English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News &
Editorials
For July 02/2026
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news
The Bulletin's Link on the lccc Site
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/aaaanewsfor2026/english.july02.26.htm
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Bible Quotations For today
You know how to interpret the appearance of the sky, but
you cannot interpret the signs of the times. An evil and adulterous generation
asks for a sign, but no sign will be given to it except the sign of Jonah
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Matthew 16/01-04/:"The
Pharisees and Sadducees came, and to test Jesus they asked him to show them a
sign from heaven. He answered them, ‘When it is evening, you say, "It will be
fair weather, for the sky is red." And in the morning, "It will be stormy today,
for the sky is red and threatening." You know how to interpret the appearance of
the sky, but you cannot interpret the signs of the times. An evil and adulterous
generation asks for a sign, but no sign will be given to it except the sign of
Jonah.’ Then he left them and went away."
Titles For Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials
published on 01-02 July/2026
Canada Day: Gratitude for a Free Nation and Hope for a Sovereign
Lebanon/Elias Bejjani/July 01/2026
A Prayer for the Deliverance of Lebanon from Mercenaries/Elias Bejjani/June 30/
2026
Video link from FDD for an important English interview the Journalist Carine
Hajjar (American Of Lebanese Descent) addressing the Lebanese on going and
current problems with Hezbollah/Interview was conducted by Mark Dubowitz
U.S. Quietly Shelves Proposed Hezbollah ‘Deconfliction Mechanism’/Mark
Dubowitz/FDD-Policy Brief/July 01/2026
Lebanon, Syria join CENTCOM-led Middle East security dialogue for first time
Israel defense minister says troops to stay ‘indefinitely’ in Lebanon, Syria,
Gaza
Salam says framework agreement should lead to Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon
Netanyahu: Iran tried to force us out of Lebanon but that won't happen
Israeli forces demolish, bulldoze, and set up checkpoints in south Lebanon
Qatari Emir stresses need for solidifying Lebanon ceasefire in talks with
Witkoff, Kushner
Israel signals no withdrawal from Lebanon, eyes possible new campaign against
Iran
Israel defense minister says troops to stay 'indefinitely' in Lebanon, Syria,
Gaza
Moussawi slams Lebanese leadership's 'endless lowliness and despicableness'
Vance and Rubio take different approaches to Lebanon, Iran
UNIFIL says peacekeepers remain in south Lebanon despite movement restrictions
UNIFIL source to LBCI: UNIFIL verifying reports of Israeli army crossing gates
in southern Lebanon
President Aoun: Washington framework agreement upholds state authority and
Lebanon's rights
President Aoun discusses current developments with Greek PM
EU ambassador after meeting with President Aoun: €3 Billion in aid to Lebanon
since 2019
Abolishing Lebanon’s ‘anti-normalization’ laws: A prerequisite for peace/David
Schenker on 2 July 2026
Titles For The Latest English LCCC
Miscellaneous Reports And News published on 01-02 July/2026
Iran says to use frozen funds in Qatar to buy ‘required goods’
Trump upbeat as US and Iran hold indirect talks in Qatar
Netanyahu says Israel 'stronger than ever', war 'never ends'
Israel ex-army chief launches campaign in bid to unseat Netanyahu
US signs agreement to build permanent embassy in Jerusalem
US, Iran officials hold indirect talks in Doha
US envoy warns some NATO allies ‘lagging’ on trump spending vow
Trump says Iran talks were 'very good'
One US service member missing after helicopter goes down in Arabian Sea
Europeans to fill almost all gaps left by US in NATO defense plans, source says
Trump: Acting spy chief free to declassify records, including 2020 election
Bahrain seeks emergency UN Security Council meeting after Iranian attacks
State TV cuts short Iran negotiator interview, drawing ire
Ship runs aground in Strait of Hormuz
Syria president names last members to finalize first post-Assad parliament
Russian strikes in Ukraine kill six, wound dozens
German prosecutors charge Nord Stream suspect
China's top diplomat urges US to handle Taiwan with 'utmost caution'
Titles For The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous
sources published on 01-02 July/2026
14 Points on the 14 Points: Assessing the
Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement/Robert Satloff/The Washington Institute/Jun
29, 2026
Why Siccing Syria’s Army on Hezbollah Is So Dangerous/David Schenker//The
Washington Institute/Jun 28, 2026
Trump's Iran 'Deal' Is a Coffee Break: Who Will Enforce It After He Leaves
Office?/Grégoire Canlorbe/Gatestone Institute/July 01/2026
Washington Handed Iran the Paper and Kept the War/Pierre Rehov/Gatestone
Institute/July 1, 2026
Russia, Hamas, and China: Three reasons Turkey shouldn’t get the F-35/Cameron
McMillan, Bradley Bowman, Sinan Ciddi/Breaking Defense/July 01/2026
Why Is Saudi Arabia Appeasing Iran?/Hussain Abdul-Hussain/The National
Interest/July 01/2026
Five Key Legal Questions About the June 2026 U.S.-Iran Memorandum of
Understanding/Orde Kittrie/International Law and Security Forum/July 01/2026
Human Rights in Turkish-Occupied Cyprus/Erdogan's Record and Its Implications
for the Ankara NATO Summit/Sinan Ciddi/FDD/July 01/2026
Video link and text from FDD for an important English interview with Journalist
Carine Hajjar (American Of Lebanese Descent) addressing the Lebanese on going
and current problems with Hezbollah/Interview was
conducted by Mark Dubowitz
Iranian extortion does not weaken foreign influence in the Gulf. It guarantees
it/Ali Shihabi/Arab News/July 01, 2026
Burnham will quickly find that real solutions are not easy/Mohamed Chebaro/Arab
News/July 01, 2026
A link to an important and informative video interview about Lebanon, the
Lebanese-Israeli framework agreement, and the mistakes of American presidents
with Professor Dan Schueftan from Israel Update channel.
Selected Face Book & X tweets on 01 July
Latest English LCCC Lebanese &
Lebanese Related News & Editorials published
on 01-02 July/2026
Canada Day: Gratitude for a Free Nation and
Hope for a Sovereign Lebanon
Elias Bejjani/July 01/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/07/155716/
“Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord.” (Psalm 33:12)
As Canadians celebrate Canada Day from coast to coast to coast, I join millions
of citizens in expressing gratitude for a nation that has become a beacon of
freedom, democracy, pluralism, and human dignity. For my family and me, this
celebration carries a special meaning. Since immigrating to Canada in 1986, we
have experienced firsthand the blessings of living in a country where the rule
of law prevails, human rights are protected, and citizens are empowered to
pursue their aspirations in peace and security. Canada welcomed us not merely as
immigrants, but as future citizens and partners in building a prosperous
society. It offered us opportunities, stability, and a sense of belonging. Here,
diversity is embraced as a source of strength, and freedom is not a slogan but a
living reality. On this occasion, I am reminded of the words of Holy Scripture:
“Give thanks to the Lord, for He is good; His love endures forever.” (Psalm
107:1) And:“Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord.” (Psalm 33:12). These
verses capture the profound gratitude I feel toward God for the privilege of
calling Canada home.
Yet while celebrating Canada’s freedom and sovereignty, my thoughts inevitably
turn to Lebanon—the homeland of my birth, a nation I continue to love despite
its long and painful ordeal. The contrast between the Canadian experience and
the Lebanese reality could not be more striking. While Canada flourishes under
democratic institutions and national sovereignty, Lebanon has spent decades
struggling under successive occupations and foreign domination. Armed
Palestinian organizations once transformed large parts of the country into
military strongholds outside state authority. This was followed by the Syrian
occupation, which imposed political, military, and security control over Lebanon
for nearly three decades, undermining its institutions and suppressing its
independence.
Although the Syrian military withdrew in 2005 following the Cedar Revolution and
the sacrifice of Lebanon’s sovereignty martyrs, true independence remained
elusive. Iran quickly filled the vacuum through Hezbollah, its most powerful
proxy in the region. Today, Hezbollah functions as a state within the Lebanese
state. Armed, financed, and directed by the Iranian regime, it monopolizes
decisions of war and peace, undermines state institutions, and subordinates
Lebanon’s national interests to Tehran’s regional agenda. For decades, Hezbollah
has dragged Lebanon into destructive wars and conflicts that the Lebanese people
neither chose nor approved. It has participated in regional military campaigns,
most notably in Syria, while maintaining an arsenal that stands above the
authority of the Lebanese government and armed forces.
The consequences have been catastrophic: political paralysis, economic collapse,
international isolation, mass emigration, and the erosion of state sovereignty.
Millions of Lebanese have paid the price for policies imposed by an armed
organization whose loyalties extend beyond Lebanon’s borders.Yet despite these
tragedies, the Lebanese people’s aspiration for freedom remains unbroken.
Lebanon’s history is one of resilience. Time and again, its people have
demonstrated extraordinary courage in defending liberty, coexistence, and
democratic values. They deserve a country governed by one constitution, one
legitimate authority, and one national army—not by competing centers of power or
foreign-sponsored militias. The future of Lebanon can only be secured through
the full restoration of sovereignty, the exclusive authority of the state over
all weapons, the independence of national decision-making, and the reaffirmation
of the principles that once made Lebanon a beacon of freedom in the Middle East.
As we celebrate Canada Day, I also reflect on the words of the Prophet Isaiah:
“Learn to do right; seek justice. Defend the oppressed.” (Isaiah 1:17) And the
promise found in Scripture: “Love and faithfulness meet together; righteousness
and peace kiss each other.” (Psalm 85:10). These values—justice, freedom, peace,
and human dignity—are not only the foundation of Canada’s success. They are also
the values that must guide Lebanon’s rebirth.
Today, I offer my heartfelt thanks to Canada for the opportunities, freedoms,
and security it has provided to my family and to countless others who arrived
seeking refuge from oppression and instability. At the same time, I pray for
Lebanon: that it may finally be liberated from all forms of foreign domination,
whether direct or indirect; that it may reclaim its sovereignty and
independence; and that it may once again become a homeland of freedom, peace,
prosperity, and hope.
May God continue to bless Canada. And may God grant Lebanon the freedom,
sovereignty, and peace for which its people have struggled and sacrificed for so
long.
“So if the Son sets you free, you will be free indeed.” (John 8:36)
Happy Canada Day.
A Prayer for the Deliverance of
Lebanon from Mercenaries
Elias Bejjani/June 30/ 2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/06/155672/
Lord, enough is enough. Lebanon and the Lebanese people have suffered for
decades because of the cowardice, corruption, treachery, and moral bankruptcy of
those who have sold their loyalty to foreign regimes and ideologies. Grant our
homeland deliverance from the mercenaries who have polluted Lebanon’s identity
and from all the merchants of the false “resistance” narrative who have
transformed our country into a battlefield for others.
Free Lebanon from those who have willingly subordinated its sovereignty to the
Iranian regime and its expansionist project, and from every politician who has
bartered the nation’s independence for power, personal gain, or sectarian
interests. The Lebanese people’s true enemies are not only those who carry
weapons against the state, but also the political class that has enabled them,
protected them, and legitimized their domination.
Among those who bear historical responsibility are Michel Aoun, his son-in-law
Gebran Bassil—sanctioned for corruption—Nabih Berri, Walid Jumblatt, and the
entire leadership and apparatus of Hezbollah, which serves as the armed arm of
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps rather than the interests of Lebanon.
They are joined by the remnants of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the
Baathists, the heirs of the failed Arab nationalist movements inspired by Gamal
Abdel Nasser, Muammar Gaddafi, and Yasser Arafat, along with segments of the
radical left and Islamist movements that have consistently placed foreign
agendas above Lebanon’s sovereignty and the welfare of its people.
The list is long, but the truth is simple: no nation can survive when its
identity is replaced by imported ideologies, when its institutions are held
hostage by illegal weapons, and when loyalty to foreign powers supersedes
loyalty to the homeland.
May God restore Lebanon’s freedom, sovereignty, neutrality, and constitutional
order. May He give courage to those who still believe in the Lebanon of
coexistence, liberty, and the rule of law, and may He liberate our beloved
country from every occupier, every mercenary, every corrupt leader, and every
ideology that seeks to erase its unique identity.
May Lebanon once again belong only to the Lebanese people.
Video link from FDD for an important English interview
the Journalist Carine Hajjar (American Of Lebanese Descent) addressing the
Lebanese on going and current problems with Hezbollah
Interview was conducted by Mark Dubowitz
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/07/155745/
FDD/July 01/2026
The Israel-Lebanon framework brokered by Secretary Rubio may be historic, but
Hezbollah still hasn't disarmed. The deal ties Israeli withdrawal to the
Lebanese army securing designated pilot zones — yet Hezbollah and its
parliamentary allies have already rejected it outright. Meanwhile, the U.S.-Iran
MOU threatens to undercut the whole effort, handing Tehran leverage over
Israel's right to self-defense and potentially unlocking billions of dollars for
the regime that arms Hezbollah in the first place. With Hezbollah the linchpin
of Tehran's "axis of resistance," leaving Lebanon unaddressed is a danger that
can't be ignored.
Carine Hajjar — opinion journalist at The Washington Post and Steamboat
Institute fellow with deep roots in Lebanon — joins Mark Dubowitz on The Iran
Breakdown to ask whether this is Lebanon's real chance to break free of Iran's
grip, or another false dawn.
U.S. Quietly Shelves Proposed Hezbollah ‘Deconfliction
Mechanism’
Mark Dubowitz/FDD-Policy Brief/July 01/2026
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/06/30/u-s-quietly-shelves-proposed-hezbollah-deconfliction-mechanism/
The new U.S.-brokered Israel-Lebanon framework has its strengths and weaknesses.
But one immediate and unequivocal benefit is that it buries the misguided idea
that Hezbollah should have a seat at the table in determining when — or how —
Israel may defend itself.
Pilot Zones Aim To Keep Hezbollah Out
The Trilateral Framework signed by the United States, Israel, and Lebanon on
June 26 marks an important step toward normalizing relations between Jerusalem
and Beirut. For now, it allows the IDF to remain in key areas of southern
Lebanon to prevent renewed cross-border threats from the Iran-backed terrorist
group Hezbollah.
Under the agreement, the Lebanese Armed Forces will deploy in designated “pilot
areas” near Israel’s security zone to demonstrate they can keep Hezbollah out.
The framework explicitly states that Hezbollah “will have no military or
security role.” It advances a vision of a sovereign Lebanon governed by one
state, one army, and free of foreign domination — conditions that would
eventually permit an Israeli withdrawal.
At the signing ceremony, Secretary of State Marco Rubio pointedly framed the
conflict as one between Israel and an external terrorist actor — not between
Israel and Lebanon itself. Israel, he noted, has suffered terrorist attacks
launched from Lebanese territory “not by the Lebanese people, not by the
Lebanese government, but by an outside actor.”
‘Deconfliction Mechanism’ Abandoned
Rubio’s approach effectively shelved a proposal floated just days earlier by
Vice President JD Vance following talks with Iranian officials in Switzerland.
Vance suggested that future Hezbollah attacks on Israel could be managed through
a “deconfliction mechanism” involving Hezbollah, Lebanon, Israel, and mediators
such as Qatar and Pakistan.
Such a framework would have given an Iran-backed terrorist organization a de
facto role in controlling Israel’s right to self-defense. It would have
subordinated Israeli security to the calculations of Tehran’s most powerful
regional proxy.
Jerusalem rejected the idea outright. Beirut also had no interest in tying
Lebanon’s future to Hezbollah or Iran at a moment when it is attempting to
reclaim its sovereignty.
Iran’s Approach to Negotiations Hasn’t Changed
The Trilateral Framework appears to be a strategic correction that has displaced
the proposed deconfliction mechanism as the administration’s preferred approach.
That should be welcomed, but the larger concern is that the idea was entertained
at all.
For decades, Iran and its “Axis of Resistance” have used negotiations to manage
rather than resolve conflicts, buying time, easing pressure, and preserving
military capabilities while continuing to pursue maximalist objectives. Unless
Iran and Hezbollah are prepared for direct political engagement with Israel —
which they are neither willing nor likely to pursue — the United States should
not legitimize diplomatic mechanisms that elevate terrorist organizations into
interlocutors.
Secretary Rubio deserves credit for restoring strategic clarity. Lebanon — not
Hezbollah — should determine its security policy and relationship with Israel.
Direct communication between sovereign governments is a foundation for peace.
Hezbollah and its Iranian patrons should have no role in deciding when Israel
can defend its citizens.
*Mark Dubowitz is the CEO of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).
For more analysis from Mark and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X
@FDD. Follow Mark on X @mdubowitz. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan
research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
Lebanon, Syria join CENTCOM-led Middle East security
dialogue for first time
Al Arabiya English/01 July ,2026
The US military headed a regional security dialogue in the Middle East on
Tuesday, marking the first time Lebanon and Syria have participated in such a
defense conference led by Washington.
Senior military officials from Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the UAE, and Yemen participated in the dialogue,
which examined ways to enhance defense collaboration across the region,
according to the US Central Command (CENTCOM).
Participants all underscored their shared commitment to the free flow of
commerce through the Strait of Hormuz, CENTCOM said in a statement posted on
X.“We continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with our regional partners,”
CENTCOM chief Adm. Brad Cooper said. “The discussions underscored our shared
commitment to regional security and stability.”CENTCOM added that the United
States and its regional partners operate the world’s “most sophisticated and
largest active air and missile defense umbrella across the Middle East.”The US
announced a new Middle Eastern Air Defense coordination cell, the Combined
Defense Operations Cell (MEAD-CDOC), in January. The cell is meant to share
information and threat warnings between the US and regional partners. It is
located in the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Al Udeid Air Base in
Qatar. Read more: US fighter jet shoots down Iranian drone approaching aircraft
carrier in Arabian Sea
Israel defense minister says troops to stay ‘indefinitely’ in Lebanon, Syria,
Gaza
Al Arabiya English/01 July ,2026
Israel’s defense minister said Wednesday that Israeli forces would remain in
self-proclaimed “security zones” established in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza, without
any timeline for withdrawal.
“The IDF will remain in the security zones in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza
indefinitely in order to protect our residents and communities,” Israel Katz
said. “We will not withdraw from the security zones,” Katz said at function held
in honor of Israeli soldiers killed during the 2006 war in Lebanon. Katz also
reiterated an earlier warning to Iran, saying the Islamic Republic would be
struck with “full force” if it attacked Israel over its operations in Lebanon.
Israel and Lebanon signed a US-sponsored framework agreement under US
sponsorship on Friday to pave the way for peace between the two countries and
disarm Iran-backed militant group Hezbollah. Israeli officials, including Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have repeatedly ruled out withdrawing troops from
southern Lebanon, where Israeli forces continue to clash with Hezbollah
fighters. They maintain that any troop withdrawal would happen only after
Hezbollah has been disarmed across Lebanon. Hezbollah drew Lebanon into the
Middle East war in early March with rocket fire aimed at Israel to avenge the
killing of Iran’s supreme leader in US-Israeli strikes. Israel responded with
massive airstrikes and a ground invasion of southern Lebanon. According to
Lebanon’s health ministry, nearly 4,300 people have been killed in Israeli
attacks since the war erupted. The Israeli military says it has lost 38 soldiers
and one civilian contractor in Lebanon since fighting began in early March.
Israel has also carried out repeated incursions and bombings in Syria since the
overthrow of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad, saying it seeks to establish a
demilitarized zone in the country’s south. In Gaza, Israeli forces occupy nearly
70 percent of the territory. Both the Palestinian militant movement Hamas and
the Israeli military accuse each other of violating the ceasefire, which has
been in effect since October last year. With AFP
Salam says framework agreement should lead to Israeli
withdrawal from Lebanon
Naharnet/July 01/2026
Prime Minister Nawaf Salam on Wednesday defended the framework agreement that
Lebanon has signed with Israel, saying that if it gets implemented, it should
lead to an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.It would also "allow our displaced
people to return to their villages and homes in a safe and dignified manner,"
Salam told LBCI television."Our goal is for the southerners to return to their
homes and for the bloodshed to stop. The second war claimed more than five
thousand martyrs in a war of revenge linked to (slain Iranian supreme leader
Ali) Khamenei," the premier added.
Aoun says rumors about Haykal's dismissal unfounded
Naharnet/July 01/2026
"President Joseph Aoun denied on Wednesday rumors about his willingness to
dismiss Army Commander Rodolphe Haykal and the heads of security agencies,
saying these claims are "unfounded.""Their roles remain vital to maintaining
national security and enforcing state sovereignty," Aoun said of Haykal and
security agencies' leaders.A Lebanese military delegation refused last week to
take a commemorative photo with an Israeli delegation as they met in Washington,
out of consideration for the feelings of the Lebanese people who lost their
homes and loved ones in the war. Aoun lauded a recent US-led framework agreement
with Israel aiming at ending the conflict in Lebanon, saying it preserved
Lebanon's rights both judicially and on the ground. "We did not surrender, nor
did we compromise on our rights,' the President said, adding that "Lebanon is a
sovereign state that negotiates on its own behalf."
Aoun said Lebanon chose the path of negotiations because it is the best possible
option after the failure of the experience of wars and that Southerners of all
sects have the right to live in safety and should not have to repeatedly pay a
heavy price through killing, destruction, and displacement "every now and
then".The framework deal was strongly opposed by Hezbollah and its ally,
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who said it would not pass but warned against
strife and taking to the streets."I commend Speaker Nabih Berri's stance in
averting civil strife," Aoun said. "We are all in agreement that strife and
targeting the military are strictly forbidden." Aoun on Tuesday met with Haykal
and praised the role of the Lebanese Army and its leadership in "extending state
authority, maintaining security and stability in the country, controlling the
borders, and protecting civil peace." He said the "campaigns of doubt and
slander" to which the military institution and its leadership are subjected from
time to time will not affect its national performance.Berri also cautioned
against any moves targeting the military or its leadership. "If they touch the
army or its commander, we will never remain silent," he said.
Netanyahu: Iran tried to force us out of Lebanon but that
won't happen
Naharnet/July 01/2026
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Wednesday said that Iran has "tried
to force" Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, but stressed that such a move "will
not happen."He was referring to Iran's negotiations with the United States and
its attempt to make withdrawal from Lebanon part of the deal. "As long as
Hezbollah remains armed and threatening the north, Israel will remain in
southern Lebanon," Netanyahu added. “We have created a wide buffer zone along
the entire northern border. We will remain and restore security to the north,”
he said. Netanyahu also said that Israel is also
committed to doing "everything" possible to reach a peace agreement with
Lebanon.
Israeli forces demolish, bulldoze, and set up checkpoints in south Lebanon
Naharnet/July 01/2026
Israeli forces opened fire Wednesday on a civilian vehicle in Ibl al-Saqi and
bulldozed roads and uprooted trees from Hamoul and Naqoura to Aita al-Shaab in
south Lebanon. Israeli troops also detonated houses
overnight in Beit Yahoun, Hadatha, and al-Tiri, shelled the outskirts of Beit
Yahoun, and machine-gunned the main road from Kounine to Bint Jbeil.
The National News Agency meanwhile reported that Israeli forces had set
up checkpoints along the border zone, the Israeli-declared Yellow Line, and the
Litani River.
Qatari Emir stresses need for solidifying Lebanon ceasefire in talks with
Witkoff, Kushner
Naharnet /July 01/2026
Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani has discussed with U.S. envoys
Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner the latest developments in the negotiations with
Iran and the current situation in Lebanon. Qatar's ruler emphasized to Witkoff
and Kushner "the importance of consolidating the ceasefire in Lebanon" and
affirmed Qatar's continued partnership with Pakistan in mediation efforts and
support for the various negotiation tracks, Qatar's emiri diwan said. It noted
that Witkoff and Kushner expressed their appreciation for Qatar's role, in
partnership with Pakistan, in bridging the gaps between the parties.Witkoff and
Kushner also affirmed Washington's commitment to the negotiation track with Iran
to reach a comprehensive agreement.
Israel signals no withdrawal from Lebanon, eyes possible new campaign against
Iran
LBCI/July 01/2026
As Israel marked the 20th anniversary of the soldiers killed in the Second
Lebanon War, it escalated its threats on multiple fronts, from Lebanon to Iran,
while continuing to obstruct the implementation of the trilateral framework
agreement it signed with Beirut. Israel has justified the delay by citing the
pending arrival of U.S. troops and the need to coordinate with the Lebanese army
on a mechanism for transferring responsibility and completing the Israeli
military's withdrawal from the two pilot zones. At the
same time, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz called for preparations for a
third military campaign against Iran. Katz's remarks echoed those of Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who stressed not only that Israel would not
withdraw from Lebanon but also that it would preserve the operational freedom of
its military there. As the Israeli military continues to carry out strikes in
southern Lebanon and operations targeting Hezbollah tunnels and infrastructure,
a complex diplomatic battle is unfolding behind the scenes at the United Nations
over the future of monitoring in southern Lebanon. Israel is seeking to block
the renewal of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL, mandate,
arguing that it has completely failed in its mission over the years and has lost
touch with the realities on the ground.
Israel defense minister says troops to stay 'indefinitely' in Lebanon, Syria,
Gaza
Agence France Presse/July 01/2026
Israel's defense minister said Wednesday that Israeli forces would remain in
self-proclaimed "security zones" established in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza, without
any timeline for withdrawal. "The IDF will remain in
the security zones in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza indefinitely in order to protect
our residents and communities from jihadist elements," Israel Katz said. "We
will not withdraw from the security zones," Katz said at function held in honor
of Israeli soldiers killed during the 2006 war in Lebanon. Katz also reiterated
an earlier warning to Iran, saying the Islamic republic would be struck with
"full force" if it attacked Israel over its operations in Lebanon. Israel and
Lebanon signed a U.S.-sponsored framework agreement on Friday to pave the way
for peace between the two countries and disarm Iran-backed militant group
Hezbollah. Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have
repeatedly ruled out withdrawing troops from southern Lebanon, where Israeli
forces continue to clash with Hezbollah fighters. They maintain that any troop
withdrawal would happen only after Hezbollah has been disarmed across Lebanon.
According to Lebanon's health ministry, nearly 4,300 people have been killed in
Israeli attacks since the war erupted.The Israeli military says it has lost 38
soldiers and one civilian contractor in Lebanon since fighting began in early
March. Israel has also carried out repeated incursions and bombings in Syria
since the overthrow of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad, saying it seeks to
establish a demilitarized zone in the country's south. In Gaza, Israeli forces
occupy nearly 70 percent of the territory.Both the Palestinian Islamist movement
Hamas and the Israeli military accuse each other of violating the ceasefire,
which has been in effect since October last year.
Moussawi slams Lebanese leadership's 'endless lowliness and despicableness'
Naharnet/July 01/2026
MP Ibrahim Moussawi, a member of Hezbollah's Loyalty to the Resistance bloc, has
launched a scathing verbal attack on Lebanon's ruling authorities over the
framework agreement that has been signed with Israel. Moussawi emphasized that
"in the face of the immense sacrifices, steadfastness, loyalty, selflessness,
morality, courage and valor offered by our fighters and martyrs ... we find in
the Lebanese authorities a bottomless depth of depravity and baseness." The
lawmaker lamented that authorities have "offered themselves cheaply and for
nothing, submitting to American dictates and serving the Zionist project." "This
came after a regional equation imposed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, which
serves Lebanon's interests in terms of a ceasefire and the withdrawal of the
Israeli enemy," Moussawi added. "The framework agreement is an agreement of
humiliation, shame, subservience and surrender. It is null and void, worthless
because it was born illegitimate. It violates the law, the constitution, and the
National Pact," Moussawi said.
Vance and Rubio take different approaches to Lebanon, Iran
Associated Press/July 01/2026
Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio appear to be staking
out differing approaches to carrying out President Donald Trump's national
security agenda as the possible 2028 presidential rivals jostle for position in
a divided Republican Party.
With vastly different backgrounds and policy experience, they have moved along
separate paths to stake out territory: Rubio, the son of Cuban immigrants with a
long history in the Senate and major interest in Latin America, and Vance, a
child of the Midwest and Marine Corps veteran who served in the Senate for only
two years before being tapped as Trump's 2024 running mate, with a message of
opposing foreign wars. While deferential to each other — and with the White
House and State Department denying any suggestion of a rift — Vance and Rubio
appear the most divergent on the Middle East. In discussing Iran, Vance has
several times been critical of Israel and its actions in Lebanon, saying Trump
has been frustrated by Israeli actions against Iranian-backed Hezbollah that
have angered Iran and made negotiations with Tehran more difficult. Rubio,
meanwhile, has remained supportive of Israel or held his tongue, particularly
over the situation in Lebanon — an issue he has taken the lead on and resulted
in a preliminary framework agreement last week.
Vance takes the lead on Iran negotiations and Rubio on Lebanon
"The talk about differences is not idle speculation," said Dan Fried, a former
assistant secretary of state and ambassador to Poland who is now with the
Atlantic Council, a Washington think tank. "There is definitely something to
it."
The White House fired back at any suggestions of a rift.
"Why is the legacy media obsessed with driving a wedge between Vice
President Vance and Secretary Rubio that does not exist? There is one camp —
President Trump's camp — and the entire administration is fully behind the
president's efforts to ensure Iran can never possess a nuclear weapon," White
House spokeswoman Anna Kelly said. State Department
spokesman Tommy Pigott added that "Rubio and the entire administration is 100%
in lockstep behind President Trump."Yet, according to Trump administration
officials familiar with the matter, Rubio was so skeptical of obtaining an
acceptable deal with Iran that he declined to head the U.S. delegation to the
first ceasefire negotiations in April in Islamabad, Pakistan.
Vance, however, seeing an opportunity to burnish his foreign policy
credentials, jumped on it, asking Trump twice to take the lead before Trump
agreed, according to the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity to
discuss internal administration deliberations. Vance did lead the U.S.
delegation to the inconclusive meeting in Pakistan, then again this month to
talks in Switzerland, which followed the signing of a memorandum of
understanding between the U.S. and Iran. The truce agreed to in that document is
very fragile, tested by repeated exchanges of fire between the sides in recent
days. "It's rather unusual for the VP to be given the lead role in a
negotiation, but it's quite possible that Rubio is happy to let him. It's a pig
in a poke. It's a loser job," said Ian Kelly, a retired career diplomat and
ambassador during the first Trump administration. He added that both men seem to
"have equal ambitions to replace" Trump, but that the president's semi-joking
comments this month that he would blame Vance if the Iran talks do not succeed
appeared to suggest that he was being "set up for failure."
Vance and Rubio deny any division between them
Vance has talked up the chances of success for a broad agreement with Iran,
albeit with caveats, while Rubio, although publicly supportive, has repeatedly
taken a more agnostic line while denying any division. "We're all focused on the
jobs in front of us. I think the president loves to stir the pot a little bit
and loves the entertainment of it," Vance said. "I love Marco," he said. "I
think he's a great secretary of state. He's become a very, very dear friend. I
think both of us are very much focused on accomplishing the American people's
business right now."
Rubio also has rejected that there is any schism.
"When it comes to foreign policy and national security, we have no drama. We
have no games," Rubio told reporters last week during a trip to Bahrain, the
last of a three-nation tour of the Arab Gulf countries that have been most
directly affected by the Iran war.
"We have a group of people that work very well together and closely to execute
on the president's directives, which is why I think we've had good outcomes and
good achievements, and we're going to continue to have good outcomes and good
achievements," Rubio said. "Everyone has an important role to play, and everyone
is playing that role and doing it in a collaborative process."
That has not stopped Trump from fanning the flames of potential rivalry,
repeatedly asking crowds of supporters who they would prefer to succeed him and
suggesting at one point they might be an unbeatable ticket. There is little
doubt that the men do not share the same worldview, however.
"Rubio speaks within the rubric of the Ronald Reagan construct of the
free world and its importance," Fried said. "Vance is not interested in the
free-world construct. He speaks in the language of not wanting to fight what he
believes are abstractions."Fried said it is impossible to predict how that would
translate into policy but warned that "we're headed toward a bad place in Iran,
which is giving up any support for Iranian civil society and not being terribly
good at containing Iran.""Instead, we seem to be allowing ourselves to be backed
into a 'sphere of influence' situation where Iran is weaker but ends up better
off than before. I can't imagine Rubio agreeing to that," Fried said. Aides to
Rubio point out that he has said several times he would defer to the vice
president should Vance choose to run for the 2028 Republican presidential
nomination.
At the same time, Rubio has used his dual perch as Trump's top diplomat and
national security adviser to make over the National Security Council, installing
several close allies in top White House positions in recent weeks. Those include
his former State Department counselor, Mike Needham, who is now deputy national
security adviser. Also, Jeremy Lewin, who oversaw the dismantlement of the U.S.
Agency for International Development for Rubio and took charge of foreign
assistance last year, is soon to join the NSC as a deputy for the Western
Hemisphere. The head of NSC communications, Dylan Johnson, also serves as
assistant secretary of state for public affairs.
UNIFIL says peacekeepers remain in south Lebanon despite movement restrictions
LBCI/July 01/2026
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) confirmed in a statement
Wednesday that its peacekeepers “remain on the ground, monitoring the situation
and reporting observed violations in line with our mandate under Security
Council resolution 1701.”The peacekeeping mission affirmed that its personnel
continue to face restrictions on their freedom of movement, “including blocked
routes due to barriers, debris, and other obstacles” that “temporarily halt
essential patrols and safety operations.”It added that “despite these
challenges, UNIFIL continues to facilitate humanitarian access. Our peacekeepers
stay in position and remain committed to supporting stability in southern
Lebanon.”
UNIFIL source to LBCI: UNIFIL verifying reports of Israeli
army crossing gates in southern Lebanon
LBCI/July 01/2026
A UNIFIL source told LBCI that the mission is verifying reports that the Israeli
army has established crossing gates in areas of southern Lebanon. The same
source noted that the Israeli army had previously placed barriers on several
roads in Naqoura and in the area known as Skandarouna, located between Naqoura
and Bayyada.
President Aoun: Washington framework agreement upholds state authority and
Lebanon's rights
LBCI/July 01/2026
President Joseph Aoun said that the framework agreement that emerged from the
Washington negotiations reflects the principle of the state through the
provisions it contains, stressing that Lebanon entered negotiations because they
represented "the best possible option" after the failure of war. Speaking during
separate meetings with delegations from the Beirut and North Bar Associations
and the Economic Bodies, Aoun said Lebanon is a sovereign state that negotiates
on its own behalf, adding that the framework agreement preserves Lebanon's
rights both legally and on the ground. He emphasized that Lebanon "has neither
surrendered nor compromised its rights."
Aoun also praised Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri's stance in preventing internal
strife, saying that "we all agree that sedition and any harm to the Lebanese
Army are unacceptable."
He stressed that residents of southern Lebanon, regardless of their sect, have
the right to live in safety and should not have to repeatedly pay the heavy
price of war through killings, destruction, and displacement. The president also
dismissed reports suggesting there are plans to dismiss the Lebanese Army
commander or the heads of the country's security agencies, affirming that their
role is essential in maintaining security and extending state sovereignty across
the country.
President Aoun discusses current developments with Greek PM
LBCI/July 01/2026
President Joseph Aoun received a phone call from Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos
Mitsotakis, during which they discussed the current developments in Lebanon and
the region, particularly efforts to end the war in Lebanon in light of the
framework agreement reached as a result of Lebanese-American-Israeli
negotiations in Washington. In this context, the Greek Prime Minister reaffirmed
his country’s support for the framework agreement and for the positions taken by
President Aoun and the Lebanese government to extend state sovereignty over the
entire Lebanese territory.
He also expressed Greece’s readiness to assist Lebanon in overcoming the
difficult period it is going through in various fields, particularly in
supporting the Lebanese Army. He noted that the Greek Minister of Defense has
been tasked with coordinating with his Lebanese counterpart in this regard.
President Aoun thanked Prime Minister Mitsotakis for Greece’s positions in
support of Lebanon on various levels, praising the historic Lebanese-Greek
relations.
EU ambassador after meeting with President Aoun: €3 Billion in aid to Lebanon
since 2019
LBCI/July 01/2026
The European Union Ambassador to Lebanon, Sandra De Waele, said following her
meeting with President Joseph Aoun that the European Union is Lebanon’s largest
partner and supporter, noting that it provides, along with its member states,
more than 70% of total international aid, amounting to nearly €3 billion since
2019. She explained that the European priority is to support the Lebanese state
and strengthen its capacities and institutions across various sectors, including
security, education, agriculture, water, and public services. She said the
European Union has allocated around €220 million since 2023 to support the
security sector, including €182 million for the Lebanese Army, stressing that
support programs will continue to expand in the upcoming period.
The European Union Ambassador to Lebanon, Sandra De Waele, said following
her meeting with President Joseph Aoun that the European Union is Lebanon’s
largest partner and supporter, noting that it provides, along with its member
states, more than 70% of total international aid, amounting to nearly €3 billion
since 2019. She explained that the European priority is to support the Lebanese
state and strengthen its capacities and institutions across various sectors,
including security, education, agriculture, water, and public services. She said
the European Union has allocated around €220 million since 2023 to support the
security sector, including €182 million for the Lebanese Army, stressing that
support programs will continue to expand in the upcoming period.
Abolishing Lebanon’s ‘anti-normalization’ laws: A
prerequisite for peace
David Schenker on 2 July 2026
Last week in Washington, Lebanon and Israel declared their intent to end the
state of war and committed to draft a peace treaty. The Framework Agreement is
ambitious and faces significant obstacles to implementation, including,
principally, Iran-backed Hezbollah. But Lebanon’s own antiquated boycott
regulations are also a barrier to improved relations between the neighboring
states.
On April 23, President Trump was introduced to Lebanon’s Orwellian censorship
laws. In the Oval Office after the second round of U.S.-brokered
Israeli-Lebanese peace talks, Anthony Merchek, a correspondent with MBC TV,
asked Trump about Lebanon’s draconian “anti-normalization” laws that bar
Lebanese citizens from engaging with their Israeli neighbors. “It’s a crime to
talk with Israel?” Trump asked, seemingly unaware of the proscription. “Well,
I’m pretty sure that will be ended very quickly. I’ll make sure of that,” he
added.
The president will have his work cut out for him. Lebanon’s restrictions have
existed for the past 71 years. But the direct peace negotiations between Lebanon
and Israel are challenging this taboo on Lebanese contact with Israelis.
Increasingly, Lebanese are talking about ending these anachronistic statutes —
and some are even flagrantly violating this outdated ban.
Fittingly, Lebanese journalists are leading the charge. Since the launch of
direct talks between Lebanon and Israel, several reporters have aired interviews
with Israelis on Lebanese television channels and websites. These scoops can get
Lebanese correspondents into serious trouble. Lebanese military courts routinely
prosecute and sentence Lebanese civilians to jail time. Harassment and threats
by Hezbollah and its media outlets are also not uncommon.
Israel has reportedly raised the ban during the peace negotiations, but changing
the anti-normalization law isn’t a Lebanese priority. Nonetheless, Lebanese
journalists and media outlets increasingly appear to be disregarding the
prohibition.
Shortly after the talks started, for example, the U.S.-based Lebanese journalist
Hanin Ghaddar — a colleague of mine at The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy — interviewed the Israeli expert on Hezbollah Sarit Zehavi for the
Lebanese-owned news website This Is Beirut. A month later, on May 29, the same
site posted a lengthy interview with Yechiel Leiter, the Israeli ambassador to
Washington, who leads the Israeli delegation at the peace talks. The following
week, on June 4, Leiter again appeared in the Lebanese media, this time on the
Beirut-based Al Jadeed television station. In an unprecedented step, the
channel’s Washington correspondent Pedro Ghanemasked the Israeli ambassador a
question, which he answered.
These exchanges may seem trivial, but under Lebanese law they constitute
criminal offenses.. Nevertheless, just a day later, during a prime-time
interview on Lebanon’s most popular TV channel, LBCI, anchor Toni Mrad
interviewed Israeli journalist Barak Ravid, a reporter for Axios in Washington
and a correspondent for Israel’s Channel 12 News. The interview was widely
covered and interpreted in the regional media — both Arab and Israeli — as an
act of defiance by the Lebanese media.
It’s not clear whether these latest Lebanese engagements with Israelis will be
prosecuted by the Lebanese authorities. But the military court has clearly taken
notice and is apparently looking to stem the tide. Shortly after the LBCI
episode, the tribunal sentenced Maria Maalouf — a Lebanese journalist residing
in the United States — to 15 years in prison for a 2021 interview with the
Israeli channel Kan News. And in separate but related proceedings, the military
court sentenced two other Lebanese nationals in absentia to hard time for social
media postings that the court deemed pro-Israel or critical of Hezbollah.
In other words, while Lebanon’s leaders are negotiating with Israel about
forging peace and disarming Hezbollah, the Lebanese deep state is indicting
Lebanese citizens advocating the very same things. Meanwhile, pro-Hezbollah’s
paper, Al Akhbar, is lamenting the trend toward normalization with Israel. Al
Jadeed’s coverage, one article stated, had “surpassed the Hebrew channels” in
promoting the Israeli narrative. Days later, another commentary disparaging
LBCIbemoaned — without irony — journalists’ “disdain” for Lebanese law.
In spite of — or perhaps because of — the criticism, the night that article was
published, Al Jadeed doubled down. During his talk show, host George Salibi
directed a question to Hassan Fadlallah, a Hezbollah member of Lebanon’s
parliament. Salibi read from his phone a query posed moments earlier on the
social media platform X by an Israeli army spokesperson. Fadlallah was
scandalized. An Al Akhbar article the next day said the incident “raises
increasing questions about the trajectory of some Lebanese media outlets.”
Indeed it does.
Over the past months, we’ve seen a move toward more normal — if not normalized —
relations between Lebanon and Israel. Yet it’s unclear whether the recent flurry
of Lebanese media engagements with Israelis represents an opening of the
floodgates. Clearly, many among Lebanon’s Fourth Estate understand these laws —
originating in 1955 — to be outdated, stifling, and largely in the interests of
Hezbollah. But Beirut hasn’t decided where it will come down. Amid the peace
talks and Israel’s ongoing military incursion into Lebanon, President Joseph
Aoun’s government is under enormous pressure from Hezbollah. The new U.S.-Iran
Memorandum of Understanding — which links the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz
to Lebanon — has buoyed the Iran-backed militia and added to the pressures on
the government.
Given all this recent media engagement, U.S. mediators might be tempted to start
pressing Lebanon to rescind or suspend its anti-normalization laws. But absent
concrete progress on the ground, doing so could undermine Beirut’s already
tenuous credibility. For the time being, the wiser U.S. approach would be to
stand aside, let this organic normalization gain momentum, and intercede only to
dissuade the Lebanese government from prosecuting cases.
Buoyed by the U.S.-Iran agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, Hezbollah will
try to roll back this nascent glasnost in the Lebanese media. The militia
opposes the direct peace talks, and the only engagement with Israel it wants is
military confrontation. But if the peace negotiations and the media actions
persist, Lebanon may have a chance to reach a new normal with its neighbor.
David Schenker is a Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy and a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
in the Trump administration.
The Latest English LCCC
Miscellaneous Reports And News published on 01-02 July/2026
Iran says to use frozen funds in Qatar to buy ‘required goods’
AFP/01 July/2026
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said Wednesday that Tehran
would use some of its frozen assets in Qatar to purchase goods needed by the
country following talks in Doha.
Under the memorandum of understanding that halted the war between Iran and the
United States, Washington agreed to make available Iran’s frozen or restricted
assets as part of the agreement’s implementation. It remains unclear how the
mechanism for releasing and using the funds would work, or when it would take
effect. “During the meetings with Qatari officials, including the Central Bank,
a number of issues related to the expenditure of part of the initial six billion
dollars were reviewed,” Gharibabadi said, according to the IRNA state news
agency. “It was agreed that, based on the needs communicated by our country, the
required goods would be purchased and made available to Iran.”The amount
Gharibabadi mentioned refers to part of Iranian oil revenues transferred from
South Korea to restricted accounts in Qatar since 2023. Last month, Iranian
foreign ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said Tehran alone would decide how to
use the released assets, “in whatever way is most beneficial and favorable to
the country.”He also said the funds would “be available for Iran to freely use
as it sees fit to supply the goods that the country needs.”US Vice President JD
Vance had said in June that the assets had not yet been unfrozen under the
agreement, but if they were, the US and Qatar “have approval over that process.”
He also suggested the money would be used to purchase US goods, including
agricultural products such as soybeans. Iran’s chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher
Ghalibaf rejected that characterization on Tuesday, saying $12 billion of the
country’s $24 billion in frozen assets “are to be given” to Iran’s Central Bank
“so that it can purchase any goods it needs, at any price and in any currency
worldwide.”Read more: Iran couldn’t export ‘single barrel of oil’ during US
blockade, Ghalibaf says
Trump upbeat as US and Iran hold indirect talks in Qatar
Al Arabiya English/July 01/2026
US President Donald Trump hailed the progress on Wednesday of indirect talks
between the United States and Iran in Qatar, as the sides aimed to push forward
negotiations and quell tensions following exchanges of fire. The US leader said
there had been “very good meetings” in Doha after an early dispute over the
format threatened to overshadow discussions. Iran insisted there would be no
direct negotiations between the sides in the Qatari capital on the two parties’
memorandum of understanding aimed at ending the Middle East war, which broke out
with US-Israeli strikes on Iran in late February. “As far as things are going,
the denuclearization of Iran is moving along well,” Trump told reporters as he
prepared to board his Qatar-gifted Air Force One plane, which the Gulf state
donated last year. We hit them very hard... but we’re getting along very well.”
The memorandum of understanding, brokered by Qatar and Pakistan, culminated in a
summit last month in Lucerne, Switzerland. It includes a 60-day ceasefire
pausing the war, the reopening of the blockaded Strait of Hormuz and a timeframe
for a final deal to permanently end the conflict and reach an agreement on
Iran’s nuclear program. Earlier a diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity
to discuss the sensitive talks, confirmed negotiations were under way in Doha
with Qatari and Pakistani mediators.
‘Different public messages’
The discussions, being held at a lower level and focused on the details of the
MoU, were to “build on the progress made at the Lake Lucerne Summit,” the
diplomat told AFP. Tehran denied an earlier claim by Trump that there would be
direct talks in Doha. Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said
the Iranian delegation would be led by Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem
Gharibabadi, but added the officials “have no plans for negotiations with the
American side at any level over the coming days.”US envoys Jared Kushner and
Steve Witkoff were not taking part in the technical talks, the anonymous
diplomat told AFP, after they met with Qatar’s Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed
bin Abdulrahman Al Thani on Tuesday. Qatar’s foreign ministry said the trio
discussed “the ongoing talks” between the US and Iran “within the framework of
the memorandum of understanding,” as well as developments in Lebanon. On
Wednesday, the office of Qatar’s emir also said the two US envoys had met with
Qatari ruler Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.
‘Implementation challenges’
Since the signing of the US-Iran deal last month, both sides have exchanged fire
in the Gulf, with Tehran targeting a commercial ship it said had deviated from
its approved route through the Strait of Hormuz. US
Central Command responded by saying it had attacked 10 Iranian military targets.
Iran then hit back with strikes against targets in Kuwait and Bahrain,
which both condemned Tehran for the attacks. Iran’s chief negotiator Mohammad
Bagher Ghalibaf said Tuesday that “when a war of this magnitude comes to an
end... it is inevitable that there will be implementation challenges, incidents
and differences of opinion, especially where parties such as the Israeli regime
are concerned.”He said the Iranian delegation in Doha would be focused on the
implementation of clauses in the deal related to the strait and fighting in
Lebanon. “Naturally, the Islamic Republic is committed to ensuring that the
agreement is implemented, and the enemy, the United States and its ally, must
also fulfil their commitments,” he said. The exchanges of fire appear to have
calmed in the days leading up to the talks in Qatar. On the Lebanon front,
fighting between Israel and Hezbollah has been relatively quiet.
Iran-backed Hezbollah drew Lebanon into the Middle East war in March with
rocket fire at Israel, triggering Israeli airstrikes and a ground invasion.
Tehran has insisted any deal should include an end to the parallel conflict in
Lebanon and a withdrawal of Israeli troops from its south, part of which they
have occupied. With AFP
Netanyahu says Israel 'stronger than ever', war 'never ends'
Naharnet/July 01/2026
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said that his pursuit of "total
victory" against Iran and its proxies "never ends."In a televised interview with
Israeli Channel 14, Netanyahu said Israel "is stronger than ever", adding that
"when you’re strong, people form alliances with you, and they make peace with
you as well." "There are understandings with Lebanon that nobody foresaw," he
said. The Israeli PM touted the targeted killings of
senior Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iranian leaders, as well as the newly established
military buffer zones in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria.
He said as long as he is prime minister, "Iran will not have nuclear weapons"
Israel ex-army chief launches campaign in bid to unseat
Netanyahu
Agence France Presse
Israel's former army chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot on Tuesday announced the start
of his electoral campaign as he bids to take over the seat of prime minister
from veteran leader Benjamin Netanyahu. Four months ahead of the planned polls,
Eisenkot held his first electoral meeting, where he declared that "Israel
deserves to open a new chapter. We will write it together.""For the future of
Israel, we must ensure that next October, the 'October 7' government ends its
role in history," he said, in reference to the 2023 Hamas attack on Israel that
occurred under Netanyahu's watch. "We will open a new chapter in the history of
Israel, a much better chapter, because Israel must win, and it will win," he
continued. A sharp critic of Netanyahu's policies and conduct during the Gaza
war, Eisenkot founded his Yashar (Right in Hebrew) party in September 2023. A
poll on Israel's Channel 12 this week predicted his party would clinch 22 out of
120 seats, right behind Netanyahu's Likud party which was projected to win 24
seats. The son of Moroccan Jewish migrants, Eisenkot
enjoys popular support, especially as his son Gal died in combat in Gaza, as did
two of his nephews. The 66-year-old made his first foray into politics alongside
Benny Gantz, also a former army chief, in 2022. He has remained tight-lipped on
his position regarding the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
having served as a member of Netanyahu's war cabinet from October 2023 until his
resignation in June 2024.
"I believe that Israel needs an honest and dignified Zionist leadership, a
political home for citizens who dream of a different Israel and wish to bequeath
to their children and grandchildren a strong and secure country," he declared on
Tuesday, to applause. "We will replace a leadership devoid of vision and
strategy, which is leading the country toward a loss of direction," he said.
US signs agreement to build permanent embassy in Jerusalem
Agence France Presse/July 01/2026
The United States on Wednesday signed an agreement to build a new embassy
compound in Jerusalem, in a move that Israel said reflected the "unbreakable
alliance" between the countries. During his first
term, U.S. President Donald Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital in
December 2017 and ordered the relocation of Washington's diplomatic mission from
Tel Aviv. But the services were spread across several
locations in Jerusalem until a single permanent site could be found. "The United
States not only recognises Jerusalem as the eternal, indigenous, and forever
capital of the Jewish people, but also that the United States says that we're
going to do something about it," U.S. ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee said
during a signing ceremony at Israel's foreign ministry. "We are going to plant
our flag, our American flag, on the soil of Jerusalem for a permanent and a
brand new embassy compound that will serve as our mothership of diplomatic
activities here in Israel. "I would say God made that decision 3,800 years ago,
and we finally got around to acknowledging what had been determined long before
the United States of America came along," he added. The embassy will be built at
the Allenby compound in southern Jerusalem.Trump's 2017 decision broke with
decades of U.S. policy, under which Jerusalem's final status was expected to be
determined through negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.
Jerusalem has long been one of the most contested cities in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
After Israel captured East Jerusalem during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, it
declared the city its undivided capital, a claim that has not been widely
recognised internationally. Palestinians seek East Jerusalem as the capital of a
future Palestinian state. Because of these competing
claims, most countries established their embassies in Tel Aviv, maintaining that
Jerusalem's status should be resolved through peace negotiations in accordance
with international law and relevant United Nations resolutions. Israel's Foreign
Minister Gideon Saar said the agreement to build Washington's permanent embassy
in Jerusalem underscored the "unbreakable alliance" between the two countries.
"President Trump's historic decision in 2017 to move the embassy to Jerusalem
set the record straight," he said at the signing ceremony. "And today, with the
agreement to begin building a permanent embassy complex, that decision becomes
even deeper and more enduring."In a separate post on X, Huckabee said: "Just as
the U.S. is vital and irreplaceable for Israel, Israel is vital for the U.S. and
its interests in the region."The embassy agreement comes after the United States
and Israel fought alongside each other during a months-long military campaign
against Iran. The move also follows a period of reported tensions between Trump
and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu amid disagreements over efforts to
end the war with Iran.
US, Iran officials hold indirect talks in Doha
Agence France Presse/July 01/2026
Indirect talks in Doha between officials from the United States and Iran aimed
at ending the Middle East war have started, a diplomat with knowledge of the
talks told AFP on Wednesday. The diplomat, speaking on
condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive talks, confirmed negotiations
were underway after they earlier said the U.S. and Iran were to hold "indirect
technical talks on Wednesday in Doha with Qatari and Pakistani mediators".
The Doha talks are based "on the memorandum of understanding, building on
the progress made at the Lake Lucerne Summit," the diplomat said, referring to
recent talks in the Swiss resort town and the negotiating framework endorsed by
the two sides in June. U.S. envoys Jared Kushner and
Steve Witkoff are not taking part in the technical talks, the diplomat added,
after they met with Qatar's Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al
Thani on Tuesday. Both the U.S. and Iran had said they would send officials for
meetings in Qatar. The U.S.-Iran memorandum of
understanding, brokered by Qatar and Pakistan, includes a 60-day ceasefire in
the war that started with U.S.-Israeli strikes on February 28, the reopening of
the blockaded Strait of Hormuz and a timeframe for a final deal to end the war
and reach an agreement on Iran's nuclear program. Iranian officials were set to
travel to Doha on Wednesday but Tehran denied an earlier claim by U.S. President
Donald Trump that there would be direct talks. Iranian
foreign ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei confirmed the Iranian delegation would
be led by Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi but said the officials "have
no plans for negotiations with the American side at any level over the coming
days". Kushner and Witkoff instead met with the Qatari
prime minister on Tuesday, the Gulf state's foreign ministry said. The trio
discussed "the ongoing talks between the United States of America and the
Islamic Republic of Iran within the framework of the memorandum of
understanding," the ministry said in a statement, adding that they also
discussed developments in Lebanon.
US envoy warns some NATO allies ‘lagging’ on trump spending
vow
Al Arabiya English/01 July ,2026
The US ambassador to NATO warned Wednesday that some European countries were not
doing enough to fulfil a defense spending pledge, ahead of a summit in Ankara
with President Donald Trump. Under pressure from
Trump, NATO leaders agreed at a gathering last year in The Hague to boost
defense-related spending to five percent of GDP by 2035.
“Some allies are doing more than others -- and we have countries like
Poland, the Nordic countries, the Baltics, and Germany leading the way,” US
envoy Matthew Whitaker told journalists. “But we have
some that are lagging behind, that either are not spending enough right now or
don’t have a credible path to get to the Hague defense commitment.”Whitaker said
Trump “fully expects that all allies will step up immediately and get on the
path to five percent and do it with urgency.” The NATO summit in Turkey comes
after Trump lashed out at European allies over their response to his war in
Iran. Whitaker said he believed the bad blood was behind the alliance, claiming
that “those days are past us.”He pointed to Spain for having “disappointed”
Trump over Iran and for its “unwillingness to demonstrate a credible path to
five percent.”
But he said that he did not expect a bust-up at the summit between Trump and
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez. As defense spending rises across the
alliance, Whitaker said that Europe must now show it is turning the increased
cash into real capabilities. “The goal is clear, continue shifting the burden
for the conventional defense of Europe to our allies in NATO,” he said. “The
United States is not going anywhere, but we have responsibilities globally.”
Bolstering the defense industries on both sides of the Atlantic will be a major
focus of the upcoming gathering. Whitaker said the United States welcomed EU
efforts to increase production, but warned against the continent putting up
barriers for US firms. “We certainly do not support
the protectionist language that often times many of the European defense
initiatives have included that would cut out allies,” he said. “That’s one area
that may come up during the summit and we expect that we can come to some
agreement on that challenge.”
Trump says Iran talks were 'very good'
Agence France Presse/July 01/2026
U.S. President Donald Trump hailed the progress on Wednesday of indirect talks
between Iran and the United States, saying there had been "very good meetings"
in Doha."As far as things are going, the denuclearization of Iran is moving
along well. They've had very good meetings, and we'll see," Trump told reporters
as he prepared to board his new Qatar-gifted Air Force One plane for a trip to
North Dakota."We hit them very hard... but we're getting along very well," he
said of the talks, which are aimed at quelling tensions following exchanges of
fire between the two sides.
One US service member missing after helicopter goes down in Arabian Sea
Reuters/01 July ,2026
One US service member was missing and three others were wounded but in stable
condition after their MH-60S Seahawk helicopter made an emergency landing in the
Arabian Sea on Wednesday, the US military said, adding there was no indication
the crash was caused by hostile action. “US Navy assets in the region are
currently searching for other aircrewman still missing. The cause of incident is
under investigation,” the US Navy’s 5th Fleet said in a statement, adding that
the helicopter was deployed to the region on the USS George H.W. Bush aircraft
carrier. Helicopter water landings can be dangerous, even for experienced
pilots, given the propensity of top-heavy aircraft to flip upside-down during
submersion. US forces in the region are also on high alert amid periodic
flare-ups in violence during the ceasefire between the US and Iran.
Europeans to fill almost all gaps left by US in NATO defense plans, source says
Reuters/01 July ,2026
NATO is set to announce at next week’s Ankara summit that its European members
have filled almost all the gaps left by the United States in the alliance’s
defense plans, a NATO source told Reuters on Wednesday. The main gap NATO is
still struggling to plug is in strategic bombers, where the US has said it will
make only one aircraft available instead of two, said the source, speaking on
condition of anonymity. The US told its allies in May that it had decided to
shrink the pool of military capabilities committed to the transatlantic alliance
in a crisis, raising urgent questions as leaders prepare for a NATO summit in
Ankara on July 7 to 8. The move is meant to gradually end an “unhealthy
co-dependence” on US forces as Washington faces the potential of simultaneous
conflicts in multiple theatres, according to NATO’s top commander, US Air Force
General Alexus Grynkewich. In mid-June, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said
other allies were increasing their contributions and would fill “a lot” of the
gaps but did not give any details. Asked for comment, a NATO spokesperson
referred to these remarks by Rutte. The US did not publicly disclose details of
its reductions, but they range from refueling aircraft to fighter jets, drones
and ships, according to figures provided to Reuters by a military source.
The number of US F-15 and F-15E fighter jets available to NATO will fall
by a third to 99 and the number of MQ-4 and MQ-9 Reaper drones by half to 12,
according to the source. The number of KC-135 and KC-46 refueling aircraft falls
to 63 from 79, while only one strategic bomber and aircraft carrier would be
allocated, rather than two. The number of maritime patrol aircraft goes down to
15 from 26, the number of destroyers falls to nine from 17, and the only
submarine carrying cruise missiles is also cut from the commitments. The NATO
alliance is under unprecedented strain, with some European countries concerned
that Washington may fulfil repeated threats by US President Donald Trump to
withdraw.
Trump: Acting spy chief free to declassify records, including 2020 election
Reuters/01 July ,2026
US President Donald Trump said on Wednesday that his acting spy chief has wide
permission to declassify records, including potentially those tied to the 2020
election, even though his close ally is only at the intelligence helm for a
short time. Trump appointed Bill Pulte as acting director of national
intelligence last month, elevating a political loyalist with no national
security experience at a time of war and global tensions. Following a political
backlash over his pick, Trump subsequently nominated Jay Clayton, the top US
attorney for Manhattan, but then abruptly postponed Clayton’s confirmation
hearing in an effort to force Congress to pass a strict voter identification
bill. “Bill’s there, just, you know, for maybe a month or two months or
something,” Trump told reporters as he departed Joint Base Andrews for an event
in North Dakota. “But while he’s there, I said, ‘You can declassify whatever you
want.’”Asked if that included records related to the 2020 election, Trump added:
“I told him you could do it, it’s fair. You got to ask him.”Trump, who won a
second White House term in the 2024 election after losing in 2020, has long
falsely claimed widespread fraud in US elections. The Office of the Director of
National Intelligence and the office of Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman
Tom Cotton did not immediately respond to a request for comment. The ODNI
oversees the premier foreign spy service, the Central Intelligence Agency, and
the National Security Agency, the massive agency that eavesdrops on foreign
communications and helps defend the United States against cyberattacks.
It was not clear when lawmakers would act on Clayton’s nomination, but
Trump told reporters there would be a hearing in two weeks. Congress is in
recess for the July 4 holiday and no hearing was listed on the Senate
Intelligence panel’s website. Pulte currently leads the Federal Housing Finance
Agency but will also remain as ODNI until Clayton is approved by the Senate.
Pulte has reportedly already moved to cut hundreds of intelligence jobs.
Bahrain seeks emergency UN Security Council meeting after Iranian attacks
Arab News/July 01, 2026
NEW YORK: Bahrain on Wednesday requested an emergency meeting of the UN Security
Council following Iran’s recent attack on the kingdom, Arab News has learned.
The meeting is expected to take place on Thursday, with Bahrain’s Foreign
Minister Abdullatif Bin Rashid Al-Zayani arriving in New York on Wednesday to
participate in the session. The request comes amid heightened tensions in the
Gulf despite a US-Iran agreement signed on June 17 aimed at ending military
hostilities. Since then, Iran has targeted a
commercial vessel it said had deviated from its approved route through the
Strait of Hormuz, while US Central Command said it struck 10 Iranian military
targets over the weekend. Tehran subsequently launched attacks on US military
bases in Kuwait and Bahrain, prompting condemnation from Gulf Cooperation
Council countries. Iran’s chief negotiator, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, said on
Tuesday that implementation challenges were inevitable following the end of a
conflict “of this magnitude.”
State TV cuts short Iran negotiator interview, drawing ire
Agence France Presse/July 01/2026
Iranian state television on Tuesday cut short the broadcast of an interview with
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran's top negotiator in talks with the United States,
drawing criticism from his team.
"This discussion was delivered to the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
(IRIB) more than 2 hours before the broadcast time; but unfortunately, the
broadcast of this discussion was stopped in the middle of it," said a statement
by the parliament media centre on Wednesday. "This is despite the fact that this
discussion was recorded and the least duty of the IRIB officials was to
coordinate it with the parliament's media centre if they decided not to
broadcast part of the discussion contrary to procedures," the statement added.
The state broadcaster argued that the interview was cut into two parts and the
second section will air on Wednesday night. The parliamentary media centre noted
that the parts that were cut included the topics of U.N. nuclear watchdog
inspections, the country's frozen assets, and a 300-billion-dollar
reconstruction credit. Many hardliners, including conservative lawmakers and
media personalities, have criticised the deal signed between Tehran and
Washington to end the regional conflict.Last month, a state TV presenter called
for the closure of Tehran's Mehrabad Airport so that the Iranian negotiation
team would not be able to travel to Switzerland to talk with the U.S.
delegation. The critics claim that Iran has hastily reopened the Strait of
Hormuz -- letting oil flow through the strategic waterway -- without gaining any
tangible benefits from the Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. During the
state TV interview on Tuesday, Ghalibaf argued that the memorandum has enabled
Iran to sell its oil as the U.S. removed its own blockade of the Strait. "From
the day the blockade was lifted until today, we have exported more than 40
million barrels of oil," he said, adding that "by contrast, during the previous
50 to nearly 60 days, we were genuinely unable to export even a single barrel of
oil."
Ship runs aground in Strait of Hormuz
Associated Press/July 01/2026
A ship ran aground in the Strait of Hormuz after not running Iran's approved
route through the water, Iranian state television reported Wednesday. The report
identified the affected vessel as a foreign container ship, but offered no other
immediate details. The Iranian state TV report appeared aimed at underlining the
claims Tehran has made since the U.S.-Iran war to control over the strait, which
has long been considered by the world as an international waterway and saw a
fifth of all oil and natural gas pass through it in peacetime. It also came as
U.S. Mideast envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, U.S. President Donald
Trump's son-in-law, were in Doha, Qatar, for talks with mediators as Iranian
negotiators were also to be there. Iran and the United States agreed as part of
an interim deal to allow ships to pass uncharged for 60 days, but Tehran
insisted it must control the routes of the vessels and later charge fees for
passage, upending decades of practice in the waterway. The U.S. and many Gulf
Arab states say they won't agree to the charges. An effort by Oman and a U.N.
agency to launch a new route near Oman's shore sparked attacks across the
Mideast over last weekend, highlighting the tensions still gripping the Mideast.
Iranian state TV said the ship "ran aground with its cargo because of shallow
waters along the route it had chosen and was unable to continue sailing." It
said shippers needed to follow the instructions of Iran's paramilitary
Revolutionary Guard in the strait. The Guard's navy "has repeatedly warned
captains, shipowners and officials of shipping companies around the world that
any entry or exit through routes other than the "Route of Authority" in the
Persian Gulf could lead to irreparable incidents," it said. The report did not
mention the two ships Iran attacked in recent days for daring to head out
through the strait without Tehran's permission, including one that was carrying
crude oil from Qatar.
Syria president names last members to finalize first post-Assad parliament
Associated Press/July 01/2026
The first Parliament in Syria's post-Assad era took shape Wednesday with the
release of a list of 70 legislators picked up by interim President Ahmad
al-Sharaa. The inauguration of the new Parliament
shows the country is moving ahead with drafting laws as the nation works on
recovering from decades of iron-fist rule under the Assad family and a deadly
war that has killed about half a million people. The head of Syria's electoral
committee, Mohammed Taha al-Ahmad, told reporters that the new 210-member
legislature will hold its first meeting Monday. Members will be sworn in and the
Parliament's presidential council will be elected. The
list of 70 legislators picked by al-Sharaa included 15 women, which raised the
number of female members in the legislature to 22. Syria held the first phase of
its parliamentary elections in October while excluding the southern province of
Sweida, which is controlled by Druze gunmen opposed to the central government.
The vote at the time also excluded northeast Syria, which was under Kurdish
control. A vote in northeast Syria was held in May after government forces took
control of the area during deadly clashes early this year. No date has been set
yet for a vote in Sweida, but two representatives for the predominantly Druze
region were among the names released by al-Sharaa on Wednesday. The Parliament
will have a 30-month term and work on a new elections law while preparing the
ground for a popular vote in the next elections, according to al-Ahmad. Syria
had been without a Parliament since the December 2024 offensive by insurgents,
led by al-Sharaa's now defunct Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group, that ended the Assad
family's five-decade dynasty.
Russian strikes in Ukraine kill six, wound dozens
AFP/01 July ,2026
Russian strikes across Ukraine Wednesday killed six people and wounded some 50
others, local authorities announced. In Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city,
seven glide bombs hit three districts, killing a 15-year-old and injuring 32
people, mayor Ihor Terekhov reported on Telegram.
In the southern region of Odesa, two people were killed and 15 injured in a
ballistic missile strike that started a fire, according to regional governor
Oleh Kiper. A minibus was also attacked by a drone in the Kherson region, also
in the south, killing an 18-year-old woman and another person, governor
Oleksandr Prokudin said, adding that nine people were wounded. In another drone
attack in the Kherson region targeting an administrative building, one person
was killed and two others wounded, he said. More than four years after the start
of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, strikes from both sides of the front occur
daily and continue to claim increasing numbers of civilian victims. In June, the
number of long-range drones and Russian missiles launched against Ukraine fell
sharply compared with May, according to an AFP analysis of data from the
Ukrainian air force. Diplomatic efforts mediated by the United States have been
at a standstill since late February, when the war in the Middle East was
triggered by Israeli-American bombardments of Iran.
German prosecutors charge Nord Stream suspect
LBCI/July 01/2026
German prosecutors said Wednesday they had brought charges against a suspect in
the 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipeline linking Russia with Europe.
Federal prosecutors confirmed to AFP that a man had been charged over the
explosion, with German media reporting that the man was a Ukrainian national
said to be the head of the team that carried out the operation.AFP
China's top diplomat urges US to handle Taiwan with 'utmost caution'
LBCI/July 01/2026
China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi urged the United States to handle Taiwan with
"utmost caution" during a call with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a Chinese
readout published Wednesday said.
"The Taiwan question has far-reaching implications, and we hope the U.S. will
treat Taiwan-related matters with utmost caution," Wang said during a phone call
with Rubio on Tuesday, according to Chinese state broadcaster CCTV.AFP
The Latest LCCC analysis & editorials
from miscellaneous sources published on 01-02 July/2026
14 Points on the 14 Points: Assessing the Israel-Lebanon
Framework Agreement
Robert Satloff/The Washington Institute/Jun 29, 2026
Robert Satloff is the Segal Executive Director of The Washington Institute, a
post he assumed in January 1993.
This landmark document offers a once-in-a-generation opportunity to build real
peace between Beirut and Jerusalem, but progress needs to be swift and visible
given the threat of violent opposition from Iran and its local allies.
After a rocky start to their fifth round of negotiations and a delay of several
hours before the closing ceremony, Lebanon and Israel ultimately signed a
“framework agreement” on June 26, marking a substantial step-up from the
“statement of intent” they had been expected to endorse. This was the first
accord between the two neighbors since the short-lived May 1983 peace agreement,
and given its scope, ambition, and potential implications, it is perhaps the
most significant since their armistice agreement seventy-seven years ago.
The text of the agreement is divided into fourteen points, a structure that not
only echoes the recent U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding, but also appears
purposefully chosen to present an alternative path to that MOU in terms of
addressing the Lebanon question. Here are fourteen observations on those
fourteen points:
1. The term “framework agreement” was born in 1978 to describe the two halves of
the original Camp David Accords, one of which evolved into the 1979 Egypt-Israel
peace treaty. (The other half—on the Palestinian question—never reached
fruition.) The phrase suggests a major step forward, though not a conclusive
one. The previous four rounds of talks produced statements with varying degrees
of specificity, but one can assume that implementing the new framework agreement
will be the focus of Israel-Lebanon diplomacy for the foreseeable future.
2. While media reports have focused on the details of Hezbollah disarmament,
Israeli withdrawal, and the creation of “pilot zones” for the deployment of the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), it is important to note that the agreement’s core
strategic objective is to establish peace between the two countries. The words
“peace” or “peaceful” are used ten times in the text, with paragraph 12
requiring the two sides to immediately begin the process of establishing
“working groups to draft the full comprehensive peace and security agreement.”
This puts to rest any intra-Lebanese debate about whether Beirut might set more
limited goals for this diplomacy, such as renewing the bilateral armistice or
seeking some form of nonbelligerency agreement. The goal is now clear: full
peace.
3. The agreement’s use of the word “irreversible” is striking. This is an
especially strong term in the diplomatic realm and has not been used in any
previous Arab-Israel peace agreement. Yet it appears twice in this agreement,
and in two very different contexts: paragraph 1 states, “This
Framework...expresses a determination to make irreversible progress towards the
comprehensive resolution of all issues between the two countries”; paragraph 4
states, “The Government of Lebanon reaffirms its resolute and irreversible
commitment to restoring and exercising full sovereignty over all its territory.”
This linguistic connection underscores the critical linkage between Lebanon’s
assertion of full sovereignty and the goal of forging peace with Israel.
4. The text is a bit contradictory on whether this is a trilateral agreement or
a bilateral agreement achieved with American support. Its official title is
“Trilateral Framework,” suggesting that the United States is an equal partner.
Yet paragraph 1 notes that “[b]oth countries affirm their intention to resolve
[all] issues as sovereign states through direct bilateral negotiations, with the
mediation and support of the United States.” However diplomats sort this out,
the agreement’s numerous other commitments make clear that America’s role—from
negotiation to implementation to defending the process from its adversaries—will
be indispensable. (See point 11 below)
5. While peace is the ultimate objective, the pathway to that goal runs through
executing the key operational principle outlined in paragraph 2: that both
governments “commit to a reciprocal, sequenced process, with clear conditions,
whereby the LAF will restore effective sovereign authority over all Lebanese
territory, pending the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups and
dismantlement of associated infrastructure, enabling the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
to progressively deploy out of the Lebanese territory.” This is the fundamental
deal at the heart of the agreement—as the LAF fulfills its commitment to deploy
in certain areas and disarm, dismantle, and prevent the regrouping of Hezbollah
once there, the IDF will cede control and leave, with Lebanese civilians then
permitted to return under “exclusive” Lebanese government control. There is no
defined timeline for this process, but the sequencing is crystal clear. Israeli
withdrawal is neither automatic nor assumed, and Lebanon makes no demand for an
immediate, unconditional departure. Rather, IDF redeployment is envisioned as a
rolling process whose pace and breadth are determined by the pace and breadth of
the LAF’s own efforts. As the text states, only “successful implementation” will
enable the IDF to leave.
6. The agreement does not define “disarmament” or “dismantlement,” but those
terms are explained as follows in the subsequently reported security annex:
“taking legal measures against all non-state armed personnel engaging in
unauthorized activity, and destroy[ing] or render[ing] inoperable associated
infrastructure, including but not limited to weapons, weapons caches, tunnels,
and command centers, by those non-state armed groups.” As the process unfolds,
it will be important to monitor whether dismantlement extends to Hezbollah’s
weapons factories, drone assembly plants, training facilities, and other
military infrastructure, and perhaps even its communications networks, financial
institutions, and leadership facilities. As for disarmament, the security annex
is silent on whether this process will be consensual, coercive, or both, opening
the possibility of multiple tactics to achieve that goal. Yet one option is
specifically ruled out: incorporating Hezbollah units into the LAF, an idea that
has been gaining traction in some circles. According to paragraph 4, Beirut has
committed to ensure that “non-state armed groups” will have “no military or
security role and no armed capabilities anywhere in Lebanon.”
7. Paragraph 3 states that “pilot zones” will serve as “the mechanism for phased
and verified redeployments of the IDF and the deployments of the LAF.” While
Lebanon and Israel had endorsed this concept in previous talks, they came to
Washington last week with very different ideas about implementation. Beirut
originally proposed that the IDF withdraw from a zone along the border, with
displaced Lebanese civilians then returning to that zone. Not surprisingly,
Israel balked at the idea of beginning the process within firing range of its
northern communities. Ultimately, they agreed on two zones further north in the
“South Litani Sector.” They also agreed to add more pilot zones “by mutual
consent.”
Relatedly, the security annex commits the two sides to establishing a novel
joint initiative—the bilateral “Military Coordination Group for Lebanon”
(MCG4L)—to “operate 24/7, managing deconfliction, verification, and overall
implementation.” This step-by-step process of expanding LAF control while
disarming and dismantling Hezbollah is eventually envisioned as extending
“throughout Lebanon.”
8. While the pilot zones focus on disarming and dismantling Hezbollah in defined
areas of territory, Beirut also made a broader commitment to starve Hezbollah of
funding throughout the country. As paragraph 11 notes, the government pledges to
prevent “funds from flowing to any entity, organization, or individual
affiliated with non-state armed groups,” and “explicitly commits to prevent
reconstruction funds from flowing to non-state armed groups and connected
entities.” (Notably, the United States has joined in this commitment as well;
see point 11 below.) Defining precisely who is “affiliated” with Hezbollah and
what is a “connected entity” will be critical. Does this include the Council for
South Lebanon, or the Amal movement led by Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri?
What about local Hezbollah mayors in communities south of the Litani? In any
case, the principle adopted here is a powerful tool to help strangle the group
financially.
9. One fascinating subtext in the agreement is that both sides repeatedly
commiserate with each other’s difficulties and challenges, reflecting a deeper
sense of mutual empathy than normally found in such documents. For example, one
might think that the Israeli government would be indifferent to whether Lebanese
civilians return to southern Lebanon and, similarly, that the Lebanese
government would be indifferent to the situation facing Israel’s northern
communities—they would normally be expected to focus on their own national
priorities instead. Interestingly, however, the document reflects a sense that
these discrete national interests are linked. In paragraph 8, for example, “the
two countries recognize that the restoration of security in South Lebanon
through the deployment of the LAF, the safe return of its civilian population,
and the security of Israel’s northern communities, are essential to long-term
stability and peace.” It is difficult to find this degree of empathetic
understanding in any previous Arab-Israel peace agreement.
10. Critics of Lebanon’s negotiating acumen have pounced on the commitment made
in paragraph 13 “to take good faith measures that demonstrate positive intent,
including the cessation of all hostile or adverse actions in international
political or legal fora, and pledge to work towards the search for and return of
remains and the release of detainees.” Specifically, domestic opponents accuse
the Lebanese government of giving away citizens’ rights to hold Israel
responsible for the hardship, displacement, and deaths suffered as a result of
military action in recent months. Yet this is a skewed misreading of a
commitment that benefits both sides. For example, while it likely means that
Lebanon will no longer partner with UN Human Rights Council investigations of
Israeli actions, it also puts to rest Lebanese concerns that Israel would
support potential U.S. congressional efforts to cut or severely condition
bilateral military assistance to the LAF as penalty for its failure to act
against Hezbollah. To be sure, this paragraph does not mean that Lebanon will
suddenly change its position on the International Criminal Court case against
Israeli officials or the International Court of Justice case charging Israel
with genocide—but that is because Lebanon (like Israel and the United States)
never ratified the Rome Statute and is not a party to the ICC, nor has it ever
made an official intervention on the ICJ genocide case.
11. The U.S. role in the agreement is deep, as seen in numerous parts of the
text. Stitching them together, the Trump administration committed to the
following:
providing “mediation and support” for Israel-Lebanon diplomacy (para. 1)
supporting the drafting of the security annex (para. 2)
verifying and supporting the pilot zone initiative (para. 3)
leading the effort to enlist international and Arab support for this process (para.
4)
supporting and participating in a “military coordination group” to ensure
implementation (para. 7)
rallying international partners to support Lebanon’s reconstruction (para. 10)
working with Lebanon to prevent financial flows to Hezbollah and its affiliates
(para. 11)
facilitating Israel-Lebanon negotiations for a final peace agreement (para. 12)
In addition, the agreement mentions that “any new U.S. assistance” to Lebanon
would be “strictly conditioned on verifiable milestones, full transparency,
demonstrated results, and ongoing oversight”—concepts that, by implication, do
not necessarily apply to existing U.S. assistance.
In publicly reported versions of the security annex, Washington’s role is
surprisingly limited, mentioned only in terms of facilitating implementation and
mediating dispute resolution. In reality, however, a more robust role is likely
to emerge for the United States as the lead actor in the creation of a “mutually
agreed-upon third-party entity” that will verify the “clearance of all non-state
armed groups and their military infrastructure” in the pilot zones.
Two implications are clear from all these American commitments: first, that the
United States—not the UN or some consortium of countries—bears responsibility
with the parties for executing this agreement, and second, that the Trump
administration needs to quickly stand up a substantial interagency team
dedicated to full implementation of Washington’s commitments.
12. The authors of the agreement were unambiguous in rejecting the idea that
Iran has a legitimate role to play in determining the future of Lebanon’s
political or security affairs, despite this notion being inherent in the
U.S.-Iran MOU. As stated in paragraph 6, “The Government of Lebanon rejects the
claims of any state or non-state actor to use force on its behalf without its
explicit authorization, and reiterates that any claim by any state or non-state
actor to exercise a military or security role is illegal per the decisions of
the Lebanese Government and contrary to Lebanese national interests.” It is no
surprise, then, that Iran’s top agents in Lebanon—Hezbollah and Amal—have
denounced the agreement in extreme terms. Hezbollah took to the streets to
threaten violence against the government, while Berri labeled the document
“sedition” and proudly advertised a phone call with his Iranian counterpart
Muhammad Baqer Qalibaf, highlighting his close coordination with Tehran. The
result is that Lebanon is now the unambiguous ground zero for the Islamic
Republic’s claim to a broader regional role after surviving the Iran war.
13. The Lebanese government’s courage and tenacity should not be underestimated.
The path of least resistance for President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf
Salam would have been to close ranks with Berri, stand with the U.S.-Iran MOU’s
call for a full ceasefire, and support Tehran’s demand for unconditional Israeli
withdrawal from all Lebanese territory. While this could have spurred Washington
to cut off U.S. funding for the LAF, certain states in the region would likely
have made up the difference. Instead, Lebanon’s leaders acknowledged that most
of their public is fed up with decades of war and Iranian control, and they made
the bold decision to reject Tehran’s entreaties and gamble on Washington,
Israel, and the pursuit of peace. There is a long way to go, especially on
implementing the pledge to disarm and dismantle Hezbollah, which Lebanese
governments have been promising to do since the Taif Accord four decades ago.
But this time the result may finally be different, since the die has been cast
and the contest between proponents and opponents of the agreement has become a
zero-sum game.
Hopefully, Israel’s government—which is facing its own domestic political
crosswinds—will recognize the moment and act in both word and deed as the
partner that this precedent-shattering agreement envisions. Among other things,
this would include avoiding provocative statements and measures that complicate
Beirut’s already tortuous path, coordinating closely with Lebanese political and
security authorities on implementation, and quietly encouraging international
donor efforts to support Lebanon’s reconstruction and rehabilitation.
14. As much as the framework agreement is a signal success for U.S.
diplomacy—and especially for Secretary of State Marco Rubio—it has also laid
bare an internal U.S. debate over whether Iran is solely part of the problem in
the Middle East or possibly part of the solution. This is often depicted as a
contest between Rubio and Vice President JD Vance, the lead defender of the
U.S.-Iran MOU. As of this writing, President Trump has not publicly commented on
the Lebanon agreement, though paragraph 14 expresses “deep appreciation” for his
“vision and leadership.” This may suggest he is not yet ready to offer a
definitive verdict on the issue—a potential source of concern for both Israel
and Lebanon, despite Trump’s reportedly warm weekend phone call with Aoun.
Conclusion
The Israel-Lebanon agreement offers a once-in-a-generation opportunity to build
real peace between these neighbors, but the way forward is fraught and fragile.
With an array of opponents already declaring their intent to kill the
opportunity in its crib, progress needs to be swift and visible.
Today saw an early positive step, as U.S. Central Command chief Adm. Brad Cooper
visited Beirut to begin coordinating implementation of the security annex with
LAF commander Gen. Rodolphe Haykal—a smart move given the latter’s record of
prioritizing “civil peace” over measures to disarm Hezbollah. Washington should
push for additional helpful steps, such as broader Arab and international
endorsement of the agreement. But nothing will replace a key missing
piece—effusive public embrace of the agreement by President Trump himself. Done
artfully, in a way only he can do it, this could greatly boost Israel-Lebanon
diplomacy without injury to the main body of the Iran MOU he negotiated, and
without exacerbating tensions between his vice president and secretary of state.
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/14-points-14-points-assessing-israel-lebanon-framework-agreement
**Robert Satloff is the Segal Executive Director and Howard P. Berkowitz Chair
in U.S. Middle East Policy at The Washington Institute.
Why Siccing Syria’s Army on Hezbollah Is So Dangerous
David Schenker//The Washington Institute/Jun 28, 2026
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/why-siccing-syrias-army-hezbollah-so-dangerous
The potential upsides of implementing the Trump administration’s poorly
conceived idea are negligible at best, while the downsides would be legion,
including further damage to Middle East stability and American interests.
From the Gaza Riviera to the promised annexation of Greenland to the alienation
of India, to neutrality in Ukraine—and this is just a partial list—the Trump
administration has pursued a series of ill-advised foreign policy initiatives
during its second mandate. Among the growing catalogue of problematic policies
advocated by the administration, its latest bid to deploy the Syrian army to
fight Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon is particularly dangerous. If
implemented, the intervention would all but certainly further undermine regional
stability and US interests in the Middle East.
On 16 June, President Trump said he believed the best approach to Hezbollah was
for the military forces of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to deploy to Lebanon
and attack the group. While Israel had proven incapable of disarming the
militia, the president maintained that Syria could “do a better job of doing
it.” It was the first official admission by the administration of a long-rumoured
US plan that, until then, Washington had denied. Indeed, in March, US Special
Envoy Tom Barrack tweeted that these stories were “false and inaccurate.”
After months of persistent reports, Trump’s call for Syrian military
intervention didn’t come as a total surprise. Yet it was nonetheless shocking,
given the predictably negative consequences. Even for an administration that
prides itself on disruption, this seemed a bridge too far.
Washington’s friends in Lebanon who support the disarmament of Hezbollah oppose
Syrian involvement. There’s a complicated history between the states that
resonates to this day. Under the authoritarian Assad regime that ruled Syria
from 1970 until it was toppled in 2024, Damascus did not recognise Lebanese
sovereignty. For the Assads, Lebanon was part of Syria. This wasn’t just a
theoretical approach; from 1991 to 2005, Syria militarily occupied Lebanon,
disappearing thousands of Lebanese political opponents along the way.
The brutal Syrian occupation only ended after a mass uprising following the
assassination of Lebanon’s most popular politician, former premier Rafik Hariri,
by the Assad regime and Hezbollah. After working so hard to end the Syrian
presence, the vast majority of Lebanese have no interest in seeing their
neighbours return. Many Lebanese, not surprisingly, also harbour an enduring
disdain for Syrians.
At the same time, Lebanese are suspicious of Syria’s new government, led by al-Sharaa,
an erstwhile member of al- Qaeda. Moderate Sunni, Christian, and Druze Lebanese
express concern about religious extremism next door, and a Syrian army brimming
with foreign fighters and allegedly former jihadis.
Washington’s friends aren’t the only ones concerned about a Syrian military
deployment to Lebanon. The Shiite militia Hezbollah also talks a lot about the
threat from Sunni extremism in Syria and what it would mean for the group’s
constituents. It wasn’t that long ago that the region was plagued by
Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence.
No doubt, Hezbollah has exploited (and exaggerated) fears about al-Sharaa to
shore up support for the militia, but it does have some very real reasons to be
concerned about the Syrian military. During the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah
deployed to Syria to defend the Assad regime. At the time, the group’s secretary
general, Hassan Nasrallah, said the move was defensive as he believed there was
a Western plot to empower extremist Sunni groups to be used against Hezbollah.
Over the course of 8 years, Hezbollah, along with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps, helped prop up the Assad regime in a war that destroyed Syria and
ripped apart its social fabric. Hezbollah also fought against the very same
Sunni foreign fighters who are now incorporated into the predominantly Sunni
Muslim Syrian military. To say there is bad blood is an understatement. As a
result, it is unlikely that Syrian military operations in Lebanon could avoid
degenerating into a very ugly sectarian conflict, especially if Lebanese Sunni
jihadist groups join as well.
What Sovereignty?
To be clear, the US plan inviting Syria back into Lebanon to deal with Hezbollah
undermines Washington’s stated objective to support Lebanese sovereignty.
Furthermore, a recent US invitation to Tehran to participate in the Hezbollah
“deconfliction cell” in Lebanon also throws Washington’s commitment to Lebanese
sovereignty into question. It is difficult to make the case that the Trump
administration seeks to advance Lebanon’s sovereignty when it is allowing—and
even encouraging—Syria, Iran and Israel to station forces there.
Lastly, the deployment of Syrian forces to Lebanon could have negative
implications for the Sharaa government in Damascus. President Trump has heavily
invested in the success of the Sharaa government in post-Assad Syria. Damascus
continues to face enormous economic and security challenges, making a costly
military campaign a ridiculous proposition. Furthermore, Syria’s
relatively small army, which already has limited capabilities, could be
dangerously stretched. If a significant number of Syrian forces enter Lebanon,
it could leave a vacuum where remnants of the Islamic State (IS) could step in,
especially now that US forces have fully withdrawn from Syrian territory. Even
if such military adventurism does not break or strain the Syrian army and the
Sharaa government, it would almost certainly distract it from delivering on
promises made to the Syrian people of a better life following 60 years of
authoritarian rule. Over the past 18 months, Damascus has been laser-focused on
managing Syria’s tenuous political transition, piecing together the war-torn
country, and rebuilding state institutions.
Little Upside
The downsides of this Trump administration proposal are legion. As with the
ill-advised war on Iran, which led to the closure of the Hormuz Strait, the
implications of pursuing this Syria policy are just as predictable and
detrimental to US interests, while the upside is almost negligible.
While President Trump—impatient with the slow pace of Hezbollah disarmament—sees
the Syria option as a quick fix to the Hezbollah problem, it almost certainly
will not resolve the issue. A wiser path would be to patiently stay the course
with the slow but steady Lebanon-Israel talks being mediated by Washington. The
recent framework agreement was a positive development on that front. The
Trump administration’s Syria initiative is poorly conceived and dangerous.
Fortunately, President Sharaa understands the risks associated and has so far
had the wisdom and resolve to refuse the undertaking. Ironically, the restraint
and political insight of this former jihadist are likely to save the Trump
administration from yet another unnecessary foreign policy debacle. **David
Schenker is the Taube Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and director of
its Rubin Program on Arab Politics. This article was originally published on Al
Majalla’s website.
Trump's Iran 'Deal' Is a Coffee Break: Who Will Enforce
It After He Leaves Office?
Grégoire Canlorbe/Gatestone Institute/July 01/2026
Unfortunately, when it comes to the Middle East, Trump's approaches have not
been the magic bullets he might have hoped.
With the plan of turning Gaza into a "Riviera of the Middle East," both
Hamas-free and (in the October 2025 update of the plan) placed under the
administration of a committee supervised by a "Board of Peace" -- much of which,
bizarrely, appears made up of countries engrossed in waging jihad -- Trump has
so far been less than successful. Hamas, to this day, has not disarmed and
refuses even to entertain the notion. Much of Gaza remains solidly under its
control.
In addition, Trump's January promise to the Iranian people that "HELP IS ON ITS
WAY" seems equally on the rocks. Executions of dissidents have once again been
stepped up, and the US is apparently doing nothing about it.
Trump's abrupt decision, on April 8, 2026, to end the joint U.S.-Israel
offensive (Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion), which had begun
February 28 -- evidently signaled to adversaries not strength but weakness: that
he could not tolerate more than a short-run intervention.
Most of the declared goals of the US offensive – including that "Help is on its
way" –- have, tragically, been abandoned.... Now Iran is saying that it has "no
choice but to obtain nuclear weapons."
American voters are watching the IRGC dictate its terms to the US -- as if they
are the victors. No wonder Iran's leaders are celebrating.
Souk-bargaining over the end of the MOU, after all the money and benefits have
been given up front... will easily outlast the Trump Administration to enable
Iran's regime to rebuild, possibly stronger than before. Trump's MOU will not
bring peace. It is simply a coffee break until he is safely out of office.
Trump's current MOU "deal" is a deal to talk about a deal – for eternity.
Later, when Iran's hardline regime – the same as before, just with new faces –
becomes restive again, it will be far more difficult, and more costly in blood
and treasure, to stop. A single one of Iran's ballistic missiles can obliterate
an entire city block. Ballistic missiles may not be able to "blow up the
planet," but they can threaten and devastate other countries -- and were
seemingly the reason Trump called for the April 8 ceasefire. That call was
possibly Trump's greatest disaster. America was winning -- then Trump stopped!
Iran's ballistic missiles can hit Europe as well as Israel and other neighbors
in the Middle East. Future models will be able to reach Boston, Washington, DC
and New York. It would have been so much easier to stop Hitler before he crossed
the Rhine.
There are no moderate IRGC jihadists -- no Delcy Rodríguez-like figure with whom
to negotiate -- just as there were no moderate Nazis in Germany. If there is no
real regime change, there will be no peace.
No one is expecting Iran's regime to live up to anything it signs anyway. It
never has. The Trump Administration is reportedly waiting to see a "change in
destructive behavior" -- which may last only as long as the time it takes to
change a "toll" to a "fee," for the "service" of allowing transit of commercial
cargo ships through an international waterway, especially when Trump's term in
office is over.
The most tragic part is that Trump's original instincts were right. Turn Gaza
into a "Riviera in the Middle East" -- an American protectorate on the
Mediterranean, perhaps with a U.S. military base to keep order. Trump seems to
have let himself fall into a trap of listening to "friends " -- who are not
friends -- then sidelining and excoriating his true friends, such as Israel.
If some of the rulers in the Middle East convinced Trump to let them generously
"help" with the reconstruction of Gaza, it may well have been to acquire a
foothold on Israel's border from which to keep trying to obliterate Israel....
no one new seems to be rushing to join them. Perhaps these countries have a
different plan in mind.
America regrettably cannot be "made great again" without restoring its
leadership as a bulwark against oppression and barbarism.... No wonder Trump did
not want the MOU made public. By now, he probably knows it is a dud. He is
probably concerned about America's 250th birthday party this week and the price
of gas at the pump.
Perhaps Trump has become infatuated with dreams of glory – even for a fake peace
– rather than for America First or even the future of the West. Many of Trump's
new fake "friends" are, in reality, cold-blooded dictators who loathe the West
and, despite what they tell him, have not lost their appetite one day to
overthrow it.
If one were to ask many countries in the Middle East if they would rather go
forward into the 21st century with artificial intelligence and high tech or
remain in the 7th century, they would probably ask why they cannot have both:
better technology with which to fulfill Allah's divine mission of a global
caliphate?
Perhaps Trump is hoping to win over these dictators. Perhaps they might even
sound won over – until his presidency is over.
Trump has negotiated impressive investments in the US from oil-rich Arab states.
Qatar... What have they asked for from Trump as his end of the deal?
Trump still can inform Iran's regime that "We won, you lost, now here is what
you are going to do." Trump can still decide to make Gaza the "Riviera of the
Middle East " under joint American and Israeli supervision. It is what American
voters are waiting to hear. Until then, Iran is effectively calling the shots
while Trump is backtracking off one red line after another... Why should
Americans vote for that? Many must be justifiably horrified. America is --
again! -- choosing to lose.
The entire West would do well to get over the illusion that fighting back
against those planning to destroy you is endangering you. If adversaries are
planning to destroy you, you are already in danger. Confronting them is the
proper reaction, not the wrong one
Unfortunately, when it comes to the Middle East, U.S. President Donald J.
Trump's approaches have not been the magic bullets he might have hoped.
Pictured: Trump speaks during the Gaza Peace Summit in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt on
October 13, 2025. "Peace through strength," when it comes to U.S. President
Donald J. Trump, appears to mean "peace through whatever works" – diplomacy,
sometimes seeming to verge on suicidal patience, and economic pressure, with
military pressure only as a last resort, and even then, only in a short-run way.
As one might expect from the co-author of The Art of the Deal, the core of his
foreign policy so far has been making deals – or trying to.
Trump has not been afraid to use pressure — economic and short-run military — to
persuade foreign powers to sign agreements that match U.S. interests or, when
U.S. interests are not involved, to make the world, eventually, more peaceful
for the free world.
Among Trump's amazing achievements at the White House are indisputably the
Abraham Accords, and -- in dazzling partnership with Israel, under the
leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu -- freeing the Hamas hostages
and effectively demolishing much of Iran's military and nuclear infrastructure,
a threat no prior president had the courage to confront.
Unfortunately, when it comes to the Middle East, Trump's approaches have not
been the magic bullets he might have hoped.
With the plan of turning Gaza into a "Riviera of the Middle East," both
Hamas-free and (in the October 2025 update of the plan) placed under the
administration of a committee supervised by a "Board of Peace" -- much of which,
bizarrely, appears made up of countries engrossed in waging jihad -- Trump has
so far been less than successful. Hamas, to this day, has not disarmed and
refuses even to entertain the notion. Much of Gaza remains solidly under its
control.
In addition, Trump's January promise to the Iranian people that "HELP IS ON ITS
WAY" seems equally on the rocks. Executions of dissidents have once again been
stepped up, and the US is apparently doing nothing about it.
Trump appears first to envision a goal and then the extent to which that goal
may be reached through dealmaking or pressure. If the goal cannot be reached
fully in those ways, the goal is then revised downward, if not abandoned. Trump
appears to choose dealmaking over war, and adjust his goals accordingly.
When the goals are adjusted downwards from U.S. and Western interests, the
results tend to be less than positive. One issue in which The Art of the Deal
might have been better left aside is trying to negotiate with the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
Trump's abrupt decision, on April 8, 2026, to end the joint U.S.-Israel
offensive (Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion), which had begun
February 28 -- evidently signaled to adversaries not strength but weakness: that
he could not tolerate more than a short-run intervention.
The Arab Gulf states, as Iran's rulers had most likely planned, presumably
informed Trump that they did not appreciate being attacked.
Most of the declared goals of the US offensive – including that "Help is on its
way" –- have, tragically, been abandoned. According to the U.S. version of the
MOU (Iran released this one) and according to Trump himself, "It's okay" if
Iran's radical Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has ballistic missiles. In
addition, after 60 days, control of the Strait of Hormuz will be negotiated, as
will control of Iran's enriched uranium, which Iran is apparently planning to
"blend down" until it is enriched back up again. Also apparently up for grabs
are control of a sovereign state, Lebanon, in addition to Iran's other proxies,
Hamas and the Houthis, neither of which was even mentioned in the MOU – and
control of Iran's centrifuges to resume enriching uranium "for peaceful purposes
only," of course – and presumably for making nuclear weapons on the side, just
as in President Barack Obama's 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
"nuclear deal."
Trump's stated reason for going to war was that "Iran cannot have a nuclear
weapon" -- it is why the U.S. and Israel in June 2025 bombed three mountains
within which Iran stored its enriched uranium. Now Iran is saying that it has
"no choice but to obtain nuclear weapons."
American voters are watching the IRGC dictate its terms to the US -- as if they
are the victors. No wonder Iran's leaders are celebrating.
Souk-bargaining over the end of the MOU, after all the money and benefits have
been given up front -- including $300 billion, $3 billion of which has already
been transferred to them --- will easily outlast the Trump Administration to
enable Iran's regime to rebuild, possibly stronger than before. Trump's MOU will
not bring peace. It is simply a coffee break until he is safely out of office.
Later, when Iran's hardline regime – the same as before, just with new faces –
becomes restive again, it will be far more difficult, and more costly in blood
and treasure, to stop. A single one of Iran's ballistic missiles can obliterate
an entire city block. Ballistic missiles may not be able to "blow up the
planet," but they can threaten and devastate other countries -- and were
seemingly the reason Trump called for the April 8 ceasefire. That call was
possibly Trump's greatest disaster. America was winning -- then Trump stopped!
Iran's ballistic missiles can hit Europe as well as Israel and other neighbors
in the Middle East. Future models will be able to reach Boston, Washington, DC
and New York. It would have been so much easier to stop Hitler before he crossed
the Rhine.
When the ceasefire was announced in April, Iran's missile and drone capabilities
had been severely degraded, its air force and navy mostly annihilated, and its
defense-industrial base largely destroyed (but its reconstitution not
prevented). Iran's energy infrastructure is still in place and, most
importantly, there has been no regime change: the IRGC became the sole power
structure with the new, incapacitated Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei formally
sitting at the top.
There are no moderate IRGC jihadists -- no Delcy Rodríguez-like figure with whom
to negotiate -- just as there were no moderate Nazis in Germany. If there is no
real regime change, there will be no peace. After the April 8 ceasefire, several
requests were relayed to Tehran through the U.S. blockade of the Strait of
Hormuz, and strikes on naval vessels, air-defense systems, radar, surveillance,
and command-and-control sites, and drone- or missile-related control nodes.
In the meantime, however, demands for Iran to renounce its nuclear weapon
ambitions, relinquish its enriched uranium, limit its ballistic missile
production and discontinue support for its proxies, would all be reduced to just
opening the Strait for shipping, possibly until the IRGC felt like closing it
again
No one is expecting Iran's regime to live up to anything it signs anyway. It
never has. The Trump Administration is reportedly waiting to see a "change in
destructive behavior" -- which may last only as long as the time it takes to
change a "toll" to a "fee," for the "service" of allowing transit of commercial
cargo ships through an international waterway, especially when Trump's term in
office is over. Trump's current MOU "deal" is a deal to talk about a deal – for
eternity.
"Rather than waging the war to the end, Trump chose to suspend it," wrote Guy
Millière, a senior fellow of the Gatestone Institute, on May 26.
"When one wages a war and is winning, one does not stop along the way;
otherwise, one gives the enemy a respite and gives it the means to reorganize
and rearm. [...] The agreement, if it is reached and if it corresponds to what
it appears to be [...], will lead to the regime parting with its enriched
uranium and saying that it renounces its military nuclear program. That said,
the renunciation of its military nuclear program will be merely a verbal
renunciation. [...] If the agreement is reached, whatever its content, it will
leave the regime in place, and that regime will still be a fanatical regime
[...] seeking to destroy Israel and support Islamic terrorism. This regime will
regard its survival as a victory."Trump, for all his mastery in the "art of the
deal," refuses to see the leadership role of the U.S. through to the end. He
"choked," as he would say.
Trump, after claiming that "help is on its way," abandoned the Iranian populace.
Then, when Israel was told not to protect itself adequately from the missiles
and attack drones launched by Iran's proxy Hezbollah, Trump abandoned Israel –
just as the Iranians had planned.
The most tragic part is that Trump's original instincts were right. Turn Gaza
into a "Riviera in the Middle East" -- an American protectorate on the
Mediterranean, perhaps with a U.S. military base to keep order. Trump seems to
have let himself fall into a trap of listening to "friends " -- who are not
friends -- then sidelining and excoriating his true friends, such as Israel.
While Trump was boasting that Iran's new IRGC rulers with whom he is negotiating
are "less radical," the very man who had electronically signed the MOU, Iran's
"New Rational Leader," Speaker of the Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf,
immediately went on television declaring the "liberation of Jerusalem."
If some of the rulers in the Middle East convinced Trump to let them generously
"help" with the reconstruction of Gaza, it may well have been to acquire a
foothold on Israel's border from which to keep trying to obliterate Israel.
Despite all the glowing advancements promised by the Abraham Accords, no one new
seems to be rushing to join them. Perhaps these countries have a different plan
in mind.
America regrettably cannot be "made great again" without restoring its
leadership as a bulwark against oppression and barbarism. Unless the Trump
Administration can demonstrate a real win -- not a fake one, no matter how often
Trump tries to tell us how good his deal is -- his party may not even be able to
keep the House and Senate in the midterms this November. No wonder Trump did not
want the MOU made public. By now, he probably knows it is a dud. He is probably
concerned about America's 250th birthday party this week and the price of gas at
the pump.
Where fulfilling the role of a great world leader is compatible with dealmaking,
Trump appears to be willing to assert himself as a great power; but where a
choice has to be made between that and the terrible advice he is following to
negotiate with terrorists instead of dictating his terms to them, he appears to
shrink back to his role as a dealmaker – and from the looks of it, not even one
that can best Iran or Hamas.
Perhaps Trump has become infatuated with dreams of glory – even for a fake peace
– rather than for America First or even the future of the West. Many of Trump's
new fake "friends" are, in reality, cold-blooded dictators who loathe the West
and, despite what they tell him, have not lost their appetite one day to
overthrow it.
Qatar has "invested" more than $400 billion in infiltrating the US – possibly
more than a trillion dollars all told -- no doubt with Muslim Brotherhood
"strings attached." China is waging war on America every way it can. It
maintains secret biological warfare laboratories in California and Nevada that
are developing deadly genetic pathogens. It sends poisonous agriculture seeds to
the U.S.; steals American intellectual property valued at roughly $600 billion a
year; sends spy balloons over U.S. military sites, buys up "farmland" next to
them, and smuggles in fentanyl to kill around 100,000 Americans each year -- the
equivalent of one jumbo jet crashing every day.
Trump's Russian "friend," President Vladimir Putin, has a record of killing
critics too numerous to name; razing Grozny, and invading Georgia and Ukraine.
If one were to ask many countries in the Middle East if they would rather go
forward into the 21st century with artificial intelligence and high tech or
remain in the 7th century, they would probably ask why they cannot have both:
better technology with which to fulfill Allah's divine mission of a global
caliphate?
Trump is poorly placed to warn that the U.S. might have to distance itself from
some European countries undergoing Islamization when he himself cozies up to
supporters of terrorism such as Qatar – which according to at least one expert,
"funds more terrorism than Iran " -- or Turkey, which is reportedly preparing
for war, or Syria's President Ahmed al-Sharaa, whom Trump appears proud of
having "essentially put there; he's doing a phenomenal job," but under whose
leadership attacks on Alawites, Christians and Druze have "skyrocketed," despite
Western-friendly talk about "inclusivity" and "pluralism." Meanwhile, Syria is
"coming together" more hard-core Islamized than ever. Perhaps Trump is hoping to
win over these dictators. Perhaps they might even sound won over – until his
presidency is over.
As a Western power, you should never prioritize the interests of a non-Western
power over those that are Western -- even if it looks as if your short-term
interests are being served. It can backfire someday. The issues of civilization,
the continuing security of the West, cannot be detached from national
interests.1
The 2025 White House National Security Strategy correctly refers to European
countries' ongoing "loss of national identities" and to the "stark prospect of
civilizational erasure." The report also raises the question of, by that erasure
or by "regulatory suffocation", "whether certain European countries will have
economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies."
Trump has negotiated impressive investments in the US from oil-rich Arab states.
Qatar, for instance, committed last year to investing $1.2 trillion in America,
as well as a $400 million aircraft, the "flying palace," among other tributes.2
What have they asked for from Trump as his end of the deal? Regarding the
U.S.-Israel strikes on Iran, Trump lately has been favoring the interests of
Muslim countries over those of Israel. On June 24, 2025, then on April 8, 2026,
Trump prevented escalations that would have endangered Iran's Muslim neighbors.
However, he then called for a ceasefire that prevented Israel from further
weakening Iran.
On April 8, Trump called for another ceasefire just as Israel was successfully
degrading Iran's biggest proxy Hezbollah, which has been bombarding Israel, most
likely at the behest of Iran. Having Hezbollah bombard Israel serves at least
two of Iran's objectives. It drives Israelis out of the northern part of their
country -- Iran might hope permanently -- then, when Israel retaliates, Trump
orders it to stop before it can accomplish its goals. The latest ceasefire also
created tension between the U.S. and Israel, which Iran regards as its two
biggest targets singled out for demolition.
Trump acted similarly again on March and May, when he asked Netanyahu to abstain
from some strikes. Trump would have done better to learn from Netanyahu rather
than to hamper his efforts. Trump still can inform Iran's regime that "We won,
you lost, now here is what you are going to do." Trump can still decide to make
Gaza the "Riviera of the Middle East " under joint American and Israeli
supervision. It is what American voters are waiting to hear. Until then, Iran is
effectively calling the shots while Trump is backtracking off one red line after
another: ballistic missiles, removing Iran's enriched uranium, "Help is on its
way," ending Iranian support for terrorist proxies, possibly freedom of
navigation – and a status quo of once more having Iran enrich uranium for
nuclear weapons. Why should Americans vote for that? Many must be justifiably
horrified. America is -- again! -- choosing to lose. The entire West would do
well to get over the illusion that fighting back against those planning to
destroy you is endangering you. If adversaries are planning to destroy you, you
are already in danger. Confronting them is the proper reaction, not the wrong
one
Israel's retaliation against Hamas in Gaza did not cause masses of Muslims or
Palestine-friendly Westerners to rally against Israel. Pursuing the operations
in Iran would not have resulted in chaos. Now, Iran is being allowed to continue
being a major source of regional and worldwide destabilization and a threat to
Israel and America. That is what will result in chaos.
1 Previous cases of such detachment are certainly legion: the French-Ottoman
alliance that, in the 16th century, was directed against Habsburg Spain and the
Holy Roman Empire; the England-Morocco alliance that, at the crossroads of the
16th and 17th centuries, was directed against Spain; the Britain-Ottoman
alliance that, in 1798-1801, was directed against France during the French
campaign in Egypt; or the alliance that Britain and France, in the Crimean War
of 1853-1856, formed with the Ottoman Empire against Russia.
2 Trump, on the occasion of his May 2025 Middle East trip, signed a U.S.-Qatar
economic agreement worth at least $1.2 trillion, which included commercial
aircraft but also defense, energy, and advanced technology; and announced a $600
billion Saudi commitment to invest in the U.S., in areas like energy security,
defense, technology, infrastructure, or critical minerals, as well as more than
$200 billion in new U.S.–UAE deals. Other Islamic countries with which
substantial economic agreements, in 2025, were announced are Indonesia,
Pakistan, Malaysia, or even Turkey; concerning the latter, on the occasion of
Erdoğan's White House visit on September 25, 2025, a U.S.-sourced LNG supply
deal involving Turkey's BOTAS and Mercuria, with a targeted bilateral trade
volume of $100 billion, was settled in the natural gas sector. A U.S.-Turkey
memorandum on strategic civil nuclear technology, besides, was concluded, as
well as Turkish Airlines' planned purchase of up to 225 Boeing aircraft.
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/22659/iran-deal-is-a-coffee-break
© 2026 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute.
Washington Handed Iran the Paper and Kept the War
Pierre Rehov/Gatestone Institute/July 1, 2026
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/22661/iran-mou-lebanon-framework
The Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding tells Iran that Hezbollah survives and
Israel leaves. The Trilateral Framework says that Hezbollah disarms and that,
until it does, Israel stays in Lebanon.
The negotiations with Iran were led by Vice President JD Vance, who never wanted
this war and made no secret of his wish to end it cheaply. He produced the
Islamabad MOU, the paper Iran's regime wanted to hear. The Trilateral Framework
was created by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who has spent his career treating
Iran's proxy network as a threat to be dismantled rather than soothed.
Iran negotiated the Islamabad MOU and believed it had won the war. It discovered
that the Trilateral Framework, the only binding document, the one with
mechanisms, was written to ensure the opposite. The negotiations with Iran were
led by Vice President JD Vance, who never wanted this war and made no secret of
his wish to end it cheaply. He produced the Islamabad MOU, the paper Iran's
regime wanted to hear. The Trilateral Framework was created by Secretary of
State Marco Rubio, who has spent his career treating Iran's proxy network as a
threat to be dismantled rather than soothed.
Great powers, losing patience, sign a document and persuade themselves that it
is strategy. The Islamic Republic of Iran has watched this habit in Western
capitals for over 40 years and learned to feed on it. What it had not yet
absorbed is that an administration can run two contradictory instruments at
once, letting the weaker one absorb the enemy's hopes while the stronger one
quietly sets the terms.
That is the situation today in Lebanon. Within nine days, the United States put
its name to two texts pointing in opposite directions. The first is the
Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, signed remotely by the US and Iran on
June 17, its name inherited from the failed talks in Pakistan. Its 14 points
open with a demand for the immediate end of hostilities, explicitly including
Lebanon, and the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. Iran's regime intended
this opening clause as a deed of eviction: Israel out of southern Lebanon,
Hezbollah preserved, the situation frozen in the Islamist militia's favor. The
second document, the Trilateral Framework Agreement signed by the US, Lebanon
and Israel at the State Department on June 26, says something Iran's mullahs
cannot accept and apparently did not see coming.
A memorandum of understanding is, in diplomatic practice, a statement of intent.
It binds no one. It announces a direction and leaves the obligations for later,
which is why exhausted powers reach for it, buying the language of peace at the
price of nothing concrete. Iran understood this and pocketed the first clause as
a guarantee. What it could not foresee was that the operational follow-on would
be drafted by a different hand, answering to a different policy, and that the
second text would gut the first without ever formally repudiating it.
The Trilateral Framework signed in Washington is not a memorandum. It is an
implementation accord among Israel, Lebanon, and the United States, with
Washington as guarantor of a sequenced and verifiable process. Where the
Islamabad MOU treated Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon as the precondition, the
Trilateral Framework inverts the order. The Lebanese Armed Forces will assume
control of two pilot zones; Hezbollah is to be disarmed and its infrastructure
dismantled; only upon verified disarmament does Israel progressively redeploy. A
Military Coordination Group, facilitated by the United States, will supervise
the mechanism. Hezbollah is not a party to any of it. Its weapons and
infrastructure are the objects.
Consider what each document asks of the same actor. The Islamabad Memorandum of
Understanding tells Iran that Hezbollah survives and Israel leaves. The
Trilateral Framework says that Hezbollah disarms and that, until it does, Israel
stays in Lebanon. The Washington framework carries a verification schedule, a
coordination body, and an American signature on the operational page. The
Islamabad MOU was the consolation Iran was permitted to believe and has no
mechanism behind it at all.
A division of labor inside the Trump administration was deployed, and not
concealed. The negotiations with Iran were led by Vice President JD Vance, who
never wanted this war and made no secret of his wish to end it cheaply. He
produced the Islamabad MOU, the paper Iran's regime wanted to hear. The Lebanon
framework was created by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who has spent his
career treating Iran's proxy network as a threat to be dismantled rather than
soothed. One man offered Iran the vocabulary of relief. The other wrote the
document that conditions every concession on the disarmament of Iran's most
valuable proxy.
Hezbollah understood the trap faster than its patron. The day after the
Washington signing, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem declared the
framework null and void, and insisted that the first article of the Islamabad
MOU (Israel's withdrawal) be implemented in its place. No amount of trilateral
architecture, Qassem argued, could override the text Iran had secured. The
terrorist militia that called the MOU a "gift of honour, dignity, and strength"
now calls the Lebanon framework "a 'humiliating' and 'shameful' surrender" --
the most candid judgment the document has drawn.
The Israeli reading was equally direct. At the signing, Israel's Ambassador to
the US, Yechiel Leiter, compressed the whole maneuver into a line: in this
performance-based framework, Iran is out, Hezbollah is out, and the road between
Israel and Lebanon is open. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was
blunter, saying that Israel will remain in the security zone in southern Lebanon
until Hezbollah is disarmed and the threat it poses to Israel is removed. His
message to Iran was that it will have no foothold in Lebanon, neither it nor its
proxy militia. That is not the language of a power that has agreed to leave.
None of this means the matter is settled. A framework is a sequence, not a fact,
and sequences in Lebanon have a long record of stalling at the first zone. A
report in the Jerusalem Post makes plain how modest the initial withdrawal is
and how much depends on the Lebanese Armed Forces being tasked with disarming a
militia that is stronger than the state. Hezbollah retains the power to make the
"pilot zones" ungovernable, and Iran retains the power to reopen the file the
moment American attention drifts. The contradiction between the two papers has
not been resolved. It has been postponed, on terms favorable to Jerusalem.
The structure of the arrangement deserves to be seen plainly because it explains
why the satisfaction in Iran curdled so quickly. Iran negotiated the Islamabad
MOU and believed it had won the war. It discovered that the Trilateral
Framework, the only binding document, the one with mechanisms, was written to
ensure the opposite. This was not a single masterstroke and should not be sold
as one. It was the older and colder craft of letting an adversary invest its
hopes in the weaker instrument while the stronger one is prepared in the next
room.
Whether this holds will be decided not in Washington but in the Lebanese
villages south of the Litani River, where a terrorist militia that answers to
Iran is being told to surrender the weapons that are its reason for existing.
The framework can be enforced, or it can be evaded. What can no longer be
claimed is that the United States agreed to Iran's terms. It agreed to a paper
that said so, and signed another that did not, and handed the second to the man
who meant it.
**Pierre Rehov, who holds a law degree from Paris-Assas, is a French reporter,
novelist and documentary filmmaker. He is the author of six novels, including
"Beyond Red Lines", "The Third Testament" and "Red Eden", translated from
French. His latest essay on the aftermath of the October 7 massacre " 7 octobre
- La riposte " became a bestseller in France. As a filmmaker, he has produced
and directed 17 documentaries, many photographed at high risk in Middle Eastern
war zones, and focusing on terrorism, media bias, and the persecution of
Christians. His latest documentary, "Pogrom(s)" highlights the context of
ancient Jew hatred within Muslim civilization as the main force behind the
October 7 massacre.
© 2026 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No
part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied
or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.
Russia, Hamas, and China: Three reasons Turkey shouldn’t
get the F-35
Cameron McMillan, Bradley Bowman, Sinan Ciddi/Breaking Defense/July 01/2026
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/06/30/russia-hamas-and-china-three-reasons-turkey-shouldnt-get-the-f-35/
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan appears eager to impress Washington and
Brussels at the upcoming NATO summit in Turkey, with Ankara undertaking robust
preparations and Turkish officials trumpeting Erdogan’s personal ties with
President Donald Trump.
Erdogan, no doubt, has many goals heading into the summit, including
strengthening Turkey’s defense industrial base and championing its growing arms
exports. Erdogan would also like to see Turkey readmitted to the F-35 fighter
jet program.
It appears the Turkish leader’s campaign is having an effect. Speaking to
reporters on Wednesday from the oval office alongside Secretary General of NATO
Mark Rutte, Trump said he would “probably do something” to make Erdogan “very
happy” in response to a question about whether the administration would allow
Turkey to obtain the F-35. Vice President J.D. Vance indicated that the Pentagon
was “reviewing” legal avenues to provide Turkey with the F-35, only for Trump to
interject that “we will work it out.”
Readmitting Turkey to the F-35 fighter jet program would be a major mistake.
That is because Erdogan has repeatedly cozied up with America’s enemies — namely
Russia, Hamas, and China. A country led in such a manner should not be trusted
with one of America’s most cutting-edge combat aircraft.
Despite the Trump administration’s suggestions to the contrary, the case against
Ankara receiving the F-35 remains clear.
After Turkey procured the S-400 air and missile defense system from Russia
despite repeated warnings from the United States, the first Trump administration
was left with no choice but to evict Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019. The
reasons are as self-evident now as they were then.
The F-35 boasts sophisticated capabilities and sensors that make it central to
American security and future US conflicts with China, Russia, Iran, or North
Korea. Turkey’s possession of both the S-400 and the F-35 would be dangerous
because it would allow the two systems to be operated in regular proximity to
each other or even networked together.
This would enable Moscow to potentially gain valuable intelligence helpful for
shooting down F-35s flown by Americans or our allies. If that were to happen,
given growing security cooperation among the four Axis of Aggressors
adversaries, we should not be surprised if Moscow shares sensitive technological
details of the F-35 with Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang. That would not only
endanger American national security and pilots, but also US partners who fly the
aircraft.
Even if Ankara got rid of its S-400s, something Erdogan has been reluctant to
do, Washington should still not provide Turkey with the F-35 because he has
demonstrated a willingness to align with other enemies of the United States as
well.
Take Hamas, for example. After the terrorist group launched its horrific terror
attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, Erdogan continued to support a terror group
that has murdered and held Americans hostage and is dedicated to the destruction
of America’s partner, Israel. Indeed, after the terror organization conducted
the worst single-day murder of Jews since the Holocaust, Erdogan praised Hamas.
But Erdogan’s embrace of America’s enemies does not stop there. In addition to
purchasing Russian air defenses and supporting Hamas, Erdogan’s government has
developed troubling ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), America’s
leading adversary.
As part of a growing bilateral relationship under Erdogan, China has invested
heavily in Turkey’s digital ecosystem. By the end of 2025, over 150 Chinese
companies were active in Turkey’s digital infrastructure, including its 5G
telecommunications system, according to a study by the Swedish Defence Research
Agency. The presence of Chinese 5G equipment is especially concerning, as it has
been linked to significant espionage and cyber risks.
To be sure, the issue of Chinese 5G devices and American allies is not unique to
Turkey. But, unlike Turkey, many of these countries have worked to mitigate the
presence of Chinese 5G equipment or transition away from it entirely. The United
Kingdom, for instance, has taken steps to remove Chinese 5G equipment. Ankara,
on the other hand, is moving in the opposite direction and its relationship with
China goes beyond solely the economic and technological domains.
Turkey’s association with the Chinese and Russian-led Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) is also troubling. The SCO is a key element of the PRC’s
strategy to project power beyond the Pacific. While not a full member, Turkey
has been a “dialogue partner” of the SCO since 2012. It is also worth
remembering that Turkey came close to purchasing the export variant of the
Chinese HQ-9 air and missile defense system in the 2010s before settling on
another bad option: the Russian S-400.
Taken together, Turkey’s ties with China are clearly inconsistent with NATO’s
2024 Washington Summit Declaration, which identified the PRC as a country whose
“stated ambitions and coercive policies continue to challenge our interests,
security and values.”
Erdogan wants to portray Turkey as a robust Western ally that supports
collective security goals. That marketing campaign will be on full display at
the NATO summit. But that is not Erdogan’s real focus. His main priority is
achieving strategic autonomy and independence from the West to further his
aggressive revisionist and irredentist goals that undermine American, European,
and Israeli security. That is why he is prioritizing obtaining technologies from
the West and why he is willing to work with Russia, Hamas, and China.
It is clear that Erdogan has applied a full-court press on Trump. In his
comments Wednesday, Trump called Erdogan “a respected man, a respected leader.”
That is not exactly an assessment most Americans would use for someone who has
fully embraced Hamas, a designated terrorist organization, especially after the
group launched the Oct. 7 terror attacks. Moreover, what should matter to the US
government is not the personal relationship between Trump and Erdogan, but
rather a sober assessment of whether the transfer of the F-35 is in the American
interest and consistent with US law.
It clearly is not and would run afoul of the Countering America’s Adversaries
Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and Section 1245 of the 2020 National Defense
Authorization Act. Section 1245 makes clear that Turkey cannot receive the F-35
if it still “possesses” the S-400. The Trump administration reiterated in a Dec.
15, 2025 letter that it was committed to abiding by CAATSA and clearly
understood the requirements of Section 1245.
Congress should warn the administration to not ignore the law and serious
concerns related to Russia, Hamas, and China. If the administration proceeds
anyway, members of both parties and chambers would be wise to support joint
resolutions of disapproval to block the sale of the F-35 to Turkey.
Regardless, Congress should also require the administration to submit an annual
written report on any Turkish defense industrial base, dual-use, or security
cooperation with Russia or China. That would help expose concerns that should
inform future policy toward Ankara.
There are several opportunities to better secure the alliance and American
interests at the NATO summit next month. But readmitting Turkey to the F-35
program is not one of them.
*Cameron McMillan is a senior research analyst for the Center on Military and
Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where
Bradley Bowman is the senior director. Sinan Ciddi is a senior fellow and the
director of FDD’s Turkey Program.
Why Is Saudi Arabia Appeasing Iran?
Hussain Abdul-Hussain/The National Interest/July 01/2026
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/why-is-saudi-arabia-appeasing-iran
Normalization with Israel would be far more beneficial for Saudi security than
conciliation with the regime that has bombed its territory.
Last week, while Iran attacked Bahrain and ships navigating through the Strait
of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia was preparing a reconciliation summit with Tehran.
Meanwhile, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
counterparts in Manama and issued a joint statement setting firm red lines. The
ministers demanded confrontation of all Iranian threats, including missiles,
drones, and proxy support. They insisted that trade and investment with Iran
remain conditional on compliance and an end to destabilizing behavior, called
for blocking Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and demanded free navigation through the
Strait of Hormuz without Iranian fees or control.
This was a coordinated and firm position. Even though Saudi Arabia was at the
meeting, it seems to have chosen a different independent course. Alongside
Qatar, Riyadh continues to pursue reconciliation with Iran. The United Arab
Emirates (UAE), which suffered the most severe Iranian attack, has taken a
noticeably more cautious approach. This split within the GCC reveals that Saudi
Arabia is not leading a unified Gulf position. Instead, it is advancing its own
policy of accommodation toward the country that directly attacked it.
Unlike how it imagines itself, Saudi Arabia was not a mediator during the recent
escalation. It was in fact a target. Iran struck Saudi territory with ballistic
missiles and explosive drones.
Riyadh absorbed these attacks without expelling the Iranian ambassador or
breaking diplomatic relations, although it did expel the Iranian military
attache and launch covert, retaliatory strikes on Iran. Its public justification
for its restraint was concern over potential damage to critical infrastructure,
such as water desalination plants. However, Iran’s own desalination facilities
were equally vulnerable to Saudi retaliation. Now, after taking Iranian fire
without response, it is moving toward a reconciliation summit.
A recent editorial in Al Riyadh by Saudi journalist Nawal al-Jabr framed this
approach as a pursuit of peace: “Peace in politics is built on will, guided by
wisdom, and expanded through diplomacy at every turn.”
The editorial claimed that “Across the region today, attention is turning to
those capitals that maintained a steady and balanced presence, a clear vision,
and consistent messaging throughout,” and that “Saudi Arabia played a central
diplomatic role.” It further argued that “This stance is rooted in a broader
vision that prioritizes regional security, the safety of maritime routes, stable
energy markets, and long-term regional stability.”
Riyadh presents its restraint as strategic wisdom. In practice, it has chosen to
accommodate the aggressor rather than deter it.
The inconsistency becomes clearest when compared with Saudi policy toward
Israel. Iran has repeatedly attacked Saudi territory and interests. Israel has
never done so in the nearly eight decades since its founding. Yet Riyadh has
shown far greater willingness to engage with and accommodate Iran.
If Saudi Arabia were genuinely guided by realpolitik and long-term strategic
interests, it would have recognized the value of closer ties with Israel. Such a
step could strengthen Saudi economic diversification, provide access to advanced
security cooperation, and improve its overall position against future Iranian
pressure. Instead, the kingdom has pursued the opposite course.
This approach carries clear strategic costs. By signaling that direct attacks
can be followed by reconciliation without meaningful consequences, Saudi Arabia
weakens deterrence across the region. By refusing to link any outreach to Iran
with tangible progress toward Israel, it forgoes a partnership that could
materially improve both its economic outlook and its security posture. At a time
when Saudi finances remain under pressure, and its vital energy infrastructure
faces ongoing threats, rejecting a relationship with a capable regional power in
favor of accommodation with an adversary appears difficult to justify on realist
grounds.
If Saudi Arabia were as realistic with Israel as it has been with Iran, Riyadh
would have advised the Palestinians to agree to whatever arrangement could end
their conflict with Israel, in the service of greater regional stability. Had
Palestinians been as realistic with Israel as Saudi has been with Iran, the
Palestinians would have saved themselves tens of thousands of victims, vast
destruction, and decades of conflict.
Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy lacks strength or strategic depth. It is a policy
that rewards aggression and forgoes available tools to strengthen the kingdom’s
position. The question is no longer whether Saudi Arabia seeks peace. The
question is why it appears willing to make peace with the country that bombed
it, while continuing to resist peace with the country that did not.
About the Author: Hussain Abdul-Hussain
Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a research fellow at The Foundation for Defense of
Democracies (FDD), where he focuses on the Gulf region and Yemen. Hussain earned
a degree in history and archaeology from the American University of Beirut. He
joined FDD after a 20-year career in journalism, during which he served as a
reporter and editor at The Daily Star in Beirut, helped set up and manage the
Arabic satellite network Alhurra Iraq in Washington, DC, and headed the
Washington bureau of Kuwaiti daily newspaper Alrai. He has also written for The
New York Times and The Washington Post. He is the author of The Arab Case for
Israel: And Other Essays from a Distant Conflict.
Five Key Legal Questions About the June 2026 U.S.-Iran Memorandum of
Understanding
Orde Kittrie/International Law and Security Forum/July 01/2026
https://internationallawfare.asu.edu/forum/five-key-legal-questions-about-june-2026-us-iran-memorandum-understanding
This article analyzes five key legal questions relating to the memorandum of
understanding (MOU) signed on June 17, 2026 by U.S. President Donald Trump and
Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian.
The analysis draws on my decade as an attorney in the State Department Legal
Adviser’s Office, followed by two decades as a law professor teaching and
writing about international law issues. For three of those years in the State
Department Legal Adviser’s Office, I served as the U.S. government’s lead
attorney drafting and successfully negotiating five U.S.-Russia nuclear
agreements over the course of fifteen trips to Moscow.
Parts of this legal analysis are informed by discussions with some of my fellow
alumni of the Legal Adviser’s Office, and other international law experts. But
the responsibility for any errors it may contain is entirely mine.
International agreements signed by senior U.S. officials are typically written
following particular templates (depending on the nature of the agreement) and
using words carefully selected to convey specific legal meanings. Because the
MOU does not follow this pattern, this analysis is a work in progress. I will be
revising it for various reasons, including as the U.S. and Iran further clarify,
through word and deed, what the MOU means to them.
I. Is the MOU legally binding on the U.S. and Iran?
Short answer
The text of the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed on June 17,
2026 by U.S. President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is
ambiguous as to whether or not the MOU is legally binding on the U.S. and Iran.
Deeper analysis
U.S. law, including the Case-Zablocki Act and its implementing regulations,
makes a clear conceptual distinction between “international agreements,” which
are legally binding, and “non-binding instruments” which are “intended to have
political or moral weight, but not intended to be legally binding.”
Legal analysts have thus far disagreed on whether the MOU is legally binding,
variously describing it as not, or likely not, or maybe, legally binding. I
particularly recommend this analysis by Professor Duncan Hollis, who previously
served as the State Department’s lead attorney for treaty affairs, is editor of
The Oxford Guide to Treaties, and is one of the leading academic experts on
treaty issues. Describing the MOU as “poorly drafted,” Professor Hollis notes
that it “contains elements of both” binding agreements and non-binding
instruments, leaving its legal status “decidedly murky.”
The title “memorandum of understanding” is not itself determinative of whether a
document, agreed upon by the U.S. and a foreign nation, is legally binding and
thus formally constitutes an “international agreement” as defined by U.S. law.
The internal text of a U.S. document agreed with a foreign nation typically
makes clear whether the document is intended to be binding or non-binding.
However, as Professor Hollis notes, the MOU includes conflicting elements. One
MOU element mitigating in favor of it being non-binding is its lack of a set of
administrative rules, typically included at the end of a binding international
agreement, providing a dispute resolution mechanism and specifying when the
agreement takes effect and how it can be amended or terminated.
On the other hand, the MOU uses numerous phrasings – including words like
“undertake” and “agree” – which are typically suggestive of a legally binding
commitment. In addition, the MOU has been signed by the parties’ leaders, which
is often associated with (but not determinative of) an agreement being legally
binding.
Given the ambiguity of its text, whether the MOU is legally binding is, per U.S.
law, “a matter of judgment based on all of the circumstances of the
transaction.” The State Department Legal Adviser is empowered by U.S. law to
make that determination.
One key criteria, under U.S. law, for an agreed document to be legally binding
is that “[t]he parties must intend their undertaking to be legally binding, and
not merely of political” effect. Thus, if the MOU is said to be legally binding,
by the relevant officials of both Iran and the U.S., then it is legally binding.
Professor Hollis suggests, and I agree, that the two parties “alleviate the
confusion by jointly signaling their views on what kind of agreement” they have
signed.
II. Does the MOU legally bind Israel?
Short answer
The MOU seems to imply, in its first sentence, that its commitments extend to
Israel. It states that the U.S. and Iran “and their allies in the current war,
by signing this MOU, declare the immediate and permanent termination of military
operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and undertake from now on not to
initiate any war or any military operation against each other . . . ” As
discussed in response to Question I above, it is unclear whether the MOU is
legally binding even on the parties to it, namely the U.S. and Iran. Even if the
MOU is legally binding on the U.S. and Iran, it is not binding on Israel, which
neither signed the MOU nor otherwise consented to be bound by the MOU.
Deeper analysis
As discussed in response to Question I above, the MOU is not clearly legally
binding on the U.S. and Iran (whose presidents signed it). But even if the MOU
were binding on those signatory countries, none of the MOU, including its first
sentence, would be legally binding on Israel. An international agreement could
only be legally binding on Israel if a) Israel signed or otherwise directly and
explicitly adhered to the agreement, b) explicitly provided the U.S. with a kind
of proxy authorizing it to sign for Israel, or c) a legally binding UN Security
Council resolution imposed the agreement’s terms on Israel. Thus, an Israeli
action which contradicts the MOU does not violate international law (or U.S.
domestic law for that matter) simply because it contradicts the MOU.
III. Is the MOU subject to the requirements and restrictions set forth in the
Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act?
Short Answer
The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (INARA) imposes several
requirements and restrictions on any “agreement with Iran relating to the
nuclear program of Iran.” These include required submission to Congress by the
President of the following within five calendar days of the agreement being
reached: 1) both the agreement itself and “any additional materials related” to
the agreement; 2) a “verification assessment report” by the Secretary of State;
and 3) a certification by the President. In addition, INARA specifies that
during the 30-day period following a covered agreement’s transmittal to
Congress, “the President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or
otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran . .
. or refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to” the covered
agreement.
The June 2026 U.S.-Iran MOU appears to fall clearly within INARA’s definition of
an “agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran,” and thus be
subject to INARA’s requirements and restrictions.
The Administration is evidently not applying INARA’s requirements and
restrictions to the MOU, apparently on the basis of an opinion from the
Department of Justice that some or all of INARA’s requirements and restrictions
somehow are not applicable to the MOU. The White House and the Department of
Justice have apparently not shared this surprising opinion, or its arguments,
with either Congress or the public.
Deeper Analysis
The June 2026 U.S.-Iran MOU appears to fall clearly within INARA’s definition of
an “agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran,” and thus be
subject to INARA’s requirements and restrictions.
INARA specifies that “[t]he term ‘agreement’ means an agreement related to the
nuclear program of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United
States to take action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or
otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a
political commitment or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally
binding or not…”
The MOU is clearly “related to the nuclear program of Iran.” Paragraph 8
includes a reaffirmation by Iran that “it shall not procure or develop nuclear
weapons,” along with an agreed framework for the U.S. and Iran to resolve the
disposition of Iran’s stockpiled enriched material. In Paragraph 9, Iran agrees
to “maintain the current status quo of its nuclear program” pending a “final
deal.”
The MOU also clearly both “includes the United States” and “commits the United
States to take action.” Indeed, the MOU commits the U.S. to take several
different actions. One of the most salient examples is the U.S. commitment, in
paragraph 4 of the MOU, that “Immediately upon the signing of this MOU, the
United States of America will begin the removal of its naval blockade . . .”
Another salient example is the U.S. commitment, in paragraph 10, that “The
United States of America undertakes that immediately upon the signing of this
MOU . . . the U.S. Department of Treasury will issue waivers for the export of
Iranian crude oil, petroleum products and derivatives, and all associated
services….”
INARA’s definition includes an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran
“regardless of whether it is legally binding or not.” Thus, the lack of clarity
as to whether the MOU is legally binding (which is discussed in the answer to
Question I above) does not exclude the MOU from INARA’s coverage.
INARA was passed to strengthen Congress’ role in overseeing President Barack
Obama’s 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, INARA does not
have a sunset date and is as applicable to President Donald Trump’s June 2026
MOU with Iran as it was to Obama’s JCPOA.
IV. Are the MOU’s commitments to lift sanctions on Iran, and the
administration’s implementation of those commitments, consistent with U.S. law?
Short answer
Paragraph 10 of the MOU contains a U.S. commitment, to immediately waive
sanctions on Iran, which is inconsistent with the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review
Act of 2015 (INARA). The Treasury Department’s issuance on June 22 of a license
which implemented the MOU’s paragraph 10 by immediately pausing sanctions on
Iranian petroleum appears to be a violation of INARA.
INARA specifies that during the 30 day period following transmittal to Congress
of any nuclear agreement with Iran, “the President may not waive, suspend,
reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory
sanctions with respect to Iran . . . or refrain from applying any such sanctions
pursuant to an agreement” covered by INARA. The Trump Administration’s
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Iran was transmitted to Congress on June
18. The license was issued four days later.
As discussed in the answer to Question III above, the MOU appears to fall
clearly within INARA’s definition of an “agreement with Iran relating to the
nuclear program of Iran,” and thus be subject to INARA’s requirements and
restrictions.
The Administration appears to be acting on the basis of an opinion provided to
the White House by the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice that
some or all of INARA’s requirements do not apply to the MOU. The White House and
the Department of Justice have apparently not shared this surprising opinion, or
its arguments, with either Congress or the public.
In addition, paragraph 7 of the MOU appears to exceed the president’s authority
when it says, “The United States of America undertakes to terminate all types of
sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including . . . all unilateral
U.S. sanctions, primary and secondary, in an agreed upon schedule as part of the
final deal.”
Deeper analysis
A. Treasury Appears to Have Violated INARA by Providing Iran with Petroleum
Sanctions Relief Pursuant to the MOU
The Treasury Department’s issuance on June 22 of a license immediately pausing
statutory sanctions on Iranian petroleum, pursuant to a commitment provided in
the MOU, appears to violate INARA.
Section 135(b)(3) of INARA specifies that during the 30-calendar day period
following transmittal to Congress of an agreement with Iran relating to the
nuclear program of Iran, “the President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide
relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with
respect to Iran under any provision of law or refrain from applying any such
sanctions pursuant to an agreement” covered by INARA.
Paragraph 10 of the MOU states: “The United States of America undertakes that
immediately upon the signing of this MOU, and until the termination of
sanctions, the U.S. Department of Treasury will issue waivers for the export of
Iranian crude oil, petroleum products and derivatives, and all associated
services including banking transactions, insurances, transportation, etc.” The
Treasury license issued on June 22 waives, suspends, or otherwise provides
relief from, sanctions prohibiting transactions “ordinarily incident and
necessary to the production, sale, delivery, or offloading of crude oil,
petrochemical products, or petroleum products of Iranian origin.”
Former top attorneys from both the George W. Bush and the Barack Obama
administrations quickly warned that INARA prohibited such waivers for the first
30 days following the MOU’s transmittal to Congress. The MOU was transmitted to
Congress on June 18.
INARA was passed to strengthen Congress’ role in overseeing President Barack
Obama’s 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The 30 day period was
designed to provide Congress time to review the JCPOA, and potentially reject
it, prior to implementation.
INARA does not have a sunset date and appears to be as applicable to President
Donald Trump’s MOU with Iran as it was to Obama’s JCPOA.
B. Paragraph 7 Undertaking to “Terminate” All U.S. Sanctions on Iran Exceeds
President’s Authority
Paragraph 7 includes the following: “The United States of America undertakes to
terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including
. . . all unilateral U.S. sanctions, primary and secondary, in an agreed upon
schedule as part of the final deal.” This would on its face include U.S.
sanctions targeting not only Iran’s nuclear program but also its sponsorship of
state terrorism, support for proxy forces destabilizing the region, missile
program, and human rights violations.
The MOU addresses the nuclear program of Iran, and purports to pave the way for
a “final Deal” resolving the nuclear dispute between the U.S. and Iran. But the
MOU contains no reference to, and does not appear to anticipate the “final Deal”
in any way addressing, Iran’s missile program or human rights violations.
The MOU does reference, albeit indirectly, Iran’s sponsored terrorist and other
proxy forces. The MOU states that Iran and the U.S., “and their allies in the
current war, by signing this MoU, declare the immediate and permanent
termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon…” The MOU
also states that “The final Deal will confirm the permanent termination of the
war on all fronts, including in Lebanon…” This formulation could, if broadly
interpreted and sustainably and verifiably implemented, conceivably entail Iran
halting its sponsorship of state terrorism and regional destabilization.
To the extent the missile and human rights sanctions on Iran are Congressionally
imposed (rather than created by a president pursuant to his International
Emergency Economic Powers Act authorities), the president may (depending on
whether the statutory requirements for a waiver are met) be able to waive the
sanctions without Congressional action (after the INARA waiting period). But in
the absence of Iran actually halting its missile program and human rights
abuses, the administration will likely find it impossible to terminate its
missile and human right sanctions on Iran without Congressional action.
Such Congressional action could include direct repeal of the sanctions statutes
or, potentially, Senate consent to a treaty overriding the sanctions statutes.
Analysts would need to determine whether such a treaty could be self-executing
or would need to be implemented by Congress statutorily (thus requiring
legislative action by both chambers).
V. Has the Administration fully complied with the INARA requirement that the
agreement, “including all related materials and annexes,” be submitted to
Congress, along with a “verification assessment report” and a “certification,”
within five calendar days?
Short answer
The Administration submitted the three-page MOU to Congress on June 18, less
than a day after President Trump signed it. However, INARA requires the
President to submit to Congress within five calendar days of the agreement being
reached not only the agreement itself but also the following which the
Administration has evidently not submitted: 1) “any additional materials
related” to the agreement; 2) a “verification assessment report” by the
Secretary of State; and 3) a certification by the President.
Deeper analysis
INARA requires the President to submit to Congress within five days not only the
agreement itself, which it submitted on June 18, but also the following which it
has evidently not submitted:
A. “all related materials and annexes”
INARA, in its definitions section, makes clear that the requirement to submit
all “additional materials related” to the MOU includes “annexes, appendixes,
codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance,
technical or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered
into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented
in the future”
Vice President J.D. Vance has said that the deal includes “gentlemen’s
agreements” with Iran, some of them written and some oral. Special Envoy Steve
Witkoff reportedly noted that a side letter exists in which Iran invites the
International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect its nuclear sites and uncover the
locations of Tehran’s enriched uranium.
Consistent with INARA, the Administration should have submitted all of this to
Congress within five calendar days of June 17, the date on which the agreement
was reached.
With regard to the oral “gentlemen’s agreements” referenced by Vance, it is
important to note that under both international law and U.S. law, international
commitments can potentially be legally binding even if they are oral. U.S. law
requires that oral arrangements which might be legally binding be “reduced to
writing by the agency that concluded the oral arrangement.”
B. A “verification and assessment report of the Secretary of State”
INARA requires that “[n]ot later than 5 calendar days after reaching an
agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall
transmit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership. . . a
verification assessment report of the Secretary of State. . . with respect to
the agreement” assessing:
“the extent to which the Secretary will be able to verify that Iran is complying
with its obligations and commitments under the agreement”
“the adequacy of the safeguards and other control mechanisms and other
assurances contained in the agreement with respect to Iran’s nuclear program to
ensure Iran’s activities permitted thereunder will not be used to further any
nuclear-related military or nuclear explosive purpose. . .”
“the capacity and capability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to
effectively implement the verification regime required by or related to the
agreement, including whether the International Atomic Energy Agency will have
sufficient access to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of covert
nuclear-related activities. . .”
The first two sentences of the MOU’s paragraph 8 contains important commitments
and assurances regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The first sentence states: “The
Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear
weapons.” The second sentence states: “The Islamic Republic of Iran and the
United States of America have agreed to resolve the disposition of stockpile
enriched material pursuant to a mechanism that will be mutually agreed upon . .
. with the minimum methodology to be down blending on-site, under the
supervision of the IAEA.”
The required “verification assessment report” would be expected to address
whether the MOU provides, or the IAEA otherwise has, sufficient access to Iran
to verify Iran’s implementation of these assurances and commitments.
However, the MOU does not in fact contain any “safeguards” or “other control
mechanisms” or other verification elements, let alone a “verification regime,”
relating to these assurances (other than the vague reference to IAEA supervision
of the down blending). It would be important for Congress to see how frankly
this gap is addressed by the verification and assessment report.
C. A “certification” by the President
INARA requires that “[n]ot later than 5 calendar days after reaching an
agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall
transmit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership . . . a
certification” that “the President determines the agreement meets United States
non-proliferation objectives, does not jeopardize the common defense and
security, provides an adequate framework to ensure that Iran’s nuclear
activities permitted thereunder will not be inimical to or constitute an
unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and ensures that Iran’s
nuclear activities permitted thereunder will not be used to further any
nuclear-related military or nuclear explosive purpose, including for any
research on or development of any nuclear explosive device or any other
nuclear-related military purpose.”
The President has yet to make such a certification.
Such a certification could be difficult to make. Critics would contend that the
MOU does not provide an “adequate framework to ensure that Iran’s nuclear
activities permitted thereunder” will not be used to further Iran’s nuclear
weapons program. A “certification” would therefore presumably assert that the
MOU is a stepping stone to a final agreement which will meet the specified
criteria.
*Orde Kittrie is a senior fellow at FDD and law professor at Arizona State
University’s Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law. He previously served as the
U.S. State Department’s lead attorney for nuclear affairs.
Human Rights in Turkish-Occupied Cyprus
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lyoA_QS5hF4&t=3s
Erdogan's Record and Its Implications for the Ankara NATO Summit
Sinan Ciddi/FDD/July 01/2026
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/06/30/human-rights-in-turkish-occupied-cyprus/
Chairman Smith, Chairman McGovern, and honorable members, I thank you for the
opportunity to testify on Turkey’s policies towards Cyprus, the wider Eastern
Mediterranean, and the implications for the security and stability of the
transatlantic alliance.
As a political scientist and policy analyst, I have studied and taught about
modern Turkish politics since 2002 in Turkey and the United States. I witnessed
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party’s rise to
victory in November 2002 and have followed his progress since. Since his
earliest days in power, I have stood in opposition to his Islamist worldview,
documented his disdain toward democratic government, and chronicled his
subjugation of the Turkish people to economic and political ruin. Turks today
are measurably worse off under Erdogan’s rule than at any other point in
Turkey’s history as a republic.
My unceasing critique of Erdogan’s record has resulted in the Turkish
government’s ban of my social media accounts in Turkey by court order, its
declaration of me a traitor, and its branding of me as a member of the Islamist
Fetullah Gulen Cult, which was partially responsible for the coup to topple
Erdogan in 2016. For my part, I am as proud a Turk as I am a British and
American citizen. I was raised in a secular and progressive family. I am the son
of an accomplished Air Force pilot and an internationally renowned,
award-winning artist mother. My entire parental and educational upbringing
biases me to respect the virtues of democratic government and reject the
autocratic-Islamist project of Erdogan’s governance and the kleptocratic regime
he has built. My persona and character are not limited to my words here but are
echoed throughout my entire public scholarship since embarking on my career.
My reason for giving you my brief biography is simple: I am not anti-Turkey, but
anti-Erdogan. My counsel to this committee is premised on my desire to protect
the national security interests of the United States and the NATO alliance and,
ultimately, to contribute what I can to facilitate Turkey’s return to democratic
governance. Far too many scholars, analysts and journalists overlook or
underreport the danger Erdogan represents to the United States, NATO and
Turkey’s own citizenry. Many Turks are afraid of criticizing Erdogan,
justifiably fearing loss of their livelihoods, imprisonment, or being targeted
by agents of his autocratic regime.
By contrast, many Turks who are not supportive of Erdogan’s domestic governance
of Turkey still believe his foreign policy pursuits make Turkey stronger on the
world stage. I am here to argue against this perspective and point out the
increasing threat that Erdogan presents to the Eastern Mediterranean, or NATO’s
southeastern flank. Many Turks have forgotten or do not see that there is a
difference between wanting their country to be strong, to be successful, and to
defend its security interests, and wanting to enable an increasingly malign
government with revisionist ambitions that could initiate armed conflict with
Greece, Cyprus, or even Israel.
Turkey seeks to gain access to cutting-edge U.S. defense articles, including
reentry into the F-35 program, from which it was removed in 2019 for purchasing
a Russian missile defense system and an F-110 engine to power its indigenous
fifth-generation fighter plane, the Kaan. Equipping Erdogan with such U.S.
capabilities would be a tremendous mistake. Transferring them to Turkey would
not be the same as transferring them to other stalwart NATO allies, such as
Great Britain, Germany, or Poland. These countries have all demonstrated a
desire to uphold the collective interests of European and NATO security;
Erdogan’s aim is to equip his military for revisionist purposes that could
attempt to redraw the boundaries of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle
East.
NATO is a collective alliance that safeguards the security interests of all its
members; it is not a body created to further one autocrat’s irredentist vision.
The regime Erdogan has built could outlast him, representing a persistent threat
to the security and stability of the Mediterranean and Middle East, as well as
to the core security interests of the United States and NATO. The Turkey Erdogan
seeks to build is not a power that intends to be a force multiplier to the
transatlantic and rules-based order that emerged at the end of World War II; it
is one that seeks to supplant it.
A cottage industry of analyses portrays Erdogan’s Turkey as a power moving
closer to supporting NATO and Europe’s security interests, and as a potential
guarantor for the West’s efforts to contain or even thwart the threats posed by
Vladimir Putin’s Russia.[1] I am here to argue that nothing could be further
from the truth. Such accounts rely on a desire to normalize Erdogan’s autocratic
exploits and whitewash and underreport his revisionist ambitions for the Near
and Middle East.
Erdogan’s Turkey is a state sponsor of terrorism, with a proven track record of
providing materiel support for Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and potentially
Hezbollah. Support for these extremist Islamist entities is based on overseeing
the emergence of a new Middle East geostrategic map — one which Turkey dominates
while both undermining Israel and its other regional partner and supplanting the
U.S.-led security order that has underwritten stability in the Eastern
Mediterranean for decades. Cyprus sits at the center of this design. It is not a
peripheral dispute; it is the keystone of Erdogan’s broader bid to remake the
region’s maritime and defense map in Turkey’s favor.
Cyprus: The Keystone of Turkey’s Revisionist Strategy
Cyprus is the clearest illustration of the gap between the image Erdogan will
project at the NATO summit in Ankara and the reality of his conduct. Turkey has
illegally occupied roughly one-third of the island since its 1974 invasion,
maintaining tens of thousands of troops, combat drones, and missile capabilities
in territory that no state other than Turkey recognizes as the so-called
“Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.”[2] The international community, including
the United States and the European Union, recognizes the Republic of Cyprus as
the island’s sole legitimate government.
Over the past year, Ankara has used the regional turmoil produced by the war
against Iran as cover to escalate dramatically. In March 2026, Turkey deployed
six F-16C fighter jets and additional air defense systems to the occupied north,
operating from Ercan Airport near Nicosia.[3] This was the first deployment of
combat aircraft to the occupied zone and a major escalation in the
militarization of the Eastern Mediterranean. The move also raised serious legal
questions: Turkey’s F-16 fleet was acquired through U.S. foreign military sales
and is subject to International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) end-use
conditions. Positioning U.S.-manufactured aircraft in occupied territory,
without consultation, is precisely the kind of conduct that warrants
congressional oversight and an investigation into whether end-user agreements
were violated.
The provocations did not stop there. In June 2026, Turkish F-16s harassed
aircraft carrying the defense ministers of Greece, France, and the Netherlands
as they flew into the Republic of Cyprus for an informal EU defense meeting,
with interference originating from the illegal Tymbou airport in the occupied
north.[4] The European Commission opened an investigation, but the episode
underscored Ankara’s view that Cyprus is a strategic arena through which it can
challenge its regional rivals and test Europe’s willingness to defend its own
interests.[5]
Turkey’s objection to Cyprus’s deepening security ties with Europe — including a
Status of Forces agreement that would allow French military personnel to operate
on the island (signed in June 2026) — reveals the logic at work. Ankara
perceives the emergence of a regional bloc composed of Cyprus, Greece, France,
and potentially Israel as a threat to be disrupted, not a stabilizing
development to be welcomed.[6] That is the posture of a revisionist power, not a
status quo ally.
Turkey’s revisionist policies in response to the emerging partnerships and
regional order in the Eastern Mediterranean should be kept in mind as attempts
are made to kickstart a new initiative to solve the Cyprus problem. Previous
attempts would have resulted in a Cyprus — which, incidentally, is days away
from completing its second tenure as president of the Council of the European
Union — whose foreign policy would be subject to Erdogan’s wishes. The prospect
of a veto-wielding member of the European Union and a charter member of the
Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum having to accommodate its foreign policy in any
way to please the present government in Ankara should terrify both Washington
and Brussels. Cyprus has transformed itself over the past decade into a
frontline state for Western security interests and a key intermediary between
the Middle East and Europe. To allow this strategic partner of the United States
to be subject to the whims of Erdogan in any way would be diplomatic
malpractice.
Redrawing the Map: The ‘Blue Homeland’ and Maritime Revisionism
Cyprus cannot be understood in isolation from Ankara’s wider maritime ambitions.
Turkish officials have advanced domestic legislation that would codify claims to
as many as 152 islands and islets in the Aegean Sea — a direct threat to
sovereignty arrangements established by international treaties and long accepted
by Turkey’s own NATO allies.[7] This is the “Blue Homeland” doctrine in
practice: an effort to redraw maritime boundaries unilaterally through
parliamentary legislation, naval pressure, and the steady militarization of
contested spaces.
The objective is to deny Greece, Cyprus, and Israel the ability to develop
offshore energy resources. Ankara also seeks to fracture the partnerships these
states have built around them, and to assert claims unrecognized by the majority
of states. Israel, which lies less than 300 miles from Cyprus, has developed
increasingly close defense and energy ties with Athens and Nicosia, including
joint exercises and cooperation on offshore natural gas infrastructure. Turkish
combat aircraft operating from Northern Cyprus place Israeli naval vessels,
energy platforms, and air routes within closer operational reach.[8] The
militarization of Cyprus is therefore not a parochial dispute among Ankara,
Athens, and Nicosia. It is a deliberate instrument for undermining the security
of three U.S. partners simultaneously.
Against this backdrop, the committee should weigh the consequences for Turkey of
acquiring the F-35. The deployment of fourth-generation F-16s to occupied Cyprus
has already threatened the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean. The
introduction of a fifth-generation stealth aircraft would transform it. An F-35
based on or operating from the occupied north would be able to penetrate
contested airspace with a low-observable signature, hold Cypriot, Greek, and
Israeli air defenses at risk, and surveil Israeli naval vessels and offshore
energy platforms with a degree of impunity that no aircraft currently in
Turkey’s inventory can achieve. Given Ankara’s demonstrated willingness to
forward-deploy U.S.-origin combat aircraft to occupied territory without
consultation, there is every reason to expect that the F-35 would be used not as
a contribution to shared defense but as an instrument of coercion against three
U.S. partners.[9]
The danger is compounded by Turkey’s retention of the Russian S-400 air defense
system. The rationale for expelling Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019 was
that operating the S-400 alongside the aircraft would allow its advanced radar
to collect data on the F-35’s stealth signature and expose sensitive tactical
characteristics to Moscow — intelligence that Russia could be expected to share
with Iran and China. That risk has not diminished; the S-400 remains on Turkish
soil. Placing the world’s most advanced stealth fighter in the hands of a
government that simultaneously fields Russian air defenses, shelters Hamas, and
is openly hostile to Israel would not strengthen the alliance. It would hand a
revisionist actor a capability it could turn against the very partners NATO
exists to protect.[10]
The NATO Summit: Marketing Versus Reality
At the NATO summit that Turkey will host in July 2026, Erdogan will present
himself as a strong Western ally devoted to collective security and a potential
bulwark against Vladimir Putin’s Russia. That presentation is a marketing
campaign, not a statement of intent. His true priority is strategic autonomy —
independence from the West sufficient to pursue his revisionist and irredentist
goals without constraint.[11]
The evidence is in plain sight. When Erdogan traveled to Washington in the fall
of 2025, his central objective was to obtain advanced defense technology:
readmission to the F-35 program and production licenses for the F110 engines
that would power Turkey’s indigenous Kaan fighter. He left empty-handed on the
items that mattered most, securing only smaller deals in civil nuclear
cooperation and jetliner sales.[12] Two legal frameworks stood in his way and
should remain in place: sanctions pursuant to the Countering America’s
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), imposed after Turkey purchased the
Russian S-400 air defense system, and Section 1245 of the Fiscal Year 2020
National Defense Authorization Act, which bars F-35 transfers to Turkey unless
Ankara removes the S-400 and its associated personnel. Ankara offered no such
commitment.
That calculus is now being tested in real time. In the days immediately
preceding this hearing, the Trump administration informed Congress that it
intends to proceed with the sale of more than $700 million in General Electric
F110 engines to power Turkey’s Kaan fighter, overriding a hold placed on the
package by Representative Gregory Meeks (D-NY), who objected that the
administration had bypassed congressional review and failed to brief lawmakers
on the implications of the sale or on Turkey’s continued possession of the
S-400. Speaking alongside Vice President Vance, the president signaled he was
prepared to do something that would make Erdogan “very happy” on both the
engines and the F-35, while the vice president stated that the administration
was reviewing whether Turkey had met the statutory certification requirements
for the aircraft.[13]
The risks of this course are significant and warrant this committee’s close
attention. The F110 engine is the single most important enabler of the Kaan
program, the flagship of Erdogan’s drive for an indigenous fifth-generation
fighter and, with it, the strategic independence that drives his foreign policy.
Clearing the engine sale advances precisely the capability that Turkey intends
to operate free of Western constraint, and it is being read in Ankara — and
presented by Turkish officials — as the first step back toward the F-35 itself.
Proceeding over Congress’s objections, without certifying that the S-400 has
been removed as the law requires, erodes the very oversight framework that
Section 1245 and CAATSA were designed to protect. It also rewards a government
that has offered no concession on the S-400, no change in its sheltering of
Hamas, and no reduction in its hostility toward Israel. No country, ally or not,
deserves the right to acquire such capabilities as a means to undermine the
security of other U.S. allies and the national security goals of the United
States itself.[14]
There is also the issue of Turkey’s dependence on and strategic cooperation with
Russia. President Trump identified a core obstacle accurately: Turkey’s
dependence on Russian energy. Yet Erdogan confirmed his unwillingness to end
Russian fossil fuel imports, which have only grown under his rule — making
Turkey the third-largest importer of Russian fossil fuels after China and
India.[15] A leader genuinely committed to the transatlantic alliance would
treat that dependency as a liability to be unwound. Erdogan treats it as a
policy to be defended. The reason he seeks Western technology while preserving
his ties to Moscow is that he wants the West’s competencies without its
constraints. The same logic motivates Turkey’s missile and indigenous-fighter
programs, which should alarm rather than reassure Europe and the United
States.[16]
A further dimension deserves the committee’s scrutiny: Turkey’s exposure to
Chinese telecommunications equipment. Ankara has permitted Huawei to play a
central role in building out its national 5G network, even as the United States
and a growing number of allies have moved to exclude the company on the grounds
that Chinese intelligence law can compel it to hand over data and that its
infrastructure may contain exploitable backdoors. This is not an abstract
concern for the F-35. The aircraft represents the U.S. military’s frontline
defensive capabilities, and its effectiveness and sustainment depend on secure
networks. Washington has previously weighed restricting F-35 basing in allied
countries, in part because of Huawei’s presence in their telecommunications
systems, and Chinese actors have a documented record of targeting F-35 design
data. A Turkey that operates Russian air defenses and relies on Chinese network
infrastructure constitutes a counterintelligence risk: sensitive data on the
aircraft’s signature, mission systems, and operating patterns that could be
exposed to two of America’s principal strategic competitors at once. This alone
is a reason for Congress to indefinitely withhold the F-35 from Turkey.[17]
None of these developments describes a Turkey that is aligning to uphold NATO
and Europe’s security interests. The record points in the opposite direction.
The Turkey Erdogan is building does not seek to be a force multiplier for the
rules-based order; it seeks to supplant it, casting itself as a neo-Ottoman
power and Israel’s principal challenger in the Middle East.[18]
State Sponsorship of Terrorism and the New Regional Map
Erdogan’s revisionism is not confined to maritime boundaries. His government
provides material support and political sanctuary to Hamas. Turkish intelligence
has hosted Hamas leaders in Istanbul,[19] and the haven Turkey provides has
fueled terror operations reaching into the West Bank.[20] Since the deadly
October 7 terrorist attacks that resulted in the murder of more than 1,200
Israeli citizens, Erdogan’s advocacy for Hamas has increased. He has
consistently declared, “Hamas is not a terrorist organization; it is a
liberation group, ‘mujahideen’ waging a battle to protect its lands and people.”
Erdogan and senior Turkish officials routinely host Hamas’s senior leadership,
praising their acts of terror against what Erdogan refers to as the Israeli
“genocide/massacre squad.”[21] In March 2026 alone, Turkey’s chief of
intelligence, Ibrahim Kalin, hosted Hamas’s senior leadership in Istanbul for
talks “emphasizing coordination” between Turkish officials and Hamas against
Israel.[22]
Since the October 7 attacks, the U.S. Treasury has sanctioned numerous Turkish
entities for their support of Hamas, most recently in March 2026.[23] The Office
of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Ghazi Destek Dernegi (GDD), Hayat
Yolu, and the Palestinian White Hands Assistance and Solidarity Association for
their roles in channeling funds to Gaza-based charities under Hamas’s control —
effectively enabling the group to generate and transfer resources in support of
its military operations.[24]
Treasury officials cited internal Hamas documents obtained by investigators
showing that GDD, in coordination with other sanctioned entities such as Waed
Society Gaza, provided material support to individual Hamas operatives and
contributed to construction projects that directly advanced the organization’s
infrastructure.[25] Hayat Yolu, meanwhile, was identified as facilitating
fundraising networks tied to the Muslim Brotherhood, elements of which have been
designated as terrorist organizations by the Trump administration.[26]
Beyond Hamas, Turkey functions as a base for the wider Muslim Brotherhood
network and its jihadist offshoots.[27] These are not the affiliations of a
Western security partner; they are the instruments of a state pursuing the
emergence of a new regional order it intends to dominate, displacing Israel and
other U.S. partners. Ankara’s ambitions are stated openly. Turkey’s Interior
Minister recently voiced the aspiration of governing Jerusalem — a deliberate
provocation aimed at Israel.[28] Ankara’s revival of the Hejaz Railway and its
promotion of a competing trade corridor are bids to undercut Israel’s regional
role and reshape the region’s economic geography in Turkey’s favor, in rivalry
with the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).[29]
This pattern extends to Iran. Far from joining the Western effort to contain
Tehran, Ankara condemned U.S. strikes on Iran and positioned itself as a
defender of the clerical regime’s survival.[30] Turkey has played a central role
in the transfer of Iranian weapons to Sudan[31], and its use of the SADAT
paramilitary network — a Turkish equivalent to Russia’s Wagner Group — together
with its destabilizing interventions in the Horn of Africa demonstrates a
willingness to project force in ways that run counter to Western and even
counterterrorism interests.[32] Taken together, these behaviors have led
analysts to ask whether Turkey is becoming “the new Iran” — a NATO member whose
growing challenge to Western interests must be confronted rather than wished
away.[33]
Authoritarianism at Home, Disinformation Abroad
The external conduct I have described is the projection of a domestic system
that has abandoned democratic rule. A June 2026 European Parliament report
condemned authoritarian rule in Turkey and urged sanctions against the country’s
justice minister, indicating the systematic erosion of judicial independence,
the persecution of political opposition — including the arrest of Istanbul Mayor
Ekrem Imamoglu — and the dismantling of press freedoms.[34] This same apparatus
operates abroad through coordinated digital authoritarianism, including
state-aligned troll and bot networks that spread deception and
disinformation.[35] A regime that surveils and silences its own citizens cannot
be expected to honor the sovereign borders or democratic norms of its neighbors.
Recommendations for Congress
The NATO summit in Ankara should not become a platform that launders Erdogan’s
record. The United States retains significant leverage, and Congress has both
the tools and the responsibility to use it.[36]
Insist on recognition of sovereign borders. S. officials should use the summit
to insist publicly that Turkey recognize the established sovereign borders of
Cyprus and Greece and cease its harassment of allied aircraft and vessels in the
Eastern Mediterranean. The United States should make clear that there will be no
recognition of the regime in Turkish-occupied Cyprus, and it should officially
label the northern part of Cyprus as “occupied.”
Maintain CAATSA sanctions and Section 1245 restrictions. Congress should
preserve existing sanctions and the statutory restrictions on the sale and
transfer of the F-35. No advanced strategic weaponry should be transferred to
Turkey while it retains the Russian S-400 system, sustains record Russian energy
imports, and shelters Hamas.
Investigate the ITAR and end-use questions. Congress and the State Department
should investigate whether Turkey’s deployment of U.S.-origin F-16s to occupied
Cyprus violated end-user agreements and ITAR restrictions, and condition any
future arms transfers — including F-16 upgrades — on guarantees that American
systems will not be based in disputed or occupied territory. Simultaneously,
Congress and the State Department should remove any remaining ITAR restrictions
on Cyprus. The U.S.-Republic of Cyprus strategic partnership has been advancing
rapidly, but is subject to an artificial and unjustified limitation, namely the
requirement that ITAR restrictions on the Republic of Cyprus be waived annually.
This annual waiver should no longer be required.
Treat Turkey’s behavior as an alliance-wide issue. Turkey’s conduct in Cyprus is
no longer a regional dispute; it affects wider European and NATO security. The
United States should coordinate with Greece, Cyprus, France, and Israel to deter
continued escalation.
Designate and disrupt support for terrorism. Congress should press the executive
branch to hold Ankara accountable for its sanctuary to Hamas and Muslim
Brotherhood networks and scrutinize Turkey’s role in weapons transfers and
paramilitary operations from Sudan to the Horn of Africa.
Press for Turkey’s return to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list.
The FATF removed Turkey from its grey list in June 2024 based on largely
technical, crypto-related legislative reforms, even as Ankara remained a premier
jurisdiction for terrorism financing and the principal foreign champion of
Hamas. As this testimony has shown, the U.S. Treasury has repeatedly identified
Turkey as a base for Hamas’s financial operations, sanctioning front companies
and individuals, and Turkey has done little to address the U.S.’s concerns. The
delisting handed Erdogan a reputational and financial reward while relinquishing
a key source of international leverage. Washington should press the FATF to
reexamine that decision and return Turkey to the grey list, and, in the interim,
sustain expanded scrutiny of Turkish financial institutions for compliance with
anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing standards.[37]
Require the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)
to report on religious freedom violations in occupied Cyprus under its chapter
on Turkey. In the past, USCIRF reported on Turkey’s religious freedom violations
in Cyprus under the Turkey country chapter.[38] Its failure to continue to do so
artificially inflates Turkey’s standing in the annual report on religious
freedoms. Turkey already stands as one of the worst violators of religious
freedoms worldwide. Its true standing — if its actions in Cyprus are taken into
account — is even worse. Turkey has allowed the vandalization of historic
churches and monasteries and their conversion into barns, nightclubs, and art
galleries. Christians continue to be ethnically cleansed out of the northern
part of Cyprus, and the continued assault on Christian heritage by Turkey raises
the prospect of Christianity being extinguished on the part of the island where
Christianity’s first missionary journey — undertaken by Saint Paul and Saint
Barnabas — started. This is untenable under a U.S. administration whose foreign
policy has prioritized the protection of Christianity.
Conclusion
Cyprus is the node where Erdogan’s ambitions become visible. It is where he
tests Western resolve, militarizes contested space, and seeks to fracture the
partnerships that anchor stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. The summit
Turkey hosts will showcase a Turkey that does not exist — a loyal Western ally
devoted to common defense. The real Turkey is a state pursuing strategic
autonomy in order to advance revisionist and irredentist goals that undermine
American, European, and Israeli security, and that is precisely why it courts
Western technology while deepening its ties to Russia, China, and Hamas.[39]
The United States and its allies should approach Ankara with clarity rather than
wishful thinking. The gap between Erdogan’s marketing and his conduct is wide,
and the cost of failing to recognize it will be borne by the very allies —
Greece, Cyprus, and Israel — whose security the transatlantic alliance is meant
to guarantee.[40]
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your
questions.
[1] For a representative example of this argument, see: “Turkey’s Quiet
Realignment: Russia’s Loss Is NATO’s Gain,” Foreign Affairs, June 10, 2026.
(https://www.foreignaffairs.com/turkey/turkeys-quiet-realignment)
[2] Sinan Ciddi, “Turkish Deployment of F-16s in Occupied Portion of Cyprus
Raises Tensions in Eastern Mediterranean,” Foundation for Defense of
Democracies, March 9, 2026.
(https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/03/09/turkish-deployment-of-f-16s-in-occupied-portion-of-cyprus-raises-tensions-in-eastern-mediterranean)
[3] “Türkiye deploys F-16s to Turkish Cyprus to boost security amid Iran war,”
Daily Sabah (Turkey), March 9, 2026.
(https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/turkiye-deploys-f-16s-to-turkish-cyprus-to-boost-security-amid-iran-war/news);
Cem Devrim Yaylali, “Turkey sends six F-16 fighters to Northern Cyprus amid Iran
missile threats,” Defense News, March 9, 2026.
(https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/03/09/turkey-sends-six-f-16-fighters-to-northern-cyprus-amid-iran-missile-threats)
[4] Nektaria Stamouli, “Turkish forces harass aircraft carrying ministers into
Cyprus,” Politico Europe, June 8, 2026.
(https://www.politico.eu/article/turkish-forces-harass-aircraft-carrying-ministers-into-cyprus);
“EU executive to look into Turkish plane harassment claims,” Kathimerini
(Greece), June 9, 2026.
(https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1306119/eu-executive-to-look-into-turkish-plane-harassment-claims)
[5] Sinan Ciddi, “Turkey Escalates Tensions in Cyprus,” Foundation for Defense
of Democracies, June 9, 2026.
(https://www.fdd.org/analysis/policy_briefs/2026/06/09/turkey-escalates-tensions-in-cyprus)
[6] Nektaria Stamouli, “France, Cyprus close to concluding Status of Forces
agreement for French deployment,” Politico Europe, June 7, 2026.
(https://www.politico.eu/article/france-cyprus-pact-for-french-deployment)
[7] Nicoletta Kouroushi, “Turkey’s Blue Homeland Agenda and the Future of
Maritime Competition,” Middle East Forum, June 6, 2026.
(https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/turkeys-blue-homeland-agenda-and-the-future-of-maritime-competition);
Sinan Ciddi, “Turkey’s Maritime Strategy Heightens the Risk of a New Eastern
Mediterranean Crisis,” Middle East Forum, May 13, 2026.
(https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/turkeys-maritime-strategy-heightens-the-risk-of-a-new-eastern-mediterranean-crisis)
[8] Sinan Ciddi, “Turkish Deployment of F-16s in Occupied Portion of Cyprus
Raises Tensions in Eastern Mediterranean,” Foundation for Defense of
Democracies, March 9, 2026.
(https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/03/09/turkish-deployment-of-f-16s-in-occupied-portion-of-cyprus-raises-tensions-in-eastern-mediterranean)
[9] On the operational reach of Turkish combat aircraft based in occupied Cyprus
already extended over the Eastern Mediterranean, see: Sinan Ciddi, “Turkish
Deployment of F-16s in Occupied Portion of Cyprus Raises Tensions in Eastern
Mediterranean,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, March 9, 2026.
(https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/03/09/turkish-deployment-of-f-16s-in-occupied-portion-of-cyprus-raises-tensions-in-eastern-mediterranean)
[10] On the S-400’s radar collecting data on F-35 stealth characteristics and
the risk of exposure to Russia, Iran, and China, see: “Erdogan Claims Progress
in Bid to Secure F-35 Fighter Jet From United States,” Foundation for Defense of
Democracies, June 27, 2025.
(https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/06/27/erdogan-claims-progress-in-bid-to-secure-f-35-fighter-jet-from-united-states)
[11] Ragip Soylu, “Turkey vows fully independent defense industry,” Middle East
Eye (UK), June 18, 2025.
(https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-defence-industry-fully-independent-erdogan-vows)
[12] Sinan Ciddi and William Doran, “Erdogan Leaves Washington Empty-Handed on
F-35s?” RealClearDefense, October 10, 2025.
(https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/10/10/erdogan_leaves_washington_empty-handed_on_f-35s_1140092.html)
[13] Jared Malsin and Robbie Gramer, “A Turkish Arms Sale Leads to a Face-Off
Between Trump and Congress,” The Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2026.
(https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/a-turkish-arms-sale-leads-to-a-face-off-between-trump-and-congress-ee55c700);
Reuters, “US reviewing F-35 fighter jets sale to Turkey as Trump pushes $700
million jet engine deal,” The Jerusalem Post (Israel), June 25, 2026.
(https://www.jpost.com/international/article-900492)
[14] On the centrality of the F110 engine to the Kaan program and Ankara’s
framing of the sale as a step toward the F-35, see: Thomas Newdick, “Trump Set
To Clear Critical F110 Turbofan Engine Sale For Turkey’s Kaan Fighter,” The War
Zone, June 25, 2026.
(https://www.twz.com/air/trump-set-to-clear-critical-f110-turbofan-engine-sale-for-turkeys-kaan-fighter)
[15] Sinan Ciddi and William Doran, “Erdogan Leaves Washington Empty-Handed on
F-35s?” RealClearDefense, October 10, 2025.
(https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/10/10/erdogan_leaves_washington_empty-handed_on_f-35s_1140092.html)
[16] Sinan Ciddi, “Turkey’s Missile Ambitions Should Alarm Europe and the United
States,” RealClearDefense, May 16, 2026.
(https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/05/16/turkeys_missile_ambitions_should_alarm_europe_and_the_united_states_1183123.html)
[17] On Turkey’s adoption of Huawei 5G infrastructure, see: David Sacks,
“China’s Huawei Is Winning the 5G Race,” Council on Foreign Relations.
(https://www.cfr.org/articles/china-huawei-5g) On prior U.S. consideration of
restricting F-35 basing over allied Huawei networks and Chinese targeting of
F-35 design data, see: “Lawmakers Consider Blocking Some F-35 Deployments over
Huawei 5G Network,” Military.com, May 13, 2020.
(https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/05/13/lawmakers-consider-blocking-some-f-35-deployments-over-huawei-5g-network-reports.html);
Shannon Vavra, “U.S. Secretary of Defense urges NATO allies to block
Chinese-built 5G tech,” CyberScoop, September 20, 2019.
(https://cyberscoop.com/u-s-secretary-defense-urges-nato-allies-block-chinese-built-5g-tech)
[18] Jonathan Spyer, “Neo-Ottoman Power: Erdogan Positions Turkey as Israel’s
Main Middle East Challenge,” The Jerusalem Post (Israel), May 31, 2025.
(https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-855952)
[19] Sinan Ciddi, “Turkish Intelligence Chief Hosts Hamas Leaders in Istanbul,”
FDD’s Long War Journal, March 26, 2026.
(https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/03/turkish-intelligence-chief-hosts-hamas-leaders-in-istanbul.php)
[20] Sinan Ciddi and Ahmad Sharawi, “Hamas Haven Provided by Turkey Fuels Terror
in the West Bank,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, June 23, 2026.
(https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/06/23/hamas-haven-provided-by-turkey-fuels-terror-in-the-west-bank)
[21] “President Erdogan: ‘Israel’s Policy of Genocide, Occupation, and Invasion
Must Come to an End,’” Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of
Communications (Turkey), October 7, 2024.
(https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/president-erdogan-israels-policy-of-genocide-occupation-and-invasion-must-come-to-an-end)
[22] Sinan Ciddi, “Turkish Intelligence Chief Hosts Hamas Leaders in Istanbul,”
FDD’s Long War Journal, March 26, 2026.
(https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/03/turkish-intelligence-chief-hosts-hamas-leaders-in-istanbul.php)
[23] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Treasury Continues to
Disrupt Hamas’ Sham Charity Network as the Group Refuses to Disarm,” March 12,
2026. (https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0415)
[24] Ibid.
[25] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, “Treasury Exposes and
Disrupts Hamas’s Covert Support Network,” January 21, 2026.
(https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0368)
[26] Mariam Wahba, “U.S. Issues Its First-Ever Designations of Muslim
Brotherhood Branches as Terrorists,” January 15, 2026.
(https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/01/15/u-s-issues-its-first-ever-designations-of-muslim-brotherhood-branches-as-terrorists)
[27] Sinan Ciddi and William Doran, “Islamist Turkey: A Base for Muslim
Brotherhood Jihadism,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, April 1, 2026.
(https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/04/01/islamist-turkey-a-base-for-muslim-brotherhood-jihadism)
[28] Sinan Ciddi, “Turkish Interior Minister States Dream of Governing
Jerusalem, Provoking Israel,” FDD’s Long War Journal, June 8, 2026.
(https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/06/analysis-turkish-interior-minister-states-dream-of-governing-jerusalem-provoking-israel.php)
[29] Ahmad Sharawi and Sinan Ciddi, “Turkey’s Hejaz Railway Revival Is a Bid to
Undermine Israel’s Regional Role,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, June
15, 2026.
(https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/06/15/turkeys-hejaz-railway-revival-is-a-bid-to-undermine-israels-regional-role);
Sinan Ciddi, “Turkey’s corridor dream won’t beat IMEC, but it could still
reshape Eurasian trade,” Kathimerini (Greece), May 11, 20206.
(https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/1303453/turkeys-corridor-dream-wont-beat-imec-but-it-could-still-reshape-eurasian-trade)
[30] Sinan Ciddi, “Backing the Tehran Regime’s Survival, Turkey Condemns U.S.
Strikes on Iran,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, March 1, 2026.
(https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/03/01/backing-the-tehran-regimes-survival-turkey-condemns-u-s-strikes-on-iran);
Sinan Ciddi and Ahmad Sharawi, “Turkey’s Mission to Put an End to the Iran War,”
RealClearWorld, March 24, 2026.
(https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2026/03/24/turkeys_mission_to_put_an_end_to_the_iran_war_1172312.html)
[31] Sinan Ciddi, “Turkey Plays Central Role in Transfer of Iranian Weapons to
Sudan,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, May 15, 2026.
(https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/05/15/turkey-plays-central-role-in-transfer-of-iranian-weapons-to-sudan)
[32] Sinan Ciddi, “SADAT: Turkey’s Wagner Group,” The National Interest, May 7,
2026.
(https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/sadat-turkeys-wagner-group);
Sinan Ciddi and William Doran, “How Turkey’s Aggression in the Horn of Africa
Could Benefit al-Shabaab,” Middle East Forum, February 27, 2026.
(https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/how-turkeys-aggression-in-the-horn-of-africa-could-benefit-al-shabaab)
[33] Sinan Ciddi and Natalie Ecanow, “Turkey: The New Iran? Ankara’s Growing
Challenge to Western Interests,” The Jerusalem Post (Israel), April 6, 2026.
(https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-892113)
[34] Sinan Ciddi, “EU Report Slams Authoritarian Rule in Turkey, Urges Sanctions
Against Justice Minister,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, June 22, 2026.
(https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/06/22/eu-report-slams-authoritarian-rule-in-turkey-urges-sanctions-against-justice-minister)
[35] Ihsan Yilmaz and Bulent Kenes, “Digital Authoritarianism in Turkish
Cyberspace: A Study of Deception and Disinformation by the AKP Regime’s AKtrolls
and AKbots,” European Center for Populism Studies (Belgium), November 13, 2023.
(https://www.populismstudies.org/digital-authoritarianism-in-turkish-cyberspace-a-study-of-deception-and-disinformation-by-the-akp-regimes-aktrolls-and-akbots)
[36] Sinan Ciddi, “Don’t Let Turkey Hijack the NATO Summit,” The National
Interest, June 23, 2206.
(https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/dont-let-turkey-hijack-the-nato-summit)
[37] Max Meizlish and Sinan Ciddi, “Turkey Should Remain on FATF Grey List,”
Foundation for Defense of Democracies, June 27, 2024.
(https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/06/27/turkey-should-remain-on-fatf-grey-list);
see also Max Meizlish and Sinan Ciddi, “Turkey Delisting Exposes Financial
Watchdog’s Blind Spot,” Washington Examiner, July 14, 2024.
(https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/3081294/turkey-delisting-exposes-financial-watchdogs-blind-spot)
[38] United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, “Turkey,” 2012
Annual Report.
(https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/2012ARChapters/turkey%202012.pdf)
[39] Sinan Ciddi, “Turkey Is the NATO Ally Trump Should Pressure First,”
Washington Examiner, April 1, 2026.
(https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/restoring-america/courage-strength-optimism/4511572/turkey-is-the-nato-ally-trump-should-pressure-first)
[40] Jonathan Schanzer, “Bridging the Gap: Turkey Between East and West,”
Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on Europe,
March 5, 2025. (https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20250305/117927/HHRG-119-FA14-Wstate-SchanzerJ-20250305-U2.pdf)
Video link and text from FDD for an important English
interview with Journalist Carine Hajjar (American Of Lebanese Descent)
addressing the Lebanese on going and current problems with Hezbollah
Interview was conducted by Mark Dubowitz
01 July/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/07/155745/
The Israel-Lebanon framework brokered by Secretary Rubio may be historic, but
Hezbollah still hasn’t disarmed. The deal ties Israeli withdrawal to the
Lebanese army securing designated pilot zones — yet Hezbollah and its
parliamentary allies have already rejected it outright. Meanwhile, the U.S.-Iran
MOU threatens to undercut the whole effort, handing Tehran leverage over
Israel’s right to self-defense and potentially unlocking billions of dollars for
the regime that arms Hezbollah in the first place. With Hezbollah the linchpin
of Tehran’s “axis of resistance,” leaving Lebanon unaddressed is a danger that
can’t be ignored.
Carine Hajjar — opinion journalist at The Washington Post and Steamboat
Institute fellow with deep roots in Lebanon — joins Mark Dubowitz on The Iran
Breakdown to ask whether this is Lebanon’s real chance to break free of Iran’s
grip, or another false dawn
Transcript
About
The Israel-Lebanon framework brokered by Secretary Rubio may be historic, but
Hezbollah still hasn’t disarmed. The deal ties Israeli withdrawal to the
Lebanese army securing designated pilot zones — yet Hezbollah and its
parliamentary allies have already rejected it outright. Meanwhile, the U.S.-Iran
MOU threatens to undercut the whole effort, handing Tehran leverage over
Israel’s right to self-defense and potentially unlocking billions of dollars for
the regime that arms Hezbollah in the first place. With Hezbollah the linchpin
of Tehran’s “axis of resistance,” leaving Lebanon unaddressed is a danger that
can’t be ignored.
Carine Hajjar — opinion journalist at The Washington Post and Steamboat
Institute fellow with deep roots in Lebanon — joins Mark Dubowitz on The Iran
Breakdown to ask whether this is Lebanon’s real chance to break free of Iran’s
grip, or another false dawn.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ckOpGkrwCxM&t=1s
Transcript
DUBOWITZ: Today I’m speaking with someone who spent her career untangling
American foreign policy with a sharp eye on Lebanon. Carine Hajjar is an opinion
journalist at The Washington Post where she writes on a wide range of topics,
including US foreign policy in the Middle East. She’s a Steamboat Institute
fellow and before joining the Post, she was a columnist and editorial board
member at the Boston Globe and served as a fellow on The Wall Street Journal’s
editorial board. She was awarded the Joseph Rago Memorial Fellowship for
Excellence in Journalism by the Fund for American Studies, and her analysis made
her a regular guest in Fox News, CBC, NewsNation and other outlets. I wanted to
speak with Carine because the piece she recently published in The Washington’s
Post, which we’ll link to in the show notes, responding to President Trump’s
comment that Lebanon is quote, a very small piece of the puzzle in the Middle
East.
That question has become even more consequential after Secretary Rubio brokered
a landmark agreement between Israel and Lebanon, an agreement that could reshape
the strategic landscape if it holds. Lebanon isn’t a piece of the Iran puzzle.
It’s the front line of the Islamist revolution. As long as Hezbollah remains
armed and entrenched, that revolution doesn’t end at Iran’s borders. It lives on
in Beirut’s southern suburbs. So, do the White House must calculate by giving
Tehran a veto over Israel’s right to defend itself in the U.S.-Iran MOU? Can any
deal with the Islamic Republic endure while Hezbollah remains armed, entrenched,
and answerable, not to Beirut, but to the IRGC? And does Secretary Rubio’s new
Israel-Lebanon agreement offer a real chance to break Hezbollah’s grip, disarm
its terrorist army and restore Lebanese sovereignty?
Or will it merely freeze the battlefield until the next war? Few people are
better positioned to answer those questions than Carine Hajjar. Welcome to the
Iran breakdown. So, let’s break it down. Carine, great to have you.
HAJJAR: Thanks for having me on. Thanks for that very generous introduction.
Appreciate it.
DUBOWITZ: Well deserved. You’ve had a great career at such a young age, so it’s
really, really impressive. I want to start with your personal story and tell us
a little about you and your family and your connection to Lebanon before we
break it down.
HAJJAR: Yeah, absolutely. I was born in Boston. My family, we’re all proud
Americans, but we have a Lebanese background. My mom is Venezuela in Lebanese.
My dad’s grandparents are from Lebanon, and we are always raised very close to
the culture. We’re Melchite and Maronite Christians. I was raised in both of
those churches in the Boston diaspora. And so from a young age, I was always
interested in Lebanon from a cultural and religious perspective, but as I’ve
gotten older and written more about foreign policy and studied these issues
more, it’s also become sadly a conundrum that I’ve followed for a long time now,
but it’s looking like Lebanon is close to, or at least we’ve been saying for the
last year, this is the best opportunity that they have to break free from Iran’s
shackles through via Hezbollah. But I’m really hoping that they can take this
opportunity in particular the agreement, the framework agreement that was
brokered last week by Secretary Rubio between the Israelis and the Lebanese and
take this opportunity to regain their sovereignty and move.
They’ll have a lot of challenges after that too, by the way, but it’s a good
opportunity for them.
DUBOWITZ: Well, so your mom’s Venezuelan and Lebanese. So, two countries that
are going through some incredibly sweeping changes. Still have family in
Venezuela and Lebanon or most of them have left?
HAJJAR: Yeah. A lot of people have, with the instability in both countries over
the years, have gone to school elsewhere, have moved and started new lives. But
I do still have family in these places and they’re both places that I’ve visited
actually and have been a part of my childhood, my young adulthood. And so, it’s
been really tragic to watch them go through so much and both countries at the
same time actually going through a lot of change, a lot of tragedy, also a lot
of opportunity, but my heart’s been with the Venezuelan people after this
earthquake in particular. And I really hope that the country, it was on the path
to maybe a better opportunity and really hoping for free and fair elections in
Venezuela. I think that’s what it would take and that’s what the White House
should try to do to get that country back on track.
DUBOWITZ: So, Carine, you had a piece in The Washington Post just recently on
Lebanon and I want you to explain to our listeners the sort of main thesis of
that piece and particularly responding to President Trump’s comment that Lebanon
is just a small piece of the puzzle. Give us broad outlands of what you had
written and let’s dig into that.
HAJJAR: Yeah. Well, I’m sure that the White House wishes that Lebanon was a
small piece of the puzzle, but the truth is that based on the negotiations that
they’ve carried out with the Iranians, they’ve in a lot of ways made Lebanon the
linchpin of their diplomatic dealings with the Iranians. And so, if you really
zoom out, if we’re talking about Iran, one of President Trump’s original
objectives was to undercut their funding and enabling of terrorist proxies. And
Hezbollah is like the crown jewel of the Islamic Republic’s axis of resistance.
And so, losing Hezbollah is the Iranians are just saying it explicitly. They’re
just not going to tolerate it. They’ve said that they will not sign a final
agreement, for example, unless Israel withdraws from Lebanon where they’re
actively in conflict with Hezbollah or things have calmed down for now, but
conflict kicks up all the time.
But the piece just points out, the president is trying to do two things at once.
He’s pursuing this diplomatic track, this very positive diplomatic trap between
the Lebanese and the Israelis. We had this really historic framework on last
week from the White House with both countries saying and saying directly to each
other, we haven’t seen something like this in decades, but going even further
and saying that they want peace and recognizing each other’s right to
self-defense, recognizing the need to work together, to work towards peace, to
work towards Lebanon sovereignty. So, this is a major diplomatic victory. Now at
the same time, President Trump risks undercutting it through this memorandum of
understanding with the Iranians, which not only allows the Iranians to call
strategic shots in Lebanon, the Iranians insisted, for example, that there would
have to be a ceasefire in Lebanon. I’m not sure why they were given the leverage
to do that.
We had a crippling blockade. We had militarily weakened the regime,
nevertheless, that was on the table. And on top of that, the MOU could free up
billions of dollars for the Islamic Republic, and we know what they do with that
money because they’ve done it time and time again. When they have cash that’s
freed up, they will send it to terrorists before helping their own population.
DUBOWITZ: Right. So, the MOU you’re talking about, I mean, it’s actually the
first provision in the MOU, which effectively gives the Islamic Republic of Iran
a veto right of Israel’s right to defend itself from Hezbollah. And as you say,
effectively saves Hezbollah from the massive beating that it has sustained since
October 7th, 2023. But then Secretary Rubio comes in and I think in some
respects sort of overturns that with this Lebanese Israeli framework agreement.
Tell us a little bit more about the agreement. I mean, it’s obviously a detailed
agreement. We’ll also link to it in the show notes, but what struck you about
the agreement that was new, hopeful, and also what worries you about the
agreement?
HAJJAR: Yeah. So, one of the most extraordinary parts of it is that the Israelis
and the Lebanese were even sitting down together and taking pictures together.
That shouldn’t be the case, but over decades, again, we haven’t seen them
directly communicate in this way very much. So that’s already in and of itself a
victory. And then both countries committing to each other’s peace, the
commitment to Lebanese sovereignty, these are again, shouldn’t really be
surprising, but given the history between the two countries are really big step
forward. So, I was pleased to see that. Another funny thing about the MOU, it
also has about the framework agreement between the Lebanese and the Israelis is
that it also has 14 points in the same way that the MOU does. So, whether or not
there’s some meaning there, not sure, but that’s an interesting part of it. But
look, it basically says it puts Lebanon sovereignty in the Lebanese government’s
hands.
And to understand what that means, we have to zoom out a little. The Lebanese
government right now is supposed to by UN resolutions, by its own declarations,
is supposed to have a monopoly on the state’s arms, but Hezbollah is an armed
militant group within the country that loves to pick fights with the Israelis,
dragging innocent Lebanese civilians into war over and over again. And so, what
this MOU does is… And that’s why the Israelis right now are in Lebanon because
they are creating a buffer zone to keep Israel’s north safe. And so, what the
framework agreement is basically saying is that, okay, the Israelis are going to
give the Lebanese army to, they’re calling them pilot zones. They’re saying, if
you can keep these secure and disarmed of Hezbollah, we can continue to move
forward incrementally on giving back land and giving the Lebanese state control,
but it all depends on the Lebanese state’s ability to disarm Hezbollah.
Now they’ve been saying that they want to do this. They’ve dragged their feet on
it. There are a lot of internal political challenges. I don’t want to downplay
them. There is a legitimate fear of sparking a sort of civil war. If you’re
fighting Hezbollah fighters within the country, Lebanon has unfortunately had a
very long civil war, very deadly civil war. And so just psychologically, there’s
a fear of sparking internal conflict. And there’s also a lot of corruption.
There’s also Hezbollah operatives, no doubt in the Lebanese armed forces, but
hopefully this is a chance to prove, okay, if we can take these two pilot zones
and the Lebanese army can keep them free of Hezbollah, then things will keep
moving along and the Lebanese army can prove, look, we’re maintaining
sovereignty, we’re setting the table for the Israelis to leave safely and we can
do this and you don’t need Hezbollah.
DUBOWITZ: So, Carine, there’s been obviously a lot of optimism about this
because as you say, it’s the first time, I think since 1983, there actually has
been an agreement. That agreement, of course, was short lived and was blown out
by both the Syrians and the Iranians with their Hezbollah proxy. So maybe now
there’s more optimism because Hezbollah’s been severely weakened. And I hear a
lot of criticism of Israel that Israel has moved into the security zone, has
taken over large chunks of Southern Lebanon in order, as you say, to protect its
north and that the IDF is going to stay there and operate there until the
Lebanese government and the Lebanese armed forces are actually capable of taking
back territory and holding it against Hezbollah. Are you one of those people who
believes that the IDF is a problem or a solution? Is the IDF something that can
enforce this kind of agreement or should the IDF be withdrawing from Lebanon and
letting the Lebanese government try to clean up the mess?
HAJJAR: Well, look, I mean, I think any country in this situation has a right to
self-defense. The truth is that starting from October 8th, Hezbollah picked a
fight with the Israelis by shooting rockets into Israel just the day after the
October 7th attack. And I think a lot of Lebanese both understand this and also
are waking up to the fact that Hezbollah continues to drag them into wars. A lot
of Lebanese don’t want to go to war. They just don’t want war period. They’ve
gone through conflict over and over again. So, there’s a lot of fatigue. That
being said, I think it’s hard to just boil it down to black and white, good guy,
bad guy, because we have to look at the facts on the ground and how complicated
it is just for the Lebanese people themselves. I very much understand when I
talk to Lebanese people and they’re saying, “We are just tired of war.” It’s
less about necessarily who’s shooting the rockets and just the fact that rockets
are falling down on a civilian population.
That’s tragic no matter which way you look at it. But I mean, even some polling
is showing that Hezbollah is becoming less and less popular. I mean, it’s
already just unpopular in Lebanon because people understand that it continues to
drag the Lebanese people into war and that’s what actually makes this framework.
So, Hezbollah’s whole raison d’étre to, at least they claim to defend Lebanese
sovereignty from Israeli aggression, but this completely undercuts that sham of
a narrative because it’s basically saying, Israel is saying, “We will leave
Lebanon. We will help you even rebuild and regain your sovereignty, but the
Lebanese state has to prove that they can disarm Hezbollah.” And so the message
that should be sending to the Lebanese and not just the Lebanese to the hundreds
of thousands of Shiites who have been displaced by the war in the South because
Southern Lebanon, there’s a large Shiite population there.
This is the population that tends to be more aligned with Hezbollah. The message
this is sending to them is like, wait, Hezbollah is basically our only barrier
to going home. The Israelis are saying they’re ready to pack up and leave if the
Lebanese state can prove that they can hold down the fort here. And it is just
Hezbollah that’s saying, “We’re not going into this agreement. We’re not going
to disarm.” And I mean, the implication is that they just want more conflict.
So…
DUBOWITZ: What do you say to people who are sort of skeptical and I guess
Israelis, but as well, Americans too, who say we’ve seen this movie before,
right? This was 2000 where the Israelis withdrew from Lebanon, all their
soldiers came back to the UN designated border. And in response to that,
Hezbollah began massively arming and rearming, kidnapping Israeli soldiers,
launching terrorist attacks, firing rockets, missiles, and drones across the
border. By the way, clearing out tens of thousands of Israeli citizens from
their homes in the north after October 7th. And here we go again. We’ve seen
this movie before. The Israelis are back in. They have another security zone the
way they did from 1982 to 2000 and the Lebanese government seems well
intentioned and the LAF has been well trained by the Americans. We put a billion
dollars into the LAF, but what do you say to people who are just deeply
skeptical that this is going to be any different than it was before?
HAJJAR: I say that I share their skepticism, to be completely honest. I’m very,
very cautiously optimistic and just the existence of an opportunity doesn’t mean
that the Lebanese will take it or necessarily can take it. It is really
difficult. I mean, I think what makes this time different is that Hezbollah has
been so diminished. And again, that’s what makes me so concerned about the MOU
and frankly just befuddled by it because the Trump administration seems to be
doing two things at once. If this MOU with Iran goes, if these billions of
dollars that are in the deal are unfrozen and sent to the Iranians, if they have
$300 billion unlocked to help with reconstruction, well, money’s fungible. That
frees up resources to help rebuild Hezbollah. And so I think that it’s always a
big if, but this could work if a lot of pieces fall in place.
And then there’s another layer of skepticism that I have just beyond the current
condition right now and the two diplomatic tracks. We’ll say that the Lebanese
state does manage to disarm Hezbollah and have a monopoly on the state’s arms.
Well, you still have the next problem, which is that Lebanon’s been in a deep
economic crisis for years. There’s deep corruption in the state and in the
government. And so, these are going to be big political questions for them to
grapple with as well.
DUBOWITZ: Yeah. I mean, I always say about Iran that the only place where
Iranians don’t succeed is inside the Islamic Republic of Iran because you’ve
seen incredible Iranian diaspora communities right all over the world in the
United States and Canada and Australia and Europe, very successful, very well
educated, very entrepreneurial Iranians. You can say the same thing about
Lebanese. I mean, Lebanese people are also incredible immigrants. I grew up in
Canada, huge Lebanese community, very successful. We’ve seen Lebanese Americans
and Lebanese Australians and yet inside Lebanon itself because of the
corruption, because of the wars, because of the devastation inflicted on that
country by the Islamic Republic of Iran and Hezbollah, the Lebanese people have
really suffered. I mean, what used to be called the Paris of the Middle East,
right? I’ve never been a Beirut. I couldn’t go there. I’m sanctioned by Iran and
I’m sure Hezbollah would not welcome me with open arms there.
But I imagine Beirut has the potential to be the most beautiful city and
certainly my dream is to have breakfast in Tel Aviv and dinner in Beirut and
then go clubbing with my Israeli and Lebanese friends. Again, is that a dream?
Will we see that in our generation or do you think that the Trump administration
is really giving it away through this MOU and through an attempt and agreement
with the same regime in Iran?
HAJJAR: I’m really worried that the political pressure is just going to get to
the White House and they are going to give it away. I mean, ultimately, I think
that for Lebanon, I think that the clearest path to seeing being able to drive
from Tel Aviv to Beirut is the fall of the Iranian regime and it feels as if the
White House has sort of abandoned that objective. Now what is really frustrating
about negotiating with the Iranians at all is that I don’t think that we have to
be negotiating with the Iranians. Certainly FDD has done great work on the
economic toll that the Iranians have faced by when the US had our blockade on
Iranian oil exports. I mean, it just completely dried up their main source of
income and so there was tremendous economic pressure on top of tremendous
military pressure and I think that we could have just made it clear to the
regime, step a foot out of line and we’re going to strike hard.
We don’t need to negotiate. We can keep the pressure up. And that’s what
President Trump has historically been really good at. I mean, the first
administration was a great example of maximum pressure and really weakening the
regime and when their source of cash starts to weather, that also causes the
proxies to suffer. And so the whole thing was sort of working and I don’t know
why we’re abandoning that strategy. I think the president had actually placed
himself in a great opportunity to continue putting pressure on the Iranians even
more now that the proxies were weakened, the regime was weakened. But
ultimately, I think the regime in Iran falling would make it much easier for
Lebanon to thrive. But look, I mean, this framework agreement is really hopeful.
I’m skeptical, but I really do hope the Lebanese can pull it off. I really hope
the Lebanese state takes this seriously.
I know that there’s a lot of concern about having the Lebanese armed forces
clash head to head with Hezbollah, but at some point there’s going to have to be
some type of conflict to regain the country. Hopefully it’s not a civil war or
anything like that, but the Lebanese army is going to have to prove we will go
after your weapons and we’ll do what it takes to do that. And the Israelis are
trying to make that easier by handing over these pilot zones. Secretary of State
Rubio, I think said he was going to give an extra 30 million to the Lebanese
army to help bolster them to do the job, but certainly being able to drive from
Tel Aviv to Beirut would be good for the Lebanese too. I mean, they’re just sick
of war.
DUBOWITZ: Yeah. So, the question that I have is also beyond Hezbollah and then
Lebanese armed forces is the Lebanese government itself because it is not a
monolith as you know better than anyone and there are factions within the
Lebanese government that are pro – Hezbollah. I’ve been personally out there
publicly trying to lead a, maybe at this point, a one-man campaign to get Nabih
Berri sanctioned because of his support for Hezbollah and because of his
corruption and also because he’s standing in the way of a peace process. Talk a
little bit about the sort of inner workings of Lebanese politics, Lebanese
government, the sort of Lebanese game of thrones that has been endemic to
Lebanon for so many years.
HAJJAR: Yeah. You’ve actually seen the prime minister and the president Joseph
Aoun speak out in favor of disarmament. And so again, even that, that should
sound obvious, but these are big steps for the Lebanese who the fact that both
Trump and the Israelis had really weakened Iran and Hezbollah made it so that at
least like for the first time in my life, I had never heard so much open
criticism of Hezbollah in Lebanon. I was there last summer, and I did some
reporting and I was pretty struck by how much… I mean, these were things that
you always heard privately, but people were openly criticizing Hezbollah. And
so, the prime minister, the president are saying all the right things. Again, it
comes down to doing the right things. Are you willing to take on Hezbollah head
on? Are you willing to do that and take on that confrontation?
And then you have Nabih Berri, the speaker who is part of the Amal movement, a
close ally of Hezbollah, and he has basically rejected the framework agreement.
Hezbollah has rejected the framework agreement. But again, what they’re
basically rejecting is a roadmap to getting Israel out of Lebanon. And so, it
directly, again, undercuts the whole raison d’étre of Hezbollah’s moment, which
is again, it’s a sham but to guard Lebanon sovereignty. And so, I think the
Lebanese people are going to start to see that this is absolutely ridiculous,
especially those who have been displaced. We want to go home and the only people
that are stopping us from being able to do that are Hezbollah and Berri and his
allies.
DUBOWITZ: Yeah. My colleagues had in the Wall Street Journal last week that had
an op-ed about this, and it struck me that we talk a lot about Hezbollah. We
talk a lot about Lebanese government, but that actually on the ground right now,
I think they cited about 150 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders who
are actually directing Hezbollah and directing the war against Israel. I think
it underscores what you said earlier about for Iran, I mean, this is, as you
say, the crown jewel in the axis of resistance or what we like to call the axis
of misery on this podcast and they’re not willing to let Hezbollah go. They will
fight to the death, and they will fight to the death as they always have to the
last dead Lebanese, the last dead Palestinian, the last debt Iraqi and Yemeni
because they have no problem wasting the lives of other people that defend the
Islamic Republic.
Do you get a sense when you are in Lebanon, and you are speaking to people there
that they are sick and tired of having the Islamic Republic take that country
into war repeatedly? Is there a lot of anti-Iranian sentiment? And I guess in
particular, I wanted to ask you, I imagine on the Sunni side of the street and
the Christian side of the street, yes, but on the Shiite side of the street, are
you seeing a growing rejection of the role of the Islamic Republic?
HAJJAR: Well, I think that there’s a potential for that to happen again because
the people who have been the most impacted by Israel’s presence in the south of
Lebanon have been the Shiites. That is the Shiite stronghold, and they want to
go home. I mean, we’re talking hundreds of thousands of people. A lot of these
people are living intents, they just want to go home and the main obstacle to
going home is Hezbollah sparking wars over and over again. And of course, the
narrative that Hezbollah uses is, “Well, the Israelis are keeping you out of
your homes.” But again, why this framework is so important is because Israel
literally says, “If you can disarm Hezbollah, we will leave. We have no
territorial ambitions in Lebanon. You can go home.” So, it really puts a lot of
pressure on the Lebanese state and yeah, I mean, to just the original question
about how people are feeling about Hezbollah, like I said, I was pretty
surprised by how openly people were criticizing Hezbollah.
And then with Iran, you had President Joseph Aoun telling or addressing the IRGC
basically, this was in an interview I want to say a few weeks ago saying, “It’s
not your country, it’s ours.” So, the implication is that Iran is directly
undermining Lebanese sovereignty. So, people are coming around to it. I think
most reasonable people agree that Iran and Hezbollah are the main problem in
Lebanon right now. It’s just a matter of acting on that and doing what it takes
to get rid of them.
DUBOWITZ: So, Carine, you and I are based in Washington. We live in this
ecosystem of think tank experts and policymakers and journalists. I think it’s
fair to say that the prevailing narrative today where we live and work is that
Iran is winning the war. America and Israel are losing. All of this aggression
that we’re seeing is Israeli aggression and Trump aggression and that without
that there would be diplomatic opportunities and hope and peace and the absence
of war. Is that a narrative that you think is fair? Have I fairly characterized
that? And if so, is that right? Are there elements of it that people like me are
not understanding? Because I just came back from the Aspen Ideas Forum a few
days ago and it was interesting because it was just sort of what you would
expect, like very left of center views of the Middle East and the Trump
administration.
And there was a lot of obviously Trump skepticism bordering on Trump arrangement
syndrome there. Obviously in Washington, the pro-Trump crowd is like Trump
Messiah syndrome. So, everything the president does is right and can’t be
criticized. But I feel like you and I and some others, somewhere between Trump
arrangement syndrome and Trump Messiah syndrome where people are trying to be
analytically fair, analytically honest and trying to look at the region with
open eyes and be clear minded about what the opportunities are. What’s your
sense of the narrative, the ecosystem, and obviously the media environment in
which you work?
HAJJAR: Yeah, I think you’ve pretty much nailed it. There’s a sense that the
White House has gone into this. I mean, the White House ripped up the Obama
deal, the Trump White House ripped up the Obama deal and at the time I thought
that was a good idea. I didn’t think it was a good deal and now it seems as if
they’re settling for something that is even weaker. I mean, look, the MOU is
only temporary. They’re going to continue negotiating, but by negotiating with
the Iranian regime, you’re legitimizing it basically and if they get access to
$300 billion, well then you’re allowing them to not only be legitimized, but
also to thrive and to rebuild and to regenerate.
I share a lot of the skepticism that I’ve heard about the president’s dealings
with the Iranians. I really do think that there’s a lot of political pressure on
him right now with gas prices so high. This is one of his worst polling issues.
The poll I was looking at yesterday had gas prices with higher disapproval than
the economy, but both are pretty low down for the president. He’s really
struggling and this is a problem going into the midterm, so we have to
acknowledge the political realities here. But like I said earlier, it’s only a
loss because we chose a loss. It’s only a loss because the White House chose a
loss. There was, again, economic leverage, there was military leverage and the
president was in a great place to say, if he didn’t want to continue the
conflict, especially the kinetic aspects of the conflict, he could have walked
away and said, “All right, we’re going to continue squeezing your economy.
“We’re not sitting down to negotiate when you’re ready to surrender or give us
exactly what we want, then we’ll come back to the table until then step a foot
out of line, here are X, Y, Z terms. We’re going to hit you hard.” So
unfortunately, I share a lot of the resignation on this topic in particular.
DUBOWITZ: I’ve been working on Iran for 23 years, so I’ve gone through lots of
ups and downs and twists and turns. I mean, it does occur to me that if you just
sort of zoom out and you look at the thousand-day war, which is the war since
October 7th, 2023, that Iran was at its height on that day. Iranian power,
Hezbollah power was really at its height. In a thousand days, the United States
and Israel have taken the Islamic Republic and its terror proxies from the
height of that power to the nadir of the power. I mean, we’ve seen
extraordinary, I think, devastation of nuclear missile, defense industrial base,
economy, terror proxies. And so, the big question I think that you’re raising is
why take all that leverage that you’ve built over a thousand days and squander
it in a 14 provision MOU that looks like it was written by Iran and Qatar
translated into English using ChatGPT, which by the way, replete with some
spelling mistakes.
I’m always the sort of looking as an editor and you can see the mistakes, but
not only in grammar, but the absolute giveaways in terms of massive concessions
to an Islamic Republic that is on its knees why another president would extend a
hand and pull them up to their feet. But you mentioned the domestic situation. I
mean, maybe say a little bit more about that. It seems to me like this is
President Trump hitting the pause button, getting to November, getting oil
prices down, gasoline prices down, inflation down, trying to keep the house and
Senate other he’s going to be impeached and under investigation for the next two
and a half years. And then maybe it’s a big maybe coming back to the battle to
win the Battle of Hormuz and to continue to double down on his strategy of
crippling the regime. Is that a fair characterization of that or are you deeply
worried that we’re not going back and the regime is going to rebuild,
reconstitute, and as you say, regenerate with all the implications for Hezbollah
and Lebanon?
HAJJAR: Well, I certainly hope that you’re right because to your point, and I
don’t want to downplay the historic achievement that the president… I mean, this
was a historic achievement. He really did weaken the regime. He really did
weaken the proxies and the reason why it is so frustrating is because he was so
successful and again, is willing to undercut that success. So, I do hope that
this is a political pause. I mean, look, it’s not ideal, but these are the
politics. My other hat that I wear is I go around and cover a lot of the hot
races right now. I’ve been in Maine, I’ve been in Texas hoping to go to some
other contested races and talking to voters and seeing what really matters to
them. And it is true. I mean, the American voter is really struggling with their
bills, especially with gas.
Inflation is top of mind. I’ve heard that people just feel frustrated that they
were promised by the Trump campaign that they were going to bring down inflation
like day one or week one and then they’re still waiting for their bills to come
down. And so it’s a political reality. The midterms do matter and I really do
hope that he should do it sooner rather than later, but that the president wakes
up and sees that he’s giving up a tremendous foreign policy leverage here. But
more than that, he could be undercutting a really big opportunity in Lebanon. It
falls more in line with his diplomacy around the Abraham Accords and that could
just be a great achievement for the president to have as he leaves office and he
risks abandoning that. But hopefully the fact that they are putting political
capital into this Israel-Lebanon framework and the fact that Secretary of State
Rubio was there too is a signal that look, we still care about the region.
We still care about brokering peace and doing the right thing, but maybe we have
to kick the can down the road. That would be the hopeful reading, I guess.
DUBOWITZ: Okay. I think you’re right. I mean, you mentioned the Abraham Accords,
which was extraordinary, but one has to keep into perspective. I mean, that was
between Israel and countries that Israel was never at war with, that a Lebanon
Israel peace agreement is profound and unprecedented. And if Lebanon and Israel
were to make peace, not only would we have our dream of having breakfast and Tel
Aviv and clubbing in Beirut, then more importantly, what that would mean
actually for the region. And my understanding is that this was supported very
quietly by both the Saudis and the Emiratis who really backed the Lebanese
government in moving forward. So I mean, I think that might be a good sign that
if Lebanon and Israel to make peace, you could really broaden and extend the
Abraham accords. Do voters care? I mean, when you talk to voters about these
issues, do they care beyond the pocketbook issue?
HAJJAR: My honest answer is not really and that tracks with campaigns going back
years, foreign policy usually ranks lower than your kitchen table issues. And I
think that another issue is that the Trump administration ran on promises that
they would not start other forever wars or other prolonged entanglements in the
Middle East in the Middle East. So there’s sort of this whiplash that voters and
especially Trump supporters are experiencing where they’re like, “Well, you
promised you weren’t going to do this type of thing and now we’re doing it and
it’s also raising the price at the pump and that’s affecting me personally.” And
so you can sort of understand why voters are frustrated and the president has
seen his economic approval erode tremendously among core constituencies like
white voters without college education I believe his polling with men has
dropped as well. So this is hitting home with the people that were promised
we’re not going to go into the Middle East and do another war.
DUBOWITZ: I think what frustrates me, Carine, is that I think there is a way to
defend the MOU and just be honest and transparent about it. And that is, look, I
have midterms in November, there’s a lag time between price of oil going down
and then the price of gasoline going down and then the rate of inflation going
down, right? That doesn’t happen immediately. There’s a lag time between those
sort of three key economic indicators. So when I looked at November and I backed
up to June, I realized I had to get the price of oil down from 120 to 70 or in
the 60s by June in order to get gasoline down by this summer in order to get
inflation down by the fall in order to keep the house and Senate. Okay. So, I
went to my CENTCOM commander, Bradley Cooper. I said, “Admiral Cooper, you’re
doing a great job.
“You’re getting five, six million barrels a day through Hormuz. Can you get me
12, 15 million barrels a day?” And he said, “I can, sir, but it’s going to take
me a few months.” The president said, “I don’t have a few months.” All right,
Vance, go to Islamabad and negotiate with the Iranians and get me an agreement.
I don’t really care what’s in it. I’m probably not even going to read it, but
all I want to do is open Hormuz, get the oil flowing and then keep the House and
Senate and we’ll get back to this in November. To me, that would be an honest
case to be made to the American people about why you’re doing it. Instead, we’ve
got some administration officials defending the MOU as like, “Gee, wow, it’s the
first time we’re getting to negotiate with those IRGC guys and there really are
wonderfully moderate and pragmatic.
“And by the way, if we flood the Islamic Republic with $300 billion of cash,
we’re going to turn the hard men of Tehran into responsible global stakeholders.
And when we do, we will have peace between Iran and the United States and
there’ll be peace in the Middle East and all will be well and good, and we’ll
get the nuclear dust and we’ll end the nuclear program because we’ve discovered
a new leadership in Tehran. There has been regime change. There are new leaders
and they are the Persian version of Delcy Rodriguez in Venezuela.” Is that fair?
I mean, wouldn’t that be a fair case to be made, an honest case to be made
instead of what I think is nonsense about this idea that you can seduce hardcore
theocratic jihadists become responsible pragmatic global stakeholders?
HAJJAR: Well, fair and honest aren’t always part of the political calculus no
matter who you’re dealing with, no matter what party, politicians like to make
big promises. They like to say that they can do things quickly. And so what
you’re laying out is entirely realistic. The problem is, again, the president
made promises about the economy recovering much faster than it did. He made
promises about this war or this conflict being much shorter than it was and so
he sort of undercuts his credibility and even more so now that there are
administration officials going around and trying to normalize conversations with
people who are part of a foreign terrorist organization or other people who have
been behind the death of hundreds of Americans. So, it’s not realistic. I don’t
think that Americans are going to buy it and it’s deeply frustrating. I mean,
you are so right.
There was a way to explain this MOU to say, look, this is a pause on the way to
something better. That doesn’t necessarily explain why we’ve conceded so much in
it already, but just putting that aside, this is a pause. Instead, we’re going
around saying that we can talk to the hidden Ayatollah and everything’s going to
be okay. I don’t buy it and I don’t think that voters do either.
DUBOWITZ: So, look, on the MOU, I think again, there are ways to mitigate the
damage. I think it’s awful. I think it’s fatally flawed in every provision from
one to 14. I think there are ways to limit the damage. I think the $300 billion
only comes at the end if there’s some final agreement that strips Iran of its
entire nuclear infrastructure, one hopes that that is the nuclear demand and
that hasn’t been dropping because I worry that if… I saw this in 2013 when the
Obama administration did a joint plan of action where they conceded enrichment
to the Islamic Republic Iran for the first time in contravention of six UN
Security Council resolutions and gave $20 billion to them in exchange for
limited nuclear concessions. And that flawed interim agreement led to the
fatally flawed 2015 agreement under Obama. So, I worry that a flawed interim
agreement today is going to lead to a fatally flawed final agreement, but let’s
assume there’s no final agreement and what we’re really looking at is a 14-point
MOU that President Trump has no intention of complying with and the Islamic
Republic has no intention of complying with.
And this, again, is just hit the pause button, get to November, and then double
down. What is your view of how the president going forward, let’s say after
November, should explain his Iran policy? I mean, what’s missing in the policy?
You mentioned, I think, something that the president needs to say more. I mean,
Iran has been responsible for the deaths and maiming of thousands of Americans,
never mind hundreds of thousands of Middle Easterners. I mean, this is a
terrorist regime that has been at war with us since 1979 and maybe President
Trump’s the first president has said, “That’s it. I’m drawing a line. You’ve
been killing Americans, maiming Americans, kidnapping them, taking them hostage,
and I’m going to draw a line and I’m going to hit back.” How do explain that to
the voters that you’re talking about in these key districts and states?
HAJJAR: Well, actually I think he was doing it or he was getting there early on.
Don’t quote me on the date, but one of the early speeches that the president
made, I think it was early spring about the conflict and why he was starting
this conflict was not for even now, but for Americans’ grandchildren and
basically taking Iran at face value when they say that they want to destroy
Western civilization, they want to do as harm. And I think that we should take
them at face value because even though they’re not as powerful or able as the
United States is, when they have the ability to inflict pain in the region,
inflict pain on Americans, they’ve done so. And so we have the proof that
they’re going to do it. And so I thought that what the president said about
taking on Iran to help future Americans was really wise.
It’s really hard to sell a conflict where you don’t see an immediate payout and
it’s just really hard to explain it to the American people, understandable. I
mean, war is horrible period. It’s unpopular, but sometimes it’s necessary and
making that case is very difficult. But the president was onto something when he
was taking Iran at face value. I think I’d like to see more voices and certainly
in the media and in the public sphere talk about the radical ideology that
informs this regime and take it seriously when they say that they want to hurt
us because they do.
DUBOWITZ: And yet the reality of politics, and I’m sure you’re seeing it in the
states and districts you’re covering and certainly you see it in Washington
within the media ecosystem is I think everybody has decided on the left and
increasingly on the isolation is right, that the real problem is not the Islamic
Republic of Iran and its terror proxies. The real problem is Israel. And I mean,
that seems to be the dominant narrative that’s coming out of the pages of most
mainstream publications and broadcast media and that seems to be the narrative.
What to make of that with acknowledging that there are serious issues in Israeli
politics and there are serious problems in the way that the war has been
executed from an Israeli perspective, but how do we get away from a narrative
that seems so obsessed with the Israeli issue and the Israeli-Palestinian issue
to one that understands that the Middle East really at the core of the problems
of the Middle East are a ideology of radical Islam that is being advanced by a
theocratic regime like the Islamic Republic through terror proxies like
Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, the Shiite militias and Iraq, Palestinian Islamic
Jihad and others.
HAJJAR: It is the question. I mean, obviously I’m sure you’ve talked about on
the show and your listeners are aware that antisemitism is on the rise
everywhere and Israel and the Jewish state becomes a very convenient scapegoat
for when you don’t like certain policies that your own government is taking on.
And I mean, one, my answer to that is always, well, the buck stops, we can’t
blame Israel if we don’t like a conflict that the White House decided to enter
the buck stops with the president. So that’s one thing. But I mean, the big
answer to your question I think is more education. I spent a lot of time after
October 7th on college campuses covering anti-Israel protests and was stunned by
how little students knew about the Middle East, how little people knew about,
for example, Lebanon when they were chanting hands off Lebanon. And so, I think
to a very young, progressive American student who is at a progressive
institution, the world has been framed to them as oppressor versus oppressed and
Israel falls square within the oppressor category and so they take that and they
run with it.
But we’ve been talking now for almost an hour, and this is a really, really
complicated conflict. And so I’d like to also see our politicians and folks in
the media and people in the public sphere do a better job of separating what can
be valid criticisms of Israel, the type of political criticisms that you would
make of your own politicians, even military criticisms from just questioning the
state’s right to exist, because a lot of these criticisms just do get at
Israel’s very right to exist. And the truth is if America was being bombed from
its northern or southern border, we would respond because we would have to
defend ourselves. And I think just that very basic idea of self-defense has been
lost in all of this.
DUBOWITZ: Yeah, we look for simple solutions and simple solutions are always
wrong and as you say, it’s an incredibly complicated area. I am more optimistic
than I’ve been in two and a half decades or working on this. I’m optimistic
because I believe profoundly in the Lebanese people, I believe profoundly in the
Iranian people and in the Israeli people. And I also do believe in the common
sense of the American people. I think when you go off, you get yourself out of
those progressive bubbles in Washington or on college campuses and you go into
the heartland of America. I think Americans have good common sense. I think they
do know the difference between good and evil and I think that the president has
an opportunity to really bring this through to a successful conclusion in his
remaining two and a half years and it would be extraordinary.
I mean, peace between Israel and Lebanon, a crippled Islamic Republic and God
willing at some point, a new free and prosperous Iran and checking these new
aggressive actors like Erdogan’s Turkey and dealing with some of the remaining
terrorist organizations that continue to plague the region, the president could
really hand off to the next president a remarkably different Middle East. So,
Carine, thank you. Thank you for your reporting and your insights and I’d love
to have you back on the show to follow the trajectory of this issue.
HAJJAR: And thank you for your work. Thanks for having me on.
DUBOWITZ: All right, great. Okay.
Iranian extortion does not weaken foreign influence in the Gulf. It guarantees
it
Ali Shihabi/Arab News/July 01, 2026
Iran has acquired an appetite for extortion with this war. Its leverage over the
Strait of Hormuz has suddenly opened its eyes to an opportunity where it can
hold the Gulf Cooperation Countries and the world to ransom. For particularly
the small GCC states that sit directly on the Gulf, the strait is not merely one
maritime route among many. It is their only sea-based outlet, the artery through
which energy exports, imports, food security and commercial confidence pass.
That gives Iranian threats real weight. This extortion has legs to it. But
precisely because it has weight, it would be remarkably short-sighted of Iran to
use it. If Iran tries to turn the strait into a
tollbooth for political money, reparations or submission, it will not create
dependence. It will create urgency. The GCC states will accelerate a race to
diversify away from the Strait of Hormuz through pipelines, ports, railways,
land bridges and new strategic corridors. Over time, this will make the strait
far less relevant than it is today. Saudi Arabia gives
all GCC countries access to the Red Sea. Oman gives them access to the Arabian
Sea. Both channels will be used to the fullest. Even southern Yemen and
Hadramout will be brought into this equation as further access points to the
Arabian Sea, avoiding both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab Al-Mandab Strait
where possible. Iran may imagine that geography has handed it a permanent
weapon. In reality, abusing that weapon will only convince its neighbors to
spend whatever is necessary to blunt it.
Iran also needs to recognize why Gulf states have turned to outside powers. It
is Iran’s own threats and revolutionary ambitions that have pushed its neighbors
to grant the US and, in some cases, Israel access to their skies, bases,
facilities and intelligence networks to deter or strike Iran. Iranian behavior
opened the door to Israel’s deeper role with the UAE and Bahrain. Had these
states not felt threatened by Tehran, they would have had far less reason to
bring Israel into the Gulf security equation.
Tehran should not be surprised. States that feel threatened seek protection and
Gulf states may continue to host any power that credibly promises deterrence. If
Iran wants fewer hostile foreign forces on its doorstep, more intimidation will
only backfire. It must stop giving its neighbors reasons to invite them in.
Iran should see the Gulf states as potential economic partners and investors,
not as rich targets to absorb, pressure or plunder. For decades, Iran has
watched its Gulf neighbors explode in prosperity while it languished behind.
That contrast has fed a strong streak of envy in Iranian political thinking. Yet
Iran’s failure to develop was not caused by Dubai, Doha, Riyadh, Kuwait, Manama
or Abu Dhabi. It was caused by flawed economic policies, political adventurism,
sanctions born from confrontation and a leadership class that repeatedly chose
ideology over prosperity and, in many cases, corruption and venality. Iran has
only itself to blame for much of the economic isolation it now suffers.
Only if Iran gives up its predatory ambitions and looks inward, toward pushing
its people up the human development index, can the Gulf states begin to see it
differently. A stable, confident, economically open Iran would be a major
regional asset. It could attract capital, trade, technology, tourism and
infrastructure partnerships from the GCC. But a revolutionary Iran that
threatens shipping, exports militias, demands tribute and uses the Strait of
Hormuz as blackmail will remain a threat. The result will be more suspicion,
more contingency planning and more cooperation with Iran’s enemies.
This war and the severe economic damage Iran has suffered should force Tehran’s
new leadership to recognize the opportunity now before it. The Gulf states have
learned that the American security umbrella is neither as impregnable nor as
responsive to their interests as they once assumed. Washington’s erratic actions
did not give GCC concerns the priority they expected and their interests paid
the price. States that feel threatened seek protection and Gulf states may
continue to host any power that credibly promises deterrence.
As a result, Gulf capitals are more open than they have been in years to a
durable understanding with Iran that can bring security and stability to the
region. That stability could unlock significant GCC investment in Iran, provided
the right economic conditions exist and investment can proceed on a free market
basis. This is Tehran’s real opening: to move the Gulf states away from fear,
suspicion and cooperation with Iran’s enemies toward confidence, cooperation and
shared prosperity.
To do that, Iran must resist the temptation to bully its neighbors over the
Strait of Hormuz or demand reparations from Gulf states that were not
responsible for attacking it. Yes, some of them hosted US military facilities,
but that was itself the result of decades of Iranian threats to export the
revolution, undermine their governments and threaten their security. If those
threats end, the logic behind such contingency planning will gradually weaken as
well.
Trust will not emerge overnight but Iran can begin by demonstrating that it sees
the Gulf states not as vulnerable targets to be coerced but as sovereign
neighbors with whom it seeks genuine security, economic partnership and mutual
prosperity.
*Ali Shihabi is an author and commentator on the politics and economics of Saudi
Arabia. X: @aliShihabi
Burnham will quickly find that real solutions are not easy
Mohamed Chebaro/Arab News/July 01, 2026
Will Labour MPs dare ask themselves whether they were too hasty in pushing
outgoing Prime Minister Keir Starmer out of office? Were they too eager to
remove a PM who had legitimacy and won a resounding majority in a general
election just two years ago, only to replace him with someone who lacks
legitimacy and will ultimately have to call an election he will not be certain
of winning?
Above all, will anyone dare ask themselves whether Andy Burnham, the new Labour
MP tipped to be the UK’s next leader, has a plan, a vision and the means to meet
voters’ expectations in a way Starmer failed to do? Does he have what it takes
to uphold the national interest of the nation, improve its security, its growth
and economic potential, its services and welfare in a way that is feasible and
not costly simply by rewiring the state, as he claimed this week in his first
major speech?
Does anyone believe that Burnham’s proposed devolution from London to provincial
cities and counties will recalibrate the state and its institutions, regenerate
society and erase the UK’s regional discrepancies? Is this the answer to the
many adversities today’s Britain is suffering from?
Let us be clear, maybe Burnham will be better than Starmer in terms of style and
form, but he — just like the most vocal opposition parties like the
Conservatives, the Greens and the extreme-right Reform UK — does not have a
magic wand to transform things at the speed an impatient electorate wants.
The UK, like many liberal democratic Western countries, has maybe reached the
stage where its greedy form of capitalism has priced the nation and its people
out. But be warned that all parties will still sell the electorate fake hopes to
make them feel better for a short time. Yet they will fail to deliver real
growth and societal improvements, as those would necessitate sacrifices that the
electorate will not be able to stomach and hard work that politicians and
societies are unlikely to embark on. Most importantly, they need time — a
commodity that is not in great supply these days.
Burnham has pledged to give away a chunk of the central state’s power by handing
greater autonomy to local leaders in a circuit-breaker for the sclerotic British
economy.
The former mayor of Greater Manchester, the “King of the North” as he is called
by his supporters, also said he would open a prime minister’s office in
northwest England as part of “the biggest rebalancing of power” the UK has ever
seen. In a speech aimed at bringing voters, Labour Party colleagues and the
financial markets up to speed with his economic vision, Burnham said that
“growth cannot be ordered from the top down — it can only be nurtured from the
bottom up.” He will attempt to reverse almost two decades of low growth since
the 2008 financial crisis through an approach dubbed “Manchesterism,” harnessing
private and public money to invest in areas like transport, housing and
infrastructure.
During the speech at the People’s History Museum in the city where he spent nine
years as mayor, Burnham said a new government office in Manchester — dubbed “No.
10 North” — would oversee regional development and become “the nerve center of a
rewired Britain.” It will be tasked with equalizing living standards across the
country, with regional mayors given more power over housing, welfare and
education as part of his planned reforms.
But Burnham’s rousing and positive speech was short on details and methodology,
especially regarding where his government would find the necessary money to
finance its many projects. In the UK, people tend to give any leader a chance
for their first 30 to 100 days in office, but many questions are likely to mar
his tenure, just like his predecessor.
Those questions are basic. Where will the money come from? Others, such as Boris
Johnson, have spent massive amounts of money trying to devolve and regenerate
but ultimately ran out of cash. Devolution and housebuilding do not come cheap.
Welfare and defense spending hit any budget hard, especially as Burnham seems
committed to not changing the fiscal rules and borrowing limits to please the
financial markets.
Another source of money is raising taxes. Will Burnham raise them? Taxation,
even amid ballooning demands, has become toxic. And many doubt he will go down
that road, as it may threaten a new flight of wealth from the country and more
economic stagnation.
People tend to give any leader a chance for their first 30 to 100 days, but many
questions are likely to mar his tenure.
Another question touches his legitimacy. Will he dare to call an election? He
could be tempted, as he will likely be basking in some early popularity. But
that could change quickly. Meanwhile, if he does not hold elections soon, his
authority and legitimacy will always be in question, especially if he embarks on
constitutionally sensitive changes.
And the list goes on. How will a new government under Burnham succeed in terms
of housebuilding and motivating unproductive, dormant young people after
everyone else failed? Yes, Burnham has so far proven himself better at making
people feel good. He looks more relaxed and relatable than Starmer, but that
alone does not amount to policy delivery and meeting a splintered electorate’s
aspirations.
Change can initially make people feel good. Burnham could enjoy a brief
honeymoon period and it is hoped that the seventh prime minister the UK has had
in the last decade will have what it takes to transform his upsurge in
popularity into serious policy delivery.
Promises on devolution and rewiring the nation and its institutions are
important and welcome, but that will not save Burnham from the tests ahead and
he will soon find that real solutions are neither cheap nor easy.
*Mohamed Chebaro is a British-Lebanese journalist with more than 25 years of
experience covering war, terrorism, defense, current affairs and diplomacy.
كلام ومواقف مهمين
A link to an important and informative video interview about Lebanon, the
Lebanese-Israeli framework agreement, and the mistakes of American presidents
with Professor Dan Schueftan from Israel Update channel.
June 30/2026
CAN ISRAEL SAVE THE US FROM ITS MISTAKE? With Guest Dan Schueftan
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z4s0JR2Lf7M
Trump’s MOU repeats a very American mistake, says guest Prof. Dan Schueftan:
like many presidents before him he does not understand radicalism. But the
Lebanon Deal may be able to rectify some of the damage. In which case, says
Schueftan, it would not be the first time that Israel saves the US from its own
mistakes. Also in this episode: the judges in his trial declare the bribery case
against Netanyahu groundless.
The HK book Dan referred to turned out to be A World Restored, which,
incidentally, Gadi only read on kindle and had a hard copy sent to Mike a few
weeks back, because Amazon won't ship it to Israel. Highly recommended.
Selected Face Book & X tweets on
01 July
Tom Harb
Lebanese-American success! Part of Trump team.
Professor @YaredPierre , born in Lebanon & Columbia prof, served brilliantly as
Acting Chair of President Trump’s CEA. Trump called him a ‘STAR’ who helped Make
America WEALTHY Again with his team of Brainiacs. Thank you for
Ronnie Chatah
We have two choices: an MOU that seals our fate as an Iranian protectorate; or a
tripartite framework - with its word choices & limitations - that ends Israeli
occupation with sub-state disarmament.The existential threat to Lebanon is not
Zionism, colonialism or capitalism.It’s Hezbollah’s weapons.