English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For August 30/2026
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news

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Bible Quotations For today
The repentance of the sinful woman: I tell you, her sins, which were many, have been forgiven; hence she has shown great love. But the one to whom little is forgiven, loves little.’
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Luke 07/36-50/:”One of the Pharisees asked Jesus to eat with him, and he went into the Pharisee’s house and took his place at the table. And a woman in the city, who was a sinner, having learned that he was eating in the Pharisee’s house, brought an alabaster jar of ointment. She stood behind him at his feet, weeping, and began to bathe his feet with her tears and to dry them with her hair. Then she continued kissing his feet and anointing them with the ointment.Now when the Pharisee who had invited him saw it, he said to himself, ‘If this man were a prophet, he would have known who and what kind of woman this is who is touching him that she is a sinner.’ Jesus spoke up and said to him, ‘Simon, I have something to say to you.’ ‘Teacher,’ he replied, ‘speak.’‘A certain creditor had two debtors; one owed five hundred denarii, and the other fifty. When they could not pay, he cancelled the debts for both of them. Now which of them will love him more?’Simon answered, ‘I suppose the one for whom he cancelled the greater debt.’ And Jesus said to him, ‘You have judged rightly.’Then turning towards the woman, he said to Simon, ‘Do you see this woman? I entered your house; you gave me no water for my feet, but she has bathed my feet with her tears and dried them with her hair. You gave me no kiss, but from the time I came in she has not stopped kissing my feet. You did not anoint my head with oil, but she has anointed my feet with ointment. Therefore, I tell you, her sins, which were many, have been forgiven; hence she has shown great love. But the one to whom little is forgiven, loves little.’Then he said to her, ‘Your sins are forgiven. ’But those who were at the table with him began to say among themselves, ‘Who is this who even forgives sins?’And he said to the woman, ‘Your faith has saved you; go in peace.’

Titles For The English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on August 29-30/2026
Statement of Condemnation and Solidarity with Lebanese Sovereignist Writer and Director Youssef El Khoury/Elias Bejjani/August 29/202
Yes to peace with Israel & no the Jihadist-Iranian Hezbollah/Elias Bejjani/August 28/2026
Elias Bejjani/Who Was Queen Esther, Who Saved the Jews from Annihilation During the Reign of the Persian King Ahasuerus?/Prepared, Compiled, Edited, and Summarized by Elias Bejjani
Video Link & text for an interview with Lebanese-Israeli Activist Maryam Younes, Daughter of a Hero of the South Lebanon Army/Maryam was born in Lebanon, grew up in Israel, and dreams of returning to South Lebanon after Lebanon is liberated from the barbaric Iranian occupation.
U.S. State Department Spokesperson: Hezbollah Is Not Willing to Talk to the Lebanese State, the United States, or Israel Because It Simply Takes Its Orders from Iran
Israeli Apache Helicopter Fires Heavy Machine Guns Toward the Outskirts of Zawtar al-Sharqiya
Hezbollah’s Refusal to Relinquish Ali al-Taher Hill Is Triggering International Vetoes Against Lebanon
Berri to Asharq Al-Awsat: UNIFIL alternative is another force operating under UN banner
A Direct Meeting Between Washington and Hezbollah Is Approaching... Who Will Be in the Delegation?
U.S. State Department: Lebanon’s Sovereignty Requires Hezbollah’s Disarmament
The End of UNIFIL in Lebanon? Washington Pushes for New Security Arrangements
Surprise Development Regarding Hezbollah: Artificial Intelligence Enters the Battle to Dismantle Its Financial Networks
Three Scenarios Could Push Hezbollah Back into Confrontation: Is Lebanon Approaching a New War?
Negotiations Collide with Ali Al-Taher Hill: Israel Sets a Condition While the Lebanese Army Faces a Difficult Test
Lebanon archeological finds showcase rich heritage
In Qlayaa: Commemoration of the Martyrs of the Lebanese Resistance
Rifi: The Era of Wilayat al-Faqih as a Model Capable of Governing the Region Has Ended
The Gathering of Lebanese Shiites: The State Must End Outsourcing Aid and Reconstruction to Institutions Controlled by the ‘Shiite Duo’ and Put an End to Sectarian and Discriminatory Practices
Arrest of the Primary Accomplice in the Kidnapping and Murder of Pascal Sleiman in Syria / Will Damascus Hand Over the Wanted Individuals to Beirut?
The Battle of the Heights: What After Ali Al-Tahr?
The President's Messages from General Security to Whom?
Does Sheikh Naim Qassem know that Bashar al-Assad "fled" from Syria?
So that Lebanon, Israel, and the United Nations may find peace!
Early Setbacks in the Path of the "New" Lebanese State

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on August 29-30/2026
That sucker is open": U.S. gains the upper hand in the battle for Hormuz
War weighs on Iran’s economy as US intensifies sanctions
6 months on, Iran’s leaders are defying the US and signaling no tolerance for dissent
Trump announces deal for huge US stake in Venezuelan oil reserves
Iran-led militias in Iraq plan to target Saudi Arabia: Sources
Netanyahu condemns violence in West Bank villages in rare settler criticism
Dozens of Israeli settlers attack flashpoint West Bank village
Israel army says struck Hamas commander in Gaza hospital compound
UAE central bank to examine transactions at Banque Misr branches
Druze factions block students from sitting exams in row with Syria govt
US to end military aid to Iraqi Kurds: Report
Nepal flood death toll rises to 675: Disaster authority
At least 37 dead after Russian strike on warehouse near Kyiv
US-Ecuador operation destroys alleged drug-smuggling boat
Pope Leo grants Eastern Synods the faculty to remove Patriarchs

Titles For The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on August 29-30/2026
The Synod Gains Authority to Request the Removal of a Patriarch: Amendments to the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches/Nidaa Al-Watan/August 29, 2026
Iran's Regime: 'The Only Solution Is to Build a Nuclear Bomb and Fire It'..What Happens After President Trump Leaves Office?/Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Gatestone Institute/August 29, 2026
Sadat Does Not Deserve All This Ingratitude/Bilal Al-Dawi/ Al-Watan/August 29, 2026
How Does Tehran Think?/Hoda Raouf/Independent Arabia/August 29, 2026
Between Japan and Lebanon: The Paradox of Rising from the Rubble of Defeat and the Trap of Ongoing Collapse/Dr. Mona Fayyad/From the Livetime website/August 29, 2026
Iran Between Piracy and Settlement/Sanaa Al-Jak/Nidaa Al-Watan/August 29, 2026
Mecca defense pact redraws the region’s strategic map/Prince Turki al-Faisal/Al Arabiya English/29 August ,2026
Iran, Hezbollah, and the new US sanctions that aim to take them down/Khaled Abou Zahr/Arab News/August 29/2026
Selected Face Book & X tweets on August 29/2026

Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on August 29-30/2026
Statement of Condemnation and Solidarity with Lebanese Sovereignist Writer and Director Youssef El Khoury
Elias Bejjani/August 29/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/08/157044/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=009wMFHGnf8
I, Elias Bejjani, in my own name and on behalf of the Lebanese in occupied Lebanon and the Diaspora who share my national and faith-based aspirations for a free, sovereign, independent, democratic Lebanon, liberated from the Iranian Jihadist occupation and from the domination of its Lebanese mercenary tools, condemn in the strongest terms the lawsuit filed by the Higher Islamic Shiite Council against the Lebanese sovereignist writer, director, and activist Youssef El Khoury, against the backdrop of his political views and national positions, which he expressed freely and responsibly within the framework of his natural and constitutional right to freedom of expression.
This lawsuit cannot be separated from the climate of intimidation that has prevailed in the Lebanese arena for decades, where religious, political, and judicial institutions are often used as tools of pressure to silence free and independent voices that refuse to submit to Iran’s project of domination over Lebanon and call for the restoration of the sovereignty of the state and for the exclusive possession of weapons by the Lebanese legitimate authorities.
The Higher Islamic Shiite Council was established to serve as a national reference concerned with the affairs of members of the Lebanese Shiite community and to defend their interests and rights within the framework of the Lebanese state. However, its non-Lebanese and Iranized positions and practices have led a broad segment of Lebanese, including many free members of the Shiite community, to regard it as a political institution completely aligned with Hezbollah’s choices and with the expansionist and terrorist agenda of the Iranian regime, rather than expressing the aspirations of free Lebanese Shiites who aspire to a free, sovereign, and independent state.
Turning political and intellectual disagreement into judicial prosecutions, and summoning public prosecution authorities and security agencies to confront an opinion, a position, or a historical interpretation, constitutes a serious violation of the principles of freedom, democracy, and pluralism upon which Lebanon was founded. Ideas are not confronted with lawsuits, opinions are not answered with intimidation, and intellectual debate is not settled in courtrooms.
Youssef El Khoury, this resounding voice in the wilderness of the Land of the Cedars, has exercised nothing more than his legitimate right to express his political opinion and his reading of historical events and their contemporary repercussions. Every citizen has the right to agree or disagree with him, to debate or criticize him, but no religious or political authority has the right to monopolize history, faith, or patriotism, or to impose upon the Lebanese a single interpretation of events and facts under threat of prosecution and intimidation.
Youssef El Khoury is a free Maronite committed to the words of Our Lord Jesus Christ to the scribes and Pharisees who asked Him to silence His disciples and the crowds: “If these were silent, the stones would cry out.”Luke 19:39–40,
What is most dangerous in this case is the continued use of the Lebanese judiciary in political and ideological battles targeting opponents of Hezbollah’s criminal project and of the disguised Iranian occupation of Lebanon. Instead of the judiciary being used to protect citizens, safeguard their rights, and hold accountable those responsible for the wars, destruction, corruption, and collapse that have afflicted the country, it is being employed to pursue sovereignist voices and free national voices.
Together with all the free and honorable Lebanese, I declare our full solidarity with Youssef El Khoury, and I consider that targeting him is an attack on every free Lebanese who refuses to submit to the logic of weapons and foreign tutelage, and on every person of opinion who calls for the establishment of a genuine sovereign and independent state that is subject to no foreign or militia influence.
I also affirm that defending Youssef El Khoury’s freedom is a defense of the freedom of all sovereignist Lebanese, and of their right to think, express themselves, criticize, and hold others accountable, without fear of intimidation, accusations of treason, or prosecution.
The Lebanon in which we believe is the Lebanon of freedom, pluralism, and democracy, not the Lebanon of intellectual repression and silencing of voices. It is the Lebanon of sovereignty and independence, and of the supremacy of the state over all external loyalties and axes.
Full solidarity with Youssef El Khoury.  And full condemnation of the attempts to silence free voices through lawsuits and intimidation, and through the exploitation of religious and judicial institutions to serve political agendas that have nothing to do with the interests of Lebanon and the Lebanese.

Yes to peace with Israel & no the Jihadist-Iranian Hezbollah
Elias Bejjani/August 28/2026
To Iran’s mercenaries and the scum of hatred, extremism, and the business of “resistance”: Yes, a thousand times yes to peace and normalization with the State of Israel. And Lebanese Jews are above you, and more Lebanese than you are, you agents of the terrorist mullahs.

Elias Bejjani/Who Was Queen Esther, Who Saved the Jews from Annihilation During the Reign of the Persian King Ahasuerus?
Prepared, Compiled, Edited, and Summarized by Elias Bejjani
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/08/156807/
Queen Esther is one of the most prominent female figures in the Old Testament, and her story is told in full in the Book of Esther. She was a Jewish girl who became queen of the Persian Empire, and God used her to save her people from annihilation.
The Book of Esther recounts an event of great importance that took place after the Persians conquered the Kingdom of Babylon and destroyed its capital. A community of Jews remained living in exile, among whom was a young woman named Esther who found favor with King Ahasuerus and became his wife. However, the king’s wicked advisor, Haman, sought to destroy the Jews and wipe them out in order to seize their wealth and possessions. Esther intervened with wisdom and courage, thwarted his plot, and saved her people from a terrible fate. Haman himself was eventually executed, proving the saying that evil ultimately turns upon the evildoer. To this day, the Jewish people commemorate this deliverance through the Feast of Purim.
The central theme of the book is God’s providence and power. God preserved and protected His people even while they were living in exile. He turned all things to their good when they prayed, fasted, and cried out to Him. Their hope was not in vain, and He delivered them from Haman’s grasp. It is noteworthy that God accomplished His will through human beings rather than through direct intervention.

Video Link & text for an interview with Lebanese-Israeli Activist Maryam Younes, Daughter of a Hero of the South Lebanon Army/Maryam was born in Lebanon, grew up in Israel, and dreams of returning to South Lebanon after Lebanon is liberated from the barbaric Iranian occupation.
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/08/157078/
Interview conducted by Tamir Morag for the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs
August 27, 2026
Note: Transcription, summary, English translation, headings, and wording by Elias Bejjani, with complete editorial freedom.
Introduction
This interview with Lebanese-Israeli activist Maryam Younes sheds light on a personal, political, and human story that combines Lebanese identity with Israeli citizenship. She recounts her family's displacement from South Lebanon following the year 2000 and explains how that experience shaped her views on Lebanon, Israel, and the prospects for peace in the region.
The interview also explores the reality of the Lebanese community in Israel, the legacy of the South Lebanon Army (SLA), her views on Hezbollah, the future of Lebanese-Israeli relations, and the role that Lebanese and Israelis can play in overcoming political and psychological barriers and fostering a culture of peace between the two peoples.
Main Themes and Highlights of the Interview
1. A Dual Lebanese-Israeli Identity
Maryam Younes spoke proudly of both her Lebanese and Israeli identities, emphasizing that this unique dual identity enables her to understand and connect with both societies.
2. Displacement from South Lebanon
She recounted how her family was forced to flee South Lebanon when she was five years old following Israel's withdrawal in 2000. She explained that she has been unable to visit Lebanon since then and continues to carry a deep longing for her homeland.
3. Family Background and Maronite Heritage
Maryam explained that she comes from a Lebanese Maronite Christian family that preserved its language, traditions, and Lebanese identity despite living in Israel.
4. Why She Became Active on Social Media
She stated that her goal is to challenge and break down the stereotypes that Arabs and Israelis hold about one another. She seeks to highlight the stories of Lebanese living in Israel, the history of the South Lebanon Army, and the experience of the Lebanese community there.
5. Facing Accusations and Smear Campaigns
Maryam noted that when she first became active online, she was subjected to extensive insults and accusations of treason and collaboration. She added that attitudes toward her message have gradually become more positive as support for peace has grown.
6. Her View of the Palestinian Issue
She described the Palestinian issue as complex and argued that its continuation for decades has harmed both the Arab peoples and the region as a whole.
She stressed the need for leadership capable of reaching a lasting solution.
7. Her Position on Hezbollah
Maryam described Hezbollah as a terrorist organization that has devastated Lebanon politically, economically, and socially. In her view, Hezbollah remains the primary obstacle to Lebanon's stability and to any future peace.
8. Peace Between Lebanon and Israel
She expressed her full support for peace between Lebanon and Israel. She believes the current moment presents a historic opportunity for Lebanon to free itself from Hezbollah's influence and move toward a different future.
9. Communication Between Lebanese and Israelis
Maryam spoke about her ongoing communication with many Lebanese through social media platforms. She noted that numerous Lebanese encourage her efforts and express their desire to see the displaced return and genuine peace achieved.
10. Israeli Public Opinion Regarding Peace with Lebanon
She stated that the overwhelming majority of Israelis, regardless of their background or religion, support peace with Lebanon. At the same time, she emphasized that any peace agreement must guarantee security and prevent the presence of armed organizations along the border.
11. The South Lebanon Army Issue
Maryam defended the members of the South Lebanon Army and rejected attempts to label them as traitors. She argued that they fought armed organizations in defense of their villages, communities, and homeland. She also spoke about the suffering endured by the families that were forced to seek refuge in Israel after 2000.
12. Lebanese Shiites and Their Relationship with Hezbollah
She distinguished between Lebanon's Shiite community and Hezbollah.
According to Maryam, many Shiites have suffered from Hezbollah's policies, and there are Shiite voices opposed to the organization, although many remain afraid to express their views publicly.
13. A Final Message
Maryam called on Lebanese citizens to overcome fear and extremism and to work toward building a sovereign, free, and independent Lebanese state.
She emphasized that peace begins with people just as much as it begins with political leaders, and that building a better future requires courage, reconciliation, and a willingness to move beyond the conflicts of the past.
Introduction Published with the Interview
Maryam Younes was born in Lebanon but was forced to leave with her family when she was only five years old. Her father served in the South Lebanon Army, and following Israel's withdrawal in 2000, the family fled to Israel believing their exile would last no more than two weeks. Twenty-six years later, Maryam is still waiting for the day she can return home. In this episode of In the Middle, Tamir Morag speaks with Maryam about her Lebanese and Israeli identity, her family's story, Hezbollah's grip on Lebanon, and the growing voices on both sides of the border calling for what once seemed impossible: genuine peace between Lebanon and Israel. For Maryam, peace is not merely a political agreement—it is a deeply personal dream of returning to her village and reuniting with her family once again.

U.S. State Department Spokesperson: Hezbollah Is Not Willing to Talk to the Lebanese State, the United States, or Israel Because It Simply Takes Its Orders from Iran
National News Agency (NNA) / August 29, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The U.S. Embassy quoted a spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State as saying:
“The trilateral framework clearly stipulates that the Lebanese government is the sole legitimate authority authorized to negotiate Lebanon’s future on behalf of the Lebanese people. The United States stands with the Lebanese people and wants Lebanon to be a safe and sovereign country. To achieve that goal, Hezbollah must disarm. As Ambassador Michel Issa has stated, we want nothing more than for Hezbollah to hand over its weapons.”The spokesperson added: “When Hezbollah decides that it is ready to do so, it can speak with the Lebanese state, with which we are already engaged in dialogue, and inform it of its readiness to surrender its weapons. At that point, we can try to bridge differences. However, at present, Hezbollah is unwilling to speak with the Lebanese state, with us, or with Israel because it simply takes its orders from Iran. The time has come for Hezbollah to do what is best for Lebanon and the Lebanese people.”

Israeli Apache Helicopter Fires Heavy Machine Guns Toward the Outskirts of Zawtar al-Sharqiya
Nidaa Al-Watan / August 29, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
An enemy Apache helicopter was observed Saturday evening conducting a sweep operation with heavy machine-gun fire toward the outskirts of the town of Zawtar al-Sharqiya.

Hezbollah’s Refusal to Relinquish Ali al-Taher Hill Is Triggering International Vetoes Against Lebanon
Nidaa Al-Watan / August 29, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
Between the fire of the South, the fog surrounding the Rome negotiations, and the closed chambers of the United Nations Security Council, Lebanon finds itself facing a test that may determine the shape of the coming phase: Will diplomacy succeed in containing the battlefield, or will the battlefield impose its conditions on the negotiating table? Israeli escalation and Hezbollah’s intransigence have turned the Ali al-Taher Heights into a focal point that encapsulates, within a single geographic area, the issues of weapons, withdrawal, Lebanese Army deployment, and the cessation of military operations. Meanwhile, a new round of negotiations in Rome remains scheduled for September, pending Washington’s decision on the exact date. According to information obtained by Nidaa Al-Watan, efforts led by President Joseph Aoun, in coordination with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri—who has also become directly involved in the Ali al-Taher file—to persuade Hezbollah to withdraw from the hill and hand it over to the Lebanese Army, have thus far failed to produce any results. Sources believe that Hezbollah’s continued refusal to cooperate with the Lebanese state could trigger a gradual Israeli escalation extending beyond Ali al-Taher to areas such as Jabal al-Rayhan and Sajd if the issue remains unresolved. The sources added that Israel is no longer willing to make additional concessions as long as the Lebanese state has not taken serious and practical steps toward disarming Hezbollah. This places Beirut before an increasingly difficult phase in which American pressure, Israeli threats, and attempts by the Lebanese state to prevent a wider confrontation are all intertwined. On the ground, Israeli military operations in the South continue to intensify and expand. Israeli military spokeswoman Ella Wawiya announced on X that combat forces from the Golani Brigade continue to operate in the security zone in South Lebanon to eliminate threats. She stated that over the past several weeks Israeli forces had destroyed more than 400 terrorist infrastructures and seized a variety of weapons, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, explosive devices, weapons, and mortar shells.
Stalemate on All Fronts
According to sources, the deadlock on the ground is directly affecting the negotiation track, explaining why no final date has yet been set for the next round of Rome talks and why agreement has not been reached regarding the verification committee and new pilot areas.
At the same time, attention is focused on closed consultations being held by the United Nations Security Council regarding Lebanon at France’s request, as France remains the lead nation on the Lebanese file. Discussions are centered on the post-UNIFIL phase.
In Beirut, officials are increasingly concerned that the time remaining before the departure of UNIFIL forces may not be sufficient to formulate an alternative arrangement and ensure a smooth transition to new security structures in the South.
As is now widely known, Israel supports the creation of an alternative European-international force but insists that it possess clear authority and effectiveness and play a direct role in supporting Hezbollah’s disarmament. Hezbollah and Iran, by contrast, reportedly favor a model closer to UNIFIL—a force with limited powers and influence. However, prospects for a compromise appear slim due to a firm American veto against reproducing the previous UNIFIL model, whether through another mandate extension or through a replacement force operating under the same approach.
American sources told Nidaa Al-Watan that even the most recent UNIFIL mandate was undermined by the Lebanese state's failure to establish full control over its territory. The promised deployment of approximately 15,000 Lebanese Army soldiers was never completed, and requests for UNIFIL assistance in securing the borders were reportedly absent. As a result, a genuine partnership between the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL never fully materialized, while the South remained open to the consolidation of Hezbollah’s influence.
Meanwhile, the Lebanese Army remains the cornerstone of any future security arrangement. President Joseph Aoun met with Lebanese Army Commander General Rodolphe Haykal to discuss the country’s security situation, particularly in southern Lebanon, in light of continuing Israeli attacks on southern villages and towns. Haykal also briefed the President on the results of his recent visit to Italy and his meetings with Italian officials. The meeting carries additional significance ahead of the conference that France, in coordination with Jordan, has scheduled for September 17 to support the Lebanese Army. International expectations are rising regarding the strengthening of the Army’s capabilities, expansion of its deployment, and assumption of broader responsibilities. However, according to an informed source, the success of the conference depends on Lebanon’s ability to provide tangible examples proving that strengthening the Army is being accompanied by a genuine expansion of state authority on the ground. Support for the Army Depends on the State’s Performance. This is where the issue of Ali al-Taher once again becomes crucial. If the Lebanese state succeeds in persuading Hezbollah to hand the position over to the Army, Lebanon will arrive in Paris carrying a practical achievement it can present to international donors.If Ali al-Taher remains outside the authority of the state, represented on the ground by the Lebanese Army, and if agreement on pilot zones and verification mechanisms continues to stall, Lebanon may instead face the opposite question: Why should international support for the Lebanese Army be increased if the state remains unable to empower it to exercise authority in the very areas where it is supposed to assume security responsibility?

Berri to Asharq Al-Awsat: UNIFIL alternative is another force operating under UN banner
Mohamed Choucair/Asharq Al-Awsat/August 29, 2026
BEIRUT: The United States' persistent refusal to renew the mandate of the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) demands a search for an alternative UN peacekeeping force that has both European and American backing to operate in southern Lebanon, Lebanese parliament Speaker Nabih Berri told Asharq Al-Awsat.Berri warned that without such a force, there would be no legal basis to maintain an international presence. This international role remains essential as the sole framework supporting the Lebanese Army's efforts to deploy and extend state sovereignty over all its territory, which is conditioned on a full Israeli withdrawal to the international borders, he went on to say. Berri stressed that bilateral agreements between Lebanon and Israel are not an alternative to an international presence in the south, so long as Tel Aviv refuses to implement what the two countries reached under the US-sponsored "Framework Agreement."This agreement committed to implementing the first "pilot phase" and establishing a mechanism to verify the army's deployment in the covered towns. Berri noted that despite his rejection of the agreement, he had proposed expanding it by applying it on the district level, based on the administrative divisions of the south, rather than restricting it to the occupied town of Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh and incorporating liberated towns into it. The December 31 expiration of the UNIFIL mandate in southern Lebanon, driven by Washington's insistence, has raised deep concerns among the Lebanese public regarding the loss of an international presence that can monitor the Israeli withdrawal. While Israel pushes for bilateral agreements in place of the UN force, an approach broadly rejected in Lebanon, alternative proposals include forming a European force under a UN mandate if the Security Council extension is blocked.This shifts the responsibility to the United States to consider Lebanon's position, especially since President General Joseph Aoun has called for a UN-backed European force as an alternative if Washington blocks Lebanon's official request to temporarily extend UNIFIL’s mandate.

A Direct Meeting Between Washington and Hezbollah Is Approaching... Who Will Be in the Delegation?
Youssef Abdel Nabi/Al-Kalima Online/ August 29, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
Al-Kalima Online has learned from a Turkish diplomatic source that contacts and consultations are underway regarding the possibility of a direct meeting between the United States and Hezbollah amid divisions within the U.S. administration over how to handle the Lebanese file. According to the source, the American position appears split between one camp advocating a military solution—associated with Secretary of State Marco Rubio—and another favoring dialogue and engagement, associated with Vice President J.D. Vance.
As these differences persist, the option of a direct meeting appears to be gaining momentum, with Hezbollah’s weapons and disarmament expected to be central topics of discussion. The Turkish diplomatic source stated that Hezbollah is not fundamentally opposed to a direct meeting with the United States but insists that it take place within a framework providing international guarantees. The group reportedly rejects a purely bilateral meeting in Beirut without a guarantor party. In this context, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa reportedly preferred that the meeting be held in Beirut, while Hezbollah insists on a venue and framework offering international guarantees. A Turkish proposal has therefore been put forward to host the meeting, either in Turkey, Qatar, or Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad. Regarding the Hezbollah delegation, information indicates that MP Hassan Fadlallah is being considered to head the delegation, accompanied by Ahmad Mehanna, who currently serves as a liaison with several Lebanese political actors. According to the source, the meeting may be closer than many believe, particularly as efforts are underway to finalize the venue and the composition of the delegations at the beginning of September. Consequently, the coming days may witness intensive contacts in that direction. The key question remains: Can Turkey provide the framework and guarantees required for such a meeting, and can Washington unify its position between those advocating military pressure and those favoring direct engagement?

U.S. State Department: Lebanon’s Sovereignty Requires Hezbollah’s Disarmament
Riyadh – Al Arabiya.net/August 29, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
A spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State said on Saturday that the “Trilateral Framework Agreement” between the United States, Lebanon, and Israel clearly stipulates that the Lebanese government is the sole legitimate authority authorized to conduct discussions regarding Lebanon’s future and to speak on behalf of the Lebanese people. In a post on X, the spokesperson affirmed that the United States stands with the Lebanese people and wants Lebanon to be “a safe and sovereign country,” stressing that achieving this objective requires the disarmament of Hezbollah. The spokesperson added that Washington “wants nothing more than for Hezbollah to hand over its weapons,” noting that when the group becomes ready to do so, it can communicate with the Lebanese state, with which the United States is already engaged in dialogue, and inform it of its willingness to surrender its arms, thereby allowing efforts to bridge differences. The spokesperson continued that Hezbollah currently “does not want to speak with the Lebanese state, with us, or with Israel,” arguing that the group “simply takes its orders from Iran.”He concluded by saying: “It is time for Hezbollah to do what is best for Lebanon and the Lebanese people.”
The American remarks came after Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem reiterated on Friday his rejection of the framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel, insisting that his Iran-backed organization, which has fought two wars with Israel in recent years, would not surrender. In a televised speech, Qassem declared: “We oppose the framework agreement and call for its downfall.” The framework agreement, concluded between Lebanon and Israel on June 26 following five rounds of U.S.-mediated negotiations, provides for Hezbollah’s disarmament, Israel’s gradual withdrawal from territories it occupies in southern Lebanon, and the deployment of the Lebanese Army beginning in designated “pilot zones.” During the latest round of Lebanese-Israeli talks in Rome earlier this month, the two sides reportedly discussed the countries that could participate in a committee tasked with verifying the deployment of the Lebanese Army in those pilot zones and overseeing the dismantling of Hezbollah’s Iranian-backed military infrastructure and disarmament.
A new round of negotiations is expected in September, although a date has not yet been set.

The End of UNIFIL in Lebanon? Washington Pushes for New Security Arrangements
Janoubia/August 29, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The mission of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is entering a critical phase amid growing reports of a U.S. effort to end its current mandate and structure, alongside Israeli pressure to redesign security deployment and monitoring mechanisms in southern Lebanon. These developments come as Lebanon faces a sensitive security challenge along its southern border, with a fragile ceasefire still in place and no final settlement regarding military deployment or the future of Hezbollah’s weapons. According to diplomatic sources, Washington and Tel Aviv are pushing for a comprehensive review of the arrangements established under UN Security Council Resolution 1701, arguing that the current formula is no longer capable of addressing the new realities on the ground. Western sources indicated that the U.S. administration is exploring a new international and regional framework compatible with the military and political developments of recent years, while Israel favors reducing the UN role and moving toward a more direct security coordination mechanism with the Lebanese Army. Washington may reportedly use its influence within the Security Council—including the possibility of withholding support for a mandate renewal or reducing financial contributions—to push for a restructuring of UNIFIL or its replacement with a different security arrangement. One proposal under discussion involves establishing a direct coordination mechanism between the Lebanese and Israeli armies, potentially including military communication channels designed to prevent field confrontations. However, the proposal faces Lebanese opposition due to concerns that such direct coordination could evolve into a reality that exceeds the political and legal frameworks governing relations between the two countries.
Israel views UNIFIL as incapable of preventing Hezbollah from rebuilding its military infrastructure in the South and believes that changes in the security environment since 2006 require new arrangements that provide stronger guarantees for border security.Meanwhile, Washington appears intent on linking any future security arrangements to Lebanon’s broader political and economic track, including reconstruction efforts and international support for the Lebanese Army. Various proposals reportedly include expanding the role of other international and regional actors or establishing an international monitoring committee to oversee the implementation of security arrangements, while maintaining a central U.S. supervisory role. Should a new framework be adopted, it would effectively represent a shift away from the traditional UNIFIL model toward a mechanism more closely aligned with the military and political realities that emerged after the latest war. The debate extends beyond UNIFIL itself to the identity of the parties that may participate in future arrangements. Indicators suggest that Israel seeks to reduce the European—particularly French—role in southern Lebanon’s security file while granting the United States greater influence in managing the next phase.
Political analyst Yassin Al-Dweish argues that efforts to end the current UNIFIL structure cannot be separated from broader attempts to reshape the security environment in southern Lebanon. He warns that dismantling existing arrangements without a clear and mutually accepted alternative could create a security vacuum and provide Israel with greater freedom of military action along the border. He further notes that direct military communication between the Lebanese and Israeli armies would place Lebanon’s military establishment before an extremely sensitive test, given Lebanon’s longstanding rejection of arrangements that could be interpreted as military normalization. According to Al-Dweish, alternative international options range from expanding the mandate of a new international force to establishing a monitoring mechanism more closely linked to the United States, with broader authority over weapons and military deployment issues in southern Lebanon. He believes that American pressure may ultimately be aimed at encouraging the Lebanese state to accept new security arrangements in exchange for incentives related to reconstruction assistance and international aid. As Resolution 1701 remains the principal international framework governing security in southern Lebanon, any modification to UNIFIL’s mission will inevitably be linked to the future of that framework itself. Consequently, ending UNIFIL’s current mandate without a clearly defined alternative may not reduce tensions but instead open a new phase of negotiations and pressure regarding military deployment, monitoring mechanisms, and the future of Lebanon’s southern border.

Surprise Development Regarding Hezbollah: Artificial Intelligence Enters the Battle to Dismantle Its Financial Networks
Janoubia/August 29, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
Arab News published a report examining the latest U.S. sanctions imposed on Iran and questioning their ability to increase pressure on Tehran, as well as whether they form part of a broader strategy aimed at weakening the Iranian regime and its regional networks, foremost among them Hezbollah. According to the report, translated by Lebanon24, Washington escalated its measures against Iran on August 24 by targeting officials and entities linked to Iran’s military, nuclear, missile, and drone programs, as well as international networks that assist Tehran in selling oil, transferring funds, and circumventing sanctions.
The report noted that what distinguishes these new measures from previous sanctions is their greater focus on intermediaries, traders, shell companies, and foreign entities facilitating Iranian activities, thereby significantly increasing the risks faced by those actors.
These measures, described by the report as part of an “Economic Outcast Operation,” fall within the broader framework of the “Maximum Pressure” campaign against Iran. However, according to the newspaper, the key question concerns the ultimate objective of these sanctions: Are they merely intended to increase economic pressure on the Iranian regime, or are they part of a broader effort to weaken it?The report highlighted that the United States has built a vast sanctions regime against Iran over the past decade, relying on five major executive orders since 2010, as well as congressional legislation targeting primarily the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its sources of financing, and Iran’s oil, financial, missile, and nuclear sectors. Since February 2025, Washington has reportedly designated more than one thousand individuals, companies, vessels, and entities as part of its pressure campaign against Iran.
At the same time, Tehran has developed increasingly sophisticated methods to evade sanctions through complex international networks involving shell companies, banks, commercial intermediaries, and maritime fleets, enabling it to maintain portions of its oil exports and financial flows. The report also noted Iran’s growing reliance on cryptocurrencies as a means of transferring funds and preserving value. Several major sanctions-evasion cases were reviewed, including that of Iranian businessman Reza Zarrab, who was arrested in the United States in 2016 for allegedly operating a large-scale sanctions-evasion scheme. The report further cited recently uncovered networks linked to members of the Zarringhalam family and oil trader Hossein Shamkhani, describing how billions of dollars were allegedly transferred through shell companies, exchange offices, and international oil networks. American authorities have also seized oil shipments and prosecuted intermediaries linked to the IRGC, in cases that reportedly illustrate the growing role of cryptocurrencies in financial transfers.Nevertheless, the newspaper argued that these cases simultaneously demonstrate the remarkable adaptability of Iranian financial networks, which continue to alter their methods despite sanctions, seizures, and arrests, potentially limiting the long-term effectiveness of sanctions.
Hezbollah’s Financial Networks Under Scrutiny
The report then shifted its focus to Hezbollah, arguing that after its recent American reclassification in a manner explicitly linking it to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, greater attention should be directed toward targeting its financial infrastructure and economic networks. According to the report, dismantling these networks would not only increase pressure on Iran, given Hezbollah’s central role in Tehran’s regional strategy, but could also contribute to greater stability in the Levant. The report accused Hezbollah of managing illicit activities and channeling their revenues through complex financial networks. These activities allegedly include drug trafficking, money laundering, facilitating cocaine shipments, handling proceeds from Latin American cartels, and smuggling Captagon and other narcotics. It also attributed additional activities to Hezbollah, including trade-based money laundering, counterfeiting goods and currencies, trafficking in so-called “blood diamonds,” dealing in high-value commodities through West African networks, and smuggling goods and cash.According to the report, Hezbollah relies on front companies, charitable organizations, real-estate and commercial investments, and informal transfer systems such as hawala networks to collect, transfer, launder, and channel funds back into Lebanon. The report further alleged that Hezbollah operates a parallel financial system centered around the Al-Qard Al-Hassan Association, which it described as functioning effectively as a financial institution outside the officially regulated banking sector while handling Iranian funding and proceeds from illicit activities. The report called for targeting Al-Qard Al-Hassan and other entities such as Bayt Al-Mal, as well as currency-exchange networks, gold-trading fronts, and what it described as Hezbollah’s “central financial unit,” which allegedly coordinates the collection and distribution of resources.
Artificial Intelligence as a New Weapon
Among the report’s most notable recommendations was expanding cooperation between the United States and private technology companies specializing in cybersecurity and anti-money-laundering operations. It cited advanced data-analysis technologies developed by firms such as Palantir and argued that artificial intelligence could become a critical tool in tracking complex financial networks by identifying patterns and linking transaction data, commercial records, sanctions lists, and open-source information. According to the report’s assessment, these technologies—combined with cryptocurrency-tracking tools—could accelerate the identification of financial activities linked to Hezbollah and expose intermediaries, companies, and front organizations involved in moving and concealing funds. The report concluded that dismantling highly adaptable financial networks is not an easy task. Nevertheless, continuously disrupting those networks and increasing the cost of illicit financing operations could eventually weaken Hezbollah’s military capabilities. According to the report’s author, delivering a major blow to Hezbollah’s financial infrastructure and dismantling its existing networks may represent one of the most effective ways of increasing pressure on Tehran, especially given what was described as Hezbollah’s declining position in Syria and reduced support from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. The report therefore presents a new equation in the confrontation: sanctions on one side, and artificial intelligence, data analysis, and financial-tracking technologies on the other, all aimed at uncovering financial networks that are difficult to expose through traditional methods.

Three Scenarios Could Push Hezbollah Back into Confrontation: Is Lebanon Approaching a New War?
Janoubia/ August 29, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The Palestine Chronicle published a report examining the reasons behind Hezbollah’s halt to its daily operations against Israel and the circumstances that could prompt it to resume military confrontation. The report argues that the current calm does not necessarily indicate a decline in Hezbollah’s military capabilities or the exhaustion of its options; rather, it may represent a “tactical pause” intended to allow the organization to reorganize and reassess its position. According to the report, translated by Lebanon24, Hezbollah’s decision to stop responding to Israeli operations in southern Lebanon has raised questions regarding the motives behind this move and whether it reflects political and military pressures or a reassessment of battlefield calculations. The report noted that in early March, Hezbollah resumed responding to what it described as “daily Israeli violations of the ceasefire agreement” after nearly fifteen months of confrontation, a move that surprised observers who believed the organization had emerged from the war with significantly diminished capabilities. However, since April 16, Hezbollah has once again suspended its daily operations against Israel and returned to observing the ceasefire agreement. According to the report, its fighters now intervene primarily when Israeli forces attempt to advance into Lebanese territory. The report attributes the de-escalation decision to several factors, including understandings between the United States and Iran and pressures that, according to the author, contributed to reducing major Israeli strikes on Beirut and civilian areas in southern Lebanon. It also pointed to American pressure on the Syrian leadership to move toward the Bekaa region, coinciding with escalating internal Lebanese disputes over Hezbollah’s weapons and growing concerns that the issue could evolve into a confrontation between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Army. At the same time, the report suggests that the period of calm may have provided Hezbollah with an opportunity to reorganize its military posture, acquire additional weapons, and reposition some of its capabilities in preparation for more dangerous scenarios, including a possible confrontation with Syria or internal escalation within Lebanon. The report recalls the approach of former Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, who advocated avoiding internal conflict and making concessions when necessary in order to maintain focus on confronting Israel. According to the report, Hezbollah’s current leadership appears inclined to follow the same strategy.
Military Options
From a military perspective, the report identifies two principal paths available to Hezbollah should it decide to resume fighting. The first would involve a return to daily military operations aimed at inflicting material and human losses on Israeli forces. The second would involve participation in a broader conflict within a multi-front regional war. The author argues that the forty-one-day war demonstrated that Hezbollah’s effectiveness increases when it operates simultaneously with Iran and its allies. In particular, the report notes that Israeli air assets became heavily engaged in targeting sites inside Iran while Iranian ballistic missiles were being launched toward Israel, potentially providing Hezbollah with greater freedom to conduct more effective attacks. According to the report, Hezbollah possesses an arsenal of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and a substantial stockpile of drones, enabling it to strike targets deep inside Israel.
However, using these capabilities independently could impose greater costs than employing them as part of a broader multi-front confrontation.The report also notes that Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement had previously threatened to intervene in support of Hezbollah in any future war. According to the author’s account, Iranian pressure and warnings contributed to Israel’s decision to avoid further escalation prior to April 16.The report argues that Hezbollah remains capable of sustaining a prolonged confrontation with Israel even without Iranian participation or the opening of additional fronts, provided it does not simultaneously face an internal Lebanese confrontation or an attack originating from Syrian territory. Nevertheless, the author believes Hezbollah’s strongest scenario would be to wait for a broader regional conflict to develop and then enter the confrontation as part of a multi-front equation, allowing it to adopt a different military strategy and exert greater pressure on Israel.
Historical Comparison
The report recalls the period before Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, noting that Hezbollah was then carrying out approximately 300 operations per month against Israeli forces. By comparison, according to figures cited in the report, Hezbollah conducted as many as 100 operations per day during some phases of the most recent confrontation. However, the author emphasizes that Israel’s current strategic approach differs significantly from that of the late 1990s, arguing that Israeli leadership has shown a greater willingness to escalate since October 7, 2023.
Three Possible Scenarios In conclusion, the report identifies three primary scenarios that could lead Hezbollah to resume military operations: First: Hezbollah could find itself compelled to fight in self-defense as a result of Israeli attacks, possibly while also facing a Syrian confrontation or internal conflict within Lebanon. Second: A broader regional, multi-front war could erupt, prompting Hezbollah to join the conflict alongside Iran and its allies. Third: Hezbollah could wait for what it considers the appropriate moment to launch an independent confrontation with Israel, seeking to increase the cost of Israel’s military presence and wear down its forces over an extended period through asymmetric warfare tactics. The report concludes that the current calm does not necessarily signify the end of the confrontation. Rather, it may represent a period of repositioning and preparation while Hezbollah waits for circumstances that will determine whether it remains contained or returns to combat in a new round of conflict.

Negotiations Collide with Ali Al-Taher Hill: Israel Sets a Condition While the Lebanese Army Faces a Difficult Test
Janoubia/August 29, 2026
Ali Al-Taher Hill in southern Lebanon has become a central obstacle in the negotiation process between Beirut and Tel Aviv after efforts to resolve the issue of the military facility located beneath the hill through Lebanese Army intervention failed to produce results. The development comes amid continuing escalation in southern Lebanon, transforming the hill into a focal point where military realities and diplomatic negotiations intersect.According to Al-Jadeed TV, negotiations were conducted in an attempt to resolve the Ali Al-Taher dispute by allowing the Lebanese Army to enter the facility beneath the hill. However, those negotiations ended without a breakthrough.Earlier reports citing Lebanese diplomatic sources indicated that Israel is unwilling to resume negotiations unless the Lebanese government agrees to deploy the Lebanese Army to Ali Al-Taher Hill and take control of the military installation currently held by Hezbollah. According to those reports, Israel wants the Lebanese Army’s deployment to result in the removal of Hezbollah personnel from the site and the dismantling of its military infrastructure there, arguing that the existence of a Hezbollah military facility in the area contradicts the security arrangements Israel seeks to establish in southern Lebanon. These demands come as Ali Al-Taher has evolved from a military site of strategic importance into a direct component of the broader negotiating process.Reports indicate that the hill’s elevated position, overlooking extensive areas of southern Lebanon, has increased its military and political significance, making it a major point of pressure.
Lebanon and Israel Exchange Blame
Lebanon, for its part, accuses Israel of obstructing progress through its continued occupation, attacks, demolition activities, and land-clearing operations in the South.Lebanese officials argue that ongoing Israeli military operations place any field arrangements under severe strain and undermine efforts to advance negotiations. As a result, the Ali Al-Taher issue has become linked to the broader relationship between the two sides and to efforts aimed at preserving stability on the ground. The matter also coincides with Lebanese anticipation regarding future contacts between Washington and Tehran and the potential impact of any agreements—or disagreements—between them on the Lebanese front.
A Political and Security Test
Ali Al-Taher is no longer merely a military site in southern Lebanon. It has become a political and security dilemma that encapsulates a fundamental dispute between Lebanon and Israel: who exercises authority over the site, and how can security arrangements be implemented without triggering internal confrontation? Israel wants the Lebanese state to demonstrate its ability to impose its authority by entering the facility and dismantling the military infrastructure located there. However, implementing such a step without Hezbollah’s consent could place the Lebanese Army on a collision course with the organization. This is the core sensitivity of the issue.From the Israeli perspective, deployment of the Lebanese Army to the site would serve as a test of the Lebanese state's ability to enforce its authority. From another perspective, however, the move could evolve into an internal confrontation if it proceeds without Hezbollah’s approval. As Israeli military pressure continues and no agreement has been reached regarding a mechanism to address the hill’s status, Ali Al-Taher has become a test case for the negotiations themselves, amid growing concerns that failure to resolve the dispute could transform a political impasse into an open field confrontation.

Lebanon archeological finds showcase rich heritage
AFP/August 29, 2026
BEIRUT: From a Roman temple to ancient olive presses, Lebanon keeps turning up archaeological treasures even as the latest Israel-Hezbollah war has caused excavations to grind to a halt at precious heritage sites in the country’s south. Important discoveries in recent years include the remains of columns and bases from a Roman temple in Maasser Al-Shouf in the mountains southeast of Beirut, nestled next to a millennia-old cedar forest. “A whole system was built around this temple,” which dates to between the first century BC and the second century AD, said Myriam Ziade, regional antiquities official with the culture ministry. She said the site was turned into a Crusader fortress between the 12th and 13th centuries. The local municipality reported finding huge stone blocks on the hill in 2017, and excavations began five years later with a team from an Italian university, with the dig revealing the ruins of the large temple, she said. Archaeologists are to soon resume work at the site, located “on a network of roads leading from the Mediterranean coast to the Bekaa valley” in the country’s east, she said. The eastern city of Baalbek has one of Lebanon’s best-known landmarks: a stunningly well-preserved Roman temple complex set against the mountainous border with Syria.Lebanon is brimming with archaeological finds showcasing its rich history over thousands of years, from the Phoenician, Persian, Roman and Byzantine periods, the Crusades, and Arab and Islamic sultanates and empires.

In Qlayaa: Commemoration of the Martyrs of the Lebanese Resistance
Nidaa Al-Watan / August 29, 2026
In the presence of Republic Strong Bloc MP Georges Okais, Assistant Secretary-General for Regional Affairs Georges Eid, Special Envoy for the Marjayoun-Hasbaya Region Fadi Salameh, and with the participation of regional center presidents and members, supporters, and party comrades, the Marjayoun-Hasbaya region commemorated the martyrs of the Lebanese Resistance. The Divine Liturgy was presided over by Father Antonios Farah, with the participation of the Episcopal Vicar for Marjayoun and Hasbaya, Father Georges Nahra, Father Hanna Khoury, Father Philippe Aklah, and Father Ghassan Nasr.
Among those attending were Qlayaa Mayor Hanna Daher, representatives of Jdeidet Marjayoun, Deir Mimas, and Rashaya Al-Foukhar, local mukhtars, municipal officials, and community leaders. Also present were Kataeb Party officials, including Saeed Saeed, President of the Marjayoun-Hasbaya District, and Khaled Abla, Head of the Jdeidet Marjayoun Section, in addition to Kamal Abu Ghayda representing former Minister Anwar Al-Khalil, Faisal Ghabar representing the Progressive Socialist Party in the region, Inspector General Nidal Al-Rai, school principals, and presidents of clubs and associations.

Rifi: The Era of Wilayat al-Faqih as a Model Capable of Governing the Region Has Ended
National News Agency (NNA) / August 29, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
MP Ashraf Rifi said in a statement that “Mojtaba Khamenei is either clinically dead, or his political role has effectively come to an end. Whatever is being issued in his name appears to be part of an attempt to reorganize the balance of power within the Iranian regime.”He added: “As for what is being issued under the pen of Ahmad Vahidi, commander of what remains of the Revolutionary Guard and a central figure in the recent coup, it suggests a clear attempt to monopolize both religious and political legitimacy by granting religious cover to one individual while denying it to rival figures.” Rifi continued:“The most important reality is that the era of religious regimes in the region entered its final stage with the death of Ali Khamenei. What we are witnessing today is not the consolidation of a religious regime but a struggle over the remnants of its influence and legacy.” He concluded: “The era of Wilayat al-Faqih as a concept capable of ruling the region has ended. What is taking place today is a battle over the remaining influence and power left behind after the collapse of this model.”

The Gathering of Lebanese Shiites: The State Must End Outsourcing Aid and Reconstruction to Institutions Controlled by the ‘Shiite Duo’ and Put an End to Sectarian and Discriminatory Practices
Janoubia/August 29, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The Gathering of Lebanese Shiites held its regular meeting on August 28, 2026, during which participants discussed a number of developments on the Lebanese and regional scenes, as well as political, economic, and social issues directly affecting the lives of Lebanese citizens, particularly members of the Shiite community.The gathering focused on the worsening economic and social conditions facing Shiites amid rising living costs and increasing difficulties in securing basic necessities, especially safe and adequate housing. These challenges are compounded by the approaching school year and the additional financial burdens associated with tuition fees, books, supplies, transportation, and other educational expenses. The participants stressed that the situation in southern Lebanon can no longer be viewed as a temporary crisis or passing circumstance because of its prolonged duration and the displacement, destruction, economic disruption, social hardship, and community fragmentation it has caused. For this reason, the gathering proposed describing what the South and its inhabitants are experiencing as a “Shiite Nakba” (Shiite Catastrophe), arguing that the consequences of the disaster may continue for many years and that entire generations could be forced to wait before their villages and neighborhoods regain normal life. The gathering also discussed aid, compensation, and relief programs and expressed serious concern over reports that some assistance is being distributed selectively according to political or partisan affiliation, as well as claims that aid distribution has been entrusted to forces that dominate decision-making in southern Lebanon. The statement emphasized that assistance is a right of those affected and not a favor granted by any political organization. It stressed that aid distribution should be based on clear, transparent, and unified criteria, free from favoritism and political loyalties. The gathering called upon government ministries, official institutions, and donor organizations to actively monitor and publicly disclose eligibility criteria, distribution mechanisms, and the identities of implementing agencies in order to ensure that assistance reaches its rightful recipients without discrimination. The organization further stressed that the people of southern Lebanon, like all Lebanese citizens, are rights-bearing citizens rather than electoral constituencies or partisan groups to be exploited for political purposes.
Protecting their dignity and guaranteeing their rights to housing, employment, education, and personal security, it said, should be at the forefront of any national policy, relief effort, or reconstruction plan.The gathering also condemned what it described as discriminatory practices, sectarian behavior, and hate speech directed against displaced Lebanese Shiites in some towns and areas where they have sought refuge after the destruction of their homes. It accused certain local administrations of neglecting the problem or even encouraging such behavior and called upon the Ministry of Interior to address the issue and instruct local authorities to adopt measures that protect displaced residents and prevent discriminatory and racist practices.At the conclusion of its meeting, the Gathering of Lebanese Shiites called for treating the southern crisis as a national, humanitarian, and social issue that transcends internal divisions. It urged the establishment of independent and transparent mechanisms for assessing damage, distributing aid, providing temporary housing, and implementing a serious and sustainable reconstruction plan that would enable residents to return to their villages, restore normal life, and end the practice of assigning reconstruction efforts to institutions and administrations dominated by the “Shiite Duo,” which, according to the statement, have effectively been turned into partisan offices.

Arrest of the Primary Accomplice in the Kidnapping and Murder of Pascal Sleiman in Syria / Will Damascus Hand Over the Wanted Individuals to Beirut?
Richard Harfouch/Nidaa Al-Watan August 29, 2026  (Google translation from Arabic)
For over two years, the crime of kidnapping and murdering Pascal Sleiman, the coordinator of the Lebanese Forces party in Jbeil, remained trapped between two contradictory narratives: a narrative of a car theft gone wrong ending in the owner's death, and a narrative of targeted assassination driven by motives extending beyond ordinary criminal acts. The recent indictment issued in the case marks a fundamental shift in the course of the dossier. While the decision did not adopt a populist political framing of the case, nor did it definitively resolve the ultimate beneficiary or the final underlying motive, it judicially dismissed the "car theft" hypothesis as an explanation for what happened. It established that there was pre-planning and a kidnapping operation that culminated in Sleiman’s intentional murder—and it is precisely here that the true significance of the decision lies.
According to the data contained in the file, Mount Lebanon First Investigating Judge Nada Asmar did not treat the political narratives surrounding the case as givens. Instead, she reassembled the elements of the operation from its beginning: the movements of the group members, the surveillance of Sleiman, the selection of time and location, the alteration of travel routes, turning off phones or placing them in airplane mode, the use of multiple vehicles, the division of roles among different groups, and the concealment of the true objective of the operation from some of its participants. These details force a question that can no longer be ignored: What car theft operation requires this level of organization and security precautions?
On April 7, 2024, Sleiman was subjected to a kidnapping operation while he was in the Mayfouq area, before being transferred to Syrian territory, where his body was subsequently found. From the very first hours, a narrative emerged claiming that the objective was to steal his car and that his death occurred during the execution of the crime. However, the indictment redrew the legal boundaries of the case. The investigation, as shown by its conclusions, took into account the number of group members, the tracking and monitoring mechanism, the manner in which Sleiman was handled, and his expressed readiness to surrender what he owned in exchange for his release. Despite this, the operation did not stop at seizing the car; it ended with his murder and the transfer of his body to Syria. Consequently, the decision shifted the case's characterization from a "theft ending in accidental death" to a planned, intentional kidnapping and murder, while leaving the task of expanding the search for the true motive to subsequent judicial stages. This specific point will be among the most prominent files presented to the Indictment Chamber and later to the Criminal Court: Why Pascal Sleiman specifically?
The man was no ordinary figure. Politically, he was the "Lebanese Forces" coordinator in Jbeil, a position carrying significant partisan symbolism in a highly sensitive area. Professionally, he spent many years in the banking sector and assumed responsibilities in information systems at Byblos Bank. While these elements alone do not prove any political or financial motive, they make investigating the background of the victim's selection a fundamental part of uncovering the full truth. Sleiman’s wife, Micheline Wehbe, viewed the decision as a milestone after more than two years since the crime, stressing that the family has never been convinced of the theft narrative from day one, though they chose to wait for the judiciary's word. Wehbe told Nidaa Al-Watan that the decision "restored hope not only to Pascal’s family, but to all Lebanese, that there is a judiciary capable of playing its role and speaking the truth regardless of circumstances and pressures." She added that the family respected the investigation from the beginning and did not preempt its results, but remained convinced that what happened "was not merely a car theft operation," considering that "the decision brought the case back to its correct path after a great deal of ambiguity and misinformation surrounding it." For her, the issuance of the decision does not mark the end of the road, but rather the beginning of a new phase before the Criminal Court, emphasizing that the family is not seeking revenge, but rather truth, justice, and holding everyone who participated in the crime accountable for their actions before the law. However, the most prominent development that may open a new window for the investigation comes this time from Syria. Judicial sources revealed to Nidaa Al-Watan that the Syrian Firas Riad Memo, one of the main participants according to the file in the kidnapping and murder of Pascal Sleiman, was arrested by Syrian security in March 2026 in the Qatana area and is now in the custody of the Syrian authorities.
The sources considered that this development opens the door for more effective Lebanese judicial action toward Damascus to complete the investigation, particularly regarding the motive and who stands behind the operation. They added that even if handing Memo over to Lebanon proves legally impossible for any reason, the Lebanese judiciary can still request the Syrian judicial authorities to interrogate him in Syria regarding Sleiman's crime and send a copy of the investigation records to Lebanon, allowing the judicial path to continue and an attempt to uncover what remains obscure in the case.
For her part, the lawyer representing Sleiman's wife, Attorney Eliane Fakhry, revealed via Nidaa Al-Watan that the request to extradite two of the primary wanted individuals in the case—Zakaria Zaafar al-Qasim and Firas Riad Memo—did not stem from recent developments. She clarified that she submitted an official extradition request as early as August 27, 2024, and that the request followed the competent administrative and judicial channels at the time, but the political and security conditions in Syria did not allow for a result.
Today, after the transfer of the file from the investigating judge to the Indictment Chamber, Fakhry affirmed that the prosecution team will renew its request and re-pursue the handover of the Syrian wanted individuals, based on the legal frameworks governing judicial cooperation between Lebanon and Syria.
In contrast, sources at the Ministry of Interior settled the question regarding the authority mandated to act, confirming that the dossier of exchanging wanted individuals or requesting their extradition is fundamentally a judicial matter. The sources explained that "the competent authority is the Public Prosecution Office at the Court of Cassation, and any official request must be issued by the Lebanese judiciary, while the security agencies undertake the execution of what the judiciary requests within approved legal frameworks."
Thus, Memo's arrest in Syria presents a practical opportunity for the Lebanese judiciary, especially since the file no longer revolves solely around the question of how the crime occurred, but has moved to the harder question: Why did it happen? The indictment answered a fundamental part: Sleiman did not die in a fleeting theft, but was intentionally killed following an organized, planned kidnapping. As for the missing link, it remains the motive and the ultimate beneficiary.

The Battle of the Heights: What After Ali Al-Tahr?
Nadia Ghassoub/Nidaa Al-Watan/August 29, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The importance of the heights in southern Lebanon is no longer measured solely by their geographical elevation, but by the capacity they grant for observation and control over movement and deployment paths. From here, locations such as the Beaufort Castle (Qalaat al-Shaqif), Ali Al-Tahr, and Mount Rihan acquire significance that goes beyond their immediate military boundaries, entering into broader calculations concerning the shape of the security zone that may crystallize after the end of the confrontation. Ali Al-Tahr, which in past weeks turned into one of the most prominent flashpoints of confrontation, needs no recounting of what has already been said about it. Its strategic location, alongside the discussions surrounding tunnels and military installations within it, made it a central focus in Israeli calculations and those of Hezbollah. However, what matters today is not the details of the battle, but whether it will remain an isolated event or reflect a broader trajectory to rearrange the military geography in the South. Before it, Beaufort Castle stood as a clear model of the importance of commanding heights. Between Shaqif and Ali Al-Tahr, another geography emerges that deserves monitoring, foremost among them being Mount Rihan. Yet, transitioning from one site to another does not automatically allow for the conclusion that there is an integrated military plan targeting these locations sequentially, nor is there, thus far, decisive evidence proving that Israel has decided to advance toward Rihan or turn it into a direct military target.
Nevertheless, the location of Mount Rihan makes it part of the equation. It lies within a mountain range granting it the ability to oversee vast areas of its surroundings and monitor axes connecting southern regions to one another. Geographically, it is linked to Iqlim al-Tuffah and expansions that affect population movement, access to agricultural land, transportation routes, and the future of economic activity and reconstruction. The sensitivity of the scene is heightened by what was revealed during the confrontations regarding a vast network of tunnels and military installations built by Hezbollah over the years. This infrastructure—including storage and supply facilities and tunnels with various functions—makes controlling the geography more complex. However, the presence of underground infrastructure in certain areas does not necessarily mean that every height in the South conceals similar installations; therefore, a distinction must be made between confirmed intelligence and the probabilities dictated by the nature of the terrain.
Hence, the question regarding Mount Rihan is premature militarily, but not politically or geographically. If the confrontation ends at specific borders, and the Lebanese Army takes over the strategic positions within new security arrangements, Rihan may remain outside the circle of escalation. Conversely, if Israel heads toward a deeper security perimeter or seeks to guarantee control over the heights overlooking movement axes, its location could become much more sensitive in the coming phase.Here, the issue transcends the limits of narrow military maps. Any redraw of deployment in this region will reflect on the shape of life within it, the Lebanese state's ability to assert its presence, and the nature of the arrangements imposed after operations halt. Therefore, monitoring the heights does not mean assuming a battle, but reading the direction the southern map could take in the post-war phase, and preventing possibilities from turning into realities before their time. Thus, the issue does not appear to be a race from one hill to another, as much as it is a struggle over geography itself: who monitors it, who deploys in it, who secures it, and who holds the decision of access to it. After Shaqif and Ali Al-Tahr, Mount Rihan remains a site for observation rather than a confirmed target. The most important question, ultimately, is not what will happen in Ali Al-Tahr, but what comes after Ali Al-Tahr in the political future of the South.

The President's Messages from General Security to Whom?
Samer Zreik/Nidaa Al-Watan/August 29, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The speech delivered by President Joseph Aoun during the celebration of the 81st anniversary of General Security carried political messages that sparked a storm of controversy amid what appeared to be a trace of ambiguity regarding the intended recipient. This ambiguity stems not from an excess of symbols, but from the complex reality formed in recent weeks, as General Security found itself at the heart of multi-directional political and media pressure.
These pressures ranged from handing over an officer from the Assad army to Syria, granting the "unaccredited" Iranian ambassador a 6-month courtesy residency, the explosion of the Hezbollah passport issue on a wide scale, to the fabricated uproar surrounding recruitment exam results.
President Aoun wanted to send his first message by utilizing the occasion to support the General Security institution, affirming that it is not left exposed to political campaigns. His support for its director, Major General Hassan Shaqir, was clear in both photographic symbolism and rhetoric. The President believes that what the institution has achieved over a year and a half—despite difficult political and financial conditions—makes it a role model for state administrations and security institutions.
The indicators of this message were documented in the chosen title, "Laying the cornerstone for General Security medicine," as well as the video showcased regarding comprehensive workshops, the rehabilitation of regional and border buildings, the updating of systems and databases, and the development of automation. This work has taken acceptable strides with the creation of an electronic platform through which citizens are supposed to obtain all services seamlessly over the coming months, including biometric passports.
As for President Joseph Aoun's demand for personnel and officers "not to be influenced by the media and what is published on social media platforms"—which took up the largest share of controversy due to conflicting interpretations—the intention targeted the massive campaign over the recruitment exam results for the ranks of constable and inspector. Shaqir's insistence on adopting successful candidates according to their grades, while aligning this criterion with regional, sectarian, and confessional balances, exposed him to multi-party political pressures to pass names and push failing candidates through within the culture of traditional political clientelism (quotas). The President of the Republic put his finger on the wound of these results by speaking of "people who do not want state institutions," but rather clientelism—this being the subtext of his politically intense message. Quotas were not entirely absent, but they were kept within narrow limits. The same message was present in the issue of the frozen residency of Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Reza Sheibani for six months. Although Shaqir appeared to be the main actor in this formula, it received broad official political cover encompassing Baabda, the Grand Serail, and Ain el-Tineh, to avert the explosion of a crisis in strained relations with Iran.The same applies to the handover of the major general in the Assad army to his country's authorities, viewed as a serious test for the path of reshaping Lebanese-Syrian relations according to existing agreements and understandings.
As for the investigations published by the Al-Arabiya channel regarding Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps elements obtaining Lebanese passports, they were outside the scope of the speech's messages for a simple reason: Shaqir had already launched an internal investigation into the matter the day after his appointment, under full cover from Baabda and with Arab and regional monitoring. At the time, it was revealed that major drug traffickers had obtained forged passports.
However, the deeper message transcends these issues. The greatest challenge for the institution and its director goes beyond balancing security dimensions with administrative improvement; it is tied to dismantling pockets of influence, addressing a political identity that extends beyond state boundaries, and a functional legacy that was helpful to Hezbollah and caused many comparisons and campaigns. The identity carved into collective consciousness requires greater effort, and this is the master message in the President's speech: an institution once burdened by parallel roles is gradually reclaiming its national function as a state tool.

Does Sheikh Naim Qassem know that Bashar al-Assad "fled" from Syria?
Mohammad Salam/Federal News Agency/August 29, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The world today is witnessing what amounts to a third confrontation in 93 years with a totalitarian regime: the Iranian regime of the Supreme Leader. This follows the end of Hitler's Nazi totalitarianism, which placed the Aryan-Germanic race at the top of the human hierarchy and collapsed at the end of World War II in 1945 after ruling since 1933, and the South African apartheid regime, which ruled from 1948 until 1994 when it ended with the first multiracial democratic elections, where races were categorized according to skin color. Hitler's racial Nazism considered the "Aryan-Germanic race" superior to the rest of the peoples of the planet. The South African system adopted a system of "segregation" that divided the population into four categories: Black, White, Coloured, and Asian, imposing segregation in housing, education, and public facilities. It's worth noting that "apartheid" in the local language means "separation." One of the most difficult confrontations the free world has faced with totalitarian regimes is the current conflict with the Iranian regime of the Supreme Leader (Velayat-e Faqih). This is because its totalitarianism is based on "doctrine," not on race, color, or geographical origin. This makes it a religious ideology that transcends nationalities and classes, uniting its followers in obedience to the Supreme Leader as the representative of the Mahdi. The system of the Supreme Leader is characterized by the discipline and obedience of its followers and their hostility towards others, even those who are followers of the Twelver Shi'a sect, whose religious authority is in Najaf, Iraq, not Qom, Iran. But before consolidating its control over Lebanon, the Iranian-backed party stumbled in a bloody Shiite-Shiite war known as the "War of Brothers" between the Amal Movement and Hezbollah. This three-year conflict, which lasted from 1988 to 1990, resulted in between 1,500 and 2,500 deaths on both sides. Historical documentation, including Wikipedia and reports by the Independent Arabia Foundation, indicates that the vast majority of casualties were from the Amal Movement, which lost three of its most prominent field commanders and founders: Daoud Daoud, Mahmoud Faqih, and Hassan Sbeiti. They were killed in an ambush in the Ouzai district of Beirut on September 22, 1988. At least 5,000 people were wounded on both sides as a result of direct fighting and heavy weapons fire. The war encompassed areas of Beirut, including the Al-Laja and Al-Khandaq Al-Ghamiq neighborhoods, the southern suburbs of Beirut, Ghaziyeh south of Sidon, Nabatieh, and the Iqlim al-Tuffah region. Former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, in cooperation with the Iranian leadership, imposed an end to the "war of brothers" in October 1990. Roles were divided so that the Amal Movement assumed the political and parliamentary leadership of the Shiites, while Hezbollah assumed the role of what it calls "resistance"—a role it did not adhere to. Hezbollah participated in the parliamentary elections, which resulted in a bloc representing it in the Lebanese parliament. After the fall of the Assad regime and its Iranian ally, which had ruled Syria and Lebanon, Hezbollah lost the "Arab" support for its resistance, which has not liberated an inch of Gaza and has lost approximately 600 square kilometers of southern Lebanon to Israel. This is despite Secretary-General Naim Qassem's insistence that he only recognizes the November 26, 2014 agreement, signed in the past, roughly two weeks before the collapse of the Assad-Iranian alliance and the rise to power of President Ahmed al-Sharaa, an ally of America, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and most Arab states. This raises the question: Will the regime of the Supreme Leader and its proxies fall, or will all those it is fighting fall with it?

So that Lebanon, Israel, and the United Nations may find peace!
Elias Zoghbi/Facebook/August 29, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
Against the backdrop of the debate at the United Nations regarding the renewal or non-renewal of UNIFIL's mandate, and the disagreement over the replacement force after its withdrawal at the end of this year, let us consider breaking free from this vicious cycle that has persisted since 1978, through 2000 and 2006, and up to the present day. Let us courageously acknowledge that this UN force has failed to prevent wars, implement Resolution 1701, or ensure stability. Its mandate has consistently been violated, whether by Israel or Hezbollah, as if they were conspiring to render it ineffective. Israel consistently complains about UNIFIL's inability to prevent Hezbollah's armed activities south of the Litani River, and expresses its displeasure by intermittently obstructing its convoys and patrols. Meanwhile, Hezbollah has repeatedly attacked Israel, sometimes under the guise of protecting civilians, and at other times by directly firing on its convoys and killing its soldiers. Hezbollah has exploited UNIFIL's laxity to dig tunnels and reinforce its arsenals and positions, in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which mandates UNIFIL's implementation.
Therefore, given the limited effectiveness of these UN forces, we, as the Lebanese state and as Lebanese citizens, must demonstrate national courage and strive to abandon this failed "international service" instead of demanding its extension with all its problems. This can be achieved by persistently pursuing direct negotiations to realize two national objectives:
The state's monopoly on weapons and decision-making, and achieving an Israeli withdrawal under the necessary security and political conditions, most importantly the dismantling of all illegal weapons. The Lebanese army will then assume sole responsibility for the borders and sovereignty with Israel, based on peaceful understanding and mutual guarantees of full sovereign rights. Here, another act of courage is required: acknowledging that the 1949 Armistice Agreement has been overtaken by developments and circumstances. Clinging to it means remaining in a state of war, while we are now compelled to choose peace and align ourselves with the regional movement towards major understandings and historic settlements. We cannot remain prisoners of the past while others are opening up horizons for the future. If a military monitoring force is deemed necessary to implement the field agreements and oversee the Israeli withdrawal and disarmament, whether based on "experimental zones" or otherwise, it can be formed and deployed, with its mission ending immediately upon the completion of the weapons inventory and Israel's withdrawal.
This is the logical, natural, and practical path for implementing the "framework agreement" between Lebanon, Israel, and the United States, thus ending the "international force cycle" and bringing relief to Lebanon, Israel, and the United Nations itself! Anything other than this option is a recipe for war.

Early Setbacks in the Path of the "New" Lebanese State
Nabil Bou Monsef/An-Nahar/August 29, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The Lebanese political arena was not lacking in voices raised in protest and condemnation of the often discordant statements of US envoy Tom Barrack regarding the inclusion of Hezbollah and Iran in any internal dialogue, without which no settlement would be viable, even if he later tried to rectify it in a manner reminiscent of his earlier attempt to "fix it but made it worse." Nor was the arena lacking in voices of escalating discontent, marked by widespread anger, regarding the resort by presidential and security officials to passing a settlement to extend the term of the Iranian ambassador, a move rejected by the Lebanese state in all its forms, even before Foreign Minister Youssef Raji, who had taken the initial step of declaring Mohammad Reza Sheibani persona non grata. The procedural pass, or leak, that legalized Sheibani's stay for six months, was executed in the manner of last-minute maneuvers, a tactic often associated with the authorities during the eras of Syrian and Iranian tutelage, even though subsequent reactions were largely characterized by a decision to refrain from causing further unraveling of the situation. The major alliances upon which the foundations of the current era and government are built have been exposed. Naturally, the authority, now facing its most perilous test yet in the face of the most arduous negotiating period with Israel, has survived a double blow. The most serious expression of this was the astonishing, absolute silence maintained by the presidents and political figures, offering neither a response to Tom Barak nor even a justification for the disappointing solution adopted to keep Mohammad Reza Sheibani in his post despite the Foreign Minister's firm and public stance. A segment of the Lebanese population, exhausted by the continuous crises that have plagued the past, present, and future, tends to readily accept the logic of compromises, typical of the traditionalists in the intricacies of Lebanese politics. A heavy history, yet to be written, despite the ceaseless torrent of personal political memoirs—a history that continues to evolve with the digital revolution and the era of the global artificial intelligence system—demands that much of it be gathered to teach future generations which country they belong to and what the characteristics of its past and present are in the very foundation of state-building. Nevertheless, we find ourselves asking, time after time, and time again, what this context means for the state. The new government, so fondly termed and imbued with long-held hopes, has finally found an opportunity it cannot afford to miss. The current trajectory of setbacks by the existing authority will not serve the interests of the state, the supreme symbol of sovereignty and the ability to match major and minor decisions, at every level of the state hierarchy, with decisive action, even if implementation is marred by both positive and negative aspects. The gradual collapse of the state through these setbacks is the most dangerous and dire fate Lebanon faces today, a fate inextricably linked to its promised path of dismantling the buried structures of power falsely and ignorantly labeled the "deep state," which are in reality remnants of occupations that preceded, accompanied, and even surpassed the Israeli occupation. These models, whose danger is downplayed by those in power, reveal a spreading disintegration that warns us that no setback, even when some or most of its causes are justified, will be halted by political expediency or cheap attacks on those who refuse to accept these regressive steps backward in the nation-building process. The hope remains that a confluence of external circumstances will somehow restore the state. There is a certain degree of regression because countries do not adhere to the strict and unequivocal standards of authority every day to grant the government and its officials certificates of good conduct or to punish them for failing to meet the necessary standards of decisiveness in implementing decisions, policies, and procedures. This is also a dangerous misconception because no one knows how a country's external perception can change when its archives accumulate precedents that foreshadow a loss of credibility.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on August 29-30/2026
That sucker is open": U.S. gains the upper hand in the battle for Hormuz
Barak Ravid/xios/August 29/2026
The Strait of Hormuz has been Iran's most powerful card since the start of the war in late February. But over the past two months, U.S. officials say the American military has steadily eroded Iran's leverage over the crucial waterway.
Why it matters: What began six months ago with the goal of degrading Iran's missile capabilities and destroying what remained of its nuclear program has evolved into an open-ended fight over the world's most important energy chokepoint.
U.S. officials say they've turned the tide in the strait and believe it could be a watershed moment in the war that brings not only gradual relief to the world economy, but also a better deal with Iran.
"That sucker is open. The Iranian response is very mild. They don't want us to go back at them. That's the whole ball game. The rest doesn't matter," President Trump told Axios in a phone interview on Thursday.
Flashback: When the war began, the Strait of Hormuz was open, oil was flowing without interruption to global energy markets and Brent crude oil was trading at about $72 a barrel.
Behind the scenes: Two Israeli officials say the move to close the Strait of Hormuz was initiated by then-commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, General Alireza Tangsiri.
In the first 72 hours of the war, Iran announced it was closing the strait and warned it would attack tankers that tried to transit.
But behind the scenes, Tangsiri gave an order that dramatically escalated the situation: to deploy naval mines in the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS), the main international shipping lane through the strait, Israeli and U.S. officials say.
Tangsiri was killed three weeks later in an Israeli airstrike in Bandar Abbas, Iran.
Driving the news: Iranian attacks on ships and the threat of mines brought commercial shipping to a standstill.
In the next two months, Brent crude skyrocketed to as high as $126 a barrel.
Trump agreed to a ceasefire on April 8 partly in response to rising gas prices in the U.S. and pressure on energy markets — precisely the economic pain Iran wanted to inflict.
The reopening of the strait was the linchpin of the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed two months later.
But the strait never fully opened and the deal soon collapsed.
Zoom in: After the MOU fell apart, the military worked to reopen the strait unilaterally. The effort included several elements:
Together with the United Arab Emirates, a U.S. military task force started guiding ships through the southern channel of the strait while giving them air cover and intercepting Iranian drone and cruise missile attacks.
A two-week U.S. bombing campaign significantly undercut the IRGC's capacity to attack ships crossing the strait.
A mine-sweeping operation involved Navy divers, Navy SEALs, underwater and surface drones, and private contractors to detect and neutralize the mines.
A blockade of Iranian ports was restored.
Zoom out: While the number of ships that cross the strait — and the amount of oil exported from it — remain well below pre-war levels, the reality on the ground has improved. Iran has lost much of its control over the strait and the U.S. military is effectively controlling most of it, U.S. officials said.
Iran is still firing at ships but its ability to target them accurately is limited. Only 2% of the ships that transited through the strait over the last month were hit, a U.S. official said.
More than 200 mine-like objects have been swept from the main lane of the strait. U.S. officials say only 11 of them were actual mines and just a few were properly deployed.
In recent weeks, traffic through the southern channel has grown to 20 to 30 tankers every night, carrying an average of 9 to 10 million barrels, per U.S. officials. That's roughly half the pre-war volume.
"We achieved a major milestone in the Strait of Hormuz. Internationally recognized sea routes in the strait are free of Iranian sea mines. Bottom line: Today international shipping lanes are open and momentum is building," CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper said in a video posted Thursday night.
Yes, but: Oil experts and tanker trackers are skeptical that the actual figures are that high. U.S. officials say they're undercounting.
Periodic reports of oil tankers being struck by projectiles also raise questions about the safety of commercial shipping through the strait, despite U.S. assurances.
The big picture: The U.S. oil export operation shows signs of momentum. The UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait have already joined, and Saudi Arabia is also expected to. U.S. officials hope Qatar will soon start sending liquefied natural gas tankers through the U.S.-protected route.
By mid-September, the U.S. hopes to widen the main channel of the strait so that at least 50 ships can transit in and out of the Gulf every night.
The goal is to reach 60 to 70 percent of pre-war oil exports.
State of play: Two regional sources told Axios that in recent days Iran has shown renewed interest in negotiations.
The commander of the Pakistani army visited Tehran on Sunday to try to revive the mediation between the U.S. and Iran.
He was followed later in the week by the foreign minister of Oman, who came to Tehran to discuss the Strait of Hormuz.
On Thursday, the prime minister of Qatar — a key mediator between Iran and the U.S. — arrived for talks in Tehran at Iran's request, the regional sources said.
At least in public, Iran has stuck to the same positions, demanding that the U.S. implement the MOU and offer terms for reopening the strait.
The other side: At the moment, President Trump says he isn't interested in negotiating with Iran.
"I don't want to meet, they do. In fact, they are begging to make a deal," Trump wrote on Truth Social Thursday.
But White House envoy Steve Witkoff is still talking to the Qataris and to other mediators.
U.S. negotiators want to see if the U.S. blockade, economic pressure campaign and growing leverage in the strait will make Iran soften its positions.
U.S. officials believe shifting conditions in the strait give the Trump administration a stronger hand in any future negotiations with Iran.
They see the June 17 MOU, which focused partly on Hormuz, as no longer relevant. And they're treating negotiations between Oman and Iran on new arrangements for managing the strait as background noise.

War weighs on Iran’s economy as US intensifies sanctions
Reuters/29 August ,2026
Iranian leaders are acknowledging the economic toll of war with the United States, with the supreme leader calling on the government to address the hardship while the president reported foreign trade has shrunk 35 percent due to the American sanctions and blockade.
The warnings came even as other leaders threaten the US with military retaliation and declarations that the Iranian navy maintains control of the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic waterway giving Iran leverage through its ability to disrupt global energy markets.
With the war now at the six-month mark, and negotiations at an impasse, President Donald Trump’s administration has stepped up efforts to punish Iran financially with what it has billed as an “economic D-Day.”Washington has warned countries to cut their business ties with Iran or face secondary sanctions, though the Treasury Department stopped short of imposing penalties against major Iranian trade partners such as China and India, which could have repercussions for the US and global economies. The US Treasury Department did impose sanctions on Egypt’s Banque Misr for doing business with Tehran, proposing a rule that would cut off the bank’s branches in the United Arab Emirates from dollar transactions. Egypt’s central bank said it and the foreign ministry were in contact with US officials concerning the matter, adding the measure was limited to Banque Misr UAE’s US dollar transactions with correspondent banks only. Banque Misr said it is reviewing the notice related to restricting US dollar correspondent banking services provided by US financial institutions to its branch in the UAE, according to a statement on Saturday.
It added that the branch icontinues to provide banking services to its customers in accordance with the applicable rules and procedures. US Treasury officials separately issued sanctions targeting one entity based in Hong Kong and one person linked to Iran’s Bank Melli, according to a notice posted on the department’s website. US Treasury officials separately issued sanctions targeting one entity based in Hong Kong and one person linked to Iran’s Bank Melli, according to a notice posted on the department’s website.The sanctions drive compounds the toll of the war on Iran’s economy, where annual inflation hit 66 percent last month. Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, who was injured and has not been seen publicly since the February 28 attack that killed his father, former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, called on the government to tackle the economic hardship.
“There is the need to seriously address the chain of economic and livelihood challenges, such as inflation, unemployment, management of prices and the market for goods and services,” said a written statement attributed to Khamenei. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian told state media that Iranian exports and imports slumped nearly 35 percent because of US sanctions and a naval blockade of Iranian ports. But he said Iran was able to sell about 90 million barrels of oil during the short-lived memorandum of understanding that the US and Iran signed in June, when Washington permitted Iranian oil sales. With the US focused on its economic pressure campaign, others have sought to revive diplomatic efforts to end the war. Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani met with Iranian leaders in Tehran on Thursday. He said he had stressed during the meeting the importance of returning to the pre-war status of open shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on Friday described the talks with Al Thani as “creative.” Qatar, a US ally and Gulf neighbor to Iran, and Pakistan helped broker the June memorandum of understanding that led to a brief ceasefire before disagreements over the strait caused it to unravel. US military commanders say American forces have cleared sea mines from the strait that had been laid months ago by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Trump has repeatedly said the strait is open, but the IRGC’s navy said in a statement that such claims “are an obvious lie,” reiterating that the waterway remained closed to ships without Iranian permission. Preliminary shipping data released on Friday showed that only seven commodity vessels had transited the Strait of Hormuz on Thursday, down from 17 a day earlier and below the 10-day average of 15.

6 months on, Iran’s leaders are defying the US and signaling no tolerance for dissent
AP/August 30, 2026
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates: After six months of war, Iran’s leadership has coalesced around a hard core of military generals and clerics long entrenched in the ruling theocracy. They are ready for a potentially long confrontation with the US and determined to prevent any unrest at home.
It’s a far cry from US President Donald Trump’s initial hopes of toppling the Islamic Republic and his subsequent claims that “regime change” had brought more compromising officials to the fore. Iran’s new leaders evince little faith in any agreement with Trump — after coming under attack twice while holding talks — and they may be bracing for another assault once the US replenishes its supplies of interceptors. They have also threatened to escalate the war as a continuing American blockade and Trump’s plans for new sanctions threaten to suffocate Iran’s already worsening economy.
“If (Trump) wants to do something, we will retaliate in a seismic manner,” the new secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Mohsen Rezaei, said last weekend. In a post on X, he said that “if the economic war continues, not a single drop of oil will be exported” from the Arabian Gulf.
Iran is determined to smother any internal unrest
Rezaei’s appointment came in a recent set of decrees by the supreme leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, that formally set Iran’s new senior leadership, including top military posts. Khamenei’s father and much of the highest echelons were killed in the bombing campaign launched by the US and Israel on Feb. 28.Perhaps most telling was the newly named head of the Basij, the Revolutionary Guard’s volunteer street force, which played a major role in crushing January’s nationwide protests, when thousands were killed. That post went to Hossein Taeb, a hard-line cleric and longtime intelligence chief who led one of the first major crackdowns on protests, in 2009.His appointment is seen as a sign that the leadership is intent on preventing any new unrest as discontent over the economy spreads.The 56-year-old Khamenei has not been seen in public, or even appeared in video or audio, since Israeli strikes killed his father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who had been Iran’s supreme leader for some 37 years. The younger Khamenei is believed to have been wounded in the strikes. His public absence could reflect the depth of security surrounding him, since he is likely in Israel’s sights, or the extent of his wounds.
The supreme leader surrounds himself with hard-line allies
With the appointments announced Aug. 11 and 12, he has surrounded himself with longtime personal allies, like Rezaei and Taeb.They are “a clique of older senior officers who’ve served together over the last decades,” said Sascha Bruchmann, an analyst with the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Middle East office in Bahrain. Rezaei, 71, led the paramilitary Revolutionary Guard during its formative years, through the entire 1980-1988 war with Iraq and until 1997. He has run for president as a hard-line candidate multiple times since 2009.
Brig. Gen. Ahmad Vahidi, 68, was confirmed as head of the Guard, where he has been acting commander since his predecessor was killed along with the elder Khamenei. Also confirmed in their posts were the acting commander of the Guard’s naval forces, Gen. Ali Ozmaei, and the military chief of staff, Gen. Ali Abdollahi. Bruchmann, who pointed out that Rezaei was Vahidi’s commander for many years, said the emphasis appears to be on ensuring unity. “It looks like internal cohesion, as in hard core people are being pulled into the inner circle,” he said. Moderates urge restraint over economic concerns
Homayoun Falakshahi, the top oil analyst for the global commerce information firm Kpler, wrote that the appointments of Rezaei and Vahidi show “greater influence for officials associated with a tougher stance.”
Still, escalation is not inevitable, and Iran could find it difficult to “escalate enough to restore deterrence without triggering retaliation that leaves it worse off,” he said.A ceasefire deal reached in June quickly fell apart amid exchanges of strikes. Iran has demanded the release of billions in frozen assets as called for under the deal — as well as formal authority over the Strait of Hormuz. President Masoud Pezeshkian is one of the most prominent voices still calling for a negotiated solution. His allies argue Iran risks overplaying its hand by continuing the war as its economy suffers. “It would be better to bring the war to an end, since today we enjoy power and dignity and the entire world approved our victory, and the US is hated,” Pezeshkian said last week. He has also defended the June ceasefire deal against hard-liners’ accusations that it conceded too much.
In contrast to ultra-hard-liners who reject any talks, Rezaei has held out the possibility of a deal — if the US backs down. On Monday, he told Pakistani mediator Gen. Asim Munir that the US should “change its attitude and take practical action about implementing the conditions” of the ceasefire deal.
Tehran-based political analyst Ahmad Zeidabadi said there are “serious differences over the future path of the country.”Hard-liners oppose normalization with the US because “their survival depends on the existence of conflict and hostility,” he wrote in the newspaper Hammihan, which backs Pezeshkian. Amid worries over unrest, a strong figure leads the Basij
So far there has been no sign of new protests even as Iranians find it harder to afford basic staples. Taeb’s appointment as head of the Basij is a sign the leadership wants to preempt any potential unrest “before it even manifests,” Bruchmann said. “Putting someone from an intelligence background in charge of the people that would do the crackdown makes sense,” he said. Taeb, a 63-year-old cleric, led the Basij when it played a key role in crushing mass protests that erupted against the 2009 reelection of hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Dozens were killed. Soon after, Taeb was named chief of the Guard’s intelligence apparatus. He led the agency for nearly 13 years until he was removed in 2022, reportedly in a shake-up after Israeli espionage successes. The Basij run a nationwide network of volunteers who maintain a presence in the streets, government offices and cultural centers, seeking to ensure loyalty and ideological purity for Iran’s theocracy. In the decree appointing Taeb, Khamenei ordered him to deepen the Basij presence in Iranian social life, use new technologies and “promote the Basij across the world against Zionist-American arrogance” — suggesting the group may begin to form links with Iran’s proxies abroad. The Basij boosted its presence during the war, and hard-liners have held nightly rallies in Tehran and other cities, drumming up support and intimidating any possible dissenters. It’s unclear specifically how Taeb will step up the force’s role, but in a recent speech he seemed to point to increasing control over society. He warned that US pressure on the economy aimed to create divisions within Iran. “If the mosque becomes the center of the neighborhood, the nation will protect its unity, which will be a greater deterrent than any missile.”

Trump announces deal for huge US stake in Venezuelan oil reserves
AFP/29 August ,2026
President Donald Trump said Friday his administration has reached a huge oil deal with Venezuela that gives the United States majority control of 65 billion barrels of proven petroleum reserves. In a Truth Social post, Trump called this “the biggest oil deal in world history” and said it will more than double US oil reserves.Venezuela has operated under intense pressure and close scrutiny from the Trump administration since the US ousted and captured long time ruler Nicolas Maduro in January. It allowed his then vice president, Delcy Rodriguez, to stay on and serve as interim leader so long as she toes the US line. Trump said Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had reached this new oil deal with Rodriguez “through a partnership with private business.”“This Transaction will greatly strengthen the already growing relationship between Venezuela and the United States!” Trump wrote.
He did not say what Venezuela gets out of the arrangement. But the news site Axios reported Thursday the two countries were in talks on a dozen productive oil fields with 90 billion barrels of proven reserves - about a third of Venezuela’s total proven reserves of 300 billion barrels. Axios quoted two US officials. In return for a US ownership stake, private companies, including American firms, would develop the fields and return more oil revenue to Venezuela, according to Axios. Venezuela has the world’s largest proven oil reserves.
Axios also said the deal would more than double US oil reserves at a time when the US strategic petroleum reserve is at a 40-year low. Trump insisted the deal will lower gasoline prices for Americans - a major issue as his approval ratings fall ahead of November midterm elections after launching a war on Iran that has disrupted global oil supplies.

Iran-led militias in Iraq plan to target Saudi Arabia: Sources
Al Arabiya English/29 August ,2026
Iran-led militias in Iraq were planning to target Saudi Arabia “within hours,” sources told Al Arabiya English on Friday citing intelligence. Militias in Iraq aligned to Iran have previously launched strikes on Saudi Arabia. In July, Saudi air defenses intercepted and destroyed a number of drones that attempted to target oil facilities in the Eastern Province and Riyadh, according to statements by Ministry of Defense spokesman Major General Turki al-Malki published by the Saudi Press Agency (SPA). Saudi Arabia responded with targeted precision strikes against sites belonging to those militias operating from Iraqi territory and linked to the attacks.

Netanyahu condemns violence in West Bank villages in rare settler criticism
AFP/29 August ,2026
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu levelled rare criticism at Jewish settlers in the occupied West Bank, condemning what he called “criminal acts of violence” perpetrated in two Palestinian villages on Saturday. “I strongly condemn the criminal acts of violence committed in the villages of Qusra and Jalud by a handful of rioters who are violating the law, causing a grave injustice to the law-abiding Jewish community, interfering with the IDF in carrying out its missions, and harming Israel’s standing in the world,” Netanyahu said in a statement.

Dozens of Israeli settlers attack flashpoint West Bank village
AFP/29 August ,2026
Dozens of Israeli settlers attacked the Palestinian village of Qusra in the northern occupied West Bank on Saturday, residents and the military said, after nearly three weeks of tension in the area. Earlier in August a group of rogue settlers began blocking supplies from entering Palestinian houses on the outskirts of the village near Nablus, trapping residents inside and drawing domestic and international condemnation. Weeks later, Israeli forces continue to operate in the area while settlers still roam the surrounding hills. On Saturday, Qusra resident Yussef Abdul Kareem Hassan told AFP that a handful of villagers were doing work on a house when they were approached by a small group of settlers. The settlers then called for backup and returned with dozens more, Hassan said, adding that they had surrounded the Palestinians inside the house and began throwing stones. AFP footage of Qusra on Saturday showed dozens of Israeli forces deployed to the site. The Israeli military said soldiers and border police forces were dispatched “following reports that Israeli rioters had arrived in the area and that violent clashes had occurred, including stone-hurling toward Palestinians and additional civilians.”“Upon their arrival, the security forces identified dozens of rioters who had barricaded themselves inside a Palestinian home while Palestinian residents were inside,” a military statement said, adding that it was “aware of reports of Palestinian injuries.”It said forces had worked to remove the settlers from the house, separate the groups, and confiscate vehicles “that were suspected of having been used to reach the area.”The vehicles would be used as evidence in a police investigation that has been opened, it said, adding that forces continued to operate in the area “to prevent further disturbances and restore order.”“The security forces strongly condemn all forms of violence,” it said.Violence by Israeli settlers towards Palestinians in the West Bank has persisted for years, often with little or no legal consequence, but recent months have seen a surge in attacks. More than 500,000 Israelis live in settlements in the Palestinian territory, which are illegal under international law, among some three million Palestinians. Israel has occupied the West Bank since 1967. According to an AFP tally based on data from the Palestinian health ministry, Israeli forces or settlers have killed at least 1,103 Palestinians in the West Bank, including both militants and civilians, since the start of the Gaza war in October 2023.Israeli figures show at least 48 Israelis, including civilians and security personnel, have been killed in Palestinian attacks or during Israeli military operations during the same period.

Israel army says struck Hamas commander in Gaza hospital compound
AFP/29 August ,2026
Israel’s military said it struck a Hamas commander within the compound of a Gaza hospital on Saturday, while the territory’s health officials said Israeli strikes elsewhere killed three people. It is the latest bloodshed to occur in the war-shattered territory despite a US-backed ceasefire that took effect in October 2025, with Israel continuing to target Palestinians it says are militants. The military said it struck a Hamas commander who “was hiding within the compound” of al-Aqsa Martyrs Hospital in the central city of Deir al-Balah but was unable to immediately confirm if he had been killed. It said the commander, who it did not name, advanced “attacks against IDF troops and Israeli civilians” and was hit in a structure adjacent to hospital buildings. The hospital reported that three people had been injured in an Israeli strike near a warehouse close to the maternity ward inside the medical facility.
The military said steps had been taken to “mitigate the risk to civilians”, adding that it had warned Gazan medical authorities two days earlier about “the cessation of the use of medical facilities for terrorist purposes.”Earlier in the day, al-Aqsa Hospital reported one person killed by Israeli fire in the eastern area of the city. The Israeli military said it was checking the reports. In Gaza City, the civil defense agency, which operates as a rescue force under Hamas, said an Israeli strike near a roundabout in the Tel al-Hawa neighborhood killed two people and injured several others. When contacted by AFP, the Israeli military said it struck a “military operative” in the area. Israel has kept striking Gaza, and its forces have made further inroads despite a US-brokered ceasefire announced in October, with Israel insisting it must eliminate threats from Hamas, which led the unprecedented October 7, 2023 attack against Israel. Israeli operations in Gaza have killed at least 1,313 people since the ceasefire came into effect, according to the Palestinian territory’s health ministry, which also operates under Hamas authority and whose figures are considered reliable by the United Nations.
The Israeli army has reported five deaths in its ranks over the same period, as well as the death of one civilian contractor.

UAE central bank to examine transactions at Banque Misr branches
Arab News/August 29, 2026
LONDON: The UAE central bank said on Saturday it would conduct an “urgent examination” of transactions by Banque Misr branches in the Emirates. The statement came after the United States said it would cut off the UAE-based operations of the Egyptian bank from US financial institutions. The US Treasury accused Banque Misr UAE of helping the Iranian regime access US dollars and evade sanctions. The UAE central bank said it had “decided to conduct a special and urgent examination that includes a forensic/in-depth lookback covering the period referred to in the statement issued by the US authorities.”The investigation would focus on “banking transactions of the companies mentioned in the statement,” the central bank said. Earlier, Banque Misr, which is headquartered in Cairo, said it was reviewing the US Treasury notice, and Egypt’s central bank said it was in contact with US officials over the matter. The UAE central bank said it was studying options regarding the status of the bank if the US imposes the measures against it. “The appropriate decision in this regard will be taken in due course, taking into consideration the obligations of the bank towards its customers in the UAE,” the central bank said. The statement said that banks licensed in the Emirates are expected not to expose the UAE’s financial system to “reputational risks, to respect the laws and regulations of the countries whose financial institutions are used in conducting transactions, and not to misuse the advanced financial infrastructure of the UAE.”It said the central bank routinely examines procedures against money laundering and terror financing at banks operating in the UAE. The US Treasury accused Banque Misr UAE of processing an estimated $1.8 billion for 103 companies, which it said were part of “Iranian shadow banking networks.”The action came days after Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced “economic D-Day” against Iran as the US moves to further choke off Tehran’s finances.

Druze factions block students from sitting exams in row with Syria govt
AFP/August 29, 2026
SWEIDA, Syria: Armed factions in Syria’s Druze-majority Sweida province have blocked students from traveling to sit for official exams, demanding they be held instead in the areas they control, drawing condemnation from the Damascus-appointed governor on Saturday.
Sweida city and other parts of the southern province are run by local armed groups and are the last areas outside the grasp of Syria’s new government, which has been trying to establish control over the entire country after toppling longtime ruler Bashar Assad in 2024.
Tensions have run high ever since clashes last year between the Druze and government-aligned forces that spiralled into some of the worst internecine violence the country had witnessed since Assad’s fall. The authorities had scheduled an exam session for Saturday in the government-controlled north of the province for students who were unable to take the test two months ago due to the ongoing tensions. But Druze fighters in Shahba, north of Sweida city, said in a statement on Friday that “all roads are completely closed to the movement of students and proctors to examination centers outside the area,” insisting that tests should be held in their areas instead, citing security concerns. Sweida governor Mustafa Al-Bakkur condemned the move on Saturday, saying: “Outlaw gangs are working to make the future of Sweida’s students a political bargaining chip to be manipulated as they please.”He said that around 150 students were still able to sit for their exams, some of them having left Druze-controlled areas days prior to avoid any obstacles.
‘Shots in the air’
One 18-year-old student told AFP she was on a bus in Sweida city hoping for the road to open when “an armed group arrived and threatened the students.”“Some members of these factions fired shots into the air to intimidate and frighten the students” after they insisted on heading north, she added, requesting anonymity out of fear for her safety. The education ministry said in a statement that it “regrets that not all of our students were able to reach the examination centers.”Reacting to Saturday’s events, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Syria Marianne Ward said the body was “concerned” by the developments. “The United Nations calls on all relevant stakeholders to ensure that children with the support of their caregivers can exercise their right to education without pressure or disruption of movement,” she added. In July 2025, clashes erupted in Sweida between Druze factions and Bedouin fighters, with security forces intervening on the side of the Bedouins along with other tribal groups. In the end, more than 2,000 people were killed, including 789 Druze civilians, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights monitor. A committee formed by the Syrian government said it had documented the killing of 1,760 people. Government forces and their allies were accused at the time of executing civilians and other abuses, and Damascus last month said it began trying suspects over the violence.Israel, which also has a Druze population, intervened militarily during the clashes with strikes in Sweida and Damascus, saying it was defending the minority community.

US to end military aid to Iraqi Kurds: Report
Arab News/August 29, 2026
LONDON: The US is planning to cut off military aid to Iraqi Kurds, four sources with knowledge of the situation have told the BBC. The move was conveyed by the US Department of Defense to leaders of Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region.
Under the plan, the US would shun the renewal of an expiring agreement to provide assistance to the Peshmerga, the Kurdish security force. The BBC spoke to two officials involved in behind-the-scenes talks and two other sources with knowledge of the matter, some of whom spoke on condition of anonymity. The memorandum of understanding on security between the Pentagon and the Kurdish Regional Government is set to expire on Sept. 30, the day the US and other countries are expected to withdraw their last remaining forces from Iraq. The withdrawal will represent a formal end to the international military coalition against Daesh, which included the Peshmerga. The coalition fought to end the terrorist group’s control of swathes of Iraq and Syria. The only remaining US military base in Iraq, located in Kurdistan’s capital Irbil, is set to close in September upon the withdrawal of coalition forces.
In the 2026 fiscal year, the Peshmerga — which has about 180,000 troops in Iraqi Kurdistan — received $61 million for weapons, training and stipends through the Pentagon’s program to counter Daesh. A source familiar with Pentagon operations said a final decision is still being reviewed, and Washington is considering ways to maintain some security support in Iraq and its Kurdish region following the withdrawal.In response to a request for comment by the BBC, the White House referred to a Pentagon spokesperson, who highlighted a statement by the Department of Defense summarizing Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi in July. “The US, Iraq and coalition partners have achieved tremendous success in defeating Daesh and now the Iraqi security forces, including the Peshmerga and other Iraqi Kurdistan Region security forces, will lead the fight against terrorists in Iraq,” the statement said.A State Department spokesperson said Washington is focused on the troop withdrawal and ensuring that Al-Zaidi is “positioned to disarm Iran-aligned terrorist militias and safeguard Iraqi sovereignty.”Last December, the US opened its largest worldwide consulate in Irbil at a cost of $800 million. Michael Rigas, a senior State Department official, said at the opening ceremony that the facility was “a testament to the value of the relationship between the US and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.”Though the US has not revealed how many American troops remain in Iraq, experts believe the figure is under 1,000, down from 170,000 at the peak of the Iraq War. Baghdad and Washington have discussed a potential defense pact in recent meetings, and the latter has signaled its openness to a bilateral security arrangement. Last month, Al-Zaidi — who was elected in May — highlighted the troop withdrawal during a visit to Washington. “Oct. 1 will mark a new day in the trajectory of the Iraqi state, as Iraq will be free of any foreign military presence,” his office said in a statement at the time. Analysts said the US withdrawal will also reduce American forces’ exposure to Iranian missile and drone attacks in the Kurdish region. Tehran conducted a series of strikes against US bases in the area, including in Irbil.

Nepal flood death toll rises to 675: Disaster authority
AFP/29 August ,2026
Devastating floods near the border with China this week have killed at least 675 people in Nepal, its disaster authority said on Saturday. Chinese state media earlier confirmed seven dead in Tibet following Wednesday’s disaster, taking the total killed to 682.
Rescuers in Nepal and China were still battling to locate thousands of people missing days after a deadly, tsunami-like wall of water and debris swept through the Himalayan region, engulfing villages. The number of missing soared close to 3,000 Saturday, latest figures from both countries showed, with 633 bodies recovered - and reports of some dead possibly swept downstream as far away as India. In an area home to vast energy infrastructure projects, Nepal’s disaster authority added 933 hydropower workers to a missing persons list already including trekkers and pilgrims to Tibet’s sacred Mount Kailash. Those that made it out say they have lost everything and now face an agonizing wait to discover the fate of missing loved ones, and the prospect of rebuilding their lives from nothing. “All the settlements near the river were swept away. There is nothing left,” survivor Buddhi Ram Dangol told AFP. Samjhana Thing said she had been waiting three days for news of her missing brother. “We don’t know anything. Hopefully he is in a safe place,” she said.
‘Enormous’ trauma
The trauma of Wednesday’s catastrophe has been “enormous,” and as many as 93,000 people may have been affected, the Red Cross said, with the death toll expected to rise. Emergency teams had been racing to retrieve survivors from affected zones, where the widespread devastation meant food and water supplies were running out. Compounding the search for the missing have been fears of further flooding in affected areas. The deluge of ice and mud caused huge lakes to form, and one of these formations has become a direct threat to emergency workers scouring the region for survivors. Nepali police urged all rescuers to “immediately move to a safe location,” saying they had received information that “a water dam has burst again on the Tibetan side.”In Tibet, where Chinese authorities are the only source of information, Beijing suspended its rescue operation at the hardest-hit area of Gyirong over the risk of renewed flooding, before saying the threat had eased. State news agency Xinhua reported early Saturday morning that two villagers had been rescued in the area.
‘All swept away’
On the Nepali side of the border, the military located people trapped in the tunnel of the Trishuli 3A hydropower project, where they were working to find a way in to extract the survivors. “Two helicopters have been dispatched, but it is challenging because it is tough to even locate the entry points of the tunnel,” army spokesman Raja Ram Basnet told AFP. Some 350 workers and residents have been brought to safety from the site, he added, but efforts were ongoing to rescue more than a hundred trapped in the same area. Workers rescued from other dam projects along the Trishuli valley described a disaster that unfolded with terrifying speed. Buddha Tamang told AFP he survived only because he was inside a tunnel at the dam where he worked when the flood struck. “The senior officers working on the other side, they were all swept away,” Tamang, who was airlifted on Thursday after being marooned for more than 24 hours, told AFP.
Nepal reported a death toll of 626 people on Saturday.
There are 2,426 people, including hundreds of foreigners, who are out of contact in Nepal. Across the border in Tibet, which is largely inaccessible to foreign journalists - seven people died and 554 remain missing, the state Xinhua news agency reported early Saturday. Authorities also said they had evacuated 555 stranded tourists and 499 Chinese residents from Tibet. In India, authorities said they had recovered seven bodies from rivers flowing from Nepal, believed to be flood victims.
Pilgrimage route
Scores of Hindu devotees from across the world are among those missing on the border, as many were on a pilgrimage to Tibet’s Mount Kailash. Sivaranjani Muthunathan was travelling by bus with 56 others towards the Chinese border when they became stuck in what they thought was a traffic jam. “Then there was fog, smoke, something that seemed to suddenly engulf us,” Muthunathan, 46, told AFP on Friday, showing a phone video she recorded of a torrent surging towards her. Around them, vehicles were swept away or buried under mud.
“One by one, we also climbed out through the driver’s side,” then scrambled up a hill, she said.

At least 37 dead after Russian strike on warehouse near Kyiv
Al Arabiya English/29 August ,2026
At least 37 people have died after a Russian drone struck a warehouse near Kyiv’s western suburbs overnight, sparking a huge fire and explosions, authorities said Saturday. The warehouse appeared to have been storing “explosive objects,” Ukrainian prosecutors said, opening an investigation into criminal negligence.Officials did not give details about the nature of the facility. Both Russia and Ukraine have intensified long-range strikes on each other in recent months, sparking fires and sending civilian casualties to record levels. AFP reporters saw a huge column of black smoke pouring over the capital’s western suburbs, as officials reported the facility was still on fire. Among the dead was Taras Didych, mayor of the village of Dmytrivska, Kyiv region governor Tymur Tkachenko said. Ukrainian prosecutors announced an investigation. “On 28 August at around 8:10 pm (1710 GMT), an unmanned aerial vehicle... fell on or struck the grounds of an enterprise in the town of Myla,” the office of Ukraine’s prosecutor general said. Myla is a town on Kyiv’s western outskirts. “A large-scale fire broke out on the enterprise’s grounds, and detonation began,” it added. The prosecutor’s office specified that its investigation would focus on “the legality of the... storage of explosive objects and materials on the enterprise’s grounds”, as well as whether the company, which was not named, had the “necessary permits and approvals”. Prime Minister Sergiy Koretsky expressed regret that a “lesson” had not been learned after a previous deadly attack in July in Vyshneve, near Kyiv, on a munitions depot. That investigation revealed serious failings on the part of the state-owned company, which did not comply with standards despite the proximity of residential buildings. “In the fifth year of the full-scale invasion, making the same mistakes over and over is criminal negligence,” he said on Telegram. “Everyone responsible, without exception, must face severe punishment so that such situations never happen again.”For his part, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that ammunition should not be stockpiled near homes. “There are regulations in place – ammunition cannot be stored near homes or other residential areas. Appropriate conclusions will certainly be drawn,” he said in a post on X. With AFP

US-Ecuador operation destroys alleged drug-smuggling boat
AFP/29 August ,2026
The United States military intercepted and destroyed an alleged drug trafficking boat in the Eastern Pacific on Friday in a coordinated operation with Ecuador, officials said. US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) said in a post on X that its forces intercepted a vessel “operating as a floating refueling station” in the Eastern Pacific.The vessel was operating “in support of the Los Choneros violent narco-terrorist organization,” it said, referring to one of Ecuador’s main drug trafficking and extortion gangs. SOUTHCOM said those on board were escorted to Ecuador before US forces destroyed the vessel. Grainy video footage accompanying the post showed a boat on fire following a large explosion. “Working together with our Ecuadorian partners, our coalition dealt a decisive blow to a narco-terrorist operation responsible for moving significant amounts of drugs through the region,” SOUTHCOM said. The US military launched operation “Southern Spear” in early September, with President Donald Trump arguing that Washington is effectively at war with drug cartels operating out of Latin America. More than 200 people have been killed in strikes in the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific Ocean since then, according to a tally by AFP. Trump’s administration has not provided definitive evidence that the vessels it has been striking are involved in drug trafficking. Ecuador’s right-wing President Daniel Noboa is one of Trump’s closest allies in Latin America. In March, Ecuador joined Trump’s “Shield of the Americas,” a US-led coalition to combat drug trafficking in the region.

Pope Leo grants Eastern Synods the faculty to remove Patriarchs
Vatican News/29 August ,2026   (Google translation from Arabic)
An Apostolic Letter in the form of a motu proprio by Pope Leo XIV, with the incipit Mutua concordia, which was published today, 29 August, amends canons 106 and 126 of the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches and grants the Synod of Bishops the power, through “an orderly procedure”, to remove a Patriarch from office should their relationship be irreparably compromised for serious reasons.Without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Apostolic See, therefore, the Synods of Bishops in such cases are called upon “to restore the wounded communion” through a procedure which, in accordance with the norms, guarantees the Patriarch “the right to a full defence before the Synod”. It will, however, remain for the Pope to “grant his assent to the synodal decision, to ensure that the Fathers’ full freedom to express their choice is guaranteed, free from any possible undue internal or external pressure”.
The Pontiff has ordered that a new paragraph, §3, be inserted after §2 of Canon 106, specifying that “should the Patriarch fail to fulfil the obligations” laid down by the Code itself “the Synod of Bishops of the patriarchal Church may be lawfully convoked by the Bishop who is the most senior in terms of episcopal ordination and who is entitled to vote; and if he too fails to proceed with the convocation, this power passes to the subsequent Bishops, who are more senior in terms of episcopal ordination, who are available to do so and who are entitled to vote”.
Canon 126 is also modified by the addition of a new paragraph stipulating that “for a grave cause recognized as such by the Synod of Bishops of the patriarchal Church, that same Synod—convoked in accordance with Canons 106 § 1, no. 3, and 108 § 3—may request the Patriarch to resign from office.”.
The following paragraph establishes that if, following such a request, “the Patriarch does not resign from his office, the Bishop who is the most senior in terms of episcopal ordination, and who is entitled to vote, shall arrange for the election of a new President by the Synod, which shall submit the removal of the Patriarch to a secret ballot of at least two-thirds of the members of the Synod entitled to vote, whilst respecting [the Patriarch’s] right to defend himself before the Synod itself”. It is also the President’s responsibility to inform the Pope, who must give “his assent to the removal, which renders the patriarchal see vacant”.Given that in the Eastern Churches there exists a close relationship uniting the Patriarch – who presides over his patriarchal Church as father and head, tamquam pater et caput (CCEO, can. 55) – and the Synod of Bishops, which he himself convokes and leads, a harmonious relationship between them is essential for a fruitful ecclesial life, in the unity of the Spirit and in the sole interest of the Church itself, the motu proprio says. However, the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches, which governs the functioning and duties of the Synods of Bishops, made no provision for the event that “the sacred bond between the Pater et Caput and the other Bishops should be irreparably compromised”, resulting in ‘a grave wound requiring remedy, as also urged by numerous Eastern Prelates’,
With the Motu Proprio, therefore, a set of rules comes into force to be followed in the event of an irreconcilable rift between the Patriarch and the Synod, should the Patriarch fail to resign. It is established that it is the responsibility of the Synod to set out the serious reasons that led to the rift, to determine who is to convene the Synod in such a situation and how this is to be done, to specify the majority of votes required to bring the Patriarch’s term of office to an end, and to ensure that the Patriarch’s rights of defence are safeguarded.
The Pope’s provisions are intended to enhance the prerogatives of the Synod of Bishops of the Eastern Catholic Churches, endowing them with a new power consistent with their nature as Churches sui iuris and restoring to them that which originates within them, since they are better placed to understand and assess the situation, whilst reserving for the Roman Pontiff a role of guarantor. The provisions set out in the Motu Proprio also apply, by their very nature, to the major archiepiscopal Churches (cf. can. 152).

The Latest LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on August 29-30/2026
The Synod Gains Authority to Request the Removal of a Patriarch: Amendments to the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches
Nidaa Al-Watan/August 29, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
On August 29, 2026, His Holiness Pope Leo XIV issued an Apostolic Letter Motu Proprio entitled “Mutua Concordia”, through which he amended Canons 106 and 126 of the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches, strengthening the authority of the Synods of Bishops of Eastern Patriarchal Churches, particularly in cases where communion between the Patriarch and the bishops has suffered a serious and irreparable breakdown.
In the document, the Pope emphasized that “mutual concord” between the Pater et Caput (“Father and Head”) of an Eastern Church sui iuris and the bishops who together constitute the Synod is the very spirit of communion within the hierarchy of the Eastern Churches.
He explained that the Synod of Bishops is the body from which the election of the Patriarch originates, reflecting an authentic call to exercise patriarchal ministry in a collegial spirit rooted in an ancient and venerable Eastern tradition. The Pope stressed that Eastern Catholic Churches demonstrate the need for broader recognition and strengthening of synodal authority, a matter that is also significant in the context of relations among churches, particularly in light of theological sensitivities and practices within the Orthodox Churches.
He affirmed that this synodal spirit must be continually preserved and developed within Patriarchal Churches and Major Archiepiscopal Churches through a shared responsibility that extends beyond the election of the Pater et Caput to the governance and ordinary administration of the Church.
The Pope noted that if this ecclesial harmony suffers serious damage, efforts must be made to restore it within episcopal communion. Although the Patriarch is the first member of the Synod and not merely its presiding officer, he cannot be viewed independently from it.
He further explained that an irreparable rupture between the Patriarch and the bishops constitutes a grave wound that requires a remedy, a concern long raised by many Eastern bishops.Accordingly, the Pope declared that in exceptional situations where the crisis of communion reaches a serious and irreparable level, the Synod must possess the legal authority to hold the Patriarch accountable for his actions. To provide a fuller expression of the internal autonomy of Eastern Patriarchal Churches—while preserving the prerogatives of the Apostolic See—the Pope granted Synods of Bishops the authority to restore damaged communion, including, for grave reasons, the power to remove a Patriarch from office through a legal procedure that guarantees his full right of defense before the Synod.
The Pope observed that the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches previously lacked provisions addressing such circumstances and therefore required a structured mechanism for the removal of a Patriarch. At the same time, he reserved to the Roman Pontiff alone the authority to confirm the Synod’s decision, thereby ensuring complete freedom for the bishops to express their judgment without internal or external pressure.
Following consultation with the Dicastery for Legislative Texts and the Dicastery for the Eastern Churches, Pope Leo XIV amended Canons 106 and 126.
Under the amendment to Canon 106, if a Patriarch fails to fulfill his obligations, the bishop senior in episcopal ordination among those entitled to vote may lawfully convene the Synod of Bishops. If he also declines, the authority passes successively to other bishops according to seniority. The amendment to Canon 126 provides that the patriarchal see becomes vacant upon the Patriarch’s death or resignation. Acceptance of a Patriarch’s resignation now belongs to the Synod of Bishops, following consultation with the Roman Pontiff, unless the Patriarch has submitted his resignation directly to the Pope.
In cases involving a grave cause recognized by the Synod, the Synod may request the Patriarch’s resignation. If he refuses, the senior bishop entitled to vote shall oversee the election of a Synod president, who will submit the matter of the Patriarch’s removal to a secret ballot requiring the approval of at least two-thirds of the voting members, while guaranteeing the Patriarch’s full right of defense. The President of the Synod must then inform the Roman Pontiff as quickly as possible. Only papal approval gives legal effect to the removal decision and results in the vacancy of the patriarchal see.The amendments also entrust the Synod of Bishops with evaluating the application of Canon 62 regarding a removed Patriarch. Pope Leo XIV ordered that the provisions of the Apostolic Letter take immediate effect upon publication in L’Osservatore Romano and later publication in the Acta Apostolicae Sedis.The Apostolic Letter was signed at the Vatican on August 29, 2026, in the second year of Pope Leo XIV’s pontificate.

Iran's Regime: 'The Only Solution Is to Build a Nuclear Bomb and Fire It'
What Happens After President Trump Leaves Office?
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Gatestone Institute/August 29, 2026
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/22818/iran-regime-nuclear-bomb
"The only way to save the country... is building an atomic bomb and firing it, no other way is left for us. We should create a tsunami whose waves hit the American coasts." — Iranian cleric Mohammad Bagher Kharrazi, secretary-general of Iran's proxy, Hezbollah, and closely tied to Iran's current Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei
The real question needs to be: What happens after Trump leaves office?
The regime's character — Islamist, anti-Western, any American and expansionist — has not changed. If Western powers are truly serious, they must work to completely eliminate Iran's present regime.
Recent developments show the danger of permitting recovery. Iran's army is claiming that weapons systems damaged in the 2026 war have already been "rebuilt" -- either domestically or after having been imported, and with a shift toward offensive capabilities. Satellite imagery and intelligence assessments reveal rapid reconstruction of missile bases, tunnel entrances, production facilities, and infrastructure — faster than many anticipated. Israeli officials have expressed surprise at the speed of recovery in ballistic missile capabilities. Leaving these arsenals in place would simply make further military efforts more dangerous both for US bases and allies in the Gulf. Any rebuilding of Iran's military infrastructure must be disrupted; leaders driving this belligerency need to be removed from power.
Economic isolation also remains critical, as US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has laid out, complete with universally enforced secondary sanctions. The European Union should close remaining diplomatic and commercial channels that provide legitimacy or revenue.
The West should not have to wait for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon -- when it would be impossible to stop, which is why the regime wants one -- before taking Iran's threats seriously. The war with the Iranian regime -- to contradict those who claim it was a war of choice – is anything but that. Iran, China and Russia have been trying to take down Western civilization for decades. Only Trump had the vision and the determination to take on these threats.
For both US and international security, it is obligatory for the world's leading superpower, the United States of America, to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and to protect countless lives. Iran's regime must not be allowed to rebuild its military or remain in power. Every available measure needs to be pursued until the Islamic Republic of Iran is totally dismantled. For decades, half-measures have failed.
The alternative is for the West's nuclear-capable adversaries -- whose "only solution" will assuredly put the world at risk -- to succeed in their mission.
In the ideology of Iran's ruling establishment, nuclear weapons are still openly contemplated not just as a deterrent but as instruments of mass destruction. If an extremist regime acquires a nuclear weapon, the question is: What happens afterwards? The regime's character — Islamist, anti-Western, any American and expansionist — has not changed. If Western powers are truly serious, they must work to completely eliminate Iran's present regime.
For anyone who has ever harbored doubts—and for those who still do—that Iran's regime stands against humanity, peace, and the basic norms of civilization, the latest remarks from hard-line Iranian cleric Mohammad Bagher Kharrazi -- secretary-general of Iran's proxy, Hezbollah, and closely tied to the current Supreme Leader -- should be impossible to ignore. "The only way to save the country... is building an atomic bomb and firing it," Kharrazi recently declared, "no other way is left for us.... We should create a tsunami whose waves hit the American coasts".
In the ideology of Iran's ruling establishment, nuclear weapons are still openly contemplated not just as a deterrent but as instruments of mass destruction. If an extremist regime acquires a nuclear weapon, the question is: What happens afterwards?
Iran's primary target, of course, remains Israel. Iranian leaders and their proxies have long framed the Jewish state's destruction as a religious and strategic mission, if not obligation. Israel's compact size, roughly the same as New Jersey (22,000 sq. km.), means that even a single nuclear weapon would cause catastrophic destruction. Moreover, nuclear weapons capability — or the materials and know-how — could be easily transferred to proxies such as Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, or others. These groups have already attacked civilians, shipping, and their neighboring states not even involved in a dispute. A nuclear-armed Iranian regime, or one that arms its network, also assures a regional arms race – already begun by Saudi Arabia trying to build the infrastructure for uranium enrichment, for "peaceful purposes," of course -- at least until they are not.
US President Donald J. Trump has not treated Iran's nuclear ambitions as an ordinary diplomatic disagreement. He has repeated that "Iran Cannot Have a Nuclear Weapon." A regime whose voices openly discuss building and "firing" nuclear weapons, with scenarios of tsunamis against America, cannot be trusted with such capability. This is the language of ideological fanaticism from a theocracy that has spent nearly half a century exporting its revolution, funding terrorism, and crushing dissent at home, complete with the slaughter of "at least 42,000" of its own citizens in just two days, on January 8 and 9, 2026.
The problem is compounded by the fact that Iran's brutal Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) regime itself remains firmly in place. Iran's new leadership structure has continued to elevate hard-line figures with deep IRGC backgrounds. Under Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, key security and military posts have been filled with veteran IRGC hardliners — the old guard of anti-American, anti-Israeli ideologues associated with the era of Qasem Soleimani. Appointments of men such as Mohsen Rezaei to the Supreme National Security Council and Ahmad Vahidi to lead the IRGC, rather than signaling any pragmatic shift, instead point to the commitment of Iran's current leaders to outlast Trump's term of office.
The real question needs to be: What happens after Trump leaves office?
Meanwhile, repression inside Iran continues. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk reported that at least 56 people had been executed on national-security charges since March 19, including 27 allegedly involved in the protests earlier this year. Human rights organizations have also documented expedited trials and death sentences against protesters.
The regime's character — Islamist, anti-Western, any American and expansionist — has not changed. If Western powers are truly serious, they must work to completely eliminate Iran's present regime.
Recent developments show the danger of permitting recovery. Iran's army is claiming that weapons systems damaged in the 2026 war have already been "rebuilt" -- either domestically or after having been imported, and with a shift toward offensive capabilities. Satellite imagery and intelligence assessments reveal rapid reconstruction of missile bases, tunnel entrances, production facilities, and infrastructure — faster than many anticipated. Israeli officials have expressed surprise at the speed of recovery in ballistic missile capabilities. Leaving these arsenals in place would simply make further military efforts more dangerous both for US bases and allies in the Gulf. Any rebuilding of Iran's military infrastructure must be disrupted; leaders driving this belligerency need to be removed from power.
Economic isolation also remains critical, as US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has laid out, complete with universally enforced secondary sanctions. The European Union should close remaining diplomatic and commercial channels that provide legitimacy or revenue.
The West should not have to wait for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon -- when it would be impossible to stop, which is why the regime wants one -- before taking Iran's threats seriously. The war with the Iranian regime -- to contradict those who claim it was a war of choice – is anything but that. Iran, China and Russia have been trying to take down Western civilization for decades. Only Trump had the vision and the determination to take on these threats.
For both US and international security, it is obligatory for the world's leading superpower, the United States of America, to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and to protect countless lives. Iran's regime must not be allowed to rebuild its military or remain in power. Every available measure needs to be pursued until the Islamic Republic of Iran is totally dismantled. For decades, half-measures have failed.
The alternative is for the West's nuclear-capable adversaries -- whose "only solution" will assuredly put the world at risk -- to succeed in their mission.
*Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a political scientist, Harvard-educated analyst, and board member of Harvard International Review. He has authored several books on the US foreign policy. He can be reached at dr.rafizadeh@post.harvard.edu
*Follow Majid Rafizadeh on X (formerly Twitter)
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"Sadat" Does Not Deserve All This Ingratitude
Bilal Al-Dawi/ Al-Watan/August 29, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
It is a very strange "algorithm" that no longer makes sense to anyone, or rather, a very difficult "equation" that defies resolution. This algorithm and equation is the casualness with which the great President Anwar Sadat—the hero of war and peace—is attacked. Insulting him is no longer just easy; rather, this abuse is carried out continuously, with unacceptable and rejected transgressions, at all times and on all occasions. Some politicians and intellectuals permit themselves to impugn President Sadat and accuse him of the most heinous accusations and worst traits. It even reached the point where some wrote about the happiness that supposedly overcame the Egyptian people upon hearing the news of his assassination during the military parade on October 6, 1981. There is no power nor strength except in God. May God have mercy on you, "Sadat," hero of the epic crossing, you who signed the decision for war with your own hand, you who made us hold our heads high, recover our land, and restore our compromised dignity. You who turned the setback into a clear victory, you who chose the great commanders to undertake the mission of reclaiming the land so that they excelled because you made the correct choice. You who executed the strategic deception operation with brilliance and mastery, you who said that military history would pause for long examination and study before the operation of October 6, 1973, when our armed forces managed to storm the difficult obstacle of the Suez Canal, cross the impregnable Bar Lev Line, and establish bridgeheads after throwing the enemy off balance in six hours. You who said: "I pledged before God and before you to prove to the world that the 1967 setback was an exception in our history, not the rule." You who said that this nation can finally rest assured and feel secure after fear, knowing it now possesses both a shield and a sword. Political life had stalled, and President Sadat brought it back to the light; political parties began operating on the ground, and our usurped land returned to us through war, negotiation, and peace. Some established a "rejection front," yet after the passage of years, they flipped, changed their viewpoints, and wholeheartedly endorsed Sadat's perspective on the peace he believed in and implemented on the ground. Transgressing against President Sadat—despite his recently surging popularity and despite his passing—goes beyond all this. Admiration for his intelligence, shrewdness, and ability to outmaneuver Israel in both war and peace is growing, recovering Sinai through both while giving Israel a worthless paper bargain.
I do not believe those who were overcome with joy upon hearing the news of Sadat's assassination; this is my right. Yes, I do not believe them, I do not trust them, I do not read them, and I do not care about their statements. Yet I imagine that President Sadat is hurting now in his grave from the words of these ungrateful people who have practiced political imposture for years with statements full of nothing but noise. President Sadat does not deserve all this gloating; rather, he deserves our honor and praise. If we possess any degree of integrity, we must give credit where it is due and affirm that President Anwar Sadat is the master and leader of victory. History has been written, and inscribed at the top of its pages is: "Sadat the shrewd, ahead of his time and age, and the significance of what he did in war and peace will grow even more in the coming years in light of the crimes committed by Benjamin Netanyahu, his extremist government, and his endless schemes."

How Does Tehran Think?
Hoda Raouf/Independent Arabia/August 29, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The conflict between Iran and Washington has shifted into a phase centered on who will manage the Strait of Hormuz, according to what rules, with what guarantees, and what political and economic compensation Iran will receive in exchange for fully restoring navigation. This is the essence of the ongoing negotiating battle that has lasted for months.If Oman succeeds in turning the temporary corridor into a permanent arrangement for navigation—coinciding with an American-Iranian understanding regarding sanctions, the blockade, and a memorandum of understanding—the Strait of Hormuz could become a gateway to a settlement rather than a catalyst for a new round of escalation.
In recent days, regional visits to Iran have increased—from Pakistan, Oman, and Qatar—and Tehran and the Sultanate of Oman announced reaching an understanding regarding navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. But does Iran trust regional mediations? Does the understanding with Oman mean the opening of the Strait? Why do Iran's and Trump's visions for the Strait differ? Overall, have the mediations, talks, and conflict moved even a single square forward?
Recent Iranian-Omani talks have acquired special significance because they reveal a gradual shift from discussing the possibility of restoring navigation to attempting to formulate a phased system for managing navigation, without Iran having agreed so far to fully reopen the Strait. Has the nature of the Iranian-Omani talks changed between July and August?
The current track began more modestly on July 11, when Omani Foreign Minister Badr Al-Busaidi and his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araghchi held talks in Muscat regarding navigational security and freedom of movement in the Strait of Hormuz. The two sides agreed at the time to continue consultations at both the political and technical levels to reach understandings consistent with international law. At that stage, the primary focus was on the general principle: how to re-secure navigation in the Strait after the war, and how to avoid turning the waterway into a direct arena of confrontation between Iran and the United States. However, by August, negotiations shifted to a more specific level. On August 6, Iran announced that reaching an agreement with Oman regarding Hormuz was drawing close, and reports indicated the two sides had agreed on coordinates for lanes that ships could use. Nevertheless, Tehran has stressed since that time that any agreement with Oman alone would not be sufficient to reopen the Strait, and that the decision is also tied to broader American commitments. Here, the paradox governing current negotiations clearly emerged for the first time: Iran is negotiating with Oman over the mechanism of navigation, but it is negotiating with the United States over the conditions for reopening Hormuz. This distinction is crucial for understanding what is happening.
What changed in the August 25 talks? On August 25, the talks moved to a more practical stage with the Omani Foreign Minister's visit to Tehran and his meeting with Abbas Araghchi. Remarkably, the joint Iranian-Omani statement did not simply speak of opening the Strait; rather, it spoke of a phased framework that could form a practical and enforceable basis, including the establishment of a joint temporary navigational corridor, alongside a joint mine-clearing project.
The two sides agreed to continue technical negotiations regarding a permanent corridor, future management of the Strait, information exchange, and the management of vessel traffic, navigational, and security services. Nothing major changed: negotiations are now examining how to manage navigation itself during a transitional phase, who defines its rules, and how to transition from a temporary arrangement to a permanent system, with understandings spanning 30 to 60 days. Yet all of this does not mean the reopening of the Strait. Iran agreed to discuss and establish a temporary navigational corridor, but it has not announced the full reopening of the Strait. Instead, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi emphasized that the arrangement with Oman does not mean the Strait will open automatically, and that transitioning to a permanent solution requires additional negotiations—a repetition of previous statements.
Similarly, high-ranking Iranian sources confirmed that the final agreement between Iran and Oman was not yet complete on August 25, and that the two sides are still negotiating issues such as managing the Strait and revenue sharing. Therefore, the more accurate description of what is happening is not the opening of Hormuz, but an attempt to establish a controlled, temporary transit regime within a strait whose full opening Iran still considers tied to the broader political settlement.Since the beginning of the war, Iran has viewed the Strait as one of its most important tools of deterrence and pressure against the United States. Consequently, relinquishing the Hormuz card without obtaining clear political and economic compensation would mean, from the Iranian perspective, giving up one of its most potent remaining sources of leverage. This is why Iranian officials have linked full reopening to what Tehran considers unfulfilled American commitments within the framework of the previous memorandum of understanding, particularly concerning sanctions, the blockade, and naval procedures.
In other words, Iran wants to say: we can negotiate with Oman on how ships pass, but the decision to fully open Hormuz is not a technical decision; it is a political decision tied to relations with Washington. Yet the real knot is not in Muscat; despite the importance of the Omani role, the primary problem remains elsewhere—the relationship between Tehran and Washington. Even if Iran and Oman reach a complete technical agreement on ship routes, that does not resolve the larger political question: What will Iran get in return? This is where the importance of simultaneous developments in Washington comes into play.
The United States views reopening Hormuz as an increasingly critical strategic objective, especially after the continued closure of the Strait became a pressure factor on energy markets and the global economy. In response, Washington continues its policy of economic pressure and sanctions against Tehran, creating a highly complex equation: Washington wants to open Hormuz to ease global economic pressure, but at the same time, it wants to use economic pressure on Iran to force concessions. Meanwhile, Tehran wants to use Hormuz as a pressure card to extract American concessions before letting go of it. Thus, the Strait becomes part of a larger bargaining game.

Between Japan and Lebanon: The Paradox of Rising from the Rubble of Defeat and the Trap of Ongoing Collapse
Dr. Mona Fayyad / From the Livetime website/August 29, 2026   (Google translation from Arabic)
I was deeply moved when I watched the Antarctica series on Netflix, and I wondered if we in Lebanon could achieve something similar to what Japan did in 1950, or if our situation is hopeless!The series revolves around the model established by the Japanese expedition to the South Pole in the 1950s, demonstrating how a scientific and technological project could be transformed into a catalyst for rebuilding national sentiment in the context of post-occupation and defeat.Japan, emerging from World War II, did not merely rebuild its physical infrastructure, but also sought to reproduce its collective narrative and image in the world by shifting the center of legitimacy from the military sphere to the scientific and civilian sphere. This expedition played a symbolic role in this transformation, as it was presented as proof of the Japanese nation's ability to rise and reintegrate into the international community through peaceful means. What is striking about this experience is that launching this expedition was not merely an administrative or scientific decision, but a distinctly political and symbolic act, framed by a public discourse linking scientific progress with the restoration of national dignity. Educational and media institutions played a pivotal role in this process, through emotional and educational mobilization campaigns that simplified the project and presented it as a collective human adventure, capable of attracting diverse social groups to secure the necessary funding for the journey given the state's limited resources.
It is precisely here that the remarkable role of mobilizing children becomes apparent. Elements of the polar environment, such as penguins and sled dogs (huskies), were transformed into emotional and educational tools that brought the project closer to everyday imagination and fostered an emotional connection between the individual and the expedition. This symbolic use of animals was not a marginal detail, but rather an effective mechanism for transforming a complex project into a story that could be understood and identified with, especially by younger generations. In this sense, popular donations were not merely a financial resource, but a mechanism for generating a sense of belonging. The act of donating itself contributed to solidifying a feeling of participation in a collective national achievement.
This leads us to what Benedict Anderson calls "imagined communities," where a nation is formed through shared narratives that give individuals a sense of belonging to an entity that transcends their individual experiences. It also falls under what Eric Hobsbawm referred to as "the invention of tradition," where rituals and practices are constructed to legitimize a new form of patriotism. According to Axel Hennith, the nation-state is not built solely on dry laws and constitutions (which Lebanon has lost their function and effectiveness due to corruption), but rather on what he calls "common moral life." This life is only realized when citizens participate in "living practices, traditions, and shared projects" that give them a sense of solidarity and mutual recognition, making them feel that their individual freedom is linked to the freedom of others and to the success of the collective. This is exactly what Lebanon lacks today, in the absence of any comprehensive project that would redefine national identity away from the alleys of sectarianism and corruption. However, the success of the Japanese experiment was not solely a result of rhetoric; it rested on specific structural conditions. The first of these was the existence of a cohesive state capable, despite defeat, of planning, implementing, and managing resources. The second was the presence of political and administrative elites who understood the necessity of transitioning from military nationalism to a civilian-scientific legitimacy and who sought to solidify this shift through concrete projects. The third, and perhaps most important, condition was the level of public trust in institutions, allowing citizens to believe that their contributions, whether material or symbolic, would actually be used to serve the common good.
Without this last element, any attempt at popular mobilization loses its meaning and becomes merely a formality. When I considered a similar campaign we might launch in Lebanon to raise funds to help southerners, rebuild the country, and prevent the Shiite sectarian duo from exploiting the situation, a radically different reality emerged from that of Japan.
The current Lebanese reality stands as a structural antithesis to that situation. Instead of serving as a unifying framework, the state has become an arena of conflict between sectarian forces and patronage networks, hindering the ability to launch any inclusive national project. Furthermore, the lack of trust between citizens and institutions preemptively undermines any possibility of popular financial mobilization, as public resources are perceived as vulnerable to plunder or sectarian exploitation. This is compounded by the multiplicity of conflicting narratives surrounding the very meaning of the state, ranging from the logic of "resistance" to that of "sovereignty," and from conflicting regional and international allegiances. This prevents the formation of a "shared narrative" upon which to base a collective mobilization.
In this context, reconstruction and aid mechanisms become tools for reproducing political loyalties, as evidenced by the dominance of patronage-based institutions in resource distribution, thus reinforcing dependency rather than building equal citizenship.
Therefore, this comparison does not aim to replicate the Japanese model, but rather to reveal the missing element in the Lebanese case: the absence of a symbolic and institutional framework that transforms economic action into an act of belonging. The problem lies not only in the scarcity of resources, but also in the inability to generate a shared sense of purpose that would motivate individuals to contribute voluntarily to a project that transcends their divisions.
Therefore, any attempt to launch reconstruction funding initiatives in Lebanon will remain limited in its impact unless it is accompanied by rebuilding trust, formulating a comprehensive national narrative, and establishing transparent mechanisms that decouple resources from patronage. In short: liberating the state from its occupiers.Without this, the difference between the two experiences remains an expression of a profound difference in the structure of the state, the nature of the elites, and the conditions for producing national meaning.

Iran Between Piracy and Settlement
Sanaa Al-Jak/Nidaa Al-Watan/August 29, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
Recent developments in the conflict between the United States and Israel on one side, and Iran on the other, indicate a decline in the Lebanese file's independence, reducing it once again to a bargaining chip in the hands of influential actors and their ability to obstruct progress. This is evident in the successive Israeli crimes against southern Lebanon and the statements that undermine the state and the army, as well as in its use by both the US and Iran as a clause in a larger settlement. This is demonstrated by the interview given two days ago by Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, on Al-Manar TV, in which he claimed to be "defending Lebanon and providing it with support," and "preventing Israel from advancing towards the southern suburbs of Beirut." He described Hezbollah's resistance as "exceptional" and Israel's losses as "significant," while ignoring the Israeli massacres that employ the principle of annihilation and wipe out entire families, leaving the entire south as its playground without any deterrent response to this "exceptional resistance." Rezaei's claims regarding Lebanon are aimed at rallying the support base of Hezbollah, which has been left to the mercy of the Israeli enemy. They also attempt to downplay the impact of the American economic sanctions targeting Iran, sanctions for which the Iranian people are paying the price in increased poverty and oppression. This allows their rulers to continue their piracy-like adventures, not only against the Americans and Israelis, but also against their neighbors and wherever their influence expands. The Revolutionary Guard and its factions—whether Iraqi, Houthi, or Hezbollah—are working to ignite conflicts on all fronts, from the Strait of Hormuz to the Ali al-Taher hill, in order to maintain their economic and political dominance. This desired influence is what prompted Rezaei to reject any development that would lead to "ending the war in Lebanon and Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories" as a precondition for any understanding with the United States, as well as "ending the war in Gaza and halting Israeli attacks on Syria." While including Gaza in the conditions remains unnecessary, especially given the leaked information that Hamas political bureau chief Khalil al-Hayya and other leaders have confirmed their movement will exercise its natural right to political and social activity after the "road map" is implemented and they surrender their weapons, the inclusion of Syria on the Iranian list remains questionable. This is particularly pertinent given the severed relations between the two countries and the meetings that have begun between Syrian and Israeli officials in Jordan, seeking a mutually acceptable settlement. Therefore, the progress of the settlement process, albeit slowly, explains Iran's haste in offering apologies and concessions to the Syrian state, its pretense of supporting and defending it, and its attempt to turn the page on its crimes against humanity committed against Syrians—crimes no different from Israel's crimes in Gaza and Lebanon, perpetrated in collusion with the Assad regime and Hezbollah. From this perspective, it can be argued that Iran's mobilization, based on piracy—whether through attacks or statements—to assert its presence does not preclude it from seeking the favor of al-Julani; otherwise, Naim Qassem's stances toward Syria, and Mahmoud Qamati's opening of dialogue with the Americans, would not have been possible. Between piracy and compromise, we are faced with numerous revolutionary pronouncements.

Mecca defense pact redraws the region’s strategic map
Prince Turki al-Faisal/Al Arabiya English/29 August ,2026
The signing of the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan has attracted global attention and prompted differing views over its importance and strategic significance for the allied countries. Many commentators have rushed to question its value or whether it can realistically be implemented, as though it were designed to counter the ambitions and plans of certain countries and should therefore be stopped before it takes effect, or as though it were sectarian in nature. Such arguments overlook the fact that this is a defensive alliance, whose value would only be questioned by those harboring hostile intentions toward these non-sectarian states or planning to target them in the future.
Forming alliances to address immediate or anticipated future security and military threats is a legitimate right of states under international law and a normal practice throughout the history of international diplomacy. Alliances are formed between responsible states that share a strategic assessment of the nature of the threats to their security and stability, as well as to the security and stability of their broader geostrategic environment. The countries allied under the Mecca Agreement share such an assessment in light of the wars unfolding in the region, the strategic vacuum these conflicts are expected to leave behind, the erosion of the balance of power and the end of the regional order that prevailed over previous decades. That order was linked to international protection of a region whose security and stability are both a global need and necessity, not only because of its geoeconomic and geofinancial importance, but also because of its pivotal location and historical and political standing.
The three countries are all geostrategically important, and their respective capabilities complement one another in ways that could restore the strategic balance in the region and fill any strategic vacuum left by regional wars. Through their alliance, the three countries can become a major force in confronting current and future threats facing the region. The alliance may also expand to include other countries that share the same objectives.
Some interpretations that fail to grasp the agreement’s strategic dimensions have suggested that Saudi Arabia’s importance and role within the alliance are tied to its financial capabilities and its desire to guarantee its own security, reducing the Kingdom’s role to these important considerations. Yet Saudi Arabia’s geostrategic importance is no less significant than that of the other parties to the alliance, and may even surpass theirs.
Others have argued that Saudi Arabia is constantly looking for a supporter to help safeguard its stability and security, as though such efforts were somehow unique to the Kingdom when all countries pursue them. Yet Saudi Arabia’s position on the international geopolitical map has itself made the Kingdom a destination for countries seeking its support and backing. Saudi Arabia’s geostrategic standing stems from its strategic geographical location, its central religious importance, its oil resources, financial strength, moderate policies, diplomatic role, international relationships and military capabilities.
Saudi Arabia’s strategic geographical position, encompassing most of the Arabian Peninsula, connects three major regions: the Middle East, Africa and South Asia. The Kingdom has coastlines on both the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf, placing it close to some of the world’s most important maritime trade and energy routes. This enables Saudi Arabia to influence the strategic environment of both vital regions and serve as a stabilizing force within them. From this position, the Kingdom influences global energy markets, maritime security, the balance of power in the Arabian Gulf and the Middle East, and relations among the world’s major powers. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has underscored the importance of Saudi Arabia’s position on the Red Sea, as well as the readiness of its ports and infrastructure to provide an alternative route for energy supplies and serve as a logistics hub for global supply and supply chains.
Oil is one of Saudi Arabia’s most important strategic assets. The Kingdom holds one of the world’s largest proven oil reserves and has consistently ranked among OPEC’s leading producers and exporters. It also possesses substantial spare production capacity, allowing it to increase or reduce output more rapidly than many of its competitors. This capacity gives Riyadh exceptional influence over global oil supplies and prices, as Saudi production decisions can affect inflation, transportation costs, government revenues and economic growth in both developed and developing countries. Saudi Arabia is therefore not merely an oil exporter, but a major participant in managing the global energy market. Today, the Kingdom is also building part of its geopolitical importance on its success, through Vision 2030, in transforming its oil-based wealth into lasting economic, technological and institutional influence, while expanding into other sectors including investment, tourism, entertainment, logistics, manufacturing, mining, renewable and nuclear energy, defense production and other important industries.
If strategic location and oil resources are important geostrategic and geopolitical factors, Saudi Arabia’s religious standing is no less significant. The Kingdom is home to the direction of prayer for Muslims and Islam’s two holiest cities, which millions of Muslims around the world yearn to visit every year to perform Hajj and Umrah and visit the holy sites. This gives Saudi Arabia an international standing that no other country possesses. Organizing, administering and protecting these holy sites, an honor for the Kingdom as well as a duty it bears, has enabled Saudi Arabia to build extensive and deeply rooted relationships with governments, communities and Islamic organizations across Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas. The Kingdom’s religious standing also enables it to serve as an influential Islamic voice, given its position as an Arab power, an Islamic center, a major energy producer, a strong economy and an active member of international and regional organizations, including the G20, which brings together the world’s leading economies. Few countries possess such overlapping sources of influence, standing and strategic importance across so many different spheres.
While Saudi Arabia has maintained a strategic relationship with the United States both historically and today, it also has multifaceted strategic partnerships with China, Russia, the European Union and the majority of countries around the world, with the exception of the Zionist entity. These relationships are built on shared interests and mutual benefits in ways that serve the Kingdom’s security, the stability of its region and its broader strategic sphere. Saudi Arabia manages its international relations and diplomacy with wisdom, confidence and credibility. It works to resolve conflicts and wars in the region and uses its diplomacy to uphold Palestinian rights and find ways out of the wars imposed on the region. This approach has made Saudi Arabia an important strategic actor in a turbulent international system that is increasingly moving toward multipolarity.
Whatever the extent of Saudi Arabia’s strategic importance, the Kingdom is moving confidently toward the future, harnessing the sources of that importance to build its own strength. The alliance is ultimately an added source of value in achieving the Kingdom’s security and stability and ensuring the success of its ambitious plans for a safe and stable region.
**This op ed was originally published in and translated from Asharq Alawsat

Iran, Hezbollah, and the new US sanctions that aim to take them down
Khaled Abou Zahr/Arab News/August 29/2026
Can the latest US sanctions on Iran pile more pressure on Tehran? On Aug. 24, Washington stepped up its measures targeting the Iranian regime by targeting not only officials and entities linked to the country’s military, nuclear, missile and drone programs, but also the international networks that enable Tehran to sell its oil, move funds and circumvent existing sanctions. The main difference from previous sanctions, therefore, was a greater focus on intermediaries, traders, shell companies and foreign actors. In short, it puts those who facilitate these activities at higher risk. Operation Economic Outcast is part of the campaign of maximum pressure on the Iranian regime. Yet, after decades of US sanctions and Tehran building alternative systems to mitigate them, what exactly is the objective of the latest measures: is it to inflict more pain on the regime, or part of a broader scheme to bring it down? And will it work?
The US has maintained an extensive program of sanctions against Iran in recent times, with five major Executive Orders since 2010 as well as acts of Congress. This has been done with a main focus on addressing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and its financing of terrorism, by countering trade in sectors such as oil, finance, missiles and the nuclear industry. As an indication of the scope of recent measures, since February 2025 Washington has designated more than 1,000 individuals, companies, ships and other entities as part of its campaign of pressure against Iran.
It is well known that Tehran has for years found fresh ways to circumvent sanctions with great creativity. Through the use of complex international networks involving shell companies, banks, commercial intermediaries and maritime fleets, it has been able to preserve oil exports and the resultant inward financial flows. It has also been a leading early mover on the use of cryptocurrencies as a new way to transact and store value.
One of the most notable cases related to sanctions on Tehran is that of Reza Zarrab, an Iranian businessman arrested in the US in 2016 for orchestrating a massive scheme to evade sanctions, which highlighted the scope of Iranian capabilities.
More recently, networks were uncovered involving members of the Zarringhalam family and oil magnate Hossein Shamkhani, who are accused of funneling billions of dollars through shell companies, currency exchanges and international oil networks.
US authorities have also seized oil shipments and charged several intermediaries linked to the IRGC, in cases that have highlighted the growing use of cryptocurrencies to move funds.
However, these cases also demonstrate that despite significant seizures, arrests and additional sanctions, Iranian networks have consistently managed to adapt and alter their methods, which limits the long-term effectiveness of sanctions.
Will the decision now to target individuals and entities that collaborate with the Iranian regime, which certainly is a positive step, prove conclusive and finally put the IRGC out of business? Perhaps such steps should have been taken sooner.
Following the US reclassification of Hezbollah this month to explicitly classify it as an extension of the IRGC, there should now be a greater focus on targeting the Lebanese organization’s financial structures and ecosystem. This would not only serve broader efforts to hurt Iran, as Hezbollah is a key element in its strategy, but would also contribute to greater stability in the Levant. The use of artificial intelligence-driven pattern detection and cryptocurrency-tracing tools can disrupt designated financing networks.
Hezbollah conducts its illegal activities, and channels the proceeds, through complex financial networks. Those networks should be taken down. While some in Lebanon still consider Hezbollah to be Lebanese, the organization functions like a transnational criminal enterprise, perhaps larger in size than some of the most well-known organized crime enterprises.
The illicit activities include drug trafficking and related money laundering, including the facilitation of cocaine shipments and the handling of proceeds from Latin American cartels, as well as involvement in the smuggling of captagon and other drugs.
Other endeavors include trade-based money laundering, counterfeit goods and currencies, trafficking in blood diamonds and other high-value commodities via West African networks, goods smuggling, and related bulk movements of cash.
Hezbollah uses front companies, charities, real-estate and commercial ventures, and informal transfer systems such as hawala to raise, move and launder funds that flow back into Lebanon, where the group maintains a parallel financial system centered on nonprofit financial institution Al-Qard Al-Hasan, which functions as its de facto bank outside of the formal, regulated sector, and processes Iranian funding and proceeds from illicit activities.
There is an urgent need to target this institution, other entities such as Bayt Al-Mal, and networks of money-exchange houses, gold-trading fronts and Hezbollah's Central Finance Unit, which consolidates and allocates resources.
In the fight against the Iranian regime and Hezbollah, the US government should expand its partnerships with private technology firms that focus on cybercrime and anti-money-laundering efforts, taking into account the achievements of Palantir, for example, to deploy advanced data-integration and analytics tools.
The use of artificial intelligence-driven pattern detection and cryptocurrency-tracing tools can help disrupt designated financing networks. By using these deep-tech capabilities to merge transaction data, corporate registries, sanctions lists and open-source intelligence, agencies and the wider intelligence community can more rapidly identify Hezbollah’s financial activity. It is well known that dismantling adaptive networks is not an easy task. But continual disruptions, as well as measures that increase the operational costs of illicit finance, would hurt Hezbollah’s military activities, without a doubt. That would mean fewer drones in the sky.While there will be no stopping the interference of the Iranian regime until all of its networks are destroyed, hitting Hezbollah the hardest and dismantling all of its current structures would deal the strongest possible blow to Tehran.
With Hezbollah no longer welcome in Syria and receiving fewer subsidies from the IRGC, any blow to its financial systems, and the ways in which money flows to it from Tehran, would be a net win in the fight against the group’s terror activities and the regime in Iran.
**Khaled Abou Zahr is the founder of SpaceQuest Ventures, a space-focused investment platform. He is the CEO of EurabiaMedia and editor of Al-Watan Al-Arabi.

Selected Face Book & X tweets on August 29/2026
Rep. Carlos A. Gimenez
Erdogan’s continued support of anti-American terrorist groups in the Middle East is a direct to the safety & wellbeing of the American people.Erdogan’s pathetic rhetoric & calls for violence against #Israel undermines #Turkey’s role in NATO & will not be tolerated. 🇺🇸

Nadim Koteich
Together with the United Arab Emirates, a U.S. military task force started guiding ships through the southern channel of the strait while giving them air cover and intercepting Iranian drone and cruise missile attacks.

Nadim Koteich
Dear @araghchi
you’re not only a liar, you’re a pathetic terrible one.
•$7.5B is old money, not current flow. That period (late March–late July) includes the brief June–July window when the US lifted the blockade and licensed oil sales during talks. Iran used that opening to dump stored crude, mostly toward China.
•August reality: tanker data shows loadings around 260k barrels a day. Down 80%+ versus last year. The blockade is back on. Iran’s Central Bank governor already said they are not exporting oil.
•“Funded through January” only means the regime claims enough hard currency for official government bills. It does not mean shops, wages, or the wider economy are fine.
•Street: the rial is about 2 million per dollar, inflation is around 90%, food inflation is over 120%, and people face kilometer-long petrol queues. Stations are running dry, with a 14–15 million liter daily gasoline shortfall.
•Fars and Oil Ministry numbers are not independently audited. Tehran has every reason to claim “we’re fine” while the pressure campaign is underway.
•Economic D-Day launched after this four-month window. Using a lagging official press line as proof the choke already failed is the actual spin.
•Past sales are not current exports. Government cash on the books is not the public economy. That’s total BS.

FDD
Could Ankara become Hamas's next home base if it's ousted from Gaza? On the FDD Morning Brief, @JSchanzer and @DayanCenter's @hayeytan unpack Turkey's duplicitous game as the Board of Peace pushes to dismantle the terror group.
For the full episode: https://bit.ly/4qM9C2r
https://x.com/FDD/status/2093699906124882237/video/1

Danny Danon  דני דנון
Israel stands with the United States in the fight against terrorism and welcomes its decision to designate “Palestine Action” as a terrorist organization.Unsurprisingly, @volker_turk
once again chooses to stand on the wrong side of history by condemning this decision.
The UN’s condemnation only supports terrorism.

Andrea Stricker
Nothing is wrong with Saudi Arabia supporting enrichment on U.S. soil (without any access), having an assured fuel supply made in America, and fueling its future U.S.-built reactors along with a full suite of U.S. training, assistance, and safety.
Wins all around and no downsides for nonproliferation.
More here: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-a-saudi-nuclear-program-is-not-worth-ending-us-nonproliferation-policy

Barak Ravid
Two Israeli officials say the move to close the Strait of Hormuz was initiated by then-commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, General Alireza Tangsiri
In the first 72 hours of the war, Iran announced it was closing the strait and warned it would attack tankers that tried to transit
But behind the scenes, Tangsiri gave an order that dramatically escalated the situation: to deploy naval mines in the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS), the main international shipping lane through the strait, Israeli and U.S. officials say.
Tangsiri was killed three weeks later in an Israeli airstrike in Bandar Abbas, Iran

U.S. Embassy Beirut
In response to a media inquiry from @ThisIsBeirut_ , a U.S. Department of State spokesperson said: The Trilateral Framework clearly states that the Lebanese Government is the sole legitimate interlocutor for discussions about the future of Lebanon and on behalf of the Lebanese people.
The United States stands with the Lebanese people and wants Lebanon to be a safe and sovereign country. For that to happen, Hizballah must disarm. As Ambassador Issa has said, we want nothing more than for them [Hizballah] to hand over their weapons. When Hizballah decides it is ready to do so, it can talk with the Lebanese state, with whom we are already in dialogue and tell them it is ready to turn in its weapons. Then we could try to bring the views close to each other.
But as it stands, Hizballah so far does not want to talk to the Lebanese state, nor talk to us, nor talk to Israel, because it is simply taking orders from Iran. It's time for Hizballah to do what’s best for Lebanon and the Lebanese people.

Pierre Rehov
In June 1964, an opportunistic Egyptian criminal bandit, paid by the KGB, brandished the Jordanian flag after removing its star. That is how 3,000 years of "Palestinian" history were born, fabricated out of whole cloth for the sole purpose of harming the West and finishing Hitler's work.