بروفايل: كوثراني… «مايسترو» الملف العراقي يرتبط مباشرة بحسن نصر الله/Cawtharani… Hezbollah’s Iraq File Maestro Baghdad/A new Soleimani? US zeroes in on shadowy Hezbollah power broker in Iraq/Iran Shows Off Drones that Can Reach Israel, Threat Increases

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بروفايل: كوثراني… «مايسترو» الملف العراقي يرتبط مباشرة بحسن نصر الله/الشرق الأوسط/22 نيسان/2020

Cawtharani… Hezbollah’s Iraq File Maestro
Baghdad – Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday, 22 Apri/2020

A new Soleimani? US zeroes in on shadowy Hezbollah power broker in Iraq
Ali Choukeir/The Times Of Israel/April 22/2020

Iran Shows Off Drones that Can Reach Israel, Threat Increases
Seth Frantzman/The Jerusalem Post/April 22/2020

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بروفايل: كوثراني… «مايسترو» الملف العراقي يرتبط مباشرة بحسن نصر الله/الشرق الأوسط/22 نيسان/2020
برز اسم القيادي في «حزب الله اللبناني» الشيخ محمد كوثراني على الساحة العراقية حتى قبل اغتيال قائد «فيلق القدس» الإيراني قاسم سليماني في بغداد بضربة أميركية، لكن يبدو أنه، منذ ذلك الوقت، أصبح الشخصية المحورية التي تُحرّك عجلات السياسة في بلاد الرافدين.
الأسبوع الماضي؛ رصدت الولايات المتحدة مكافأة تصل إلى 10 ملايين دولار مقابل «أي معلومات عن نشاطات وشبكات وشركاء» كوثراني، مشيرة إلى أن للقيادي اللبناني دوراً في «التنسيق السياسي للمجموعات العسكريّة الموالية لإيران»، وهو تنسيق كان «تولّاه في السابق الجنرال الإيراني قاسم سليماني».
لدى وقوع الغارة الأميركية التي أودت بسليماني ونائب رئيس «هيئة الحشد الشعبي» العراقي أبو مهدي المهندس في 3 يناير (كانون الثاني) الماضي، سرت شائعات عن إمكانية وجود كوثراني ضمن الموكب. لكن سرعان ما جرى نفي الخبر.
لكن ذلك، حسب تقرير لوكالة الصحافة الفرنسية، يشكل دليلاً على مدى ارتباط القيادي اللبناني بهذا الملف، وبالتالي على الدور الكبير الذي أنيط به بعد تلك الضربة، حتى إن مسؤولاً عراقياً يصفه بـ«النسخة الأخرى من سليماني».
وتعدّ واشنطن أنّ كوثراني «يُسهّل أنشطة مجموعات تعمل خارج سيطرة الحكومة العراقيّة من أجل قمع المتظاهرين بعنف» أو «مهاجمة بعثات دبلوماسيّة أجنبيّة»، ويشارك في «تدريب وتمويل وتقديم دعم سياسي – لوجيستي لمجموعات شيعيّة عراقيّة متمردة».
بعد قرار الإدارة الأميركية، سرت أخبار في وسائل إعلامية محلية عدة عن وجود كوثراني في بغداد، مشيرة إلى أنه يقوم بمفاوضات حول الحكومة الجديدة في المنطقة الخضراء؛ عقر دار الأميركيين، لكن لم يكن في الإمكان تأكيد ذلك. وكانت مصادر سياسية عدة مقربة من دوائر القرار في العاصمة العراقية أكدت في وقت سابق أن كوثراني، وهو من مواليد آخر الخمسينات، كان يرافق سليماني في جولات التفاوض مع القوى السياسية حول اختيار شخصية لرئاسة الحكومة. ويقول مصدر مقرب من محيط كوثراني إن الأخير «هو مسؤول الملف العراقي المرتبط مباشرة بأمين عام (حزب الله) اللبناني حسن نصر الله منذ عام 2003». ويشير مسؤولون يعرفون كوثراني من قرب إلى أنه شخصية تمتلك «خبرة كبيرة جداً، ولعله الأجنبي الوحيد بعد سليماني العارف بتفاصيل المشهد العراقي». ويحمل «الشيخ»؛ كما يصطلح على تسميته بسبب عمامته البيضاء، الجنسيةَ العراقية، وقد وُلد وترعرع في العراق ووالده لبناني. وتقول شخصية إسلامية في بيروت إن كوثراني «من الجيل الأول في (حزب الله). هو من عائلة عُلمائية وعلمية معروفة في لبنان، وكان من الذين رشحهم (حزب الله) للمجلس النيابي في عام 1996».
درس كوثراني الفقه في شبابه في حوزة النجف بجنوب العراق، وهو متزوج من عراقية ولهما 4 أولاد، ويتكلم بلهجة البلد، بحسب مقربين.
وفي عام 2013، وضعت وزارة الخزانة الأميركية كوثراني على لائحة الإرهاب مع 3 لبنانيين آخرين بتهمة دعم مجموعات متطرفة في العراق وتقديم دعم مالي لـ«فصائل» مختلفة في اليمن، ولـ«قادة عسكريين مسؤولين عن أعمال إرهابية» في كل من مصر والأردن وقبرص وإسرائيل.
ويقول المحلّل السياسي والعسكري العراقي هشام الهاشمي، إن «أهمية كوثراني» خلال السنوات السبع الماضية باتت تكمن في «أنه يلعب أكثر من دور». ويضيف أن كوثراني اليوم هو «ضابط إيقاع البيت السياسي الشيعي الولائي»؛ أي الأحزاب السياسية الشيعية العراقية التي تعدّ المرشد الإيراني آية الله علي خامنئي مرجعها الفقهي والعقائدي. ويشير الهاشمي إلى أن كوثراني «عمل بعد عام 2014 على تيسير لقاءات ومصالحات بين العرب السُنّة الذين كان لهم موقف ضد السلطة الشيعية في بغداد»، وأن «دوره تعاظم بعد اغتيال سليماني والمهندس، وأصبح منسقاً بين المكونات السياسية» من سُنّة وشيعة وأكراد.
وتؤكد مصادر دبلوماسية عراقية عدة أن لكوثراني «مونة» على السياسيين العراقيين، لدرجة أنه «طلب مبلغاً بملايين الدولارات من العراق لحلحلة الأزمة الاقتصادية في لبنان» قبل أشهر. وجرى هذا الطلب خارج القنوات الرسمية بين البلدين، ولم يتضح ما إذا كانت جرت تلبيته؛ بحسب المصادر. إلا إن محيط كوثراني نفى هذا الموضوع تماماً. ويفسر هذا الدور المتعاظم القرار الأميركي الجديد حول كوثراني. ويقول المصدر المقرب من دائرة كوثراني: «طلب معلومات عنه الآن قد يكون مقدمة لعملية اغتيال محتملة أو اعتقال». ويضيف أن ذلك يندرج في سياق الاغتيال السياسي ومحاولة الولايات المتحدة ضبط الأدوار في المرحلة المقبلة، لأنها «غير قادرة على الدخول بمواجهة مع الإيرانيين مماثلة لاغتيال سليماني والمهندس». ويرى أن «اغتيال قائد (فيلق القدس) الجديد إسماعيل قاآني غير وارد في حسابات واشنطن حالياً، لذلك توجّه الأميركيون إلى كوثراني لأنه حزبي لا يمثل دولة»؛ وبالتالي لا يترتب على ذلك أي تبعات دبلوماسية.

Cawtharani… Hezbollah’s Iraq File Maestro
Baghdad – Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday, 22 Apri/2020
The name of Hezbollah power broker Muhammad Kawtharani had gained attention even before the assassination of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad. Since Soleimani’s assassination, Kawtharani had gained traction in Iraqi politics. Washington offered a $10 million reward for information on Kawtharani, whom it says has taken over part of the role of Soleimani. Washington charged last week that Kawtharani had “taken over some of the political coordination of Iran-aligned paramilitary groups” formerly organized by Soleimani. When a US drone strike in January killed Soleimani and others in a small convoy outside Baghdad airport, the little-known but powerful official from Lebanon’s Iran-backed Hezbollah movement was initially rumored to have died alongside him. It was quickly confirmed that Kawtharani, who has long spearheaded Hezbollah’s Iraq policy, was not among those killed in the attack.“In that role, he was like a copy of Soleimani,” a senior Iraqi official who met with Kawtharani several times told AFP. Washington considers that Kawtharani “facilitates the activities of groups working outside the control of the Iraqi government to violently suppress demonstrators” or “attack foreign diplomatic missions”, and participates in “training, financing, and providing political-logistical support to Iraqi Shiite rebel groups.”
After the US administration’s decision to sanction Kawtharani and offer a reward for information about him, there was news in several local media outlets about the presence of Kawtharani in Baghdad, noting that he was conducting negotiations on the new government in the Green Zone, but it could not be confirmed. Born in Iraq in the late 1950s, Kawtharani studied in the holy shrine city of Najaf and is married to an Iraqi woman with whom he has four children. “Kawtharani was appointed to head Hezbollah’s Iraq file in 2003 and has reported directly to its secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah,” said a source close to Hezbollah’s senior ranks. Washington had first sanctioned Kawtharani as a “terrorist” in 2013 for providing training, funding, political, and logistical support to Iraqi Shiite insurgent groups. Iraqi political expert Hisham al-Hashemi said Kawtharani wore multiple hats.
“He’s the conductor in the Shiite loyalist orchestra,” said Hashemi, referring to the collection of Iraqi Shiite parties that see Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as their main reference.

A new Soleimani? US zeroes in on shadowy Hezbollah power broker in Iraq
Ali Choukeir/The Times Of Israel/April 22/2020
Washington offers $10 million reward for information on Muhammad Kawtharani, whom it charges has taken over part of the role of assassinated Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani
BAGHDAD (AFP) — Months after the United States killed a top Iranian general in Baghdad, it has offered millions for any details on the mysterious man filling his boots — Hezbollah power broker Muhammad Kawtharani.
Washington charged last week that Kawtharani had “taken over some of the political coordination of Iran-aligned paramilitary groups” formerly organized by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani.
In fact, when a US drone strike in January killed Soleimani and others in a small convoy outside the Baghdad airport, the little-known but powerful official from Lebanon’s Iran-backed Hezbollah movement was initially rumored to have died alongside him.
It was quickly confirmed that Kawtharani, who has long spearheaded Hezbollah’s Iraq policy, was not among those killed in the attack that brought arch enemies Tehran and Washington to the brink of war.
But rumors of his demise only proved his place among the shadowy pro-Iran brokers steering politics in Iraq, the oil-rich but poverty-stricken country torn by unrest since the 2003 US-led invasion that toppled dictator Saddam Hussein.
Hezbollah supporters hold pictures of slain Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps General Qassem Soleimani during a ceremony marking the anniversary of the assassination of Hezbollah leaders, Abbas al-Moussawi, Ragheb Harb and Imad Mughniyeh and the end of a 40-day Muslim mourning period for Soleimani, in Beirut, Lebanon, February 16, 2020. Keen to curb Iran’s influence in Iraq, the United States last week announced the reward of up to $10 million for any details on Kawtharani’s activities or associates. The State Department accused him of inheriting part of Soleimani’s role coordinating among pro-Tehran factions that have attacked foreign diplomatic missions and “engaged in wide-spread organised criminal activity.”
The conductor
Washington had first sanctioned Kawtharani as a “terrorist” in 2013 for providing “training, funding, political, and logistical support to Iraqi Shi’a insurgent groups.”Born in Iraq in the late 1950s, Kawtharani studied in the holy shrine city of Najaf and is married to an Iraqi woman with whom he has four children.
Little is known about his early political work, but his rise to prominence began following the US-led invasion. “Kawtharani was appointed to head Hezbollah’s Iraq file in 2003 and has reported directly to its secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah,” said a source close to Hezbollah’s senior ranks.
In that role, the slender sheikh traveled frequently between Baghdad and Beirut to negotiate with Iraqi figures, particularly during politically turbulent times like government formation and elections. He was often in the Prime Minister’s Guesthouse, an ornate resort in Baghdad hosting officials and foreign dignitaries, in his traditional white turban and black robe. “In that role, he was like a copy of Soleimani,” a senior Iraqi official who met with him several times told AFP, referring to the Iranian general’s infamous shuttle diplomacy. Kawtharani fluently speaks Iraqi dialect, which differs markedly from Lebanese Arabic.
“He’s got a lot of experience and is the only foreigner, after Soleimani, to know the Iraqi political scene inside out,” another Hezbollah source said. Iraqi political expert Hisham al-Hashemi said Kawtharani wore multiple hats. “He’s the conductor in the Shiite loyalist orchestra,” said Hashemi, referring to the collection of Iraqi Shiite parties that see Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as their main reference. As such, he painstakingly builds consensus among Iraq’s varying Shiite political and armed factions — but he has also worked on bringing Iraq’s Sunnis on board with their traditional Shiite rivals.
A growing profile
Following the US strike that killed Soleimani and top Iraqi commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, Kawtharani saw his portfolio balloon further to include coordination with Kurdish parties. “He became responsible for all the political factions,” said Hashemi.
At the same time, he crafted ties between Iraq and Lebanon, where Hezbollah has strained under financial pressure from US sanctions. “Kawtharani held sway over Iraqi politicians — so much so that he asked for millions of dollars from Iraq last year to solve Lebanon’s financial crisis,” a diplomatic source told AFP. The request was made outside the formal state-to-state channels and it was unclear if it was ever processed. And while a second Iraqi official confirmed Kawtharani made the request, a source close to the sheikh in Beirut denied the overture. The US’s renewed spotlight on Kawtharani was worrying, another source close to him said. “Seeking information about him now may be an introduction to a possible attempt at his arrest, or his assassination,” the source said. When approached by AFP regarding Kawtharani, numerous Iraqi and Lebanese sources declined to comment on his activities, hinting at fears their information would be used by the US to target him.Given the backlash the US faced internationally following its assassination of Soleimani and Muhandis — both key officials in their respective countries — the US may target someone with a relatively lower profile.
“Assassinating the new Quds Force chief Ismail Qaani isn’t among Washington’s options right now. That’s why they turned to Kawtharani. He’s a party official but not a government one,” the source said.

Iran Shows Off Drones that Can Reach Israel, Threat Increases
Seth Frantzman/The Jerusalem Post/April 22/2020
Iranian Defense Minister Amir Hatami inspects the new drones.
Iran’s Defense Ministry unveiled a mass of new drones [unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs] over the weekend for the Islamic Republic’s army and air force. According to Tehran the drones have new capabilities, and can fly more than 1,000 km, which means they could reach Israel from Iran.
Iran has been producing drones since the 1980s and is an innovator in drone warfare. It used 25 drones and cruise missiles to attack Saudi Arabia last September, and has flown drones into Israeli airspace.
Iran’s Defense Minister Brig.-Gen. Amir Hatami showed off the drones on Saturday. He said that one jet-powered UAV could fly at speeds of 900 km per hour at an altitude of 12,000 meters. This would rival the best drones that the US and other countries are now using. These drones have a range of up to 1,500 km, he said, and can fly for several hours. It is a message to Israel, the US and their allies: We can reach you.
Iran says it has provided a “mass delivery” of the Ababil-3 and Karar drones to the air force. The country has a new drone unit that it established in recent years and its IRGC has been using drones to target various enemies, including ISIS. The Ababil-3, Hatami says, can fly 150 km, and the Karar is armed with various weapons that now give the drones “pinpoint” attack abilities. The implication is that these drones have guided bombs and can operate like cruise missiles.
The Ababil-3 is a redesign of earlier Iranian drones, with twin tails. It is likely based on a South African design which itself may have been borrowed from old Israeli designs, such as the Israeli Hunter or Mastiff. The Ababil-3 is supposed to be a medium-range reconnaissance drone, but Iran says it has “combat” potential and can carry other payloads as well. It has an electro-optical add-on that enables it to collect footage. Iran used this capability in September 2018 to target Kurdish dissidents in Iraq, filming its missile attacks with a drone.
Meanwhile, the Karar is designed to be a “strategic” drone that Iran says can be used as a kamikaze drone – basically like a cruise missile. Iran has successfully deployed these kinds of technologies to the Houthi rebels in Yemen, who have used them against Saudi Arabia in dozens of attacks.
The new drones allegedly have some sort of guided missile or smart bomb ordnance. It’s not clear if Iran has perfected the technology and ranges it ascribes to its drones, but attacks in Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia are evidence that Iran’s drone threat is increasing.
Iranian drones have been sent to Syria’s T-4 base. One of them flew into Israeli airspace in February 2018 and was shot down by a helicopter. Iranian-backed Hezbollah also deployed drones in the Golan in the fall of 2019. Israel carried out an airstrike in August 2019 to neutralize the Hezbollah drone team.
Iran has recently seen some of its shipments of drone parts stopped by the US Navy on the way to Yemen. These included gyroscopes and other technology that Tehran has used elsewhere in drone exports and drone warfare.
Iran exports drones to its “axis of resistance” proxies across the region.
The reason Iran is unveiling its drones now is linked to its annual army day. However, Iran also used army day to showcase efforts to fight the coronavirus. Iran has more than 5,000 dead from COVID-19, and the drone unveiling is therefore a way to show that Iran continues its technological advances despite US sanctions and the pandemic. Iranian IRGC fast boats harassed the US Navy last week in the Persian Gulf – and in the past, Iranian drones have flown over a US aircraft carrier and provoked American ships. The USS Boxer downed an Iranian drone last year.
Iran’s drones are its version of an air force. Since Iran does not have a very strong army, the drones are used to pose a strategic threat to enemies. Tehran uses the drones to threaten attacks on infrastructure in other states, and it exports them to what it calls the “axis of resistance,” its proxies across the region. Its goal is to upgrade the abilities of groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, groups which don’t have air forces and are ostensibly at the mercy of much more powerful adversaries when it comes to air power.
But the drone threat, in Iran’s view, can be a game changer, by posing a threat that is difficult to detect or stop. That was illustrated in the attack on Saudi Arabia, when Iranian drones penetrated both radar defenses and air defenses.
Since Iranian drones are generally not very fast moving and have no stealth abilities, they can be easily detected. Iran has attempted to get around that by using them like cruise missiles, or claiming it has new jet-powered advances. Since the Islamic Republic already has an advanced rocketry program for ballistic missiles, there is no doubt that it has the ability to build different systems. Until they are used, however, it is unclear what their real capabilities are. In Saudi Arabia, Iranian-designed drones have flown hundreds of kilometers, penetrating deep into the country’s interior.
Iran has continued to threaten Israel through shipments of precision guided munitions to Hezbollah. Its drone arm is one of many technologies it uses in these continuing efforts.
* Seth Frantzman, a Middle East Forum writing fellow, is the author of After ISIS: America, Iran and the Struggle for the Middle East (2019), op-ed editor of The Jerusalem Post, and founder of the Middle East Center for Reporting & Analysis.