The Danger of the Iranian Mullahs Possessing a Nuclear Bomb: Hitler’s Lesson That Was Never Understood Elias Bejjani/November 09/2026
اضغط هنا لقراءة التعليق باللغة العربية/Click here to read the editorial in Arabic
Allowing the current Iranian regime to possess a nuclear weapon is not merely a strategic error; it is a catastrophic gamble with the security of the entire international order. This regime is not like ordinary states that seek deterrence or balance. It is a system built on a religious-political doctrine that views global chaos as the path to “salvation,” war as a sacred means, and human beings as cheap fuel.
Ideological Roots: Delusions Managed as State Policy
The belief system that governs Tehran today is not merely a political ideology. It is a mixture of delusions, hallucinations, and detachment from reality. According to the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih established by Khomeini after 1979, “true peace” can only be achieved with the return of the “Hidden Imam” (the Mahdi) from his occultation. For that to happen, the ground must first be prepared through chaos, wars, and global turmoil. This is not marginal rhetoric; it is an integral part of the regime’s political and religious literature. Khomeini himself wrote in his books and letters about the necessity of exporting the revolution and about political borders being temporary illusions in the face of the “Islamic ummah” that must submit to the rule of the jurist.
In their view, the entire world is not a collection of sovereign states with borders, but open arenas for their struggle. When they lose one arena, they move to another: from Lebanon to Syria, from Iraq to Yemen, from Gaza to the Red Sea. This pattern has been clear since the 1980s: the creation of Hezbollah in Lebanon, support for the Houthis in Yemen, the arming of militias in Iraq and Syria, and the financing of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Whenever one front narrows, another is opened. Borders, to them, are imaginary lines, and states are merely tools or temporary obstacles
There is no real value for human life in this system. The concept of “martyrdom” has been widely promoted since the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), when tens of thousands of young men and boys were sent in human-wave assaults against mines and tanks, promised paradise and the houris. This discourse continued after the war and became a permanent tool of mobilization. A regime that holds such a belief does not fear human losses the way modern, democratic, and free states do. Martyrdom is not a tragedy; it is a ticket to paradise. This renders traditional deterrence calculations weakly effective against a system that sees mass death as a path to ideological victory.
The Historical Parallel with Hitler: A Lesson Never Absorbed
In its essence and mechanisms, this situation resembles that of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. After Hitler came to power in 1933, he rearmed first secretly and then openly, violated the Treaty of Versailles, remilitarized the Rhineland in 1936, annexed Austria in 1938, and then demanded the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. At the Munich Conference in September 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and French Premier Édouard Daladier made major concessions, believing that “peace in our time” was possible by containing Hitler through dialogue and concessions. That conviction was a catastrophic historical error. Instead of containing him, they gave him time, legitimacy, and the ability to rearm, until it was he who imposed war in 1939 by invading Poland, then overran Europe and killed millions before his regime was brought down in 1945.
The parallel is not superficial. Both regimes built an ideology that sees the world as an arena of inevitable conflict, used propaganda and mass mobilization to glorify sacrifice and death, repeatedly violated international agreements without initially paying a real price, and benefited from the hesitation of the major powers and their fear of early confrontation.
The Nuclear Record and Negotiations: A Consistent Pattern of Deception
Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, Iran’s nuclear program has followed a secretive path. In 2002, the Iranian opposition revealed the Natanz and Arak facilities, prompting investigations by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Over two decades, recurring patterns emerged: concealment of facilities, delays in reporting, enrichment beyond declared limits, and research activities with military dimensions. The 2015 JCPOA granted Iran sanctions relief in exchange for temporary restrictions. After the American withdrawal from the agreement, Tehran accelerated enrichment, reaching levels close to military use in later stages, while reducing cooperation with inspectors. This is not the behavior of a state seeking only legitimate deterrence. It is the behavior of a regime that uses negotiations as a tool to buy time and resources—exactly as Hitler used diplomatic conferences before the war.
The Consequences of Western and Israeli Policies: The Price of Hesitation and the Return to the Logic of Concessions
There is another highly dangerous dimension directly linked to the Iranian regime’s ability to recover and rebuild its influence. When American policy shifts from a approach of maximum pressure, severe sanctions, and clear military deterrence to one that relies primarily on agreements, concessions, and open dialogue, the Iranian regime regains a wide margin for maneuver. This shift does not occur in a vacuum; it directly affects American military capabilities in the region, the readiness of allies to act decisively, and Tehran’s own calculations. The weaker the language of deterrence becomes and the more it is replaced by the language of containment through agreements, the greater Iran’s ability to re-finance its proxies and rebuild its military, missile, and nuclear infrastructure.
The same applies to the Israeli arena. When the continuity of a leadership that adopts a policy of direct confrontation with the Iranian axis and its proxies is disrupted, and is replaced by periods of hesitation or internal political deals that limit freedom of military and intelligence action, the result is to give Tehran and its arms the opportunity to reposition. In such periods, Iran regains the ability to reactivate Hezbollah in Lebanon, reorganize the militias in Iraq and Syria, support Palestinian armed groups, and then gradually move toward broader attempts to influence the Gulf states and destabilize their regimes from within through financial, media, and sectarian networks. Regional history since 2003 confirms that any vacuum in Israeli or American pressure is quickly filled by renewed Iranian influence.
This dynamic is not theoretical. Whenever external pressure recedes, the regime returns to the pattern of “crisis management” through proxies: igniting relatively low-cost fronts, exhausting adversaries, and buying time for the nuclear project. Therefore, any policy that prioritizes lowering energy prices or avoiding short-term confrontation at the expense of long-term deterrence ends up practically giving the Iranian regime exactly what it needs: time, resources, and relative legitimacy.
The Error of Regional Support for the Regime: Qatar, Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt
There is another strategic error committed by certain regional states, foremost among them Qatar, Turkey, and Pakistan, and behind them influential circles in Egypt. These states, or currents within them, act as if keeping the Iranian regime away from direct confrontation—or even supporting it diplomatically, economically, and in the media on certain files—serves their stability or balances other powers. This calculation is fundamentally mistaken.
The Iranian regime does not recognize genuine long-term partners. It uses interest-based alliances as long as they serve its project, then turns against them or blackmails them when the balance of power changes. Qatar, which has opened wide channels with Tehran; Turkey, which intersects with it on regional and commercial files; Pakistan, which shares a complex border and fluctuating security relations with Iran; and Egypt, where some circles try to bet on an Iranian balancing role—all will be among the first to suffer if the regime succeeds in acquiring nuclear capability and fully restoring its momentum.
Why? Because the doctrine of exporting the revolution does not stop at Iran’s traditional adversaries. It views “moderate” Sunni regimes or those allied with the West as obstacles to its project, just as it views Israel and the United States. The experience in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon proves that once Iranian influence takes root, it is not content with partnership; it seeks hegemony through militias, a parallel economy, and sectarian penetration. The Gulf states, Egypt, and Turkey itself are not immune to this pattern if the regime acquires a nuclear umbrella that grants it relative immunity.
The support or diplomatic cover granted to the regime today under the pretext of “avoiding war” or “regional balance” is in reality the granting of additional time to a project that recognizes neither borders nor permanent allies. Anyone who thinks he can tame this regime or use it as a pressure card will, in the event of the success of the Iranian nuclear project, be among the first to pay the price.
Conclusion: The Real Price of Hesitation
What is required is not more negotiations that give the regime time, but a decisive confrontation that prevents it from acquiring full nuclear capability and severs its ties with its proxies. Plans to curb this regime and weaken it structurally are far more important than any temporary rise in oil prices or short-term electoral calculations. Energy prices fluctuate and recover; a nuclear weapon in the hands of an aggressive theocratic regime detached from reality is a permanent threat that is not easily reversible.
History does not forgive those who repeat their mistakes while knowing them. Allowing the Iranian mullahs to reach the nuclear bomb, while deterrence policies are weakened in Washington and Tel Aviv and the regime’s moves are covered by certain regional capitals, is one of those mistakes that the future will not easily forgive. The states that bet on containing this regime through dialogue, deals, or looking the other way will discover, sooner or later, that they did not contain it—they merely cleared its path to becoming the one that imposes its terms.
