Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on September 08-09/2023
Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary
Saint Of The Day site
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/122075/122075/
The Church has celebrated Mary’s birth since at least the sixth century. A September birth was chosen because the Eastern Church begins its Church year with September. The September 8 date helped determine the date for the feast of the Immaculate Conception on December 8. Scripture does not give an account of Mary’s birth. However, the apocryphal Protoevangelium of James fills in the gap. This work has no historical value, but it does reflect the development of Christian piety. According to this account, Anna and Joachim are infertile but pray for a child. They receive the promise of a child who will advance God’s plan of salvation for the world. Such a story, like many biblical counterparts, stresses the special presence of God in Mary’s life from the beginning. Saint Augustine connects Mary’s birth with Jesus’ saving work. He tells the earth to rejoice and shine forth in the light of her birth. “She is the flower of the field from whom bloomed the precious lily of the valley. Through her birth the nature inherited from our first parents is changed.” The opening prayer at Mass speaks of the birth of Mary’s Son as the dawn of our salvation, and asks for an increase of peace.

Video link of the Divine Mass Patriarch Al-Rahi presided over today, September 8, 2023, on the anniversary of the birth of the Virgin Mary in the courtyard of the Beiteddine Diocese, with all reports that covered his visit to Mount Lebanon
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/122083/122083/
*Al-Rahi from Beiteddine: Lebanon cannot continue its path without reconciliation and frankness
NNA/LCCC/September 08/2023 (Google Translation)
*Patriarch Al-Rahi meets with Sheikh Akl of the Unitarian Druze Community
LBCI/September 08/2023
*Al-Rahi meets Abi al-Mona as he tours Chouf, Aley on reconciliation anniversary
Naharnet/September 08/2023
*Al-Rahi: Lebanon is final homeland for all its citizens
LBCI/September/2023
*Jumblat lauds al-Rahi, urges US, Iran to facilitate president election
Naharnet/September 08/2023
*Rahi meets Druze Sheikh in Chanay: Lebanon should cling to positive neutrality
NNA t/September 08/2023
*Jumblatt receives Patriarch Rahi and Druze Sheikh Akl at Mukhtara palace
NNAt/September 08/2023
*The long road to reconciliation: Lebanon’s historic Christian-Druze rapprochement
LBCI/September 08/2023

Question: “How should a Christian react to all the doomsday predictions out there?”
GotQuestions.org/September 08/2023
Answer: In the 1950s the world feared it was on the edge of a nuclear apocalypse. Near the turn of the century, there was worldwide speculation about Y2K and the possible end of the civilized world as a result. A pop culture stir arose over the end of the Mayan calendar in 2012. Then there was discussion in Christian circles over the appearance of blood moons, supposedly also a sign of catastrophic events. How, then, should a Christian respond to doomsday predictions and related news events? From a Christian perspective, our first reaction should be to take a deep breath and relax. At some point in time, this world is going to end (2 Peter 3:10). Christ will return (Revelation 19:11–13) at the time He is prepared for (1 Corinthians 15:51–52). And yet, every single person on earth is a split second away from a personal doomsday, right now (Psalm 39:5). Heart attacks, war, accidents, and such can bring us face-to-face with our Creator more readily than a global catastrophe (James 4:13–15). Whether the end times are right around the corner or a long way off, we are called to be prepared (2 Corinthians 6:2), not panicked. The vast majority of doomsday predictions are pure speculation, myth, or uninformed hysteria. Even the Mayans didn’t think of their calendar cycle as predicting the end of the world. Computer experts were not the ones pushing the Y2K panic. And virtually no Christian theologians think that the blood moon phenomenon is a major indicator of any particular event. As with other fads and crazes, the discussions are driven by poor reasoning and even worse facts. Born-again Christians can be confident in their salvation and trust in God to handle everything else, too (Matthew 6:25–34). We are told that it’s possible to read the signs of the times (Matthew 16:3) but also that it’s impossible for any person to know for sure when the end times will really occur (Matthew 24:36). Rather than focusing on dates, disputes, and rumors, we ought to concentrate on bringing the gospel to as many people as possible. The ship is going down, but before we worry about how and when the end will come, we need to get more people into lifeboats and life jackets!

Al-Rahi from Beiteddine: Lebanon cannot continue its path without reconciliation and frankness
NNA/LCCC/September 08/2023 (Google Translation)
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/122083/122083/
Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Mar Bechara Boutros Al-Rai considered that “Lebanon cannot continue its path without reconciliation and frankness, and we pray that reconciliation and frankness will continue at the political level, and we ask God to enable everyone to do it with courage.” He said in his sermon while presiding over the Mass of the Feast of Our Lady of Salvation in the courtyard of the Beiteddine Diocese in the Chouf: “It is a sacrifice of gratitude to God for this beautiful day, in which we experienced the beauty of the reconciliation that took place in the mountain in the year 2001.” He believed that "Lebanon cannot complete its path without reconciliation and frankness, and we pray that reconciliation and frankness will continue at the political level, and we ask God to enable everyone to do it with courage." He said: “The beginning was in Shanai with Sheikh Akl of the Druze Unitarian sect, Sami Abi Al-Muna, and the goal was to renew the bonds of love, friendship, and cooperation in our service together on the spiritual level. After that, we had a pause in the Barouk, greeting our people there, and a pause in this chair.” He continued: Then we visited Baakline, where Abu Al-Muna and I spoke about the fruits of the historic reconciliation conducted by the late Maronite Patriarch Mar Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir and former MP Walid Jumblatt, to confirm that we are committed to continuing this historic reconciliation, because the unity of our people and the unity of our politicians in the nation’s journey rests on it.” After that, we moved to Darat Al-Mukhtara, shared a dinner of love, and exchanged words with Jumblatt. And now we are here, to thank God for this beautiful day, and to extend our greetings to all those who accompanied us,” stressing, “We thank God for these blessings, and renew our faith in the process of reconciliation, and we pray that reconciliation includes all responsible politicians, parties, and groups, so that the nation will be safe.” He saw that “Lebanon cannot continue its path without reconciliation and frankness, and we pray that reconciliation and frankness will continue at the political level, and we ask God to enable everyone to do it with courage.”

Al-Rahi meets Abi al-Mona as he tours Chouf, Aley on reconciliation anniversary
Naharnet/September 8, 2023
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/122083/122083/
Maronite Patriarch Beshara al-Rahi started Friday a tour to the Chouf and Aley regions on the anniversary of the 2001 Mountain Reconciliation. After meeting Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Sami Abi al-Mona in the town of Chanay, al-Rahi highlighted the diversity of Lebanon. "Lebanon cannot be a land of diversity, unity, and openness without being neutral," he said. For his part, Abi al-Mona said that Druze and Christians "hand in hand, will set the (Chouf) Mountains as a good example for all of Lebanon, from Chanay to Barouk, Baakleen and al-Mukhtara," as he offered to al-rahi the Key of the town of Chanay. In August 2001, late Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir brokered a historic reconciliation between Maronites and Druze, who fought a war in 1983. He later toured the predominantly Druze Chouf region of Mount Lebanon and visited al-Mukhtara. Abi al-Mona and Al-Rahi visited Friday al-Barouk and the Maronite Diocese in Beiteddine, before heading to Baakline and later to al-Mukhtara, where they will meet with former Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jubmlat and head of the Democratic Gathering bloc Taimour Jumblat. Al-Rahi had said that if a Lebanese dialogue happens in spite of the bickering, it would require going to it without prejudgments nor the will to impose ideas, projects and viewpoints, which some interpreted as a call for parliamentary blocs to engage in a seven-day dialogue proposed by Speaker Nabih Berri, and rejected by the Lebanese Forces and the Kataeb party. "Dialogue is a means and not a goal," Abi al-Mona said from Baakline, calling for a dialogue that aims at breaking the impasse and reaching a consensus. "Why don't we call for it, not to bypass the constitution, but for the beauty of consensus," he said.

Patriarch Al-Rahi meets with Sheikh Akl of the Unitarian Druze Community
LBCI/September 08/2023
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/122083/122083/
Patriarch Mar Bechara Al-Rahi embarked on a visit to the Mountain of Reconciliation, the Mountain of Coexistence, and the Mountain of History. This historic visit was initiated by the Patriarch and the Druze spiritual leader, Sheikh Akl of the Unitarian Druze Community, starting their journey in Shanay region. Together, they completed the mountainous tour. The second stop was in Barouk, where a grand reception was held for Patriarch al-Rahi along the way. In front of the monument of the national anthem's writer, Rashid Nakhle, Al-Rahi stated, "We all must work for the nation." In the Bishopric of Beiteddine, Al-Rahi, accompanied by bishops, the delegation, and several prominent figures and deputies from the region, stopped before going to the National Library in Baaklin. A national gathering took place there, bringing together official, religious, political, and social figures. The main stop was in Mukhtara, where the Former Progressive Socialist Party leader, Walid Jumblatt, stood with his son Taymour, welcoming his guest at the historic Jumblatt residence, as described by Al-Rahi. In the heart of Mukhtara, Jumblatt chose to host the Maronite Patriarch, conveying his political messages. Al-Rahi's lengthy day was concluded with a Mass on the Feast of Our Lady of Salvation in the Bishopric of Beiteddine before moving on to a dinner attended by several priests.

Jumblat lauds al-Rahi, urges US, Iran to facilitate president election
Naharnet/September 8, 2023
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/122083/122083/
Progressive Socialist Party former leader Walid Jumblat on Friday lauded Maronite Patriarch Beshara al-Rahi’s “local, Arab and international efforts for resolving the presidential crisis.” “We also highly appreciate your support for dialogue, despite the various obstacles,” Jumblat added addressing al-Rahi, at a gathering in Mukhtara that was part of the patriarch’s tour of the Chouf and Aley regions. "There is no one more foolish, ridiculous and dangerous than those who are calling for vacuum instead of facilitating the issue of the presidential election,” Jumblat added. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and U.S. mediator Amos Hochstein “have both said that they support the election of a president. That’s excellent, but how?” the ex-PSP leader added. He accordingly called on Abdollahian and Hochstein to “facilitate the election of a president.”

Jumblatt receives Patriarch Rahi and Druze Sheikh Akl at Mukhtara palace
NNAt/September 08/2023
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/122083/122083/
Former Head of Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt, on Friday welcomed at the Mukhtara Palace, Maronite Patriarch, Mar Beshara Boutros Al-Rahi, and Sheikh Akl of the Unitarian Druze Community, Dr. Sami Abi Al-Muna, as part of their tour in Mount Lebanon. Greeting them at the Mukhtara palace, Jumblatt said: "Reconciliation in the mountain was consecrated despite some discordant voices that work to exhume graves. In our literature, the martyrs are all martyrs of the homeland without discrimination."Addressing Patriarch Rahi, Jumblatt said: “We highly appreciate all the local and Arab efforts you are making to resolve the presidential dilemma, and we highly applaud your support for the call for dialogue.”Patriarch Rahi, in turn, said: “This day is historic, and we have come to commemorate once again the reconciliation you made with Patriarch Sfeir, which you wanted to include all Lebanese.”Patriarch Rahi pointed out that "Lebanon cannot continue in this situation, as it has become a stranger to itself and must be treated with frank reconciliation between all its sects."The Patriarch said: “We cannot visit this historic Dar without it having a remarkable impact because we stand before a great history of patriotism, and we are happy because its protector and the protector of the history it carries is its owner, Walid Beik Jumblatt, who constitutes a subject of security for the Lebanese who are awaiting his stances."

Rahi meets Druze Sheikh in Chanay: Lebanon should cling to positive neutrality
NNA/September 8, 2023
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/122083/122083/
Maronite Patriarch, Mar Beshara Boutros Al-Rahi, on Friday visited Chanay-Aley for a meeting with Druze Sheikh, Sami Abi Almouna, in the presence of a number of official religious, political, and social figures. During the meeting, Rahi stressed the paramount importance of building internal unity in Lebanon. “We are a state of openness, and this is dubbed positive neutrality, which is at the heart of Lebanon's identity and nature. Without it, Lebanon loses its role and mission as previously mentioned by Saint Pope John Paul II,” Al-Rahi added. For his part, the Druze Sheikh stressed the importance of Patriarch Al-Rahi’s “historic visit,” saying it expresses “the truth about the unified mountain that we have been endeavoring together to consecrate as a good model for the entire Lebanese nation.” “We will translate your visit from kind words into action, an economic investment movement, and construction that will consolidate our presence in this mountain,” he added as addressing Rahi.

Al-Rahi: Lebanon is final homeland for all its citizens
LBCI/September 8, 2023
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/122083/122083/
The convoy of Maronite Patriarch Bechara al-Rahi stopped in Barouk, where the town's residents, along with the head of the Druze community, Sheikh Sami Abil-Muna, and the accompanying delegation, welcomed him with welcoming signs.
The mayor of Barouk, Elias Nakhla, gave a speech in which he pointed out that "His Beatitude the Patriarch and the head of the Druze community are teachers of coexistence, from whom we learn and teach our children to instill love, despite the injustice our country is experiencing." In response, Patriarch al-Rahi thanked the organizers for their warm welcome and pointed out that "it is not enough for us to say that we are all for the homeland because, unfortunately, we are not all for the homeland. It is not enough to say that Lebanon is a final homeland when we find that loyalty is lacking. We cannot live the lie between what we say and what we do. Today, in Barouk, we stand before the national conscience and renew our belief that Lebanon is a real and final homeland for all its citizens, and all loyalty is to it alone. Unfortunately, in all countries, their national anthem is sung in full, except Lebanon; we suffice with the first part. From here, in front of the statue of Rashid Nakhlé, let us declare our commitment to sing our national anthem in full because it is an integral link that cannot be broken, carrying a national commitment that befits us as Lebanese." For his part, Sheikh Sami Abil-Muna saw that "there is no speech after the speech of His Beatitude, who, with his presence and high morals, speaks through us, and his word is our word."

The long road to reconciliation: Lebanon's historic Christian-Druze rapprochement
LBCI/September 8, 2023
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/122083/122083/
More than one confrontation occurred between the Druze and Christians from 1840 to 1860 under Ottoman rule, and then in the Mountain War (Harb al Jabal) in 1983, where hundreds of victims fell, and the majority of Christians left. Walid Jumblatt wanted to turn the page of the past definitively after scattered reconciliations witnessed by some villages, and who better than Bkerke and its "master" to meet in this mission to put an end to the tragedies and open a new page in Christian-Druze relations. The rapprochement between Bkerke and Moukhtara increased in 2000 after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and after the appeal of the patriarchs in September of the same year.While the late Patriarch Mar Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir openly raised his voice demanding the withdrawal of the Syrian army, Walid Jumblatt demanded the redeployment of the Syrians to the Bekaa as stipulated in the Taif Agreement. He faced a campaign of attack by some of Syria's allies in Lebanon. The late Samir Frangieh, known as the "Red Beik," for decades, was a friend of the head of the Progressive Socialist Party and, at the same time, close to Patriarch Sfeir.  He and his friend Fares Souaid took on the task of conveying messages between Moukhtara and the Maronite Patriarchate. The weekend of the first week of August 2001 was chosen as the date for reconciliation due to its symbolism, as the people of Al Jabal- Christians and Druze - celebrate the Feast of Our Lady of the Hill in Deir Al-Qamar. Patriarch Sfeir went to Al Jabal, where he met its Christian residents in popular gatherings in Christian villages, while Jumblatt mobilized the MPs of the Democratic Gathering and senior Druze leaders in Moukhtara to receive Sfeir with the best reception, consecrate the reconciliation of the Al Jabal residents, and enhance the return of Christians to the villages.
President Emile Lahoud, upon his arrival at the Lady of the Hill Church to participate in the Patriarch's Mass, was met with slogans condemning his presence and criticizing Syrian tutelage over Lebanon. Opponents of Syria from the Free Patriotic Movement, the Lebanese Forces, the Kataeb, and Al-Ahrar gathered at the bend of Kahaleh at the end of the Patriarch's tour, which lasted for two days. They raised partisan flags for the first time in over a decade. They chanted against Syria and demanded its withdrawal from Lebanon, a move that disturbed Damascus and the Lebanese security apparatus, which feared the growing influence of Christians and the coordination between Bkerke and Moukhtara. The response came two days later, on August 7, with the arrest of hundreds of supporters of Christian parties and their imprisonment. The reconciliation ended a historical conflict, consolidated the calm atmosphere, strengthened brotherhood among Al Jabal's residents, and paved the way for cooperation utilized in the "Independence Uprising," contributing to the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Al Jabal's reconciliation has become a founding document and a shining era in the history of Lebanon and its Mountain.

Report: Lebanon to have president before year's end, war ruled out
Naharnet/September 8, 2023
Lebanon is “governed by stability and security and its civil peace will not be shaken,” a senior Lebanese leader has quoted a prominent international envoy as saying. The envoy had visited Lebanon recently, the senior leader told the Nidaa al-Watan newspaper, in remarks published Friday. “Lebanon’s stability is a domestic need as much as it is a foreign need, specifically for the neighboring countries, and all the talk about possible security incidents that might spread across Lebanon is aimed at intimidation and imposing political facts under the pressure of the need of the Lebanese for safety,” the envoy reportedly said. The political leader added that “a Qatari security envoy will arrive in Beirut at the end of this week and will prepare for the post-Le Drian period, or for the arrival of an envoy who also represents the Arab and international quintet and who will carry political, economic and financial orientations.” “The ruling establishment will become before two choices: electing a president who is not a party and who would be the gateway for salvation -- seeing as the Gulf has finalized its preparations for major investments in Lebanon -- or continuing with the same obstructive and intimidating approach which will push Lebanon into a new abyss from which there can be no salvation,” the leader quoted the envoy as saying. “Lebanon will have a president before the end of this year if things go as planned,” the leader added, noting that “the messages sent by the White House’s top energy adviser Amos Hochstein during his visit to Lebanon firmly confirm that the era of stability will begin.” “His visits to Raouche, which is open to all directions, and to Hezbollah’s bastion Baalbek are a practical and executive message that things are headed to a solution and not to war,” the senior leader added.

Wronecka says UNIFIL extension opportunity for all sides to 'recommit to stability'
Naharnet/September 8, 2023
U.N. Special Coordinator for Lebanon Joanna Wronecka on Friday met with caretaker Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib. The Special Coordinator underlined that the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2695 on the renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate should be “an opportunity for all sides to recommit to stability in southern Lebanon and along the Blue Line,” her office said. She mentioned in particular “the importance of working towards the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006).”“It is important to move towards a permanent ceasefire and long-term solution to the conflict in line with Resolution 1701. To this end, UNSCOL works in support of the Lebanese authorities and extends the good offices of the U.N. Secretary-General for peace and security in the region,” she said. The Special Coordinator also reiterated the need to elect a new president and ways to overcome the current political impasse. “In her upcoming round of meetings, the Special Coordinator will be encouraging stakeholders to adopt a constructive solution-oriented approach,” her office said in a statement. The Special Coordinator also reconfirmed the U.N.’s “commitment to support Lebanon and the Lebanese people.”

Supreme Islamic Sharia Council: Will Mufti's term be extended or challenged?
LBCI/September 8, 2023
After approximately a month, the term of the Supreme Islamic Sharia Council, consisting of 38 members and headed by the Republic's Mufti, Sheikh Abdel Latif Derian, is coming to an end. It was previously agreed upon to suspend sessions a month before to prepare for the upcoming elections. However, in a surprising move, the Dar al-Fatwa has called the council members to a session on Saturday. This session coincided with the presentation of a proposal by some council members to renew Mufti Derian's term for an additional four years, even though his term is set to expire in approximately one and a half years when he reaches the legal age of 72. Opponents of the extension argue that amending the law from a council about to end its term in a month is not permissible. This group includes former Prime Minister Fouad Saniora, former Minister and Deputy Head of the Council Omar Miskawi, and several influential figures closely associated with Caretaker Prime Minister Mikati. But why is there a dispute over the law while Derian's term still has a year and a half left? The Supreme Islamic Sharia Council is facing a crucial election in a month, with Saniora fighting to secure a majority allowing him to appoint the new Mufti.
Meanwhile, the opposing group, both internally and externally, insists on ensuring Derian's continuity at the helm of Dar al-Fatwa regardless of the outcome of the upcoming elections. But will the session on Saturday take place, and what will be on its agenda? The session's convening depends on ensuring a quorum. Former Prime Ministers (Tammam Salam, Fouad Saniora, Najib Mikati, Saad Hariri, and Hassan Diab) will not attend, with some of them being abroad (Salam and Hariri) and others boycotting (Saniora). Furthermore, Mikati has distanced himself from any battle against Derian, with sources indicating a good relationship between Mikati and Derian. However, the absence of former prime ministers and the boycott by some council members do not seem to affect the quorum, which appears calm for Saturday's session. Moreover, it is true that the session for extension cannot be held in the absence of the Vice President who decided to boycott, and he is required to chair the session for extension in his absence. However, sources have confirmed that the Mufti can preside over the session, open it, and then withdraw from it later. Thus, the Saturday session is decisive; either the extension will be taken off the table, or a confrontation will loom in a month, leading to a potential battle after a year and a half.

National treasure reclaimed: US efforts secure the return of 12 stolen Lebanese artifacts worth millions
LBCI/September 8, 2023
Twelve stolen artifacts from Lebanon are on their way back to their rightful home. While their material value is estimated at nearly nine million dollars, their true worth is immeasurable as they constitute a national treasure.
These artifacts, dating back approximately two thousand years, belong to both the Roman and Greek eras and consist of nine mosaic panels:
- Two depicting autumn and summer from the 5th century AD.
- The gods Neptune and Amphitrite from the 3rd century AD.
- Several panels depicting the god Dionysus.
- King Lycurgus killing Ambrosia.
- Additionally, two marble statues from the 4th century of the legendary twins Castor and Pollux stolen from Aabbasiyyeh in southern Lebanon.- Lastly, a 1st-century AD bronze statue of a praying Roman athlete stolen from the city of Baalbek. These pieces were looted from Lebanon over the years, beginning during the war. They were found in New York, either on display in apartments and museums or hidden in warehouses. Before reaching art dealers, a Lebanese man was accused of smuggling them from Lebanon and displaying some in his residence in New York.
The accused is Georges Lotfi, a former pharmacist turned smuggler, who is now wanted by the Interpol. The Lebanese state did not uncover, pursue, or recover this national treasure. It's an achievement offered to Lebanon by the United States. This achievement is credited to Assistant District Attorney Colonel Matthew Bogdanos, who headed the antiquities trafficking unit. He led a criminal investigation with a professional team from the New York Public Prosecution investigators, US Homeland Security, and archaeological experts. Bogdanos is a hero; he is the Indiana Jones of New York, as described by Ambassador Abir Taha Audi, who closely monitored his investigations through extensive correspondence with the Lebanese Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Culture.
Bogdanos will soon be in Lebanon, responding to an invitation from the Minister of Culture, Mohammad Wissam al-Mortada, to honor him alongside Abir Taha, who, on behalf of Lebanon, signed the list of recovered antiquities with the New York District Attorney.
Twelve of these treasures were not all displayed during the ceremony due to their size but were prepared for immediate shipment to Lebanon. They will not return to their archaeological sites but will be exhibited in Beirut's National Museum, as stipulated in the agreement signed in New York.

UN Special Coordinator applauds Lebanon's diplomatic efforts for UNIFIL renewal
LBCI/September 8, 2023
Caretaker Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, Abdallah Bou Habib, discussed with the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Joanna Wronecka, the context of renewing UNIFIL's mandate in the Security Council this year.
The Special Coordinator welcomed the Foreign Minister's visit to New York to follow up on the renewal process and his direct meetings with Security Council members and the UN Secretary-General, given its importance in explaining Lebanon's perspective.
Bou Habib and Wronecka emphasized "the importance of continuing coordination between UNIFIL and the Lebanese authorities following the new resolution adopted by the Security Council and in line with the SOFA agreement, which is evident on the ground in the south through continuous and effective coordination between the two parties." They also discussed the importance of finding a solution to the remaining land border points to enhance stability in the south and preserve Lebanon's rights.

Geagea slams 'disorienting' dialogue, says Berri 'master of antics'
Naharnet/September 8, 2023
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea has dubbed a seven-day dialogue proposed by Speaker Nabih Berri an attempt to obstruct the presidential election. "Berri is a master of political antics," Geagea said, adding that dialogue is a futile farce. He called on Berri to stop disrupting Parliament and presidential elections and to call for open election sessions. "Everything else is an attempt to distract our attention and to disorient us," he said. Berri had called on all political blocs to engage in a seven-day dialogue, following which open presidential election sessions would be held. While many MPs lauded Berri's initiative, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea and Kataeb Party chief Sami Gemayel both rejected his call for dialogue.

Two men questioned in Lebanon over Carlos Ghosn 2019 escape
Associated Press/September 8, 2023
Lebanese judicial authorities have questioned two people at the request of Turkey on suspicion of being involved in the 2019 escape of auto tycoon Carlos Ghosn from Japan to Lebanon, officials said Friday. The recent questioning of the two men in Beirut came a week before a hearing in Lebanon about the $1 billion lawsuit that Ghosn, formerly the president of Nissan, filed against the company and about a dozen people in Beirut over his imprisonment in Japan and what he says is Fmisinformation spread against him. The officials said one of the two men who were questioned is a Lebanese pilot who was at an airport in Istanbul when the plane carrying Ghosn from Japan landed. The pilot, officials said, denied that he got paid to help in Ghosn escape to Beirut. The Associated Press agreed to withold the pilot's name at the request of officials. The AP has previously reported on the other man questioned, George-Antoine Zayek. He is believed to have helped a third man, former Green Beret Michael Taylor, hide Ghosn in a large black box supposedly containing audio equipment, although they knew Ghosn was not allowed to leave Japan while awaiting trial. A Tokyo court handed down prison terms in 2021 for Taylor and his son Peter after they were accused of helping Ghosn escape to Lebanon while awaiting trial in Japan. Zayek told Lebanese judicial officials that he did not know Ghosn before the escape adding that in 2019 he met Taylor in Dubai then they flew to Japan to attend a concert, the officials said on condition of anonymity in line with regulations. They quoted Zayek as saying that while in Japan, Taylor said that they should head to Lebanon and they boarded a plane where he saw two large boxes and flew to Turkey and then to Beirut. Zayek said after arriving in Lebanon he knew from media reports that Ghosn was on the plane, the officials said. Ghosn was arrested in Japan in November 2018 on charges of breach of trust, misusing company assets for personal gain and violating securities laws by not fully disclosing his compensation. Ghosn is wanted in Japan and France. Since he fled to Lebanon, Beirut has received three notices from Interpol based on arrest warrants for him from those countries. In France, he is facing a number of legal challenges, including tax evasion and alleged money laundering, fraud and misuse of company assets while at the helm of the Renault-Nissan alliance. Lebanon has no extradition treaty with Japan and does not extradite its citizens. Ghosn has French, Brazilian and Lebanese citizenship.

Bassil accuses Berri and opposition of collusion to keep vacuum
Naharnet/September 8, 2023
Free Patriotic Movement chief Jebran Bassil has lashed out at both Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and the Lebanese Forces-led opposition over the issue of the proposed dialogue. “As if all parties have a tacit agreement on maintaining presidential vacuum so that each of them can implement his project,” Bassil said at an FPM ceremony in Batroun. “After we reached with the French a format for consultations, which would have been limited in program and form, the parliament speaker called for a traditional dialogue in parliament with a vague format for successive sessions, as if there is an intention to waste the chance,” Bassil charged. “The opposition meanwhile totally rejected dialogue, as if it is doing a favor for the proposer of the initiative in order to torpedo open (electoral) sessions,” the FPM chief added. “I fear that we might have returned to the Tayyouneh alliance to waste the chance to elect a president,” Bassil went on to say. He had accused Berri and Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea of colluding together during the 2021 Tayyouneh clashes.

With 20 wounded, Ain al-Hilweh clashes fuel Palestinian rivalries in Lebanon
Adam Lucente/Al-Monitor/September 8, 2023
Clashes resumed in Lebanon’s Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp on Thursday night in the latest instance of violence in the notorious camp for Palestinian refugees. The fighting, which stretched into Friday, occurred between the Palestinian group Fatah and rival Islamists, leading to at least 20 injuries. Stray bullets struck parts of the nearby coastal city of Sidon, Lebanon’s official National News Agency reported. Dozens of residents fled their homes in the northern end of the camp, where the fighting was concentrated, and some sheltered in a nearby mosque, Agence France-Presse reported. The United Nations’ humanitarian coordinator for Lebanon, Imran Riza, said armed groups have taken over eight schools run by the United Nations' agency for Palestinian refugees, blocking access for 6,000 students about to begin the school year. “I urge armed groups to stop the fighting in the camp and vacate these schools immediately,” said Riza, per the National News Agency. Videos posted on social media showed fires and sounds of gunshots in the camp. Ain al-Hilweh is home to around 50,000 refugees, descendants of Palestinians who were expelled or fled their homes during the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 that led to Israel’s creation. Internal security is handled by a joint committee of Palestinian factions. Conditions in the camp are widely regarded as poor. Why it matters: Clashes between Fatah and Islamist groups are a regular occurrence in the notorious camp. The most recent round of violence began in late July, when a Fatah member attempted to kill an Islamist fighter as revenge for an earlier death. Fatah commander Abu Ashraf al-Armoushi was then killed in an ambush. The fighting that began in late July lasted several days and resulted in at least 13 deaths. A truce was reached on Aug. 3. However, clashes were expected to resume since Islamist factions have not handed over the accused killers of Armoushi to Lebanese authorities, according to the Associated Press. The Lebanese army has no jurisdiction inside Palestinian refugee camps in the country per the 1969 Cairo Agreement signed between the Palestinian Liberation Organization, of which Fatah is a party, and Lebanon. The arrangement is a source of tension in Lebanon, as many in the country view the camps as hotbeds for militant activity. In recent years, Syrian refugees have also come to reside in the camp. Know more: The fighting is coinciding with tensions between Fatah and the Gaza-based Islamist rivals Hamas in the Palestinian territories. The Fatah-led Palestinian Authority is widely unpopular, leading to increasing support for Hamas.

Twenty wounded as clashes resume in Ain el-Hilweh
Associated Press/September 8, 2023
Clashes resumed in Lebanon's largest Palestinian refugee camp overnight, with heavy gunfire and shelling wounding at least 20 people and prompting residents of the camp and the surrounding area to flee on Friday. There had previously been several days of street battles in the Ein el-Hilweh camp between Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah movement and Islamist groups after Fatah accused the Islamists of gunning down one of their military generals on July 30. Those street battles left at least 13 dead and dozens wounded, and forced hundreds to flee from their homes. An uneasy truce has been in place since Aug. 3, but clashes were widely expected to resume as the Islamist groups have not handed over the accused killers of the Fatah general, Mohammad "Abu Ashraf" al-Armoushi to the Lebanese judiciary as demanded by a committee of Palestinian factions earlier this month.
A committee of Palestinian factions in Ein el-Hilweh announced on Tuesday that their joint security forces would launch raids in search of the accused killers. Maher Shabaita, head of Fatah in the Sidon region, told The Associated Press that the Islamist groups had launched an attack Thursday night in an attempt to forestall plans by Palestinian forces to clear militants out of schools they had been occupying in the camp. By late morning Friday, the fighting had at least temporarily subsided. The state-run National News Agency reported 20 people were wounded, including an elderly man, and transported to hospitals overnight. Shabaita said the wounded included three civil defense volunteers who came under shelling as they were working to extinguish fires. There were no immediate reports of deaths. The public Lebanese University announced it would close its branches in the city of Sidon, which is adjacent to the camp, and postpone scheduled exams in light of the fighting. Officials with the U.N. agency for Palestinian refugees, UNRWA, could not immediately give information on the number of casualties or displaced. UNRWA appealed last week for $15.5 million to repair infrastructure damaged in the last round of clashes in the camp, provide alternative education locations for children whose schools were damaged or occupied by militants, and give cash assistance to people who have been displaced from their homes.

Statement by UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Lebanon: Urgent call to stop the fighting in Ein el-Hilweh Palestine Refugee Camp and vacate...
NNA/September 08/2023
The United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for Lebanon, Imran Riza, made an urgent call to stop the fighting in Ein el-Hilweh Palestine Refugee Camp and vacate the UNRWA schools.
In his statement, Riza said: “The continuing clashes in the Ein El-Hilweh Palestine Refugee Camp, along with the ongoing takeover of eight UNRWA schools, are preventing the access of nearly 6,000 children who are about to begin their school year.
Education institutions must be safe and neutral spaces, critical for children's learning, well-being, and growth. The use of armed groups of schools amounts to gross violations of both International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law endangering children's rights to a safe learning environment, and jeopardizing their future and the future of their community. I urge armed groups to stop the fighting in the camp and vacate these schools immediately. I also call for the facilitation of the work of UNRWA and other humanitarian organisations to provide much-needed protection and assistance to families in need in the camp. The protection of civilians, including children, and their access to school, safe from all forms of violence and exploitation, is a shared responsibility. All concerned actors must take action to protect civilians, facilitate unhindered humanitarian access, and prevent the use of civilian infrastructure for fighting purposes."

Berri broaches general situation with MP Abdel Massih, receives Brigadier General Shehadeh, Greek Orthodox Patriarchate delegation
NNA/September 08/2023
House Speaker, Nabih Berri, on Friday met at the Second Presidency in Ein El-Tineh, with MP Adib Abdel Massih, with whom he discussed the country’s general situation, political developments and legislative affairs. Speaker Berri also received Lebanes government’s coordinator with UNIFIL, Brigadier General Mounir Shehadeh. Berri later received a delegation representing Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch and All the East, John X Yazigi. The delegation handed Speaker Berri the invitation of the Saint John of Damascus Institute at the Balamand regarding the international scientific conference organized by the University of Balamand under the patronage and presence of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch and All the East, John X, under the headline: “The Antiochian Orthodox Church from the Fifteenth Century to the Eighteenth Century: Towards an Accurate Understanding of History.”

Gasoline prices drop, diesel price edges up in Lebanon
NNA/September 08/2023
Gasoline prices in Lebanon dropped on Friday as the price of gasoline (95 octanes) has decreased by LBP 7,000, and the price of gasoline (98 octanes) has increased by LBP 7,000. The price of diesel has increased by LBP 13,000 and the price of a gas canister has maintained a steady price.
Consequently, the new prices are as follows:
95 octanes: LBP 1801000
98 octanes: LBP 1839000
Diesel: LBP 1679000
Gas: LBP 914000

Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on September 08-09/2023
US-backed Kurdish fighters say battles with tribesmen in eastern Syria that killed dozens have ended
AP/September 09, 2023
BEIRUT: A US-backed Syrian force declared its operations in eastern Syria completed Friday after almost two weeks of fighting with local tribesmen left dozens of people dead. The Syrian Democratic Forces said the fighting ended with its recapture of areas in Deir Ezzor province that the Kurdish-led force had lost during the battles triggered by the militia’s arrest of a rival US-backed commander. The clashes were among the worst in recent years in the region along the border with Iraq where hundreds of US troops have been based since 2015 to help in the fight against the Daesh group. Many feared the fighting between the rival Syrian militias that broke out on Aug. 27 would affect the efforts to combat Daesh. Earlier this week, the SDF took control of the areas it lost during the recent clashes. The SDF said the fighting left 25 of its fighters dead in addition to 29 members of rival groups and tribal gunmen. It said nine civilians were also killed and accused government forces of helping to incite the violence. The Kurdish-led force said it captured 21 fighters. Earlier Friday, the SDF said its fighters had detained a senior official with the Daesh group who was in charge of financing and arming sleeper cells. Despite the Daesh group’s defeat in Syria in March 2019, Daesh sleeper cells still carry out deadly attacks in Syria and in neighboring Iraq. The extremists once controlled wide areas and declared a caliphate in the two countries. The SDF said its militia members, with the support of the US-led coalition against the Daesh group and the Counter Terrorism Group in Iraq’s Kurdistan region, apprehended senior Daesh financier Abdul-Ghafour Taber Al-Diab, also known as Abu Amir. He was detained Thursday in the northern Syrian city of Raqqa, which was once seen as the capital of the extremists, according to the SDF. “He was responsible for financing the Daesh terrorist cells and their terrorist acts in the region, supplying them with weapons,” the militia said in a terse statement. In other parts of Syria, hundreds of people took part in anti-government protests in the southern city of Sweida, tearing down pictures of President Bashar Assad from a state institution. The demonstrations were sparked by worsening living conditions and inflation that surged after Assad’s decision last month to double public sector wages and pensions. The protests in Sweida province, where Druze people represent the majority of the population, are now in their third week. Surging inflation and the war-torn country’s spiraling economy initially drove the demonstrations but quickly shifted to marchers calling for the fall of Assad’s government. Sweida province has largely avoided the fighting of Syria’s 12-year civil war, which has killed a half-million people, wounded hundreds of thousands and left parts of the country destroyed. The conflict has displaced half of Syria’s prewar population of 23 million, including more than 5 million who are refugees outside the country. The Druze, followers of a 10th century offshoot of Shiite Islam, made up about 5 percent of Syria’s prewar population and are split between supporters and opponents of President Bashar Assad.

Syrians tear down poster of Assad in Sweida as protests swell
Reuters/September 08, 2023
BEIRUT: Demonstrators in the southern Syrian city of Sweida tore down a portrait of President Bashar Assad on Friday as anti-government protests that began three weeks ago swelled with crowds coming in from surrounding villages. In footage posted on activist pages, a group of men could be seen ripping a banner portraying Assad’s face that was hanging above the local branch of the Farmers’ Union. They then proceeded to weld shut the doors of the offices. Criticism of Assad has been growing in Sweida since demonstrations began in mid-August over the removal of fuel subsidies, the latest in a string of measures that have put a strain on people suffering from an economic meltdown. Sweida is capital of a province of the same name that is home to most of Syria’s minority Druze sect. The city remained in government hands throughout the civil war and was largely spared the violence seen elsewhere. Open criticism of the government has been rare in government-controlled areas of the country, but the economic situation has prompted public discontent that is increasingly directed at Assad. In Sweida city, hundreds gathered in Karama Square on Friday as the protests, carrying the multi-colored Druze flag.
“We raised our voices and Assad ran in fear!” the crowds chanted. “Hey Bashar, we don’t want you!“ Earlier this week, demonstrators tore down a portrait of Bashar’s father, former President Hafez Assad, that had been hanging on a government building and smashed a bust of his head, slapping it with their shoes. Residents of other government-held parts of Syria — where restrictions are tighter — have made more discrete gestures of protest to avoid detection by government forces.

US says it disrupts illicit oil shipment by Iran’s IRGC, seizes contraband crude
Reuters/September 08, 2023
HOUSTON: The US on Friday divulged it disrupted in April a multimillion-dollar shipment of crude oil by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, seizing more than 980,000 barrels of contraband crude oil that violated US sanctions. In April, Reuters reported that the US confiscated cargo onboard tanker Suez Rajan, which was carrying Iranian oil at sea. The US statement on Friday confirmed and fleshed out details of the story which cited sources. The “illicit sale and transport of Iranian oil” violated sanctions targeting Iran, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) said in a statement that for the first time acknowledged its role. A plea agreement between the parties was made public this week. The vessel was unloaded last month after waiting 2-1/2 months off the coast of Texas to discharge. The Suez Rajan Ltd. company pleaded guilty in April and was sentenced by to three years of corporate probation and a fine of almost $2.5 million, according to legal documents. Empire Navigation, the operating company of the vessel carrying the contraband cargo, agreed to cooperate and transport the Iranian oil to the United States, the DOJ added, calling it the first criminal resolution to such a sanctions-violating sale. Empire Navigation, which also incurred the significant expenses associated with the vessel’s voyage to the US, did not immediately respond to a request for comment. “It’s a message to every Iranian smuggler that there is an off ramp from the mob,” said Mark Wallace, chief executive of US advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran, which uses satellite images to track tanker movement and first noted that the Suez Rajan had taken on the oil from another tanker. Empire Navigation should be applauded for its cooperation with US authorities, Wallace added. Participants attempted to disguise the origin of the oil using ship-to-ship transfers, false automatic identification system reporting, falsified documents and other means, the DOJ said, adding that the charterer of the vessel used the US financial system to facilitate the transportation of Iranian oil. The contraband cargo is now the subject of a civil forfeiture action in the US District Court for the District of Columbia, according to the DOJ. The forfeiture complaint alleges the oil aboard the vessel is subject to forfeiture based on terrorism and money laundering statutes, the DOJ added. Funds successfully forfeited with a connection to a state sponsor of terrorism may in whole or in part be directed to the US Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund. Suez Rajan Ltd. has agreed to forfeit all interests related to the cargo and waive all challenges, according to legal documents.

Iran’s Abduction of EU Diplomat Adds to Troubling Trend of Hostage Taking
FDD/September 08/2023
Latest Developments
European Union officials confirmed reports on September 5 that Iran abducted a Swedish EU employee last year. According to The New York Times, Iranian authorities detained Johan Floderus, 33, a member of the EU’s diplomatic corps, at the airport as he was leaving Tehran last year. The regime accused Floderus of espionage and has held him in Tehran’s notorious Evin prison for more than 500 days with no end in sight.
Iran has a long history of taking foreign hostages for use as bargaining chips against Western nations. In August, the United States agreed to unfreeze $6 billion in Iranian funds held in South Korean banks for the release of five Iranian American hostages. The hostage deal also came shortly after the United States allowed Iraq to pay Iran $10 billion that Baghdad owed for natural gas imports.
Expert Analysis
“By detaining a European diplomat, the regime in Tehran is clearly ramping up its hostage-taking approach. Tehran’s boldness in escalating this behavior stems from the West’s failure to provide a substantial response that would impose costs on the regime and discourage such actions. Indeed, Western governments have emboldened Tehran by acquiescing to its demands.” — Saeed Ghasseminejad, FDD Senior Iran and Financial Economics Advisor
“Iran continues to seize foreign nationals for a simple reason: because it can. Tehran knows that the United States is willing to pay billions of dollars for the release of prisoners. At the same time, Iran can humiliate the United States, giving the mullahs a pretext to deride America as a weak and declining power.” — Tzvi Kahn, FDD Research Fellow and Senior Editor
Swedish Bargaining Chips
Iran is likely keeping Floderus as well as Swedish Iranian doctor Ahmadreza Djalili — held hostage since 2016 — as bargaining chips to secure the release of Hamid Nouri, a former jail guard for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, whom Swedish authorities arrested in November 2019. In July 2022, a Swedish court found him guilty and sentenced him to life in prison for his role in Tehran’s execution of thousands of Iranian political prisoners in 1988. Nouri’s return to Iran would hand the regime a propaganda victory.
Known Hostages Still in Prison
Iran is currently holding at least 12 other known foreign or dual-national hostages besides Floderus and Djalili. These include Swiss-Iranian telecommunications executive Kamal Alavi since at least 2007, Iranian-Canadian banker Abdolrasoul Dorri-Esfahani since 2016, Australian-Iranian academic Meimanat Hosseini-Chavoshi since 2018, Canadian Iranian professor Reza Eslami since 2020, German-Iranian broadcaster and businessman Jamshid Sharmahd — who also holds a U.S. visa — since 2020, British-Iranian lawyer Shahram Shirkhani since at least 2020, British-Iranian labor activist Mehran Raoof since 2020, German-Iranian human rights activist Nahid Taghavi since 2020, French nationals Cecile Kohler and her partner, Jacques Paris, since 2022, and banker Louis Arnaud since 2022. Iran has also held an Iranian national with U.S. permanent residency, Shahab Dalili, since 2016.
French-Iranian anthropologist Fariba Adelkhah, whom Tehran arrested in 2019, was released in February. However, Iranian authorities have not returned the documents she needs to leave Iran, requiring her to go through the slow administrative process of obtaining new documents.

Rights Groups Say Iranian Security Forces Killed, Tortured Protesters In Kurdish City
Radio Farda/September 08/2023
Human rights activists say that at least eight people, including a child, were killed in the violent suppression of protests in the western Iranian city of Javanrud, while dozens of others were beaten and arbitrarily detained by security forces.
Javanrud, a Kurdish-majority city, became a flashpoint for unrest following the death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran's "morality police" for allegedly improperly wearing her hijab, or head scarf. A joint report by the Iranian rights groups Kurdistan Human Rights Network and the Human Rights Campaign, released on September 6 to mark the upcoming anniversary of the nationwide "Woman, life, freedom," protests sparked by Amini's death on September 16, showed the families of those killed, injured, and arrested have been pressured by the authorities to keep silent over what took place.
"The actions in Javanroud were systematic, carried out with the full knowledge and direction of government officials. The extensive use of military equipment against civilians is a stark example of a crime against humanity," said Hadi Ghaemi, the director of Human Rights Campaign. "The possibility of protests starting again in Iran is very high in the face of the violent reaction of the government and suppression of protesters," he added.
The findings of the joint report are based on an extensive review of hundreds of photos, videos, and interviews with 38 eyewitnesses, including families of the deceased, injured, and those detained in Javanrud. According to the report, from October 8 to December 31, security forces targeted protesters using "military-grade weapons."
Beyond the fatalities, the report indicates that at least 80 individuals, some of them children, sustained severe injuries. Many of the injured faced further physical assault at the hands of security personnel. The human rights organizations also highlighted the arbitrary arrest of 89 individuals, 26 of whom were children. Many detainees, including minors, were subjected to torture and threats of sexual assault. Despite the severity of the allegations, no government officials have faced legal repercussions. The report goes a step further, naming some of the alleged perpetrators in Javanroud. Rabin Rahmani of the Kurdistan Human Rights Network said the "recurring human rights violations" in marginalized regions like Kurdistan and Baluchistan "pave the way for tragedies like those witnessed in Javanrud and Zahedan." Amini's death sparked protests in Saghez that spread around the country and ultimately posed one of the biggest threats to Iran's clerical establishment since the foundation of the Islamic republic in 1979. Human rights groups estimate that over 500 protesters were killed by security forces. Thousands were detained, with seven facing execution after what many have termed "show trials." The report concludes with a call to action, urging the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on Iran, adopted in November 2022, to probe the Javanrud incidents. It also appeals to global governments to condemn the events in Javanrud and to consider imposing political, economic, and diplomatic sanctions on the Islamic republic. The human rights groups further recommend the formation of multilateral coalitions to publicly denounce the actions of the Islamic republic, suggesting joint statements at events like the UN General Assembly later this month.
*Written by Ardeshir Tayebi based on an original story in Persian by RFE/RL's Radio Farda

Ukraine’s Zelensky: Our partners have eased up on sanctions on Russia
Reuters/September 08, 2023
KYIV: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Friday that his country’s allies had eased sanctions on Russia and called for a renewed drive to impose further punitive measures on Moscow. “At this time, we see too long a pause by our partners in terms of sanctions,” he said in his nightly video address. “And very active Russian attempts to evade sanctions.” Zelensky said keeping the pressure on Moscow should focus on Russia’s energy sector, its access to microelectronics and its financial sector. “There are three priorities: further sanctions against Russia’s energy sector, real restrictions on the supplies going to the terrorists of chips and microelectronics in general and continued blocking of Russia’s financial sector,” he said. “The world’s sanctions offensive must resume.” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Oleg Nikolenko had earlier said Ukraine rejected any suggestion of easing sanctions against Russia as part of efforts to restore the UN-backed agreement to ship grain through the Black Sea. “Easing part of the sanctions regime against Russia in exchange for the resumption of the grain agreement would be a victory for Russian food blackmail and an invitation to Moscow for new waves of blackmail,” Nikolenko wrote on Facebook.

Zelenskyy and his spy chief grabbed a photo with what looks like the Mi-8 helicopter a Russian pilot secretly flew to Ukraine in a daring defection
Sarah Gray,Erin Snodgrass/Business Insider/September 08/2023
In August, the pilot flew low and with his radio off into Ukraine after six months of planning.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy posed for a photo with the head of Ukraine's Defense Intelligence Kyrylo Budanov in front of a Mi-8 helicopter. The helicopter in question appears to be the one flown by a Russian pilot into Ukraine in a daring defection carried out on August 9, 2023. News that a Russian pilot defected to Ukraine in the same type of helicopter emerged in August, and additional details about the secret plot were revealed in a dramatic video released by Ukraine's Defense Intelligence in early September. The Mi-8 helicopter in the photo, taken to commemorate the Day of Military Intelligence of Ukraine, has the number "62" on it as does one shown in the video released by Ukraine. The additional information about the defection included an interview with the pilot, Maksym Kuzminov, a 28-year-old former captain in Russia's 319th separate helicopter regiment, in which he encouraged others to defect and explained why he chose to leave Russia. "What is happening now is simply genocide of the Ukrainian people: both Ukrainian and Russian," Kuzminov said, adding that he defected because he didn't want to be involved in committing war crimes. The Russian pilot who defected speaks in an interview.Defense Intelligence of Ukraine Kuzminov reached out to Ukraine's Defense Intelligence at the end of 2022, The Wall Street Journal reported, and the plan was then put into motion. He communicated with Ukrainian defense officials via the encrypted messaging app Telegram and came up with a plan to fly the stolen Russian helicopter into Ukraine. Kuzminov's parents were taken out of Russia before he defected. The pilot said he flew at an extremely low altitude and in radio silence mode to avoid detection during the defection on August 9. Ukraine has sought to incentivize Russian troops to defect since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, passed a law last year courting demoralized Russian troops, offering monetary rewards to Russians who defected with their equipment. A helicopter fetches the equivalent of $500,000, the legislation says, and a Ukrainian military intelligence spokesperson confirmed this week that Kuzminov will get the full payout. Two other crew members were on board who were not aware of the defection, and when they tried to flee they were "eliminated," Budanov told Radio Free Europe in August.

Russia holds elections in occupied Ukrainian regions
Associated Press/September 8, 2023
Russian authorities are holding local elections this weekend in occupied parts of Ukraine in an effort to tighten their grip on territories Moscow illegally annexed a year ago and still does not fully control. The voting for Russian-installed legislatures in the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions begins Friday and concludes Sunday. It has already been denounced by Kyiv and the West. "It constitutes a flagrant violation of international law, which Russia continues to disregard," the Council of Europe, the continent's foremost human rights body, said this week. Kyiv echoed that sentiment, with the parliament saying in a statement that the balloting in areas where Russia "conducts active hostilities" poses a threat to Ukrainian lives. Lawmakers urged other countries not to recognize the results of the vote. For Russia, it is important to go on with the voting to maintain the illusion of normalcy, despite the fact that the Kremlin does not have full control over the annexed regions, political analyst Abbas Gallyamov said. "The Russian authorities are trying hard to pretend that everything is going according to plan, everything is fine. And if everything is going according to plan, then the political process should go according to plan," said Gallyamov, who worked as a speechwriter for Russian President Vladimir Putin when Putin served as prime minister. Voters are supposed to elect regional legislatures, which in turn will appoint regional governors. In the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, thousands of candidates are also competing for seats on dozens of local councils. The balloting is scheduled for the same weekend as other local elections in Russia. In the occupied regions, early voting kicked off last week as election officials went door to door or set up makeshift polling stations in public places to attract passersby.
The main contender in the election is United Russia, the Putin-loyal party that dominates Russian politics, although other parties, such as the Communist Party or the nationalist Liberal Democratic party, are also on the ballots.
For some residents of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, large swaths of which have been held by Russian-backed separatists since 2014, there is nothing unusual about the vote.
"For the last nine years, we've been striving to get closer with Russia, and Russian politicians are well-known to us," Sergei, a 47-year-old resident of the occupied city of Luhansk, told The Associated Press, asking that his last name be withheld for security reasons. "We're speaking Russian and have felt like part of Russia for a long time, and these elections only confirm that."Some voters in Donetsk shared Sergei's sentiment, expressing love for Russia and saying they want to be part of it.
The picture appears bleaker in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. Local residents and Ukrainian activists say poll workers make house calls accompanied by armed soldiers, and most voters know little about the candidates, up to half of whom reportedly arrived from Russia — including remote regions in Siberia and the far east.
"In most cases, we don't know these Russian candidates, and we're not even trying to figure it out," said Konstantin, who currently lives in the Russian-held part of the Kherson region on the eastern bank of the Dnieper River. Using only his first name for safety reasons, Konstantin said in a phone interview that billboards advertising Russian political parties have sprung up along the highways, and сampaign workers have been bused in ahead of the vote. But "locals understand that these elections don't influence anything" and "are held for Russian propaganda purposes," Kostantin said, comparing this year's vote to the referendums Moscow staged last year in the four partially occupied regions. Those referendums were designed to put a veneer of democracy on the annexation. Ukraine and the West denounced them as a sham and decried the annexation as illegal. Weeks after the referendums, Russian troops withdrew from the city of Kherson, the capital of the Kherson region, and areas around it, ceding them back to Ukraine. As a result, Moscow has maintained control of about 70% of the Kherson region. Three other regions are also only partially occupied, and Kyiv's forces have managed to regain more land — albeit slowly and in small chunks — during their summer counteroffensive. In the occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia region, where the counteroffensive efforts are focused, Moscow-installed authorities declared a holiday for Friday, the first day of voting. The Russian-appointed governor of the annexed region, Yevgeny Balitsky, noted in a recent statement that 13 front-line cities and villages in the region come under regular shelling, but he expressed hope that despite the difficulties, the United Russia party "will get the result it deserves."
In the meantime, early voting is underway. Ivan Fyodorov, Ukrainian mayor of Melitopol, a Russian-held city in the Zaporizhzhia region, told AP that local residents are effectively being forced to vote. "When there's an armed person standing in front of you, it's hard to say no," he said.
Early in the war, Fyodorov was kidnapped by Russian troops and held in captivity. He moved to Ukrainian-controlled territory upon release.
There are four different parties on the ballot, the mayor said, but billboards advertise only one — United Russia. "It looks like the Russian authorities know the result (of the election) already," Fyodorov said. The city's population of 60,000 — down from 149,000 before the war — has been subject to enhanced security in the days leading up to the election, according to Fyodorov. Authorities stop people in the streets to check their identification documents and detain anyone who looks suspicious, he said. "People are intimidated and scared, because everyone understands that an election in an occupied city is like voting in prison," Fyodorov said. Russian authorities aim to have up to 80% of the population take part in the early voting, according to the Eastern Human Rights Group, a Ukrainian rights group that monitors the vote in the occupied territories. Poll workers go door to door — to markets, grocery stores and other public places — to get people to cast ballots. Both those who have gotten Russian citizenship and those still holding Ukrainian passports are allowed to vote. Those who refuse to vote are being detained for three or four hours, the group's coordinator, Pavlo Lysianskyi, said. The authorities make them "write an explanatory statement, which later becomes grounds for a criminal case against the person." Lysianskyi's group has counted at least 104 cases of Ukrainians being detained in occupied regions for refusing to take part in the vote. In the end, said Gallyamov, the Russian analyst, Russian authorities will not get "anything good in terms of boosting their legitimacy" in the occupied regions.

Russia says it has repelled numerous Ukrainian attacks along front line
MOSCOW, Sept 8 (Reuters)/September 8, 2023
Russia said on Friday it had repelled numerous Ukrainian attacks along the front line and inflicted hundreds of losses on enemy forces, challenging Kyiv's assertion that Ukraine was making slow but steady progress in a counteroffensive. Russia controls about 18% of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea which it annexed in 2014 and a swathe of eastern and southern Ukraine which it took control of in 2022. For several months, Ukraine has been battling to try to regain some of that territory and has retaken some villages but not yet made significant territorial breakthroughs against heavily fortified Russian lines which are strewn with thousands of landmines. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy on Thursday singled out military units in the east and south for their fighting and military officials reported some breakthroughs in Bakhmut and near the village of Robotyne. Moscow said its forces had stood their ground though. "In the Donetsk direction, units of the Southern grouping of troops, in cooperation with aviation and artillery, repelled 12 attacks," the Russian defence ministry said. "In the Zaporizhzhia direction, units of the Russian group of troops during the day repelled five attacks," it added. Russia said Ukrainian losses totalled nearly 1,000 men over 24 hours in the battles. Reuters is unable to verify battlefield reports by either side. Ukraine has been trying to pierce Russian lines just south of the city of Orikhiv in an attempt to divide Russian forces and put its main supply lines under threat. (Reporting by Guy Faulconbridge Editing by Andrew Osborn)

Ridiculous rumours of Vladimir Putin being in ill health
Kate Nicholson/HuffPost/September 8, 2023
Seemingly ridiculous rumours of Vladimir Putin being in ill health – or possibly even being dead – have been circulating for a long time.
But, the conspiracy theory got an extra boost last week when a Ukrainian spymaster suggested the Putin everyone knew had not been in the public eye for more than a year.
Though the authoritarian Russian president is still making public appearances (and acting pretty normal – most of the time), speculation about his wellbeing has surged ever since he launched the invasion of Ukraine.
So, why do these rumours keep coming back? And what would happen if the 70-year-old Putin were to actually die while president?
Why does anyone believe Putin is dead?
Ukrainian spymaster Major-General Kyrylo Budanov claimed last week that the Kremlin has been using a body double for Putin for the last 14 months.
Speaking to Radio Svoboda last week, he said: “The Putin who everyone used to know was last seen around June 26, 2022.”
When asked again if he thought Putin was alive, he said: “I don’t know what to answer you.”
The presenter suggested Putin was using a body double, and he agreed.
Budanov has previously said that Putin’s ears looked different in various public appearances, suggesting this was evidence it wasn’t the “real” president. He said: “Each person’s ear picture is unique. It cannot be repeated.”
Then there’s the questionable moment when Putin was seen on camera forgetting which wrist his prized £21,500 watch was on during the Russian Council for Strategic Development and National Projects.
The conspiracy has also been fuelled by claims the shape of Putin’s wrinkles and chins alter from one appearance to the next.
Of course, as far as we’re aware, all of these claims are based on video footage and images. There has been no verification that Putin is using a body double, and speculation about his health appears baseless at the moment.
But, what would happen if Putin actually died – or stepped down?
According to Al Jazeera, the Russian Federation Council has 14 days to call early presidential elections if Putin were to die or step down abruptly. If it doesn’t act, the Central Election Commission would call it.In the interim, prime minister Mikhail Mishustin would be acting president – although he is unlikely to become a permanent replacement, and is not seen as being close to the president.Political analyst Tatiana Stanovaya told Al Jazeera back in September last year that conservative forces and security officials would take over and fill the power vacuum until a replacement was elected.She said: “If something happens to him tomorrow, I believe that the system would survive; it’s still robust.”However, she warned that if something were to happen to Putin in “one year or more” – so, from about now – “the risks of destabilisation are much higher” and there’s more likely to be infighting.“Next year, the situation might be more different and difficult,” she said back in 2022.The expert also noted that “no one knows” who will follow Putin right now, and no one “wants to appear as a successor, because it makes your position more vulnerable”.She was also speaking prior to the (failed) armed rebellion led by Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, now reported to have died in a helicopter crash.Through that coup, he posed the largest threat to his power Putin had seen throughout his time in office – and he was dead within two months.Meanwhile, Putin’s main political opponent Alexei Navalny has been imprisoned following a trial for embezzlement and contempt of court (in a trial Amnesty International described as a sham).Writing in Foreign Affairs last year, Syracuse University professor Brian D Taylor, claimed: “In the event that Putin dies or leaves office unexpectedly, therefore, alliances between elites will be at least as important as formal rules in determining who succeeds him.”What about the international stage? There is a chance someone more practical could get into power if Putin, for some reason, left office – and they may dismiss the war altogether, because of the intense impact on the economy.In fact, Business Insider India spoke to analysts who claimed in June that China’s leader Xi Jinping may be “contingency planning” if Putin leaves office.Anders Åslund, an economist and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, suggested that Xi was looking at building bonds with Mishustin, after holding a rare one-on-one meeting with him in April during a Moscow summit.
Would Putin ever step down voluntarily?
It doesn’t look like it, even though he has been leading Russia for more than 20 years.There are more presidential elections next year, but the constitution was changed in 2020 so he could run for an extra two six-year terms until 2036 (when he will be 86).Putin was the driving force behind the invasion of Ukraine, even as Russia’s offences continue to falter – and his fate is now tied up with the Ukraine war, according to some.Steve Rosenberg, BBC’s Russia editor told BBC Radio 4′s Today programme: “Russia has survived – it has for centuries. But Vladimir Putin’s fate, irrevocably now, is linked to the outcome of this war.”But, others believe the Russian Ministry of Defence has been positioned at the frontline of any domestic (or international) backlash to the ongoing conflict.Research fellow for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Emily Ferris, told HuffPost UK: “Some criticism has come close to personal criticism of Putin, but not enough to undermine the image he’s trying to promote of himself as the bringer of peace.”

NATO deputy visits Israel, emphasizes shared threats from Iran, Russia
Rina Bassist/Al-Monitor/September 8, 2023
On a three-day visit to Israel, NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoana said on Friday the defense alliance shares many of the same security concerns as Israel. Speaking with Al-Monitor, Geoana warned against Iran’s affiliation with Russia and the cooperation of the two governments with North Korea. “We fully understand the deep Israeli concerns over the destabilizing efforts by Iran to create trouble,” Geoana said. “We share many of the concerns that Israel shares. Not only on Iran directly, but also Iran in its constellations of authoritarian regimes, such as the close relationships between Iran and Russia or with North Korea," he added. The NATO official highlighted Iran's role in Ukraine as major challenge to our security both in Europe and also in the Middle East. "In Ukraine, for instance, we are talking of 1,000 [Iran-manufactured] drones. So much destruction, and such a breach of international law," he said. US and Western officials have accused Iran of supplying the Kremlin with dozens drones, among them reportedly Shahed-136s and 131s to use them in Ukraine. Geoana arrived in Israel on Wednesday, following a January visit by Israeli President Isaac Herzog to NATO headquarters in Brussels and against the backdrop of negotiations for a new partnership agreement between the alliance and Israel. While in Israel, Geoana met with President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as well as representatives from Israel's security and high-tech sectors. He also visited Technion — Israel Institute of Technology, in Haifa.
NATO 'optimistic' about Israel's partnership
An Israeli diplomat explained to Al-Monitor that a four-year partnership framework agreement would allow the two sides to advance new projects without needing of turn to political decision makers for approval in each instance. The new framework would also reset the priorities of the partnership, putting an even greater emphasis on cooperation on emerging threats, innovation, resilience, climate change and more. Israel, he said, is seen by NATO as a security provider, not a security consumer. As such, the alliance is interested in Israeli know-how, especially in the areas of drones technologies and intelligence, reverse engineering of weapons, and resilience strategies, including in public health.  Geoana told Al-Monitor that he is optimistic about the talks on a partnership being concluded soon. He added, “We have submitted to Israel our new proposal for a four-year partnership. We are very ambitious from our side, though of course we had a solid foundation to begin with. We have been partners with Israel for almost 20 years now. I would say that one of the backbones of our proposal is new technologies and innovation of ecosystems. We are now waiting for a counter Israeli proposal, which we should get in the coming few weeks. We are hoping to launch our renewed and reinforced partnership in the very near future.” When Israel first engaged with NATO in the late 1990s, after it signed the Oslo Accords with the Palestine Liberation Organization, their relationship was mostly within the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue, a forum for cooperation between NATO and seven countries around the Mediterranean. Over the years, Israel has become more interesting to the alliance as a “like-minded country” with whom it can cooperate on technological innovations. “It is true,” said Geoana, “that much of NATO’s attention is now focused on the war in Ukraine, towards the east, but the southern region [the Mediterranean] is still very important for us. Battling terrorism is also a priority for us. We put big emphasis on our partnerships, in the Gulf, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, the Mediterranean Dialogue, these are all very important for us.”
In March, the ELNET European networking group in cooperation with Mitvim Institute, an Israeli thinktank, hosted the first NATO Seminar in the context of the Abraham Accords, focusing on the challenging security environment, and the opportunities arising from the accords, particularly in regard to maritime security, alternative energy sources, and the threat of the deepening Russian-Iranian alliance. Geoana told Al-Monitor that the alliance supports the Abraham Accords and searches for where it can contribute the most to advance stability in the region. “The visit of President Isaac Herzog at the Brussels NATO headquarters was very significant,” he remarked. ”It was the first time an Israeli president addressed the North Atlantic Council. At the meeting, Herzog made a very strong case for supporting the Abraham Accords. “NATO is of course an organization, not a country, thus cannot be part or signatory to the accords, but we encourage all initiatives that enhance stability, especially in the very volatile Middle East region. Don’t forget that other Abraham Accords countries are also partners with NATO. We are very attentive and very supportive of the efforts to enlarge the circle of the accords.”

Palestinian fishermen decry Israel's ban on Gaza exports as collective punishment
Associated Press/September 8, 2023
Israel closed the main commercial crossing in the Gaza Strip, effectively banning exports from the coastal territory after saying it had uncovered explosives in a shipment of clothes to the occupied West Bank. Gaza's fishermen, with their perishable exports, were among the first to feel the pain. The new restrictions choke off the territory's already ailing economy. They come on top of the punishing 16-year blockade that Israel and Egypt have maintained since the Islamic militant group Hamas seized control of the enclave in 2007. The blockade, which Israel says is needed to prevent Hamas from arming, severely limits the movement of people and goods in and out of Gaza. Israel closed the Kerem Shalom cargo crossing late on Monday after saying it had discovered explosives hidden in a shipment of Zara jeans and other clothing bound for the West Bank — one of the main markets for Gaza's tiny export sector. Israeli officials fear the explosives were bound for Palestinian militants in the West Bank. Israel has not said when the crossing will reopen. Palestinian fishermen, businessmen and rights advocates condemned Israel's latest measure as a form of collective punishment against Gaza's 2 million people, including tens of thousands of laborers who heavily depend on exports to Israel and the West Bank to stay afloat. Nearly all the goods that enter and exit Gaza pass through Kerem Shalom. Gaza's 4,000 fishermen, worried about keeping their surplus seafood from spoiling, condemned the ban. "Now I can't make a living," said Khalid al-Laham, 35, from his bare home in the southern town of Khan Younis as his five children scurried around him. "I have to borrow food from the shops."The struggle also reached Gaza's wealthiest traders. "Fish are completely different from any product, it's sensitive," said Mohammed Abu Hasira, a 38-year-old owner of a popular Gazan fish restaurant near the Mediterranean. "They should punish those who are at fault. Why are we being punished with them?" Abu Hasira's plans to export truckloads of fish Thursday were thwarted by the Israeli decision, he said. Within moments, his profits evaporated and costs skyrocketed.Overall, the measure has caused 26 tons of fish to rot and resulted in $300,000 in weekly losses, Gaza's main fishermen's union said.
The restrictions represented a reversal of recent Israeli military moves to ease the blockade to relieve economic pressure on Gaza to prevent tensions from boiling over into another bloody conflict. Israel now allows some 21,000 Palestinian laborers from Gaza to enter Israel for work, and in July, Israel issued hundreds more permits. Some 70% more people left the strip in July than during the same month last year, according to the United Nations humanitarian office. But now Gaza's fishermen and others affected by the Israeli measure said they've again been subsumed into a larger political struggle that has nothing to do with them. Israel says the closure was intended to deter militants from sneaking explosives through the crossing and to press the strip's Hamas rules to crack down on the smuggling. "The defense establishment will not allow terror organizations to take advantage of civilian and humanitarian facilities," Israel's defense ministry said. The move, rights groups said, also laid bare Israel's inability to provide an effective answer to the security incidents and to address Gaza's underlying problems."Instead of finding proportionate and reasonable measures, it just imposes sweeping measures and punitive closings," said Miriam Marmur, a spokeswoman for Gisha, an Israeli human rights group. Under the blockade, Gaza's businessmen have grappled with what they describe as exasperating bureaucratic controls and routine indignities.
Fishermen say their struggle reflects how the blockade has damaged a vital part of Gaza's economy. In July, fish accounted for 6% of all exports, according to the U.N. The restrictions have prevented them from importing engines, fiberglass, and other materials needed to repair their dilapidated boats. The naval blockade limits how far out into the Mediterranean Sea the fishermen can go – and how much and what type of fish they can catch. If they drift too close to Israel's maritime border, they risk being shot at or having their boats seized by the Israeli navy. Since the start of the year, the U.N. humanitarian office, or OCHA, has recorded over 400 incidents in which Israeli forces opened fire at Palestinian fishermen approaching the sea boundary, causing injuries and damage. "Recurring shootings off the coast of Gaza are deeply troubling," said Noel Tsekouras, head of OCHA's Gaza office. "These actions severely jeopardize livelihoods."This week's closure has left all merchants reeling in the crowded enclave. In an upscale tower just blocks from the seaport, Muhammad al-Ghussein, an engineer and spokesperson for the Palestinian Businessmen Association, said he shared the fishermen's concerns. "Halting exports is like dealing a fatal blow to a sector that's already dying," he said.

Thousands rally in support of Israel's judicial overhaul before pivotal hearing
Associated Press/September 8, 2023
Several thousand protesters supporting the Israeli government's judicial overhaul have rallied in front of the Supreme Court in Jerusalem, before a pivotal hearing next week on the legality of the first major bill of the overhaul. The bill, which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's far-right coalition passed in July, bans the Supreme Court from striking down government decisions it deems unreasonable. With leading politicians signaling they won't respect a court decision striking down the law, the stage could be set for a constitutional crisis. The hearing is set for Tuesday, though a ruling is likely months away.
The pro-overhaul crowd Thursday was overwhelmingly religious, many of them working class Jews of Mizrahi, or Middle Eastern, descent. Others came in from West Bank settlements. Mizrahi Jews tend to be poorer and some have expressed hostility toward what they say is an elitist class of Ashkenazi, or European, Jews. Brandishing signs with the words "end the judicial dictatorship" and "the elites are taking control," protesters said the overhaul was necessary to rein in the power of unelected justices. "The Supreme Court is on the way to becoming the dictator of Israel," protester Avram Farber said. "It's trying to push for making the Israeli government — that enjoys a majority in the parliament — to be illegitimate."Opponents of the overhaul, who come largely from the country's secular middle class, see the plan as a power-grab by Netanyahu's government that will weaken the country's checks and balances. They fear that by limiting the power of the court, Netanyahu and his ultranationalist allies are pushing the country toward autocratic rule. Their grassroots protest movement, the largest in Israel's history, is now nearing its ninth month. For the first time in Israeli history, all 15 justices of the Supreme Court will hear Tuesday's case. The court will rule on the legality of a bill that weakens its ability to act as a check on the ruling coalition, headed by the prime minister. The bill bars the court from striking down parliamentary decisions on the basis that they aren't "reasonable." The justices have used the standard in the past to nullify government decisions that they view as unsound or corrupt. This year, for instance, the court struck down the appointment of a Cabinet minister because of prior convictions for accepting bribes and tax offenses. The government says the reasonability standard is anti-democratic, because it allows judges to override the decisions of an elected parliamentary majority. A poll by the Israel Democracy Institute, a Jerusalem think tank, found that just 14% of the Israeli public supports the legislation, while roughly 60% oppose it. The survey, conducted earlier this year, questioned 3,077 Israeli adults and had a margin of error of 1.8 percentage points. If the justices strike down the law, the stage may be set for a constitutional crisis. The parliamentary speaker, Amir Ohana, hinted this week that he wouldn't accept the court's ruling, saying he wouldn't allow the Knesset to be "trampled." Netanyahu hasn't publicly committed to following the ruling of the court, but posted Ohana's comments to social media on Thursday. The hearing set for Tuesday is the first of three overhaul cases on the court's docket this month.

Israel's security brass advocates Saudi deal as way to calm tensions with Palestinians
Ben Caspit/Al-Monitor/September 8, 2023
TEL AVIV — While a path of escalating Palestinian attacks and tensions threatens to deteriorate into further violence with Israel, a path of Saudi-Israeli rapprochement appears to be emerging that could herald a historic Middle Eastern peace.
The major issues are whether the promise of the Saudi track can be leveraged to benefit the Palestinians and Israelis and whether either option is feasible given the political chokehold curbing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s freedom to act.
US national security adviser Jake Sullivan told reporters on Thursday that a “broad understanding of many of the key elements" had been reached in negotiations with Saudi Arabia on a normalization deal with Israel, but he cautioned, “We don't have the terms ready to be signed. There is still work to do."
Netanyahu on side of security establishment
The top echelons of the Israeli military and other defense agencies believe that Israel should try to harness any agreement with Saudi Arabia to calm tensions on the West Bank.
“This kind of agreement is a historical lever,” a former senior Israeli security source told Al-Monitor, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “When the Saudis enter the Abraham Accords, it's a drama that can change reality, it creates economic and financial levers, political opportunities and maybe a different atmosphere that will help lower the flames.”The BBC reported on Friday that Palestinian officials held talks in Riyadh with their Saudi counterparts this week. Among their demands are a cash boost for the Palestinian Authority (PA) of hundreds of millions of dollars and more control over land in the West Bank, according to the report. Unlike the security agencies, Netanyahu's hardline coalition is strongly averse to the idea of a Saudi-Israeli-Palestinian deal. The two extreme right-wing parties in the coalition — Religious Zionism, led by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who is also tasked with advancing Jewish settlement of the West Bank, and Jewish Power, led by National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir — see the PA as a bitter enemy that must be vanquished. They have no intention of going along with any concessions to the Palestinians, which the Saudis have set as a key condition for normalization with Israel. On the contrary. According to some of Netanyahu's associates, he is on the side of the security establishment. Still, he cannot say so out loud. His trial on charges of corruption resumed this week after a summer recess, and to survive he needs his extremist political allies to push through deeply controversial legislation weakening the country’s judiciary. Meanwhile, tensions in the past few months once again escalated in the Palestinian territories. Intelligence assessments had until recently downplayed the prospect of a mass Palestinian uprising despite a wave of terrorism by individuals influenced by social media incitement. The assessments shifted, however, with the formation of Israel’s ultra right-wing government, the increasing friction between extremist settlers and Palestinians, and the worsening economic situation of the Palestinians on the West Bank.
“The number of warnings of terrorist attacks has been rising tremendously recently,” a senior Israeli security source told Al-Monitor on the condition of anonymity. “It is not close to what happened here during the second intifada [20 years ago], nor is there a deep terror infrastructure that can take us back to those days, but it is also a far cry from the situation we had become accustomed to in recent years. The restraining factors are weakening, while the accelerating and flammable factors are multiplying. It's dangerous.”
Netanyahu hears these warnings, but he cannot risk angering his far-right partners or playing chicken with a thug like Ben-Gvir despite Jewish Power’s declining popularity. A Maariv newspaper poll published on Friday gave Ben-Gvir’s radical party four seats in the 120-seat legislature, putting it on the verge of a Knesset ouster. Netanyahu fears, however, that the negotiations with Saudi Arabia and proposed concessions to the Palestinians might give Ben-Gvir a badly needed boost and reverse his decline.
Meanwhile, negotiations reported earlier this week on a compromise between Netanyahu and the centrist opposition on the issue of the judicial overhaul being pushed by his government have not taken off. When Netanyahu called on former defense minister Benny Gantz last Tuesday to “come talk,” he was actually addressing US President Joe Biden. Netanyahu knows that Gantz will not make the same mistake twice and agree to ally with Netanyahu, as he did in 2020, and will not enter into futile negotiations.
“If Netanyahu wants to sign the outline that he himself brought to the president, he is welcome to do it. We will support him from the outside,” a senior source in Gantz’s National Unity told Al-Monitor, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “However, that's not what he wants. All he wants is to display pragmatism and signal to Washington that he does not intend to continue the regime coup in order to get a meeting at the White House. Well, with all due respect, we are not in charge of Netanyahu's meetings with Biden.”
Netanyahu is considering a speech to accurately define, for a change, what his legislative plans actually are and in a way that will convince the public that the principles of the judicial revolution are dead in the water. A senior Likud political source told Al-Monitor, however, that Netanyahu doesn't really want to convince the public, just the Americans.
White House prioritizing Saudi deal
Are the Americans convinced? Seemingly, yes, judging by the determination with which the administration continues to advance the deal with Saudi Arabia and the perceived foreign policy boon for Biden ahead of next year’s elections.
“The White House wants this very much,” a senior Israeli political source told Al-Monitor, on the condition of anonymity. “They are working on it with all their might, they are very close to agreeing with Saudi Arabia on the formula regarding uranium enrichment, which will be carried out on the kingdom's soil but under American supervision.” Netanyahu, according to this source, will go along with this arrangement to acquire this jewel in the crown of his legacy. “They know that Netanyahu will agree to anything in order to get the Saudi candy,” noted the political source. “Given his condition, it's not candy — it's an oxygen balloon.”

Assistant Secretary Barbara Leaf discuss Syrian, Palestinian files with Jordan FM
LBCI/September 8, 2023
The Syrian and Palestinian files formed the core of discussions held by the US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Barbara Leaf, in talks with the Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi in Amman. The discussions addressed the refugee crisis in the region, emphasizing the need for continued cooperation to resolve regional crises.

Paris mayor strips Palestinian leader of honor over Holocaust outburst
Agence France Presse/September 8, 2023
Paris mayor Anne Hidalgo has stripped Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas of the French capital's highest honor after he made remarks about the Holocaust that echoed anti-Semitic tropes, her office said on Friday. Abbas could no longer hold the Grand Vermeil medal after he "justified the extermination of the Jews of Europe" in World War II, her office told AFP. "The comments you made are contrary to our universal values and the historical truth of the Shoah," Hidalgo said in a letter to Abbas sent on Thursday. "You can therefore no longer hold this distinction."The text of the letter was published on X, formerly known as Twitter, by Yonathan Arfi, president of the Representative Council of French Jewish Institutions (CRIF), an umbrella organisation representing French Jews. "This important decision honours Paris and the city's ongoing commitment against anti-Semitism," he wrote. Abbas, 87, claimed Jews had been murdered in the Holocaust because of their "social role" and not religion, saying it was "not true" that "(Adolf) Hitler killed the Jews because they were Jews". Echoing anti-Semitic tropes, he claimed Europeans "fought (the Jews) because of their social role, and not their religion. Because of usury and money". Abbas made the remarks during a speech late last month before senior members of his Fatah party in Ramallah, and a video of the event surfaced this week. "You (...) justified the extermination of the Jews of Europe during World War II with a clear desire to deny the genocide," Hidalgo said in the letter. "I vehemently condemn your remarks, no cause can justify revisionism and negationism," she added. Abbas had been given the award during a 2015 visit to Paris. A spokesperson for the European Union said "the speech... contained false and grossly misleading remarks about Jews and anti-Semitism". France's consulate in Jerusalem called the remarks "totally unacceptable".

World Bank official says Turkey's economic U-turn 'step in right direction’
Adam Lucente/Al-Monitor/September 8, 2023
An official from the World Bank praised Turkey’s new economic policies on Thursday and pledged more support as the country continues to battle an economic crisis. Humberto Lopez, the World Bank’s country director for Turkey, touted the Turkish government’s actions “to restore macroeconomic stability” in an interview with Turkey’s official Anadolu news agency. “We believe that the monetary policy tightening being implemented by the central bank, the unwinding of distortive financial regulations and the fiscal revenue measures to curtail the fiscal deficit being pursued by the Ministry of Finance are steps in the right direction,” said Lopez. Lopez added that the World Bank plans to add another $18 billion to its exposure in Turkey over the next three years in response to the government’s actions. This will add to the $17 billion in World Bank programs currently in Turkey. Bloomberg reported on Tuesday that the World Bank is in advanced talks to pledge $18 billion for projects in Turkey in the next three years. Why it matters: Turkey’s economy has been in crisis since 2018, marked by the plummeting value of the lira and high inflation. For years, the central bank, under the direction of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, declined to raise interest rates to combat inflation. The Turkish government has instituted several fiscal policy changes since Erdogan was reelected in May. Under the new governor, Hafize Gaye Erkan, the central bank raised interest rates in June, July and August. In an effort to reduce Turkey’s massive budget deficit, the government raised taxes on several sectors in July. On the currency, the central bank began phasing out the lira protection scheme known as KKM in August. Despite the praise from the World Bank, the new policies have their downsides. The tax hikes will make it more difficult for consumers, particularly the poor, to purchase things amid the crisis. Some observers have also criticized the ending of the lira protection scheme as unviable, Mustafa Sonmez reported for Al-Monitor last month. Inflation is still high in Turkey, with annual inflation hitting 58.94% in August, up 9.09% from the previous month. The lira also remains weak and traded at around 26.8 to the US dollar as of 1 p.m. ET on Thursday. The lira traded at around 18 to the dollar at the same time last year, according to market data.

Qatari investors in talks with Daily Mail owner to buy rival newspaper group
Jack Dutton/Al-Monitor/September 8, 2023
LONDON — Gulf states are extending their influence in the UK media landscape. The Daily Mail and General Trust, an influential British newspaper group, is reportedly in talks with Qatari investors to support a combined bid for its rival Telegraph Media Group.
DMGT, which owns the Daily Mail, the i and Metro newspapers, is working to finance a bid for TMG in a deal that could cost more than 500 million pounds ($624 million), the Financial Times reported Friday. TMG includes both The Telegraph and Sunday Telegraph newspapers and The Spectator magazine. All are right-wing outlets with strong links to the ruling Conservative UK government, and former Prime Minister Boris Johnson famously worked for The Telegraph and The Spectator. The auction of TMG is expected to start in the coming weeks, and the British press is reporting Goldman Sachs and Lazard are involved in leading the sale. Abu Dhabi-based RedBird IMI, a venture led by former NBCUniversal and CNN boss Jeff Zucker, has also held talks with DMGT about supporting the bid for TMG, the Financial Times reported. RedBird IMI, a joint venture between RedBird and International Media Investments, made its first media investment in August in a new nonfiction content studio called EverWonder. Al-Monitor has reached out to RedBirdIMI for comment on the report talks for TMG. Another source said the Telegraph’s former owners, the Barclay family, had held discussions with UAE-based investors to support their bid to buy it back. On June 7, Lloyds Banking Group, Britain’s biggest high street lender, took control of TMG for the interim period between the media group was sold to a new buyer. The Barclay family has been in a dispute with Lloyds over debts owned to its subsidiary Bank of Scotland of allegedly nearly 1 billion pounds ($1.25 billion). Those debts were secured against the publisher. DMGT spokesperson Sean Walsh said in a statement, “Over the past few years we have been approached and have had talks with a number of Middle Eastern investors who have shown an interest in participating in a bid for the Daily Telegraph.”“To date we do not have a formal relationship with any investors. However, if we did, we would only do so if we have the majority of economic and equity risk and the control needed to invest in the business and protect its editorial independence,” he added.
Brothers Sir David and Sir Frederick Barclay paid 665 million pounds ($829 million) for TMG in 2004.

G20 gathers in India with Xi absent
Agence France Presse/September 08/2023
G20 leaders descended on New Delhi Friday, with deep divisions between heavyweight members and Chinese President Xi Jinping's no-show calling the bloc's relevance into question.The G20 was conceived in the throes of the 2008 financial crisis as a way of managing the global economy. But finding consensus among members has been increasingly difficult in recent years. With several leaders already in New Delhi -- spruced up and partly emptied of people for the occasion -- hosts India were scrambling for agreement on pressing issues like the Ukraine war, climate and global governance. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has painted the summit as his country's diplomatic coming of age -- evidence of New Delhi's clout and prestige on the global stage. But that notion was called into question by rival leader Xi, who pointedly decided to skip the meeting and send his number two, Premier Li Qiang instead. No official reason has been given for the absence, but Xi has chastised Modi about a deadly China-India border dispute and been open about making U.S.-led groupings like the G20 more amenable to Beijing's interests. As the summit takes place, Xi will host the leaders of Venezuela and Zambia in Beijing. Modi -- sensing an opportunity to burnish his credentials as a statesman ahead of a re-election tilt early next year -- has thrust himself front and center of proceedings.
His image adorns countless G20 billboards and posters plastered around Delhi.
A failure of G20 leaders to on agree a joint summit statement, a usually routine diplomatic affair, could be seen as an embarrassment for India and for Modi's claim of uniting developing and richer members. Modi looks set to secure at least one concrete step in that direction -- with several leaders expressing support for expanding the bloc into the "G21" and including the African Union as a permanent member. But elsewhere Ukraine appears to be a key sticking point, and who pays for efforts to heal the world's rapidly heating climate.
"Have a little bit of patience" senior Indian diplomat Amitabh Kant said Friday, insisting a text would be put to leaders for them to decide. Diplomatic opprobrium and war crimes charges are also keeping Russian leader Vladimir Putin away from the summit, although Moscow continues to press allies to water down international condemnation of its invasion of Ukraine. "Once again, Vladimir Putin is failing to show his face at the G20," said British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak. "He is the architect of his own diplomatic exile, isolating himself in his presidential palace and blocking out criticism and reality." "The rest of the G20, meanwhile, are demonstrating that we will turn up and work together to pick up the pieces of Putin's destruction."
'Monitoring carefully'
Heading to the summit, U.S. President Joe Biden also insisted that the meeting would still "deliver", even as markets fretted that a trade war between the world's two largest economies was poised to escalate. Rumors have swirled that China may be poised to ban Apple's ubiquitous iPhone. U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, speaking on Air Force One bound for the summit, parried queries about those rumors. Questions such as "what's motivating them, what the scope of this will be, and what they think the net effect of that will be" were for Beijing to answer, he said. Many G20 leaders fear their economies are already at risk of being collateral damage as the big beasts of world trade lock horns. Economists say U.S. restrictions on the transfer of sensitive technologies to China have deepened a slowdown in the world's second-largest economy. They also point, however, to serious structural problems in China such as a shrinking labor force, slower productivity and an overheated real estate market. Speaking in Delhi on Friday, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned a Chinese slowdown carried risks for the entire globe. "China faces a variety of both short- and longer-term global challenges, economic challenges that we've been monitoring carefully," she said. "That said, China has quite a bit of policy space to address these challenges".

Latest English LCCC  analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on September 08-09/2023
Iran’s New Patrons....Why China and Russia Are Stepping Up Their Support
Reuel Marc Gerecht and Ray Takeyh/Foreign Affairs/September 08/2023
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/irans-new-patrons
On assuming power in 1979, Iran’s revolutionaries prided themselves on rejecting the global order. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the country’s first supreme leader, declared that his state would be “neither East nor West.” Khomeini viewed the United States as “the Great Satan”—the preeminent, spiritually corrupting imperial power that supported Westernizing despots in the Muslim world. But in his eyes, godless communism and the Soviet Union were just as baleful. “My dear friends, you should know that the danger from communist powers is not less than America,” he said in 1980.
By rejecting partners, the Islamic Republic showed it would not be an ordinary country that sought to maximize its advantages by forging alliances. Instead, the revolutionary regime saw itself as a vanguard charged with leading the world’s subjugated masses toward freedom and justice. After Iranian soldiers ejected the Iraqi army from Iranian territory in 1982, the Islamic Republic’s war against Iraq became a liberation movement aimed at freeing Muslims all the way to the Mediterranean. The government plotted to overthrow other neighboring governments, as well, and sponsored a variety of Islamic terrorist organizations across the Middle East. In fact, the clerical leadership responded sympathetically to anti-American left-wing secular radicals wherever it encountered them.
But as Tehran quickly discovered, going it alone was not an effective strategy. The country’s zeal for exporting revolution put it at odds with most of the world, and especially with states in its region. Indeed, the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary attitude and doggedness in the Iran-Iraq War hardened sectarian sentiments in the Middle East. Iran sold its oil, but it never became a destination for global commerce. By the time of his death, in 1989, Khomeini had achieved none of his foreign objectives.
Khomeini’s successors were bound to take stock of their revolution. And upon assuming office, the country’s new supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, tentatively started to reach out. Tehran maintained its hostility toward the United States, always the central target of its rage, but scaled back its commitment to further revolution in Muslim lands. It spent less time railing against countries outside the West and began looking for great-power patrons.
At first, it struggled to find them. Iran began hunting for partners at an inopportune moment: right after the end of the Cold War, when American power was largely uncontested. The Europeans were always willing to trade with Iran, but their investments, even in the oil sector, were made with hesitation. China and Russia were more eager to conduct commerce with Iran, but they did not yet share Tehran’s hostility to Washington. In fact, Beijing and Moscow were wary of antagonizing the United States at the height of its post–Cold War power.
Over the last 15 years, however, that has changed. As Washington’s power and influence have declined, Beijing and Moscow have decided that they can challenge the liberal international order. They have routinely welcomed Iranian officials and offered Tehran more extensive economic and military support. Even though this aid comes with strings, Tehran has benefited greatly. China provides Iran with U.S. sanctions–resistant trade and easier access to advanced technology. As a result, the clerical regime no longer fears economic collapse. Russia, meanwhile, has helped modernize Iran’s military. Diplomatically, Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran have become a revisionist axis, effectively ending the Islamic Republic’s isolation. Buttressed by these new allies, the Iranian theocracy can, whenever it chooses, press ahead with building a nuclear bomb. And thanks to their support, the Tehran government is feeling more powerful and more secure than it ever has.
LONE WOLF
When Iran first tried opening up in the 1990s under the administration of President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the country struggled. The supposedly technocratic revolutionaries behind the clerics had difficulty creating a more coherent economy with a modern infrastructure. They were not big fans of the rule of law, uniform tax policies, or honest bookkeeping—three of the main prerequisites for sustained economic development. They would not touch the Islamic Republic’s vast spoils system, in which familial, clerical, and Revolutionary Guard networks are the decisive economic force. Corruption, sometimes carried out through violent means, was and remains endemic.
That said, Iran did find some opportunities abroad before the current millennium. To feed its growing energy needs, China began purchasing sizable quantities of Iranian oil. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia was in dire economic straits, so it developed a lucrative commercial relationship by selling weapons to Tehran. In exchange, the Islamic Republic ignored Russia’s slaughter of Muslim rebels in Chechnya. Realizing that it had little traction in the Persian-speaking Sunni regions of Central Asia and not wanting to offend Moscow, Tehran did not press its religious mission in Russia’s backyard.
But neither China nor Russia was willing to forge a serious partnership with the Islamic Republic. China, intensely focused on its own economic development, needed access to the U.S. market and American technology. It had no interest in allying itself with one of Washington’s main antagonists. Russian President Boris Yeltsin and, initially, Vladimir Putin, his successor, were also interested in dialogue and trade with the United States as they sought to integrate Russia into the global economy. Although he certainly desired one, Khamenei could not construct a Eurasian alliance against Washington.
Iran began hunting for partners at an inopportune moment.
Isolated and largely alone in the early 1990s, Rafsanjani and Khamenei amped up the country’s clandestine nuclear weapons research, which had commenced in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War. Both men also blessed illicit weapons trading with North Korea. (In his diaries, published in 2014, Rafsanjani bragged about how Iranian ships carrying “sensitive material” from North Korea in 1992 had escaped U.S. naval surveillance.) In 2002, when a dissident group revealed that the Islamic Republic had a relatively elaborate atomic program, the Europeans responded with diplomacy while the U.N. Security Council imposed sanctions against the mullahs. The United States, occupied with the war in Afghanistan and the coming invasion of Iraq—which was in part justified by fear of Saddam Hussein’s quest for weapons of mass destruction—went along with the European Union’s diplomatic track.
Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator with Europe from 2003 to 2005 and later the country’s president, described these years as ones of extraordinary unease. In his memoirs, published in 2012, Rouhani stressed that “no one thought Saddam’s regime would collapse in three weeks.” He went on: “Our military leaders had told us that Saddam would not be defeated soon and it would take America at least six months to a year to reach his palace.” In a 2005 speech to Iran’s Expediency Council and national security council staffs, Rouhani called George W. Bush a “drunken Abyssinian”—the Persian equivalent of a “mad cowboy.” In the regime’s view, the United States, an angry colossus, now stalked the Middle East. Tehran responded cautiously, declining to confront Washington in Iraq.
The United States imposed a web of sanctions that, combined with an impoverishing socialist economy, severely limited Iran’s capacity to attract foreign investment, trade, and hard currency. The resulting nuclear crisis was a turning point: to blunt U.S. pressure, the country realized it needed Chinese and Russian support.
Early on, however, neither great power offered much. In 2003, when Rouhani journeyed to both Beijing and Moscow asking for help, he was rebuffed. Referring to Washington and its allies, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing told Rouhani, “Don’t anticipate that we will stand against them.” In Moscow, Putin was even more direct. “We will not stand against the world on your behalf,” he said in a meeting with Rouhani. “We are neighbors, but we will not endanger our own national interests.” During Bush’s second term and U.S. President Barack Obama’s first, Washington used its upper hand to persuade China to reduce its purchases of Iranian oil and Russia to restrict its arms sales to Tehran.
BLOOD BROTHERS
Throughout the first decade of the millennium, Iran continued to languish in isolation. But as the 2010s began, international events started to break in its favor. The insurgency in Iraq, fueled and planned in part in Tehran, sapped U.S. willpower in the Middle East. Growing antiwar sentiment in the United States helped Obama win the presidency. Seeking to establish a new beginning with the Muslim world, and seemingly convinced that long-standing problems with Iran could be overcome through his personal intervention, Obama opened his diplomacy with Khamenei by accepting Iran’s most consequential nuclear gains.
The eventual 2015 nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, not only greenlighted the Islamic Republic’s indigenous uranium enrichment but also stipulated that after 15 years, the regime would be free to develop industrial-scale enrichment. At a time when Iran’s economy was in distress, the nuclear deal both filled the country’s coffers and legitimized its atomic aspirations. Following the faulty logic that led to massive Western investment in Communist China and post-Soviet Russia, the agreement assumed that if Iran were free to trade, it would turn it into a less threatening, less ideological state.
U.S. policies were not the only thing that emboldened Tehran. The Arab Spring of 2011, which came after Iran’s massive pro-democracy Green Movement and upended governments across the Middle East and North Africa, also gave the clerical regime an advantage. Although most states do not like being surrounded by turmoil, Iran thrives in regional chaos, and it capitalized on the Arab Spring’s instability to extend its reach. The regime has long relied on oppressed, radicalized Shiite minorities and both Shiite and Sunni militias to exert authority. Through these proxies, the mullahs became the kingmakers of Iraq’s factious politics. No Iraqi prime minister could assume power and no parliament could convene without Tehran’s consent. Iran sent the Revolutionary Guards to Syria along with a separate militia force of approximately 70,000 men to help crush the Arab Spring’s Sunni rebellion against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Already inclined to listen to Tehran, Damascus has now become thoroughly beholden. In neighboring Lebanon, Hezbollah, an Iranian-created paramilitary organization, came to dominate the government. And in Yemen, the Tehran-backed Shiite Houthis have now defeated forces supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in that country’s most recent civil war.
Beijing has taken much of the sting out of U.S. sanctions.
These regional victories did not relieve Iran’s economic distress. But its economic salvation may be around the corner. Over the past few years, China has created its own sphere of influence. Beijing has been especially committed to gaining privileged access to the resources of the global South and has made Iran, with its large Middle Eastern footprint, an important part of its outreach. In 2021, China and the Islamic Republic signed a 25-year agreement that allows the Chinese to penetrate nearly all sectors of Iran’s economy. Beijing plans to invest in Iran’s infrastructure and telecommunications, and it has promised to help develop the Islamic Republic’s energy sector and supposedly civilian nuclear industry.
For the clerical regime, these deals are already yielding tangible economic and security benefits. Iran is selling millions of barrels of oil to China each month. Its GDP, which was cut in half between 2017 and 2020, is growing. In February 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping assured Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi that Beijing “supports Iran in safeguarding national sovereignty” and backed its efforts at “resisting unilateralism and bullying.” The Islamic Republic is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and in August, Iran was invited to join the BRICS, a bloc of large developing economies. Successive U.S. administrations have hoped that financial and diplomatic pressure would force the theocracy to cede its nuclear assets, but China’s actions have made such a scenario inconceivable. Beijing has taken much of the sting out of U.S. sanctions.
Russia is also doing its part to help Tehran. In the first ten months of 2022, Russian exports to Iran rose by 27 percent. The two countries have signed a memorandum of understanding that commits Moscow to investing $40 billion in Iranian gas projects. It is easy to see why Russia is lending a hand. Its invasion of Ukraine has left it isolated from many of its traditional partners, but Iran has clearly, surely, and irreversibly sided with Russia. “The United States started this war in Ukraine in order to expand NATO toward the East,” Khamenei said in March, bolstering Putin’s narrative about the conflict. Iran has sold large quantities of drones to Russia. In exchange, Moscow has opened its armory, providing Iran with air defense systems, helicopters, and, soon, advanced aircraft such as the Sukhoi Su-35.
THE COST OF DOING BUSINESS
For Tehran, having powerful new partners is not all good news. With great-power patronage come restraints and obligations, and the Islamic Republic has had to make concessions that it surely detests. Its deal with China gives Beijing substantial sway over Iran’s economy, to the point that it resembles the capitulation agreements that Europe once imposed on Persian monarchs. For Tehran, this is deeply ironic. The clerical regime likes to argue that its revolution reclaimed Iran’s independence, but the mullahs have now given a new foreign power several keys to their realm.
China has already begun to use its authority. Beijing wants stability in the oil-rich Persian Gulf, particularly after its extensive economic investments in Saudi Arabia. Iran, by contrast, likes to disrupt oil traffic in the Gulf in order to inflict pain on its Arab rivals. In 2019, for instance, Tehran attacked Saudi Aramco oil-processing facilities with drones and cruise missiles, temporarily reducing Saudi oil production by half and driving up global oil prices by 20 percent. But China appears to have obliged Iran to reduce tensions with the Saudis, corralling them into renewing relations in a March deal among the three countries. The Islamic Republic may still occasionally damage a tanker in an attempt to intimidate Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, but there is likely now a cap on how much pain it can inflict on its Gulf neighbors.
Such constraints are not the only reason Tehran probably resents renewed ties with Riyadh. The Islamic Republic’s rulers have long depicted the House of Saud as an agent of U.S. imperialism and an illegitimate regime that uses a reactionary interpretation of Islam to hold onto power. They detest Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s vicious anti-Shiite campaign inside his country. They blame Riyadh for inflaming the “women, life, and freedom” protests that shook Iran in 2022. And among the March accord’s three signatories, Iran clearly gained the least. China demonstrated its diplomatic skill and made itself into a Middle East power while the Saudi crown prince, known as MBS, obtained a path out of his failed intervention in Yemen and, most important, gained hope that the Islamic Republic—with its vast and growing arsenal of missiles and drones—would not bombard the gargantuan projects in his Saudi Vision 2030 development plan, on which the future of his rule rests. The only tangible benefit Iran obtained was China’s gratitude.
China could welcome an atomic Iran.
Russia has imposed an even greater burden on Iran. The Islamic Republic may not like Europe, but it does not want to make the continent into a sworn enemy the way it has the United States. Yet by providing Putin with lethal military support, Iran has indirectly gone to war with NATO. Its drones and munitions are killing Ukrainians, making it tough for even the most dogged European apologists of Iran to justify dealing with the regime. Iran’s support for Russia is also draining its military stockpiles for a war that ultimately has little bearing on its core interests. Ukraine is not part of Iran’s neighborhood; there are no revolutionary Islamist aspirations at risk in eastern Europe.
But whatever headaches the Islamic Republic may face from having patrons, they pale in comparison with the damage those partnerships do to Western interests, especially when it comes to Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. U.S. and European leaders long comforted themselves with the notion that whatever their differences with China and Russia, neither country wanted Iran to have the bomb. But that may no longer be true. Unlike the United States, Russia has lived for decades with nuclear-armed states on its periphery. Putin might be perfectly comfortable with another country in the mix. In fact, it is not hard to envision Russia sharing nuclear technologies and expertise with Iran. Iran’s crossing of the nuclear threshold would make a mockery of numerous pledges, made by both Democrats and Republicans, that Washington will never allow it to get the bomb. Putin would therefore gain from helping his Persian ally humiliate the United States and degrade Washington’s position in the Middle East.
Xi could prove equally welcoming to an atomic Iran. China’s president also cares little about international conventions, so he may not be perturbed by more nuclear proliferation. He did not object to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, after all, and he has not respected India’s territorial sovereignty in the Himalayas or the Pacific Island states’ historical claims in the South China Sea. Xi might also reasonably conclude that an Iranian bomb would expedite the United States’ exit from the Middle East. Indeed, with the American political class united in bemoaning “forever wars,” the specter of a nuclear Iran could offer a good reason to further lessen its footprint in the region. For Beijing, always aiming at Taiwan, the global consequences of a nuclear Iran are mostly beneficial.
Once Iran assembles the bomb, of course, its relations with its great-power allies are likely to change. No longer a junior partner, it may become bolder. A nuclear Iran might return to striking Gulf oil infrastructure, for example. It might share new and better missile technology with its allied militias, which could decide to act more independently and more aggressively. These hypotheticals, of course, have not yet encouraged China and Russia to reconsider their approach to the mullahs.
IRAN’S AMERICAN HUSTLE
When it comes to Iran, U.S. President Joe Biden should be unhappy with the position he finds himself in. He came into office oblivious to how the Islamic Republic’s burgeoning partnerships and the broader geopolitical landscape had brought the era of arms control to an end. He initially spoke of forging a “longer and stronger” deal with Tehran before settling for desultory “proximity talks” in which U.S. negotiators agreed to never meet their Iranian counterparts. He tried to tempt the clerical regime by offering trade concessions and ignoring the International Atomic Energy Agency’s questions about the regime’s untoward activities, much as Obama did in 2015 to get the original nuclear accord. Biden should not have been surprised when the clerical regime responded the same way it did to Obama: by dramatically expanding its nuclear apparatus. Under Biden, Iran increased uranium enrichment levels to 60 percent, the level needed to make a crude atomic weapon. In January, the IAEA detected an enrichment level exceeding 80 percent.
Today, the mood in the Islamic Republic, compared with just a year ago, is triumphant. Khamenei’s republic has survived sanctions and internal protests. With the help of its great-power allies, it has steadied its economy and started to replenish its defenses. A nuclear bomb is within reach. When the supreme leader decides to cross that threshold, there is little reason to believe that Israel or the United States intends to stop him with force.
Khamenei, then, will have done what Khomeini failed to do. He will have ensured the survival of the revolution against its primary enemy, the United States. He will have turned the Middle East into a region where Iran, after 44 years of trying, is the dominant power.
CORRECTION APPENDED
An earlier version of this article stated that Iran is selling 359,000 barrels of oil a year to China. It is selling millions of barrels of oil to China each month.

Time To Destroy North Korea’s Revenue Generation
Anthony Ruggiero/1945 site/September 8, 2023
The Biden team believes it can shame North Korea into being a responsible actor. But Kim cares not about international prestige but about survival, and right now Putin and Xi are offering better terms.
Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program Senior Director and Senior Fellow
North Korea will “pay a price for this in the international community.” That’s how National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan responded on Tuesday to news that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, who will travel to Russia this month to meet Vladimir Putin, may supply additional materiel for Moscow’s war in Ukraine. That would be an effective approach if Kim cared about his global standing. But the dear leader only responds to one thing: economic pressure that threatens his strategic priorities. And so far, the Biden administration has focused more on issuing strong rhetoric than on destroying North Korea’s revenue generation.
The Biden administration first revealed North Korea’s export of rockets and missiles to the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, in a flashy briefing in late January. National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby stood before imagery of railcars traveling in mid-November 2022 between Russia and North Korea and predicted that Wagner would “continue to receive North Korean weapons systems.” He promised consequences, and the administration designated Wagner as a significant Transnational Criminal Organization several days later.
But the administration’s North Korea policy has been largely muted. Washington condemned North Korea’s actions and shared the information on the weapons transfers with the UN Security Council’s panel of experts. Both actions reinforced their preferred path: humiliate Kim into changing course. Unfortunately for the administration, Kim has no shame.
Kim’s political prison camps and other human rights abuses are crimes against humanity and the world has let him escape without any punishment. Kim is not going to be shamed by American officials standing behind a podium in the White House briefing room.
The administration squandered eight months since the initial briefing on Russia-North Korea cooperation by relying solely on rhetoric and shunning impactful sanctions. Of course, the administration would object to that characterization, and Sullivan tried to defend the Biden team’s policy. He explained that the administration in mid-August imposed “targeted sanctions to try to disrupt any effort to use North Korea as a conduit or as a source for weapons going to Russia.” But a closer look at those sanctions reveals the administration’s misguided approach.
According to the U.S. Treasury Department, the sanctions targeted three companies linked to a “sanctions evasion network attempting to support” North Korea-Russia arms deals. These companies were owned or controlled by Ashot Mkrtychev, a Slovakian national whom Treasury designated on March 30. Treasury explained that between the end of 2022 and early 2023 Mkrtychev worked as an intermediary between Russian and North Korean officials for the transfer of “over two dozen kinds of weapons and munitions for Russia in exchange for materials ranging from commercial aircraft, raw materials, and commodities to be sent to the DPRK.”
It is possible that Mkrtychev was an entrepreneur and found an opportunity to make a quick profit facilitating Russia-North Korea arms deals. More likely is that Putin and Kim are so dismissive of the Biden administration’s response that they decided to cut out the middleman and just work directly with each other. That could explain why Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s defense minister, visited North Korea and toured a weapons expo, providing an opening for the forthcoming leader-level summit.
The administration’s sanctions misfire illuminates a larger problem: The administration has largely shunned using meaningful sanctions to counter Pyongyang’s weapons advances. Sanctions have atrophied since 2018, when former President Donald Trump pursued summit-level diplomacy with Kim. But Biden has continued this dangerous policy and has not implemented congressionally mandated sanctions that passed by overwhelming bipartisan majorities.
There is a better path. Kim has four strategic priorities: nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, North Korean elites, and the military. He likely judges every action, including aid to Russia and bolstering his relationships with Putin and China’s Xi Jinping, against how they help him advance these priorities.
That provides an opportunity for the administration to impact the North Korea-Russia relationship by destroying Kim’s revenue generation. If Kim does not have the money to buy luxury goods for his elites, or build nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles for the military, he could see his grip on power slip.
The administration should begin by targeting every sanctions evader aiding North Korea wherever located, including in China and Russia. Pyongyang relies on both countries for importing materials and financing its transactions abroad, since North Korea’s financial system is largely cut off from international finance. Washington should remember that Kim is building additional nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles. President Biden needs to prioritize this threat by targeting Chinese banks, companies, and individuals.
The Biden team believes it can shame North Korea into being a responsible actor. But Kim cares not about international prestige but about survival, and right now Putin and Xi are offering better terms. Biden can change that calculus by devastating Kim’s economy. And in so doing, Biden would ultimately help Ukraine’s war effort.
**Anthony Ruggiero is a senior fellow and senior director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He previously served as the National Security Council’s director for North Korea (2018-2019) and senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense (2019-2021) in the Trump administration. Follow him on X: @NatSecAnthony.

Iran’s Misunderstood Nuclear Law
Henry Rome/The Washington Institute/September 08/2023
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-misunderstood-nuclear-law
Tehran may argue that its 2020 nuclear law constrains its room for maneuver in any future talks, but its compliance with that law has long been spotty, and officials seem more focused on ensuring that any concessions they make are reversible.
This summer, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered his most detailed remarks in years on Iran’s nuclear trajectory. While his comments on a potential agreement with the West drew the most attention, he also called on Iranian officials to follow a controversial 2020 law that ordered rapid steps to escalate the nuclear program and reduce international monitoring. “Some people think that this law creates problems for the country,” he stated. “They are wrong. This law is a good law...And it must be followed.”
Indeed, the 2020 legislation has played a prominent role in Iranian debates about nuclear advances, and Khamenei’s comments suggest this will remain the case. Yet the law is widely misunderstood; more important, it has not been the primary driver of Iran’s actual nuclear activity over the past three years. The governments of Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi each sidestepped key provisions of the legislation while also escalating the program in ways the law does not require. Despite Khamenei’s sentiment, neither the existing law nor potential successor legislation is likely to compel escalation or constrain diplomacy.
Surprise Bill
On December 1, 2020, the Majlis passed the “Strategic Action Law to Lift Sanctions and Safeguard the National Interests of Iran,” approving a revision the next day. The bill passed with 251 of the 260 parliamentarians in attendance voting in favor; a few legislators publicly opposed the measure, but in most cases because they felt it was not aggressive enough.
The bill was unusual in two respects. First, it was a surprising attempt by parliament to assert itself on the nuclear issue. As with other strategic issues, Iran’s nuclear decisions are generally made by the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the top policymaking body that includes the president, senior ministers and military figures, the heads of the parliament and judiciary, and representatives of Khamenei, who has the final say. It usually operates based on consensus, ensuring that major decisions have buy-in from the system’s most important actors.
In 2020, however, the numerous hardliners elected to the Majlis earlier that year tried to push those limits. Rouhani strongly opposed the law, saying it was outside parliament’s purview and would obstruct attempts to revive the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). “Let us do our job,” he told lawmakers after the bill passed. Although conflicts between Iran’s executive and legislative branches are routine, they are usually limited to domestic political issues such as budgets, not national security policy. Ultimately, the system’s unelected branches—including the Guardian Council, which vets legislation—sided with parliament. The last time the legislature featured so prominently in nuclear discussions was in the early 2000s, when Tehran vacillated on whether to ratify the Additional Protocol put forward by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Second, the terms of the law were a departure from Iran’s nuclear approach in the preceding two years. After President Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA in May 2018, Iran continued abiding by its nuclear commitments for a full year. In May 2019, it began crossing these limits in a phased and reversible way, seeking to pressure the JCPOA’s other parties into saving the agreement. Yet the 2020 law ordered a rapid escalation of these activities (including techniques relevant to nuclear weapons work) and sought to gut international monitoring (see chart below).
At the time, some speculated that this shift was spurred by Israel’s killing of top Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh a week before the bill’s passage. Yet according to a legislative history published by the Majlis Research Center, the law had been in the works since June 2020—several months before the Israeli operation—and parliament approved a draft of the bill in early November. More likely, the legislation was part of a strategic effort by some in the Iranian leadership to pressure whoever won that year’s U.S. presidential election into quickly rejoining the JCPOA—though the Fakhrizadeh attack accelerated the approval process.
Mixed Implementation
Although Rouhani’s government opposed the law, it pledged to abide by it. At the time, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated, “We did not like it. And we made it very clear. But...we will implement it. We have no other option.” In practice, however, the Rouhani and Raisi governments—under the auspices of the SNSC—have had a spotty track record of actually implementing the law. The chart below illustrates this gap. (Note: For more on the technical meaning and practical consequences of the enrichment levels mentioned in the chart, see this Washington Institute infographic or the associated Iran Nuclear Glossary.)
Open imageiconTable showing the Iranian government's compliance with parliament's 2020 nuclear law.
Some of the law’s requirements are difficult to assess given the intermittent nature of IAEA reports and the fact that Iran’s nuclear capabilities were damaged by Israeli sabotage at the Natanz complex in April 2021. But other provisions can be evaluated more readily. Reports from the Majlis Research Center, a parliamentary commission, and the IAEA make clear that officials have taken a selective approach to meeting the law’s requirements, with a mid-2021 legislative report concluding that “the government considers this law as an obstacle in nuclear negotiations and refuses to precisely implement its contents.”
The government’s attitude toward Article 6 of the law has been the most controversial aspect domestically. This provision concerned the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), which embodies Iran’s legal obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Specifically, the law ordered officials to stop allowing IAEA inspections beyond those mandated by the CSA unless sanctions on Iranian oil sales and banking ties were removed within two months of the bill’s passage.
Rouhani’s government did not secure the removal of these sanctions by the required deadline or terminate excess inspections as ordered. Instead, it negotiated a “temporary bilateral technical understanding” with the IAEA in February 2021, which permitted the agency to “continue with its necessary verification and monitoring activities” temporarily. These included video monitoring of centrifuge assembly sites. The Rouhani government defended this approach as consistent with the nuclear law because the camera footage would only be accessible to the agency if a new nuclear deal was reached. Many lawmakers criticized this interpretation of the law.
Raisi’s government has continued the pattern. This May, for example, it allowed the IAEA to reinstall cameras at centrifuge workshops in Isfahan under the same conditions. Several lawmakers complained that this violated the nuclear law, but officials pressed forward anyway. They also permitted the IAEA to install enrichment monitoring devices at Fordow and the Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plant.
Meanwhile, the government escalated the nuclear program in ways that went beyond parliament’s requirements, reflecting the law’s limited influence on nuclear decisionmaking. Tehran sometimes justified these steps as fulfilments of the nuclear law even though the connections were tenuous. In April 2021, for example, it decided to begin producing 60% enriched uranium, which is a short technical step away from levels traditionally defined as weapons grade. This move was made in retaliation for an Israeli sabotage attack days prior, but the government also described it as being in line with the nuclear law’s vague provision that officials must “secure the nation’s needs for the peaceful uses of uranium with enrichment above 20%.” Other provocative steps outside the nuclear law included enriching some uranium to 83.7% purity; operating cascades of advanced IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow in a configuration that could enable rapid production of very high levels of enriched uranium; constructing a new underground facility near Natanz; and enriching with far more IR-2m and IR-6 centrifuges than the law required.
Implications
The nuclear law saga reflects the limits of Iranian domestic political influence on the regime’s nuclear decisionmaking. Although unelected elements allowed parliament to exert greater influence by passing the law, ultimately the SNSC and the executive branch were selective in following through on the legislature’s demands.
Western officials should bear these dynamics in mind in the coming months, especially if the ongoing U.S.-Iranian de-escalation efforts advance into further stages. As the past three years show, the 2020 law has not substantially shaped the government’s nuclear actions—whether in terms of advancing the program or making concessions. For example, the law did not stop Iran from allowing some improvements in IAEA access as recently as May, apparently in contravention of Article 6. It also failed to stop last month’s construction work on the Arak reactor using a JCPOA-approved design, in apparent contravention of Article 5. No potential follow-on legislation should be expected to constrain Tehran either.
Although they would not be tied down by the nuclear law in any future negotiations, Iranian officials would probably be constrained by another factor: the regime’s desire to ensure that any concessions it makes are easy to undo. Khamenei alluded to this issue of reversibility in his recent speech, stating, “The existing infrastructure of our nuclear industry should not be touched.” Tehran likely aims to maximize its leverage in case Trump is reelected next year and implements a more aggressive U.S. policy.
To be sure, Khamenei has shown some flexibility on such red lines over time. But for now, at least, Iran is unlikely to agree to any steps that require dismantling capabilities (e.g., removing advanced centrifuge cascades). For the right price, however, it may be willing to keep taking easily reversible steps such as increasing international monitoring, slowing its accumulation of enriched material, and delaying the installation of more-advanced centrifuges, regardless of consistency with parliament’s nuclear law.
*Henry Rome is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute. He would like to thank Behzad Rezaei for research assistance and Kelsey Davenport, Sarah Burkhard, and Eric Brewer for providing helpful feedback on earlier drafts.

Barbie in the Middle East
Anna Brown/The Washington Institute/September 08/2023
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/barbie-middle-east
Some countries banned the film while others let it screen amid restrictions and criticism, illustrating the region’s widening—but still comparably narrow—spectrum of views on cultural openness.
Not all audiences in the Middle East have had equal access to the summer blockbuster Barbie. When the Greta Gerwig-directed film hit theaters in late July, only two Arab countries—Morocco and Tunisia—shared in the premiere. Elsewhere, censors delayed the release, with the key markets of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates holding it until mid-August and Lebanon initially banning it outright because—in the words of Culture Minister Mohammad Mortada—it “promotes homosexuality and transsexuality...supports rejecting a father’s guardianship, undermines and ridicules the role of the mother, and questions the necessity of marriage and having a family.”
Curbs on Barbie are hardly surprising given the region’s history of censoring cinematic sexuality, LGBTQ themes, and other content seen to contradict local religious and cultural beliefs. The movie’s PG-13 rating, relatively tame treatment of sexuality, and absence of overtly LGBTQ characters did little to assuage the censors, who were likely unnerved by its female director and unflinching treatment of feminist issues. Arab female directors do, of course, exist, but their films rarely confront women’s issues so directly. The negative official reactions were also predictable given other recent restrictions on LGBTQ content, including the Saudi and Emirati ban on the PG-rated summer movie Spider-Man: Across the Spider-Verse for a scene featuring a transgender flag in the background.
Where Barbie Was Delayed
Besides Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, other governments that held up the film’s release until August included Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, and Qatar. All of them had initially announced August 30 as their target date, but their reasons for delaying release until then stemmed from concerns over the film’s content rather than any distributor issues. Vox Cinema, the local distribution partner for Warner Bros., negotiated with censors over possible cuts. In the end, they reportedly refrained from removing any major material, even allowing scenes with transgender actress Hari Nef to pass and preserving a faithful translation of the word “patriarchy.” Yet certain regional agencies assigned a more restrictive rating—Plus-18 in Egypt, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, rendering it inaccessible to underage viewers, and Plus-15 in the UAE.
The film is nevertheless a smash hit in Saudi Arabia, where movie theaters were outlawed as recently as 2018. The kingdom had banned previous straight-to-DVD Barbie movies for portraying equal gender roles. Over the past month, however, Saudi women could be seen posting images of themselves clad in pink while driving to see the new movie, while restaurants in Riyadh introduced Barbie-inspired menu items. The film’s success reinforces the notion that Saudi society is gradually liberalizing and quite hungry for Western content.
The Emirati response has been similarly exultant. According to local chain Roxy Cinemas, the film “broke all records” in ticket sales, with showings scheduled every half-hour shortly after release. Emirati “Barbie-mania” has included lists of where to find related fare throughout Dubai.
Indeed, much of the region’s public response contrasts sharply with the official response. News coverage has highlighted enthusiastic praise from moviegoers, especially young women, one of whom said, “This movie is exactly what we needed right now.” Grassroots backlash has been limited, with the usual suspects—such as Jordan’s Islamic Action Front and hardline Bahraini cleric Hassan al-Husseini—unsurprisingly venting their condemnation. Some of the film’s themes faced similar criticisms in the United States, but the fact that certain Middle Eastern governments were willing to permit screenings and public debate about these issues is a revealing shift in their approach to cultural trends they may have previously deemed threatening.
Where Barbie Was Banned
Kuwait and Oman prohibited the film entirely, while Algeria removed it from theaters after it premiered and Lebanon agreed to screen it after an initial ban. In Kuwait, the state-run news agency argued that the film presented “ideas and beliefs that are alien to the Kuwaiti society and public order.” Residents have nevertheless found ways around the ban, such as pirating the film using tips from sites like Reddit or crossing the border into Saudi Arabia—a highly ironic twist given that Saudis had to make the reverse journey in past years if they wanted to watch movies on the big screen.
Oman’s ban came without official explanation. Yet media reports indicate that the government based its decision on scenes it deemed “unsuitable for children, such as drug use or other illicit content.”
Algerian authorities banned the movie after it had already been showing across the country for weeks. The Ministry of Culture, which usually announces censorship information prior to a movie’s premiere, has offered no comment as of this writing. According to one media report, authorities belatedly concluded that the film “promotes homosexuality and other Western deviances” and “does not comply with Algeria’s religious and cultural beliefs.”
In Lebanon, some officials evidently sought to prohibit the film for its LGBTQ themes and presentation of marriage and family, echoing the rise in anti-LGBTQ sentiment propagated by Iran-backed Hezbollah, which controls much of the government. On September 1, however, the General Security Directorate released a decision allowing the film to be shown.
**Anna Brown is the media relations associate at The Washington Institute.

Beyond Oslo: Reflections on Peace, Promise, and Possibility
Nickolay Mladenov/The Washington Institute/September 08/2023
A Personal Journey Through Peace, Politics, and the Legacy of the Accords
As the tumultuous wave of change swept across Eastern Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall, hope surged in various corners of the globe. This was the time when I was coming out of secondary school and felt excited about the prospects of democracy and freedom sweeping through post-Communist Eastern Europe and inevitably, or so I thought, across the world. Against this backdrop, we heard the news that Israelis and Palestinians had secretly met in Oslo to end one of the most divisive conflicts of our time. The news and the buzz that accompanied it seemed even further validation of the march of peace sweeping the planet. Little did we know that the rising threat of radicalism and extremism, which would soon hit the Western Balkans, would also mark the years ahead for Europe, the Middle East, and beyond.
To a student of international politics interested in the Middle East, Oslo I and Oslo II were years of elation. I became obsessed with studying conflicts, conflict resolution, and mediation, inspired that through negotiations—not wars—nations and peoples could sort out their differences. What I and many others from the outside failed to grasp was that the realities on the ground left some on both sides deeply disappointed with the Oslo process. As this disappointment spilled over into violence, over 400 Palestinians and 250 Israelis were killed in the five years after the signing of the Oslo Accords.
The assassination of Israeli PM Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 was a profound shock to the world as it laid bare the opposition to peace with Palestinians in vocal segments of Israeli society. It also highlighted the growing strength of national and religious identities and their impact on politics. In hindsight, if national uniqueness and religion were driving the wars across the remnants of former Yugoslavia, why would emotions have been any different elsewhere? Unlike in the Western Balkans however, where conflicts erupted after decades of a relatively high degree of peace and coexistence under communist oppression, the Oslo Process came after many long years of horrendous violence between Israelis and Palestinians that had peaked in the first Intifada.
The Oslo Accords' interim nature appeared promising to outsiders like me because they charted a way forward. They allowed both sides the time and breathing space to address the most controversial questions—such as borders, refugees, the status of Jerusalem, and settlements—after trust had been built through a time-limited transition process. But as trust quickly evaporated, and violence and terror surged during the Second Intifada, the growing divide between Palestinians and Israelis limited the political space for leaders to pursue any form of confidence-building. Slowly, the Peace Process came to a standstill.
Little did I know then that some eighteen years later, I would find myself thrust in the middle of all this as I took on the job of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace process. Nor did I have any inkling that in this role, I would have to state publicly that the Middle East Peace Process was no more. But as I arrived at Government House in Jerusalem to take up my position in 2014, I quickly came to the realisation that despite their public statements of support and commitment towards the peace process, both Israelis and Palestinians preferred to speak to their constituency and friends rather than come back to the negotiating table.
Faced with this challenge, I went back to the basics. I worked to develop relationships with all stakeholders built on trust, even as I warned of the risks on the ground to peace and focused on alleviating the threat of war in Gaza. These priorities reflected how the prospect of Israeli-Palestinian peace had dwindled from the high hopes of the nineties to conflict management, preventive diplomacy, and the grinding work to avert the constant threat of further escalation and increased violence.
The reasons behind this change are complex and multifaceted – terror and incitement to violence, settlement expansion, Hamas’ control of Gaza to name just a few. More broadly however, two factors stood out in my mind upon my arrival. On the one side, it was the loss of belief within Israel that peace could be achieved through handing over land—a principle that had been the basis of Israeli policy since the successful peace treaty with Egypt in 1978. In response to violence, that belief was being replaced by the new doctrine that peace could come only through strength. On the other hand, it was the utter disappointment within Palestinian society that the enshrining of its national aspirations for statehood in international law via UN Security Council resolutions and a push for full UN membership had failed to deliver statehood. In response to these frustrations, Israelis and Palestinians had charted political strategies in relation to each other that made the return to meaningful negotiations close to impossible at that point.
During my five years as UN Special Coordinator, I had hardly met an Israeli who did not believe that the Peace Process only resulted in more violence, rockets, or terror, just as there was hardly a Palestinian who didn't see it as always resulting in the loss of land, more settlements, and checkpoints. Within Israel, the belief in achieving peace through Palestinian statehood had waned, replaced by a narrative emphasising security. The Palestinian side, meanwhile, was wary of losing more ground, both literally and metaphorically.
And yet in spite of its massive challenges, the 30-year journey post-Oslo Era is not without its achievements. The Palestinian National Authority governance structures established in the West Bank are a testament to the Accords' legacy. The subsequent reforms to these structures that began with PM Salam Fayadh strengthened service delivery and introduced reforms that were critical for bolstering the economy. Many of these developments have subsequently been stunted as the Palestinian political process has stagnated, but to say that "Oslo is dead" and call for dismantling established institutions would be both premature and detrimental to the future prospects of peace and stability. The solution isn't in unravelling what has been built during the past three decades but building upon what has been achieved.
As the Middle East Peace Process survives in the talking points of Foreign Ministries around the world when they visit the region, its basic premise endures—that a two-state solution, achieved through negotiations, is the reasonable way forward. This premise, along with the shifting dynamics of geopolitics in the Middle East, may indicate some potential avenues for reviving or reinventing a peace process that may ultimately engage both peoples in a peaceful resolution to this conflict.
Though noble, the notion of a one-state solution, with a diverse populace coexisting harmoniously, is fraught with complexities. No critic of the two-state solution has come up with a convincing explanation of how a one-state resolution that grants full and equal rights to Jews and Palestinians would ensure that the legitimate national aspirations of both peoples will be met. Jews are unlikely to agree to live in a state where they are a minority, and neither would Palestinians agree to live in a state where they don't have equal rights. So, a foundational assumption of Oslo—the idea that there needs to be a separation between the two peoples, remains alive.
The second element—the evolving geopolitics of the Middle East and the rising role of middle powers—is being written as we speak. The Abraham Accords signalled the Arab world's evolving stance towards Israel. Outside of the political and economic messaging of the Accords, they contained a very subtle message to Jewish Israelis—the acknowledgement that "Arab and Jewish peoples" are not only descendants of a common ancestor but are committed to the spirit of coexistence. This subtle acceptance that the Jewish people are not foreigners to the Middle East, but a historic and ancestral part of its mosaic, was an important recognition that had not been present in other peace treaties.
The history of the Balkans, marred by wars over holy sites, religion, national myths, and historical claims, has taught me to read and understand the importance of such subtle messages in politics. They are key when dealing with competing national narratives, which we in Southeast Europe have more than enough of for generations to come. My part of the world has lived through peaceful and forceful population exchanges, two Balkan and two World Wars, and most recently the post-Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. Borders have been drawn, re-drawn, and re-drawn again in the search of ethnic clarity. But we have learnt the hard way that peace will never be just about shifting a border; it will always require the involvement of identity, history, faith, and the right to live in dignity.
Drawing from the initial spirit of the Oslo Accords, where Palestinians and Israelis proactively sought a peaceful path forward, there is a desperate need for new leadership today. If bolstered by international support, this leadership can refocus on mutual recognition and mutual respect to the right and aspirations of partners in peace. And part of the process to rebuild trust is for the world to openly recognise that Jews and Palestinians have the historical, religious, and national right to statehood in the Holy Land—the right to statehood of one does not negate the right of the other. Nevertheless, leadership must start at home, within the domestic political landscape of Israel and the Palestinian people.
Israel is a vibrant democracy; its political leaders should be able to develop a compelling narrative that brings the focus back to peace and acceptance rather than on preserving today’s dangerous status quo. A whole generation of young people has grown up after the signing of the Oslo Accords; it is time for them to be part of developing a new narrative. They can now travel freely to Dubai, Manama, and Rabat, plan their holidays in Egypt, or visit the sites of Jordan and expect warm welcomes all around. Their country is strong and has firm partners across the region and beyond.
The Palestinian people are as vibrant and resilient as they come. They must be free of occupation and benefit from a fully inclusive domestic political process. They need to be able to elect their leaders freely and debate openly the future of their national project. I have often said that the division between Gaza and the West Bank is like a cancer that eats away at the Palestinian national dream. As long as Hamas controls the lives of two million people in the Strip, as long as there are no elections that unify Gaza and the West Bank under one democratically elected and accountable leadership, the goal of a state will most certainly wither away.
Such efforts will not be easy; just as the wars of the nineties profoundly reshaped the political landscape of the Western Balkans, the waves of violence between Israelis and Palestinians have reshaped the political landscape of the Middle East. The younger generation of Palestinians—who have grown up in an environment dominated by walls, checkpoints, and the omnipresent Israeli military—harbour anger, resentment, and despair. On the other hand, the younger generation of Israelis have grown up in a world dominated by rocket attacks, suicide bombings, and a narrative that portrays the Palestinians as the eternal enemy. This generation has not grown up with the ideals of Oslo. All they know is the reality they live in now.
In fact, the very term ‘peace process’ conjures scepticism. There is a palpable fear that attempts at dialogue might exacerbate tensions. Yet the vision of the 1990s, although it might seem distant, serves as a reminder of the possible. In a world where the ground realities shift and national narratives diverge, the legacy of the Oslo Accords must not be forgotten. It is a testament to what visionary leadership and international support can achieve.
The international community has a role to play now as well, but it is not to draw lines on a map or cajole both sides into photo opportunities of conferences that do not breed results. It was not the collective will of the international community that brought Yasser Arafat, Yitzhak Rabin, and Shimon Peres together in Oslo. They did it on their own, away from the cameras and microphones. The international community should instead support Israelis and Palestinians by creating incentives for peace and protecting them from those who will seek to disrupt a negotiated resolution of the conflict. To this end, it is worth considering the partners who have leverage with both sides and can speak truth to power when need be. A new formula needs to be found, one that brings the United States, Europe, and key Arab countries working together for peace. Perhaps new Asian actors can also contribute to the process. The work itself, however, needs to start at home; it cannot be imposed from the outside.
In the end, what the Oslo Accords succeeded in forging a path toward mutual recognition. However, the aftermath of the Accords emphasized that mutual recognition cannot exist in a vacuum. It must be nurtured and sustained through constant dialogue, understanding, and compromise. A series of missed opportunities, mistakes, and a lack of political will have marked the decades since Oslo. And as we stand at this juncture, it is essential to recall the original spirit of Oslo—one of hope, cooperation, and mutual respect.
I hold fast to a vision where leaders of both sides, driven by a deep conviction and responsibility towards their people, will chart a path toward peace. For peace to be sustainable, it cannot be based on constantly managing tensions but instead must address the fundamental root causes of the conflict. This involves recognising the deeply held beliefs, the traumas, and the hopes of both peoples and working tirelessly to bridge the gap of mistrust. In this endeavour, international mediators have a pivotal role—not imposing solutions but facilitating dialogues that lead to mutual understanding and respect. It's a monumental task, but history shows that leaders who are genuinely committed to peace can overcome even the most insurmountable challenges.

The Palestinian Authority 30 Years After Oslo—Flawed but Necessary
Ghaith al-Omari/The Washington Institute/September 08/2023
A collapse of the Oslo edifice will come with a hefty price for the Palestinians, not only as individuals but also as a people seeking self-determination. The “burn-it-to-the-ground-and-start-anew” approach may be emotionally satisfying, but a wiser, more responsible course would dictate preserving Oslo’s achievements and addressing whatever shortcomings that can be addressed in today’s environment until a more opportune moment for high diplomacy is reached.
The Palestinian disenchantment with the Oslo process is understandable. After all, the appeal of the process to the Palestinian public centered around the promise of achieving independence and ending the occupation. Failing to do so, it has instead produced ongoing conflict with Israel and a divided Palestinian polity with two governments whose only commonalities are corruption, poor governance, and authoritarian policies and practices. (The Israelis, for their part, were promised security and acceptance, but feel they have received continued terror and delegitimization instead.) Yet for all of its shortcomings, the Oslo process served and continues to serve key Palestinian interests, and a collapse of its framework could deal a mortal blow to Palestinian national aspirations.
A Way Back to Relevance
As Israeli and Palestinian negotiators initially met near the Norwegian capital in 1993, the Palestinian national movement was at one of its lowest points. In the aftermath of the ill-advised decision of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to support Saddam Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait, the PLO found itself regionally isolated and bereft of Arab financial and diplomatic support.
This marginalization was on vivid display in the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference and the ensuing Washington talks. Since assuming the leadership of the PLO in 1969, one of the core principles guiding Chairman Yasser Arafat was the struggle to gain recognition of the PLO as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” and to defend it against any perceived signs of Arab encroachment on Palestinian representation.
Yet by late 1991, the PLO was so weak as to accept the representation of Palestinian interests by non-PLO members as part of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. While the PLO leadership maintained enough sway to instruct Palestinian delegates to these talks to adopt inflexible positions, this obstructionist approach was unsustainable. The Oslo Accords reversed this trend and placed the Palestinian issue back into regional and global diplomatic center stage.
But Oslo was much more than a mere tactical maneuver to diplomatically rehabilitate the PLO. Palestinian self-determination, while long accepted internationally, had up to that point lacked any means for its realization. The Oslo process created such a pathway. Israeli recognition of the PLO as “the representative of the Palestinian people” created the legal and diplomatic framework for a negotiated settlement, while the creation of the Palestinian Authority established the physical and institutional foundation for such a resolution. And even though a Palestinian state was not mentioned in the Accords, they nevertheless created a logic that ultimately led to Israeli PM Ariel Sharon and US President George W. Bush adopting the two-state solution as formal Israeli and U.S. policy and rendered the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel a matter of international consensus.
A Fleeting Moment with Some Tangible Results
It is a common sentiment to hear that Oslo is dead. And indeed, many of its provisions have become defunct while two of its core pillars, the two-state solution and the PA, are under extreme stress. One would be hard-pressed to find a single world leader today who believes that a two-state solution is at hand and, accordingly, there is no diplomatic appetite to invest in its realization. More worryingly, the Israeli and Palestinian publics are abandoning it, and significant leaders in both societies actively oppose such a vision. On the ground, senior ministers in the current Israel government are pushing policies that challenge the physical viability of a future solution, primarily through the unchecked expansion of settlements deep within the West Bank. Concurrently, terrorism from Palestinian factions and individuals is resurgent, with the PA unable to exert its security control in areas under its authority.
For its part, the Palestinian body politic is going through its own deep crisis of legitimacy. The question of Palestinian representation is being challenged, though from within Palestinian politics in the form of Hamas rather than from external actors this time around. Moreover, the PA is rife with corruption and poor governance—it operates like many neighboring dictatorships to limit the political space and is fiercely resistant to any efforts towards political rejuvenation. As a result, it is drifting gradually but inexorably towards domestic and diplomatic irrelevance. Most Palestinians today see the PA as a liability rather than an asset, while many international and regional actors view it as an unappealing interlocutor.
Yet for all those ailments, the basic structural components of Oslo remain alive. The two-state solution remains a subject of international diplomatic consensus. While this does not currently translate into any diplomatic initiatives, it continues to frame and inform the positions and policies of various international actors. It likewise puts some constraints on proposed policies that would undermine it and would have otherwise gone unchecked.
And for all its shortcomings, the PA continues as a framework for the Palestinians to govern themselves and build the institutional nucleus for any future statehood. While many Palestinians aspire to a cleaner, more efficient, and more responsive government, the PA is not particularly worse than many other regional governments that are unsatisfactory yet sufficient to run a state. Moreover, as the tenure of former PA prime minister Salam Fayyad demonstrated, reforming and upgrading the PA’s institutions can be done reasonably quickly when there is the requisite political will. At a diplomatic level, despite the well-founded international complaints, the PA remains an address for international diplomatic engagement (albeit through the useful fiction of the PLO), ensuring a Palestinian presence on the international scene.
The Impact of a Collapse for Palestinians
While these Oslo structures have proven resilient and enduring, the possibility of the collapse of this edifice is becoming increasingly harder to dismiss. Were this to pass, it would be an unmitigated disaster for the prospects of Palestinian self-determination.
Today, the PA is the only remaining relevant Palestinian national political structure. A collapse of the PA will likely usher the collapse of the Palestinian national movement. Palestinian identity remains strong. Yet absent political institutions, the ability to effectively translate this identity into political and diplomatic gains will disappear. The former vehicle of the PLO became a diplomatically expedient shell alongside the inevitable diversion of financial, political and human resources into the establishment and management of the PA. For its part, Fatah—particularly under President Abbas—has come to resemble many similar ruling parties in the region and beyond: too identified with and enmeshed in the PA to survive the latter’s collapse.
It may be tempting to think that the whole-cloth collapse of these moribund structures would clear the way for the emergence of something better. Such an assumption, however, runs counter to both Palestinian history and experiences elsewhere. For one thing, there is no guarantee that the Palestinian national movement could reconstitute itself after a collapse. After all, history books are littered with the detritus of failed national movements. And even if something new were to emerge, such a process would take a generation at least, with no assured end result. The one certainty is that such a process would be bloody and disruptive, mainly for the Palestinians themselves.
For its part, Hamas may survive such a collapse—and may even benefit from it—but it has serious deficiencies that severely constrain its ability to develop into an effective and acceptable representative of the Palestinian people. Its ideological nature will always limit its ability to be a bigtent, representative organization. Regionally, the Muslim Brotherhood label to which Hamas continues to adhere is not only publicly discredited but also proactively opposed by major Arab governments. And its continued use of terror makes it an international pariah.
Similarly, the collapse of a two-state solution as an end objective will be to the detriment of Palestinians. The two-state solution remains the only possible option for the realization of self-determination of two peoples, the Jewish and Palestinian peoples, who deserve this right. Any alternative will inevitably come at the expense of either or both national groups. The continuation of the status quo—which, despite all claims to the contrary, has proven quite sustainable for more than five decades—will mean the continued denial of Palestinian national aspirations. The newly-resurrected “one state solution” presupposes that one of the two nations will subordinate its self-determination to the other, or that both will abandon theirs in favor of a post-nationalist state—a rarity even in less contentious parts of the world. And while political and legal means may improve the rights of Palestinian individuals and communities, the conflict was never about civil and political rights. It was always about national aspirations. Any proposed solution that fails to take account of nationalism is, at best, ahistorical and at worst disingenuous.
Averting Collapse
Yet for all these arguments, the repeated setbacks of the Oslo process have come with a price in the form of lost credibility among the Palestinian public. To avert further erosion and possible collapse—which would harm Palestinians, Israel, and neighboring states alike—a number of policies need to be adopted.
First and foremost, policies that foreclose the future possibility of a two-state solution must be halted, be they policies that advance settlements in areas deep within the PA that make future separation physically impossible or ones that either purposefully or inadvertently lead to the collapse of the PA—and with it the collapse of a Palestinian address for future settlement.
Beyond avoiding harm, policies need to be put in place to rehabilitate the very idea of cooperation, particularly for younger Palestinians and Israelis. This generation has come of age after 2000 and has not experienced the hope and cooperation of the 1990s, witnessing instead Oslo’s subsequent failures. Such a shift cannot be achieved through resumption of negotiations that will inevitably fail given the state of Palestinian and Israeli politics. Rather, it must be accomplished through concrete, politically viable spheres that can visibly demonstrate the feasibility and value of cooperation to both sides. In this regard, future expansion of the Abraham Accords could provide a vehicle for the implementation of such moves.
Finally, no matter how compelling the message is—and, let’s be honest, arguing for Oslo is an uphill undertaking—it cannot be favorably received if the messenger is suspect. In this case, the PA as a governing body and Fatah as a political movement are the messengers, and unless they are reformed and rehabilitated, Oslo cannot be rehabilitated in Palestinian eyes. Within this context, the idea of Palestinian elections should be approached with extreme care. In today’s environment, the loser in any elections—be it Fatah or Hamas—is highly unlikely to respect the result, and an election that fails to change reality will only deepen dissatisfaction.
For all its unfulfilled promise, and for its many shortcomings readily apparent in hindsight, the Oslo process was a historic breakthrough for the Palestinian quest towards self-determination. It created the first instance of Palestinians governing themselves on their own territory, established a future two-state solution as a subject of international consensus and created diplomatic and institutional pathways towards its realization.
Today, many of these achievements persist. Yet the failures are also real, and the disenchantment with Oslo is the overwhelming sentiment among Palestinians. Understandable as such disenchantment may be, a collapse of the Oslo edifice will come with a hefty price for the Palestinians, not only as individuals but also as a people seeking self-determination. The “burn-it-to-the-ground-and-start-anew” approach may be emotionally satisfying, but a wiser, more responsible course would dictate preserving Oslo’s achievements and addressing whatever shortcomings that can be addressed in today’s environment until a more opportune moment for high diplomacy is reached.

Video link from The Washington Institute/Watch a webcast on the anniversary of the outbreak of unprecedented, courageous protests in Iran featuring journalist and activist Masih Alinejad.
Woman, Life, Freedom: Iran’s Mass Protest Movement, One Year On
A Conversation with Masih Alinejad/September 08/2023
Click on this link/https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/woman-life-freedom-irans-mass-protest-movement-one-year-conversation-masih-alinejad
Masih Alinejad/The Washington Institute/September 08/2023
In September 2022, the death of a young Kurdish Iranian woman, Mahsa Amini, while in the custody of Iran’s so-called Morality Police sparked an unprecedented wave of protests in which huge numbers of brave women and men spoke out against the mandatory wearing of the hijab headscarf and the theocratic regime that enforced it, often brutally. Thousands of demonstrators were arrested in the harsh crackdown that followed, with many remaining in prison one year later. And now the regime is preemptively arresting activists around the country out of concern for renewed protests on the anniversary of Amini’s death.
How did the mass protests change Iran? What is the next stage of popular opposition to the Islamic regime? And what role do protesters hope the United States and other outside governments will play in advancing their pursuit of freedom, justice, and change?
Iranian-born journalist and activist Masih Alinejad has long been at the forefront of such change, whether as a crusading reporter exposing government corruption or as the founder of the online “My Stealthy Freedom” movement, which opposes the mandatory hijab law. Exiled from her native country, she has continued to provide a powerful voice and effective platform for protest from her home in America. For her courageous activism, Alinejad has been targeted twice for kidnap or assassination by the Iranian regime. In 2022, The Washington Institute conferred upon her its prestigious Scholar-Statesman Award.
To mark one year since Amini’s death and the outbreak of what some anti-regime activists have called an “evolution” in protests, the Institute’s Segal Executive Director, Robert Satloff, hosted a live conversation with Alinejad on the status of Iran’s protest movement and its prospects for the future.
*The Policy Forum series is made possible through the generosity of the Florence and Robert Kaufman Family.

Today in History: Russian Liberation from the ‘Muslim Yoke’ Begins
Raymond Ibrahim/September 08/2023 
‘The Battle of Kulikovo’ by Pavel Ryzhenko
Today in history, on September 8, 1380, Russia began its long march to liberation from the Islamic Tatar yoke, by way of a battle that is as important to Russian history as the battle of Tours (732) and the siege of Vienna (1683) are to the West.
Although pagan when they conquered Russia around 1240, by 1300 the Mongols were thoroughly Islamized. Arabic was adopted, “the entire Muslim religious establishment of qadis, muftis, and the like arose in Sarai, the Golden Horde’s capital on the lower Volga,” and “sharia, Muslim religious law,” reigned supreme. “With this the Russo-Tatar conquest society entered the mainstream of Medieval Christian-Muslim frontier life,” that is, it entered into a familiar paradigm of enmity and war, punctuated only by vast sums of gold and slaves flowing from Russia to the Horde.
In 1327, Uzbek Khan’s cousin Shevkal—“the destroyer of Christianity,” according to a Russian chronicle—asked a boon of his khan: “allow me to go to Rus to destroy their Christian faith, to kill their princes and to bring you their wives and children.” Uzbek consented. At the head of a vast horde, Shevkal invaded Russia “with great haughtiness and violence. He inaugurated great persecution of the Christians, [using] force, pillage, torture, and abuse.” Nor were Russians ignorant of the reason behind their (renewed) sufferings: everywhere in their chronicles “they appear as defenders of the faith battling to save Christianity from marauding infidels driven by religious animosity.” Moreover, “Mongol atrocities” are always recorded “as incidents in a continuous religious war.”
When the Golden Horde’s infrastructure began to fracture from internal discord in 1359, the principality of Moscow (or Muscovy) began to defy its overlords. So Khan Mamai, seeking to squash the rebels and “impose Islam on the Russians,” made for Moscow with, according to sources, some 100,000 Turco-Tatars in 1380. Boasting that they would put their swords “to the test for the Russian land and the Christian faith” against “the armor of the Moslems,” the Russians accepted the challenge.
Under the general leadership of Grand Prince Dmitri Ivanovich of Moscow, some 50,000 Russians went out and met the khan at Kulikovo Field, near the Don River and other tributaries. The opposing armies were so vast as to be spread out over eight miles. The Christians strategically positioned themselves between rivers and dense forests, thereby limiting the Tatar horsemen’s maneuvering and flanking abilities.
“I will neither protect my face nor hide in the rear, but let us all brothers fight together,” Dmitri said in response to his nobles’ pleas to stay out of harm’s way: “I want to die for Christianity ahead of anyone else, with deed as well as word, so that all others who see it will become bold.” (More practically, explained the grand prince, “it is better that we fall in battle than become slaves of these infidels.”)
Once battle commenced on today’s date, September 8, 1380, “there was such a great massacre and bitter warfare and great noise, such as there never had been in Russian principalities,” writes the chronicler; “blood flowed like a heavy rain and there were many killed on both sides.” Although outnumbered two-to-one, the Russians, “seek[ing] revenge for Tatar offenses,” fought with a savage fury. True to his word, Dmitri was seen at the front “striking to the right and to the left, killing many; he himself was surrounded by many [Tatars] and was hit many times on his head and his body.”
After hours of fierce fighting and despite heavy casualties, the Russians, with the aid of hidden cavalry that had charged out of the surrounding thick woods, managed to rout the Muslims. And so Grand Prince Dmitri—who, on learning the Mongols had fled, instantly collapsed from heavy loss of blood and nearly died—led the first major Russian victory against their Tatar oppressors since their “yoke” began 150 years earlier. Thus the Battle of Kulikovo shattered the myth of Mongol invincibility and bestowed great honor on Moscow.
Even so, full liberation was still a century away. For in 1382, the regrouped and recovered Tatars invaded Moscow, nearly burning the entire city to the ground and leaving some 24,000 corpses in their wake. But the resilient duchy continued to be the chief Russian thorn in the Horde’s side. By 1409, Emir Edigei was warning Grand Prince Vasily Dmitrivich to stop withholding full payment of jizya—“lest evil befall your domain, and Christians meet their final doom, and our anger and war be upon you!” The warning ignored, Edigei came slaughtering, pillaging, and burning, including in Moscow, though he failed to take it.
For what was done at the Kulikovo Field could not now be undone; over the next few decades, Moscow continued to grow in strength even as the Horde continued to diminish in both. Finally, in October 1480—precisely one hundred years after Kulikovo—the two armies met at the Ugra River, and “thus ended the Horde tsars,” to quote a chronicler. “Then in our Russian Land we were freed from the burden of submission to the Muslim and began to recover as if from winter to clear spring.”
Note: All quotations in the above account were excerpted from and are documented in the author’s book, Sword and Scimitar: Fourteen Centuries of War between Islam and the West.

The 21st Century Will NOT Be Chinese
Drieu Godefridi/Gatestone Institute/September 8, 2023
[T]he news of the week is most likely the crash of China. Real estate, currency, stock markets, technology, demographics: it all fits together, and what lies ahead for China looks like stagnation at best.
There are an estimated 80 million unoccupied homes in China -- a huge number, even for a giant country. While real estate has driven China's growth for decades, it is now in danger of wrecking it.
Then came the marginalization of the Chinese currency, the yuan, presented as destined to replace the dollar. Not quite yet. The yuan may or may not be weak, but above all no one wants it as an international currency because no one trusts the reliability of the Chinese regime in the long run. No one wants to buy Chinese bonds.
"It is very hard to create a reserve currency, without attractive reserve assets. China has a problem. It wants foreigners to buy bonds but they have been selling since early 2022" — Jens Nordvig, founder and CEO of Exante, Reuters, May 16, 2023.
Regarding the concept of a dedicated currency for BRICS nations, experts have expressed their skepticism. Danny Bradlow from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, cast doubt on the practicality of reverting to the gold standard -- there is not enough of it if everyone wanted it a redemption -- or using cryptocurrencies. He questioned their reliability in global trade. There are serious investors who regard cryptocurrencies as essentially a conceit, like the 17th century's Dutch tulip mania. Even then, at least you had a tulip bulb.
Chris Weafer, an investment analyst specializing in Russia and Eurasia at Macro-Advisory, labeled the proposition of a BRICS currency a "non-starter."
It is likely that Chinese Communist Party Chairman Xi Jinping does not really understand how markets work... Why would anyone want to invest in a stock market that is constantly at the mercy of a communist 'Prince' and his subjective whims and predilections?
According to China's new "Anti-Sanctions Law," just about anything can be a crime, and one's assets seized if the Communist Party leaders want them to be. The raid on the Shanghai headquarters of Bain & Company and the colonization (seizure) of the Hong Kong financial center by China's imperialists also had the effect, from a strictly financial point of view, of emptying the Chinese market of all reliability.
There is also the problem that in China there are no private companies: under the Chinese Communist Party's notion of "civil-military fusion," all companies belong to the central government and can be raided for information at any time.
Our contemporaries often forget that the Chinese regime is not the equivalent of a British, American or Dutch democracy. The Chinese regime is a dictatorship in the strict sense, the dictatorship of a single party, and ultimately of a single man, Xi.
Xi has already told his military to "prepare for war" and "fight and win" it. He has flown spy balloons over America's most sensitive military sites and sent "hundreds of military-age Chinese men" into the United States through its open southern border -- presumably to disrupt a US counter-offensive should he invade Taiwan -- to sabotage American airports, electric grids, communications systems, water supplies, bridges, ports, highways, tunnels, and other strategic infrastructure.
Xi can see that his "window of opportunity" -- during a Biden administration that is possibly compromised -- is closing, and that the US is being led by a president who shakes hands with the air; says "No comment," about a town incinerated in Hawaii, and assures Russian President Vladimir Putin that a "minor incursion" into Ukraine would be fine.
Larry Fink, Chairman of Blackrock, urged investors to "triple their allocations in Chinese assets." "[W]e are one of 16 asset managers currently offering US index funds investing in Chinese companies," BlackRock told CNN about a country that is using them displace America and rule the world.
Jamie Dimon, CEO of J.P. Morgan Chase, said that "he intends to operate in China according to US foreign policy and will plainly stop expansion if US policy dictates." In other words, investing in the Communist China, a country that openly wants to supplant America as the world's leading superpower to rule the world, is not illegal. If China attacks Taiwan and starts a war, it is the US that is funding it.
The crash of China: Real estate, currency, stock markets, technology, demographics. It all fits together, and what lies ahead for China looks like stagnation at best.
Hardly anyone cares, because it all seems so far away during the summer, but the news of the week is most likely the crash of China. Real estate, currency, stock markets, technology, demographics: it all fits together, and what lies ahead for China looks like stagnation at best.
1. Housing Market Meltdown
The crash of the Chinese housing market: There are an estimated 80 million unoccupied homes in China -- a huge number, even for a giant country. While real estate has driven China's growth for decades, it is now in danger of wrecking it. The major Chinese property development conglomerates are going bankrupt one after the other. There is no fix or solution that will artificially revive China's "bricks" this time. For years, the Chinese regime artificially stimulated real estate as an economic engine -- and it worked! -- but sometimes there comes a glut, and in China, that glut is now.
2. Collapse of the Yuan
Then came the marginalization of the Chinese currency, the yuan, presented as destined to replace the dollar. Not quite yet. The yuan may or may not be weak, but above all no one wants it as an international currency because no one trusts the reliability of the Chinese regime in the long run. No one wants to buy Chinese bonds. "It is very hard to create a reserve currency, without attractive reserve assets. China has a problem. It wants foreigners to buy bonds but they have been selling since early 2022," Jens Nordvig, founder and CEO of Exante Data, recently noted.
When big Chinese companies borrow on the international markets, it is always in euro-dollars (an iteration of the dollar), and certainly not in yuan.
The yuan, whether it is weak or not, will not replace the dollar, not even in South-East Asia. While the recent strengthening of BRICS (the informal group comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa ) is an interesting geopolitical development, there is no indication at this stage that the other BRICS members are ready to adopt the yuan in their transactions -- and certainly not India.
Regarding the concept of a dedicated currency for BRICS nations, experts have expressed their skepticism. Danny Bradlow, a faculty member at the Centre for Advancement of Scholarship at the University of Pretoria in South Africa, cast doubt on the practicality of reverting to the gold standard -- there is not enough of it if everyone wanted it a redemption -- or using cryptocurrencies. He questioned their reliability in global trade. There are serious investors who regard cryptocurrencies as essentially a conceit, like the 17th century's Dutch tulip mania. Even then, at least you had a tulip bulb.
Discussing the complexities of establishing a BRICS-specific currency, Shirley Ze Yu, a senior visiting fellow at the London School of Economics, mentioned that forming such a currency would necessitate creating a range of institutions with shared standards and values. "These are very difficult to achieve, although not impossible," she noted.
Chris Weafer, an investment analyst specializing in Russia and Eurasia at Macro-Advisory, labeled the proposition of a BRICS currency a "non-starter."
3. The Chinese Stock Market Collapse
It is likely that Chinese Communist Party Chairman Xi Jinping does not really understand how markets work. He may have thought he could multiply his arbitrary interventions in the Chinese stock market without any consequences. There might, however, be at least one consequence: a loss of confidence. Why would anyone want to invest in a stock market that is constantly at the mercy of a communist 'Prince' and his subjective whims and predilections?
According to China's new "Anti-Sanctions Law," just about anything can be a crime, and one's assets seized if the Communist Party leaders want them to be. The raid on the Shanghai headquarters of Bain & Company and the colonization (seizure) of the Hong Kong financial center by China's imperialists also had the effect, from a strictly financial point of view, of emptying the Chinese market of all reliability.
There is also the problem that in China there are no private companies: under the Chinese Communist Party's notion of "civil-military fusion," all companies belong to the central government and can be raided for information at any time.
4. Lack of Technological Innovation
China's belligerent radicalization has led the United States -- despite decades of good relations with China -- such as China's failure to comply with US transparency or accounting standards; trade deficits always in China's favor, permanent and systemic Chinese theft of American intellectual property -- to question its "sharing" of semiconductor technology with China. The Chinese government does not seem to have mastered this field yet, possibly making Xi even more interested in seizing Taiwan, which is a global center for computer chips. Chinese companies and the government may fear lagging behind companies from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the West -- and this is one of the few points of convergence in the US between Republicans and Democrats
5. Demographic Collapse
In every industrialized country and on every continent, with a few rare exceptions, demographic curves are collapsing. Above all it is true of China, which, with a fertility rate of 1.28 children per woman, seems destined to follow in the footsteps of Japan. Xi appears to be trying to reverse this downward trend, but has only succeeded in accelerating it. Despite the formal termination of China's one-child policy in 2016 and the introduction of financial benefits and tax reductions for families, birthrates have not seen a significant increase.
United Nations data indicates that while there was a minor uptick in the country's fertility rate shortly after the policy change, it has since declined. The numbers went from approximately 1.7 children per woman—similar to rates in Australia and the UK — to 1.28, one of the lowest globally. This recent decline mirrors an amalgamation of various societal and economic pressures that have accumulated in China over the years, but a dwindling labor force diminishes the potential for growth.
From the above, a prognosis: Our contemporaries often forget that the Chinese regime is not the equivalent of a British, American or Dutch democracy. The Chinese regime is a dictatorship in the strict sense, the dictatorship of a single party, and ultimately of a single man, Xi. So, if you want to overthrow a dictator, you can only do so by force, or if he decides to leave, or if his life comes to an end.
Xi, despite the failure of his economic policies, will probably not decide to leave. He might be hoping that the upcoming presidential election in Taiwan on January 13, 2024 will drop the country into his lap. To attract more international trade, he might postpone any planned aggression or, conversely, as tyrants often do, escalate hostilities to distract his own public from his economic crisis -- not as a prelude to the "Chinese century'", but as a desperate maneuver by a desperate man.
Xi has already told his military to "prepare for war" and "fight and win" it. He has flown spy balloons over America's most sensitive military sites and sent "hundreds of military-age Chinese men" into the United States through its open southern border -- presumably to disrupt a US counter-offensive should he invade Taiwan -- to sabotage American airports, electric grids, communications systems, water supplies, bridges, ports, highways, tunnels, and other strategic infrastructure.
Xi can see that his "window of opportunity" -- during a Biden administration that is possibly compromised -- is closing, and that the US is being led by a president who shakes hands with the air; says "No comment," about a town incinerated in Hawaii, and assures Russian President Vladimir Putin that a "minor incursion" into Ukraine would be fine.
Xi clearly saw the Biden administration flee from Afghanistan; eliminate energy independence and promote windmills; allow a spy balloon to complete its mission over sensitive US military sites; cancel the China Initiative that was thwarting research and industry theft; permit TikTok, Confucius Institutes, K-12 Confucius Classrooms, illegal Chinese "police stations"; let China buy American farmland, often near US military bases, and do virtually nothing to stop US investment in the Chinese industry and military by enormous public federal retirement accounts such as Thrift, as well as investments by the private sector.
Larry Fink, Chairman of Blackrock, urged investors to "triple their allocations in Chinese assets." "[W]e are one of 16 asset managers currently offering US index funds investing in Chinese companies," BlackRock told CNN about a country that is using them displace America and rule the world.
Jamie Dimon, CEO of J.P. Morgan Chase, said that "he intends to operate in China according to US foreign policy and will plainly stop expansion if US policy dictates." In other words, investing in the Communist China, a country that openly wants to supplant America as the world's leading superpower to rule the world, is not illegal. If China attacks Taiwan and starts a war, it is the US that is funding it.
The military alliances organized in the region by the Americans also bear witness to the likelihood of the outbreak of war -- and its urgency.
*Drieu Godefridi is a jurist (Saint-Louis University of Louvain), a philosopher (Saint-Louis University of Louvain) and a doctor in legal theory (Paris IV-Sorbonne). He is the author of The Green Reich.
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