reaffirmation. Of course, one cannot discern a politician's state of mind from a
single sentence. However, in political psychology, an insistent push to solidify
a concept—precisely when it is becoming a subject of debate or challenge—can
signal anxiety regarding the prevailing narrative. In other words, when
something is firmly established, there is usually no need to declare it
"enduring" once, then a second time, and then a third. This is where the
significance of Ali Ammar’s statement lies. For years, Hezbollah has
successfully linked a set of ideas: there is an Israeli occupation or threat,
therefore there is a need for the Resistance, and consequently, the Resistance’s
weaponry becomes integral to Lebanon’s protection. The equation was simple:
occupation implies resistance, and resistance implies the protection of Lebanon.
Yet, the phrase "as long as a single inch of our land remains occupied" adds a
crucial element to this equation. Under this logic, the Resistance is not tied
to a temporary circumstance; rather, it persists as long as any part of the land
remains under occupation. The word "shibr" (span/inch) renders the endpoint
extremely distant—or perhaps entirely undefined. Here, the nature of the
question shifts. Instead of a Lebanese citizen asking, "Why must Hezbollah’s
weapons remain outside the State’s exclusive authority?" the question becomes,
"How can the Resistance end as long as the occupation persists?" The distinction
may seem minor, but it is significant; the debate shifts from the issue of
illegitimate weaponry and the role of the State to the Israeli occupation
itself. Through this shift, justifying the continued existence of these weapons
becomes linked to the persistence of the external threat. This is precisely what
makes the issue part of "cognitive warfare." Cognitive warfare is not merely
about fake news or disinformation; sometimes, the battle centers on something
more fundamental: "Who defines the framework through which we understand the
problem in the first place?" If a Lebanese citizen is persuaded to view the
issue through a simple chain of logic—where occupation created the Resistance,
and the Resistance provided protection—this framework does not necessarily
dictate a specific stance on the Resistance's weapons, yet it makes certain
questions seem more natural than others. The question becomes, for instance,
"How do we preserve the capability that provided protection?" while other
questions—such as "Who holds the authority to use force?"—recede into the
background. But what happens if the Lebanese citizen begins to decouple the two
issues? They might argue: "Yes, there is an Israeli occupation or threat, but
confronting that threat does not necessarily require maintaining weapons outside
the State’s authority." At that point, the old narrative begins to lose some of
its potency; it is no longer the only narrative in the arena. A competing
narrative gains ground: that protecting Lebanon is the State’s responsibility,
and that the decision regarding war and peace is a national one. Viewed in this
light, the slogan "It remains, it remains, it remains" becomes more than just a
political catchphrase. It is a message to the "Party’s" base that the project
endures and that the resistance has not retreated. Yet, it simultaneously
reveals that sustaining this concept now requires repeated affirmation.
Meanwhile, the stance taken by the President—Joseph Aoun—subjects the issue to a
practical test. In an interview with Agence France-Presse (AFP), he affirmed the
state’s determination to disarm Hezbollah, while stressing that this must be
achieved without confrontation. Given that the party slated for disarmament
openly declares that "the resistance is here to stay," the assertion that
disarmament can occur without conflict demands more than mere intent; it
requires a clear political mechanism outlining the transition from the current
reality to the desired outcome. The question here is not intended to be
provocative; it is simply the question dictated by the equation itself: in light
of Hezbollah’s declared position, how can the President disarm the group without
a confrontation? This may well be the true test of the coming phase—not merely
the state’s ability to articulate its objectives, but its capacity to translate
that declaration into reality without plunging the country into a new conflict.
It is precisely in this arena that the impending battle may prove to be about
more than just weaponry; it is a battle over who holds the decision-making
power, who defines the meaning of "resistance," and who ultimately determines
its future.
Who sent our children to the path of death?
Retired Brigadier General Tony Abi Samra/ Call of the Nation/ September 19, 2026
(Translated from Arabic by AI)
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/09/157625/
There is a moment repeated in the history of wars, when the language of promises
ends and slogans fall before the results on the ground, and the question that
everyone tried to postpone becomes impossible: Who bears responsibility? This
article is directed first to the fathers, mothers, and families of those who
paid the highest price in the wars launched by Hezbollah without the approval of
the Lebanese state, and in a context linked to Iran’s axes and interests. These
people deserve to know who sent their children to the path of death, who made
the decisions that put them on the battlefield, and who today shirks their
responsibility and blames others. What is worse than losing a son on the
battlefield is the attempt to evade responsibility and then hold the army and
the state accountable for the consequences of decisions they did not make. Then
these young men are killed twice: once on the battlefield, and once when the
responsibility of those who sent them there is erased and the loss is placed on
the shoulders of others. In this context, the words of Hezbollah leader Nawaf
al-Moussawi about the area south of the Litani and Beaufort Castle stand out
when he said that the areas that were taken “were not taken from our hand,” but
from the hand of the Lebanese authority, because the “party” had handed them
over to the army and the state. The equation seems simple: we fought, we held
out, we handed over the land to the state, and what happened after that became
the responsibility of the state.
But is it that simple to explain the responsibility for wars?
Everyone knows that the Lebanese state did not make the decision to go to war in
support of Gaza or Iran, and it was not the decision maker that brought Lebanon
into a military confrontation with Israel. Everyone also knows that the
“Amal-Hezbollah-Iran” axis did not hand over its positions to the army, but
rather hid behind the state and its institutions, to buy time, catch its breath,
and reorganize its ranks. Who made the decision, and who bears its consequences?
It is precisely here that the example of Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto,
Supreme Commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet during World War II, becomes
extremely important. He knew the United States and its capabilities, and his
warning was clear: "If I am ordered to go to war, I will move fearlessly for the
first six or twelve months, and win one victory after another. But if the war
continues after that, I cannot guarantee success." Japan struck Pearl Harbor and
won quick victories, but the strategic calculation changed about six months
later at the Battle of Midway. Here the responsibility of the leadership becomes
clear: It is not important that the fighter be brave and capable of fighting,
but rather that the leadership has calculated in advance the balance of power,
the ability to continue, the goals that can be achieved, and the price that the
people will pay. Talking about fighting “from house to house” and about the
courage of the fighters does not resolve the question about the validity of the
decision to go to war. Tactical heroism does not correct a strategic mistake.
When the consequences of the strategic error appear, another stage begins: the
search for a narrative that explains the results, and sometimes redistributes
responsibility. Perhaps Serge Chakhotin’s ideas help us understand what we can
understand from Nawaf al-Moussawi’s words: using narrative and propaganda to
redirect responsibility away from the decision-maker. Instead of confronting the
decisions that led to the war and its consequences, the story is reframed so
that the army becomes responsible for the loss. It is an attempt to turn a
strategic mistake into a narrative that makes others pay for it.
Between "us" and "them" disappear the questions that must remain at the heart of
the debate: Who decided to open the war? Who decided to link Lebanon to Gaza and
Tehran? Who estimated the balance of power? Who determined the goals of the
confrontation? Who bears the consequences of these decisions? The Presidency of
the Republic and the government also bear the responsibility of reviewing the
path that was followed since January 2025 in negotiating with Hezbollah and the
Amal Movement, and examining whether these negotiations achieved the goal for
which they were conducted, or whether they gave the “Amal-Hezbollah-Iran” axis
additional time to reorganize its ranks and prepare for a new phase, hiding
today behind the state and its institutions. At the same time, the presidency
and the government must clearly defend the army when such accusations are
brought against it, and put responsibility where it belongs. As for the families
of those who paid the price, they have the right to know the whole truth: who
sent their children to the path of death, and who bears responsibility for the
consequences. It is not permissible for their children to be killed twice: once
on the battlefield, and again when the responsibility of the one who sent them
to it is denied.
*Vice Chairman of the Liberal Patriots Party
*Former Head of United Nations Security in Asia and the Pacific
The Latest English LCCC
Miscellaneous Reports And News published
on September 18-19/2026
Sharaa secretly building up Syrian
military, raising red flags in Israeli security community
Jerusalem Post/September18/2026
Instead of investing in infrastructure, rebuilding the country, or improving the
welfare of civilians who suffered through 15 years of war, the extremist regime
is focusing on an arms buildup. Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has been
diverting most of the country's resources, from tax revenues to international
aid, toward building a large standing army and acquiring weapons systems,
according to Israeli security assessments. Instead of investing in
infrastructure, rebuilding the country, or improving the welfare of civilians
who suffered through 15 years of war, the extremist regime is focusing on an
arms buildup while working to conceal its military expansion strategy. The
development is raising concern and red flags within the intelligence
community.According to IDF assessments, Sharaa's operational plans are intended
for the point at which he believes he can strike Hezbollah in Lebanon, which he
despises, as well as pro-Iranian Shi'ite militias in Iraq.The belief is that he
is waiting for the right moment, combining the completion of advanced stages in
his force buildup with a reduction in the US military presence in the region,
particularly in Iraq, in a way that would make it more difficult for the United
States to prevent such a move.
As Syria continues its military buildup, European countries, led by Germany, are
providing aid and embracing the Syrian president in an effort to stem the flow
of refugees and pave the way for their return to the country. According to
security officials, once Syria stabilizes and is no longer defined as a combat
zone, European governments will be better positioned to justify returning
refugees.
Moderate Sunni states seeking to moderate Sharaa's policies
At the same time, moderate Sunni states, including Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates, are working around the clock to draw Sharaa closer to them. They
are investing money in him and granting him honors in an effort to soften his
agenda, distance him from extremist elements, and moderate his policies, despite
his well-known jihadist past. According to security sources, relations between
Turkey and Syria are complicated. "Al-Sharaa will not be so quick to hand
territory over to Erdogan, nor will he necessarily allow him to take control of
military bases in Syria. Therefore, to some extent, the recent Israeli strike in
Syria helped Ahmed al-Sharaa," one security official said. "Ahmed al-Sharaa
wants to build Syria under his leadership into a regional power that will look
in every direction. The moment he decides to, he will also direct military force
against Israel."
Israel missed opportunity to make agreement with weakened SharaaAccording to
security sources, Israel missed a historic opportunity to reach an agreement
with Sharaa when he was still very weak and had only just taken office. Israel
could have established facts on the ground regarding the border area and the
status of the Israeli Golan Heights, but hesitation on the Israeli side and its
focus on other arenas prevented progress.As a result, the IDF is required to
intensify its intelligence-gathering efforts concerning the Syrian military, its
personnel and its capabilities, and to prepare operational plans in case it is
required to launch a broad operation to thwart hostile intentions or a military
buildup that undermines Israel's freedom of action or military superiority.
A future confrontation is only a matter of time, security sources assess.
Trump weighs renewed major attacks on Iran: Report
Al Arabiya English/18 September ,2026
US President Donald Trump is weighing whether to resume large-scale military
attacks on Iran as he approaches what he described as a major decision over the
next phase of the war, Axios reported on Thursday. “I have a big decision coming
up. Do I want to go in and annihilate them [the Iranian regime] or do I not?
It's a big decision. Anything could happen with me,” Trump told Axios in an
interview. His comments come ahead of a planned meeting on Tuesday with leaders
from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman on
the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Trump told
Axios that he intends to use the meeting to hear directly from Gulf leaders
about how they view the conflict and what should come next. “I want to find out
where they are and how they are doing. We have been very protective of them,” he
said. According to Axios, the talks could help shape whether Washington makes
another push for diplomacy or moves toward a renewed military escalation. Any
return to major combat operations would also require coordination with key US
partners in the region. Trump declined to tell Axios whether he expects to make
a decision before or after the US midterm elections. Several US officials
believe the current situation, which Axios described as an increasingly
difficult military and diplomatic holding pattern, cannot continue indefinitely.
Some officials have raised the possibility that Trump could return to major
combat operations after the midterms if no agreement with Iran is reached. Trump
decided against resuming major attacks in early August after Saudi Arabia and
Qatar raised concerns that Iran could retaliate against Saudi oil and gas
infrastructure, Axios previously reported. Since then, the Trump administration
has suspended negotiations with Tehran, imposed additional economic sanctions
and maintained a naval blockade on Iranian ports, while the US military has
focused on reopening the Strait of Hormuz and increasing the flow of oil through
the strategic waterway.Tanker traffic through the strait has increased
significantly, according to Axios, but remains below levels seen before the war,
while oil prices continue to remain elevated. Trump and Defense Secretary Pete
Hegseth have also ordered the US military to maintain its current force posture
in the Middle East through the end of the year, US officials told Axios, keeping
forces prepared for a possible return to full-scale combat.
One US official told the outlet that Washington would eventually have to
determine its ultimate objective in the conflict because the military could not
remain in its current posture indefinitely. Trump also told Axios that he was
pleased with the effectiveness of the US naval blockade against Iran and said
Tehran remained in direct contact with Washington and continued to seek a deal.
Separately, the White House is developing a strategy for the period after the
war that would seek to contain Iran while expanding normalization between Israel
and other countries in the region, according to Axios. The plan remains in its
early stages and is intended to guide US Middle East policy after the conflict
ends and through the remaining two years of Trump's term. Asked whether he would
meet Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu while in New York next week,
Trump told Axios: “I may.”
Iran says struck oil tanker in Strait of Hormuz
AFP/18 September ,2026
Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) on Friday claimed a strike on an oil tanker
in the Strait of Hormuz, according to state news agency IRNA, as a British
maritime agency also reported an attack. Iran has maintained its stranglehold on
the strategic strait as Washington continues pressing its counterblockade of
Iranian ports during the Middle East war. Tehran wants to charge ships for
passage, attacking vessels it accuses of attempting to circumvent its preferred
route. “The Togo-flagged oil tanker ‘Trend’ had been targeted and detained after
a fire broke out on board” late on Thursday, the statement said, calling it an
attempted “illegal passage.”Early on Friday, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade
Operations (UKMTO) said a ship was hit by an “unknown projectile,” causing a
fire that was extinguished. The monitoring agency had also reported a “security
incident” in Hormuz late on Thursday, without giving details.
It was unclear if the IRGC and UKMTO reports referred to the same incident.
France will convene G7 energy summit: Macron
AFP/18 September ,2026
President Emmanuel Macron said Friday that France would convene a G7 meeting
dedicated to energy in the weeks to come as fuel prices soar amid the US-Iran
war. “In the coming weeks, we will have a G7 meeting devoted to these energy
issues, both to strengthen cooperation and to avoid unnecessary tensions between
the G7 countries and our main partners,” Macron said.It would also be an
opportunity “to consider options for a possible release or unlocking of
strategic reserves,” he added. Macron spoke after convening leaders for a
meeting with presidential hopefuls and party leaders ahead of next spring’s
elections in which he cannot stand, having served the maximum two terms. With
the election seven months away and France’s economic situation worsening, the
government has sought to keep social discontent in check as voters increasingly
complain about the cost of living.
The surge in prices was “not the result of government decisions,” said Macron.
“It is a consequence of the geopolitical situation,” he said, adding that
support measures already in place would be “reviewed” and “adjusted” to better
help the public.“Before spending vast sums of money, which is taxpayers’ money
and would ultimately translate either into a higher deficit or higher taxes, we
must above all remain focused on addressing the root causes.”
Taliban spokesperson warns Pakistan against military
action, calls for Saudi mediation
Al Arabiya English/18 September ,2026
Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid warned Pakistan against carrying out
military operations inside Afghanistan, while rejecting Islamabad’s accusations
that Afghan territory is being used by militant groups to launch attacks across
the border.Speaking in an exclusive interview with Al Arabiya English, Mujahid
said Afghanistan would defend its sovereignty if Pakistan carried out strikes
inside the country. “If Pakistan invokes Article 51 to violate the sanctity of
Afghan territory, Afghanistan has the right to defend its country, and we will
do so,” he said, warning of a “crushing response” to any violation of Afghan
sovereignty. Mujahid was responding in part to allegations raised in an earlier
Al Arabiya English interview with the Pakistani army’s spokesperson, who said
Afghan territory was being used to recruit, train and arm militants who later
carried out attacks inside Pakistan. The Taliban spokesperson rejected those
accusations, saying Kabul does not allow the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP,
to operate from Afghan territory and does not support armed groups targeting
other countries. He also said Pakistan should address its security challenges
internally rather than attribute them to Afghanistan, arguing that unrest
involving the TTP and Baloch groups predates the Taliban’s return to power.
Despite the tensions, Mujahid said Afghanistan wants dialogue with Pakistan and
called for stronger mechanisms for intelligence-sharing and cooperation.
He also welcomed a larger Saudi role in mediating between Kabul and Islamabad,
saying the Kingdom is a friend of both countries and can play a “positive role”
in resolving their differences. Full interview will be streamed tonight on Al
Arabiya English’s YouTube live stream.
Agency: Seoul Confirms to Washington Its Intention to
Contribute to Restoring Freedom of Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz...
Diplomatic Efforts Regarding North Korea
Riyadh: AlArabiya.net and Agencies/September 18, 2026 (Translated from Arabic by
AI)
Yonhap News Agency reported on Saturday that South Korean Foreign Minister Cho
Hyun met with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Friday, reaffirming Seoul's
readiness to actively contribute to restoring freedom of navigation through the
Strait of Hormuz. The two foreign ministers held talks in Washington amidst
ongoing discussions between the allies regarding planned investments by the
Asian nation in the United States, potential efforts to help secure the Strait
of Hormuz, and diplomatic initiatives concerning North Korea. Cho Hyun and Marco
Rubio met at the U.S. State Department for their first bilateral talks since
February, at a time when the allies are addressing multiple issues—including how
Seoul might contribute to ongoing efforts to ensure the freedom and safety of
navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. In a press conference held hours before
the talks, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung stated that troops would not be
deployed in a manner that could entangle Seoul in a foreign conflict; however,
he emphasized the necessity for Korea to protect its citizens and national
interests in the region surrounding the strait. Cho and Rubio were also expected
to discuss South Korea's commitment to invest $350 billion in the United States,
in accordance with the bilateral trade agreement concluded last year. Seoul and
Washington were initially expected to announce South Korea's first investment
project under this trade agreement on Friday (Korea time); however, the
announcement was reportedly postponed until next week following a delay in
briefing the National Assembly. The foreign ministers may also discuss
cooperation on North Korea-related issues, as U.S. President Donald Trump seeks
to resume summits with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
Al Arabiya Sources: Pakistan’s Interior Minister to Discuss
Houthi Escalation in Yemen During Upcoming Iran Visit
Riyadh: AlArabiya.net/September 18, 2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
Sources from Al Arabiya and Al Hadath reported on Friday that Pakistan’s
Interior Minister, Mohsin Naqvi, is set to travel to Iran in the coming hours.
The sources indicated that he would discuss the Houthi escalation in Yemen and
its repercussions for regional security. Earlier, the *Financial Times* reported
on Friday that the Pakistani army chief had urged Iran to rein in the Houthis.
Iranian media had reported on Thursday that Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi
discussed the latest regional developments with Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir
during a phone call—held while the Iranian minister was visiting Beijing on
Wednesday—at a time when negotiations between Washington and Tehran remain
deadlocked with no agreement in sight. Prior to this, U.S. President Donald
Trump expressed hope that the war against Iran might soon come to an end; a
separate media report indicated that Trump is expected to meet with Gulf leaders
on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly next Tuesday to discuss the
conflict. The war with Iran has entered its seventh month with no end in sight.
Concerns regarding maritime navigation in the Red Sea have mounted this month
after the Iran-aligned Houthi group escalated its attacks, threatening shipping
in the Bab al-Mandab Strait. After years of relative calm, the conflict
escalated again in July against the backdrop of the war in the Middle East.
Tensions intensified further last week, raising fears that the Bab al-Mandab
Strait could be closed or that transit through it might be restricted—much like
the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. The Houthi militia continues to launch
repeated attacks against Saudi cities, regions, and vital facilities,
deliberately and systematically targeting civilians. In response, Riyadh has
condemned in the strongest terms the Houthi terrorist militia's continued,
deliberate, and heinous attacks on civilian objects and civilians within the
Kingdom. Yesterday, Thursday, the official spokesman for Saudi Civil Defense
stated that Civil Defense teams in Taif Governorate responded to the impact of
drone debris following the interception and destruction of a drone launched by
the Houthi militia. The incident resulted in the death of a Yemeni resident,
injuries to a female Saudi citizen and a Pakistani resident (who is in critical
condition), and material damage to several buildings and vehicles. Pakistan
strongly condemned the Houthi attack on Taif, expressing grave concern over the
assault, which endangered innocent lives and threatens regional peace and
security. Meanwhile, the Yemeni army recaptured positions from the Houthis west
of Taiz. The Taiz Axis Media Center reported that government forces retook
positions on Jabal al-Shuhada—overlooking Wadi al-Ghayl in the Al-Wazi'iyah
district, southwest of Taiz—following clashes that drove back Houthi militia
elements. The center added that government forces repelled an attack launched by
Houthi militias on the Al-Kadha front in the Al-Ma'afir district, west of the
governorate; the engagement resulted in Houthi casualties and forced the militia
to retreat. Separately, airstrikes targeted the group's positions and
concentrations near the Al-Qasr Roundabout at the city's eastern entrance.
Concurrently, the United Nations stated that the pace of displacement in Yemen
has risen sharply since September 3, revealing that over 100,000 people have
been displaced since the beginning of the month, with the majority heading to
the Taiz and Lahj governorates. UNICEF had previously reported that ongoing
fighting in Yemen displaced more than 57,000 children in just two weeks and
deprived children of essential services, warning that the escalation is
exacerbating the crisis for the 12.2 million children in need of humanitarian
assistance.
661 Houthi Violations Against Civilians in Taiz in 12 Days... A Scenario
Reflecting the Widening Scope of Attacks from Targeting Individuals to Striking
Homes and Facilities
AlArabiya.net: Awsan Salem/September 18, 2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
A human rights report has revealed a major Houthi escalation in Taiz
Governorate, southwestern Yemen, documenting 661 crimes and violations against
civilians in just 12 days. This trend reflects an expansion in the scope of
attacks, moving from targeting individuals to striking homes, facilities, and
essential services. In its report, the Yemeni Network for Rights and Freedoms
stated that the violations—monitored between September 3 and 15, 2026—included
killings, injuries, field executions, abductions, arrests, home raids, property
destruction, and the shelling of vital facilities. According to the report, the
escalation resulted in the deaths of 51 civilians and injuries to 62
others—mostly women and children—caused by sniper fire, artillery shelling,
mortar rounds, drones, and ballistic missiles. Meanwhile, the network documented
the field execution of nine military personnel in the Al-Wazi'iyah, Maqbanah,
and Al-Kadha districts. The network also recorded 167 cases of abduction and
arrest and 213 home raids, alongside attacks on five mosques, six health
facilities, 16 power stations and generators, and nine telecommunications
networks and stations. Additionally, two bridges and two main roads—including
the Hijat al-Abed road connecting Aden and Taiz—as well as 34 civilian vehicles,
were targeted. It stated that the escalation has caused the displacement of
thousands of families, coinciding with shortages of food, water, and medicine,
as well as a decline in basic services. It warned that continued attacks
threaten the remaining civilian infrastructure and exacerbate the suffering of
the population. Additionally, the report highlighted recruitment
operations—allegedly involving Yemeni children as well as African refugees and
migrants—that deployed them to the front lines; the network deemed this a grave
violation that exposes the most vulnerable groups to the dangers of war. The
network called upon the international community and human rights organizations
to take urgent action to protect civilians, document violations, pressure for an
end to attacks on civilian targets, and ensure the delivery of aid and basic
services to those affected and displaced.
Prominent Houthi Commander and Aides Killed in Yemeni
Airstrike Near Bab al-Mandab (Kahboub Front)
Al Arabiya.net: Awsan Salem/September 18, 2026 (Translated from
Arabic by AI)
A prominent field commander within the Houthi militia—holding the rank of Major
General and commanding the so-called "1st Commando Brigade"—was killed alongside
six of his aides on the Kahboub front near Bab al-Mandab, an area witnessing
fierce clashes with Yemeni army forces. The Houthi militia acknowledged the
death of Major General Faraq Mohsen al-Assar (known by the nom de guerre "Abu
Saqr al-Kafr"), the commander of the "1st Commando Brigade"; Houthi activists
mourned him without disclosing the circumstances of his death. Field sources
reported that al-Assar and his aides were killed in a Yemeni airstrike near the
strategic Kahboub front—which overlooks Bab al-Mandab—an area the militia has
been attempting to seize through intense, "suicide-style" attacks. According to
sources, Houthi commander Al-Assar—who hails from the Al-Qafar district in Ibb
Governorate, central Yemen—rose through the ranks to hold several military
leadership positions within the militia, most notably commanding the "1st
Commando Brigade." Military and security sources report that Al-Assar has
participated in various fronts and battles fought by the Houthi militias over
the past few years, including the Marib fronts; he was also among the commanders
involved in military campaigns launched by the group in the Al-Saddah and Al-Nadirah
districts of Ibb Governorate. Furthermore, in recent months, Al-Assar has led a
campaign to mobilize hundreds of fighters from Ibb Governorate and deploy them
to the battlefronts alongside the Houthi militias. The Kahboub front,
overlooking the Bab al-Mandab Strait, has witnessed escalating clashes in recent
days as the Houthi militia sends reinforcements to the area and attempts to
advance and seize control of strategic mountain positions and high ground. In
response, government forces have intensified their shelling and targeting of
Houthi reinforcements arriving at the Kahboub front, utilizing warplanes,
artillery, guided missiles, and drones. The Kahboub axis holds significant
military importance due to its location on high ground overlooking the roads and
passages surrounding the Bab al-Mandab Strait. According to military sources,
government forces are working to consolidate their positions on the Kahboub
heights, which would enable them to advance toward the Dhubab area; meanwhile,
locations and islands near Bab al-Mandab—including Mayyun, Zuqar, and Hanish—are
gaining strategic importance for controlling the maritime corridor.
False US AI-generated intel report almost sparked
confrontation with China: Report
Al Arabiya English/18 September ,2026
An intelligence report, circulated across the US military during the war with
Iran, almost sparked a confrontation with China after it concluded that a
Chinese ship in the Middle East was transporting components of a nuclear weapons
program, CNN reported on Friday.
After the report which was put by a special operations command analyst was
disseminated, the US military moved to implement measures to intercept the
vessel, CNN reported, citing four sources familiar with the matter. According to
two of the sources, armed US military personnel were preparing to board the
ship.Military planes were in the air, one of those sources and another source
familiar with the incident said. Officials began thoroughly examining the report
before the planned operation and found it had been generated with the help of
artificial intelligence (AI) and that a chatbot the analyst had used
inaccurately identified the material the vessel was carrying. “The bot fused
together open-source intelligence with secret signals intelligence in government
holdings and reached its fateful conclusion about the material the ship was
carrying,” CNN said, adding that it was not able to learn what the misidentified
cargo was.
The report was “entirely false,” but it also “almost started a war,” according
to one of the sources.
The Latest LCCC analysis &
editorials from miscellaneous sources published
on September 18-19/2026
The "Resistance"’s Copium of Denial
Makram Rabah/levanttime/18
September ,2026
In April 2003, Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf gave the world one of the
greatest political performances in the art of denial.
On April 7, American tanks had entered the heart of Baghdad, their images
broadcast across television screens worldwide. Yet Saddam Hussein’s information
minister stood before reporters and declared—with the confidence of a man who
possessed information unavailable to the human eye—that there were no Americans
in Baghdad and that the invading forces were being crushed and annihilated.
Two days later, on April 9, Baghdad fell.
Al-Sahhaf was not merely lying. He was providing a psychological service to an
audience no longer capable of confronting the truth. That is precisely what
makes him so contemporary in Lebanon.
Were he among us today, al-Sahhaf would probably find excellent employment with
the mouthpieces of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah in
their tabloid press. He might even discover that his imagination was rather
limited compared with the extraordinary progress the Axis of Resistance has made
in the manufacture of victory.
The Israelis enter a position? They did not enter all of it.They seize the
entrance to a tunnel? The tunnel has other entrances.They reach one facility?
There are other facilities.
They occupy a hill? The hill is not the entire mountain.
And if they occupy the mountain, do not worry: Lebanon is a mountainous country.
This is not military analysis. It is a dose of copium.
“Copium,” in the language of the internet, combines cope and opium: a
psychological narcotic consumed to dull the pain of a defeat one refuses to
acknowledge. It does not recover territory or win battles. Its function is much
simpler: to make you feel victorious while you explain why your defeat was not
really a defeat.
But Lebanon’s problem today extends beyond Hezbollah itself. Treating Hezbollah
as merely a Lebanese organization that made a series of strategic mistakes
misses the essence of the matter.
There is an owner of the project, and there is a Lebanese franchise attached to
it.
The owner is Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Lebanese franchise is
Hezbollah.
This is not a description invented by Hezbollah’s Lebanese opponents. In March,
Reuters reported that the IRGC had played a direct role in rebuilding
Hezbollah’s military leadership after the blows it suffered during the 2024 war.
Around one hundred Iranian officers were reportedly sent to Lebanon to
participate in training, restructuring, and rearmament. More importantly, the
result was described plainly: Hezbollah had been prepared to enter the 2026 war
alongside Tehran.
Iran does not merely “support” Hezbollah, as diplomatic statements so politely
put it.
Iran built it, trained it, armed it, and rebuilt its military structure. Then
came the moment to collect on its investment.
But who paid the price?
Certainly not only the IRGC officers sitting safely in Tehran.
The largest share of the Lebanese bill has been paid by the people of the south,
the Bekaa, and Beirut’s southern suburbs—above all, by hundreds of thousands of
Lebanese Shiites whom Hezbollah claims it exists to protect.
Here lies the bitterest irony of the so-called resistance.
The IRGC wants leverage on the Mediterranean, so Lebanese Shiites pay with their
sons, their homes, and their villages.
Tehran wants to remind Washington and Tel Aviv that it commands multiple fronts,
so Nabatieh, Bint Jbeil, the southern suburbs, and the Bekaa are transformed
into mailboxes for other people’s missiles.
Iran’s leadership is fighting a regional struggle for influence. But on the
Lebanese front, most of the blood is not Iranian. The destroyed villages are not
in Isfahan. The displaced families are not searching for shelter in Tehran’s
schools.
Since March 2026, more than 4,300 people have been killed in Lebanon, according
to Lebanese government figures cited by Reuters. By early September, more than
340,000 people remained displaced in the south. More than 250 children had been
killed and over a thousand wounded.
And yet the Lebanese are still expected to celebrate because the Israelis may
not have reached the final metre of a tunnel beneath Ali al-Tahir.
This is the genius of it.
The house is gone, but the tunnel is long.
The village is empty, but the “equation” survives.
The land is being swallowed, but the resistance is doing well.
Hundreds of thousands are displaced, but the enemy has not discovered where
passageway number three ends.
And if anyone dares ask what purpose this enormous military apparatus serves
when the very people it supposedly protects are sleeping in schools on foam
mattresses, the yellow press has its answer ready: You do not understand the
nature of war.
Perhaps.
Or perhaps the Lebanese are beginning to understand it all too well.
Perhaps they now understand that the celebrated “unity of fronts” means
something painfully simple: Iran chooses the front, and the Lebanese pay the
price.
More damning still, the bill is imposed, time after time, on Lebanon’s Shiite
community itself.
For decades, this community has offered its sons under the banner of liberating
the land and defending Lebanon. But the question that now grows more urgent is
this: When did sacrifice for Lebanon become the sacrifice of Lebanon for the
interests of the IRGC?
There is nothing anti-Shiite about asking this question. Quite the opposite.
The most dangerous thing Hezbollah has done is to claim an exclusive right to
represent Lebanon’s Shiites, then bind their security, their homes, and their
children’s future to the strategy of another state. As though the Lebanese
Shiite has no right to demand a state that protects him, rather than being
treated as ammunition in an Iranian strategic arsenal.
Then comes the machinery of denial to add insult to loss.
It is not enough for people to surrender their blood, homes, and livelihoods.
They must also call the result a victory.
And so Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf returns. In April 2003, he looked at the tanks
with his own eyes and declared that they did not exist.
His Lebanese successors are more sophisticated. They acknowledge that the tank
exists, but explain that its presence is proof of its defeat.
They admit that the position has fallen, but insist that its fall is part of
steadfastness.
They concede that hundreds of thousands have been displaced, but demand that the
displaced take pride because “the project” has survived.
What project? And whose project?
Why must the Lebanese Shiite die so that the IRGC can improve its negotiating
position?
These are the questions copium cannot answer.
The opium of denial may dull the pain of defeat for a while, but it cannot alter
its outcome.
In the end, as al-Sahhaf discovered in April 2003, there comes a moment when
words can no longer conceal the tank.
Especially when that tank is standing on your land.
Saudi Arabia Picked a Fight With the Two Nations That
Could Help It the Most Against the Houthis — Israel and the UAE
Hussain Abdul-Hussain/algemeine/September 18/2026
Riyadh is running out of options, and more importantly, it is running out of
time.
In less than two weeks, Iran and its proxy militia in Yemen have effectively
checkmated Saudi Arabia by severing two of its three vital oil-exporting routes.
Following Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the Houthis launched an
aggressive coastal sweep, seizing Yemen’s strategic port city of Mocha,
alongside critical Red Sea islands, thus controlling Bab Al-Mandab Strait and
declaring it off-limits to Saudi shipping.
The Houthis also resumed lobbing projectiles into the Saudi homeland. Riyadh’s
response has been dangerously quiet, limited to celebrating minor defensive
intercepts while its state pundits remain noticeably silent. The kingdom is
facing a direct threat to its sovereignty, while its decades-old strategy of
inviting distant foreign capitals to defend it has failed.
If Saudi Arabia wants to survive this onslaught, it must abandon its diplomatic
paralysis. It needs to knock on the only two doors that actually possess the
proven capability to beat back Iran and the Houthis: Israel and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE). To dig itself out of this intractable problem, Riyadh must
publicly normalize ties with Jerusalem and patch up its strained relationship
with Abu Dhabi.
Israel’s elite intelligence apparatus and unmatched air defense capabilities,
combined with the UAE’s proven track record of successfully countering Houthi
advances on the ground in southern Yemen, represent the only credible alliance
capable of shifting the balance of power.
Instead of building this vital coalition, Riyadh has spent the last two years
picking political fights with both nations while trying to buy off the Houthis
with passive ceasefires. Saudi forces looked the other way as the militia
smuggled weapons through territory of Saudi Arabia’s Yemeni allies. The Houthis
used that breathing room to prepare for this month’s offensive.
Relying on makeshift and locally produced weaponry, a non-state militia has
managed to act like a military superpower next to an established state that
spent a staggering $83 billion — seven percent of its GDP — on defense in 2025
alone, and yet, Riyadh has nothing to show for its military spending, the fifth
highest in the world.
Saudi military vulnerability is compounded by economic headwinds at home. Long
before the first Iran War in June 2025 and the second one in February 2026,
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) ambitious vision for structural
modernity had run out of steam. The kingdom desperately needed oil at $95 a
barrel to balance its books. Instead, the price has hovered at $65 since 2023,
forcing Riyadh deep into red ink and driving its national debt up to 35 percent
of GDP.
The crown prince’s flagship mega-project, the sci-fi capital city of Neom in the
country’s northwest, has been abandoned. The grand plan to emulate the UAE’s
economic success, which lowered its reliance on oil from 90 to 25 percent of
GDP, stalled, likely due to political meddling and micromanagement that
undermined the rule of law and meritocracy, the two pillars of service
economies.
Without a radical transformation, Saudi Arabia will lose the remaining economic
leverage it needs to modernize.
Blaming the Crown Prince entirely, however, misses the broader historical
context. MBS did not inherit a muscular, self-reliant superpower. He inherited a
weakening state that was already falling behind on vital human and economic
indicators. Decades of unearned prosperity funded by the discovery of massive
oil reservoirs after 1932 turned the descendants of the peninsula’s fierce
desert warriors into a society reliant on foreign labor for growth, and external
forces for defense.
The founder of the kingdom, Saud Bin Abdulaziz, perfected the law of the desert,
launching an offensive from landlocked Riyadh that swept coast to coast to forge
a nation through sheer force.
None of the founder’s muscular leadership remains today. Saudi weakness risks
validating the cyclical theory of the medieval sociologist Ibn Khaldun: the
founders build, the sons maintain, and the grandsons lose. MBS is the third
generation.
During the Cold War, Saudi Arabia benefited from America’s anti-Soviet defense
umbrella. Since that war ended, the Saudis have felt insecure in their defense
reliance on America. Riyadh thus started shopping for middle powers and stumbled
on Pakistan, which is too far away to project power in Yemen, and Turkey, whose
ascendence threatens Riyadh as much as Iran does.
This week, MBS visited Egypt, the most populous Arab country, perhaps to enlist
Cairo to war with the Houthis on Saudi behalf. But it’s been a while since the
Egyptian junta, immersed in the country’s corrupt and underperforming economy,
fought or won any real war.
Saudi Arabia has run out of ideas, but — with its very existence at stake — it
cannot afford to do nothing. To defend itself, defeat the Houthi threat, and
refocus its energy on modernization, Riyadh must put pride aside, recognize who
its true regional allies can be, and forge an overt, powerful military
partnership with Israel and the UAE.
**Hussain Abdel Hussain is a research fellow at The Foundation for the Defense
of Democracies (FDD) and the author of The Arab Case for Israel.
Don’t Let Lebanon’s Peace Agreement Prove Hezbollah Right
By Jean Aziz/Just Security Magazine/September 16/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/09/157620/
Barely six weeks after Lebanon and Israel entered their most consequential
agreement in decades, the process is already beginning to falter. The latest
U.S.-mediated talks in Rome ended without agreement on expanding the "pilot
zones" through which Israeli forces are meant to withdraw and the Lebanese Armed
Forces assume control. Israel is demanding that Lebanon’s army demonstrate
effective control in areas already handed over, alongside progress on
Hezbollah’s disarmament, before it relinquishes additional territory. Lebanon’s
position is that the army cannot fully deploy into territory that Israeli forces
continue to occupy.
This is more than a dispute over sequencing. It is a contradiction that
threatens the political logic of the entire agreement.
The framework was supposed to create a gradual transition in southern Lebanon:
Israeli forces would withdraw, the Lebanese army would expand its authority,
civilians would return, reconstruction would begin and the state would address
the continued existence of weapons outside its control. Each part of that
process was meant to make the next one more possible.
Instead, Israel is increasingly treating withdrawal as something Lebanon must
first earn by demonstrating control over territory it does not yet fully
possess. Meanwhile, military operations have continued. Two Israeli soldiers
were killed this week in an explosion while operating inside Lebanon, after
which Israel launched strikes across the south; the United Nations Interim Force
in Lebanon (UNIFIL) recorded 113 Israeli projectiles in a single day, the
highest level since June 21.
This is precisely the kind of dynamic the agreement was meant to end.
It is also why President Joseph Aoun’s visit to Washington on July 21 mattered.
The visit was not important because of its ceremony, but because it appeared to
establish the American political backing required to make an extremely difficult
Lebanese transition possible. President Donald Trump promised that the United
States would help Lebanon substantially, while Aoun sought continued American
support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and pressure towards a complete Israeli
withdrawal.
That bargain is now being tested.
Lebanon wants the state to extend its authority across its territory and wants
the Lebanese Armed Forces to assume the security responsibilities that have for
decades been divided between the state, foreign armies, and armed organizations.
It also wants to address Hezbollah’s weapons through a process that ultimately
restores the state’s monopoly over force.
But political intent alone cannot deliver that outcome. The Lebanese state
cannot credibly ask communities to support disarmament while Israeli forces
remain on Lebanese territory and military operations continue around them.
This is where the discussion of decommissioning Hezbollah has to begin.
Decommissioning does not mean simply collecting weapons. In practical political
terms, it means ending the protective function those weapons have claimed to
perform. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has long justified its arsenal partly through the
argument that the state cannot protect Lebanese territory from Israel or compel
Israel to withdraw from occupied land.
A serious process for ending Hezbollah’s military role therefore has to address
that argument, not merely denounce it.
This does not grant Hezbollah an indefinite right to retain an armed structure
outside of state authority. It recognizes something more basic: if the Lebanese
state is to replace the logic of armed resistance, it has to demonstrate that
state institutions can achieve the security outcomes that resistance claims only
weapons in the hands of Hezbollah can provide.
That becomes considerably harder when withdrawal itself is made conditional on
prior Lebanese action.
The present sequencing therefore risks creating a self-reinforcing trap. Israel
points to Hezbollah’s weapons as a reason to remain. Hezbollah points to
Israel’s continued presence as a reason to remain armed. Between them stands a
Lebanese state being asked to dismantle one side of that equation without being
given the means to remove the other.
If that continues, the agreement will not weaken Hezbollah’s resistance
narrative. It will supply it with new evidence.
The State Has to Replace More Than Weapons
No serious assessment of Hezbollah can treat it only as an external military
problem fueled by third parties.
Its capabilities were built over decades through Iranian financial, military,
and ideological support, particularly from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps. That relationship connected Lebanese security to a regional deterrence
strategy shaped largely outside Lebanon, often with devastating consequences for
the country.
But Hezbollah also became embedded within Lebanese society. Over four decades it
developed political institutions, social networks, and systems of welfare and
protection within communities where the state was often weak or absent. Many
Lebanese—particularly within the Shiite community— supported it because of
ideology, but also because the party provided forms of security and assistance
that public institutions could not. Thus, any serious transition away from
Hezbollah’s armed role must provide the party’s supporters in the Shia community
confidence that their protection, political standing, and socioeconomic
interests will not be diminished once the party’s arms become part of the state.
President Aoun himself has acknowledged this complexity. It is one reason the
question cannot credibly be reduced to an order to surrender arms.
Lebanon instead needs a comprehensive process of disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration. The purpose is not to preserve Hezbollah’s military autonomy
under another name. It is to ensure that ending that autonomy strengthens the
Republic rather than producing another cycle of instability.
That means creating the conditions under which the institutions of the state can
actually replace the functions that parallel structures have performed.
A combatant who leaves an armed organization needs a credible civilian future.
Communities that have depended on Hezbollah-linked institutions need functioning
public services and local government. Southern towns repeatedly devastated by
war need reconstruction, employment, and economic activity. Citizens who are
asked to place their security exclusively in the hands of the state need to see
that the state can protect them.
Seen this way, full Israeli withdrawal is not a separate diplomatic demand
sitting alongside decommissioning. It is one of the conditions that makes
decommissioning politically credible.
Washington’s Commitment Now Has to Become Policy
This is also why the commitments made during President Aoun’s Washington visit
now matter more than the visit itself.
Lebanon has indicated where it wants to go. It wants the Lebanese Armed Forces
to extend state authority. It wants weapons brought under legitimate
institutions. What it lacks are some of the material and political conditions
required to complete that transition.
The United States can influence both.
Trump’s promise to support Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) should
now translate into sustained military assistance, training, and institutional
support commensurate with what the army is being asked to do. The LAF is
expected to deploy across contested territory, enforce a new security order,
facilitate civilian return, and eventually assume responsibilities previously
exercised by Hezbollah. That cannot be achieved simply by declaring the army to
be the legitimate security actor and expecting capacity to follow.
Nor can the military question be separated from reconstruction.
Years of conflict have damaged homes, roads, businesses, and public
infrastructure, particularly in southern Lebanon. Municipalities are trying to
serve returning populations while operating within an economy still suffering
the consequences of years of financial collapse. If the state is expected to
become the primary source of authority in these communities, then the
institutions through which citizens encounter that state have to function.
That requires reconstruction funding, capable municipalities, economic reform,
and public institutions able to deliver services without forcing citizens back
into systems of partisan dependency. These are not ancillary development
questions attached to a security agreement. They determine whether the transfer
of authority away from an armed movement can endure.
American support for the LAF is therefore only one component of the commitment
Washington made in July. The second is political.
Israel cannot be allowed to turn withdrawal into an indefinitely postponed
reward for Lebanese performance. The Lebanese army needs access to the territory
it is being asked to control, and the Lebanese government needs to demonstrate
to its own population that choosing state authority produces actual sovereignty.
Washington helped construct the agreement precisely because neither side could
resolve this sequencing problem alone. Its role cannot end once the framework
has been signed.
An Agreement Cannot Survive Without Reciprocity
The present stalemate is especially dangerous because Lebanon is attempting this
transition within a wider confrontation involving Israel, Iran, and the United
States that remains deeply unstable.
Lebanese politics has repeatedly been overwhelmed by regional conflicts over
which the country has little control. The current negotiation process between
Lebanon and Israel mediated by the US was valuable precisely because it offered
a possible way to insulate Lebanese security from that pattern by returning
decisions of war, peace, and territorial defense to the state.
A prolonged Israeli presence would move Lebanon in the opposite direction.
Critics of the agreement would be able to argue that Beirut accepted substantial
obligations while Israel retained territorial control and freedom of military
action. Hezbollah would argue that negotiation had failed to achieve Israeli
withdrawal, and that its armed presence therefore remains critical to Lebanese
security. Iran would have every incentive to encourage that conclusion.
Washington would then confront an outcome almost perfectly opposed to its stated
objectives: an agreement intended to strengthen the Lebanese state and reduce
Hezbollah’s military role would instead reproduce the conditions from which
Hezbollah’s claim to armed resistance draws political strength.
Avoiding that result requires reciprocity in practice, not simply on paper.
Lebanon needs stronger institutions, a capable army, economic reform, and a
serious nationally-owned process through which weapons outside of state
authority can finally be addressed. The United States needs to sustain its
support for those institutions and use its leverage to keep Israeli withdrawal
moving. Israel needs to relinquish Lebanese territory rather than use its
continued occupation as leverage to compel domestic political outcomes inside
Lebanon.
These are not competing demands. They are the conditions under which the
agreement can function.
A Path Towards Peace Already Exists
The demand for complete Israeli withdrawal should also not be confused with
rejection of peace.
Lebanon remains part of an Arab position that has long offered a negotiated
route towards a broader settlement. The Arab Peace Initiative, adopted in Beirut
in 2002, established the principle of normalizing relations with Israel in the
context of withdrawal from occupied Arab territories and a just settlement of
the Palestinian question.
Its relevance today is not nostalgia for a diplomatic document written almost a
quarter-century ago. It is that lasting peace still requires addressing
occupation rather than managing it indefinitely.
Lebanon’s own peace and security cannot be detached entirely from that wider
settlement. Nor can a sovereign Lebanon be built around a permanent cycle in
which Israeli military action is invoked to justify the use of weapons outside
the state, and those weapons are then invoked to justify continued Israeli
military action.
The agreement signed this summer offered a rare chance to begin dismantling that
cycle. That opportunity has not disappeared, but for that transition to succeed,
Lebanese citizens must see that the state can recover territory through
diplomacy, defend them through national institutions, and offer something more
durable than the narrative of never-ending conflict that Hezbollah wants to
rebuild.
https://www.justsecurity.org/155102/lebanon-peace-agreement-dont-prove-hezbollah-right/
Three Things that Concern Israelis – No, It Is Not Iran,
Hamas and Hezbollah
Nils A. Haug/Gatestone Institute/September 18, 2026
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/22845/things-that-concern-israelis
What matters most to Israelis at this time, according to Israel's
former ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, is a domestic matter: that
of the forthcoming October elections.
While many parties in Israel criticize Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for
political gain and do their best to unseat him, it is to be hoped that he will
once again emerge as prime minister of a new government following the elections.
There does not appear to be a candidate of his stature or experience – or
Churchillian determination to protect both Israel and the West.
As leader of the coalition government's largest party, Likud, Netanyahu saw that
the policy of former Israeli governments towards terrorism from Gaza -- "mowing
the lawn" every few years in an effort to contain constant Hamas attacks -- had
proved to be a devastating miscalculation.
In 1946, Israel's future founding prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, explained to
a young Shimon Peres – a future prime minister and president of Israel himself:
"A statesman must decide, one way or the other: to go for peace and pay the
price, or to make war, knowing what the risks and dangers are."
The second socio-political concern is that of applying Israel's compulsory
military draft to Haredi ("ultra-Orthodox") men. Israel's Supreme Court, after
decades of delay, finally ordered eligible Haredi men to be conscripted in line
with those from all other eligible sectors of Israel's population.... The issue
continues to divide society.
The third concern pertains to the problematic omnipotence of Israel's Supreme
Court, in a country where there is no constitution and no enumerated separation
of powers.... A crucial doctrine of democracy -- the separation of powers
between the three branches of government -- has been disregarded by Israel's
Supreme Court, which does not require a plaintiff's standing to hear a case, and
makes inroads into the domains of the executive and the legislature (the
Knesset).
While many parties in Israel criticize Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for
political gain and do their best to unseat him, it is to be hoped that he will
once again emerge as prime minister of a new government following the elections.
There does not appear to be a candidate of his stature or experience – or
Churchillian determination to protect both Israel and the West.
Most Americans, particularly Jews in America, might believe that the Israelis'
primary concern is the never-ending military confrontations in Iran, Gaza, and
Lebanon. Perhaps, perhaps not.
What matters most to Israelis at this time, according to Israel's former
ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, is a domestic matter: that of the
forthcoming October elections. These elections will decisively direct the future
of the nation, for better or worse.
Israel's turbulent social discord has flared up many times in the recent past,
notably in the immediate period before the horrific October 7, 2023 invasion by
the terrorist group Hamas. There is evidence that those conflicts gave the
impression of internal weakness and military discord to Israel's enemies, Iran,
Hamas and Hezbollah. Hamas reportedly viewed the situation as the perfect time
to launch their bloodthirsty attack on a nation uninterested in battle. The
outcome resulted in the worst slaughter of Jewish civilians since the Holocaust.
There seem to be three more concerns at present among the Israeli public. First,
the choice of a future governing party and of the prime minister. While many
parties in Israel criticize Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for political gain
and do their best to unseat him, it is to be hoped that he will once again
emerge as prime minister of a new government following the elections. There does
not appear to be a candidate of his stature or experience – or Churchillian
determination to protect both Israel and the West.
Any politician who has been in leadership for many years can expect criticism
and adverse press, at home and internationally. Contrary to the Biden
administration, there is no discernible pressure from the Trump administration
for Netanyahu not to win, despite unwarranted comments from time to time. Much
can be said about Netanyahu, but one factor is beyond credible dispute: he has
for the most part tried to act in the best interests of his nation – whether
strengthening Israel's economy into that of a world-class giant, or refusing to
buckle to pressure from any U.S. administration, irrespective of the high
personal cost.
The Gaza scenario comes to mind here. As leader of the coalition government's
largest party, Likud, Netanyahu saw that the policy of former Israeli
governments towards terrorism from Gaza -- "mowing the lawn" every few years in
an effort to contain constant Hamas attacks -- had proved to be a devastating
miscalculation.
The context to this policy can be briefly explained as follows. In 2005,
Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon made a controversial decision to exit the
Gaza Strip, expelled the thousands of Jews who had been living there, and handed
it over to the Palestinian Authority (PA) to manage independently. Hamas soon
ousted the Palestinian Authority from power in Gaza – sometimes by throwing its
members from high buildings
Since that time, and only when proven necessary to maintain a semblance of
order, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have hit Hamas through carefully targeted
aerial strikes -- with no soldiers actually entering Gaza. This strategy was a
massive failure. Hamas simply rebuilt its forces again -- as future developments
disclosed in October 2023.
A prime minister only knows what he is told by the intelligence services.
General Omar Bradley never told President Harry S. Truman that the Soviet Union
had the atom bomb; Bradley apparently did not think that the president "needed"
to know. Israel's senior military and intelligence service commanders failed
dismally in their task to believe or to act on the warnings they received from
their own soldiers, agents and analysts, yet blame for the disaster is unfairly
leveled against Netanyahu. Israel's entire establishment -- the IDF,
intelligence services, politicians and legacy media -- were equally culpable for
the fiasco.
In 1946, Israel's future founding prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, explained to
a young Shimon Peres – a future prime minister and president of Israel himself,
and an inveterate compromiser for the sake of peace – that the Russian Jewish
intellectual and Marxist revolutionary, Leon Trotsky, had been "no statesman."
He elaborated that Trotsky's formula for settling issues of conflict had been
simply to "walk out of the negotiations, declare the fighting over, and decide
nothing."
Ben-Gurion then described what a real statesman would have done:
"A statesman must decide, one way or the other: to go for peace and pay the
price, or to make war, knowing what the risks and dangers are."
That is precisely what Netanyahu did after decades of Hamas terrorism, Iranian
proxy battles, and a massive military build-up by Hezbollah along Israel's
northern border with Lebanon. Netanyahu made hard decisions, generally in the
face of opposition from the US, Europe, so-called "human rights" organizations,
and Israel's loud opposition, partially backed and funded by the Obama and Biden
Administrations. Netanyahu nevertheless achieved his objectives: to secure his
people against enemies determined to eliminate them and to preserve the nation
for coming generations. Is everything about him perfect? Probably not. Is he a
towering wartime leader and statesman? Absolutely.
The second socio-political concern is that of applying Israel's compulsory
military draft to Haredi ("ultra-Orthodox") men. Israel's Supreme Court, after
decades of delay, finally ordered eligible Haredi men to be conscripted in line
with those from all other eligible sectors of Israel's population. Although such
a ruling appears fair and just, the vast majority of the Haredi population
believes that full-time Torah study for young men takes precedence over military
service, while the community's religious and political leaderships demand that
even young Haredi men who are not engaged in Torah study should be exempt from
IDF service because they believe it poses a threat to the Haredi lifestyle and
religious practice.
Although each year hundreds of young Haredi men enter IDF service in defiance of
their community's leaders, they represent only about 9% of the annual
draft-eligible Haredi cohort, compared to a roughly 88% conscription rate among
secular and religious non-Haredi Jewish men. While other young Israeli men spend
almost three years of their lives in full-time military service, and may be
wounded or killed fighting to defend their nation, 91% of their Haredi peers
spend those years studying, working, or even idling.
With the number of 18- to 19-year-old Haredi youths annually becoming eligible
for conscription numbering more than 14,000 (and growing), a significant sector
of the Haredi community objects, sometimes violently, to the conscription of
their men. During mass protests of Haredi men and boys, some of them declare,
"we will rather die than be drafted." The issue continues to divide Israeli
society.
The third concern pertains to the problematic omnipotence of Israel's Supreme
Court, in a country where there is no constitution and no enumerated separation
of powers.
In his book, Rogue Justice: The Rise of Judicial Supremacy in Israel,
Israeli-American lawyer Yonatan Green has produced a work on "the appropriate
balance of power between the Knesset and the Supreme Court," according to
commentator Neville Teller.
"Green believes that for some 40 years, power in the State of Israel has been
deliberately, consistently, and illegally usurped by the judiciary.... [and]
scrutinizes how the Supreme Court has misled itself into unbalancing the proper
relationship between the judiciary and the government."
Teller writes of Green's assertion that the Court believes "its power over
Israel's governance is absolute and cannot be challenged" -- indeed a serious
situation for the social and political stability of a nation. A crucial doctrine
of democracy -- the separation of powers between the three branches of
government -- has been disregarded by Israel's Supreme Court, which does not
require a plaintiff's standing to hear a case, and makes inroads into the
domains of the executive and the legislature (the Knesset).
Whenever Netanyahu's government objects or opposes the Court's unwarranted
interference in the executive branch's governance -- aided and abetted by the
politically biased Attorney-General Gali Baharav-Miara, in whom the government
evidently lacks confidence -- allegations are made by some Israelis that the
government is subverting democracy and destroying the country. In reality the
reverse is true. Unfortunately, many in Israel's media, as well as its
politicians, have stirred up their supporters to demonstrate, sometimes
violently, against proposed curtailments to virtually absolute -- unchecked and
uncheckable -- judicial authority.
These three concerns, with a starkly polarized electorate, promise little change
or compromise. The political area appears split into left and right with no true
centrist party to mediate matters. The Haredi conscription situation pits most
of the population against a privilege, considered by many unacceptable, afforded
to young men well able to defend their nation but unwilling to do so – at a time
when IDF conscripts as well as reservists have been giving more than their all
in deadly war zones. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court shows no sign of curtailing
its authoritarian forays into the mandate given to the Knesset and the executive
branch to govern as they see best.
All who value Western civilization and freedom might pray for brave Israel and
its defense of our freedoms in the words of the ancient Psalmist:
"For the sake of the house of the Lord our God,
I will seek your good."
— Psalm 122: 6-9
Nils A. Haug is an author and columnist. A lawyer by profession, he is member of
the International Bar Association, the National Association of Scholars, a
faculty member at Intercollegiate Studies Institute, the Academy of Philosophy
and Letters. Dr Haug's particular field of interest is political theory
connected to current events. Among degrees in Philosophy, English Literature,
and Law, he holds an M.A. in Jewish Studies (cum laude) and a Ph.D. in
Apologetical Theology. He is author of 'Politics, Law, and Disorder in the
Garden of Eden – the Quest for Identity'; and 'Enemies of the Innocent – Life,
Truth, and Meaning in a Dark Age.'. His work has been published by First Things
Journal, The American Mind, Quadrant, Minding the Campus, Gatestone Institute,
National Association of Scholars, Document Danmark, World Israel News, Israel
Hayom, Jewish News Syndicate, Tribune Juive, Document Danmark, Zwiedzaj
Polske,Schlaglicht Israel, Anglican Mainstream, Jewish Journal, The James Wilson
Institute, The Australian Jurist, and others.
© 2026 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No
part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied
or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.
Iraq’s Militia Balancing Act Gets Trickier Amid
Deadlines and Saudi Attacks
David Schenker/The Washington Institute/September 18, 2026
As the September 30 disarmament deadline for PMF militias approaches, Washington
should support the Zaidi government’s efforts and ensure that the militias’
concessions are real.
On September 10, Iran-backed factions of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)
attacked Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu oil pipeline, suspending the export of up to 4-5
million barrels of oil a day through the Red Sea. The PMF drone barrage was just
the latest reminder of the regionally and locally destabilizing role of these
militias.
Months ago, Iraq’s new premier, Ali al-Zaidi, designated September 30 as the
deadline for these groups to disarm. On the same day, the remaining U.S. forces
stationed in Iraq as part of the Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State
are slated to depart per a June 2024 agreement. The confluence of the
disarmament deadline and U.S. departure date was at one time seen as a moment of
opportunity for Baghdad to reassert state sovereignty. However, while U.S.
forces are on track to leave, it now appears that the militias will endure after
the deadline. The persistence of these Shia armed groups constitutes a serious
challenge for Zaidi, but also for the Trump administration, which is seeking to
transform the bilateral relationship.
Drawing a Line?
Zaidi assumed the premiership on May 14, less than three months after the start
of the U.S.-Israel war on Iran. Only days after he took office, Iran-backed PMF
factions, most prominently Kataib Hezbollah (KH), Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba
(HAN), and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS), launched drone salvos into Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These U.S.-designated terrorist
organizations—established in 2014 to fight the Islamic State—were attacking U.S.
diplomatic and military personnel in Iraq for years. After the war started,
however, they enlarged their target set to include Iraqi Kurds, Iraqi security
installations, and U.S. bases and oil infrastructure in the Arabian Peninsula
and Jordan. From February through April, these factions launched an
unprecedented number of attacks against such targets.
Recognizing the threat that these unilateral militia actions pose to Iraq and to
good relations with Arab Gulf states, Zaidi listed as pillar one of his new
government program, released on May 17, “restricting weapons in the hands of the
state and enforcing the rule of law.” He reiterated this policy during his July
14 Oval Office meeting with President Trump, adding that after September 30, “we
will never accept any entity carrying weapons outside the control of the state.”
Early in Zaidi’s tenure, his government engaged in a dialogue on disarmament
with Iran-backed PMF factions and other militias. With the ostensible support of
Supreme Judicial Council head Faeq Zaidan—perhaps the most influential figure in
Iraq today—Zaidi made some progress. In early June, Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), a
leading PMF faction and U.S.-designated terrorist organization, agreed to turn
over its weapons. While AAH has not been particularly active militarily of late,
its ostensible concession is nonetheless significant; Qais al-Khazali, who leads
the group, controls twenty-eight seats in the Iraqi parliament through his al-Sadiqoun
bloc. Another U.S.-designated PMF militia—Kataib al-Imam Ali, which has also
been relatively dormant recently—joined AAH in agreeing to disarmament.
Influential cleric and erstwhile politician Muqtada al-Sadr likewise consented
to integrate his Saraya al-Salam militia, which is not beholden to Tehran, into
the Iraqi military.
Not surprisingly, government disarmament discussions with the most active
terrorist factions of the PMF have not been as productive. This summer, Esmail
Qaani, chief of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force, traveled to
Baghdad to meet with the leaders of these terrorist factions and reinforce their
rejection of disarmament. In the absence of progress, the government took the
bold but short-lived step of arresting some militiamen affiliated with KH, HAN,
and KSS. Unfortunately, these detainees were subsequently handed over to the PMF
Central Security Directorate and quickly released.
Dictating Conditions
Since the first Trump administration, and particularly since the January 2020
U.S. targeted killing of Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani and PMF chief Abu
Mahdi al-Muhandis, Iran-backed factions have demanded the withdrawal of U.S.
forces from Iraq, making it a condition for disarmament. In August, however, the
factions added several additional conditions, among them the withdrawal of
Turkish forces, an end to the presence of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) on
Iraqi territory, the passage of legislation enshrining PMF salaries and
perquisites, an end to U.S. financial influence in Iraq, and the disbanding of
Kurdish Peshmerga forces.
Zaidi’s government will not entertain these maximalist demands; the existence of
the Peshmerga, for example, is guaranteed by the Iraqi constitution. In any
event, PMF concessions to date have been limited. In August, Baghdad reportedly
rejected a PMF offer to “freeze” military activities for two years and store the
militias’ weapons in their own depots rather than handing them over to the
state. Another problematic option floated by the factions is to store some of
their heavy weapons in Iran.
Ironically, these factions, which openly profess their loyalty to Tehran,
present their conditions as an attempt to secure the “sovereignty” of Iraq. As a
KSS spokesman described it, their demands are geared toward “protecting the
Iraqi people, land, and skies.” In keeping with this claim, these militias—which
have repeatedly targeted Iraq’s neighbors and their Kurdish countrymen with
drones and missiles—have also insisted that Baghdad purchase and install air
defense systems.
U.S. Policy Recommendations
The Iran war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have strained Iraq’s energy
export-dependent economy. Baghdad has declared a “crisis” and is struggling to
meet its enormous public-sector payroll, including the $3.6 billion it annually
allocates to KH, HAN, KSS, and the rest of the PMF. These financial
pressures—which could endure after the war ends—provide a modest incentive for
militias to negotiate. Meanwhile, AAH leader Khazali appears to have opted for
disarmament at least in part in the hope of participating in the highly corrupt
and profitable world of Iraqi politics. But financial inducements alone are
unlikely to end these factions’ proxy relationship with Iran. Furthermore,
Washington should not delude itself that disarmament will last: during this
year’s war, Iran has rearmed the militias with three tranches of advanced
missiles and drones.
Given Iraq’s sensitive economic position—and the high hopes for Zaidi—Washington
should be cautious about implementing broad sanctions to force action on these
militias. Nevertheless, the Trump administration should maintain some pressure
in order to support Zaidi in his disarmament efforts and ensure that any militia
concessions are not merely cosmetic or reversible. In the coming months,
Washington should do the following:
Take kinetic opportunities. Continue to work closely with Riyadh to track and
strike the senior leaders of KH, HAN, and KSS. This would help deter further
devastating strikes on Saudi oil sites, weaken militias, and strengthen the hand
of the Iraqi government.
Consider individual sanctions. Two leading officials representing Iran-backed
PMF factions in negotiations with Baghdad are Hadi al-Ameri, leader of the Badr
Organization, and Nouri al-Maliki, head of the State of Law Alliance. Together,
they control forty-seven seats in parliament and are key members of the ruling
Coordination Framework bloc, which is aligned with Iran. Both men are sticking
to their maximalist demands so far and do not appear inclined to disarm.
Instead, Maliki is talking about engaging in a process to “contain” militia
weapons—a euphemism frequently employed by the Lebanese government to defer the
disarming of another top Iranian terrorist proxy, Hezbollah. The first Trump
administration reportedly considered designating Maliki; if he and Ameri
continue obstructing the state’s attempts to establish a monopoly on weapons,
Washington should sanction them.
Reengage with CTS. Iraq’s Counter Terrorism Service played a critical role in
defeating the Islamic State and remains one of the few security services not
completely infiltrated by Iran-linked groups. In Zaidi’s first 100 days, he used
these forces to arrest PMF personnel and will likely need to rely on them in the
future. Washington should offer to assist Zaidi’s government in vetting the
senior CTS leadership in order to cleanse it of militia-affiliated personnel and
salvage this once highly professional, apolitical, Iraqi nationalist force. U.S.
authorities should also provide the Iraqi government with the operational
intelligence it needs to apprehend the cells that attacked Saudi Arabia.
Target direct militia funding. Given that the PMF has 238,000 men on the
payroll, it would be too difficult for Baghdad to completely disband it. If no
progress is made toward disarmament, however, Washington could consider
sanctioning Iraqi government officials who approve funding for U.S.-designated
PMF factions.
Maintain support for Iraq’s Kurds. The United States is departing Iraq and
removing its Patriot air defense systems from Erbil—the only protection the
Kurds had as militias launched more than 800 missiles and drones into their
areas of control in the north during the Iran war. September 30 marks the end of
the memorandum of understanding between the Pentagon and the Peshmerga, raising
the possibility that $61 million per year in aid will be cut. While Washington
should not be responsible in perpetuity for underwriting the security forces of
a state with the world’s fifth-largest proven oil reserves, the current moment
of heightened Kurdish vulnerability seems an inappropriate time to slash their
funding.
**David Schenker is the Taube Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and
director of its Rubin Program on Arab Politics.
Extremist Settler Terrorism and Violence in the West Bank:
New Data Calls for a New Strategy
Neomi Neumann/The Washington Institute/Sep 18, 2026
Acts of violence by extremist settlers have risen sharply in scale and severity,
shifting from largely reactive incidents to a more proactive, strategic effort
aimed at displacing Palestinian communities and seizing territory.
Despite differences in how various agencies collect and define extremist settler
violence in the West Bank, all available information shows that the problem has
steadily expanded over the past three years, as reflected in the boldness of the
perpetrators and the number, severity, geographic spread, and growing level of
organization behind these actions. In practice, such violence has become part of
a broader set of coercive measures aimed at pressuring Palestinian communities
to abandon their property, thereby consolidating Jewish control over these
areas. Apart from the dangers posed to Palestinian civilians, this shift holds
substantial risks for Israel’s international legitimacy, the rule of law in the
West Bank, and the future of any possible diplomatic resolution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. An effective response must be founded on three
essential pillars—policy, policing, and intelligence-driven prevention—but all
three are currently showing fatal cracks.
What the Data Shows
In general, two different measurement systems are used to track incidents of
extremist settler violence. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Israel Security
Agency (ISA) use a military security framework that counts only physical
assaults, shootings, stone throwing, and arson. By contrast, UN agencies and
human rights organizations also count threats, intimidation, roadblocks, and
property damage. Yet while the tallies differ, the trend is the same: both
datasets show a sharp and sustained rise in the level and frequency of violence
against Palestinians in the West Bank, especially since the October 7, 2023,
attacks.
According to IDF data, the number of “nationalist crime” incidents (the
terminology used for physical assaults) rose to 870 in 2025, up from 495 the
previous year. Similarly, attacks classified as “severe” rose from 83 to 120.
Palestinian fatality rates are rising as well, with the ISA reporting 15 killed
in settler attacks from January to August 2026, nearly twice the 8 killed in all
of 2025.
Meanwhile, according to data collected by the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) between January and July 2026, extremist settlers
carried out 1,380 attacks across roughly 250 communities, resulting in injuries
to approximately 900 Palestinians (some of them at the hands of Israeli security
forces during local operations spurred by these confrontations). OCHA data
further shows that the monthly average of such incidents increased nearly
fourteenfold between 2020 and 2026.
Changing motives have also produced a qualitative shift in the violence. Whereas
most extremist settler attacks were previously driven by revenge or a desire to
establish deterrence following Palestinian terrorist attacks (e.g., so-called
“price tag” incidents), perpetrators no longer seem primarily motivated by those
factors. This shift is partly due to the decline in Palestinian terrorism in the
West Bank and Jerusalem. According to ISA data, Palestinian attacks dropped from
414 in 2023 to 68 in 2025; in the first half of 2026, just 21 attacks were
recorded. Israeli fatalities from such attacks likewise declined, from 46 in
2024 to 25 last year and only 3 this year as of July.
With fewer Palestinian attacks to avenge, settler violence has become less a
reactive phenomenon and more a proactive tool in the struggle for presence and
control in the West Bank. Most perpetrators reside in, or operate from, outposts
and farms erected in the empty, open areas between Jewish and Palestinian
communities rather than established settlement blocs (for more on these sites,
see the next section). In addition to physical assaults, they usually commit
other violations that signal their broader intent to force Palestinians out,
such as preventing access to agricultural land; destroying crops, olive trees,
and farming equipment; vandalizing homes and water/electricity infrastructure;
and stealing or killing livestock.
Previously, these intercommunal attacks occurred mainly in Area C, the portion
of the West Bank placed under full Israeli control by the Oslo Accords. Yet
recent months have seen a shift toward Area B (joint Israeli-Palestinian civil
control) and even Area A (full Palestinian civil control). For instance, the
northern village of Qusra—located partly in Area B and partly in Area C—has seen
frequent but discrete extremist attacks evolve into sustained pressure,
culminating in a de facto siege beginning in August. Extremist violence has also
expanded southward since 2023 after previously focusing on northern parts of the
West Bank.
Who Are the Attackers, and Who Supports Them?
The hard core of extremist settlers who carry out most of the violence consists
of roughly 300-500 activists. Most of them are young men age 13-19 who reside in
isolated outposts, and many are part of the loose “Hilltop Youth” (HY) movement.
Although some of them come from established settler families, they generally
exhibit characteristics associated with at‑risk youths: dropping out of school,
disconnecting from social and family networks, living without adult supervision,
and in some cases amassing prior criminal records. Operating in small groups,
they develop extreme ideological identities that are nurtured by living in
environments with no clear boundaries and minimal law enforcement, allowing them
to transform previous patterns of delinquency into what they frame as an
“ideological mission.”
Many of these young men work (and sometimes live) on local “green farms” and use
them as launch points for their attacks. The farm owners are usually neither
young nor socially marginal, but they provide indirect support for the
perpetrators by giving them access to steady income, land, and logistical
infrastructure. According to data from the Farms Association, the number of such
sites has nearly doubled to more than 100 farms since the Gaza war, encompassing
around 270,000 acres of land across the West Bank and greatly expanding the
operational space available to these extremists.
There is no formal chain of authority, however—these young perpetrators operate
through a decentralized, nonhierarchical structure. They do use a few geographic
hubs as spaces for socialization and ideological reinforcement, most prominently
the settlement of Yitzhar just south of Nablus. Although this is not a command
center, it is an environment in which radical ideas receive greater legitimacy
and influential rabbinical, ideological, and social figures are active.
Some of these key religious figures are devotees of Rabbi Yitzchak Ginsburgh and
the “Od Yosef Chai” yeshiva. They do not issue operational instructions to
violent extremists, but their teachings create a conceptual foundation that
perpetrators often use to justify their actions. For instance, in an article
published September 11 in the Israeli newspaper Makor Rishon, Rabbi Menachem
Ben‑Shahar—a leading radical figure who was arrested in October 2025 for
incitement to violence—declared that the Hilltop Youth are engaged in a “moral
and precise struggle” and should be emulated. The article included testimony
from one extremist who admitted to stealing property from Palestinians—an
explicit example of how actors operating outside the law are being publicly
legitimized. Similarly, ideological and political activists such as Meir
Ettinger and Elisha Yered often shape radical narratives within the broader
settler community, reinforcing a sense of mission among violent extremists
without guiding their specific actions.
The spike in violence also aligns with the growing trend of Israeli territorial
expansion in Area C, reflecting dynamics present in government policy. Since
October 2023, Israeli ministries have taken a series of steps to increase the
number of weapons and related equipment in the hands of settlers (particularly
in farms and outposts) and strengthen their organizational capacity:
The Ministry of National Security, led by Itamar Ben‑Gvir, has created civilian
rapid‑response teams equipped and authorized similarly to police units. Although
these teams operate under IDF command during security incidents, their policing
powers originate from Ben‑Gvir’s ministry.
According to data from ACLED, the Ministry of Defense has recruited
approximately 5,500 settlers into “regional defense” reserve units stationed
near settlements.
The Ministry of National Security has expanded citizens’ eligibility for
personal firearm licenses, while the Defense Ministry has facilitated wider
distribution of weapons in West Bank settlements.
The government has provided Polaris Ranger off-road vehicles to settlements for
defensive purposes, but extremist elements have increasingly used them to reach
friction points more quickly, harass Palestinian farmers and shepherds, and
transfer weapons, equipment, and personnel between farms and outposts.
Although these government efforts have strengthened defense capabilities in the
settlements, they have also blurred the line between security activity and
ideological/territorial activism. This is particularly evident in farms and
outposts, where armed residents often simultaneously serve as defenders, reserve
soldiers, and leading players in the struggle for land control. In some cases,
this government assistance has become a force multiplier in displacing
Palestinians.
Security and Political Risks for the Palestinian Authority
According to OCHA, forty‑seven Palestinian communities totaling around 6,200
people were permanently displaced between 2023 and July 2026 due to extremist
settler violence and Israeli government access restrictions. In response, local
Palestinian defense groups (“guard committees”) have emerged in some West Bank
communities, particularly in Area B. These groups document settler activity,
alert human rights organizations, and sometimes engage in blocking roads,
throwing stones, and confronting settlers.
These groups are currently unarmed, and there is no evidence that Palestinian
Authority or Fatah personnel are encouraging the formation of armed committees.
Yet the risk of armed escalation is real. For example, on July 24, during a
“hike” (a frequent euphemism for organized patrols) by settlers in the
Palestinian village of Tal near Nablus, a Palestinian seized one settler’s
weapon, killed the settler, and likely also killed an IDF officer who arrived at
the scene. Four Palestinians were killed in the subsequent IDF response. And on
September 7, a Palestinian was killed after attempting to stab a settler who was
present in Qusra—part of a confrontation that included a group of settlers
attempting to establish an illegal outpost atop a Palestinian home.
So far, the PA has sought to counter extremist settler violence with nonviolent
measures such as providing financial and technical assistance to affected
communities, documenting settler activity, filing complaints to international
bodies, and supporting the establishment of “guard committees.” Yet its
inability to protect civilians risks further eroding its legitimacy and
governance capacity—a scenario that could gradually produce a security vacuum,
draw in Palestinian terrorist groups like Hamas, and/or spur local residents to
take up weapons in their own defense. Alternatively, the PA may decide to turn a
blind eye to terrorist activity or even confront settlers and IDF units itself.
Either way, the resulting cycle of action and reaction could destabilize the
West Bank’s entire security and political order.
Israeli Political Context
Although the Israeli government does not officially support extremist settler
violence, it is difficult to dismiss the perception among most perpetrators that
their actions align with broader government policy in the West Bank. Jerusalem’s
restrained enforcement practices have only bolstered this perception.
To illustrate: according to Israel Police data reported in July, investigations
related to “nationalist crimes” against Palestinians have increased sharply in
recent years, from 139 cases in 2019 to 779 in 2025, with the most significant
surge occurring since 2023. Despite this trend, however, the rate of
prosecutions remains very low: only 52 indictments were filed in 2025,
representing just 6.6 percent of all cases. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Israel
Katz announced the cessation of administrative detention orders against Jewish
suspects in the West Bank—a practice by which military authorities can hold
individuals suspected of posing security threats without formally charging
them—while maintaining that policy for Palestinians. He reaffirmed his refusal
to sign such orders this year. Yet media reports indicate that his decision
contradicted intelligence recommendations to resume such detentions for certain
violent extremists, which ISA officials deemed a necessity in some cases due to
the difficulty of converting intelligence into evidence that would be admissible
in non-military courts.
In addition, Katz announced in August that responsibility for law enforcement
action against West Bank settlers would be transferred from the IDF to the
Israel Police, an agency subordinate to Ben-Gvir. Although this was presented as
a necessary professional shift, the practical effect will likely be a
significant enforcement gap given Ben-Gvir’s policy preferences and the chronic
manpower shortages in the West Bank police district. The transfer will also
deepen the use of Israeli civil institutions to exercise governmental powers in
the West Bank, thereby narrowing the practical distinction between the
settlements and Israel.
More broadly, Bezalel Smotrich—who heads the Finance Ministry and also holds key
settlements-related authorities inside the Defense Ministry—used the occasion of
the upcoming parliamentary election to present a four‑year plan aimed at
establishing irreversible Israeli control in the West Bank. A central component
of this plan is increasing state land takeovers and control of open areas
through the expansion of farms and outposts, while simultaneously eroding the
PA’s powers in these areas. Hence, even though the state does not directly
orchestrate extremist settler violence, these incidents often produce outcomes
that align with the current government’s goals.
Policy Recommendations: Four Parallel Tracks
Taken together, the troubling dynamics described above pose multiple systemic
risks, including the accelerated erosion of the PA’s legitimacy and governance
capacity, the proliferation of Palestinian “guard committees” that could morph
into armed militias, and more frequent cycles of Israeli-Palestinian escalation.
Internationally, the sharp rise in extremist settler violence is increasingly
viewed not as a domestic law and order issue, but as part of what some call
Israel’s de facto annexation policy. This raises the likelihood of expanded
foreign sanctions against Israeli settlements (e.g., witness the new European
trade ban), construction firms, surveillance technologies, and even arms
exports. Unless Jerusalem shifts its strategy, these trends could destabilize
the West Bank and severely damage Israel’s strategic standing. Four lines of
action are especially crucial:
Rebuild law enforcement in the West Bank. A fundamental restructuring of the
West Bank enforcement system to address this phenomenon should include:
fully reactivating all criminal and administrative enforcement tools required to
confront extremist violence;
dismantling illegal outposts and removing unauthorized farms that serve as hubs
for territorial expansion and violent activity;
confiscating weapons and equipment from individuals who use them unlawfully;
implementing strict oversight mechanisms for civilian possession of firearms in
the West Bank, and limiting access to these weapons in sensitive areas;
restoring the ISA’s administrative and intelligence enforcement capabilities in
the West Bank, which could enable effective, timely action against violent
networks and incitement;
returning enforcement authority to the IDF in Area C until police capabilities
are significantly strengthened, which could facilitate more rapid and effective
responses to incidents.
Establish a dedicated counterterrorism task force. Addressing ideologically
driven violence requires long-term, coordinated efforts along multiple fronts,
so Israel should establish a permanent interagency task force on extremist
settler violence, pulling together the IDF, ISA, the West Bank district of the
Israel Police, and the Civil Administration. Officials should also formulate a
multiyear plan to neutralize extremist violence through intelligence collection,
monitoring of friction points, and other preventive action, while simultaneously
building tight intelligence coordination and rapid‑response mechanisms for
severe incidents. This approach would enable authorities to tackle the problem
systematically rather than simply reacting to individual events.
Help stabilize the Palestinian arena. Despite its weaknesses, the PA remains a
critical stabilizing actor in the West Bank: it reduces daily friction, limits
the local expansion of Palestinian terrorist organizations, and enables Israel
to reduce its own direct security involvement. As such, further weakening the PA
would create a dangerous governance vacuum. Israel has several means to help
prevent that scenario, such as resuming the transfer of PA clearance revenues
after fully suspending them last year; bolstering Palestinian security forces
(e.g., by easing their movement, improving tactical intelligence coordination,
authorizing nonlethal equipment, and refraining from IDF incursions in areas
where PA forces are capable of operating independently); expanding joint
economic activity under security screening; and reducing opportunities for daily
friction between Palestinian civilians and Israeli security forces.
Adopt a firm public stand against the actions of extremist settlers. Extremist
settler violence is accelerating the erosion of Israel’s legitimacy abroad and
intensifying criticism from key allies. To halt this trend, senior government
officials should issue unequivocal condemnations of such violence; maintain
continuous dialogue with allies (including in Europe) on law enforcement reforms
in order to demonstrate Israel’s commitment to good governance and the rule of
law; and take visible enforcement actions that show authorities are consistently
addressing ideological violence regardless of the perpetrators’ identity.
In considering these and other urgent changes in the coming months, officials
should not discount the extent to which extremist settler violence damages the
state of Israel itself—whether by weakening the rule of law, undermining
governance, providing ammunition to Israel’s harshest critics, narrowing its
strategic room for maneuver, or all of the above. The security establishment and
Israeli research institutes have provided frequent warnings about the dangers of
this threat, but the state’s ability to confront it has eroded due to weak
enforcement, lack of deterrence, and government policies that constrain security
agencies’ authority to act. Across the West Bank, rapidly multiplying networks
of farms and outposts have become centers of violence, with some government
ministers supporting the infrastructure from which this violence emerges.
In short, the problem is much more serious than an enforcement failure. It has
become a systemic failure—a solution to which requires a determined and
systematic response.
**Neomi Neumann is an adjunct fellow with The Washington Institute, focusing on
Palestinian affairs. Her previous positions include head of the research unit at
the Israel Security Agency.
The Real U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Deal Is Better Than We Thought
Richard Nephew/War On Rocks/September 17, 2026
The Real U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Deal Is Better Than We Thought
On Aug. 24, 2026, the Trump administration transmitted the text of the
U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement to Congress. By doing so, the
administration triggered the 90-day congressional review process described in
the Atomic Energy Act and relaunched a debate about the right approach to
international nuclear commerce.
The United States and Saudi Arabia jointly announced a deal in Nov. 2025 and
signed the final text in July 2026. President Donald Trump held up its
transmission to Congress over the issue of whether Saudi Arabia would normalize
its relations with Israel, a topic that — according to the White House — could
still lead to this agreement being shelved. But, setting this aside, there is
still a lot to consider and discuss about the terms of the nuclear deal itself.
All told, the agreement submitted to Congress is much improved over what was
leaked to and reported in the press, though perhaps this was an exercise of
media management: allowing the actual agreement to exceed the low expectations
created by its preceding press. There remain issues with the text — such as how
to handle the risk of Saudi cheating and broader concerns of precedent — but the
actual deal does have several worthwhile provisions that reduce the intrinsic
risk of nuclear trade.
A Better Text Than Expected
“I considered, when my analysis was published by War on the Rocks on July 29,
that Congress should probably seek amendments to fix some of the
nonproliferation problems reported. Though noting that the authoritative text
was not yet available, I concluded that there was a risk of the Saudis
developing advanced nuclear capabilities — the so-called “nuclear fuel cycle,”
which supports the production of nuclear materials for power or weapons —
without the requisite international inspections.” Importantly, this is a risk
that would exist for any non-nuclear weapon state that does not already possess
these capabilities; that the country involved in this case is Saudi Arabia
should not and does not affect the evaluation of an agreement that would mark a
deviation from the approach taken by the United States toward nuclear
cooperation agreements with countries around the world for decades.
Some of this risk remains but has been tempered by what’s in the text. Four
elements are important to consider in this context.
First, the uranium enrichment issue is managed reasonably well. Press accounts
had reported that the United States and Saudi Arabia agreed to conduct a study
in uranium enrichment and, depending on its conclusions, the Saudis might pursue
enrichment either immediately in collaboration with the United States or, after
a moratorium, through other partners or alone. The official text is better. The
study is intended to consider not only the economic issues around enrichment but
also how Saudi enrichment would affect U.S. national interests and the “risk of
proliferation.”
Moreover, this study’s focus will not be limited to just uranium enrichment but
will include uranium conversion, the step in the process before enrichment.
Importantly, this means that the Saudis will not have the ability to produce
large quantities of feed material for enrichment that could also support
clandestine projects. For those who remember the early days of the Iran nuclear
issue, it was uranium conversion work that originally set off the march to the
U.N. Security Council in Aug. 2005. The Saudis also agreed that, in any event,
they would not exceed 5 percent uranium enrichment unless agreed to by the
United States pursuant to a separate study. When subject to verification, this
will keep Saudi Arabia a reasonable distance away from being able to produce
weapons-usable material at any enrichment plant that might be constructed.
Second, the United States explicitly prohibits the transfer of what’s known as
restricted data in the agreement, which is defined in the Atomic Energy Act as:
all data concerning design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; the
production of special nuclear material; or the use of special nuclear material
in the production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed
from the restricted data category…
This language effectively creates a firm legal barrier on what kind of
information can be transferred to the Saudis in general, even if uranium
enrichment is eventually authorized — and it is highly unlikely that sensitive
information about the process for enriching uranium will ever be declassified or
removed from the restricted data category. Section 144 of the Atomic Energy Act
does provide a process for the transfer of restricted data, but only “provided
[that] the cooperation is undertaken pursuant to an agreement entered into in
accordance with section [123]…” This language is also how the agreement
stipulates the commitment that any transfer would be “blackboxed,” as it would
be illegal for the United States or its entities to provide any information to
the Saudis about how enrichment might actually work.
Third, the use of U.S. exclusivity throughout the agreement helps to condition
the entire agreement on U.S. consent, effectively granting the United States a
veto over Saudi nuclear projects. From studies to the terms governing which
sites will house nuclear facilities, the United States will play an inextricable
role in the nuclear program the Saudis are building. Cheating could still be an
issue but what constitutes cheating is now broader, involving both international
access rights as well as disclosures to the United States.
Fourth, although press reports accurately noted that the Saudis refused to
accept the Additional Protocol, the enhanced inspection regime developed after
the experiences of Iraq and North Korea in the 1980s and early 1990s, the Saudis
did accept important parts of the protocol through a bilateral agreement with
the United States. Those provisions appear on page 27 of the text submitted to
Congress. Moreover, they accepted that the International Atomic Energy Agency
will be responsible for implementing that agreement. This reflects Saudi
Arabia’s slow but steady move toward greater transparency and cooperation with
the IAEA over the last few decades..
It took the Saudis until 2009 to conclude their comprehensive safeguards
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and even then, the Saudis
sought to reduce their inspection burden by applying a “Small Quantities
Protocol” instead. A Small Quantities Protocol effectively tries to excuse
countries from inspections because they have insufficient nuclear material in
the country to justify normal presence of the agency. The Saudis only gave up
this Small Quantities Protocol in 2024. The IAEA will receive declarations from
the Saudis on their nuclear activities, including research and development, that
go beyond the terms of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and well beyond
the Small Quantities Protocol. The Saudis also accepted short-notice inspections
and the standard that the IAEA should be able to determine the “correctness and
completeness” of Saudi declarations.
The result of these four points — in addition to other, smaller parts of the
agreement text — is a deal that is more favorable on nonproliferation grounds
than originally feared.
But Issues Remain
This is not to say that there are no problems with the agreement or its
construct. Three jump out.
First, although the agreement includes important parts of the Additional
Protocol, it is still not the Additional Protocol, which was designed to be a
fully integrated whole of overlapping declarations, obligations, and inspection
rights. Whereas the Additional Protocol establishes a rule that countries will
grant access to any site throughout a country, the bilateral safeguards
agreement in this text limits access to “covered sites” under Article 3. This
may not be an issue in practice because the Saudis agree only to conduct
sensitive nuclear activities on covered sites and exclusively in cooperation
with the United States, but it is still an important difference, at least in
theory. If the Saudis comply with the terms, then — as the bilateral safeguards
agreement itself notes — the International Atomic Energy Agency ought to be able
to come to some judgment as to the completeness of Saudi declarations.
The problem is if the Saudis don’t comply at some future time.
But when confronting countries with undeclared nuclear activities, other tools
can address the problem. Under the existing Saudi agreement with the IAEA, the
Saudis already accept the concept of a “special inspection” request, through
which the IAEA can insist on access to a site to address an “essential and
urgent” request. Under that agreement, the IAEA can also report the Saudis to
the U.N. Security Council if they are found to be violating their obligations,
which would include a failure to declare sensitive nuclear facilities. .
Notably, it was under this type of agreement — not the Additional Protocol —
that Iran was found to be in noncompliance with its obligations and reported to
the U.N. Security Council in 2005 to 2006.
Still, the Additional Protocol exists to give the International Atomic Energy
Agency more tools, and it is disconcerting that the United States and Saudi
Arabia would agree to limit the scope of inspection work in this agreement. This
limitation may make it harder for the International Atomic Energy Agency in the
future to reach a broader conclusion about the absence of undeclared nuclear
activities in the country, even if the International Atomic Energy Agency can
verify what the Saudis have told them about. This is a distinction with
potentially significant consequences.
Second, the entire agreement hinges on U.S. exclusivity in working with the
Saudis on their nuclear program and the Saudis valuing that sufficiently to not
want to cheat. There are provisions in U.S. law already to impose sanctions on a
country that develops a clandestine nuclear fuel cycle program and these include
the mandatory cutoff of foreign aid and military sales to those who violate its
terms. But national security exceptions and waivers also exist for these
provisions and, in the case of Pakistan, the United States used them in 1981
following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. It is possible the Saudis
would be sufficiently worried about the risk of losing their nuclear cooperation
agreement with the United States and the possibility of these sorts of sanctions
being imposed, but they could also take a different view. Absent Saudi adherence
to exclusivity, some of the valuable nonproliferation elements of this agreement
would be lost.
Third, there are still issues with precedent. In a way, the proposed U.S.-Saudi
agreement is an improvement over the status quo. Currently, under the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Saudis are free to build a uranium
enrichment plant if they wish and would not face any consequences, provided that
they did so in conformity with the treaty. The Saudis are not legally obliged to
implement the Additional Protocol, even under the treaty, a fact acknowledged by
International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi in his
broadly positive comments about the bilateral safeguards text. As such, if other
countries — such as Russia or China — were to insist on the same standards as
what is in the U.S.-Saudi agreement, then it is not intrinsically worse than a
status quo arrangement in which only the terms of the pre-Additional Protocol
inspector arrangements were accepted.
However, even with the International Atomic Energy Agency administering the
inspections of this deal, it is fraught. The United States and Saudi Arabia have
decided to remove parts of the Additional Protocol from the equation. Why could
others not seek to do the same? The United States and Saudi Arabia have agreed
to consider a future uranium enrichment program in Saudi Arabia based not only
on economic grounds, but also their bilateral national interests. A future
Russian or Chinese deal could likewise do the same, but include one of those
interests: the national security imperative of facilitating uranium enrichment
work in a U.S. adversary state. The United States might quibble in those
circumstances with the specifics, but the idea behind broad principles — like
the importance of providing nuclear trade only in the context of enhanced
inspections — is that they provide protection from bad-faith arguments. This
agreement opens the door to those arguments.
This agreement, if approved, may also prompt the United Arab Emirates to seek a
revision to the terms of its 2009 nuclear cooperation agreement with the United
States, referred to at the time as the “gold standard” because the United Arab
Emirates agreed to foreswear enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. The
United Arab Emirates reserved the right to reconsider this concession if another
country in the region received more favorable treatment, and the United Arab
Emirates believe that it too deserves the benefit of a U.S.-United Arab Emirates
uranium conversion and enrichment study. Were the United States, through this
process, to agree to support the Emiratis’ development of these elements of a
nuclear fuel cycle, the agreement could directly enable the proliferation of
sensitive capabilities that the United Arab Emirates once renounced.
What To Do
Ultimately, the problem with the “gold standard” agreement is that no one else
was prepared to accept it, limiting the reach of U.S. nuclear cooperation and
the attendant nonproliferation benefits that could come even from something less
than the U.S.-United Arab Emirates agreement’s lofty heights. It is this
question that Congress should consider when evaluating whether to try to block
the U.S.-Saudi agreement: whether what’s been obtained is an improvement over
the status quo, notwithstanding the risks, and what it can do to strengthen the
agreement and support its implementation in the likely event it moves forward.
This is an important element because, although Congress could theoretically
block the agreement, it is likely that there are enough votes in favor of it to
allow the president to bring it into force.
The text itself is an improvement over what was reported but would also
constitute an improvement over the status quo, if implemented fully. Congress
should interrogate the Trump administration carefully over the terms of the
deal, including the terms of the side letters acknowledged in the text but not
made public, and any commitments made by the two parties. Congress should also
carefully examine the classified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement with
which it was provided, and ensure that it understands the full scope of any
concerns that the classified document might discuss. For example, the
unclassified text nods to Saudi officials’ discussion of a willingness to pursue
nuclear weapons should Iran acquire them. The classified text hopefully includes
specific information about the nature of this threat and gives Congress the
ability to understand Saudi capabilities in this regard.
Assuming there are no red flags in these confidential documents or indications
of a contradiction with what is in the text, then the agreement can be allowed
to enter into force. But additional provisions and conditions can be adopted
alongside the agreement.
First, Congress should reinforce that current law would, among other things,
prohibit any military exports to a country found to be in violation of a
nuclear-related agreement with the United States. Congress should also expand
the terms of these sanctions to include asset freezes and other measures
designed to impose significant economic harm on Saudi Arabia in the event of
violations, while limiting the use of waivers. The Trump administration should
be required to report on the implementation of this agreement regularly and
required in particular to report any violations of its terms within a short
timeframe. Saudi Arabia has been a partner of the United States for decades and,
hopefully, such provisions will prove unnecessary. But, if the United States is
to expand the aperture for how it conducts nuclear commerce, it should establish
a clear precedent now as to how it will respond to cheating.
Second, Congress should mandate the United States to work with the International
Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors to establish expedited procedures for
special inspections to be authorized should the International Atomic Energy
Agency be in receipt of credible allegations of Saudi violations of the terms of
its existing agreement or this new one. The International Atomic Energy Agency
Board of Governors should, in turn, accept those procedures and incorporate them
into consideration of any nuclear cooperation agreement that might come forward
that does not include the use of the Additional Protocol. Indeed, in an ideal
world, the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors would generally
seek to improve the standing of its inspectors to conduct such inspections
regardless of whether a nuclear cooperation agreement is involved. Recent
history, both the Iran case and what is now known about Syria’s nuclear
violations, suggest that improved use of the special inspection right granted to
the International Atomic Energy Agency in all of its normal agreements would be
beneficial.
Third, the United States should continue to seek the adoption of the Additional
Protocol and strengthened international inspection authorities in Saudi Arabia
and beyond. Nothing in this agreement precludes seeking such an outcome and it
should remain a U.S. priority.
Fourth, the United States should have an explicit conversation with the Saudis
about expectations regarding what would happen should the Iranians acquire
nuclear weapons. This is a fraught topic, given that every president for the
last three decades has sworn to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. But
it is also the most likely precipitating factor that could lead the Saudis to
want to pursue their own nuclear weapons capability, perhaps utilizing
technologies such as uranium enrichment. The entire concept behind a Section 123
agreement with a non-nuclear weapon state is that it should provide access to
the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy and technology without creating a risk
of proliferation. Nowhere in the provided text is there an acceptance that
Iran’s nuclear status would shift this basic parameter for U.S. cooperation.
The United States should make clear that, if despite its best efforts, Iran’s
nuclear program continues to be both a threat for nuclear weapons production or
is realized in weapons acquisition, the United States would expect the Saudis to
honor their commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons. Congress should make its similar expectations on this point clear.
The U.S.-Saudi agreement is better than expected. If it performs as promised,
its provisions of exclusivity will provide benefits to the U.S. nuclear industry
and lock Russia and China out of a potentially lucrative market that could have
attendant political and security implications long term, especially in a Middle
East where nuclear proliferation remains a serious threat. The U.S.-Saudi
agreement is also innovative and imaginative, a credit to creative negotiations
to unlock an issue that has been difficult for multiple administrations. As
such, it may also mark out a future path for U.S. nuclear cooperation that
sidesteps the positive, but overly aggressive, terms of the United Arab Emirates
“gold standard” agreement. Additional provisions to ensure its effectiveness are
not a mark against it, but an indication of how important it is to ensure that
the gains made in this agreement’s text are preserved in its application.
*Richard Nephew is a senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center on
Global Energy Policy and the Bernstein adjunct fellow at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy. He has served in multiple positions in the U.S.
government, including as deputy special envoy for Iran under President Joseph
Biden.
Selected Face Book & X tweets
on September 18/2026
Tom Harb
Lebanese government hypocrisy at its peak.
Hezbollah sympathizers in the Lebanese courts must be purged. Real sovereignty
starts there.
On one hand, President Joseph Aoun and PM Nawaf Salam thank Trump for
facilitating talks with Israel and claim they want to end hostility and pursue
peace.
On June 3 they even reached an understanding that Hezbollah is a bigger problem
for the Lebanese people than for Israel. On the other hand, their military court
just sentenced journalist Maria Maalouf to 15 years hard labor simply for
appearing on an Israeli channel and criticizing Hezbollah (terrorist
organization).
A state that talks peace and admits Hezbollah is the internal threat still lets
its judiciary punish free speech while operating under the militia’s shadow.
Free Lebanon ! #UNSCR1559
Hussain Abdul-Hussain
This is your proof that it is Lebanon, not Israel, that has
reneged on the Trilateral Framework Agreement that was supposed to end the war
between the two sides and usher in peace:
Jean Aziz Jean Aziz is one of the close advisors to Lebanese President Aoun
Lebanese Presidency. Aziz just published a piece in which he blamed Israel for
the failure, warning that if the current status quo persists, it will prove
Hezbollah's claim that peace talks with Israel are futile, should not have been
started in the first place. Aziz wrote this: The
Framework was supposed to create a gradual transition in southern Lebanon:
Israeli forces would withdraw, the Lebanese army would expand its authority,
civilians would return, reconstruction would begin and the state would address
the continued existence of weapons outside its control. Each part of that
process was meant to make the next one more possible.
The Framework says this: The Government of Israel and
the Government of Lebanon commit to a reciprocal, sequenced process, with clear
conditions, whereby the LAF will restore effective sovereign authority over all
Lebanese territory, pending the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups
and dismantlement of associated infrastructure, enabling the Israel Defense
Forces (IDF) to progressively redeploy out of the Lebanese territory.
Put the two paragraphs side by side.The Framework outlines this sequence:
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) verifiably disarms non-state armed groups
(Hezbollah) and dismantles their associated infrastructure, which enables Israel
to gradually redeploy out (withdraw) of Lebanese territory WHEREBY LAF restores
Lebanese sovereignty over this territory. The sequence
that Lebanon (Aziz) incorrectly says the Trilateral Framework demands is this:
Israel withdraws to the border, the LAF replaces IDF, residents return,
reconstruction begins. Only after these steps are fulfilled that Prez Aoun and
the Lebanese state "would address the continued existence of weapons outside its
control."Oh, and by address, Aziz does not mean forcefully disarm, because Aoun
has been saying, over the past week, that his plan has no confrontation with
Hezbollah, only talk. So now you have it. Lebanon is
behaving exactly like Arafat in Oslo. Sign on a sequence to get to peace. Renege
on your part. Blame Israel. Repeat. I'll stop here because my heart is aching.
South Lebanon will be depopulated until further notice. Hezbollah will continue
to be the Lebanese state until Islamic Iran regime collapses, if it ever does.
The Lebanese will continue to be incapable of government.
Find pics of both highlighted paragraphs, side by side. The links to
Aziz's article and to the text of the Framework in the comments section below.
Hussain Abdul-Hussain
https://www.facebook.com/reel/1430713165635389
Thank you Hudson Institute and Ludo Hood for hosting us for a great discussion
on Lebanon today. I made two points about the Lebanese Armed Forces, the Shia
and Hezbollah:
1- Since 1991, Hezbollah has been collecting intel on the Lebanese Army, which
only started collecting intel on the pro-Iran militia in 2025. This puts
Hezbollah at a greater military advantage vis-a-vis the army.
2- Between 1991 and 2025, all promotions of officer corps in the Lebanese Army
were decided by the Assad dynasty (until 2005) and by Hezbollah after that.
While it's assumed that the Lebanese Army has a Shia problem, the actual problem
are Christian officers who are in Hezbollah's pocket today, perhaps including
army chief Haykal himself.
3- Hezbollah commands the absolute loyalty of its fighters, members and their
families who are on its payroll. These add up to say 15,000, which leaves 1.5
million Shia who are not Hezbollah but still support the militia and oppose its
disarmament. Why? Because they don't want the Shia to weaken against their
competitors in Lebanon -- the Sunnis and the Christians. The Shia of Lebanon who
support Hezbollah don't do it for the sake of Iran or for "liberating
Palestine," but for reasons of useless domestic Lebanese tribal politics. See
less
Israeli UN ambassador Danny Dannon:“Turkey is following the
Iranian proxy playbook in Syria”
https://x.com/GuyAz/status/2100663702077026599/video/1
“Look at what happened in Lebanon. We speak about it every 3 months, which
became a hotbed for Iranian-backed Hezbollah for decades. Look how hard it is
for Lebanon to regain its independence after years of being controlled by
Iranian terrorist proxies. So I ask, is this stabilization, or is this
expansion? Because there is a pattern here. Take a look at this map. Look at the
tiny, tiny sliver of territory. This is the Israeli security buffer consisting
0.1% of Syria. Now look north. As of now, Turkey controls 5% of Syria. That is
50 times the size of Israel's security buffer. Yet, somehow Israel's tiny
defensive buffer is presented as a threat to Syrian sovereignty. If we are
serious about sovereignty, then we must apply the same standard and
condemnations to everyone.”
Avi Kaner ابراهيم אבי
Today I share the full story of Beepergate: why Hezbollah turned to pagers, how
the devices were compromised, what happened during the two waves of explosions,
and
Nadim Koteich
The problem with this @TheEconomist
piece is quite simple: it does not really understand Morocco.
It identifies genuine and exaggerated pressures, like social frustration, youth
unemployment, weak public services, and a less publicly present monarch.
But it then assembles these facts into a dramatic picture of a decaying state
almost entirely reduced to the palace and a handful of courtiers.
The gap is real, and King Mohammed VI has acknowledged it: Morocco has developed
at two speeds, with macro progress outpacing improvements in daily life.
The article doesn’t mention that growth reached 4.9% in 2025, inflation averaged
0.8%, and the fiscal deficit narrowed to 3.5% of GDP.
The IMF still describes the economy as resilient, while identifying unemployment
as the central weakness.Morocco has built genuine productive capacity in
industry, infrastructure, tourism, exports and logistics.The unresolved
challenge is translating those gains into jobs, better public services,
purchasing power and greater territorial equality.
The article is also an impoverished reading of how Morocco actually works.
It is certainly a highly personalized monarchy, with king Mohammed VI sitting at
the center of the political system. But personalization at the top should not be
confused with the absence of institutions underneath. The Moroccan state is run
by a large, experienced and diverse institutional elite: senior bureaucrats,
governors, security institutions, technocrats, ministries, royal agencies and
administrative structures with their own memory, routines and capacity.
The article’s treatment of Fouad Ali el-Himma, counsellor to King Mohammed VI,
is a good example of how little its writer seems to know about Morocco.
Ali el-Himma is highly influential indeed. But his power is not autonomous from
the king. He is as important and as powerful as the king wishes him to be.
Turning him into an independent pole preparing for a succession struggle
misunderstands the source of his authority, and the nature of the royal system.
Succession itself is hardly the mystery the article makes it sound like. Morocco
has a clear constitutional line of succession, with Crown Prince Moulay El
Hassan as heir.The article repeatedly converts pressure into fragility, reduced
royal visibility into vacuum, and palace intrigue into a theory of the entire
state.It sees the palace. It does not see enough of Morocco beneath it.