English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For September 22/2026
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news

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Bible Quotations For today
If any want to become my followers, let them deny themselves and take up their cross and follow me
Mark 08/34-38/09,01: "Jesus called the crowd with his disciples, and said to them, ‘If any want to become my followers, let them deny themselves and take up their cross and follow me. For those who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake, and for the sake of the gospel, will save it. For what will it profit them to gain the whole world and forfeit their life? Indeed, what can they give in return for their life? Those who are ashamed of me and of my words in this adulterous and sinful generation, of them the Son of Man will also be ashamed when he comes in the glory of his Father with the holy angels.’And he said to them, ‘Truly I tell you, there are some standing here who will not taste death until they see that the kingdom of God has come with power.’"

Titles For The English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on September 21-22/2026
Faith Reflections on the Meanings and Concepts of Humility/Elias Bejjani/September 21, 2026
Elias Bejjani: Debunking Jean Aziz’s article on the American “Just Security” website affiliated with the Democrats.. Aziz, speaking for Joseph Aoun, markets a forgery of the Framework Agreement to cover Hezbollah’s occupation.. A reading of the original text versus the narrative of the Mullas’ palace advisor/Elias Bejjani/September 19, 2026
What’s Left of Hezbollah Two Years after the War?
Lebanon Needs International Force After Peacekeepers Leave, PM Tells UN Chief
Trump tells Aoun he admires his 'decisive leadership'
Bassil says Hezbollah 'continuing policy of destroying the country'
MP Fadlallah attacks presidency, asserts Hezbollah readiness amid regional shifts
Report: Qatar, Turkey leading efforts to resolve situation in south Lebanon
Will there be a government reshuffle?
Jumblat says he would back negotiations if they lead to Israel's withdrawal
Israeli strikes target Kfartebnit, Deir Seryan, Baraashit and Ali al-Taher
Tyre's ruins survived the strikes, now divers are finding their way back underwater
Salam, Qatari PM discuss regional tensions, energy cooperation and support for Lebanese Army
PM Salam meets US Senator Jeanne Shaheen, calls for continued support for Lebanese Army
Houla municipality condemns burning of Meiss El Jabal Governmental Hospital, calls on state, international community and UN to act
From fuel to food: Global energy crisis deepens cost pressures in Lebanon

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on September 21-22/2026
US Treasury Chief Says Iran Airlines to Be ‘Shut Down’ Sept 23
Iran's Guards Threaten to Hit New Targets if US Attacks
Iran Says Strait of Hormuz will Remain Closed Until its Conditions Are Met
Russian Document Reveals How Moscow Sought to Deepen Ties with Iran to Evade US Sanctions
Trump Administration Prepares Sanctions against International Criminal Court
Macron Says Talks with Trump on Red Sea, Ukraine ‘Constructive’
UK Joins Call for Limiting UN Security Council Vetoes
NYT says Trump reversed decision on airstrikes on Houthis
UKMTO: Tanker hit by debris from unidentified projectiles near Strait of Hormuz
Houthis say they won't attack US vessels in Red Sea, warn countries not to join Saudis
Trump, Yemen’s Alimi Discuss Bab al-Mandeb Developments
Iran's Guards Threaten to Hit New Targets if US Attacks
EU’s Kallas Says Red Sea Naval Mission Needs More Than 10 Ships
Washington Mobilizes Allies in the Arctic
CNN, MS Now, Politico Sue Donald Trump over White House Ban
Israeli Forces Raid Town of Suspected Palestinian Gunman
Gaza Health Officials Say Israeli Fire Kills Three, Including Child

Titles For The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on September 21-22/2026
Un faux-semblant d’État/Dr. Charles Chartouni/Ici Beyrouth/September 21/2026
A Sham State/Dr. Charles Chartouni/Ici Beyrouth/September 21/2026
How Hamas Controls the Story Coming Out of Gaza/Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/September 21, 2026
Has the United Nations Come to an End?/Samir Atallah/Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026
From New York to Bab al-Mandab/Ghassan Charbel/Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026 America Has Not Capitalized on Iran's Defeat/Sam Menassa/Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026
The Abraham Accords at Six: How a New Paradigm Outpaced the Old Peace/Hussain Abdul-Hussain/Middle East 24/September 20/2026
Yazidi armed group YBS to disarm, integrate into Iraqi security forces/Seth J. Frantzman/ FDD's Long War Journal/September 20/2026
Letting the Houthis Control the Red Sea Coast Would Be a Gift to Tehran/Bridget Toomey/FDD-Policy Brief//September 20/2026
Letting the Houthis Control the Red Sea Coast Would Be a Gift to Tehran/Bridget Toomey/FDD-Policy Brief/September 20/2026
Can anyone stop the Houthis? ..Yemen’s civil war is set to go global/Reuel Marc Gerecht/Unherd/September 20/2026
America has never been subservient to Israel/Ben Cohen/Jewish News Syndicate/September 20/2026
The Three Quiet Victors of the Iran War/Sinan Ciddi & Benjamin Acosta/The National Interest/September 20/2026
The War Inside the War/Jonathan Schanzer/Commentary/September 20/2026
Selected Face Book & X tweets on September 21/2026

Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on September 21-22/2026
Faith Reflections on the Meanings and Concepts of Humility
Elias Bejjani/September 21, 2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/09/157698/
Humility is not weakness, nor artificial brokenness, nor a garment we wear before people. Humility is truth. The truth that a person knows himself before God, before himself, and before his fellow human being. And the truly humble person is the one who knows that everything he has is a free gift, so he does not boast and become arrogant and tyrannical as if he had not received all that he has freely from his Creator.
For this reason, Saint Jacob of Serugh distinguishes between two kinds of humility, saying: "There is a humility that comes from the fear of God, and there is a humility that comes from God Himself. There is one who is humble because he fears God, and there is one who is humble because he knows joy.
He who is humble because he fears God finds sweetness in his body, balance of the senses, and a broken heart at all times. But he who is humble because he knows joy finds great relief and an open heart and joy, so nothing restrains him or weighs him down." The first humility is the beginning of the road, a holy fear of being lost. The second humility is the summit of the road, the joy of one who has realized that God loves him freely.
The Servant Returning from the Field
At the foundation of the moral theology of humility, the Lord Jesus lays down a golden rule that demolishes every philosophy of human arrogance. In the Gospel of Luke He says: "And which of you, having a servant plowing or tending sheep, will say to him when he has come in from the field, ‘Come at once and sit down to eat’? But will he not rather say to him, ‘Prepare something for my supper, and gird yourself and serve me till I have eaten and drunk, and afterward you will eat and drink’? Does he thank that servant because he did the things that were commanded him? I think not. So likewise you, when you have done all those things which you are commanded, say, ‘We are unprofitable servants. We have done what was our duty to do.’" (Luke 17:7-10).
This parable is shocking to the ethics of this world.
In the logic of the world, he who does his duty we lift up, applaud, thank, and we may even erect a statue for him. In the logic of the Gospel, he who does his duty has no special merit. Why? Because duty is not a favor. The servant who plowed and tended sheep and then prepared supper for his master and waited until he finished, and then went to eat himself, deserves no thanks because he did what he was supposed to do. So he said: I am a lowly servant, I have done my duty and that is enough. And herein lies the dangerous moral and social disease in our societies: We thank the official because he did not steal, and we thank the employee because he came to work, and we thank the ruler because he performed his most basic duties, and we thank the clergyman because he prayed, and we thank the father because he raised his children. And this is a wrong and value-destroying human behavior. When we thank someone for doing his duty, we turn duty into a favor, and right into a gift, and faithfulness into heroism. So we teach people that the norm is negligence, and that doing one's duty is an exception that deserves a reward. And this is the very essence of moral corruption.
The truly humble person does not wait for thanks because he completed his duty. Rather, he says in his heart: "We are unprofitable servants." Not out of self-contempt, but out of realization of the truth: that life itself, and health, and talent, and the opportunity to serve, are all free gifts from God, so how can I ask for a wage for what was given to me freely? And here comes the decisive saying of Christ: "Freely you have received, freely give." (Matthew 10:8). We received salvation freely, we received talents freely, we received gifts freely. So how can we sell what we received freely for the price of thanks, praise, and power?
The Arrogant and the Humble: Two Opposite Schools
The arrogant lives in a constant argument: Who is the greatest? And this is what the Lord revealed in Capernaum: "Then He and His disciples came to Capernaum; and when He was in the house He asked them, 'What was it you disputed among yourselves on the road?' But they kept silent, for on the road they had disputed among themselves who would be the greatest." (Mark 9:33-34).
This is the arrogant person; even the Apostles before the coming of the Holy Spirit upon them fell into it. He wants to sit at the right and at the left: "Grant us that we may sit, one on Your right hand and the other on Your left, in Your glory." (Mark 10:37).
The arrogant wants glory before the cup, the chair before the cross, thanks before work. He lives to be served, not to serve. And the Lord says about the arrogant rulers of the nations: "Those who are considered rulers over the Gentiles lord it over them, and their great ones exercise authority over them." (Mark 10:42).
To lord over and to exercise authority. This is the language of arrogance. As for the humble, his school is completely different — the school of the child: "So Jesus sat down, called the twelve, and said to them, 'If anyone desires to be first, he shall be last of all and servant of all.' Then He took a little child and set him in the midst of them." (Mark 9:35-36). "Let the little children come to Me, and do not forbid them; for of such is the kingdom of God. Assuredly, I say to you, whoever does not receive the kingdom of God as a little child will by no means enter it." (Luke 18:16-17).
The child does not argue about who is the greatest. The child does not ask for thanks because he breathed or ate or played. The child receives freely and gives freely with simplicity and joy. Therefore the Lord said: "Yet it shall not be so among you; but whoever desires to become great among you shall be your servant. And whoever of you desires to be first shall be slave of all. For even the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give His life a ransom for many." (Mark 10:43-45).
Practical Humility: Freely Give
The Lord instructs His twelve disciples when He sent them to preach the Bible: "Go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel... Heal the sick, cleanse the lepers, raise the dead, cast out demons. Freely you have received, freely give. Provide neither gold nor silver nor copper in your money belts." (Matthew 10:5-9).
This is the ethic of humility: Carry no gold. The humble does not trade with his service. Heal freely. Do not ask for thanks or reward because you did your human and evangelical duty.  Enter the house and greet it. And if they reject you, shake the dust off your feet and go on.
The humble does not impose himself, nor does he emotionally blackmail people to thank him. As for the arrogant, Saint Jude says about him: "There will be mockers in the last time who would walk according to their own ungodly lusts. These are sensual persons, who cause divisions, not having the Spirit." (Jude 1:18-19).
The arrogant causes division because he always seeks the first seat, the thanks, and the glory. The humble builds, as the Apostle says: "But you, beloved, building yourselves up on your most holy faith, praying in the Holy Spirit, keep yourselves in the love of God." (Jude 1:20-21).
Conclusion
Humility is not to say with your tongue "I am lowly" while your heart waits for people to tell you, "No, you are great." Humility is to do your duty in silence, like the servant returning from the field, preparing the food for your master, serving, then eating yourself in hiddenness, and saying in your heart with joy: I have done what I had to do. And that is enough.
When we stop thanking people because they did their duty, we restore to duty its sacredness. And when we ourselves stop waiting for thanks because we did our duty, we become free.
So do not ask for thanks if you are a good father, for that is your duty.
And do not ask for thanks if you are a watchful mother, for that is your duty.
And do not ask for thanks if you are a faithful employee or an honest official, for that is your duty.
Say with the Lord: I am an unprofitable servant, I have done what was my duty to do.
And live with the joy of one who knows that everything he received freely, he gives freely.
**The author, Elias Bejjani, is a Lebanese expatriate activist
Author’s Email: Phoenicia@hotmail.com

Elias Bejjani: Debunking Jean Aziz’s article on the American “Just Security” website affiliated with the Democrats.. Aziz, speaking for Joseph Aoun, markets a forgery of the Framework Agreement to cover Hezbollah’s occupation.. A reading of the original text versus the narrative of the Mullas’ palace advisor
Elias Bejjani/September 19, 2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/09/157644/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aueSVQk9oUQ
Aziz does not analyze the Framework Agreement; he rewrites it to serve the narrative of the continuation of Hezbollah’s occupation, and turns the terms of the agreement upside down. Below is a clause-by-clause exposure of the manipulation:
1- The lie of the pilot zones and the Israeli withdrawal
What does the agreement actually say? Articles 2 and 3 are the heart of the agreement: “Commit to a reciprocal and graduated path, according to a clear sequence and specific conditions, under which the Lebanese Armed Forces will extend the effective authority of the state over all Lebanese territory, after verification of the disarmament of non-state armed groups and the dismantling of their infrastructure, which would allow the Israel Defense Forces to gradually redeploy outside Lebanese territory.”
“The Lebanese Armed Forces shall gradually assume full and effective security responsibility in pilot zones, which constitute the mechanism through which the phased and verified redeployment of Israeli forces will be implemented, in parallel with the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces… and upon verification of the successful disarmament of non-state armed groups and the dismantling of their infrastructure in these areas, the Lebanese Armed Forces shall assume responsibility…” The logic is clear and strict: no withdrawal except after complete cleansing and its verification. The Lebanese Army does not deploy into a vacuum, but must prove that it has disarmed Hezbollah and dismantled its tunnels and depots. Only then does Israel withdraw, and reconstruction and the return of civilians begin.
What does Jean Aziz write?
He turns the verse completely upside down and says: “Israel demands that the Lebanese Army prove effective control over areas already handed over… while the Lebanese position is that the Army cannot fully deploy in territories still occupied by Israeli forces.” This is blatant forgery. The agreement never said that the army deploys first in occupied land. It said the opposite: the army disarms in its own area that it already controls, under American supervision, then the United States verifies the cleansing, then Israel withdraws. Aziz turns the clear security condition into a “trap” and a “contradiction that threatens political logic,” to justify the failure of the Lebanese state to disarm. More dangerously, he deliberately ignores the phrase “after its complete cleansing of Hezbollah” which is the essence of Article 3. He wants a free, unconditional Israeli withdrawal, so that Hezbollah returns to the same points in army uniform.
2- The lie of the monopoly of arms – from an irreversible commitment to a social welfare program
The agreement – Articles 4, 6 and 9: “The Government of the Lebanese Republic reaffirms its firm and irreversible commitment to restore and exercise its full sovereignty… re-establishing the state’s monopoly on the use of force, achieving full and verified disarmament of all non-state armed groups, and ensuring that these groups do not assume any military or security role, and do not possess any armed capabilities anywhere on Lebanese territory.” “The Government of the Lebanese Republic alone possesses the exclusive sovereign authority to make decisions of war and peace… any claim by any state or non-governmental entity to exercise a military or security role is considered illegal” “Implementation of a strict performance-based program… any new American aid will be strictly conditional on achieving specific and verifiable stages”…. This is not disarmament in the south only, but in all of Lebanon, and forever.
What does Aziz write?
He turns this sovereign commitment into a DDR process – disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the Lebanese-militia style. He says: “The Lebanese state cannot ask communities to support disarmament while Israeli forces are still present… A fighter who leaves an armed organization needs a reliable civilian future… Communities that relied on institutions linked to Hezbollah need services…”
Here is the biggest manipulation: The agreement considers Hezbollah an illegal militia that must be dismantled legally and militarily. Aziz considers it an oppressed community that needs political, social, economic and employment guarantees. He does not demand disarmament, but a price for disarmament, and links it to reconstruction which Article 11 explicitly prevents from reaching Hezbollah.
3- The lie of America’s role – from guarantor of verification to unconditional funder
The agreement makes America the verification policeman, not a naive funder. Articles 9, 10 and 11 are clear: not one dollar before verification, and preventing reconstruction funds from reaching Hezbollah.
Aziz demands the exact opposite: “Trump’s pledge should now turn… into sustainable military assistance, training and institutional support commensurate with the scale of what is asked of the army… Israel should not be allowed to turn withdrawal into a deferred reward… Washington helped draft the agreement… and its role cannot end with the signing of the framework.” He wants America to pressure Israel to withdraw first, and to finance the army, municipalities and reconstruction immediately, while Hezbollah’s weapons remain. This is a literal opposite of the text of the agreement which says aid is conditional on results.
4- The lie justifying Hezbollah’s weapons
Article 5 says: “The Government of the State of Israel affirms that its military operations in Lebanon came exclusively as a result of attacks, threats and hostile intentions emanating from non-state armed groups, especially Hezbollah… The Government of Israel declares that it harbors no territorial ambitions or claims in Lebanon.” Aziz revives Hezbollah’s narrative literally: “For a long time, Hezbollah has justified its possession of an arsenal… with the argument that the state is incapable of protecting Lebanese territory… If the Lebanese state wants to replace the logic of armed resistance, it must prove that state institutions are capable of achieving security results…”
Aziz legitimizes the pretext for weapons instead of refuting it, and makes the Israeli withdrawal a condition for convincing the Shiite environment, while the agreement says the opposite: disarming Hezbollah is a condition for removing the need for any Israeli presence.
Conclusion
Jean Aziz’s article is not an analysis, but a defense memo for the jihadist, terrorist, Iranian and criminal Hezbollah written by the advisor to President Joseph Aoun, and on an American website affiliated with the Democrats to pass a message to Washington – President Trump’s adminstration- that says: Do not pressure us to disarm, pressure Israel to withdraw. The tripartite agreement signed by Lebanon says: complete disarmament, in all of Lebanon, irreversible, verified by America, then gradual Israeli withdrawal, then reconstruction without Hezbollah. Aziz’s-which is Aoun -Berri- Hezbollah narrative says: complete and immediate Israeli withdrawal, then generous unconditional American support, then perhaps we will think about a functional dismantling of Hezbollah’s weapons with social and political guarantees.
This is forgery itself. And it explains why the Rome negotiations on the pilot zones faltered: because the official Lebanese side, on the advice of Aziz and his ilk, is trying to sell Washington an agreement it did not sign, and hide an agreement it did sign.
The mask of president Joseph Aoun has fallen, revealing his true Iranized and mullah-ized nature. He is merely a “scarecrow and a figurehead” in Baabda Palace, implementing the decrees of Hezbollah, Berri, and Iran, who imposed on him a government of advisors — such as the acrobat Jean Aziz — over whom he has no authority and who are completely subordinate to Hezbollah, Berri and, of course, to their Persian mullah masters.
What is required: the resignation or dismissal of Joseph Aoun, nothing more and nothing less.
**The author, Elias Bejjani, is a Lebanese expatriate activist
Author’s Email: Phoenicia@hotmail.com

What’s Left of Hezbollah Two Years after the War?
Asharq Al Awsat/September 22/2026
The expanded war in Lebanon, which erupted with widespread Israeli bombardment on September 23, 2024, and led to intense clashes and battlefield shifts, has forced a new reality on Hezbollah. The Iran-backed group's military capabilities, supply lines, and political influence have significantly declined following severe losses within its senior leadership ranks. Furthermore, Hezbollah's deployment on the ground and operations have fundamentally changed compared to its pre-war positioning. Two years later, the group is navigating a far more complex military landscape. While the loss of a vast portion of its leadership, declining drone and missile capabilities, and shrinking supply lines through Syria have severely weakened its position, the party still retains enough military capacity to continue operating. It is actively attempting to reorganize its ranks and adapt to an altered battlefield reality - one that stretches from north of the Litani River into broader territory across southern Lebanon and the Western Bekaa. Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, security and defense expert Riad Kahwaji estimated that Hezbollah's capabilities have significantly declined between 2024 and today across its leadership, military structure, political influence, and supply lines, evaluating the scale of this drop to have "exceeded nearly half." He explained that the group has lost the vast majority of its first- and second-tier leaders, while most of the leaders present today were classified within the third tier in 2024. The nature of management within the group has also changed, as "management in 2024 was local under Iranian guidance, whereas today management and guidance have become directly Iranian," he added.On the military level, Kahwaji said that "the party's forces have become stationed north of the Litani, after having previously been present directly on the border.""Nabatieh has practically become the separation line of contact between the group's presence and the Israeli forces," he noted. Regarding the military arsenal, he said that "missile and drone capabilities still exist, but they have become less than half of what they were before."He added that Hezbollah's political influence within Lebanon has significantly weakened from its previous levels, noting that one of the most prominent shifts affecting the group is the severe disruption of its supply lines through Syria, which have now been largely cut off. Since the November 2024 ceasefire up to the current stage, retired Brigadier General Dr. Khalil Helou told Asharq Al-Awsat that the party’s "capabilities have dropped compared to what they were before the war, but it has not lost its military capacity and still possesses capabilities that allow it to continue."Its limited responses to Israel during the current stage may be a sign that it has entered a new "phase of reorganization and rebuilding of combat readiness," he added. Helou explained that the period following the November 2024 ceasefire was marked by ongoing Israeli assassinations targeting Hezbollah operatives, while the group largely refrained from retaliating. This pattern underscores a significant drop in Hezbollah's capabilities compared to its pre-2024 strength, while simultaneously indicating that the group has been undergoing a phase of reorganization, rearmament, and rebuilding of its combat readiness, he noted. Helou stressed that the strategic landscape shifted following the outbreak of the US war on Iran at the end of February, which Hezbollah joined in early March."From that point until the second ceasefire on June 17, the party engaged in the fighting, launching effective retaliatory operations in certain areas and firing missiles into both the Israeli interior and Israeli-occupied territories," Helou said. He remarked that during that phase, Israel "advanced, made incursions, and established its presence on the ground," while Hezbollah continued to carry out military responses, though the situation following the latest ceasefire has returned to a pattern similar to the period that followed November 2024.
"Today, we have virtually returned to the previous phase, as Hezbollah's responses to Israeli attacks have become almost nonexistent," he stated. "If we review operations over the past two and a half months since the ceasefire, the military operations carried out by the group against Israel are highly limited and can be counted on two hands. This stands in sharp contrast to dozens of daily Israeli operations, including airstrikes, shelling, and assassinations."

Lebanon Needs International Force After Peacekeepers Leave, PM Tells UN Chief
Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026
Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam told United Nations chief Antonio Guterres on Monday that Lebanon needed a UN-sponsored international force to stay in the country's south after the current UN peacekeeping mandate expires.The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which currently counts around 7,500 peacekeepers from 46 countries, has acted as a buffer between Lebanon and Israel since 1978.But under US pressure, the UN Security Council voted last year to halt the force's mandate at the end of this year. Meeting Guterres at the UN headquarters in New York, Salam "stressed the importance of maintaining an international presence under the umbrella of the United Nations in the south in the post-UNIFIL phase", according to a statement from the premier's office. This should be in a way that "ensures the continuation of the functions of monitoring, reporting and liaison, contributes to preserving stability, and supports the process of extending the Lebanese state's authority over all its territory", Salam added, according to the statement.UNIFIL's looming departure comes as Israel maintains troops in a self-declared "security zone" occupying around 10 kilometers (six miles) deep inside south Lebanon along the border. Israel launched heavy airstrikes and a ground invasion after Hezbollah drew Lebanon into the Middle East war in March by attacking Israel in support of the group's backer Iran. Last week, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun told AFP that Lebanon wanted a new force, European or otherwise, to prevent a security vacuum after the peacekeepers depart, but that "the best and most optimal option remains extending UNIFIL's mandate". The creation of a new force to succeed UNIFIL was also on the agenda of a meeting last week in Paris between Aoun, French President Emmanuel Macron and King Abdullah II of Jordan. France and Italy have said they want to set up a multinational coalition to succeed UNIFIL. In a June report, Guterres said peacekeepers would be needed after UNIFIL's mission expires. Salam also told Guterres that around 329,000 people are still displaced in Lebanon since the latest conflict erupted, urging support for the humanitarian response.

Trump tells Aoun he admires his 'decisive leadership'
Naharnet/September 21/2026
U.S. President Donald Trump has said that it was an “honor” to him to welcome President Joseph Aoun to the White House for a “truly historic visit,” the Lebanese presidency said on Monday, citing a letter sent by Trump. Aoun had visit the White House on July 21.
“At a time when the Middle East is witnessing conflict, I admire your decisive leadership on behalf of Lebanon and its people," Trump told Aoun in the letter, according to an Arabic-language text published by the Lebanese Presidency. Trump also thanked Aoun for awarding him the National Order of the Cedar (Grand Cordon), stating: "This gesture is an extraordinary honor that embodies the proud Lebanese spirit; I will cherish it as a symbol of our shared commitment to peace, security, and prosperity around the world."

Bassil says Hezbollah 'continuing policy of destroying the country'
Naharnet/September 21/2026
Free Patriotic Movement chief Gebran Bassil has said that he distinguishes between the FPM’s position, Hezbollah's position, and the government's position regarding the talks with Israel. “We do not refuse negotiation, but we want something in return. They (ruling authorities) depicted to the Lebanese that there is a major achievement, but what has actually been achieved is the destruction of the country rather than (Israeli) withdrawal,” Bassil said in an interview on Al-Jadeed TV, referring to the framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel. Hezbollah meanwhile “bears a greater responsibility than the Lebanese state because, despite being powerless, it continues its policy of destroying the country and altering Lebanon's demographic composition and fabric," Bassil charged."I hold Hezbollah responsible because it does not know how to exit this crisis while being part of the government," Bassil added. He asked: "How can you consider yourself victorious if your entire country is defeated? Doesn't Hezbollah have a responsibility to initiate establishing a defense strategy within the government? We are not telling Hezbollah to surrender, but we are telling them: find alternatives so that the Lebanese people feel that you sympathize with them."

MP Fadlallah attacks presidency, asserts Hezbollah readiness amid regional shifts
Naharnet/September 21/2026
Hezbollah lawmaker Hassan Fadlallah questioned the President’s ability to succeed after creating what he termed a "deep rift" with a significant segment of the Lebanese public. Fadlallah accused President Joseph Aoun of breaking core commitments he made to Hezbollah before his election.Fadlallah said Hezbollah does not oppose diplomacy per se, but it does not accept compromise on Lebanon’s sovereignty. "Who said we do not want diplomacy?" he asked. "We want diplomacy, but we want it based on rights, national consensus, and strength."Fadlallah claimed that Hezbollah maintains full operational capabilities to target Israeli troop deployments across Lebanon. He said forces on the ground are actively fortifying their positions and preparing for confrontation."The Resistance today is firm, it is regaining its strength, and actively preparing to confront the enemy," Fadlallah said, expressing confidence in the broader geopolitical environment. "Our regional standing is very comfortable, and Lebanon will be influenced by these new equations."

Report: Qatar, Turkey leading efforts to resolve situation in south Lebanon
Naharnet/September 21/2026
Qatar and Turkey are spearheading secret contacts and efforts to resolve the situation in south Lebanon and subsequently address Hezbollah’s status, the Nidaa al-Watan newspaper reported on Monday. “Indications suggest that each side is acting independently, with no unified initiative in place. The initial phase of these contacts focuses on de-escalating tensions in the south, with the aim -- should these efforts succeed -- of moving on to discuss the future of Hezbollah’s arsenal,” the daily said. Furthermore, Nidaa al-Watan said there is a proposal led by several nations -- foremost among them France and Germany -- to extend the mandate of UNIFIL by six months.“This move seeks to explore the trajectory of developments in Lebanon, Iran, and the wider region, while averting any security vacuum. The proposal is currently awaiting the respective positions of the United States and Israel,” the newspaper added.

Will there be a government reshuffle?
Naharnet/September 21/2026
There is no intention to “make changes within the government,” though both the Presidency and the Premiership have “reservations regarding the performance of certain ministers,” sources told MTV on Monday. “Nawaf Salam is dissatisfied with the performance of Minister of Education Rima Karami, while Joseph Aoun is dissatisfied with the performance of certain ministers affiliated with him,” the sources said. Lebanese Forces sources meanwhile told MTV that dismissing Energy Minister Joe Saddi is not currently on the table, while noting that “resignation, or the threat thereof, is being considered," in connection with the electricity crisis.“We will not allow it to be said later that the Lebanese Forces or its minister failed to deliver results; the aim is to hold everyone accountable for their responsibilities,” the sources said.MTV meanwhile reported that a general strike across all sectors is likely to be announced early next week due to the deteriorating socio-economic conditions.

Jumblat says he would back negotiations if they lead to Israel's withdrawal
Naharnet/September 21/2026
Former Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblat said Monday he would support the ongoing diplomatic efforts and the framework agreement if and only if they lead to an Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon. Jumblat told reporters after he met with President Joseph Aoun in Baabda that he would back Lebanon's negotiations with Israel "if they lead to a gradual or complete withdrawal" and a border demarcation. The Druze leader reiterated his support for the 1949 Armistice agreement that formally ended the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. He said that he would have "no problem" if the current negotiations lead to a withdrawal and border demarcation, while criticizing spats between Hezbollah and anti-Hezbollah MPs over the Israeli war and the framework agreement in the last parliamentary session as "shameful." In that session, Parliament granted Prime Minister Nawaf Salam's government a vote of confidence despite several objections to the government's general policy. Hezbollah MPs walked out before the vote, while Amal Movement lawmakers voted in favor.

Israeli strikes target Kfartebnit, Deir Seryan, Baraashit and Ali al-Taher
Naharnet/September 21/2026
The Israeli army struck overnight into Monday Kfartebnit, Deir Seryan, Baraashit, Ali al-Taher and Wadi Zebqine while artillery shelled al-Mansouri, Nabatieh al-Fawqa, Zawtar al-Sharqiyeh, Beit Leef, Wadi Slouqi, Touline, Hadatha, Baraashit, Majdalzoun, Kounine and Mayfadoun. Israeli forces carried out massive detonations in Baraashit and Ainata, dropped flare bombs on Zawtar al-Sharqiyeh, Markaba, Houla, and Hadatha, and opened heavy machine-gun fire towards the towns of Sarbine and Haddatha, as well as the outskirts of Mays al-Jabal, Wadi Slouqi, and Wadi Zebqine.

Tyre's ruins survived the strikes, now divers are finding their way back underwater
Associated Press/September 21/2026
Beneath the Mediterranean waters off the southern Lebanese city of Tyre, divers swim past stone walls, ancient structures and a submerged road — remnants of parts of a city that once stood above the water. With a shaky ceasefire in place after the latest Israel-Hezbollah war, visitors are returning to Tyre, a city known for its Roman ruins and its much older Phoenician history. Diving operators say interest in the underwater archaeological sites is increasing, though the number of visitors remains below prewar levels. "The diving season is not like it used to be before, but the number of people coming to dive to see the ruins is increasing day by day," said Yousef al-Jundi, manager of the Lebanon Diving Center. The remains underwater are part of Tyre's wider archaeological landscape. UNESCO says substantial archaeological remains of the ancient city are submerged, while underwater archaeological research has documented walls, harbor structures and other remains along the former island and coastline. "This is the identity of this city, which tells us how old this city is and what its history is," al-Jundi said. He said the underwater sites attract divers from around the world who want to see what is commonly described as Tyre's "sunken city." Tyre was one of the major Phoenician maritime cities of antiquity, with trading networks that extended across the Mediterranean. The city was also famous for its purple dye and later became an important Greek and Roman center. Its archaeological remains were added to UNESCO's World Heritage List in 1984.The war raised concerns over the preservation of those remains, both on land and underwater. "We were worried about the archaeological sites on land, which were affected by the war and the strikes, but at the same time we were also worried about the archaeological sites underwater, but thank God they were not affected," al-Jundi said. Before the ceasefire in late June, Tyre came under intense Israeli airstrikes, with neighborhoods in the coastal city heavily damaged during the fighting. UNESCO's World Heritage Committee placed Tyre on its List of World Heritage in Danger in July 2026, citing the threat and damage caused by the ongoing hostilities. Ali Badawi of Lebanon's Directorate General of Antiquities said protecting the underwater sites remains a challenge. "They're not very well protected," Badawi said, adding that "encroachments" sometimes happen. "But we are trying very hard through surveys and research that we're conducting, and we're trying to develop laws to ensure their safety in the future."Badawi said the authorities also want to expand research and investment in underwater tourism, including the creation of underwater archaeological parks that would allow more visitors to see the sites. The effort comes as Tyre seeks to rebuild its tourism sector after the war, while preserving archaeological remains that reflect thousands of years of the city's history.

Salam, Qatari PM discuss regional tensions, energy cooperation and support for Lebanese Army
LBCI/September 21/2026
Prime Minister Nawaf Salam met Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani to discuss the latest regional developments and bilateral relations. The two sides stressed the need to step up efforts to de-escalate tensions, preserve security and stability in the Gulf and the wider region, and prevent further confrontation.Salam thanked Qatar for its continued support for Lebanon. Talks also focused on expanding cooperation in the energy and electricity sectors to help ease economic pressures on Lebanese citizens, as well as supporting the Lebanese Army and strengthening its capabilities. The two sides also discussed ways to boost economic and investment ties and support Lebanon’s recovery and reconstruction efforts.

PM Salam meets US Senator Jeanne Shaheen, calls for continued support for Lebanese Army
LBCI/September 21/2026
Prime Minister Nawaf Salam met U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen, a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at Lebanon’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York, in the presence of Lebanon’s ambassador to the United States, Nada Hamadeh Moawad. The meeting focused on the latest developments in Lebanon and the region, as well as Lebanese-U.S. relations. Salam praised Shaheen’s support for Lebanon, particularly her continued backing of the Lebanese Army. He reaffirmed the government’s commitment to extending state authority, ensuring weapons remain exclusively under state control and pursuing reforms. Salam also stressed the importance of continued U.S. support for the Lebanese Army, strengthening its capabilities and mobilizing assistance for Lebanon’s recovery and reconstruction.He also warned against a potential security vacuum following the end of the UNIFIL mission, stressing Lebanon’s need for a continued international presence in the south. Shaheen, for her part, stressed the importance of Lebanon continuing efforts to bring weapons under exclusive state control. She also called on Parliament to pass the financial gap law and move forward with reforms needed to reach an agreement with the International Monetary Fund.

Houla municipality condemns burning of Meiss El Jabal Governmental Hospital, calls on state, international community and UN to act
LBCI/September 21/2026
The municipality of Houla condemned what it described as the “systematic and brutal destruction” carried out by Israeli forces in frontline villages, including the destruction of Houla Public School and the town’s social care center. The municipality also cited the recent burning of Meiss El Jabal Governmental Hospital, describing the attacks as a serious violation of public institutions and their humanitarian and educational roles, particularly in an area already affected by war, destruction and displacement. It called on the Lebanese state, the international community, the United Nations and local and international human rights and humanitarian organizations to address the attacks.

From fuel to food: Global energy crisis deepens cost pressures in Lebanon
LBCI/September 21/2026
Lebanese households are facing another surge in living costs as the war in the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz drive up global energy prices, adding pressure to already strained incomes. Unlike Lebanon’s 2019 economic crisis, the latest price shock is global. But Lebanese citizens are entering it after years of financial hardship, with salaries struggling to keep pace with rising expenses. According to World Bank estimates, energy prices are expected to rise by about 24% this year, while overall commodity prices are projected to increase by around 16%. Global inflation is also expected to climb from 3.3% last year to about 4% this year.Higher energy prices have a direct impact on everyday expenses in Lebanon. Rising diesel prices increase private generator bills, while higher gasoline prices push up transportation costs. More expensive energy and transportation also raise operating costs for businesses, schools, factories and retailers, with much of the burden ultimately falling on consumers. With the crisis expected to persist, households are being forced to reassess their spending, prioritize essential expenses and reduce energy consumption where possible.
But the burden does not fall on citizens alone. Other countries have introduced measures to cushion the impact of rising costs. France has provided cash assistance to low-income households and extended support to affected sectors, while Singapore has approved financial aid and fuel vouchers for transportation workers. Greece has supported affected businesses and helped cover fuel and heating costs. Germany has reduced taxes on gasoline and diesel, while Spain has cut electricity taxes and provided fuel support to specific sectors.
Lebanon may not be able to shield citizens entirely from a global crisis, but measures to ease the financial burden, identify alternatives and limit the impact of rising prices could offer some relief to households already struggling with years of economic hardship.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on September 21-22/2026
US Treasury Chief Says Iran Airlines to Be ‘Shut Down’ Sept 23
Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent warned Monday that Iranian airlines will have trouble functioning globally in two days under the weight of American sanctions, as the Trump administration intensifies pressure on Tehran.On September 23 "all the Iranian airlines will be shut down around the world," Bessent told CNBC in an interview as the war launched by the United States and Israel nears the seven-month mark. "If they land, you cannot provide them with fuel, you cannot provide them with landing services, you cannot sell them tickets or you will be knocked out of the dollar system," he added. The move follows earlier US sanctions on Iran's aviation industry and Bessent's "economic D-Day" threat on Iran and pledge to choke off Tehran financially. Two Iraqi sources told AFP on Monday that Baghdad would suspend flights by Iranian airlines following the US Treasury's announcement.Also Monday, Georgia barred Iranian carriers from its land, while Iranian airline Mahan said it suspended service to Türkiye at the request of the Turkish government. The United States and Iran have been at war since late February, when US-Israeli strikes killed Iran’s supreme leader and senior military officials at the start of a broad offensive.Tehran countered by blocking the Strait of Hormuz, a vital waterway for energy transit, causing global oil prices to surge as the conflict spread in the Middle East. Earlier this month, the United States said it imposed sanctions on "all remaining Iranian airlines" that had yet to face such penalties. The Treasury Department also took aim at targets for supporting Iran's aviation sector, including firms based outside Iran. Iran's air space was completely shut after the US-Israel alliance launched attacks in late February. Since then, some travel has resumed but only for flights run by Iranian carriers.
Bessent's comments came a day after he met with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng for economic talks laying the groundwork for President Donald Trump's summit this Thursday with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. China is one of Iran's top economic partners and diplomatic backers. Iran's aviation sector has long grappled with sanctions, which have restricted its ability to acquire aircraft, spare parts and maintenance services.

Iran's Guards Threaten to Hit New Targets if US Attacks
Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026
Iran's Revolutionary Guards on Monday warned they would attack new targets and deploy new weapons if the US launches further attacks on the country. Almost seven months into their war, Tehran and Washington remain locked in a stalemate, though neither side appears willing to return to full-scale war, said AFP. In a statement, a spokesman for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, the ideological arm of Iran's military, said "there will certainly be significant changes in our defense and our counteroffensive" in the event of a new US attack. "We will introduce new weapons with new capabilities into the battlefield, and the world will be surprised," he said. "Our targets will not necessarily be the same as before either. We have new targets that have not yet been attacked."The Guards also said they were prepared for a "prolonged war". On Saturday, the central command of Iran's military said the US was planning new action against Tehran, according to state television, but it did not elaborate. Fighting between the US and Iran has eased in recent days after a flare-up at the end of last month, though Tehran continues sporadic attacks on commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz.Both sides are maintaining rival blockades in the waterway in an effort to exert pressure.

Iran Says Strait of Hormuz will Remain Closed Until its Conditions Are Met
Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026
Iran will not ​reopen the Strait of Hormuz until its conditions are ‌met ‌and ​US ‌commitments are ⁠implemented, ​parliament speaker ⁠Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said on Sunday according to ⁠the semi-official ‌Fars ‌news ​agency. Iran ‌must ‌both fight and negotiate, Ghalibaf said, ‌adding that Tehran would use military ⁠force ⁠to push back its enemies and diplomacy to consolidate battlefield gains when ​the ​time is right. His comments came as US President Donald Trump cut short a weekend at Camp David to return unexpectedly to the White House on Saturday.
There was no explanation from the administration why Trump was no longer returning on Sunday from Camp David, a secluded presidential complex in rural Maryland, as had been previously announced.

Russian Document Reveals How Moscow Sought to Deepen Ties with Iran to Evade US Sanctions
Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026
An official Russian document obtained and reviewed by Fox News reveals how Moscow sought to deepen its relationship with Iran to bypass US sanctions, laying out plans for alternative financial channels, nuclear cooperation, Iranian production of Russian aircraft components, well as open new financial avenues. The 44-page Russian-language document was approved on the Russian side on Sept. 2, 2024. It indicated that Russia had drawn up a comprehensive plan for the period 2024-2026, which included the creation of alternative financial channels, the use of national currencies in transactions, strengthening nuclear cooperation, projects in the oil and gas sectors, the production of spare parts for Russian aircraft in Iran, and the continuation of the operation of the Bushehr nuclear power plant by Rosatom. The roadmap also calls for Russia to help establish production in Iran of individual parts and assemblies for Russian aircraft. Russian authorities were instructed to determine which aircraft parts could be repaired or manufactured in Iran, identify Iranian companies capable of producing them, certify selected sites through Russia’s aviation regulator Rosaviatsiya and conclude a localization agreement, according to Fox News.
The document also proposed building a railway line from the Iranian border with Azerbaijan to ports on the Arabian Gulf. However, it remains unclear which of these projects are still being implemented, given the changes brought about by the current war. Russia has maintained close ties with Iran for years, but those relations have intensified since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. US reports say Iran has provided drone support to Russia, but Tehran has categorically denied them. This cooperation was further strengthened as the US exerted pressure on Iran through economic sanctions, amid reports that Moscow had offered Tehran assistance in the production of cruise missiles. Keti Korkiya, a research analyst with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Russia program, reviewed the document for Fox News Digital and said its significance lies less in any single project than in the architecture Moscow was trying to build around the relationship.“The roadmap is not revelatory: people paying close attention to the relationship between Russia and Iran will see many collaborations between the two countries that have been public for years,” Korkiya said in written analysis provided to Fox News Digital. “What is more revealing is the architecture of the relationship Moscow is trying to build,” she said, pointing to financial mechanisms, transportation routes, energy investment and aviation cooperation as different ways of reducing vulnerabilities created by sanctions and Western economic pressure.

Trump Administration Prepares Sanctions against International Criminal Court
Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026
President Donald Trump's administration has prepared sanctions against the entire International Criminal Court and plans to announce them soon, two sources familiar with the matter said, a move that would step up its attack on the global tribunal that prosecutes war crimes and genocide worldwide. The Trump administration has made no secret of its disdain for the court and has worked to undermine it. US officials want the ‌court to drop ‌its arrest warrants against Israeli leaders as well as ‌a ⁠past probe into American ⁠troops in Afghanistan, Reuters said.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in July announced a campaign to isolate the court, calling on other countries to withdraw from the tribunal. Washington has imposed sanctions on a number of ICC judges and prosecutors but has so far held off from imposing sanctions on the court itself, although the move has long been considered as one of the options.The State Department did not immediately respond to a request ⁠for comment. Sanctions against the court have been prepared, the sources said, ‌even though the exact timing of an ‌announcement remained unclear. The Wall Street Journal cited officials who said the decision could be finalized ‌as soon as this week during the United Nations General Assembly meeting. Targeting the ‌entire organization directly, as well as entities that cooperate with it, could severely undermine the court's work. Any entity-wide sanctions imposed by the US Treasury would prohibit US citizens and companies from providing funds, goods, or services to the court without a license from the US Treasury's Office ‌of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Banks often over-comply with such US sanctions because they depend on access to the American financial system. Among ⁠the court's operations ⁠that could be affected by sanctions against the entire organization are the purchasing of IT services and insurance, the hiring of investigators and conducting everyday financial transactions, such as paying dozens of American employees, the ICC's registrar and president have warned.
Trump's opposition to the court goes back to his first term. It surfaced again with a plan to penalize ICC officials, an idea developed in November 2024 when Trump was reelected and the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Netanyahu for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Gaza conflict. The ICC was established in 2002 by the international community to prosecute war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. It asserts jurisdiction only if a member state is unable or unwilling to prosecute atrocities itself. The United States has never been a member.

Macron Says Talks with Trump on Red Sea, Ukraine ‘Constructive’
Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026
French President Emmanuel Macron said on Monday he had positive talks with his US counterpart Donald Trump on the conflicts in Ukraine and in the Red Sea. "The other issue we talked about was the situation in the Red Sea... It's important for global prices. Then we had a long discussion about Ukraine and Russia," said Macron after their New York meeting. "We had a very good discussion. It was very constructive." Going into the high-stakes meeting ahead of the United Nations' high-level week, a French official briefed that Macron was prepared to face Trump with "total candor."
On Ukraine, Macron said he has pressed Trump on the issue of supplying defensive weapons systems to Ukraine. They discussed "the need to help our Ukrainian friends faster and more strongly in terms of (missile) interceptors, because that is... a defensive measure," Macron said.
The French president said Trump was "very amenable and we were able to go into detail on these two conflicts, which are obviously important for peace in the world and for our security." The Red Sea has become a key oil shipping route with the Strait of Hormuz blocked, but the takeover of the Strait of Bab al-Mandab by the Iran-backed Houthi militants has complicated shipping operations there. The European Union's naval mission in the Red Sea would need more than 10 warships, its foreign policy chief said on Monday, adding ‌that for ‌now there weren’t ‌that ⁠many in the ⁠area. "When Aspides (the EU military operation) was put in place, then the indication was that ⁠it needs at ‌least ‌10 ships. The situation, ‌I think, is ‌even more grave right now," she told reporters on the sidelines ‌of the annual gathering of world leaders ⁠at ⁠the United Nations. Kallas last week sent a letter to member states asking them to contribute more naval and air assets in the region, diplomats said. Macron traveled to New York from Saint Pierre and Miquelon, a small French territory off Canada's Atlantic coast, where he met with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. Carney has been embroiled in a war of words with Trump over a failed effort between the US and Canada to strike a trade deal, resulting in tit-for-tat tariffs. The French president also plans to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly.

UK Joins Call for Limiting UN Security Council Vetoes
Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026
The United Kingdom has signed on to an initiative urging UN Security Council permanent members to withhold their vetoes on matters concerning mass atrocities, such as genocide, countries leading the push said Monday. The initiative, first proposed by Mexico and France in 2015, now has a total of 128 countries behind it, French foreign minister Jean-Noel Barrot and Mexican counterpart Roberto Velasco said in a joint statement.It is now just one country shy of reaching a two-thirds threshold of UN member states. The Security Council has been paralyzed on many issues in recent years amid deep divisions between the five veto-wielding permanent members: France, UK, Russia, China, and the United States. "By supporting this political declaration, states are demonstrating their commitment to ensuring that the Security Council can fully exercise its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security," said Barrot and Velasco. In May, a diplomatic source told AFP that France was hoping to reach the two-thirds majority before this year's UN General Assembly, which kicks off this week. Even if adopted with a two-thirds majority, the resolution would be non-binding.
Officials nonetheless hope to make it more politically difficult for a permanent member to use its veto in cases of such dire emergencies.

NYT says Trump reversed decision on airstrikes on Houthis
Agence France Presse/September 21/2026
U.S. President Donald Trump has changed his strategy on Yemen several times, The New York Times reported, torn between Saudi pressure to strike the Iran-backed Houthis and the risk of opening another front in the Middle East war. Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi movement has staged a lightning offensive in recent weeks to take over the country's entire Red Sea coast, leaving the Saudi-backed government scrambling to respond. The New York Times said Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman called Trump on Sunday "to implore him, again, to step in to help blunt the rapidly advancing group."Trump had told his advisers the day before that he opposed strikes but changed his mind after the call and "told the Pentagon to prepare for airstrikes against the Houthis," the newspaper reported, citing anonymous administration officials. However, he appeared to have reversed his decision again by midday Sunday, it said.
Trump's decision to pull back from striking the Houthis came as "commanders had approved target lists, troops were loading bombs onto U.S. warplanes selected for the missions and the wave of attacks was just about to begin," the Times said, citing two people briefed on the operation. U.S. news platform Axios said Trump had already refused a Saudi request to strike the Houthis last week. Fox News reported on Sunday that Trump had said the Houthis have agreed not to hit U.S. targets.The war in the Middle East began on February 28 with U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, after which the Islamic republic responded with attacks around the region. Iran-backed groups including the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon also later became involved. The war in impoverished Yemen, which began in 2014 with the Houthi capture of the capital Sanaa, had been largely frozen since 2022 but resumed in July.
Saudi Arabia has led a coalition backing the internationally recognized government since 2015. Its intervention escalated the war, which has triggered one of the world's worst humanitarian crises.

UKMTO: Tanker hit by debris from unidentified projectiles near Strait of Hormuz
LBCI/September 21/2026
A liquefied petroleum gas tanker leaving the Strait of Hormuz was hit by debris from unidentified projectiles, the UK Maritime Trade Operations said Monday.
The agency said the tanker would continue to its next port of call, adding that all crew members were safe. Reuters

Houthis say they won't attack US vessels in Red Sea, warn countries not to join Saudis
Associated Press/September 21/2026
A senior official with the Iran-backed Houthi rebels is warning countries against joining Saudi Arabia in Yemen’s revived civil war, telling The Associated Press on Sunday that his group has assured the Trump administration that it won’t attack U.S. vessels in the Red Sea.
Mohamed al-Bukhaiti, a member of the Houthis’ political bureau, said Washington reached out to the rebels after their rapid advance down Yemen’s western coast to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait earlier this month. “We confirmed that we are not targeting the United States, or any other nation, in the strait, with the sole exception of the Saudi enemy,” he told The Associated Press in a Zoom interview from the rebel-held Yemeni capital, Sanaa. “That remains the case.”

Trump, Yemen’s Alimi Discuss Bab al-Mandeb Developments
Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026
US President Donald Trump discussed the accelerating military developments in Yemen during a telephone call on Sunday with the Chairman of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council Dr. Rashad al-Alimi. The talks focused on the advance of Iran-backed Houthis near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, according to news agencies citing identical sources.On the ground, battles are escalating in the highlands between western Taiz and northern Lahj. Government and southern forces thwarted a Houthi advance towards al-Shamayatayn. They said they repelled repeated attacks, recaptured mountainous positions, and inflicted casualties among the Houthis. Dozens of Houthis were killed in the past 24 hours, said field sources.The government's Giants Brigades announced the destruction of five Houthi vehicles in the Kahbub mountains near Bab al-Mandeb, including a vehicle carrying a militant commander and another carrying an anti-aircraft weapon. All others on board were killed.The government's National Shield Forces also announced the downing of two drones during the fighting. In western Taiz, the fighting centered around Sharira, Mount Al-Mirzam, and Jardad, with Houthi infiltration attempts and attacks being thwarted.
In Marib, clashes and artillery shelling continue in Harib, Malaa, and Umm Reesh, with no change in the lines of control. Government forces announced strikes on Houthi gatherings, fortifications, and artillery positions, as well as airstrikes and drone attacks in Marib and Al-Bayda.

Iran's Guards Threaten to Hit New Targets if US Attacks
Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026
Iran's Revolutionary Guards on Monday warned they would attack new targets and deploy new weapons if the US launches further attacks on the country. Almost seven months into their war, Tehran and Washington remain locked in a stalemate, though neither side appears willing to return to full-scale war, said AFP. In a statement, a spokesman for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, the ideological arm of Iran's military, said "there will certainly be significant changes in our defense and our counteroffensive" in the event of a new US attack."We will introduce new weapons with new capabilities into the battlefield, and the world will be surprised," he said. "Our targets will not necessarily be the same as before either. We have new targets that have not yet been attacked."The Guards also said they were prepared for a "prolonged war". On Saturday, the central command of Iran's military said the US was planning new action against Tehran, according to state television, but it did not elaborate. Fighting between the US and Iran has eased in recent days after a flare-up at the end of last month, though Tehran continues sporadic attacks on commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz.
Both sides are maintaining rival blockades in the waterway in an effort to exert pressure.

EU’s Kallas Says Red Sea Naval Mission Needs More Than 10 Ships
Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026
The European Union's naval mission in the Red Sea would need more than 10 warships, its foreign policy chief said on Monday, adding ‌that for ‌now there weren’t ‌that ⁠many in the ⁠area. "When Aspides (the EU military operation) was put in place, then the indication was that ⁠it needs at ‌least ‌10 ships. The situation, ‌I think, is ‌even more grave right now," she told reporters on the sidelines ‌of the annual gathering of world leaders ⁠at ⁠the United Nations. Kallas last week sent a letter to member states asking them to contribute more naval and air assets in the region, diplomats said.

Washington Mobilizes Allies in the Arctic
Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Monday stressed the need for investment in the Arctic while meeting with his counterparts from seven countries in the region, on the eve of signing a security agreement on Greenland. "Allies agreed that Arctic security requires continued investment to safeguard this vital region and deter strategic competitors," State Department spokesman Tommy Piggott said in a readout of the meeting. "Discussions focused on taking greater responsibility for Arctic security by developing sovereign military and economic capabilities, ensuring investment security, and funding resilient critical infrastructure that ensures reliable access and supports our shared leadership in the Arctic."The meeting convened top diplomats from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Faroe Islands and Greenland, at a New York hotel on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. Greenland, Denmark and the United States are due to sign an agreement regarding the Arctic at the UN on Tuesday, the office of Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said Monday evening. The agreement was announced Friday by US President Donald Trump, and has not yet been made publicly available.
But Frederiksen said it recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Denmark, and the right of self-determination for Greenland's people. Washington said the agreement paves the way to strengthen US military presence in Greenland while ensuring that China and Russia will not be able to establish bases or carry out sensitive investments there without consent. Monday's discussions also touched on cooperation to develop a fleet of icebreakers between the US, Canada and Finland. In October, the United States announced the purchase of 11 icebreakers from Finland for the US Coast Guard to add to its fleet of three aging ships.European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said recently that Europe needs icebreakers to strengthen its presence in the Arctic, as global warming draws the interest of major powers to the region. Vast natural resources are becoming increasingly accessible in the Arctic as ice melts and new maritime routes open up due to climate change. China, Russia and the United States are reinforcing their presence in the strategic Arctic as a result.

CNN, MS Now, Politico Sue Donald Trump over White House Ban
Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026 A
CNN, MS NOW and Politico sued President Donald Trump on Monday for banning them from White House grounds, saying it violated their rights under the US Constitution to cover him. In a complaint filed in the Washington, D.C., federal court, the media outlets said Trump can't ban them solely because he dislikes what he calls their "negative" coverage, and reserve coverage for media who offer praise. They also said the public deserves "current and complete information" about their government. "This ban could not be a more direct assault on the First Amendment nor a more blatant violation of our most fundamental constitutional principles," the media outlets said. According to AFP, leading US broadcasters suspended the TV "pool" coverage in solidarity with CNN. "The public has a vital interest in receiving accurate, independent information about its government. No administration should restrict a news organization because it objects to its reporting," ABC, CBS, CNN, Fox and NBC said in a statement. TV broadcasters rotate responsibility for filming the president at some events.

Israeli Forces Raid Town of Suspected Palestinian Gunman
Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026
Israeli forces on Monday raided the hometown of a Palestinian man suspected of shooting dead an Israeli settler in the occupied West Bank the day before, local authorities said. Sunday's shooting occurred near the Israeli settlement of Neveh Tzuf, north of Ramallah, on the eve of the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, with the suspected assailant apprehended by soldiers after being located at a hospital. Israel's military told AFP on Sunday that its troops had raided the home of the attacker's family in the Palestinian village of Biddu, northwest of Jerusalem in the West Bank. The Jerusalem Governorate, the Palestinian local authority for the area, said Israeli forces then raided Biddu at dawn on Monday and "carried out a large-scale arrest campaign targeting dozens of young men"."The raid was accompanied by searches, vandalism, and the smashing of property inside a number of homes, as well as physical assaults on several residents," it said, adding that the raid was ongoing. When asked by AFP, the Israeli military said it was checking the reports. An AFP photographer saw Israeli forces in the town on Monday morning. Biddu's mayor, Nazmi Mansour, told AFP that the military had stormed the town after midnight with "dozens of military jeeps and hundreds of soldiers"."The soldiers began house-to-house searches and set up field interrogation centers in buildings they had taken control of," he said, adding that dozens of people were questioned."The army is still present in the town and has closed off its entrances, and all commercial shops are shut," he told AFP by telephone. Israel's army chief Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir said at the site of the attack Sunday that the military remained "on high alert"."We will impose a closure on the village and conduct investigations, through which we will reach everyone who assisted the terrorist," Zamir said. Far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir called for the attacker to be the first person executed under a recently approved death penalty law. The new law imposes the death penalty by default on Palestinians from the West Bank convicted on terror charges for deadly attacks.
Israel has occupied the West Bank since 1967 and violence there has surged since Hamas's October 7, 2023 attack on Israel which sparked the Gaza war.

Gaza Health Officials Say Israeli Fire Kills Three, Including Child
Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026
Gaza health officials said Israeli fire killed three people, including a woman and a child, and injured several others across the Palestinian territory on Monday. Officials at Nasser hospital in the southern city of Khan Younis said the body of a child, Ismail Al-Bardawil, was brought to the medical facility after Israeli tanks opened fire on tents for displaced people in the Al-Mawasi area.Mahmoud Bassal, the spokesman for Gaza's civil defense agency, which operates as a rescue force under Hamas authority, said the child was 11 years old. In the central Gaza Strip, Al-Awda hospital officials said 31-year-old Fidaa Toutah died from her wounds after being shot by Israeli forces on Salah al-Din street east of Nuseirat refugee camp.Officials at Al-Shifa hospital in Gaza City said a man, Mohsen Ahmed Bahjat, died after being shot in the head by a drone in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip.Gaza's civil defense agency confirmed the identities of the dead to AFP. It said its teams had transported nine wounded people to hospitals following Israeli fire in Khan Younis in the south and Bureij refugee camp in the center of the territory. When contacted by AFP, the Israeli military said it was checking the reports. Israel in October last year agreed to a ceasefire brokered by the United States but since then has advanced further into Gaza. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed no let-up in strikes targeting Hamas, which led the unprecedented October 7, 2023 attack against Israel. The 2023 attack killed 1,221 people, according to an AFP tally based on official Israeli figures. The massive Israeli offensive in response has left most of Gaza in ruins and killed more than 73,900 people, according to Gaza's health ministry, which is under Hamas authority and whose figures are considered reliable by the United Nations. Israeli strikes have killed more than 1,300 people since the ceasefire was announced last year, according to the Gaza health ministry. The Israeli army has identified five deaths in its ranks over the same period, as well as the death of one civilian contractor.

The Latest LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on September 21-22/2026
Un faux-semblant d’État
Dr. Charles Chartouni/Ici Beyrouth/September 21/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/09/157705/
Le spectacle politique libanais nous renvoie à des équivoques qu’on peut difficilement dissiper. On a affaire à des institutions qui dissimulent derrière leur structure formelle les réalités d’un État déliquescent, instrumentalisé par des stratégies de subversion, des régimes de captation oligarchique et des intérêts sordides de groupes mafieux. Ceci est d’autant plus frappant lorsqu’on constate que le soi-disant cabinet réformiste n’est qu’une des variantes de cette hybridation, loin d’offrir le contre-modèle qui lui est attribué. En effet, rien de neuf ne nous est proposé afin que nous puissions évoquer la possibilité d’un changement de quelque ordre que ce soit.
La loi d’airain de l’oligarchie, la colonisation des institutions et leur instrumentalisation au profit des politiques de puissance et de leurs relais nous renvoient à des réalités disparates, notamment les stratégies de domination, la criminalité organisée et les régimes alternés de subordination aux politiques de puissance. Somme toute, l’État libanais coche tous les indicateurs de l’État failli, sans prévarications majeures. S’agit-il d’une tendance lourde aux effets irrémissibles ou d’un phénomène passager et corrigeable ? Il est ardu d’y répondre alors que les pronostics sont plutôt pessimistes.
L’épreuve de la guerre en cours est révélatrice à plus d’un titre. En effet, l’État fait preuve d’une incapacité à définir les contours d’une diplomatie conséquente et en phase avec les défis posés par les conflits en cours. Le statut de l’État-lige reste l’obstacle majeur à la réhabilitation de la stature étatique, à la restauration de l’État de droit, des conditions de déploiement d’une souveraineté effective et du consensus national qui devrait leur servir de support.
Somme toute, les règles du jeu sont entièrement faussées et de manière irrémédiable. On est en droit de s’interroger sur les chances d’une stratégie réformiste qui viendrait à bout de cet état d’anomie institutionnalisée. La réponse, de prime abord, est que rien n’est envisageable à l’ombre d’une occupation de fait, de complicités objectives et d’une déliquescence prolongée. On n’est pas dans un état de crise passagère et de dysfonctionnement ; on est dans un contexte de délitement, de remise en cause de la paix civile et de conflits ouverts qui se ressourcent tous azimuts.
L’échec de l’accord de trêve, les difficultés opératoires de l’accord-cadre et les louvoiements du pouvoir exécutif témoignent d’une crise qui déborde dans tous les sens. Elle remet en question la viabilité de l’hypothétique entité nationale et ses modulations étatiques. Cette crise remet en question la viabilité de l’hypothétique entité nationale ainsi que ses modulations étatiques. L’État a lamentablement failli à ses compétences en matière de souveraineté, d’arbitrage des conflits internes, d’application de la loi et de négociation d’une fin d’état de guerre. La trêve s’est avérée un intermède qui a permis au Hezbollah de se reconstruire, de rétablir ses sources de financement et de se repositionner dans le cadre de la nouvelle dynamique de subversion remise au point par le régime iranien. Au lieu de servir de point de passage à une nouvelle étape, l’accord de trêve s’est mué en plateforme de sabotage.
Les effets pervers de cet accord sont dus aux paradoxes d’un État transformé en fiction juridique et sans consistance propre. Il s’agit, en fait, d’une existence par prétérition. L’échec n’est pas un effet du hasard ; il s’agit plutôt d’une incapacité structurelle. La question du désarmement du Hezbollah est une dérivation d’un enjeu autrement plus complexe : celui des extraterritorialités institutionnalisées, des conflits de souveraineté et de juridiction, et d’une légitimité nationale controversée. Récapituler seulement l’argumentaire en milieux chiites pour se rendre à l’évidence d’une crise structurelle et de ses ramifications.
Il est impératif que le Liban tranche des dilemmes qui remettent en question sa viabilité nationale, sa concorde civile et leurs incidences sur un ordre régional en déconfiture. L’accord-cadre négocié et arbitré par les États-Unis fournit un cadre adéquat afin de remettre le Liban sur la voie de la reconstruction étatique, comme préalable à toute entreprise réformiste. Il est impossible de rétablir les équilibres systémiques en l’absence d’un nouveau rapport de force issu des négociations. Autrement, la porte est ouverte à des dynamiques conflictuelles pérennisées et inscrites dans la longue durée.
Selon toute vraisemblance, le pays peine à se dégager des engrenages conflictuels institués par la politique de domination iranienne, au point d’intersection de l’intérieur et de l’extérieur. Les politiques de puissance propulsées par l’impérialisme iranien sont en situation de choc frontal, et les axes de démarcation et de réalignement géostratégique sont en pleine effervescence. Les politiques libanais sont soit dans le déni ou la complicité, soit dans l’incapacité de saisir la portée des dynamiques en cours, et les événements militaires et stratégiques prennent le dessus.
Ceci est d’autant plus grave que la prolongation de cet état d’apesanteur n’est pas de nature à favoriser une transition négociée, paisible et démocratique. En réalité, la guerre par procuration qui se déroule sur notre territoire n'est que le reflet d'un coup d'État chiite visant à détruire le Liban et son narratif national démocratique et libéral, hérité de l'héritage maronite, que le militantisme chiite et ses antécédents islamo-gauchistes cherchent à abattre. À récapituler la rhétorique en milieu chiite, on comprend la trame de cette haine meurtrière. Il est temps que le mensonge et la duplicité cessent pour éviter le pire à venir.

A Sham State
Dr. Charles Chartouni/Ici Beyrouth/September 21/2026
(Translated from French by AI)
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/09/157705/
The Lebanese political spectacle brings us back to ambiguities that are difficult to dispel. We are dealing with institutions that hide behind their formal structure the realities of a decaying state, instrumentalized by subversion strategies, oligarchic capture regimes, and the sordid interests of mafia groups. This is all the more striking when we see that the so-called reformist cabinet is only one variant of this hybridization, far from offering the counter-model attributed to it. In fact, nothing new is being proposed to us that would allow us to speak of the possibility of any kind of change.
The iron law of oligarchy, the colonization of institutions and their instrumentalization for the benefit of power politics and their relays refer us to disparate realities, notably domination strategies, organized crime, and alternating regimes of subordination to power politics. In short, the Lebanese state ticks all the indicators of a failed state, without major exaggeration. Is this a deep-seated trend with irremediable effects or a temporary and correctable phenomenon? It is difficult to answer when the prognoses are rather pessimistic.
The test of the ongoing war is revealing in more than one respect. Indeed, the state demonstrates an inability to define the contours of a consistent diplomacy in line with the challenges posed by ongoing conflicts. The status of a vassal state remains the major obstacle to the rehabilitation of statehood, the restoration of the rule of law, the conditions for deploying effective sovereignty, and the national consensus that should serve as their support.
In short, the rules of the game are completely and irremediably distorted. We are entitled to question the chances of a reformist strategy that would overcome this state of institutionalized anomie. The answer, at first glance, is that nothing is conceivable in the shadow of a de facto occupation, objective complicities, and prolonged decay. We are not in a state of temporary crisis and dysfunction; we are in a context of disintegration, of questioning civil peace, and of open conflicts that are fueling each other from all sides.
The failure of the truce agreement, the operational difficulties of the framework agreement, and the evasions of the executive power testify to a crisis that is overflowing in all directions. It calls into question the viability of the hypothetical national entity and its state modulations. The state has lamentably failed in its competencies in matters of sovereignty, arbitration of internal conflicts, application of the law, and negotiation of an end to the state of war. The truce proved to be an interlude that allowed Hezbollah to rebuild itself, restore its sources of funding, and reposition itself within the framework of the new subversion dynamic re-established by the Iranian regime. Instead of serving as a passage point to a new stage, the truce agreement has mutated into a sabotage platform.
The perverse effects of this agreement are due to the paradoxes of a state transformed into a legal fiction without its own substance. It is, in fact, an existence by preterition. Failure is not a matter of chance; it is rather a structural incapacity. The question of Hezbollah's disarmament is a derivation of a far more complex issue: that of institutionalized extraterritorialities, conflicts of sovereignty and jurisdiction, and a controversial national legitimacy. It is enough to summarize the arguments in Shiite circles to realize a structural crisis and its ramifications.
It is imperative that Lebanon decides on the dilemmas that call into question its national viability, its civil concord, and their impact on a collapsing regional order. The framework agreement negotiated and arbitrated by the United States provides an adequate framework to put Lebanon back on the path of state reconstruction, as a prerequisite for any reformist enterprise. It is impossible to restore systemic balances in the absence of a new balance of power resulting from negotiations. Otherwise, the door is open to perpetuated conflictual dynamics inscribed in the long term.
In all likelihood, the country is struggling to extricate itself from the conflictual gears instituted by the Iranian domination policy, at the intersection of the interior and the exterior. The power policies propelled by Iranian imperialism are in a situation of frontal shock, and the axes of demarcation and geostrategic realignment are in full effervescence. Lebanese politicians are either in denial or complicit, or unable to grasp the scope of the ongoing dynamics, and military and strategic events are taking over.
This is all the more serious as the prolongation of this state of weightlessness is not likely to favor a negotiated, peaceful, and democratic transition. In reality, the proxy war taking place on our territory is only the reflection of a Shiite coup d'état aimed at destroying Lebanon and its democratic and liberal national narrative, inherited from the Maronite heritage, which Shiite activism and its Islamo-leftist antecedents seek to bring down. To summarize the rhetoric in Shiite circles is to understand the fabric of this murderous hatred. It is time for lies and duplicity to cease to avoid the worst to come.

How Hamas Controls the Story Coming Out of Gaza
Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/September 21, 2026
Azaiza revealed details about how journalists operated under Hamas rule. He described an environment in which journalists were pressured to suppress criticism of Hamas and, in some cases, to stop filming when Palestinians expressed anger toward the terrorist group.
These are not allegations coming from an Israeli government official or a pro-Israel advocacy organization. They are admissions by a Palestinian journalist who became internationally famous for documenting the war.
When Palestinians blamed Israel, the cameras kept rolling. When Palestinians blamed Hamas, the cameras were turned off.
He acknowledged that stepping outside this framework exposes journalists to intense backlash, including organized online campaigns, accusations of treason, and physical intimidation inside Gaza.
He openly acknowledged that initially he struggled with whether to publish material showing Palestinians criticizing Hamas. He said he had never seen a Gaza journalist publish such material. He also disclosed that he grew up supporting Hamas and that Hamas's ideology and the culture of "resistance" were part of his childhood environment.
This is a remarkable admission. It helps explain why the outside world has heard relatively little from Gaza about Hamas's responsibility for the suffering of Palestinians under its rule. It also raises an obvious question: How much of the story coming out of Gaza has been shaped not only by what journalists saw but also by what they believed they were permitted to show?
Azaiza's account should therefore prompt media organizations that used his work – and the work of other Gaza-based journalists as well as journalists covering other terrorist entities and their sponsors – to examine their own reporting practices. Who supplied the information? Who was present when it was gathered? What material was not published? Were journalists pressured? Were interviews conducted freely? Were Palestinians allowed to criticize Hamas on camera? Most importantly, did international media organizations independently verify claims coming from a territory controlled by a terrorist organization?
Azaiza's interview is ultimately a warning about the dangers of accepting any side's narrative without scrutiny.... It should be a wake-up call.
The question is no longer simply what the cameras show. It is also what they do not show.
Palestinian journalist and photographer Motaz Azaiza recently revealed details about how journalists operated under Hamas rule. He described an environment in which journalists were pressured to suppress criticism of Hamas and, in some cases, to stop filming when Palestinians expressed anger toward the terrorist group.
For more than two decades, the international community has been hearing that Palestinian journalists in the Gaza Strip are providing the world with an unfiltered account of what is happening there.
A recent interview with Palestinian journalist and photographer Motaz Azaiza should make anyone who has accepted that claim without question think again.
Azaiza is hardly an obscure figure. His images from Gaza reached millions of people around the world. He was named one of TIME magazine's "100 Most Influential People," received international awards, and became one of the most recognizable Palestinian voices documenting the Gaza war.
That is what makes his recent revelations so important.
Azaiza revealed details about how journalists operated under Hamas rule. He described an environment in which journalists were pressured to suppress criticism of Hamas and, in some cases, to stop filming when Palestinians expressed anger toward the terrorist group.
These are not allegations coming from an Israeli government official or a pro-Israel advocacy organization. They are admissions by a Palestinian journalist who became internationally famous for documenting the war.
Azaiza described a WhatsApp group called "SMART" that was managed by a Hamas-affiliated media official connected to the Rafah border crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. Such structures ensure that content circulated among press workers aligns with approved messaging before reaching wider audiences.
Perhaps even more revealing was his description of what happened when Palestinians themselves criticized Hamas. Azaiza described a scene in which people emerging from an ambulance shouted criticism at Hamas ("May God take revenge on Hamas"), and onlookers or Hamas members actively forced him to turn off his camera.
What does that mean?
When Palestinians blamed Israel, the cameras kept rolling. When Palestinians blamed Hamas, the cameras were turned off.
Azaiza said that Hamas enforces a selective narrative – claiming victory or ownership over military acts while deflecting internal blame or civilian grievances – making it difficult for independent media to show the raw, unfiltered reality on the ground. He acknowledged that stepping outside this framework exposes journalists to intense backlash, including organized online campaigns, accusations of treason, and physical intimidation inside Gaza.
International audiences have often been told that the images coming out of the Gaza Strip represented an unfiltered record of Palestinian suffering.
Azaiza's account, however, suggests that the picture was considerably more complicated: journalists were operating inside a political environment in which criticism of Hamas could carry consequences.
He openly acknowledged that initially he struggled with whether to publish material showing Palestinians criticizing Hamas. He said he had never seen a Gaza journalist publish such material. He also disclosed that he grew up supporting Hamas and that Hamas's ideology and the culture of "resistance" were part of his childhood environment.
This is a remarkable admission. It helps explain why the outside world has heard relatively little from Gaza about Hamas's responsibility for the suffering of Palestinians under its rule. It also raises an obvious question: How much of the story coming out of Gaza has been shaped not only by what journalists saw but also by what they believed they were permitted to show?
Journalism conducted under intimidation cannot automatically be treated as independent journalism. The distinction is especially important because foreign news organizations have frequently depended on Gaza-based journalists, photographers, translators, and "fixers" for information that they could not obtain themselves.
If the Palestinian journalists are operating under pressure from Hamas, the implications extend far beyond Palestinian media. The influence can reach international media organizations that use their material.
A foreign correspondent or editor sitting in a newsroom thousands of miles from Gaza may believe he or she is receiving a credible eyewitness account from an independent local journalist. If the local journalist is subject to Hamas pressure, self-censorship or organized monitoring, the foreign outlet may unknowingly become dependent on a narrative that has already been filtered.
This is how an Islamist terrorist group can influence the international information environment without having to control every foreign newspaper or television station.
Azaiza's revelations are also significant because of what he said about the Hamas-led October 7, 2023 massacre in Israel. He said that he filmed Israeli hostages being beaten by Palestinian crowds after they were kidnapped to the Gaza Strip. He said he chose not to publish the footage because he feared that publication could allow Israel to identify the people involved.
This raises an uncomfortable question for the international media: How much footage from October 7 and its aftermath was never published because Palestinian journalists feared the consequences of showing what happened? Furthermore, it raises an even broader question about the distinction between documenting history and protecting a political narrative.
Azaiza's account should therefore prompt media organizations that used his work – and the work of other Gaza-based journalists as well as journalists covering other terrorist entities and their sponsors – to examine their own reporting practices. Who supplied the information? Who was present when it was gathered? What material was not published? Were journalists pressured? Were interviews conducted freely? Were Palestinians allowed to criticize Hamas on camera? Most importantly, did international media organizations independently verify claims coming from a territory controlled by a terrorist organization?
These questions matter not only because of the Gaza war but also because of the credibility of journalism itself. Azaiza's account offers a possible explanation for one of the most striking features of the coverage from Gaza: the extraordinary visibility of Palestinian suffering accompanied by comparatively little visibility of Palestinian anger toward Hamas.
Azaiza's interview is ultimately a warning about the dangers of accepting any side's narrative without scrutiny. He is telling us that there was another reality behind the camera – a reality in which criticism of Hamas could disappear from the screen, journalists could face intimidation, and a Hamas-linked network could help manage the narrative. That should not be dismissed as a minor footnote. It should be a wake-up call.
Palestinian political analyst Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib commented on September 18:
"Motaz Azaiza, a Gazan journalist evacuated during the war and someone who has personally attacked me, is finally saying the blunt truth. Gaza‑based 'journalists,' whether tied to Al-Jazeera, Hamas, foreign outlets, or social media, systematically self‑censored and hid anti‑Hamas sentiments inside the Strip. Their mission was to maintain a narrative centered solely on Israel and to erase any dissent, criticism of Hamas, or diversity in Palestinian views. Azaiza describes how he struggled with supposed 'journalists' who shut off their cameras whenever Gazans condemned Hamas or tried to hold it responsible for the catastrophe it brought upon them, from October 7 to the ruinous 'resistance' mythology that followed. So to anyone repeating the line that Gaza had 'more journalists killed than WWII and Vietnam combined,' think carefully about who and what you are calling a journalist in territory fully controlled by a violent extremist organization responsible for severe harm and repression."
Azaiza's interview proves something important: that the process by which information emerged from Gaza was not as independent as many people assumed. The situation has not changed, because most Gazans continue to live under Hamas rule. The question is no longer simply what the cameras show. It is also what they do not show.
*Khaled Abu Toameh is an award-winning journalist based in Jerusalem.
*Follow Khaled Abu Toameh on X (formerly Twitter)
© 2026 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institution

Has the United Nations Come to an End?
Samir Atallah/Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026
I used to look forward to this occasion every year: an unparalleled United Nations festival. September would arrive, and with it the annual session of the United Nations General Assembly. Delegates from nearly 200 countries, large, medium-sized, and small, would come from around the world because of both the event and the city. The event was the annual gathering of this global parliament, held since 1945. The venue was New York, the capital of money and capital in this world. I began that beautiful tradition in 1973. I decided that instead of traveling to countries around the world in search of their issues, I would spend a month at this gathering, and let the issues come to me. I expected every issue imaginable, but not for the October 6 war to break out in Egypt while I was sitting in the Security Council chamber in New York. There was the Arab world once again drenched in the blood of war, but this time with signs of victory on the horizon. I stayed on in New York that autumn. The rest was a matter of personal affairs and the confusions of life. But I had begun an intriguing annual tradition: the world comes to you, and you choose. At that stage, the world was the Middle East, Kissinger, the step-by-step approach, and Resolution 242. There was not yet any talk of a "new Middle East" or of the old world order growing rusty. Instead, there was something new that would turn the world upside down and would come to be known as Camp David. Or Anwar Sadat, who went to sleep one night in Cairo and woke up in Jerusalem, shaking hands with Menachem Begin and the leaders of Likud. After Anwar Sadat's talk of "dear Henry," nothing in the region would remain as it was. Sadat moved from one reception to another, welcoming his new partners, and traveled around the world delivering his grand speeches with his magical cane and fiery pipe, telling everyone that he had chosen the path and that all they had to do was follow him. Egypt was transformed. The Arab world cried out. Small-scale disorientation turned into total bewilderment. It was an opportunity not merely to reclaim Palestine, but for Damascus to reclaim the Umayyads, Baghdad the Abbasids, and al-Andalus to be restored within days.
Until next time.

From New York to Bab al-Mandab
Ghassan Charbel/Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026
Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly have lost much of their glow, and much of the hope once invested in them. Leaders go to renew their wager on an awakening of international legitimacy, however late. Before that, they go to address their own peoples from this international balcony- and in reality they are betting on a public-relations party held outside the hall of speeches and wishes. In past decades, the leaders of small states would paste their countries' tears onto the wall of the United Nations. The General Assembly lived for a long time amid the clamor of the confrontation that governed the world of the two camps. The memory of the building that resides in New York holds raucous hours that stole the world's gaze: a scene cut from the cloth of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev protesting with blows of his shoe; the scene of Fidel Castro, with the allure of his biography, his beard, and his olive fatigues, delivering an endless fiery speech denouncing American imperialism and affirming himself a thorn lodged in its side; and the scene of Muammar Gaddafi trying to tear up the UN Charter and throw it to the floor, flooding the Jamahiriya's delegation with astonishment, embarrassment, and shame. Time is an executioner that cuts the neck of dreams and illusions. Castro's mausoleum suffers repeated power cuts for lack of fuel. His country writhes over the fire of crises, awaiting the ripening of the hour of its fall into the hands of America, neighbor and enemy. Castro is no longer a source of inspiration, at home or abroad. Most likely he felt terrible pain on being told that "General" Donald Trump had led Comrade Nicolás Maduro off to an American prison and struck a deal with his aides.
The world has changed. The Soviet delegate's name has become the Russian delegate. The master of the Kremlin can no longer sit with the master of the White House as an equal to discuss the management of the world's affairs. The heir of the Red Army has been fighting on Ukrainian soil for years and is enlisting the soldiers of Kim Il Sung's grandson to reduce the number of bodies returning to the Russian frost. This long war befits neither great Russia nor its tsar, Vladimir Putin. The statements of his shadow, Medvedev, are regrettable; he speaks as though turning a nuclear bomb over in his hands and brandishing it at aging Europe. This week the people of the Middle East will not pay much attention to the speeches of the General Assembly. They have a feeling that Guterres's organization has become a mere relief agency, sending flour, tents, and blankets to the victims of fires that have fallen captive to the envoys of the great powers and to regional schemes. The world will certainly turn its attention to the big summit, when Trump receives his "friend" Xi Jinping, director of the "factory of the world" and laboratory of artificial intelligence.
The eyes of the people of the sick Middle East will not turn to New York. If the United Nations had weapons other than wishes, it would have used them. The eyes of the people of the Middle East will certainly turn to Bab al-Mandab. What happened there certainly goes beyond the Yemeni-Yemeni conflict. It is a regional and international matter. It is impossible to believe that the Houthis carried out their attack on a Houthi decision; the history of their experience indicates that their weapons are Iranian and their decision is Iranian. It is difficult to believe the world will agree to Iran's attempt to win the title of policeman of the two straits. To understand what happened in Bab al-Mandab, one must pause at what CENTCOM commander Brad Cooper said: that American forces had facilitated the passage of more than a billion barrels of crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz over the past two months, and had helped more than two thousand commercial ships transit. But more serious than all of this was his statement that Iran had been unable to export a single barrel of oil under the measures of the American naval blockade. Most likely the harshness of the American blockade pushed Iran to move its cards to provoke a major energy crisis at the global level, and to press on the chances of the American Republican Party in the midterm elections. So seizing control of Bab al-Mandab appears as an Iranian punishment of Trump, who imposed the naval blockade- whose effectiveness is confirmed by the continuing deterioration in the value of the Iranian currency. There are those who believe that Iran- which has come to fear that Iranians will take to the streets in protest at the mounting economic and living deterioration- is inclined to cause a major explosion in the region, in the hope that it pushes the world to demand a final ceasefire there, easing its exit from the present impasse in which it is floundering. These people place the Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia in this context. Observers are inclined to speak of difficult months ahead if the Iranian decision remains captive to the semi-suicidal policies pursued by the generals of the Revolutionary Guard with the blessing of the Supreme Leader. The question is: who will lead the region out of its present condition? If we exclude the possibility of America returning to direct military pressure, many believe that China is the only party qualified to play a role here, if the Trump-Xi summit lays down a serious road map for coexistence, competition, and cooperation between the two giants. The fate of the two straits concerns China, which depends on the region for its energy supplies, and its strong relations with Iran enable it to exert pressure to rationalize the Iranian decision. But does China want to leave its cautious style behind and engage in finding a solution for a region whose stability bears on its own economy and on the whole world's? Bab al-Mandab concerns the region and the world far more than the scenes of the General Assembly. From Ukraine to Sudan and on to Bab al-Mandab, the keys appear to reside in the drawers of the president of the United States, not in the drawers of the secretary-general of the United Nations.

America Has Not Capitalized on Iran's Defeat
Sam Menassa/Asharq Al Awsat/September 21/2026
The US administration considers that it won the war with Iran. But this has reinforced the prevailing impression, particularly across much of the media, that Washington has not yet achieved its objectives, especially since the confrontation continues in various forms.
That does not mean Iran won, given the enormous losses it has suffered, which are difficult to assess because of the scarcity of information and the information blackout. Military, nuclear, and vital installations have been destroyed; its missile and naval capabilities have been damaged; a large number of its commanders have been killed; and sanctions and the blockade have worsened the deterioration of living conditions. What the regime's officials, its media, and its proxies repeat about "victory" is therefore nothing more than bravado, for which a people exhausted by war, sanctions, and repression pays the price. But how has Iran managed to portray itself as the victor? And why could a halt to the war, if it comes, be presented as an American retreat when the balance of power and losses suggests otherwise?
The answer begins in Washington itself. Donald Trump's administration fought the war without a precise definition of victory. It declared its objectives to be destroying Iran's missile and naval capabilities, cutting Tehran's supplies to its proxies, and preventing it from acquiring a nuclear weapon. But it did not reinforce the regional situation with a political track addressing its crises, nor did it establish a mechanism to ensure that Tehran's capabilities could not be rebuilt. If military results are measured by the number of sites, missiles, and ships destroyed, then permanently preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, ending its regional influence, and stopping the arming of its proxies require an enforceable agreement, a monitoring regime, regional security arrangements, and allied states capable of protecting the results. That is what Washington has not yet accomplished.
In April, the American administration announced that major operations had achieved their objectives within 38 days, and that Iran had agreed to a ceasefire and to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. But the continuation of the conflict and the inability to reach a settlement revealed that the declaration of victory had been premature. As American efforts turned toward reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and perhaps later securing Bab al-Mandab, the war's objectives narrowed to guaranteeing freedom of navigation. All of this revealed the absence of a clear American strategy for ending the war. What is the United States' objective: disabling the nuclear program or destroying the missiles? Ending the network of proxies, changing the regime's behavior, or bringing it down? Securing the sea lanes? And can all of this be achieved through bombing alone?
The portrayal of Iran as a victorious state by its allies and by some media outlets rests on the two sides' differing standards of victory. Washington needs a quick war that achieves its declared objectives and produces a clear accomplishment that can be marketed at home, while Tehran is betting on prolonging the confrontation, raising its cost, and shifting its effects onto Washington's allies and energy markets. Thus, Washington's inability to achieve a decisive political outcome becomes material for Iranian propaganda, even if Iran emerges from the war shattered and drained.
All of this has been reflected in other issues. The Gaza plan is stalled, the Palestinian track has stopped, and Lebanon is stuck in negotiations that neither halt Israeli attacks nor address Hezbollah's weapons. Iraq and Yemen remain arenas for militia activity and proxy wars against the Gulf states, amid disruption to energy routes and sea lanes. An ally does not measure success by the number of Iranian installations destroyed, but by how much more secure it has become after the war.
The truth is that the defeat of the Iranian project is not achieved by striking its center alone, but by closing the arenas through which it expands. Here, the error in the ordering of priorities becomes clear, including cutting off the resources of militias that have returned and regained strength, as well as addressing the Palestinian issue, which Tehran has exploited for decades, along with other such issues.
Added to this is the domestic American division and the polarization that has extended to public trust in institutions, the judiciary, the media, and elections, making the war part of the political struggle over Trump. His supporters portray it as a victory, while his opponents see it as an extension of his style of governing. The American media, along with some of the European media, reflect this polarization, drawing on the gap between the administration's declarations and its results.
Other fronts have also opened that have diverted attention from Iran. Tensions with Canada, European countries, and NATO, the tariff war, the dispute over Ukraine, and the threats concerning Greenland have all generated negative reactions. When a superpower fights a complex regional war, its relations with its allies become part of the balance of power, not a marginal matter. Iran has not won. It is a state suffering heavy losses, whose regime markets its survival as a victory. But Washington, which possessed the power needed to inflict a military defeat on Iran, did not have a policy capable of capitalizing on that defeat through a settlement that protects its allies and builds a more stable regional order. Between Iran's losses and America's confusion, a vacuum emerged that Tehran now portrays itself as having filled with its victory.

The Abraham Accords at Six: How a New Paradigm Outpaced the Old Peace
Hussain Abdul-Hussain/Middle East 24/September 20/2026
Six years after the Abraham Accords were signed on the White House lawn, perhaps the clearest evidence of how profoundly they have changed the Middle East came not at another diplomatic ceremony, but behind closed doors. Just days before their sixth anniversary, the military chiefs of Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt quietly gathered in Germany under the auspices of U.S. Central Command to discuss Iran and regional security. Several of those states still have no diplomatic relations with Israel, yet their senior commanders were sitting around the same table discussing common threats and common interests.
That scene captures what the Abraham Accords have accomplished better than almost any anniversary speech could. They have transformed Arab-Israeli peace from a fragile, top-down security arrangement into a growing matrix of economic, strategic and human integration, while breaking the old assumption that Arabs and Israelis must first resolve every political dispute before they are permitted to cooperate on anything else.
For forty years, the baseline for Middle Eastern diplomacy was defined by the 1979 Camp David Accords with Egypt and the 1994 Wadi Araba treaty with Jordan. While crucial for regional stability, those earlier agreements effectively became glorified ceasefires—transactional arrangements brokered by Washington in which peace was tied heavily to American financial, diplomatic and military support rather than to a shared vision of regional partnership.
Neither relationship ultimately developed around the idea that peace with Israel, in and of itself, would become an engine for economic growth. Indeed, the Bank of Israel has noted that even decades after the treaties were signed, economic relations with Egypt and Jordan had failed to reach “macroeconomic significance.” The peace was strategically invaluable, but economically and socially it remained cold.
The Abraham Accords shattered this outdated paradigm. Built on the cold calculus of mutual benefit and economic modernization, this new bilateral peace model has outpaced its predecessors by a mile.
The governments of the Abraham Accords approached integration with a completely different mindset. They recognized that partnering with Israel, a high-tech, innovation-driven powerhouse, offered access to advanced technology, defense capabilities, agriculture, water expertise, cybersecurity and the global knowledge economy. Israel, meanwhile, gained access to Gulf capital, new markets, logistics hubs and Arab states whose strategic interests increasingly overlapped with its own.
While geopolitical dividends existed—most obviously Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara—those were merely the initial down payment. The real, compounding returns of the Accords have increasingly come from commercial, security and societal relationships that took on a life of their own.
Nowhere is this paradigm shift more evident than in the trade and tourism data. The UAE anchors this regional transformation. According to official UAE figures, cumulative merchandise trade between Israel and the Emirates reached approximately $14.53 billion between September 2020 and May 2026. Annual goods trade reached $3.25 billion in 2024 and remained above $3.2 billion in 2025, while another $1.24 billion was recorded in the first five months of 2026 alone.
The people-to-people figures are just as striking. Passenger traffic between Israel and the UAE reached approximately 1.53 million travelers in 2025, compared with 892,000 the previous year, an increase of more than 70 percent. At peak capacity, direct air links reached 136 flights per week. What began six years ago as diplomatic normalization has developed into one of Israel’s most heavily traveled regional corridors.
This economic gravity is equally visible in Morocco, which has cultivated a deeply complementary relationship with Israel. UN Comtrade data analyzed by the Observer Research Foundation show approximately $576 million in bilateral goods trade between 2021 and 2024, while the strategic side of the relationship has developed even more dramatically. ORF’s analysis of Abraham Accords trade shows that Morocco’s trade relationship has grown steadily despite political tensions surrounding Gaza.
The Moroccan-Israeli partnership is also rooted in deep historical and human ties, with tens of thousands of Israelis traditionally visiting Morocco each year and hundreds of thousands of Israelis tracing their family origins to the kingdom. More importantly, security cooperation has moved far beyond symbolism. Morocco purchased Israel’s Barak MX air-defense system in a deal reported at roughly $500 million, while Reuters reported in 2024 that Rabat planned to acquire an Israeli reconnaissance satellite in a deal worth approximately $1 billion. That deal proceeded while the Gaza war was raging, demonstrating just how deeply strategic interests had become embedded in the relationship.
Meanwhile Bahrain, which began its journey from a modest and largely symbolic commercial base, has also demonstrated that normalization can create enduring structures even where trade remains relatively small. UN Comtrade data show just over $50 million in cumulative bilateral goods trade from 2021 through 2024, while Israeli data indicate that commerce subsequently rebounded sharply after the regional disruptions of 2025. The significance of Bahrain is therefore less its absolute trade volume than the fact that diplomatic, commercial and strategic relations endured through the most difficult period since the Accords were signed.
The resilience of these ties has proven the maturity of the Abraham Accords framework. Critics long maintained that regional peace would shatter at the first sign of serious conflict. Yet throughout the grueling Gaza war, these bilateral relationships endured. Public anger across the Arab world was real, and governments in Abu Dhabi, Rabat and Manama repeatedly condemned Israeli policies, but political disagreement did not translate into the wholesale dismantling of diplomatic relations.
Unlike the popular misconception that peace requires absolute alignment on every geopolitical issue, the Abraham Accords countries have demonstrated how adult governments interact. They can sharply criticize Israeli military or political decisions while maintaining embassies, trade, strategic cooperation and the legitimacy of the relationship itself. This distinction—between opposing a policy and rejecting the state with which one disagrees—is precisely what was too often absent from older Arab-Israeli diplomacy.
The Iran confrontation has only reinforced that logic. As Bahraini analyst Ahmed Khuzaie recently argued in a Mid.East Journal analysis of the Abraham Accords and Gulf security, normalization in the Gulf is increasingly understood not as ideological convergence with Israel, but as a practical tool for security, deterrence, technology and regional influence. That helps explain how military cooperation has expanded well beyond the formal signatories and culminated in this week’s extraordinary meeting of Israeli and Arab military chiefs.
The profound success of the Abraham Accords can also be measured by the determination of their ideological opponents to discredit them. Islamist networks and Muslim Brotherhood-aligned media have repeatedly attacked Abu Dhabi and other normalization states, accusing them of breaking what they portray as Israel’s regional isolation. Yet the persistence of these attacks betrays an uncomfortable reality for the opponents of normalization: every flight, commercial contract, technology partnership and security relationship makes the old model of permanent confrontation harder to sustain.
Public anger should not be confused with diplomatic collapse. The Gaza war demonstrated that Arab governments could condemn Israeli policy while preserving relationships that they judged to be in their national interest. The tangible benefits of stability, trade and strategic cooperation proved strong enough to survive precisely the kind of crisis that critics predicted would destroy them. If regional spoilers and ideological extremists remain intent on undermining these treaties, it is because the Abraham Accords have already changed the terms of the debate. They have demonstrated that integration can generate its own constituencies, its own economic logic and its own strategic momentum, making normalization increasingly difficult to reverse.
As the region begins to look beyond the Gaza war and toward a new strategic landscape shaped by Iran, trade, technology and shifting alliances, the Abraham Accords have established a new baseline for the Middle East. They have proved that peace is not simply the absence of war, but the presence of relationships worth preserving.
That may ultimately be their greatest achievement: peace has ceased to be merely a piece of paper signed by governments and has become an interest shared by states, businesses and increasingly by people themselves.
**Hussain Abdul-Hussain is the author of The Arab Case for Israel. He is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).

Yazidi armed group YBS to disarm, integrate into Iraqi security forces
Seth J. Frantzman/ FDD's Long War Journal/September 20/2026
The Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS), a Yazidi armed group based in northern Iraq, has agreed to disarm, the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Office said on September 11. In the wake of the agreement, there are moves to stabilize areas around Mount Sinjar, where many Yazidis live, and to help displaced people return. This comes amid a larger push in Iraq to disarm various groups, including Iranian-backed militias, an issue that has also figured prominently in Baghdad’s relations with Washington. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaidi is expected to meet with US President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, which begins its annual general debate in New York on September 22. On September 11, Zaidi met with Yazidi members of the Yazidi Cause Alliance. At the meeting, the prime minister announced that the YBS would begin to hand over its weapons.
“The Prime Minister affirmed that the decision to hand over weapons comes within the framework of building a state of institutions, protecting the unity of national decision-making, and ending the multiplicity of security decision-making centers, stressing that the state will guarantee the rights of members of the Sinjar Resistance Units and the Women’s Units and their sacrifices, by regulating their status and integrating the qualified among them into Iraqi security institutions in accordance with legal and official frameworks,” a statement from the prime minister’s office said.
Murad Ismael, a Yazidi member of parliament who attended the meeting with Zaidi, praised the development. “We welcome a historic agreement to integrate the fighters of the Yazidi resistance, the YBS, into the ranks of Iraq’s official security forces, to bring all weapons under the authority of the state, and to close an important chapter — one that protects our people’s rights within the law and the Constitution,” Ismael posted on X. The YBS was founded in 2007 and has links to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the Kurdish militant group that waged a decades-long insurgency against Turkey before announcing its dissolution in 2025. The YBS has been active across the Sinjar region of northern Iraq, defending the Yazidi minority. Yazidis were targeted in a wave of bombings in 2007 during the Iraqi insurgency. In 2014, the Islamic State attacked Sinjar and committed a genocide against the Yazidis, massacring thousands and kidnapping women and children. Sinjar was liberated from the Islamic State in 2015, with YBS playing a role alongside Kurdish Peshmerga and other groups. In 2017, the Iraqi government clashed with the Peshmerga and took control of the area.
YBS’s role in Sinjar was opposed by Turkey, which viewed it as a PKK threat, with Turkey conducting rounds of airstrikes in the area over the last decade. The YBS also clashedwith the Iraqi Army in 2022. This left the Sinjar area unstable, and many Yazidis who had been displaced in 2014 by the Islamic State did not return. “A key deterrent preventing the return of IDPs [internally displaced people] is the presence of a patchwork of armed groups, including Iraqi federal forces, Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and local armed groups, including the Shingal Protection Units (YBS),” the Rudaw Media Network noted on September 17. The PMF is made up of militias, most of which are backed by Iran and many of which are sanctioned as terrorist groups by the US. These militias are supposed to disarm, along with the YBS, in response to recent Iraqi government efforts, but no final date has been given to complete the process. The YBS’s disarmament may be influenced by events in Syria. The New Region noted on September 16 that the Syrian Democratic Forces’ integration with the state in Syria may resemble the YBS agreement in Iraq. “After meeting the Yazidi Cause Alliance, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi on Friday announced that the all-Yazidi Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS), which have links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) like the SDF, will begin handing over their weapons to the state, while eligible members will be integrated,” The New Region noted on September 16.
Ismael, the Yazidi member of Iraq’s parliament, proposed integrating the YBS into Iraq’s security forces in February 2026, soon after the SDF agreed to integrate into Syria’s new security forces. In addition, both the SDF’s major component, the People’s Defense Units (YPG), and the YBS have links to the PKK, which is slated to disband under a new peace initiative in Turkey. As such, key groups linked to the PKK in Syria and Iraq appear to be undergoing broader efforts to dismantle or integrate their existing armed structures.
Questions remain in Iraq about what comes next. “Reports that armed groups in Sinjar are preparing to surrender their weapons are unfounded, a senior Nineveh security official said Saturday, stressing that no concrete steps have been taken and that more than 4,000 armed fighters remain in the district,” Kurdistan24 reported on September 12. However, Ismael is optimistic that the process will move forward. “A newly formed committee under the auspices of the Iraqi prime minister’s office will oversee efforts to rebuild the disputed district of Shingal [Sinjar] in northern Nineveh province and facilitate the return of thousands of people displaced by the Islamic State (ISIS) attack more than a decade ago, [Ismael] said,” Rudaw noted.
**Reporting from Israel, Seth J. Frantzman is an adjunct fellow at FDD and a contributor to FDD’s Long War Journal. He is the senior Middle East correspondent and analyst at The Jerusalem Post, and author of The October 7 War: Israel’s Battle for Security in Gaza (2024).

Letting the Houthis Control the Red Sea Coast Would Be a Gift to Tehran
Bridget Toomey/FDD-Policy Brief//September 20/2026
What happened to not negotiating with terrorists?
American officials met with a Houthi delegation in Oman in the days after the Iran-backed group’s advance on Yemen’s west coast, which culminated in the September 11 seizure of territory along Bab al-Mandeb, the southern Red Sea chokepoint. The Houthis, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, claimed that the advance is not a threat as the group is only targeting Saudi shipping pursuant to its declaration in July of a maritime blockade of the Kingdom. At the Oman talks, the Houthis supposedly reiterated their commitment to the ceasefire with Washington that ended Operation Rough Rider, the American bombing campaign against the group in spring 2025. The Saudis want American backing. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman called President Donald Trump twice on September 10, as the Houthis were making headway, to request American airstrikes, but Trump refused. The president wants to focus on Iran itself and the Strait of Hormuz. But the conflict in Yemen is not a different war; it’s another front in Tehran’s fight against the United States. The Iranian regime is seeing its leverage slip away as Washington gradually restores the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Letting the Houthis control the Red Sea coast would give Tehran much of its leverage right back.
Oil Markets Unsettled by Arabian Peninsula Instability
As the Houthis advanced, Saudi Arabia reported that a drone attack launched by Iran-backed militias in Iraq forced the closure of its East-West Pipeline, the Kingdom’s critical alternative to Persian Gulf exports. From April until late July, when the Houthi maritime blockade began, the pipeline had enabled an average of over 4 million crude barrels per day (bpd) — around 4 percent of global supply — in Saudi exports via the Red Sea. Brent crude, the global oil benchmark, jumped to around $110 per barrel before settling at over $105 on September 10 as news of the pipeline attack and Houthi advance broke. One week earlier, when the Houthis began ground operations on Yemen’s west coast, Brent closed at just over $95. Oil prices have fallen slightly in recent days — though Brent remains over $100 — as Saudi repair efforts may return some capacity in a matter of days, earlier than previously anticipated.
Axis of Resistance Coordinating Across Theaters
By keeping oil prices high, Tehran wants to force an end to the U.S. blockade that deprives it of oil revenue. Blocking exports via Bab al-Mandeb may make that possible despite setbacks in the gulf. In April, for example, Ali Akbar Velayati, an advisor to the Tehran regime’s Supreme Leader, said that the regime “views Bab al-Mandeb as it does Hormuz.”Despite Houthi attempt to portray the group’s advance as part of their domestic struggle, it is also an integral component of Iran’s war against the United States. President Trump said that Iran was probably behind the recent attack on the East-West Pipeline, which Riyadh attributed to Iran-backed militias in Iraq. In late July, Saudi Arabia assessed that some attacks on its energy infrastructure by these militias were conducted in coordination with the Houthis under the guidance of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Washington Must Rebuff Houthi Attempts at Normalizing Their Position in Yemen
As Washington disrupts Tehran’s leverage over the Strait of Hormuz by using it to move oil, it cannot allow the regime to maintain that same leverage over oil markets and global shipping by controlling a different waterway.
Washington should expand measures to isolate the Houthis — both financially and from weapon supply routes — even if the Trump administration does not want to join in military action against the group. The Treasury should sanction any financial institutions enabling Houthi access to the international system and front companies that enable the group to procure dual-use technologies. The administration should also instruct Oman to block Houthi financial access through institutions in Muscat.
*Bridget Toomey is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Bridget and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow Bridget on X @BridgetKToomey. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

Letting the Houthis Control the Red Sea Coast Would Be a Gift to Tehran
Bridget Toomey/FDD-Policy Brief/September 20/2026
American officials met with a Houthi delegation in Oman in the days after the Iran-backed group’s advance on Yemen’s west coast, which culminated in the September 11 seizure of territory along Bab al-Mandeb, the southern Red Sea chokepoint. The Houthis, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, claimed that the advance is not a threat as the group is only targeting Saudi shipping pursuant to its declaration in July of a maritime blockade of the Kingdom. At the Oman talks, the Houthis supposedly reiterated their commitment to the ceasefire with Washington that ended Operation Rough Rider, the American bombing campaign against the group in spring 2025. The Saudis want American backing. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman called President Donald Trump twice on September 10, as the Houthis were making headway, to request American airstrikes, but Trump refused. The president wants to focus on Iran itself and the Strait of Hormuz. But the conflict in Yemen is not a different war; it’s another front in Tehran’s fight against the United States. The Iranian regime is seeing its leverage slip away as Washington gradually restores the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Letting the Houthis control the Red Sea coast would give Tehran much of its leverage right back.
Oil Markets Unsettled by Arabian Peninsula Instability
As the Houthis advanced, Saudi Arabia reported that a drone attack launched by Iran-backed militias in Iraq forced the closure of its East-West Pipeline, the Kingdom’s critical alternative to Persian Gulf exports. From April until late July, when the Houthi maritime blockade began, the pipeline had enabled an average of over 4 million crude barrels per day (bpd) — around 4 percent of global supply — in Saudi exports via the Red Sea. Brent crude, the global oil benchmark, jumped to around $110 per barrel before settling at over $105 on September 10 as news of the pipeline attack and Houthi advance broke. One week earlier, when the Houthis began ground operations on Yemen’s west coast, Brent closed at just over $95. Oil prices have fallen slightly in recent days — though Brent remains over $100 — as Saudi repair efforts may return some capacity in a matter of days, earlier than previously anticipated.
Axis of Resistance Coordinating Across Theaters
By keeping oil prices high, Tehran wants to force an end to the U.S. blockade that deprives it of oil revenue. Blocking exports via Bab al-Mandeb may make that possible despite setbacks in the gulf. In April, for example, Ali Akbar Velayati, an advisor to the Tehran regime’s Supreme Leader, said that the regime “views Bab al-Mandeb as it does Hormuz.”Despite Houthi attempt to portray the group’s advance as part of their domestic struggle, it is also an integral component of Iran’s war against the United States. President Trump said that Iran was probably behind the recent attack on the East-West Pipeline, which Riyadh attributed to Iran-backed militias in Iraq. In late July, Saudi Arabia assessed that some attacks on its energy infrastructure by these militias were conducted in coordination with the Houthis under the guidance of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Washington Must Rebuff Houthi Attempts at Normalizing Their Position in Yemen  As Washington disrupts Tehran’s leverage over the Strait of Hormuz by using it to move oil, it cannot allow the regime to maintain that same leverage over oil markets and global shipping by controlling a different waterway.
Washington should expand measures to isolate the Houthis — both financially and from weapon supply routes — even if the Trump administration does not want to join in military action against the group. The Treasury should sanction any financial institutions enabling Houthi access to the international system and front companies that enable the group to procure dual-use technologies. The administration should also instruct Oman to block Houthi financial access through institutions in Muscat.
**Bridget Toomey is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Bridget and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow Bridget on X @BridgetKToomey. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

Can anyone stop the Houthis? ..Yemen’s civil war is set to go global
Reuel Marc Gerecht/Unherd/September 20/2026
Yemen has always been defined by its topography. A landscape of narrow coastal plains, mountainous highlands, and a desert interior, has helped preserve tribal identities, blurring and softening sharp religious divisions. If a very modern, post-1979 battle between Sunnis and Shi’ites now defines the country’s politics, a rugged and inescapable geography continues to impose itself. This is clear enough with the Zaydi Shi’ites, now better known by the name of a martyred Islamist leader: Hussein al-Houthi. Combining a deep knowledge of their country’s landscape with revolutionary zeal, the Houthis have coalesced into an unrivalled fighting force, as well as Iran’s best allies in its war against America and Israel – costing Tehran surprisingly little money.
Indeed, the more you learn about the Houthis, the less surprising it becomes that the group should have embarrassed the US Navy in 2024 and 2025 (in a foretaste of the second Iran war, Washington simply gave up firing its expensive missiles at Houthi forces), and fought a large Sunni-Arab coalition to a standstill between 2015 and 2019. Despite intense bombardments, and serious battlefield defeats, the Houthis have retained Sana’a, Yemen’s capital which they conquered in 2014. Only the Israelis, who briefly got into a missile exchange with the Houthis in 2025, have managed to deter them: they went after the Houthis’ oil supplies, energy infrastructure, ports, airports, and, perhaps most important, senior personnel. Sure enough, the Houthis stopped firing at Israel. But either way, it’s little wonder that the Houthis are now back, seizing land along the Red Sea littoral and the islands of Perim and Greater and Lesser Hanish, thereby putting into jeopardy Saudi Arabia’s capacity to export oil via its east-west pipeline.
Without outside support, Sunni Yemenis would have had no chance on the battlefield against their Shi’ite countrymen. The Houthis have received some support from Hezbollah and Iran — but not nearly on the level that Sunnis have received from foreigners since the Sixties. Islamic history has occasionally seen fervent, martial highland peoples descend into conflict with more numerous lowland believers — and usually get the better of them. The Houthis are in this line: mountain Shi’ites who have managed to gain the upper hand over the cosmopolitan and fractious Sunnis.
During the North Yemen Civil War (1962–1970), the Zaydi royalists of the old Imamate survived a massive assault by the republican forces that had overthrown them. The Republicans included predominantly Sunni Yemenis, but also Zaydi Arab nationalists, and were backed by around 70,000 Egyptian troops equipped with Soviet tanks and aircraft. The Zaydi royalists, meanwhile, adopted highly effective guerrilla tactics. Again and again, they descended from their mountain strongholds, absorbing heavy losses. They were not able to capture Sana’a — but they were repeatedly able to regroup and return to the fight.
The war today is vastly more sectarian. Few Zaydis now fight alongside Sunnis, giving the more cohesive, dogged, and fit Houthi forces the advantage.
Still, since the Nineties, support from Shi’ites in the wider region has been crucial in shaping Houthi objectives. The Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah have actively sought to convert Zaydis, who follow a different creed and jurisprudence. These efforts have met some success: perhaps as many as 10% of Zaydis have accepted Iran’s “Twelver” branch of Shi’ism. These conversions are, however, just icing on the cake. Before the Lebanese and Iranians came calling, Zaydism as a faith had considerable revolutionary potential. Historically, Yemen’s Shi’ites have had activist imams: religious leaders who could also command troops. Where the Twelver Shi’ites of Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon could — before the Iranian Revolution in 1979 — sometimes look askance at clerics assuming political power, the Zaydis had no such reservations. Zaydi imams ruled as kings, more or less continuously, from 897 to 1962, when nationalist forces toppled the imamate. The main interruptions came during two periods of Ottoman rule, from 1538 to 1635 and from 1872 to 1918. Even then, the imams did not simply disappear: they retreated into the mountains, where they continued to exercise religious authority and, at times, lead armed resistance to the Ottomans.
Today, a spiritual alignment has unquestionably taken place — and a significant slice of the Zaydi community is now inside the Iranian orbit. The Houthis’ anthem — “God is the Greatest, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse be upon the Jews, Victory to Islam” — would have seemed bizarre to most Zaydis before the radical revivalist movement of al-Houthi. Cursing distant America, or Jews as if they were a global menace, or even Israel as a part of a defining, individual creed would have been too modern.
More or less at war with the “official”, internationally-recognised government of Yemen since 2004, the country’s Shi’ites are on a winning streak. Indeed, since the Saudis, Emiratis, and a coalition of other Arab states tried to humble them from 2015 to 2018, the Houthis’ regional ambitions have grown. They have created their own supply and sanctions-resistant support networks in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, sometimes piggybacking on the Iranians, sometimes moving independently. With Iranian assistance, they figured out how to defy a Saudi naval blockade and US satellite reconnaissance. Indeed, the Houthis have been able to incorporate Iranian strategic planning into their own ambitions as well as any Iranian proxy. They have proven sharp adopters of Iranian-supplied drones and missiles, learning quickly how to build projectiles from either clandestinely delivered parts or from scratch — indeed, they have proved enthusiastic adopters of AI.
It’s also a foregone conclusion that if Iran can gain control of the Strait of Hormuz and charge tolls, the Houthis will attempt to do the same through dominating the Bab al-Mandab, the chokepoint for all trade moving through the Suez Canal — as well as for Saudi oil via its pipeline. Even if Iran fails to dominate the Persian Gulf, indeed, the odds are that the Houthis will still try to curtail Saudi shipping. If successful, the Houthi’s ambitions – and greed — may direct them towards other commercial shipping.
“The Houthis, who not long ago were mostly farmers and shepherds, have thrived in a primitive environment.”
Yemen is a very poor country, and the Zaydi mountain heartland now offers little of the trade that once made the Zaydi elite relatively rich within it. Enormous anger towards Saudis is common. When I was traveling among Yemeni Shi’ites before 9/11 and I needed a conversation starter, aspersing Saudis always worked. So targeting Saudi shipping is a given for the Houthis; and preying on others could become an irresistible financial temptation if they control the Bab al-Mandab. Raiding British and Indian trade in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in the 18th century was very good business for pirates of the Arabian Peninsula until the Royal Navy and Marines convinced them otherwise.
The US maintains Camp Lemonnier, its only permanent military base in Africa and the operational hub of US Africa Command, just across the Bab al-Mandab in Djibouti. President Trump wasn’t persuaded of the merits of using it to deny the Houthis a partial victory against his Navy in 2025. It’s a good bet that Trump will default the responsibility for stopping Houthi extortion onto European navies, especially the French, who also have a naval base at Djibouti. Trump is perennially capricious — but also firm in his conviction that Europeans are freeloaders.
Nonetheless, the problem that the West has with the Houthis is also a microcosm of the problem that the United States has with Iran: there is no clever, low-cost way to neutralise the enemy’s power. When, in 2015, he was the Saudi defence minister, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman clearly understood the long-term threat that the Houthis posed to his kingdom. The prince’s execution of the subsequent war may have been abysmal, but his analysis wasn’t. Neither the Saudis, nor the Emiratis, nor the Egyptians, nor the Jordanians, nor the Americans, nor the Europeans have been willing to put a lot of boots on the ground long enough to neutralise the Houthi war machine. Cairo’s unpleasant experience in Yemen in the Sixties — “Egypt’s Vietnam” — remains in the DNA of Middle Eastern military men. The combined Arab assault on the Houthis from 2015 onwards revealed a wariness of replicating the approach the Egyptians had used — trying to take the Houthis on in their heartland.
The Houthis know this. So do the Iranians, who have seen the most independent of their proxies become their most consequential ally. The strategic potential of Yemen’s Shi’ites now dwarfs the contribution of the Levantine Hezbollah to Iran’s remarkably consistent goal of weakening the West and their allied Arab governments in the Middle East. The Houthis aren’t nearly as sophisticated as the Levantine Shi’ites, who rival the Iranians in their formative contribution to the development of radical Shi’ism, and have proved rather better than the Iranians in maintaining the crucial interpersonal relations between Arab militants. Yet the Houthis, who not long ago were mostly farmers and shepherds, have thrived in a primitive environment. Their relations with Somalia’s Al-Shabaab — a Salafist jihadist outfit, which in 2012 pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda and has often shown a savagery that rivals Islamic State’s — clearly show the Houthis have, like the Iranians, an ecumenical disposition towards anti-Shi’ite but anti-Western Sunni Muslim radicals. If left alone, the Houthis might well develop further, becoming emissaries of Iranian mischief far beyond the Gulf of Aden. Some Islamic militants — the Taliban in Afghanistan; Hamas in Gaza — keep their violence local. They don’t become members of the “global jihad” even though they may host or associate with Muslim radicals who do. But the Houthis’ creed certainly suggests an aspiration that could take them into a larger holy cause, especially if under the tutelage of more worldly Iranians and Levantines. Regardless, the Houthis have offered Tehran the best bang for the buck of all its proxies. We don’t have reliable figures on what the Saudis and Emiratis spent on their multi-year war against Yemen’s Shi’ites, nor what the Iranian subventions were to their co-religionists, but Tehran’s costs were unquestionably a small fraction of those on the other side. The Islamic Republic is now in a deep financial crisis, but supporting low-maintenance, enterprising Yemenis may still be practicable. Strategically, it remains a steal.
If the United States, the Europeans, and most importantly the Arabs who border and depend on the Red Sea, are serious about thwarting the Houthis, then they should revisit the history of the Ottomans in the Arabian Peninsula. They checked the rebellious Zaydi imams with the patient application of brute force. (Even if, as soon as the Ottoman Empire collapsed in 1918, a Zaydi Imamate came right back). That won’t happen again, however, unless the United States leads the way.
Today, there are so far no volunteers for this mission. The experience of the Egyptians in Yemen in the Sixties, like the more recent sojourns led by the Saudis and the Emiratis, all were bitter failures. The treasure expended didn’t match the gains. The Middle East excels at forcing cost calculations. The Houthis and the Iranians are banking that the years since 9/11 have worn down their enemies. They know that in a contest of wills, they have the unassailable high ground.
**Reuel Marc Gerecht is a Resident Scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former Iranian-targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency.

America has never been subservient to Israel
Ben Cohen/Jewish News Syndicate/September 20/2026
The fact remains that what brings the democratic allies together is worth far more than the issues dividing them.
Not for the first time, and likely not for the last, Vice President JD Vance has declared that the United States “cannot let our Middle Eastern foreign policy be subservient to the State of Israel.” The use of the word “subservient” has an unpleasant smell in this context, redolent of the groyper conspiracy theories that would have us believe that the real controllers of policymaking are “the Zionists” and not the politicians we elect.
It is also a strawman argument. U.S. foreign policy has never been “subservient” to the State of Israel, if we understand that to mean that American leaders make decisions that go against our national interest in favor of Jerusalem.
According to Vance, his boss, U.S. President Donald Trump, has been the sole American leader ready to say “no” to the Israelis when saying “yes” would confound American imperatives. “I think that more than frankly any president in the last 40 years, he has shown a willingness to actually part ways with Bibi Netanyahu when he feels like the interests of the American people are different from the interests of the government of Israel,” Vance said.
This is an odd point, to say the least, to make about a man who has frequently described himself as “history’s most pro-Israel U.S. president.”
After all, it was Trump who recognized Israeli sovereignty over both the eastern half of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, when many Democratic Party politicians and European leaders warned that doing so would unleash the fearsome wrath of the entire Muslim world.
It was Trump who withdrew the U.S. from the fatally flawed 2015 nuclear deal with the Iranian regime, again drawing vocal criticism that he had acted against his own country’s interests solely to mollify Israel.
It was Trump who, in 2019, reversed his predecessor Barack Obama’s determination that settlements in Judea and Samaria were “inconsistent with international law.” The following year, he issued a peace plan that would have allowed Israel to retain the vast majority of those settlements. Again, those who criticized Trump depicted him as Israel’s patsy, making decisions that would harm America abroad for the sake of appeasing powerful Jews.
Last but not least, it was Trump who embarked on a joint military operation with Israel against Iran, once more ignoring warnings that doing so would threaten the stability of the “Abraham Accords” that he brokered between Israel and several Arab countries.
None of the apocalyptic scenarios envisaged by the alarmists ever came to fruition. And the reason is that, in all these cases, Trump’s calculations were based on U.S. interests, not Israeli ones. Critically, none of his decisions have prevented him from also clashing with the Israeli government, as he has done on several occasions.
In that sense, Vance would have been on firmer ground if he had argued that the main difference between Trump and past presidents was that his transactional approach to foreign policy yielded more successful outcomes, particularly in bringing Israel and the Arab states closer together. But there isn’t a lot of mileage in claiming that Trump has been readier to stand up to the Israelis than “any president in the last 40 years” because that simply isn’t true.
During Ronald Reagan’s tenure in the White House, bitter disputes erupted with Israel on a range of issues. After the Israeli Air Force bombed Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981, the United States responded by suspending deliveries of F-16s to Israel and then ignored Israeli protests by selling AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia. When Israel went to war against the PLO in Lebanon in 1982, the administration continually pressured Israel to end its siege of West Beirut. And when the American intelligence analyst Jonathan Pollard was unmasked as an Israeli spy in 1985, many inside and outside the administration wondered whether the American-Israeli strategic relationship would survive the blow (it did).
A similar pattern was observable in subsequent administrations.
George H.W. Bush withheld loan guarantees for Israel, fearing the funds would be used to expand settlements. Bill Clinton clashed with Netanyahu over the implementation of the Oslo peace process. George W. Bush clashed with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon over settlement expansion. Obama—Trump’s bête noire—declared that his goal was to put more “daylight” between Washington and Jerusalem, going on to forge the nuclear deal with Iran and abstain on a U.N. Security Council resolution declaring Israeli settlements illegal. Joe Biden paused shipments of 2,000-pound bombs to Israel at the height of the Gaza war triggered by the Hamas atrocities of Oct. 7, 2023, drawing an angry rebuke from none other than Trump, who accused him of having “totally abandoned Israel.”
What this brief review of the historical record demonstrates is that neither Trump nor his predecessors have been “subservient” to Israel, merely that they have exhibited varying degrees of warmth toward the Jewish state, with Trump among the more enthusiastic. But with all of them, whenever they deemed that Israel’s actions did not serve American goals, they said so, and acted accordingly.
That has been the case since the dawn of the relationship with Israel’s declaration of independence in 1948, in the midst of a war in which the Truman administration imposed an arms embargo against the nascent Jewish state as well as on the Arab aggressors.
Yet the fact remains that—whether under Trump or any other president—what brings the United States and Israel together is worth far more than the issues dividing them. There are several reasons for this, but I would highlight the most basic one of all: Israel is the only country in the Middle East where the United States can consider every government a strategic ally, whether led by the right or the left, and where the people are overwhelmingly favorable towards America. The same cannot be said about a single Muslim nation.
That doesn’t mean there won’t be disagreements with varying degrees of seriousness. What it does mean is that we need a more nuanced understanding of why a fundamentally positive relationship is punctuated by quarrels, which less informed pundits then seize on as evidence that America is finally breaking the supposed Israeli stranglehold on its policy formation.
**Ben Cohen is a research fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD), specializing in international organizations, Europe-Middle East relations and global antisemitism/anti-Zionism. A London-born journalist with 30 years of experience, he previously worked for BBC World and has contributed to Commentary, The Wall Street Journal, Tablet and Congressional Quarterly. He was a senior correspondent at The Algemeiner for more than a decade and is a weekly columnist for JNS. Cohen has reported from conflict zones worldwide and held leadership roles at the Anti-Defamation League and the American Jewish Committee. His books include Some of My Best Friends: A Journey Through 21st Century Antisemitism.

The Three Quiet Victors of the Iran War
Sinan Ciddi & Benjamin Acosta/The National Interest/September 20/2026
Turkey, Pakistan, and Qatar have played their hands well since February 28, without disrupting their relations with either the United States or Iran.
As the Iran War wages on, some of its emerging victors never fired a shot. Turkey, Pakistan, and Qatar. With the US rationing its power across the Middle East, these three made themselves indispensable to US diplomacy.
Since the April ceasefire, the debate over who’s winning the Iran War runs along a single axis. One camp contends the Islamic Republic won by merely surviving. On February 28, the campaign’s opening day, American and Israeli air attacks decapitated the Iranian leadership, killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and much of the senior command. Yet, the government—regardless of Mojtaba Khamenei’s fate—reconstituted itself and remains standing. From this perspective, survival marks a substantial victory for the Islamic Republic and frames the United States, the other Gulf states, and Israel as the losers for failing to topple the regime. The other camp treats survival as an accounting error, a theory of victory reduced to still being there when the bombing stops, and blames Washington for refusing to finish what it started. Strategic, irreversible victory has escaped Washington and Tehran alike. But both interpretations suffer from the same flaw: confining the war’s outcomes to the United States and the Islamic Republic.
Surviving a war and achieving an irreversible objective are different things. To date, Iran has achieved an essential process goal—survival—because Washington proved unwilling to pay the costs of toppling the Islamic Republic.
Israel may have achieved a victory by delivering a significant setback to the Iranian nuclear threat and cementing itself as the most integrated US battlefield partner of the 21st century. This contrasts with 1991, when Iraq fired 39 Scud missiles at the Jewish state, and the George HW Bush administration withheld the IFF codes Israel needed to enter coalition-controlled airspace without risking friendly fire. In 2026, American and Israeli forces fought in concert, transforming privileged access to US weapons into an operational alliance.
Turkey’s gains began before the direct war against Iran and accelerated with it. Assad’s December 2024 collapse made Turkey, along with Israel, one of the principal beneficiaries of Iran’s regional decline, displacing both Tehran and Moscow in Syria and the South Caucasus. Rebel leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, whom Ankara sponsored and groomed, now governs Damascus as president. Turkish officers train Syria’s new army, Turkish firms rebuild Syria’s power grid, airport, and other civilian infrastructure, and Turkish advisers help reshape Syria’s state institutions.
The demise of Syria’s Kurds under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) marks another big victory for Ankara. In January 2026, Syrian forces moved on the Kurdish-held districts of Aleppo, Arab tribal components defected, the front folded within days, and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi signed a 14-point integration agreement on terms far harsher than the March 2025 framework he had spent a year resisting. Washington simply declined to save the SDF. Tom Barrack, then-special envoy for Syria as well as ambassador to Turkey, announced that the organization’s role as the primary anti-ISIS force had expired. Ankara spent a decade seeking this outcome and obtained it without directly attacking the SDF.
A generous reading of Pakistan’s role holds that, during the most dangerous Middle East crisis in recent memory, Islamabad accomplished what China, France, Germany, India, and the United Kingdom could not. With Trump favoring personal relationships over aging and financially burdensome parchment alliances, the emerging international system appears to reward states with initiative rather than past credentials. This view is correct, but only half the story. Pakistan helped broker a US-Iran memorandum of understanding, but that agreement collapsed within weeks of its signing.
Rather than brokering peace, Islamabad won a franchise. Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief, converted geography and a personal rapport with Trump into ownership of the diplomatic switchboard. Vice President JD Vance spent 20 hours across the table from Iranian negotiators in Islamabad, marking the highest-level direct US-Iran contact since 1979, all on Pakistani real estate. By June, Pakistani officials sat alongside Qatari negotiators at talks in Bürgenstock, Switzerland.
Pakistan filled a vacuum created by an administration that trusted no one else. Vacuums narrow, but Pakistan’s broader ascent has already produced something more durable. In August, Islamabad joined Ankara and Riyadh in the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, whose collective-defense clause echoes NATO’s Article 5 security guarantee.
Qatar took a different route. Beginning with the October 7 iteration of the war, Qatar made itself an indispensable mediator between Hamas and Israel. And, in September 2025, the Israeli air force targeted Hamas’ core leadership in Doha. A couple of weeks later, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahuapologized to Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani for violating Qatar’s sovereignty and promised that Israel would not strike inside Qatar again.
That same day, Trump issued Executive Order 14353 declaring that the United States would treat an armed attack on Qatar as a threat to US security. Doha converted its indispensability to Washington into American protection, then, as the Iran front opened up, expanded its mediation franchise from Gaza to Iran. War almost always brings about unexpected outcomes. The Turkish, Pakistani, and Qatari victories are not alike and not necessarily permanent. The lesson for Washington is that it can work with Ankara, Islamabad, and Doha, when necessary. Still, it should condition diplomatic prestige, security guarantees, and military sales on concrete lasting outcomes. Further, Washington needs to cultivate alternative channels so that no one broker remains indispensable.
**Sinan Ciddi is a senior fellow on Turkey at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, DC. Sinan has over two decades of research experience focused on Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy, with bylines in Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, Politico, Newsweek, The National Interest, and 19FortyFive. He frequently provides commentary on various media outlets, including BBC, CNN International, DW News, France 24, the Greek Current Podcast, and CBS’s John Batchelor Show. Sinan is also an associate professor of national security studies at Marine Corps University and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.
**Dr. Benjamin Acosta is a senior network analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Benjamin holds a PhD in political science from Claremont, an MA in Middle East studies from Ben-Gurion University, and a BA in international relations from California State University. He also studied at the Center for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies at the American University of Beirut. He held a postdoctoral fellowship in the Department of Political Science at The Ohio State University. Benjamin’s previous appointments include: chief data officer at tech startup Arcturus Intelligence, assistant professor of political science and international studies at Louisiana State University, lecturer of government at IDC Herzliya, and senior fellow at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT).

The War Inside the War
Jonathan Schanzer/Commentary/September 20/2026
The Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, thrust Israel into wars on seven fronts. A new book by Yonah Jeremy Bob, of the Jerusalem Post, and Elliot Kaufman, of the Wall Street Journal, chronicles an eighth front: the battle inside Israel’s war cabinet. In the War Room details the clashes between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Minister without Portfolio Benny Gantz, and Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant. We’ve heard about these conflicts in bits and pieces over the past three years, but until the release of this new book, they lacked a cohesive narrative.
Bob and Kaufman weave the compelling story of Israel’s remarkable achievements on the battlefield against the Iranian regime and its terror proxies together with the utter dysfunction of a war cabinet comprising three politicians. Each had his own aspirations for power, and each had his own distinct understanding of what victory would mean in what is undeniably Israel’s longest and most complex war in the country’s history.
Individually and together, the authors enjoyed remarkable access to the key players involved. Bob embedded with the IDF to visit the tunnels of Gaza and spoke with top officials and their deputies throughout the war. Kaufman interviewed top players in both Israel and America as the war dragged on. The result is the most compelling long-form narrative of Israel’s war to date.
The book reveals the chaos during the early hours of the war. Netanyahu was not awakened until 6:29 that morning, even as Hamas fighters were gunning down Israeli citizens across large swaths of the country’s south. Shockingly, Netanyahu and IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi didn’t speak to each other until the fighting had gone on for four hours.
Bob and Kaufman also detail the dynamic in the U.S.-Israel relationship, including the surprising alliance between Netanyahu and U.S. President Joe Biden early in the war as both men worked to keep the war from widening to involve Hezbollah in Lebanon. This meeting of Machiavellian minds did not last long, as Netanyahu ultimately embraced a more aggressive posture. This put him at odds with Biden and his lieutenants and ultimately led to the (then) unthinkable: America withholding armaments from Israel.
In the War Room also provides glimpses of Hamas’s depravity. The Palestinian terrorist group scuttled three prior mass invasion plans in April 2022, October 2022, and April 2023. But it was only on October 7, 2023, that the group finally unleashed a force of around 5,600 at 119 different locations. The fact that Hamas operated out of tunnels beneath hospitals and schools is, by now, well known. The group invested hundreds of millions of dollars in a subterranean paramilitary maze instead of alleviating the economic challenges faced by some 2 million Gazans. But the authors reveal that Hamas also fought from a large tunnel beneath a cemetery in the heart of Khan Younis.
The unspeakable evil didn’t end there. Months into the war, as negative public sentiment over the death toll of the war continued to mount, with an estimated 30,000 killed, Hamas officials sought to double down. “We have the Israelis right where we want them,” read one Hamas leader’s message reviewed by Kaufman and the Wall Street Journal.
The war with Hezbollah, including the “Grim Beeper” operation and the air strikes that killed longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah a year after the Hamas invasion, is described in terrific detail. The authors reveal that Hezbollah nearly discovered the explosives in their beepers at “earlier times.” And they ask a compelling question about whether “Israel might have saved itself more than a year of war in the north” had the beeper op been executed in the early days after October 7, as Defense Minister Gallant had suggested. Predictably, a “battle over credit” among the war-room principals erupted over these major battlefield achievements.
The Iranian regime’s decision to attack Israel on April 13, 2024, was “the second-largest miss of the war” for Israeli intelligence, the authors claim. Israeli brass simply didn’t believe that the mullahs would make such a move following Israel’s strike on an Iranian outpost in Syria. The episode only reinforces a profound truism of war, namely, that wars produce only one thing consistently: unintended consequences.
When the Iranians fired additional ballistic missiles in October 2024, the Israelis still had a policy goal of not being “dragged into a regional war.” Whatever fears existed at that time were clearly no longer present by 2025, when Israel launched its 12-day war that severely damaged the Iranian military and nuclear program, capped off with the massive American strike on Iran’s nuclear sites. The next round, which began on February 28 of this year, provided clear evidence of a shift in Israeli thinking.
This halting journey from 2023 to 2026 was, in part, the result of the dysfunctional relationships among Israel’s top leaders. This is perhaps the most important theme of In the War Room. Early alignment among them was key to helping Israel rebound from the shock of Hamas’s initial success. But that alignment didn’t last. The positions of Netanyahu, Gallant, and Gantz began to shift in the face of American pressure to reduce the intensity of the war, international pressure to end the war, and new threats from across the war’s seven fronts. Interestingly, as the authors note, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar refused to make a hostage deal with Israel in March 2024 because he knew of the war-room divisions and thought they signaled a profound weakness in his enemy.
To be fair, the pressures facing these three men were enormous. Conflicts among them were inevitable, and so was the collapse of their mechanism, which required that all three agree on a given strike or strategy. Competition and mistrust had existed between them long before the war began. “Policy disagreements gave way to deeply personal spats,” the authors note. Gantz quit in June 2024. Netanyahu fired Gallant in November 2024. The distrust among them took its toll. Today, the prime minister alone charts the course of Israel’s historic multifront war.
The end point for this book is the close of 2025. Obviously, the 2026 war with Iran, undertaken in full partnership with the United States, created an entirely new set of possibilities, problems, dysfunctions, and confusions. The upcoming Israeli elections in October could be the culmination of this story or the beginning of a new chapter. Perhaps the authors will write a sequel.
For now, however, history continues to unfold in real time. Netanyahu’s achievements, with and without the input of the war room, are hard to deny. But the fact that the October 7 attacks occurred on his watch cannot be ignored. As the authors rightly note, “The buck must stop with the prime minister.”
**Jonathan Schanzer is executive director of Foundation for Defense of Democracies and contributing editor to Commentary.

Selected Face Book & X tweets on September 21/2026
Alberto Miguel Fernandez
Two Christian schools that had been seized by the Assad regime 60 years ago have been handed back to Syrian Christians by the new Damascus government.