English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For October 24/2026
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news

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Bible Quotations For today
The Parable of the king who gave a wedding banquet for his son, but those he invited did not come…For many are called, but few are chosen.
Matthew 22/01-14: “Once more Jesus spoke to them in parables, saying: ‘The kingdom of heaven may be compared to a king who gave a wedding banquet for his son. He sent his slaves to call those who had been invited to the wedding banquet, but they would not come. Again he sent other slaves, saying, “Tell those who have been invited: Look, I have prepared my dinner, my oxen and my fat calves have been slaughtered, and everything is ready; come to the wedding banquet.” But they made light of it and went away, one to his farm, another to his business, while the rest seized his slaves, maltreated them, and killed them. The king was enraged. He sent his troops, destroyed those murderers, and burned their city. Then he said to his slaves, “The wedding is ready, but those invited were not worthy. Go therefore into the main streets, and invite everyone you find to the wedding banquet.” Those slaves went out into the streets and gathered all whom they found, both good and bad; so the wedding hall was filled with guests. ‘But when the king came in to see the guests, he noticed a man there who was not wearing a wedding robe, and he said to him, “Friend, how did you get in here without a wedding robe?” And he was speechless. Then the king said to the attendants, “Bind him hand and foot, and throw him into the outer darkness, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth.” For many are called, but few are chosen.

Titles For The English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on October 23-24/2026
Statement of Condemnation and Denunciation Regarding the terrorist attack on Hammoud Church in Karak – Jordan And the terrorist attack in Hebron – West Bank/Elias Bejjani/October 23/2026
Why Is Benjamin Netanyahu’s Re-Election a Strategic Interest for Lebanon?/Elias Bejjani/October 23/2026
Elias Bejjani’s Writings and Commentaries/Joseph Hanna/October 24/2026
Report: Dahr al-Baidar truck seized but 7 others passed through the area
Dahr al-Baidar explosives case sparks Cabinet dispute over Judicial Council referral
All you need to know about Thursday's Cabinet session
Report: Hezbollah won't remain silent if warrants issued for its officials
Israeli strike targets Ali al-Taher
Report: Tampa talks were 'very bad' and 'political escalation' expected
Is there a Berri-backed US-Turkey proposal concerning Lebanon?
Aoun condemns deadly church attack in Jordan, expresses solidarity
PM Salam says Lebanon's transport crisis is a state responsibility
Geagea 'in the same boat' with Aoun and Salam as Cabinet defers explosives case
On Lebanon's border, Israelis' support for Netanyahu drops before election
What happens to Lebanon-Israel talks after Israel's election?
Electricité du Liban to cut power to public institutions over unpaid bills
Lebanon: Judicial Warrants Target Suspects in Hezbollah Explosives Case
Fear of Another War Weighs on Lebanon amid Regional Tensions
How Do We Attract and Keep Arab Investors in Lebanon?/Fouad Siniora/Asharq Al-Awsat/October 23/2026
The War and the Future of Greater Lebanon/Mustafa Fahs/Asharq Al-Awsat/October 23/2026

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on October 23-24/2026
Gunmen open fire at church in Jordan killing at least 7 people
2 soldiers killed in West Bank shooting; IDF believes Palestinian gunmen planned larger attack
Netanyahu Says Extensive West Bank Military Operation ‘On the Way’ After Attack
Hebron attack raises security concerns ahead of Israeli elections
Far-right Israeli Minister Orders Buildings Demolished in West Bank after Attack
Netanyahu Orders West Bank Closure as Attack Wounds Israelis before Election
Did Hamas Threaten Israel with Another October 7 Attack?
Gunman kills one, wounds four near Paris; French prosecutors suspect terrorism
Trump Weighs Quick End to Iran War Against Letting Conflict ‘Wither’
UAE: Oil Spill from Tanker Affects Beaches in Umm Al Quwain
Coalition Destroys Ballistic Missile, Drones, Denies Houthi Claims about Saudi Threats Against Tribal Gatherings
Trump Says He Will Fix Any Starlink Access Problem in Ukraine
Middle East, European FMs Hold Talks on Regional Developments in Istanbul
Hundreds of Syrians Protest Repeated Israeli Incursions
Ukraine embassy in Washington reopens after suspicious object causes brief disruption

Titles For The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on October 23-24/2026
Paris in Flames: Disorder Spreads, France Clings to Its Taboos/Drieu Godefridi/Gatestone Institute./October 23, 2026
Egypt May Finally Step Up Against the Houthis/Bridget Toomey and Mariam Wahba/FDD- Policy Brief/October 23/2026
Eastern Libya’s Endorsement of Maritime Agreement With Turkey Undermines U.S. Allies in the Mediterranean/Sinan Ciddi/FDD.Policy Brief/October 23/2026
U.S. Must Cut Off Chinese Firms That Profit From Stolen American AI/Susan Soh and Annie Fixler/FDD- Policy Brief/October 23/2026
Washington Should Resist Russia’s Gulf Mediation Bid/Keti Korkiya and Bridget Toomey/FDD-Policy Brief/October 23/2026
Encryption isn’t enough to protect data wherever it goes/Georgianna Shea/CyberScoop/October 23/2026
Erdogan’s “Pious Generation” Goes Global/Sinan Ciddi/The Patient Revolution/October 23/2026
Iran’s Ongoing War against the Arabs!/Radwan al-Sayyed/Asharq Al Awsat/October 23/2026
Iraq Says: We Have No Houthis/Mishary Dhayidi/Asharq Al Awsat/October 23/2026
Selected Face Book & X tweets on October 24/2026

Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on October 23-24/2026 (Some of the News reports below are translated from Arabic by AI)
Statement of Condemnation and Denunciation Regarding the terrorist attack on Hammoud Church in Karak – Jordan And the terrorist attack in Hebron – West Bank
Elias Bejjani/October 23/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/10/158518/
Today October 23, 2026, two cowardly terrorist crimes were committed that warrant the strongest terms of condemnation, denunciation and revulsion:
First: The massacre at Hammoud Church of the Greek Orthodox in Karak Governorate – Southern Jordan
The fact that an armed group of terrorists stormed a house of God in a vehicle, and opened fire indiscriminately and continuously for five minutes inside Hammoud Church and at its entrance, during a funeral ceremony attended by between 150 and 200 people, resulting in at least 7 martyrs and 34 wounded, most of them elderly between 50 and 70 years of age, is a barbaric, savage, jihadi, takfiri, criminal, satanic act that has nothing to do with humanity, religion, or morality.
Turning a burial ceremony into a bloody massacre inside a sacred place dedicated to prayer, peace and mercy reveals the true ugly face of jihadi terrorism, and confirms that political, terrorist, jihadi Islam in both its Sunni and Shiite wings constitutes an existential danger not only to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and its Christian-Muslim national fabric, but also to international peace and security and to human civilization in every country of the world.
This vile and cowardly act targets Jordanian national unity, targets the authentic Christian presence in the Mashreq, and targets all values of coexistence and peace.
Second: The terrorist operation at a checkpoint near Hebron
In the same terrorist context, severe condemnation is recorded for the treacherous terrorist operation that took place on Friday morning at a temporary checkpoint at the exit of the city of Hebron, where two armed Palestinian gunmen, armed with an assault rifle, a pistol and a large quantity of ammunition, opened fire on the checkpoint, leading to the killing of two Israeli soldiers and the wounding of three others with varying injuries.
Targeting soldiers while performing their security duty, while preliminary investigations by the Israel Defense Forces indicate that the terrorists were planning to carry out a larger attack against civilians on Route 35, is a cowardly terrorist act condemned by all standards, especially after the terrorist Hamas movement described the operation as “heroic”.
The Principled Position
Although different in location, both crimes stem from one swamp, the swamp of global jihadi terrorism, and this calls for the following positions:
Political, terrorist, jihadi Islam, in its Sunni wing represented by Hamas, ISIS, Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram, and its Shiite wing represented by the Iranian regime, Hezbollah, the Houthis and the rest of the militias, is the number one enemy of human civilization. There is no peace or stability in the Middle East and the world without uprooting this dark, takfiri ideology from its roots.
The downfall of the criminal terrorist regime in Tehran, as the mastermind, financier and central supporter of global terrorism, has become an urgent international necessity to protect world peace.
The complete and final elimination of the terrorist organizations Hamas, Hezbollah, Boko Haram, ISIS and all of Iran’s arms, militarily, financially and ideologically, is a human and civilizational demand that tolerates no settlement, appeasement or containment.
Holding accountable, exposing and pursuing the states and regimes that finance, arm and harbor jihadi terrorism, led by Iran, Qatar and Turkey, and every regime that seeks to strike civilization and its values by exporting extremism, is the responsibility of the free international community.
The pure blood that was shed in Hammoud Church in Karak, and the blood that was shed at the Hebron checkpoint, cries out to the world: Enough silence, enough complicity, enough justification of terrorism.
Mercy to the innocent martyrs, a speedy recovery to the wounded, and shame and disgrace to the murderous jihadi terrorists and their supporters and financiers forever.
*The author, Elias Bejjani, is a Lebanese expatriate activist
Author’s Email: Phoenicia@hotmail.com
Author’s Website: https://eliasbejjaninews.com

Why Is Benjamin Netanyahu’s Re-Election a Strategic Interest for Lebanon?
Elias Bejjani/October 23/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/10/158503/
As a Lebanese citizen who believes in state sovereignty, the independence of national decision-making, and Lebanon’s distinctive national identity, I view the re-election of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu next Tuesday, and his ability to form the next Israeli government, as an option that directly aligns with Lebanon’s supreme national interests at this critical juncture. Over the past several years, Netanyahu has demonstrated that he is among the Israeli leaders most determined to confront Iran’s regional project. This project, which involves supporting and arming Hezbollah and turning southern Lebanon into an advanced military platform, has for decades constituted the principal obstacle to restoring Lebanon’s full sovereignty. Treating Hezbollah as an illegitimate armed force linked to Tehran and seeking to dismantle its military infrastructure are consistent with international resolutions, foremost among them Resolution 1701, as well as with the aspirations of Lebanese citizens who want to establish a single state that monopolizes weapons and the decisions of war and peace.
Netanyahu’s position is not limited to confronting the Iranian axis and its regional allies. He also embraces a political, regional, and international vision that regards ideological extremism, represented by hard-line political Islam and destructive terrorist and jihadist organizations, whether Sunni or Shiite, as a common source of threats to stability in countries around the world, particularly in the Middle East. Accordingly, the military campaign against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad following the events of October 7, along with the determination to disarm these organizations and prevent them from rebuilding their military capabilities, clearly reflects this approach. His efforts to weaken the Iranian regime itself are likewise rooted in the firm conviction that the regime’s continued existence means the continued financing and support of armed networks in Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen. This position rejects selective distinctions between forms of extremism and seeks to protect the region from a culture of violence and militias.
In this context, the existential risks associated with Iran’s nuclear capabilities emerge as a central threat that cannot be ignored. The Iranian regime’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, or its attempt to approach the nuclear threshold, threatens not only Israel but also poses a grave danger to the stability of the entire region, particularly Lebanon. If Tehran acquires nuclear weapons, it will gain a deterrent shield that could enable it to escalate its support for its militias in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq without genuine fear of effective retaliation. It would also turn Hezbollah into an even bolder instrument for imposing a foreign agenda on the Lebanese people. Furthermore, nuclear proliferation in the Middle East could open the door to a devastating regional arms race, increase the likelihood of proxy wars or direct confrontations, and undermine any prospect of building a genuinely sovereign Lebanese state. Preventing the Iranian regime from acquiring nuclear capabilities is not merely an Israeli interest; it is a shared Lebanese, regional, and international interest, because an Iranian nuclear arsenal would increase the risks of chaos, blackmail, and the erosion of sovereignty in neighboring countries.
On the diplomatic front, Netanyahu has played a pivotal role in the Abraham Accords, which opened new horizons for cooperation between Israel and several Arab countries, including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. These agreements were not merely a symbolic normalization of relations; they represented the beginning of a process of practical cooperation among countries that share opposition to Iranian expansionism and ideological and jihadist extremism. In this context, the presence of an Israeli leadership committed to this course strengthens the prospects for expanding the circle of regional stability, an outcome that serves Lebanon’s interests in both the medium and long term.
Consequently, any weakening of Israel’s resolve to confront Hezbollah and the Iranian regime would give both parties an opportunity to regroup and restore their capabilities. For Lebanon, this would mean prolonging the existing situation: a weak state, illegitimate weapons, borders exposed to persistent tensions, and a collapsed economy. Therefore, the continuation of firm Israeli leadership, capable of maintaining military and diplomatic pressure, could help create more favorable conditions for restoring Lebanese sovereignty.
Noteworthy in this context is the public support that President Donald Trump has expressed for Netanyahu, whom he has described as a strong and courageous leader and a partner in confronting the Islamic Republic. This position reflects a convergence of views on the priority of containing the Iranian threat and preventing the regime from acquiring nuclear capabilities that could endanger regional and international peace.
In conclusion, this is not a matter of blindly supporting any external party, but rather of making a realistic assessment of the balance of power and the interests at stake. Lebanon needs a regional environment in which foreign-backed militias have less ability to impose their agendas on states and peoples. In this context, Netanyahu’s re-election and his ability to continue his policies toward Iran and Hezbollah appear, in my view, to be the option most consistent with the Lebanese people’s goal of building a free, independent, and fully sovereign state.
*The author, Elias Bejjani, is a Lebanese expatriate activist
Author’s Email: Phoenicia@hotmail.com
Author’s Website: https://eliasbejjaninews.com

Elias Bejjani’s Writings and Commentaries
Joseph Hanna/October 24/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/10/158522/
Elias Bejjani’s writings and political commentaries represent a sustained, highly committed, and ideologically consistent body of work devoted to Lebanon’s sovereignty, independence, national identity, and future. Through years of persistent writing, publishing, documenting, and political commentary, Bejjani has established a recognizable voice within the Lebanese diaspora, particularly among those who advocate restoring the Lebanese state’s full authority and ending Iran’s influence through Hezbollah.
Publishing extensively in both Arabic and English through his website, eliasbejjaninews.com, Bejjani has demonstrated an exceptional level of personal dedication to his work. His output encompasses political analysis, historical documentation, commemorations of martyrs, religious reflections, and commentaries on developments in Lebanon and the wider Middle East. He frequently supplements his articles with videos and multimedia material, extending the reach of his message to Lebanese readers at home and throughout the diaspora, as well as to English-speaking audiences.
What distinguishes Bejjani’s work is not simply the firmness of his political positions, but also the persistence with which he continues to research, write, publish, and defend them. His journalism reflects a deeply held conviction that Lebanon’s independence is not merely a political objective, but a national and moral responsibility. His tone is often urgent, uncompromising, and confrontational, reflecting his belief that the country’s sovereignty, identity, and future are at stake.
I. His Core Ideological Framework
Bejjani approaches Lebanon’s crises through a clear distinction between the sovereign Lebanese state and what he considers successive forms of foreign domination and internal complicity. In his interpretation of modern Lebanese history, the country has endured successive periods of external interference, beginning with Palestinian armed organizations, followed by the Syrian Baathist regime, and culminating, in his view, in the Iranian regime’s influence through Hezbollah.
He regards Hezbollah not simply as a Lebanese political party or resistance movement, but as an Iranian-backed military organization operating according to the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih. He argues that its independent military structure has undermined the authority of the Lebanese state, compromised national decision-making, and contributed to Lebanon’s repeated involvement in regional conflicts. He also maintains that Hezbollah’s influence constrains the freedom of the Lebanese Shiite community, whose members, like other Lebanese citizens, should enjoy the right to determine their political future without coercion or armed domination.
Iran occupies a central place in Bejjani’s political analysis. He views the Iranian regime’s regional strategy and its support for armed proxies as fundamental threats to Lebanese sovereignty, regional stability, and the security of the wider international community.
These convictions have led him to advocate consistently for:
Full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1559, 1680, and 1701, particularly regarding Lebanese sovereignty, the authority of the state, and the disarmament of armed groups outside its control.
Severing diplomatic relations with Iran and expelling its ambassador from Lebanon.
Ending Lebanon’s transformation into what he frequently describes as a permanent battleground or a regional mailbox for conflicts driven by foreign powers.
Establishing peace and mutual recognition between Lebanon and Israel under international auspices, which he considers a potential pathway toward resolving outstanding border issues, restoring stability, and enabling national recovery.
These positions form the foundation of his political writing and provide continuity across a substantial body of work produced over many years.
II. The Major Themes of His Writing
1. A Persistent Campaign Against Hezbollah and Iranian Influence
Opposition to Hezbollah and Iran is the most consistent theme in Bejjani’s political commentary. He repeatedly examines the consequences of Hezbollah’s military autonomy, its regional alliances, and its influence over Lebanese political institutions.
He attributes substantial responsibility to Hezbollah and the wider political system surrounding it for Lebanon’s political paralysis, recurring wars, displacement, and erosion of state authority. In some of his writings, he also addresses political assassinations, the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings, and the 2020 Beirut port explosion within his broader critique of armed organizations, political impunity, and Iranian influence.
A notable feature of his work is his refusal to accept the argument that Hezbollah’s weapons are indispensable to Lebanon’s protection. He instead maintains that genuine national security requires a sovereign state, a unified chain of command, and an army capable of defending the country under constitutional authority.
Bejjani also insists on distinguishing Hezbollah from the Lebanese Shiite community as a whole. He argues that no political or religious organization should claim exclusive authority to represent an entire community or determine the fate of its members through an independent armed structure.
His sustained attention to these issues reflects a long-term commitment to a single central objective: restoring the Lebanese state’s exclusive authority over weapons, security, and decisions concerning war and peace.
2. Criticism of Lebanon’s Political and Religious Leadership
Bejjani’s criticism extends beyond Hezbollah to political leaders, public officials, and religious figures whom he believes have failed to defend Lebanon’s sovereignty with sufficient determination.
He is particularly critical of leaders who, in his assessment, accommodate Hezbollah’s armed dominance, accept foreign interference, or avoid confronting the fundamental question of state authority. His language can be severe, and he sometimes employs terms such as subservience, political dependency, and dhimmitude to express his opposition to what he considers the surrender of national principles.
His criticism also reaches Christian politicians and clergy whom he believes bear a particular responsibility for defending Lebanon’s historical identity, constitutional pluralism, and independence.
This aspect of his writing demonstrates that his commitment to Lebanese sovereignty is not confined to criticizing one political organization or foreign power. He also directs his scrutiny toward those within Lebanon’s established political and religious institutions whom he considers responsible for the country’s continuing weakness.
For Bejjani, defending sovereignty requires more than declarations and patriotic rhetoric. It demands political courage, consistency, accountability, and a willingness to confront powerful interests when national principles are at stake.
3. Opposition to Political Islam
Another recurring element in Bejjani’s work is his opposition to political Islam when religious doctrine is used to justify political domination, armed expansion, or the subordination of national institutions to ideological authority.
His criticism encompasses both Shiite and Sunni expressions of political Islam that he considers incompatible with Lebanese sovereignty and pluralism. He frequently invokes painful episodes in Lebanon’s history, including the Aishiyeh massacre and the assassination of Dany Chamoun and his family, to underline his condemnation of political violence and the failure to achieve accountability for past crimes.
Historical remembrance occupies an important place in this work. Bejjani returns repeatedly to the experiences of victims, the sacrifices of martyrs, and the consequences of political extremism. His objective is not simply to recall past events, but to argue that national reconciliation cannot be built on forgetting victims, concealing responsibility, or denying historical suffering.
His approach reflects a belief that the preservation of Lebanon’s pluralistic identity requires both the defence of individual freedom and the rejection of any political project that places an ideological authority above the state.
4. His Position on Israel and the West
Bejjani’s support for Western engagement and his advocacy of Lebanese-Israeli peace distinguish his political outlook from that of many Lebanese and Arab commentators.
He has supported Israeli military actions when he believes they weaken Hezbollah or Iran’s regional influence. He also argues that direct negotiations and a peace agreement between Lebanon and Israel, conducted under appropriate international auspices, could help resolve longstanding border disputes and remove Lebanon from the cycle of recurring wars.
His position rests on the conviction that Lebanon should pursue its own national interests rather than remain subordinated to regional conflicts or the strategic priorities of Tehran.
At the same time, Bejjani criticizes Western governments, particularly certain US Democratic administrations, when he believes their policies have accommodated Iran or failed to confront the expansion of Iranian influence through armed proxies.
These views remain politically contentious in Lebanon and across the Arab world. Nevertheless, they form an integral part of his broader political project: a sovereign Lebanon, oriented toward democratic institutions and international partnerships, capable of determining its own future without armed coercion by domestic or foreign actors.
5. Lebanese Christian Identity, Faith, and Historical Memory
Beyond daily political developments, Bejjani devotes considerable attention to Lebanon’s Christian heritage, particularly its Maronite tradition, and to the historical experiences of Lebanese Christians.
His articles commemorate martyrs, national anniversaries, religious figures, and tragic events that have shaped the collective memory of Lebanese communities. Saint Charbel and other figures of Christian spirituality also appear in his religious writings, alongside biblical reflections and appeals to prayer, conscience, forgiveness, and moral responsibility.
These articles reveal another dimension of his commitment. For Bejjani, Lebanon is not merely a geographical territory or a political system; it is a historical and cultural homeland whose identity has been shaped by generations of sacrifice, faith, and attachment to freedom.
He frequently presents Lebanon’s Christian communities as important contributors to the country’s pluralistic character and historical connections with the West. His writing emphasizes the preservation of this heritage against ideological and political forces that he believes threaten Lebanon’s diversity and independence.
His commemorative and religious work also serves a personal and national purpose: keeping the memory of those who sacrificed their lives for Lebanon alive for younger generations, including Lebanese expatriates who may be geographically distant from their ancestral homeland.
6. Advocacy for International Action to Restore Sovereignty
Bejjani’s frustration with Lebanon’s prolonged political paralysis has led him, in some of his more forceful articles, to advocate stronger international involvement in restoring the authority of the Lebanese state.
He has described Lebanon as a country whose institutions have been weakened or effectively held hostage by armed and political interests. In this context, he has raised the possibility of international supervision or robust enforcement mechanisms under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter if Lebanese institutions prove unable to implement their obligations concerning sovereignty and security.
Such proposals are controversial and raise serious questions about national independence, constitutional legitimacy, and the practical limits of external intervention. They nevertheless illustrate the extent of Bejjani’s concern about the gap between Lebanon’s formal sovereignty and the state’s ability to exercise effective authority throughout its territory.
His willingness to advance such proposals also reflects his conviction that the crisis cannot be resolved through declarations alone. He calls for concrete implementation of international commitments and measures that, in his view, would allow Lebanon to recover the functions of a normal sovereign state.
III. The Characteristics of His Work
1. A Consistent and Uncompromising Voice
Bejjani writes with a sense of urgency and conviction. His vocabulary is frequently forceful, employing terms such as terrorism, occupation, betrayal, criminality, and the culture of death to describe what he considers threats to Lebanon’s independence.
This style reflects his belief that the country faces a fundamental struggle over its identity and future rather than a routine disagreement among political parties.
His uncompromising approach has helped establish a recognizable editorial identity. At the same time, the intensity of his language can limit opportunities for dialogue with those who disagree with his interpretations or policy proposals.
2. Sustained Publishing in Arabic and English
One of the most significant characteristics of Bejjani’s work is the persistence of his publishing activity. Through his website and associated media platforms, he maintains a substantial record of articles and commentaries in both Arabic and English.
This bilingual approach enables him to address two important audiences: Lebanese readers who follow political developments in their native language and international readers who seek perspectives on Lebanon’s internal crisis, Hezbollah, Iran, and the wider Middle East.
The combination of written articles and video material further expands his reach. It also reflects a willingness to adapt his publishing methods to changing media habits while maintaining his central editorial priorities.
Maintaining such a body of work requires sustained personal effort: identifying developments, formulating arguments, preparing articles, publishing material, and preserving a continuing record of political and historical events. His output demonstrates a long-term commitment to keeping Lebanese affairs in public discussion, even when the subjects are controversial or the political circumstances discouraging.
3. A Strong Moral and Religious Dimension
Bejjani’s political writing is frequently informed by Christian theology, biblical references, and appeals to conscience, shame, justice, and accountability before God and history.
He treats political responsibility as a moral question as well as a matter of constitutional order. In his view, silence in the face of injustice, the abandonment of victims, and the acceptance of political subordination are not merely strategic errors; they can also constitute failures of conscience.
This moral framework connects his political commentary with his religious and commemorative writings, giving his work a broader character than conventional daily political reporting.
4. Persistence, Volume, and Long-Term Commitment
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Bejjani’s publishing career is its continuity. Over many years, he has returned to the same fundamental questions: Who exercises authority in Lebanon? Who controls the weapons? Who determines whether the country goes to war? And what must be done to restore genuine independence?
His continued engagement with these questions demonstrates a level of dedication that extends beyond occasional commentary or reaction to breaking news.
He has maintained his publishing work across political crises, regional wars, changing governments, and successive periods of uncertainty. Rather than abandoning his central concerns when public attention shifts elsewhere, he repeatedly returns to them, documenting events and connecting current developments to Lebanon’s longer historical experience.
Supporters of his outlook may regard this persistence as evidence of principle and personal commitment. Critics may see the same continuity as an indication that his analysis remains confined within a relatively fixed ideological framework. Both observations are relevant to understanding the nature of his work.
IV. Strengths and Criticisms
Strengths from a Sovereignty-Oriented Perspective
Bejjani’s principal contribution is his sustained insistence that Lebanon cannot function as a fully sovereign state while an armed organization maintains an independent military structure and exercises substantial influence over national decisions.
His criticism of Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran and his advocacy of state control over weapons and decisions of war and peace overlap with the positions of several Lebanese opposition figures and governments that regard Hezbollah’s military role as incompatible with full state authority.
He has also consistently drawn attention to United Nations resolutions, the importance of national accountability, and the need to prevent Lebanon from being drawn into conflicts driven by external interests.
Equally important is his commitment to documentation and remembrance. By repeatedly publishing articles about political developments, historical tragedies, religious occasions, and the sacrifices of Lebanese individuals and communities, he contributes to a continuing written record of the issues that shape his understanding of the country.
His bilingual publishing activity gives this record a wider potential audience and allows his arguments to circulate beyond Lebanon’s geographical boundaries.
Limitations and Criticisms
A balanced assessment must also acknowledge several limitations of his approach.
First, the centrality of Hezbollah and Iran in his analysis can leave less room for examining other causes of Lebanon’s crisis, including sectarian power-sharing arrangements, corruption across political communities, financial mismanagement, institutional weakness, and the responsibilities of the wider political establishment.
Second, his sharp language can make constructive engagement with opposing viewpoints more difficult. Political disagreement does not necessarily demonstrate disloyalty, and the distinctions between political compromise, ideological disagreement, and collaboration deserve careful examination.
Third, his support for Israeli military operations in certain circumstances and his advocacy of international supervision remain deeply controversial. These positions require consideration of civilian suffering, international law, Lebanese national interests, and the practical consequences of proposed security arrangements.
Finally, his emphasis on Christian historical memory, while central to his identity and editorial interests, may leave some readers seeking a broader account of the experiences and historical narratives of Lebanon’s other communities.
These criticisms do not erase the significance of his sustained publishing effort. Rather, they help distinguish the value of documenting a committed political viewpoint from the separate question of whether every interpretation or policy proposal within that viewpoint is persuasive.
V. Overall Assessment
Elias Bejjani can be described as a dedicated Lebanese expatriate writer, journalist, and political activist whose work is driven by a strong commitment to national sovereignty, independence, and the preservation of Lebanon’s distinctive identity.
His writing is advocacy journalism rather than detached academic analysis. It combines political argument, historical remembrance, religious reflection, and calls for action, all organized around a relatively consistent set of convictions.
What merits particular recognition is the persistence with which he has pursued these subjects over many years. He has continued to write, publish, document, and comment on Lebanon’s crises in both Arabic and English, seeking to keep questions of sovereignty, accountability, national identity, and foreign interference before the public.
His work reflects a belief that journalism should not merely record events but also challenge prevailing narratives, preserve historical memory, and defend principles that the writer considers essential to the nation’s survival.
At the heart of Bejjani’s political project is the conviction that Lebanon cannot recover its independence while decisions about war and peace remain outside the effective authority of its constitutional institutions. He therefore calls for the restoration of state sovereignty, the implementation of international resolutions, the end of Iranian political and military domination, and the establishment of a stable Lebanon capable of determining its own future.
His positions on Hezbollah, Iran, Israel, and international intervention remain open to legitimate debate and criticism. Yet his sustained commitment to expressing and documenting those positions is an important part of understanding his place within Lebanese diaspora journalism.
Ultimately, Bejjani’s body of work represents more than a series of isolated political commentaries. It is a continuing personal and editorial undertaking shaped by his attachment to Lebanon and his determination to keep its sovereignty and future at the centre of public discussion.
Whether readers agree or disagree with his conclusions, the consistency of his efforts, the breadth of his publishing activity, and his continued engagement with Lebanon’s political and historical struggles demonstrate a longstanding commitment to the causes he has chosen to defend.

Report: Dahr al-Baidar truck seized but 7 others passed through the area
Naharnet./October 23, 2026
The explosives truck seized in Dahr al-Baidar was not the only one that passed through that area, diplomats quoted a report received by a foreign embassy in Beirut as saying. According to the Nidaa al-Watan newspaper, the report estimated that seven trucks passed along that road from the Bekaa to Beirut, and that the two individuals in the truck were not the only ones tasked with such a mission, with investigations focusing on identifying other involved individuals. The report adds that Hezbollah has formed “separate cells -- each consisting of two or three people -- with no cell aware of the other, which complicates the investigation.”A Lebanese judge on Tuesday ordered two Hezbollah officials to appear for questioning over their alleged involvement in the delivery of the explosives seized in Dahr al-Baidar, a judicial official told AFP. Lebanese authorities had been carrying out investigations after arresting two suspected Hezbollah members accused of transporting half a ton of explosives, which the Iran-backed group subsequently said were part of its "capabilities" to be used against Israel. Lebanese authorities last year committed to disarming Hezbollah after months of cross-border hostilities culminated in a 2024 war between the group and Israel. But Hezbollah drew Lebanon into the Middle East war this year by attacking Israel, which responded with heavy strikes and a ground invasion. In June, Lebanese and Israeli authorities signed a framework agreement which involves the disarmament of Hezbollah, a gradual Israeli withdrawal from territories it occupies, and the deployment of the Lebanese Army to the area. Hezbollah, the only armed group that refused to disarm after Lebanon's 1975-1990 civil war, has rejected surrendering its weapons and the direct negotiations with Israel.

Dahr al-Baidar explosives case sparks Cabinet dispute over Judicial Council referral
LBCI./October 23, 2026
The referral of the Dahr al-Baidar explosives case to the Judicial Council appears to go beyond simply pursuing the investigation. Informed sources said the wording of the referral drafted by Justice Minister Adel Nassar suggests that Hezbollah as a whole is being referred to the Judicial Council. During a Cabinet session, Minister Mohammad Haidar, who is aligned with Hezbollah, objected to the referral, describing it as politically motivated. President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam did not object to the substance of the referral but raised concerns about its timing, citing the need to follow up on the investigation. This led to a heated exchange with Lebanese Forces ministers and the justice minister. Sources supporting the referral said the case concerns the seizure of 800 kilograms of C-4 and TNT explosives in the Dahr al-Baidar area. They said Hezbollah lawmaker Hassan Fadlallah acknowledged that the explosives belonged to the group, making it responsible for the incident and subject to prosecution. The sources added that the use of these explosives, regardless of their intended target, threatens Lebanon's security. If used domestically, they would endanger public safety, while their use against Israel would also pose a security threat because of the potential Israeli response. According to the sources, Thursday's Cabinet session did not mark the end of the matter. The justice minister remains determined to raise the referral to the Judicial Council again when he considers the circumstances and available information appropriate.

All you need to know about Thursday's Cabinet session
Naharnet/October 23, 2026
Cabinet decided Thursday in a session at the presidential palace to postpone referring Hezbollah's explosives case to the Judicial Council until investigations are concluded, prompting Lebanese Forces ministers to walk out of the session in protest. Local media reported on Thursday and Friday that Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri had advised Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun against referring the case to the Judicial Council — the country’s highest criminal court for national security issues — to avoid a confrontation with Hezbollah.
Reports said Amal and Hezbollah ministers participated in the session after receiving guarantees that there would be no surprise vote on the referral.Before the session, Berri voiced his support for Lebanon's army — tasked with dismantling Hezbollah's weapons in southern Lebanon. "The army is a red line," he said.During Thursday's session, Aoun praised Berri's stance on supporting the Lebanese Army, safeguarding civil peace, and remaining open to dialogue, while PM Salam reaffirmed his rejection of the storage and transport of illegal arms.

Report: Hezbollah won't remain silent if warrants issued for its officials
Naharnet./October 23, 2026
If Cabinet goes all the way in the probe into Hezbollah’s explosives shipment and judicial warrants are issued against Hezbollah officials, the party “will not remain silent,” sources close to Hezbollah said. “Its rejection could escalate into movements on the ground,” the sources told Al-Jadeed television. “The maximum compromise the party would accept is referring the Dahr al-Baidar shipment file to the Military Court as a settlement to avoid escalation,” the sources added. A Lebanese judge on Tuesday ordered two Hezbollah officials to appear for questioning over their alleged involvement in the delivery of the explosives seized in Dahr al-Baidar earlier this month, a judicial official told AFP. Lebanese authorities had been carrying out investigations after arresting two suspected Hezbollah members accused of transporting half a ton of explosives, which the Iran-backed group subsequently said were part of its "capabilities" to be used against Israel. Lebanese authorities last year committed to disarming Hezbollah after months of cross-border hostilities culminated in a 2024 war between the group and Israel.But Hezbollah drew Lebanon into the Middle East war this year by attacking Israel, which responded with heavy strikes and a ground invasion. In June, Lebanese and Israeli authorities signed a framework agreement which involves the disarmament of Hezbollah, a gradual Israeli withdrawal from territories it occupies, and the deployment of the Lebanese Army to the area. Hezbollah, the only armed group that refused to disarm after Lebanon's 1975-1990 civil war, has rejected surrendering its weapons and the direct negotiations with Israel.

Israeli strike targets Ali al-Taher
Naharnet./October 23, 2026
An Israeli strike targeted Friday the Ali al-Taher ridge while artillery shelled the outskirts of Zawtar al-Sharqiyeh in southern Lebanon. Forces set forests ablaze in al-Qantara on Friday and carried out detonations in al-Khiam overnight.Meanwhile, drones were flying over Beirut and its southern suburbs. Overnight, artillery shells hit Mayfadoun, Zawtar al-Sharqiyeh, Baraashit and Wadi Slouqi.

Report: Tampa talks were 'very bad' and 'political escalation' expected
Naharnet./October 23, 2026
The Tampa meetings between Lebanon and Israel, the results of which were described as "very bad," along with the conclusions of the investigation into the Hezbollah explosives truck, “will place Lebanon before a political and security escalation,” diplomatic sources said.
“The American side informed the Lebanese side in Tampa that the end of the year will mark the termination of the operations of all international forces in Lebanon. Consequently, no one will remain in the South except the Lebanese Army and the Israeli army,” the sources told Al-Jadeed television.“The U.S. side wishes to exit the mediation in favor of keeping negotiations bilateral between Lebanon and Israel, but the official Lebanese stance was negative, which exacerbated the position of Washington and Tel Aviv,” the sources added. “We expect political escalation targeting the military and the political authority in the coming phase, based on the outcomes of Tampa,” the sources said. Separately, international warnings have been delivered to Lebanon emphasizing the necessity of disassociating itself from any Israeli-Iranian escalation, the sources added.

Is there a Berri-backed US-Turkey proposal concerning Lebanon?
Naharnet./October 23, 2026
There is “no U.S.-Turkey proposal concerning Lebanon,” nor are there “any U.S.-backed proposals to change the structure of Lebanese politics established by the Taif Accords,” U.S. State Department Spokesman Tommy Pigott has said, in response to a media report in this regard.
“The United States remains fully committed to working with Lebanon and Israel on the Trilateral Framework to end the cycle of conflict once and for all by implementing its key pillars:
-Disarming Hizballah, a terrorist proxy of Iran
-Achieving long-term security for Israel and Lebanon
-Establishing peaceful neighborly relations between both countries, with mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity,” said Pigott in a post on X. “We welcome support from international partners in achieving those goals,” he added.
Pigott was responding to an X post by veteran journalist and war correspondent Elijah J. Magnier, who claimed that Iran has rejected “a plan to disarm Hezbollah proposed by Speaker Nabih Berri, as suggested by Turkey and the U.S. administration.”“The communication between Hezbollah and Berri is not optimal when Berri sent a delegation to meet with the Iranian speaker (Mohammad Bagher) Qalibaf without Hezbollah's knowledge. The Turkish-U.S. proposal consisted of sharing power equally between the Christian, Shia and Sunni, the head of the army to be a Shia and the delivery of all heavy weapons to Iran,” Magnier wrote in English.

Aoun condemns deadly church attack in Jordan, expresses solidarity
LBCI./October 23, 2026
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun condemned an attack targeting worshippers at a church in Jordan’s Karak area, which left several people dead and others injured. Aoun described the attack as a violation of religious and humanitarian values, warning that terrorism seeks to undermine coexistence and fuel discord among communities. Expressing Lebanon’s solidarity with Jordan, Aoun extended his condolences to King Abdullah II, the Jordanian government and people, and the victims’ families, wishing the injured a speedy recovery. He also voiced confidence in Jordanian security agencies’ ability to identify those responsible and ensure justice.

PM Salam says Lebanon's transport crisis is a state responsibility
LBCI./October 23, 2026
Prime Minister Nawaf Salam on Friday held the Lebanese state responsible for the country’s public transportation crisis, saying the lack of alternatives forces citizens to rely on private cars or bear transportation costs beyond their means. Salam spoke at the Grand Serail during a meeting titled “Toward Developing Public Transport in Lebanon,” organized by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport in cooperation with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), with the participation of Public Works Minister Fayez Rasamny. Salam linked the crisis to years of neglect of public infrastructure and delayed reforms, saying it did not begin with Lebanon’s financial collapse. Rather, he said, it dates back to damage caused by the 1975-1990 civil war and the failure to establish an integrated transportation network afterward, which entrenched reliance on private vehicles. He said the World Bank estimated about a decade ago that the crisis was costing Lebanon more than $2 billion annually. He noted that time lost in traffic comes at the expense of productivity, while fuel, maintenance, and transportation costs consume a significant share of household incomes. Salam described improving public transportation as a practical way to increase purchasing power and expand employment opportunities. He called for more buses and routes in Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre and Zahle, along with reliable schedules, fair fares, dedicated bus lanes and accessible services for older people and people with disabilities. Salam said the plan's success would ultimately be measured by how much time citizens regain and how much money they save.

Geagea 'in the same boat' with Aoun and Salam as Cabinet defers explosives case
Naharnet./October 23, 2026
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea voiced his support for President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and called for immediate judicial action regarding Hezbollah's confiscated explosives, in an interview on Thursday night on MTV’s Sar El Waqt.
"The Lebanese Forces considers itself in the same boat as President General Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam until further notice," Geagea told host Marcel Ghanem, adding that the explosives case "must be referred without delay to the Judicial Council, as it directly threatens national security, civil peace and state authority.""The claim that investigations must conclude before transferring the file to the Judicial Council is simply inaccurate," he said. Cabinet decided Thursday in a session at the presidential palace to postpone the referral until the investigations are completed, leading LF ministers to walk out of the session in protest.Geagea called for early parliamentary elections, describing parliament as "largely paralyzed," but said he remains hopeful despite everything.

On Lebanon's border, Israelis' support for Netanyahu drops before election
Associated Press./October 23, 2026
Kiryat Shmona has long been a bastion of support for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud party. But that loyalty is no longer ironclad. Once a bustling commercial center, Israel's northernmost city was temporarily evacuated three years ago after being battered by rockets from nearby Lebanon, and it still feels half-empty even though the attacks have mostly subsided. Although the town remains staunchly conservative, there are rumblings of displeasure with Netanyahu's handling of the latest war against Hezbollah, and that could bode poorly for him in Israel's election Tuesday. Vowing to stop Hezbollah's attacks, Netanyahu led a bombing campaign in Lebanon and invaded the country twice since 2023. More than 4,000 Lebanese have been killed, and Israeli troops have occupied a swath of southern Lebanon, leveling multiple towns and displacing an estimated 1 million people. Still, Hezbollah remains active. Some in Kiryat Shmona say Israel should have been even tougher; others say they no longer trust that Netanyahu cares about them. Eti Ben Shabat, 64, says in previous elections she had always followed her family in voting for Likud, almost without thinking. But in recent years, she said, something snapped. She pointed in part to Netanyahu's broken promises to bring security to the north and dismantle Hezbollah. "I don't want the lies to continue," she said.
In previous elections, support went heavy for Netanyahu
Netanyahu is unlikely to lose Kiryat Shmona entirely. But even a small dip in its support — and that of other traditional strongholds — could spell trouble for him. It could tip a very tight election to the man aiming to replace him, Gadi Eisenkot. Or it could strengthen far-right parties, which would likely back Netanyahu to remain prime minister but would then have even greater power in a ruling coalition. Kiryat Shmona has always supported right-wing parties, particularly Likud. In the last elections held in 2021 and 2022, around 50% of voters there chose Likud, compared to a quarter of voters nationwide, according to the Central Elections Committee. "Kiryat Shmona, the way the city is socioeconomically and religion-wise, it is made for the right and specifically Likud," said Sami Malul, 72, a retired Likud city councilor who served as the town's acting mayor in 2008.
But the town is reeling from the war. The government evacuated Kiryat Shmona and dozens of other towns and villages along the Lebanese border for more than a year – from the time Hezbollah began firing on Israel after Hamas' Oct. 7, 2023, attack on southern Israel until a ceasefire with Hezbollah was reached in late 2024. Netanyahu claimed to have subdued Hezbollah. So trust in him shattered among some in Kiryat Shmona when Hezbollah missiles again started hitting in March after Israel and the U.S. launched their war on Iran. Israel's subsequent occupation of southern Lebanon has reduced but not stopped Hezbollah fire. Efforts by the Lebanese army to remove Hezbollah from southern Lebanon have made little progress. Kiryat Shmona claims that nearly 80% of its 22,000 residents have returned, but locals say the real figure is closer to 50%. Streets feel empty and abandoned. On the main commercial drags, several shops remain shuttered. Others are open but devoid of customers. Malul insists the government handled the war and the evacuation well, prioritizing residents' safety. He argued Kiryat Shmona has faced attacks since its founding and Netanyahu isn't to blame for the current situation.
Many others feel the same.
"We really love Bibi, and we can't choose anyone else, but he should see the needs of his people," said Maimon Amsalem, using Netanyahu's nickname. "Keeping our security is the most important thing, we don't want anything else." For some, three years of war triggers a dramatic shift
Nissan Zeevi, a third-generation resident of northern Israel who lives in a town adjacent to Kiryat Shmona, has voted for Likud as long as he can remember. But this year he is running for a seat in parliament with the Beyachad opposition party, furious over what he calls Netanyahu's "abandonment of the north."During the most recent war with Hezbollah, Zeevi founded Lobby 1701, an activist group advocating for better security in the north. He wants the Israeli military to increase its attacks against Hezbollah and maintain its buffer zone in southern Lebanon until the Lebanese government identifies Hezbollah as a terror organization.
"Residents in the north have been in a war for three years that hasn't ended," said Zeevi. "You can see the people's great frustration and great disappointment in Netanyahu."
"Netanyahu still has his base here, who will go with him through fire and water. But people have much more political awareness now," said Zeevi. "After 20 years, he needs to make way for new leadership."
In a small town, voting along family lines
Around town, there's little evidence that elections are just days away, and little outward excitement for Likud or Netanyahu. A few scattered campaign posters for the smaller right-wing parties flutter at intersections or are glued onto mobile bomb shelters. Few residents wanted to speak about politics, citing a general feeling of hopelessness and frustration. No candidates have offered a concrete plan for the conflict with Hezbollah, beyond offering vague promises of "strong defense."
In northern Israel as a whole, support for Netanyahu dropped from around 29% just before the last election in 2022 to around 17% in a poll conducted earlier this month for Agam Labs at Hebrew University. Nimrod Nir, the director of Agam Labs, said most Likud voters frustrated with Netanyahu will likely support hardline parties like Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) and the Religious Zionist Party, which advocate tough military action against Israel's enemies.
Waiting outside a downtown hairdresser in Kiryat Shmona, Ben Shabat talked about her decision to support Eisenkot, a former military chief who ordered disproportionate force in response to Hezbollah attacks when he was a general during a 2006 war. Ben Shabat said she trusts Eisenkot as a more honest leader than Netanyahu, who she feels made little effort to connect with residents in the north and sent soldiers to fight while his own son was in a luxury apartment in Miami. She also pointed to his ongoing corruption trial. Netanyahu made a brief campaign stop in the town on Tuesday. He visited a high school and university, events that were closed to the public, but did not walk around downtown to mingle with residents, as other candidates have done.
Her decision to vote for Eisenkot wasn't easy in a place where Likud support is a matter of identity more than ideology. The town is overwhelmingly made up of Mizrahi Jews, who arrived from Arabic-speaking countries in the Middle East and North Africa in the 1950s.
Mizrahi Jews often identify with the right and especially Likud, having faced discrimination by the European-descended elites that traditionally dominate Israeli government, military and business institutions. "Kiryat Shmona is like a small family, we're always helping each other, it's one of the things I love about it," Ben Shabat said. But that close-knit support also comes with social pressure to vote a certain way. At a recent meetup for Eisenkot supporters, the room was packed, but people did not want photos taken of the audience, worrying what their family or neighbors would think, Ben Shabat said. "It's a small place, so people aren't speaking about it openly," she said. "But inside, people really want a change."

What happens to Lebanon-Israel talks after Israel's election?
LBCI./October 23, 2026
The outcome of Israel's upcoming election could have a direct impact on the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations that began in April, with several scenarios emerging depending on who will form the next government. If Benjamin Netanyahu remains in power, Israel could maintain its current approach of linking a withdrawal from Lebanese territory to the disarmament of Hezbollah and the dismantling of its military infrastructure. Netanyahu recently said Israel would remain in what it calls a security zone in South Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed. Under this scenario, negotiations could continue, but a rapid breakthrough would remain unlikely. A second scenario would see the opposition take power, whether under former military chief Gadi Eisenkot or former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. A change in leadership would not necessarily mean a change in Israel’s security policy toward Lebanon. Eisenkot, like Netanyahu, supports maintaining a security zone inside Lebanese territory, arguing that disarming Hezbollah is a long-term process that would require the involvement of a multinational force. Bennett has also backed keeping the security zone in South Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed, while calling for economic and diplomatic pressure on the group alongside support for the Lebanese government. He has gone further by warning that Israel could directly strike Iran if Hezbollah launches an attack against Israel.
The third scenario is an inconclusive election that fails to produce a coalition capable of quickly forming a government. Israel could then enter a period of political consultations and deadlock, delaying key decisions on the Lebanon file. Military and technical meetings could continue in the meantime as the sides await the formation of a new government. However, political paralysis would not necessarily translate into a military lull. According to some observers, Israel could continue carrying out strikes in Lebanon and potentially escalate its operations even while the political process remains stalled. One factor could ultimately prove decisive regardless of who becomes Israel’s next prime minister: the United States' stance. Washington is sponsoring the negotiations, and its ability to bridge differences and exert pressure on both sides to implement their respective commitments could play a key role in determining whether the talks make meaningful progress.

Electricité du Liban to cut power to public institutions over unpaid bills
LBCI./October 23, 2026
Electricité du Liban (EDL) announced that it will cut electricity to public administrations, public institutions and independent agencies, including water utilities, that have failed to pay their outstanding bills despite repeated warnings. The measure will take effect on the morning of Monday, Nov. 2, 2026, with government hospitals exempt from the decision. EDL urged the concerned entities to settle their outstanding dues before the deadline to avoid power cuts, adding that the statement serves as official notification to all entities affected by the measure.

Lebanon: Judicial Warrants Target Suspects in Hezbollah Explosives Case
Beirut: Youssef Diab/Asharq Al-Awsat/October 23/2026
The investigation into a Hezbollah explosives shipment has widened, with Lebanese authorities issuing search notices for two people who went into hiding after being summoned for questioning.Lebanese Army intelligence and the Internal Security Forces' Information Branch are also examining data extracted from phones linked to the case. Meanwhile, authorities have been unable to bring in two Hezbollah officials previously ordered to appear for questioning, as the group refuses to hand over wanted members and demands the return of the truck and its cargo.
Search notices issued as new suspects emerge
Judicial authorities have taken further action as preliminary investigations uncover new information. A judicial source told Asharq Al-Awsat that Judge Claude Ghanem, the government commissioner to the Military Court, had issued search notices for the wife of detainee Haitham Amhaz and the owner of the truck that transported the explosives. The two were summoned for questioning by the Lebanese Army's Intelligence Directorate but failed to appear and went into hiding, the source said.The source added that investigators had made progress in identifying additional people suspected of involvement in the shipment. The move marks a new development in the security investigation, which continues to examine evidence related to the shipment and those involved in transporting it. It also adds two names to the list of wanted individuals, while orders to bring in two Hezbollah officials known as "Sajed" and "Zulfiqar" remain unenforced. Hezbollah refuses to hand over suspects, demands explosives returned. Despite developments in the investigation, Hezbollah continues to demand that the Lebanese state return the truck and its cargo of explosives, while refusing to allow wanted officials and members to appear for questioning. The group has also escalated its challenge to the Lebanese state, declaring that it would treat "any attempt to arrest one of its officials or members as an Israeli act of aggression." The judicial source said the preliminary investigation was continuing on two parallel tracks, led by Lebanese Army intelligence and the Internal Security Forces' Information Branch, despite the failure of those summoned to appear.The source stressed that the investigation would continue regardless of whether the wanted individuals were handed over, saying the procedures would run their course. Investigators examine phones and communications. The source said data extracted from the phones of detainees Ali al-Kurdi and Haitham Amhaz, as well as Amhaz's wife's phone, had yielded information that investigators were verifying and cross-checking against other findings. The information remains under review, with no final conclusions or decisions on possible further action, the source said. The examination of phone data has become particularly important because investigators have been unable to question the wanted individuals.The source said investigators were focusing on the content of communications and the nature of the connections revealed by the data. "Important information has undoubtedly emerged and is being examined to determine the responsibility of everyone connected in some way to this shipment," the source said.

Fear of Another War Weighs on Lebanon amid Regional Tensions
Beirut: Paula Astih/Asharq Al-Awsat/October 23/2026
Lebanese people are once again confronting the possibility of war as mounting regional tensions raise fears that their country could be drawn into a wider conflict, either through Hezbollah’s involvement in a conflict involving Iran or renewed fighting with Israel.
The uncertainty is compounded by Washington’s unresolved decision on whether to resume military operations against Iran, Hezbollah’s silence over how it might respond and the Lebanese state’s inability to ensure the country remains outside the regional confrontation.
Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri acknowledged “serious concerns” that a full-scale regional war could turn Lebanon into one of its battlegrounds, but cautioned that there was no concrete information pointing to such an outcome.
“We are still dealing with analysis and possibilities, not information,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat, noting that even those directly involved in mediation between Washington and Tehran lacked definitive answers.Mitri denied that official delegations visiting Lebanon recently had advised authorities to prepare for war. The decision to resume hostilities, he explained, would ultimately depend on US President Donald Trump, Iran’s response and Israel’s position.
“The war against Lebanon has not stopped in the first place. What we fear is that it will intensify again,” he said. Asked about the government’s preparations for another round of fighting, Mitri pointed to its limited resources. “The state is doing everything it can on the relief front, but our capabilities are extremely limited.”Iran-backed Hezbollah has given little indication of whether it would join a broader confrontation if Washington resumed its military campaign against Iran.
Reports suggest the group is making military and relief preparations in anticipation of renewed hostilities. Unconfirmed accounts have also said that Iran instructed Hezbollah to raise its military readiness. Political analyst Qassem Kassir, who closely follows Hezbollah’s position, said the group had been preparing for the possibility of fresh Israeli attacks since the previous war ended.
“After every war, there is a review of what happened, lessons are drawn and preparations are made for any future confrontation,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.
Such measures were only natural given Israel’s continuing attacks on Lebanon, he explained. But Kassir warned against drawing conclusions about Hezbollah’s intentions in the event of a US-Iranian confrontation, noting that even the likelihood of such a conflict remained uncertain.
“Even if war breaks out, many questions remain. What kind of war would it be? What would its repercussions be? How might it develop?” he wondered. Hezbollah does not announce its decisions in advance, he explained. Its response would depend on the nature and scale of any fighting. While preparations for different scenarios were to be expected, Kassir said there were no signs on the ground of an impending large-scale conflict. The anxiety is already shaping decisions among residents of South Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs.
Those who can afford it continue to rent apartments in Mount Lebanon, the Iqlim al-Kharroub area and other locations considered safer when clashes between Hezbollah and Israel erupt.
For families who remain in vulnerable areas, the fear of returning to emergency shelters has become a constant concern. Fatima M., 41, who works at a shopping center on the outskirts of Beirut’s southern suburbs, recalled taking refuge in Amchit, about 40 kilometers north of the capital, during earlier fighting. “We are genuinely afraid of being displaced again,” she told Asharq Al-Awsat.
“I work in the southern suburbs, but the shelter where I stayed was in Amchit. We cannot endure any more tragedies or disasters. It is time for us to live in peace, like everyone else.”
Lebanon still has 63 shelters housing displaced people, including 44 educational institutions and 11 institutes and other facilities affiliated with the Education Ministry. Ministry sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that buildings no longer used for teaching had been made available for emergency accommodation.

How Do We Attract and Keep Arab Investors in Lebanon?
Fouad Siniora/Asharq Al-Awsat/October 23/2026
I was deeply moved by a series of calls I received from several friends in the Arabian Gulf countries, specifically from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. All of them are prominent businessmen who have invested in Lebanon, known for their affection for the country and its people, and their continuous interest in exploring new investment opportunities here. The core of these communications centered on their frustration over the difficulties and complications they are encountering in Lebanon. These challenges are now pushing some of them to consider either liquidating a portion of their current investments or refraining from launching new ventures in the country. This situation stems from the regulatory hurdles and obstacles they face - issues that relevant Lebanese state officials should be highly attentive to and actively addressing. There is an urgent need to eliminate these barriers and make serious efforts to boost Lebanon's investment environment, ensuring it becomes favorable, attractive, and accessible for new capital. Furthermore, proactive steps must be taken to provide essential facilitation to Arab counterparts, encouraging them to seize new investment opportunities. Such measures would ultimately enable them to contribute to creating much-needed jobs for Lebanese citizens while strengthening the mutual interests between Lebanon and these sister nations.In this regard and within this context, the difficulties faced by prominent Emirati businessman Khalaf Al Habtoor in Lebanon serve as a primary case in point. Al Habtoor initially suffered the loss of a portion of his bank deposits in Lebanon - a hardship shared by many Lebanese citizens. Regrettably, persistent procrastination, hesitation, confusion, and a lack of direction continue to prevent Lebanese officials from reaching reasonable, convincing, and equitable solutions to this intractable and dangerous crisis.Beyond financial losses, Al Habtoor has been subjected to significant harassment, escalating to verbal assaults and threats. Such treatment is fundamentally uncharacteristic of the Lebanese people and remains entirely unacceptable when directed at Arab counterparts. Consequently, these actions have dampened their enthusiasm and restricted their willingness to contribute toward helping Lebanon navigate its growing crises.
These practices collectively reached the attention of senior Lebanese officials, yet failed to prompt any communication, driving Al Habtoor to close several establishments he had founded in Lebanon. This move resulted in the layoff of several hundred employees at those institutions.
On another note, it is worth highlighting that Al Habtoor had taken the initiative many years ago to establish a major healthcare facility in the Harrar area of Akkar, a region considered the most marginalized in Lebanon. Additionally, he consistently made sure, on numerous occasions and during the difficult circumstances Lebanon endured, to provide relief aid across multiple regions as an expression of his affection and support for Lebanon and the Lebanese people.Oddly, no Lebanese official has taken the initiative to contact Al Habtoor as they should have, nor have they looked into his complaint, examined his grievances, or shown any sensitivity toward the problems he faces in Lebanon. Consequently, there has been no initiative to work, as much as possible, toward addressing these issues he has faced - even at a bare minimum level, following the popular adage, "welcome me warmly rather than feed me."
Under the difficult circumstances that Lebanon has endured and continues to face, the country is in dire need of initiatives that encourage Arab investors to explore new investment opportunities in our nation, making the provision of facilities to them a necessity. These initiatives and remedies must focus on removing the obstacles that confront both current and potential investors, as part of a fundamental effort aimed at improving and facilitating the investment climate in Lebanon. In this regard, it might be beneficial for Lebanese officials to consider and announce the establishment of a dedicated small cell or unit acting as an open window within the IDAL institution. This unit would be accessible to both current and potential investors, tracking the issues and complaints raised by Arab counterparts. It would then relay these complaints in a structured and organized manner to relevant officials, particularly within the concerned ministries, to work toward resolving them as much as possible.This approach could also involve bringing these issues, cases, and problems to the attention of the Lebanese prime minister to address them, find effective and appropriate solutions, prevent their escalation, and mitigate their severe repercussions and consequences on Lebanon and the Lebanese economy. Will anyone take the initiative?

The War and the Future of Greater Lebanon
Mustafa Fahs/Asharq Al-Awsat/October 23/2026
The level of anxiety is rising among the Lebanese in general, and southerners in particular, with fear of what is coming, which is no longer unknown. The Israeli plan has become clear in the statements of Israeli officials, while Lebanon lives a bitter reality torn by the imbalance of political balances and internal division, from the "Tampa" military negotiations to the "Dahr al-Baidar explosives."At this moment Walid Jumblatt broke his silence and told Hezbollah what many have not said plainly: "Enough of the south's ruin." He warned of the possibility of an expansion of Israeli operations, saying that Hezbollah's secretary-general, Sheikh Naim Qassem, has no right to embroil Lebanon once again in wars that have nothing to do with it. Jumblatt does not hesitate to say things plainly. Agree with him or disagree, he brings you to the point of convergence at the moment of disagreement, and may go to disagreement at the moment of convergence. He takes care of his community in difficult moments, even when he departs from some of its positions or takes positions that may make him less influential. He refuses to let the Druze go where populism and present circumstances push them, and holds to his positions even when they summon the nostalgia of history.Jumblatt's boldness needs a matching boldness among the representatives of the Shiite community. It needs Speaker Nabih Berri, his companion on the road, to come closer to this position.
War does not threaten Lebanon with destruction alone. It opens the door to the possibility of losing parts of its geography and turning Greater Lebanon into a lesser Lebanon. The Shiite community could lose its geography, and with it its demography, and become another diaspora, like the Palestinians of 1948, though the historical circumstances differ. Then the world was divided and governed by bipolarity, and the Palestinians obtained a UN resolution on the right of return. Today, it seems, the imbalance of global power and unipolarity give Israel full capacity to impose what it wants on the Lebanese.
What is happening in south Lebanon cannot be separated from what is happening in south Syria. The Israeli advance south of Quneitra and the movements along the "Sufa 53" line raise fears of a project that goes beyond securing borders to reshaping regional geography. The hypothesis emerges that the Israeli political mind seeks to cut the corridors linking the Gulf and Türkiye to Europe through Syria and on to the Mediterranean. From here, the war, if it extends from south Syria to south Lebanon, from the "Sufa 53" line to the "Zahrani refinery," could become part of the plans for an "expanded Israel," which it is feared would annex parts of south Lebanon and south Syria to its geographic and security sphere. Tel Aviv's efforts to impose an "expanded Israel" bring back the memory of 1920, when the birth of the state of "Greater Lebanon" was proclaimed. At that time, according to the southern historian Mundhir Jaber, Britain tried to sever south Lebanon from Greater Lebanon and attach it to northern Palestine, in the context of its contest with the French mandate over the geographic divisions that followed the breakup of the Ottoman state, as well as the Balfour Declaration project. It armed Shiite groups that rejected the proclamation of Greater Lebanon and demanded to remain in Greater Syria, against Christian groups that supported the Lebanese entity, and the former fell into the trap of what London was then concealing. What is worrying is that this position could repeat itself now, in different contexts, but with the same aim.
And so, "advice is worth a camel": that is what Walid Jumblatt is saying. It means the matter requires a clear, frank public position from the Shiite community refusing to give the Israeli enemy a pretext to launch a new war. That war, if it comes, will bring great losses, and may alter history and geography together. Avoiding it is a national and historic responsibility, because the survival of Lebanon and of the south matters more than any partisan or doctrinal calculation.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on October 23-24/2026 (Some of the News reports below are translated from Arabic by AI)
Gunmen open fire at church in Jordan killing at least 7 people
Arab News/October 23, 2026
AMMAN: At least seven people were killed and 34 injured when gunmen opened fire during a funeral at a church ‌in ‌southern Jordan on Friday. The attack took place at the busy Hammoud Church in Karak ‌governorate and was carried out by "unknown assailants," the government said.
Jordan’s director of public security Maj. Gen. Obeidallah Maaytah, told a news conference that 27 of the wounded were still being treated. Security forces deployed at the church and were pursuing the ‌suspects, Al-Mamlaka TV said. A witness told the channel that a vehicle arrived carrying the gunmen, who fired continuously for five minutes before fleeing the scene. Between 150 and 200 people were inside and around the church at the time, the witness said, adding that most of the victims were aged between 50 and 70. Security camera footage captured the moment the gunmen attacked the entrance to the church. Two of the attackers appeared to be using handguns while another was carrying a rifle and had his head covered. Jordan's King Abdullah II vowed that the attack would be met with "the harshest retaliation."The terrorist attack against Karak will be met with the harshest retaliation. Those who delude themselves into thinking that they can divide Jordanians with their bullets have no chance in the face of our unity. All Jordanians, from north to south, are partners in land and fate, and nothing stands between them. Our deepest condolences to the families of the martyrs and we wish a speedy recovery to those injured. Every Jordanian life is precious, and we will strike with an iron fist against those who dare to threaten our nation. "Those who delude themselves into thinking that they can divide Jordanians with their bullets have no chance in the face of our unity," he said in a statement. "Every Jordanian life is precious, and we will strike with an iron fist against those who dare to threaten our nation."Prime Minister Jaafar Hassan chaired a meeting of Jordan's security council in Karak to discuss the response to the attack, a government spokesman said.Interior Minister Mazen Al-Faraya said Jordan has been targeted by a "terrorist attack carried out by a group of extremists."Karak is home to a significant Christian community in the Muslim-majority kingdom. Hammoud Church is Greek Orthodox - the largest Christian community in Jordan.The church's Patriarch of Jerusalem Theophilos III condemned the attack as "vile and cowardly" and said it would only serve to strengthen the bond between Christians and Muslims. "Despite the immense pain felt throughout all of Jordan, and by all honorable people across the world, this abhorrent, bloody act will not undermine our national unity," he said.The US ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz described the shooting as a "depraved and brutal attack on ​a house of worship."*With AFP and Reuters

2 soldiers killed in West Bank shooting; IDF believes Palestinian gunmen planned larger attack
Emanuel Fabian/The Times Of Israel/October 23/2026
3 injured; shooters, both 27-year-olds from nearby Hebron, killed by troops after 20-minute gunfight; IDF orders preparation for full West Bank lockdown; PM calls for destroying shooters’ entire neighborhood. The slain soldiers were named as Staff Sgt. Ron Yonatan Roytman, 23, from Ashkelon, and Sgt. Yuval Shai Svilem, 20, from Hod Hasharon. They both served in the 775th “Ari” Battalion of the Home Front Command’s Search and Rescue Brigade. Roytman was a squad commander.After conducting a preliminary probe, the Israel Defense Forces said it believed the gunmen were planning to carry out a larger attack against Israeli civilians on Route 35, but realized they would not be able to reach the highway and decided to open fire at the temporary checkpoint instead. It was also not clear if they were working alone or with a larger network. The Hamas terror group — which has a strong presence in Hebron — called the shooting “heroic,” but did not claim responsibility for it. The two attackers arrived by car at around 7:30 a.m. at a temporary checkpoint set up by the army at the exit to Hebron. The soldiers stationed there, from the Home Front Command’s 775th “Ari” Search and Rescue Battalion, were conducting routine checks on Palestinian cars leaving the city. The two Palestinians exited their car on a side street, armed with an assault rifle and a pistol. Using the buildings as cover, they opened fire on the checkpoint, according to the preliminary probe. The Magen David Adom ambulance service said it treated two of the wounded in critical condition at the scene. They were later declared dead, and the military announced they were soldiers. Three others were described as lightly to moderately wounded and were taken to hospitals in Jerusalem. One surveillance video showed the gunmen exiting their car, firing at the checkpoint, before retreating. Later, the gunmen were seen climbing over a fence in the area. “Take cover, come to the ambulance, it’s bulletproof,” a medic could be heard calling out in one clip, as gunshots rang out. “We haven’t yet managed to extract the wounded; there’s been active shooting for more than 20 minutes,” he could be heard saying in another video. The deputy commander of the Ari Battalion, a company commander, and an officer of the Paratroopers Brigade’s 101st Battalion who was stationed nearby rushed to the scene, flanked the two gunmen on the side street, and killed them. The IDF and Shin Bet were investigating whether the two gunmen acted alone or were part of a larger terror network and received funding and direction from a terror group, the army said. Following the shooting, the IDF said it launched a raid in the Hebron area. Troops were operating at the homes of the two gunmen, the military said, amid plans to demolish them. Hebron and other Palestinian villages and towns in the area were under full closure, according to the military. “This was a serious attack. The troops’ swift action prevented an even more serious attack and further harm to civilians and security forces,” IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir said during an assessment with officers on the shooting. Zamir noted that “a large quantity of ammunition was found in the vehicle in which the terrorists arrived at the scene of the attack, which was intended to be used to carry out a larger-scale attack.”
He ordered that preparations be made for additional forces to be deployed to the Central Command if required.
PM orders army to prepare for full West Bank lockdown
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a situation assessment with security chiefs and ordered preparations for a full lockdown across the West Bank, he said on X. The premier said he was joined by Zamir, Defense Minister Israel Katz, Shin Bet head David Zini, National Security Adviser Shmuel Ben Ezra, and IDF Central Command head Maj. Gen. Avi Bluth. “Our forces are operating with increased intensity to thwart terrorism and are carrying out extensive waves of arrests,” said Netanyahu. “We will pursue Hamas terrorists and those who send them, everywhere and at all times. You have no safe haven.” The West Bank and Gaza were already expected to be under lockdown on Monday and Tuesday, as a security measure amid the national elections. Later Friday, Netanyahu visited the site of the shooting attack where he intensified his characterization of Israel’s planned response. He said Israel would “destroy” the entire Hebron neighborhood from which the gunmen hailed. “First of all, we will act to destroy this place, to change it completely,” Netanyahu said in a video released by his office. “But we are going to do something that has not been done until now: We will implement the successful and aggressive model we used in the refugee camps, which are essentially terrorist strongholds.”Across the West Bank, following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack, the IDF has cleared tens of thousands of residents from refugee camps where terrorist groups have been operating, leaving them homeless. “We will evacuate the residents, we will go house to house, we will remove the weapons there as well, and all the terrorist infrastructure will be dealt with and destroyed,” Netanyahu said.Israel will also clear homes built without permits along roads in the West Bank, says Netanyahu, citing “a threat to our forces.”
Netanyahu says that the IDF has plans to carry out a major operation in the West Bank, the largest since Israel captured the territory in 1967: “The IDF is prepared to carry it out, and we will determine the timing, but it is on the way.”
Critics have long accused Israel of engaging in collective punishment against Palestinians in response to terror attacks. The Hebron governorate is already under dire economic straits, as the IDF has closed five of the seven entrances to the region where over 1 million Palestinians live, in what has ground life to a halt for the West Bank’s main economic hub.
Ben Gvir, Smotrich call for PA to be ‘dismantled’
In the wake of the attack, National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir called for the Palestinian Authority to be dismantled. The Ramallah-based PA governs the major Palestinian cities in the West Bank, including most of Hebron. “We have to act before it’s too late. The Palestinian Authority must be dismantled and demilitarized, and its terror infrastructure wiped out completely,” said Ben Gvir, who leads the far-right Otzma Yehudit party.There was no indication of any PA involvement in the incident. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who also serves as a minister in the Defense Ministry, separately wrote: “There’s no avoiding a large-scale military operation in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] to dismantle the Palestinian Authority, gather weapons and eliminate terrorists.”While hailing the current government for expanding settlements in the territory, he wrote that “this work won’t be complete without a change to Israel’s security paradigm and the defeat of terrorists through an expansive military campaign.”A short while later, Smotrich announced that he’d “given an instruction to destroy, immediately, a large swath of illegal Arab structures in the proximity of the scene of the attack.”
“The order will go into effect in the coming hours, and will be carried out over the course of the afternoon,” said Smotrich, chair of the far-right Religious Zionism party. Avigdor Liberman, of the hawkish, opposition-aligned Yisrael Beytenu party, posted on X: “How many more attacks do we need to absorb before we understand this policy of containment can’t continue? You eliminate terror, you don’t contain it!” Centrist party leaders Gadi Eisenkot, Naftali Bennet and Yair Lapid all posted statements wishing for the recovery of those wounded and praising the IDF forces that ended the attack.
Leon Kraiem contributed to this report.

Netanyahu Says Extensive West Bank Military Operation ‘On the Way’ After Attack
Asharq Al Awsat/23 October/2026
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Friday warned of an imminent large-scale military operation in the West Bank and vowed to displace some residents of Hebron after Palestinian gunmen killed two soldiers in an attack. The prime minister’s office also said it had instructed the army to close off the occupied West Bank, where the shooting occurred. The attack, which happened at a checkpoint near the Palestinian city in the southern occupied West Bank, also left three soldiers wounded. It came days before Israeli elections in which Netanyahu is facing a tight race.
The two gunmen who carried out the attack were killed in a shootout with soldiers.In a visit to Hebron after the attack, Netanyahu said Israeli forces would enter the neighborhood of the attackers and displace its residents. "We will evacuate the residents, we will go from house to house, we will also seize the weapons there, and all the terrorist infrastructure will be dealt with and destroyed," Netanyahu said, according to his office. "The defense minister and I are considering a very extensive (army) operation in Judea and Samaria, such as has not been carried out since the Six Day War," Netanyahu added, referring to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war."The army is ready to execute it and we will set the timing, but it is on the way."He said the military would apply a model previously used in refugee camps in the northern West Bank. A large-scale military operation dubbed "Iron Wall" launched in January 2025 forcibly displaced tens of thousands of people across several refugee camps, according to the UN rights office.As of July this year, 33,362 Palestinian refugees displaced from the three camps had not been permitted to return, according to the UN. Nearly two years on, Israel's military remains present in Jenin refugee camp, which before Iron Wall was a bastion of armed Palestinian militants fighting Israeli occupation. The army also remains in two refugee camps in the nearby city of Tulkarem. In all three camps the army demolished dozens of houses in the dense patchwork of alleys in order to ease access for its troops and armoured vehicles, the military said, and set up operational centres for troops in the homes of residents. "The Jenin refugee camp model is on its way to Hebron," Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on X Friday. "Every clan neighborhood in Hebron from which the terrorists emerged today will be evacuated of its residents, and the terror infrastructure in the neighborhood will be addressed and dismantled," he said, referring to the large families, or clans, that hold much influence in the city of Hebron.

Hebron attack raises security concerns ahead of Israeli elections
LBCI/23 October/2026
Does the Hebron attack in the West Bank complicate Israel’s election calculations?
The answer depends on the nature of the military operation Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has threatened to launch in response to an attack in Hebron carried out by two Palestinians, which left two Israeli soldiers dead, six settlers injured and both attackers killed.
The first, immediate phase of the military operation in Hebron is set to target hundreds of Palestinians who will be displaced from their homes, according to reports. In the next phase, their homes are expected to be demolished, following threats by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich to raze hundreds of Palestinian homes and buildings in Hebron, the city from which the attackers originated. Before any Palestinian group claimed responsibility for the attack, Smotrich accused the Palestinian Authority of encouraging such operations and threatened to dismantle it. Preliminary investigations indicate that the two Palestinians had planned to target Route 35, which carries heavy Israeli traffic, particularly on Friday mornings, the start of the weekend. However, a routine military measure, setting up a checkpoint for vehicles leaving Hebron, disrupted their plan. The two Palestinians exited their vehicle while armed and ran toward the checkpoint, triggering a 20-minute exchange of fire. According to military assessments, the two gunmen arrived by car at the temporary military checkpoint. When they realized they would not be able to pass through it and reach Route 35, which is used by Israeli civilians, they decided to target the checkpoint itself. The Israeli military said the fortuitous placement of the temporary checkpoint had prevented what it described as a catastrophe. However, security officials acknowledged an intelligence failure, noting that no prior warning or information about the attack had been received despite the heightened state of alert imposed across the West Bank following reports alleging plans to carry out attacks ahead of the elections.

Far-right Israeli Minister Orders Buildings Demolished in West Bank after Attack
Asharq Al Awsat/23 October/2026
Far-right Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said he had ordered the demolition of buildings near a shooting attack in the occupied West Bank that wounded at least five people on Friday.
"Following the attack, I have ordered the immediate demolition of a wide row of illegal Arab structures adjacent to the attack site," he said. "The order will be carried out within the next hour and will take place throughout the afternoon hours."

Netanyahu Orders West Bank Closure as Attack Wounds Israelis before Election
Asharq Al Awsat/October 23/2026
Palestinian militants wounded five Israelis in an attack on Friday before being killed in a prolonged shootout with soldiers, leading Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to order a lockdown in the occupied West Bank days before Israeli elections. Netanyahu, facing a tight race for a new term in Tuesday's election, said that Israeli troops prevented what could have been a major attack, with the two assailants allegedly carrying a large quantity of ammunition in their vehicle. An AFP journalist who witnessed the gun battle saw two Palestinian men armed with a handgun and an automatic rifle exchanging fire with Israeli forces at the Farsh al-Hawa checkpoint near the Palestinian city of Hebron. Israeli forces eventually shot and killed the attackers, with the AFP journalist seeing their two lifeless bodies on the ground next to a petrol station as troops patrolled all around. The Israeli military said soldiers had rushed to the Judea Junction area after the early-morning shooting attack and "eliminated two terrorists". The attack wounded five people, two of whom were in critical condition, said Magen David Adom, Israel's emergency medical rescue service. The service said all five were Israelis in their 20s, including one man in "very serious condition" with gunshot wounds. With the clock counting down to election day, Netanyahu called for all Likud party political meetings to be cancelled Friday due to the attack. "I salute the courage of our soldiers who acted with determination and prevented what could have been a major attack," Netanyahu said in a statement. Netanyahu said, using the biblical name for the Israeli-occupied West Bank, that he instructed the Israeli army and "security forces to impose an immediate cordon on the city of Hebron and to prepare for a full lockdown of all of Judea and Samaria starting today". He added that troops were "carrying out stepped-up operations to thwart terrorist activities and are conducting large-scale waves of arrests". The military said it had "launched offensive counter-terrorism operations in the Hebron area", adding that troops were raiding homes of the suspects and others.
Hamas praises attack
Israeli National Security Minister and far-right firebrand Itamar Ben Gvir, who has been rising in the polls, called for the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority to be dismantled because of the attack. "The Palestinian Authority must be dismantled and demilitarized, and its terror infrastructure wiped out completely," he said in a statement. No evidence suggests that the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian government in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, was connected to Friday's attack. Hamas, which is based in Gaza and carried out the October 7, 2023 attack, the deadliest in Israel's history, hailed what it called an "exceptional heroic operation" near Hebron and mourned the two dead assailants, without claiming responsibility. The attack is a "natural and legitimate response to the ongoing crimes and brutal attacks against our people", Hamas, the rival of the Palestinian Authority's ruling Fatah faction, said in a statement. Netanyahu in his statement vowed to "pursue Hamas terrorists" everywhere, adding: "You have no place to hide." Gadi Eisenkot, the former army chief who is Netanyahu's top rival in the election, praised the response by troops. "Like all Israelis, I pray for the complete and quick recovery of the injured," he said. The incident comes as tensions soar in the West Bank, including over attacks by extremist Israeli settlers against Palestinian olive harvesters, and days ahead of Israeli elections. According to an AFP tally based on data from the Palestinian health ministry, Israeli forces or settlers have killed 1,113 Palestinians in the territory since the start of the Gaza war in October 2023.  Israeli figures show at least 49 Israelis, including civilians and security personnel, have been killed in Palestinian attacks or during Israeli military operations during the same period.

Did Hamas Threaten Israel with Another October 7 Attack?
Gaza: Asharq Al Awsat/October 23/2026
Israeli newspapers have repeatedly reported a similar account claiming that Hamas warned Israel it would carry out another attack on the scale of October 7, 2023, and that the warning was conveyed through UN Middle East envoy Ramiz Alakbarov during his visit to the Gaza Strip last week, when he allegedly met senior Hamas leaders. The Israeli newspapers, particularly Yedioth Ahronoth, based their reports on information circulated by Israel's Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), which reportedly sent an urgent warning to the country's political and military leadership. The alleged threat was linked to Israeli military operations in Gaza, where the army continues to occupy more than half the territory a year after the ceasefire was announced. Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem denied in a brief statement distributed to journalists in Gaza that the movement had threatened to carry out another attack similar to October 7. He reaffirmed Hamas's commitment to the ceasefire agreement and called on mediators to intervene to stop Israeli violations against Palestinians and ensure the agreement's implementation. Qassem also warned against accepting Israeli allegations and exploiting them for electoral purposes.He did not address reports that the UN official had met Hamas leaders. Asharq Al-Awsat sought further comment from the Hamas spokesperson, but he did not respond to the correspondent's questions. Late Thursday evening, Hamas issued an official statement denying that it had threatened any attacks, without confirming or denying whether a meeting with the UN official had taken place. The published itinerary for Alakbarov's two-day visit to the Gaza Strip on October 11 and 12 made no reference to meetings with Hamas officials.According to the schedule posted on the United Nations website, his visit focused on assessing humanitarian conditions at several locations, including displacement centers, affected families, winter preparedness efforts and female-headed households. The itinerary also listed a meeting with humanitarian partners at a UNRWA facility in Gaza City to discuss humanitarian responses and gaps in assistance. An official from Alakbarov's office told Asharq Al-Awsat that the UN envoy had not met any Hamas officials during his latest visit. However, Asharq Al-Awsat learned from a local UN employee that Alakbarov visited Al-Shifa Medical Complex on Sunday, October 11, and met hospital and health officials to assess conditions at medical facilities. That visit was not mentioned in the published itinerary, and Alakbarov's office neither confirmed nor denied it.The local official also said the UN delegation came under Israeli shellfire while visiting the Zarqa area northeast of Gaza City, near the Yellow Line.
No injuries were reported, and the delegation quickly left the area. Asharq Al-Awsat attempted to contact Mohammed Abu Salmiya, director of Al-Shifa Medical Complex, but he did not answer the calls. Officials from Gaza's Government Media Office were also unreachable. UN officials routinely visit hospitals, displacement centers and other facilities to assess humanitarian conditions. Many have made such visits without meeting Hamas officials, particularly amid the precarious security situation and continuing pursuit and assassination of Hamas members in Gaza.
Observers believe the Israeli account is primarily motivated by electoral considerations, particularly amid repeated statements by Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz, about alleged Hamas plans to carry out attacks similar to October 7.
Both officials have emphasized that Israel would respond forcefully to any such attack, in statements seen as attempts to influence the elections. Similar warnings have also been made concerning Iran and Hezbollah. However, Israeli security sources told Haaretz that, contrary to claims made by Netanyahu and Katz in recent days, security agencies had not detected intensive efforts by any party to launch attacks against Israel with the aim of influencing the elections. Israeli military Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir, meanwhile, limited his remarks to affirming that the armed forces were prepared to deal with any attempts at external interference in the elections. He said the military would undertake defensive and offensive operations should any such scenario materialize.

Gunman kills one, wounds four near Paris; French prosecutors suspect terrorism
AFP/October 23/2026
Man opens fire from a vehicle in the town of Trappes, with country already on edge following riots and mass protests
A man opened fire from a vehicle on Friday in the streets of the town of Trappes, west of Paris, killing one person and wounding four, a police source said. French prosecutors are investigating the shooting as a suspected “murder in connection with a terrorist enterprise,” according to national anti-terror prosecutors. The man was arrested in the nearby town of Coignieres after opening fire in Trappes and neighboring La Verriere around 10:30 am (0830 GMT), police said. Local authorities said the toll could change as emergency services were still working at the scene, about 20 kilometers (13 miles) west of the French capital. “An individual fired shots from his vehicle at multiple people along his path, in Trappes and La Verriere,” Trappes mayor Ali Rabeh wrote on Instagram. France has seen a spate of Islamist attacks, including the slaughter by jihadists in the heart of Paris in November 2015 that killed 130. There have been fewer incidents in recent years but officials have warned that the risk remains and that attempted attacks are repeatedly thwarted by intelligence gathering. Samuel Paty, a teacher in another Paris suburb, was beheaded by a radical Islamist in 2020 after he showed his class caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed. Trappes has seen its own share of tension, after a teacher there reported receiving threats after writing that the state did not do enough to protect Paty. Additionally, the shooting comes as France is on edge following riots on the sidelines of mass protests over the cost of living last weekend, which saw some of the worst street violence the country has seen in recent years. More protests are expected this weekend, with police promising a larger presence, after a week of overnight curfews put in place in cities throughout the country. Interior Minister Laurent Nunez said the country will deploy some 70,000 security personnel nationwide, warning that calls for violence and looting were already circulating on social media.

Trump Weighs Quick End to Iran War Against Letting Conflict ‘Wither’
Asharq Alawsat/October 23/2026
President Donald Trump said on Friday the United States could end the war with Iran quickly, but questioned whether ‌Washington should ‌seek a ‌swift conclusion ⁠or allow the ⁠conflict to gradually wind down. "We could end it very quickly," Trump said. "Do ⁠we want to finish ‌it ‌off or just ‌want to let ‌it wither?" Speaking to reporters on the White House South ‌Lawn as he left on a trip to ⁠Florida, ⁠Trump said oil is getting out through the Strait of Hormuz. "We are getting everything we want,' he said.

UAE: Oil Spill from Tanker Affects Beaches in Umm Al Quwain
Asharq Al Awsat/23 October/2026
The UAE Ministry of Climate Change and Environment said on Friday that its monitoring and environmental assessment systems had detected marine pollution caused by an oil leak from a tanker.The spill had affected beaches in the emirate of Umm Al Quwain, the ministry said.
It said in a statement that the leak had caused odors reported by residents of Sharjah, Ajman and Umm Al Quwain, adding that it posed no health concerns or risks to residents. All beaches and coastal areas in Umm Al Quwain had been temporarily closed as a precautionary measure to ensure the safety of the marine environment while survey operations were completed, added the ministry. Specialist teams had begun coordinating with the relevant authorities to contain the pollution, cordon off affected areas and launch cleanup and remediation operations to limit its environmental impact, the statement added.

Coalition Destroys Ballistic Missile, Drones, Denies Houthi Claims about Saudi Threats Against Tribal Gatherings
Asharq Alawsat/October 23/2026
Official Spokesperson of the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen Major General Turki Al-Malki said on Friday that air defenses intercepted and destroyed a ballistic missile launched by the Houthi militia toward Riyadh. It also destroyed two drones fired by the terrorist group toward Saudi Arabia Southern Region. The Coalition had on Thursday downed a ballistic missile fired at Najran and nine drones launched at the Eastern Region, Riyadh and Madinah.The Coalition also categorically denied allegations by the terrorist Houthi militia that Saudi Arabia had threatened to target tribal and civilian gatherings, describing them as false and entirely baseless. “Both the content and timing of these claims reflect ongoing attempts to mislead public opinion, divert attention from the militia’s own crises and practices, and draw members of authentic Yemeni tribes into its conflicts,” Al-Malki said. He stressed that Yemeni tribes will remain an integral part of Yemen’s social and historical fabric, a firm pillar of its society, and a bridge of brotherhood between the Saudi and Yemeni peoples, bound by religion, neighborly ties, history, and a shared destiny. “These bonds are far too deep to be undermined by disinformation campaigns or attempts to sow division and hostility,” he said. He reaffirmed Saudi Arabia’s steadfast commitment to Yemen’s security and stability and to maintaining its historic ties with the Yemeni people. These ties strengthen security and stability, safeguard the interests of both peoples, and prevent Yemeni tribes from being exploited or drawn into conflicts that do not serve the Yemeni people’s aspirations for security, peace, and development, he went on to say. “The truth will always prevail over disinformation campaigns, and the bonds of brotherhood between the two peoples will remain strong in the face of all attempts to sow discord and division,” he added.

Trump Says He Will Fix Any Starlink Access Problem in Ukraine
Asharq Alawsat/October 23/2026
US President Donald Trump said on Friday that if there was still a problem with access to Starlink communication systems in Ukraine, he would get it straightened out. Trump told reporters at the White ‌House that ‌he had not spoken to ‌SpaceX ⁠CEO Elon Musk ⁠about the matter but, if access was not fixed, he would speak to him. "If there is a problem, I'll get it straightened out," Trump said. ⁠The caps have been ‌in place ‌since October 13 as relations between ‌Kyiv and Washington deteriorated. Ukrainian officials ‌said on Friday that speed restrictions on Starlink communication systems in Ukraine remained in place, contradicting Trump's previous ‌statement that the services had been fully restored. "Elon will never ⁠do ⁠anything wrong. I know him very well. He's a fair person, and you know it's an unusual situation where they're talking to a private company. But he's not going to do anything that's wrong," Trump said.

Middle East, European FMs Hold Talks on Regional Developments in Istanbul
Asharq Al Awsat/October 23/2026
Foreign ministers from eight European and Middle Eastern countries met in Istanbul on Friday in an unprecedented format for talks on reopening the Strait of Hormuz and crises across the Middle East. Ministers from Britain, France and Germany -- the so-called E3 -- as well as Italy met counterparts from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and Türkiye to discuss the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Yemen, Hormuz -- a crucial trade route blocked in the Iran war -- and ways to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The talks began at an Istanbul hotel overlooking the Bosphorus, after separate meetings of top European diplomats and diplomats from regional countries. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said a new escalation between Iran and the United States "would create nothing but losers and would undoubtedly have very serious consequences for hydrocarbon prices".
"And so the first thing this group of eight countries ... will do is call on both sides to exercise the utmost restraint, because we cannot afford another escalation in the region," he told journalists on the sidelines of the talks in Istanbul. Italy's Antonio Tajani said the aim was to work for "de-escalation to guarantee freedom of navigation"."I do not believe the problem can be solved from a purely military standpoint," he said. "If we want to reopen Hormuz, which is vital for our economies, we must promote dialogue and make Iran understand that this attitude cannot continue."
'Iranian tactics' -
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan hosted the meeting as Türkiye stepped up efforts to strengthen its regional role, including through the Makkah Defense Alliance, a defense pact launched with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in August.
Türkiye has said the pact is not aimed at any specific country and remains open to others, including Egypt. "Our platform has several advantages, particularly because it is informal and flexible and focuses specifically on the issues we face. It allows us to exchange information and coordinate our positions more effectively," Fidan told reporters. "We are not aware of any other platform that brings together countries with such different geographical and political backgrounds. Türkiye, in particular, is well placed to play a constructive role in this process."Cairo has yet to decide whether to join the alliance. On Wednesday, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said Egypt would "defend Saudi territory" and would not take part in any attack on Yemen.Iran-backed Houthis are battling Yemen's legitimate government and have launched attacks on Saudi Arabia. British foreign minister Ed Miliband's office said ahead of the talks they would essentially revolve around "the Strait of Hormuz and the situation in Saudi Arabia". It said Miliband would "advocate for a diplomatic solution to the (Hormuz) crisis that restores full navigational rights and freedoms". He was also to stress "how Iranian tactics are being replicated across the region, with attacks on Saudi Arabia further destabilizing the region and increasing pressure on vital waterways and global chokepoints, such as Bab al-Mandeb and the Suez Canal". Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan bin Abdullah attends the meeting of the top diplomats of the R4 mechanism and the European E3 mechanism in Istanbul on October 23, 2026. (AFP)
'De-escalation' -
Fidan stressed that regional security required countries in the region to assume responsibility and that Ankara prioritized cooperation mechanisms based on "regional ownership". "Regional frameworks turn into credible platforms for action and cooperation", he said ahead of the talks. "Stability cannot simply be imported, and lasting solutions cannot be imposed from outside. Those who live with conflict must play a central role in resolving it," he added. The eight countries "decided, after very constructive discussions, to continue the work by meeting at regular intervals", Barrot said.

Hundreds of Syrians Protest Repeated Israeli Incursions
Asharq Al Awsat/October 23/2026
Hundreds rallied across Syria on Friday condemning Israeli incursions in the country's south including one this week that killed a man with a disability, AFP correspondents and state media reported. The Israeli military has carried out hundreds of strikes in Syria and conducted frequent incursions into its territory since Islamist authorities took power after toppling longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. It also sent troops into a UN-patrolled buffer zone that had separated Israeli and Syrian forces on the mainly Israeli-occupied Golan Heights since 1974. Protesters rallied in several locations including Damascus and central Syria's Homs, decrying Israeli incursions and attacks in the southern Quneitra and Daraa provinces, state media reported. An AFP correspondent in Daraa city saw hundreds rallying, some waving Syrian flags. Protester Taysir al-Hariri told AFP that demonstrators had gathered to "send a message to the world" that Syria stands united "against Israeli incursions and against anyone who is tempted to tamper... with national security". State television footage of other rallies showed protesters carrying posters reading "We are all Moaz", referring to the man with special needs who Syria said was killed by Israeli fire a day earlier during an incursion in Daraa province. Syria accuses Israel of violating a 1974 disengagement agreement through repeated incursions in the south, the raiding of homes there and the seizing of dozens of residents, in conjunction with other military activity including shelling. In Damascus, outside a United Nations building, the family of a Syrian man seized by Israel called for his release, with children holding posters reading "I want my dad". State media on Friday also reported that Israeli forces advanced in part of Quneitra province and blocked several roads. Israel has vowed to keep troops in a so-called "security zone" in southern Syria, where it seeks a broader demilitarized area. Syria and Israel have held negotiations as they seek to reach a security agreement, but Israel remains distrustful of Syria's new authorities.

Ukraine embassy in Washington reopens after suspicious object causes brief disruption
LBCI./October 23, 2026
The Ukrainian embassy in Washington said ‌on Friday that it was resuming operations after a brief disruption caused by the discovery of a suspicious ⁠object that U.S. law enforcement examined and determined was non-threatening. Law enforcement and a bomb squad were called earlier to assess the object, which was discovered near the entrance to ‌the ⁠embassy's consular section, triggering a temporary evacuation of the premises. The area around the diplomatic mission ⁠had reopened after authorities gave the all-clear, and consular services were expected ⁠to resume shortly, the embassy said in a ⁠statement. Reuters

The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on October 23-24/2026
Paris in Flames: Disorder Spreads, France Clings to Its Taboos
Drieu Godefridi/Gatestone Institute./October 23, 2026
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/22937/paris-in-flames-disorder-spreads
These events did not arise in a vacuum. France has long refused to confront three interlocking realities that its political class treats as taboos: mass uncontrolled immigration, the growing presence and separatism of Islam, and the unaffordable costs of the EU's "energy transition."
What gives these riots their strength is the role played by La France Insoumise (LFI), Jean-Luc Mélenchon's party, which has for years indulged in toxic pro-Islamist tirades with openly antisemitic undertones.
The party seems to know that it will never come to power. It has therefore decided to fully embrace the politics of revolution and disorder, relying on and openly aligning itself with the most extreme elements of France's Muslim population. In many respects, LFI is an openly Islamist party.
Not all Muslims, of course, are Islamist. Approximately 60% of young French Muslims, however, believe that Sharia law takes precedence over the laws of the French Republic, according to data from a 2020 official survey, with similar findings reported in subsequent surveys conducted in late 2025.
Immigration, Islam, and LFI are not the only factors involved. Insane energy costs compound the social and fiscal pressure. Fuel prices are high enough to revive Yellow Vest-style anger. The government has responded with releases from strategic diesel reserves, price caps, and targeted aid -- not the needed structural reform.
The reality is that the French state appears less capable than ever of putting its disastrous finances in order; there is a looming risk of a snowball effect regarding interest on the debt.
France has not run a budget surplus since 1974; the structural drivers — high spending, demographic pressures, and refusal to prioritize growth-oriented reforms — remain intact.
Meanwhile, France remains locked into its taboos. The demented "energy transition" continues despite the visible cost-of-living backlash. Serious discussion of migration selection, remigration, assimilation requirements, or the cultural and security implications of Islam is still heavily constrained by elite consensus and legal or media norms.
On the night of October 17-18, 2026, France saw some of its worst urban violence in years. The physical damage is extensive.
On the night of October 17-18, 2026, France saw some of its worst urban violence in years. What began as largely peaceful demonstrations over the cost of living, high fuel prices, and the state of public services—especially schools—descended into widespread rioting, arson, and looting across multiple cities. The most established media outlets acknowledge "scenes of war." Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez put the number of participants at roughly 550,000 nationwide (the communist union CGT claimed closer to 800,000), with about 110,000 in Paris. Police made approximately 1,800 arrests, including a record of more than 1,200 in the capital. More than 900 police officers were injured.
France's "mostly peaceful protests"
The physical damage is extensive. In Paris, shopfronts were smashed (luxury retailers but also many modest shops and private properties), cars and bicycles were torched, barricades of garbage dumpsters and bicycles were burned, and restaurants were gutted by fire. Whole streets were described by officials as "devastated." In Limoges, the 19th-century town hall was destroyed by arson; in Lyon the tourist office was set alight; city halls and public buildings were attacked or defaced, notably in Marseille, the second-largest city in France. Looting targeted hundreds of shops in Paris, Marseille, Lille, Bordeaux, Nice, and Strasbourg.
Authorities attributed the worst violence to "far-left" or "ultra-left" elements joined by opportunistic delinquents. Groups in black, masked and wearing balaclavas, clashed with police who deployed tear gas and water cannons. Yet, everywhere, the instructions and rules of engagement for law enforcement remained clear: above all, no violence. This means that the rioters will prevail over the security forces, who are mainly reduced to mere spectators. Such is the cowardice of the Macron regime. More than 3,000 businesses were damaged, with losses estimated at more than a billion euros. A synagogue on Rue Burnouf in Paris's 19th arrondissement was found vandalized and ransacked, with religious items scattered; reports differed on whether it was deliberate vandalism linked to the riots or an attempted robbery (Torah scrolls were reportedly left untouched.)
The causes
These events did not arise in a vacuum. France has long refused to confront three interlocking realities that its political class treats as taboos: mass uncontrolled immigration, the growing presence and separatism of Islam, and the unaffordable costs of the EU's "energy transition."
Immigrants and their descendants are disproportionately concentrated in certain banlieues and cities where public services are most strained and where earlier waves of unrest (including 2005) already originated. France's welfare system, housing, education, and security budgets have been under continuous pressure from high inflows, low assimilation rates in segments of the population, and the existence of areas where republican authority is contested. Crime statistics, the dynamics of France's 751 no-go zones, and repeated episodes of youth violence have been documented for years; the October looting and organized attacks proceeded according to established patterns.
The most recent riots are by no means an exception; they are rather another episode in a long series of events, with many more undoubtedly on the way.
What gives these riots their strength is the role played by La France Insoumise (LFI), Jean-Luc Mélenchon's party, which has for years indulged in toxic pro-Islamist tirades with openly antisemitic undertones.
The party seems to know that it will never come to power. It has therefore decided to fully embrace the politics of revolution and disorder, relying on and openly aligning itself with the most extreme elements of France's Muslim population. In many respects, LFI is an openly Islamist party. In the 2022 presidential election, according to polling institutes' estimates, 69% of Muslim voters cast a ballot for Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the first round.
Official statistics and surveys place the French Muslim population at roughly 9–10 percent of the total (around 6–7 million people), up from roughly 1 percent in the 1960s. The Institut national d'études démographiques (INSEE) data show Muslims as the second-largest declared religious group among younger adults, with far higher rates of practice and intergenerational transmission than Catholicism: 91 percent of second-generation immigrants raised in Muslim families retain the faith as adults, versus much lower retention among those from Christian backgrounds. Strong religiosity is markedly higher among Muslims.
Not all Muslims, of course, are Islamist. Approximately 60% of young French Muslims, however, believe that Sharia law takes precedence over the laws of the French Republic, according to data from a 2020 official survey, with similar findings reported in subsequent surveys conducted in late 2025.
In France, antisemitic incidents have risen sharply in recent years, often linked to Islamist networks or radicalized youths; synagogue incidents occur against that backdrop. Islamist influence in neighborhoods, schools, and associations has been repeatedly flagged by security services and interior ministry reports. The political left, particularly La France Insoumise (LFI), has cultivated alliances with Islamist-adjacent or "pro-Palestinian" currents and is regularly accused of legitimizing or instrumentalizing disorder.
Nicolas Sarkozy, in a private remark reported in September 2025, put it bluntly: "The Rassemblement National of Marine Le Pen wants power and will obtain it; LFI does not want power—what it wants is disorder, anarchy, and violence." These riots, and the driving role played by LFI, appear to prove him right. Sustained chaos seems to serve its revolutionary orientation better than ordinary governance.
Immigration, Islam, and LFI are not the only factors involved. Insane energy costs compound the social and fiscal pressure. Fuel prices are high enough to revive Yellow Vest-style anger. The government has responded with releases from strategic diesel reserves, price caps, and targeted aid -- not the needed structural reform. France's nuclear fleet remains a comparative advantage, yet years of green-transition policies, taxes, regulatory costs, and underinvestment have contributed to elevated prices and public resentment. Protesters explicitly cited fuel prices alongside school conditions.
Consequences
The plausible consequences of these riots are straightforward and already visible. Macron will not resign. He is in the final months of his second disastrous term ahead of the 2027 presidential elections next spring. His approval rate is low, but the institutional calendar and political incentives do not favor an early exit. The immediate fiscal outlook continues to worsen. France's public deficit is projected around 5.4 percent of GDP for 2026 (among the eurozone's highest), with debt near 120 percent of GDP. Prime minister Lecornu's 2027 budget aims for roughly 5 percent via some €54 billion in savings and freezes, yet the National Assembly remains fragmented after the 2024 snap elections. The reality is that the French state appears less capable than ever of putting its disastrous finances in order; there is a looming risk of a snowball effect regarding interest on the debt.
Previous budgets have required the 49.3 constitutional tool to bypass a vote (Article 49.3 of the French Constitution is a powerful mechanism that allows the prime minister to force the passage of a bill through the National Assembly without a vote). Markets have pushed French yields much higher. Further unrest and political paralysis make credible consolidation harder, not easier. Interest costs are again rising. France has not run a budget surplus since 1974; the structural drivers — high spending, demographic pressures, and refusal to prioritize growth-oriented reforms — remain intact.
Sarkozy's observation on LFI is being confirmed in real time. The party and its allies benefit from the perception of systemic failure while avoiding the responsibilities of office. Having spent years courting Muslims and engaging in antisemitic tropes with total impunity — often with the complicity of the Left — LFI (La France Insoumise) escalates its behavior further with each passing day.
Meanwhile, France remains locked into its taboos. The demented "energy transition" continues despite the visible cost-of-living backlash. Serious discussion of migration selection, remigration, assimilation requirements, or the cultural and security implications of Islam is still heavily constrained by elite consensus and legal or media norms. Marine Le Pen — a probable, though not certain, winner of the presidential election — has just declared that "Islam is compatible with the Republic." She reportedly intends to lower the retirement age to 62—in a country with an increasingly aging population where, it should be remembered, the state pays out pensions.
The truth is that if France fails to confront its taboos, the October riots will, in retrospect, look like a practice run.
*Drieu Godefridi is a jurist (University Saint-Louis, University of Louvain), philosopher (University Saint-Louis, University of Louvain) and PhD in legal theory (Paris IV-Sorbonne). He is an entrepreneur, CEO of a European private education group and director of PAN Medias Group. He is the author of The Green Reich (2020).
© 2026 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute.

Egypt May Finally Step Up Against the Houthis
Bridget Toomey and Mariam Wahba/FDD- Policy Brief/October 23/2026
After nearly three years of staying out of the wars in the Middle East, Egypt may finally be ready to engage.
On October 18, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi pledged to provide Saudi Arabia with “all necessary and possible” support to defend itself against Houthi attacks. A day prior, Sisi had requested parliamentary authorization to deploy Egyptian forces if Riyadh asks for such assistance. While the Egyptian parliament delayed the vote until October 26, officials have specified that any support would be exclusively defensive. This change comes on the heels of sustained efforts by Riyadh to garner regional support as it faces deadly attacks from the Houthis. On September 15, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) visited Cairo to seek Egyptian assistance. Yet a commitment to defensive support falls short of the more consequential contribution needed to help Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s internationally recognized government decisively address the Houthi threat.
Despite Economic Strain, Egypt Has Failed To Respond to Houthi Attacks
Since the Houthi’s began attacking commercial shipping in the Red Sea in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack that plunged the region into war, merchant ships have avoided the Suez Canal, costing Egypt billions of dollars in tolls and spurring a prolonged economic crisis. Despite these direct costs, Cairo had refused to engage the Houthis. It has opted instead for statements urging deescalation. Before the attacks began, the Suez Canal generated a record $10.25 billion in revenue in 2023. That figure plummeted 61 percent to $3.99 billion in 2024, before recovering only slightly to $4.2 billion in 2025. The disruption has deprived Cairo of a critical source of foreign currency while its economy remains under strain.
Cairo Isn’t Alone in Limiting Its Support for Riyadh to Defense
Saudi Arabia’s Mecca Pact partners, Pakistan and Turkey, activated the agreement on October 5 and announced the “rapid deployment” of forces to the Kingdom. Pakistan Army spokesman Lt. Gen. Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry said that the country is giving Riyadh “whatever support is needed.” However, he added, the alliance “is purely defensive.” Turkey is also providing defensive and technical assistance only.
Egypt Has a Role To Play, but Washington Can Do More
Restricting assistance to defensive measures helps treat the symptom, not the cause. Washington should work with Riyadh to translate its regional and global support into a coordinated strategy that combines maritime security, air and missile defense, and support for Yemeni government forces in their counteroffensive against the Houthis. Cairo can contribute to maritime efforts to isolate the Houthis with naval and intelligence assets. There are multiple regional and international maritime missions tasked with defending shipping in the Red Sea — both Riyadh and Cairo are members of at least two. Instead of operating parallel maritime efforts, Washington should work to harmonize and potentially consolidate anti-Houthi maritime missions. The missions should focus not only on defending shipping in the Red Sea, but also interdicting Houthi maritime smuggling routes which are essential to the group’s weapons supply.
Additionally, Cairo and other regional partners can support Saudi efforts to fund and supply Yemeni armed forces which are leading the fight against the Houthis on the ground. Without isolating the Houthis from weapons resupply and challenging their control in northern Yemen, their capacity to threaten not just Saudi Arabia, but the region, will persist.
*Bridget Toomey is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Mariam Wahba is a research analyst at FDD. For more analysis from Bridget, Mariam, and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Bridget on X @BridgetKToomey and Mariam on X @themariamwahba. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

Eastern Libya’s Endorsement of Maritime Agreement With Turkey Undermines U.S. Allies in the Mediterranean
Sinan Ciddi/FDD.Policy Brief/October 23/2026
At the beginning of this year, the speaker of eastern Libya’s parliament described a proposed maritime border deal with Turkey as “built on illegality.” However, on October 20, the same parliament unanimously approved the agreement. The agreement violates Greece’s internationally recognized maritime rights, opens the way for Turkish drilling in contested waters, and raises the prospect for armed conflict between Turkey and Greece. The approval means that the agreement now has the backing of both Libya’s rival governments. The internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) based in Tripoli in the west assented to the agreement in 2019 — a reflection of its indebtedness to Ankara for military intervention on its behalf in the Libyan civil war. It took Turkey seven years of courting the Benghazi-based Government of National Stability (GNS) to achieve the same outcome in the east, where Gen. Khalifa Haftar leads the government, whose forces once battled Turkey-backed adversaries. The European Union immediately denounced the deal now concluded with the government in eastern Libya, because it “infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states [and] does not comply with the law of the sea.” Nevertheless, the eastern Libyan parliament’s support strengthens Turkey’s position in contested maritime zones claimed by Greece and Cyprus, advancing the implementation of Turkey’s “Blue Homeland” maritime expansion doctrine.
A Strategic Victory for Ankara
Turkey’s position in Libya has now been shored up in three distinct but interrelated areas. Legally, the GNA vote repairs the 2019 agreement’s principal deficiency, namely approval by only one of Libya’s two rival administrations. Militarily, Turkey’s troop deployment in Libya is now authorized to continue until January 2028; in eastern Libya, Haftar’s faction has reportedly reached agreements with Ankara regarding military bases, surveillance infrastructure, and officer training. Economically, the vote safeguards Turkish commercial interests, as Turkish contractors are engaged in 633 projects in Libya valued at $31 billion.
Major Concerns for Regional U.S. Allies
For Greece, the parliamentary approval represents a setback in its diplomatic efforts to prevent the agreement’s ratification. Athens has consistently maintained that the pact ignores the status of Crete, which lies between the Turkish and Libyan coasts. Greece’s foreign ministry immediately declared the new maritime deal as “null and void.” Ankara already treats this maritime boundary as operational; in April, a Turkish drone traversed the area during a U.S.-led exercise in Libya. For Cyprus, the primary concern is the potential erosion of regional influence. Ankara has leveraged the 2019 agreement to assert a role in the development of the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI), a planned power cable connecting Greece, Cyprus, and ultimately Israel. The deployment of Turkish F-16s to occupied northern Cyprus in March may also increase the proximity of Israeli maritime assets to Turkish military capabilities.Without strong pushback from the European Union, whose maritime borders are being challenged by Turkey and Libya, this agreement could precipitate armed conflict between NATO members Turkey and Greece. Turkey now maintains military forces in Libya, Syria, occupied Cyprus, and Somalia, operating bases on three continents and enhancing its capacity to assert its maritime claims through military means.
U.S. Should Support EU Allies in Curbing Turkish Power Projection
Washington should advocate for cooperation grounded in international law. The administration should publicly reaffirm that the memorandum does not impose obligations on other states, aligning with the European Union’s stance. Additionally, it should exert pressure on Haftar, a U.S. citizen, and condition support for any Libyan unity initiative on Tripoli and Benghazi engaging in maritime border negotiations with Greece and Egypt in accordance with the law of the sea. The Pentagon should ensure that AFRICOM exercises do not reinforce Turkey’s maritime boundary, while the State Department should support survey activities for the GSI. Congress should examine whether Turkey’s deployment of U.S.-manufactured F-16s to occupied Cyprus contravenes end-use regulations. It should establish conditions for future arms transfers to Ankara, including any potential reentry into the F-35 program, by requiring Turkey to relinquish the use of force in pursuing its Libya-based claims. Furthermore, Congress should continue to strengthen security cooperation with Greece, Cyprus, and Israel to ensure that Ankara’s strategy yields greater costs than benefits.
*Sinan Ciddi is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Sinan and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow Sinan on X @SinanCiddi. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.

U.S. Must Cut Off Chinese Firms That Profit From Stolen American AI
Susan Soh and Annie Fixler/FDD- Policy Brief/October 23/2026
The evidence of Chinese intellectual property theft emerged in federal court, but the U.S. government turned to sanctions to punish the companies that received the illicit files. On October 19, the State Department sanctioned five China-based entities connected to Linwei Ding, the former Google engineer convicted by a federal jury in January of stealing more than 1,000 files on Google’s artificial intelligence (AI) hardware and software infrastructure. The Google case is part of a longstanding pattern of Chinese intellectual property (IP) theft for strategic gain.
The case also shows the amplified impact of the coordinated usage of economic statecraft tools. The Department of Justice prosecution established Ding’s criminal liability, while the State Department sanctions target the Chinese firms that benefited from the stolen IP, restricting their access to funds and property in the United States.
Developed by Google, Smuggled to China
In 2023, while still employed as a software engineer by Google, Linwei Ding founded Shanghai Zhisuan Technology with the stated aim to “replicate and upgrade” Google’s 10,000-card supercomputing cluster. The system links 10,000 AI chips into a single supercomputer and is critical to running large-scale AI data centers.As Zhisuan’s CEO, Ding secured seed funding from the Chinese startup incubator MiraclePlus in exchange for a 7 percent stake in a MiraclePlus-affiliated venture fund. The October 19 State Department designations targeted Zhisuan, MiraclePlus, two MiraclePlus-managed venture funds with indirect Chinese government ownership, and one of their subsidiaries for theft of trade secrets under the Protecting American Intellectual Property Act (PAIPA).
Familiar Pattern, Evolving Tactics
In 2020, then-FBI Director Christopher Wray called Chinese IP theft “one of the largest transfers of wealth in human history.” It costs the U.S. economy an estimated $225 billion to $600 billion annually, and U.S. intelligence agencies attribute up to 80 percent of economic espionage cases to China. Technology firms are the primary target, accounting for one-third of incidents. Nearly a decade ago, experts with the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit warned that Chinese companies not only use nominally legal means like joint ventures with foreign firms to misappropriate IP but also engage in industrial espionage and cyber-enabled data theft. Chinese telecom giant Huawei has allegedly done so, with indications of theft by employees, breaches of joint venture confidentiality, and an incentive program rewarding IP theft. A federal trial of the company began last month, as federal prosecutor Taylor Stout alleged “the entire business operated through a pattern of theft, lies and cover-ups.”As technology has advanced, China’s IP theft tactics have also evolved. A U.S. government advisory in September accused China-based AI firms of carrying out industrial-scale distillation attacks against U.S. AI firms, a method that entails systematically querying U.S. models to train competing ones.
Protecting American Innovation Against China
Beyond the direct losses, IP theft distorts markets by letting thieves compete without bearing the costs of research and development and by discouraging companies from investing in new technologies.
China understands these stakes and is strengthening protections for its own IP to safeguard strategic assets and incentivize innovation by Chinese firms. Washington must do the same.
Coordinating economic statecraft actions amplifies their impact: prosecution punishes the thieves, while sanctions target the firms that profit from the theft. The executive branch should continue this approach and, should the ongoing Huawei case end in a guilty verdict, consider following a similar pattern by sanctioning Huawei subsidiaries and officers under PAIPA. The Commerce Department should also add the Chinese firms behind distillation attacks on leading U.S. AI companies to its Entity List, which restricts their access to U.S. exports. In addition, the U.S. government must update customs architecture to address modern trade challenges. Specifically, Washington should close the customs enforcement gaps that let Chinese firms illegally obtain cutting-edge AI chips and servers through foreign partnerships. Prevailing over China in the technology domain requires organizing government structures to protect American innovation.
*Susan Soh is a research associate for the Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Annie Fixler is the director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) and a senior fellow at FDD. For more analysis from the authors, CEFP, and CCTI, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD, @FDD_CEFP, and @FDD_CCTI. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

Washington Should Resist Russia’s Gulf Mediation Bid
Keti Korkiya and Bridget Toomey/FDD-Policy Brief/October 23/2026
As Iranian attacks in the Persian Gulf return to wartime highs and Saudi Arabia faces deadly strikes on its infrastructure from the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states are asking for support. They shouldn’t expect sincere help from Russia.
On October 18, during Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Bahrain, GCC officials urged Moscow to press Iran to halt its attacks on GCC members. The request came despite Russia’s deepening military cooperation with Tehran, its support for the Houthis, and its limited ability to influence Iranian decisions. For the Kremlin, however, diplomatic involvement offers an opportunity to expand its regional influence and accumulate leverage for future negotiations, even without delivering a settlement.
Moscow’s Diplomatic Push in the Gulf
Moscow’s efforts to secure a role as mediator began before Lavrov’s visit to Bahrain. On October 9, President Vladimir Putin relayed Iran’s position on a possible settlement to President Donald Trump, following talks with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. At the Bahrain meeting, Lavrov promoted Moscow’s updated collective Gulf security framework, unveiled in June. One of the plan’s aims is to reduce reliance on the American security umbrella, something some Gulf countries are already exploring. The proposal also calls for Gulf states to prohibit third parties from using their territory to attack neighboring countries, a provision that could constrain U.S. military operations in the region. The following day, Lavrov traveled to Tehran, where he briefed Iranian officials on his discussions with GCC representatives and reiterated Russia’s willingness to help find a diplomatic settlement.
Putin’s communication with Trump and Lavrov’s back-to-back meetings in Bahrain and Tehran demonstrate Moscow’s ability to maintain contact with Washington, Tehran, and the Gulf states. Russia has sought a greater role in Gulf security for decades, and the current crisis gives the Kremlin another opportunity to advance those ambitions.
Moscow Is No Neutral Mediator
Moscow continues to cooperate militarily and economically with Tehran even as it offers to help mediate an end to the conflict, raising questions about its willingness to pressure its partner. Iran has transferred Shahed drone technology to Russia, which in turn helped Tehran upgrade its drones using technology developed during the war in Ukraine. Moscow reportedly provided intelligence, such as satellite imagery, to help Iran target American forces. Moscow and Tehran are also pursuing cooperation in energy, finance, transportation, and sanctions-busting.
Russia’s partnership with Iran extends to the Houthis. The group has sought weapons and sanctioned materials — such as oil and stolen Ukrainian grain — from Moscow. A Houthi-affiliated company also trafficked hundreds of Yemeni men to Russia to fight in Ukraine. In 2024, The Wall Street Journal reported that Russia was supplying intelligence to the Houthis to help them attack vessels in the Red Sea. Lavrov’s remarks in Tehran further raised questions about Moscow’s willingness to pressure Iran. During his October 19 visit, he described Iran’s cause as just. Russia also abstained on a March UN Security Council resolution condemning Iranian attacks on Gulf states and vetoed a Bahrain-sponsored resolution in April aimed at protecting shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Despite its deepening military and economic cooperation with Tehran, Moscow has not shown that it can sway Tehran’s decisions. In March, Putin offered to convey Gulf leaders’ concerns about Iranian attacks to Tehran and subsequently spoke with Pezeshkian, yet the strikes continued. Russia also benefits from higher oil prices and the diversion of Washington’s attention from Ukraine. The Kremlin has a track record of using diplomatic negotiations to advance its strategic interests, and involvement in Gulf mediation could provide opportunities to expand its regional influence and gain leverage in negotiations with Washington.
Keep Moscow Out of Gulf Security Arrangements
Washington should work closely with GCC partners to prevent Russia, a close partner of Tehran, from assuming any mediating role in the conflict or participating in future Gulf security arrangements. Instead, Washington should support increased GCC cooperation with partners that will meaningfully contribute to their security, like Ukraine, which has assisted Middle East countries with counter-drone defenses.
*Keti Korkiya is a research analyst with the Russia Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Bridget Toomey is a research analyst at FDD. For more analysis from Keti, Bridget, and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Bridget on X @BridgetKToomey. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

Encryption isn’t enough to protect data wherever it goes
Georgianna Shea/CyberScoop/October 23/2026
Once data is in use, encryption falls short. A tested approach that replaces sensitive values with realistic substitutes could make stolen information far less useful to hackers.
Cybersecurity policy has long treated data protection as a systems problem: encrypt the database, secure the network, restrict access, monitor activity, and keep attackers out. All of that still matters. But those defenses have a major blind spot. Once inside the wall the data itself is at risk. Every time data is used, copied, or moved, the risk that a malicious actor will steal and expose the data significantly increases. Policymakers need to consider a tested method that reduces the value of sensitive information if it compromised.
Hospitals, banks, defense contractors and government agencies cannot operate on permanently unreadable data. They need to process records, share information, analyze intelligence and prepare data for artificial intelligence models. The reality is data moves. It travels through cloud platforms, vendors, backups, analytics tools, payment processors, software services, AI pipelines, and partner systems. Every handoff creates another place where information can be copied, cached, logged, and indexed, and another place where it can be mishandled or stolen.
This is the gap encryption does not close. Encryption protects data when it is stored or traveling, only partially protects it when it is transmitted, and does not protect data at all when it is processed. Once an authorized system decrypts information so someone can use it, the data becomes readable again. The defenses have not reduced the sensitivity of the information. If an adversary steals unencrypted data — or decrypts stolen data at a later date when quantum computers are readily available — the adversary now has the sensitive information.
All told, encryption is essential, but it’s also not enough. Washington needs to take that seriously.
One promising answer is vaultless, keyless pseudonymization. The phrase sounds technical, but the idea is straightforward: replace sensitive values with realistic substitutes before the data spreads.
A name becomes another name. A Social Security number becomes another valid-looking Social Security number. A payment card number, patient identifier, or address keeps the same basic format. Databases, billing platforms, and analytics tools can still process the record because it looks structurally familiar. But the identity is no longer exposed to every vendor, platform, or downstream user that touches it.
That is a different mindset from the one that dominates cybersecurity policy. We spend enormous energy trying to protect every system that might handle sensitive data. We should keep doing that. But in a world of cloud services, supply chains and AI systems that retain information in hard-to-track ways, perfect control over every downstream system is more difficult than ever. The question is no longer only about securing systems but also about making exposed or stolen data less useful to threat actors if they acquire it through any means.
Traditional tokenization models swap out real values for “token” terms and store original values — like names, passwords and credit card numbers — in a central vault. That can reduce exposure, but it creates an obvious target. If the vault itself is accessed, the sensitive values behind the tokens may be exposed.
Vaultless, keyless pseudonymization is designed to remove the single point of failure created by a central vault or master key. In a model assessed by our Transformative Cyber Innovation Lab at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the protected data could be restored only when the required parties authorized it under controlled conditions; no one party could reverse the pseudonymized tokens on its own.
The test showed the approach could preserve the format of sensitive contents while limiting access to the real values behind them. Unauthorized restoration attempts failed and were logged. Multi-party stakeholder authorized restoration returned the correct values. Intercepted tokens did not reveal the original data value. And the system contained a unique ability to revoke access to the token — regardless of where it exist — by cutting off downstream re-identification.
The assessment showed promise that sensitive data could remain useful for legitimate work while becoming far less valuable to attackers and unauthorized users. Using vaultless, keyless pseudonymization can significantly reduce the impact of a data breach or ransomware attack if the stolen or exposed data has no intrinsic value. The federal government should evaluate this methodology to assess what is required to make it work in live, real-world operations. Right now, agencies may be inclined to ignore this type of technology simply because it does not fit neatly into existing categories for encryption, access control, or other cybersecurity processes. This is a mistake. The National Institute of Standards and Technology should evaluate what the technology does, what risks it reduces, what new dependencies it introduces, and what evidence is required before it can be trusted in practice. NSA should examine the same questions for classified networks. Procurement regulations should also get smarter. Vendors claiming tokenization, pseudonymization, data-layer protection or quantum-resilient properties should have to explain whether raw data enters their infrastructure, whether any token-to-source mapping exists, who can restore original values and what independent review has been completed.
Cybersecurity policy has spent decades trying to keep attackers out. That work will never end. But we need this second objective: make sensitive data less damaging when it inevitably escapes.
*Georgianna Shea, who is a Doctor of Computer Science, is chief technologist at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation and its Transformative Cyber Innovation Lab.

Erdogan’s “Pious Generation” Goes Global
Sinan Ciddi/The Patient Revolution/October 23/2026
Late this past September, Turkey’s Education Ministry entered into an agreement with the Ensar Foundation, an organization that claims to advance educational objectives in keeping with what it calls the teachings and requirements of Islam. This agreement authorized the foundation to organize a knowledge competition for high school students. A week before, the Diyanet Center of America, a significant religious institution near Washington, D.C., launched a leadership program for imams. And in June, a New York-based nonprofit established by two Erdogan-linked charities submitted its latest Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) report, detailing its activities on behalf of Turkish clients.
These developments are interconnected and form part of a wider, long-term initiative: President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s strategy to develop what he calls “a pious generation.” Ongoing for more than a decade, this effort operates through Turkish government agencies and foundations affiliated with the Erdogan family, widening its reach from West Africa to suburban Maryland. In the United States, the Turken Foundation, which maintains family ties to the Erdogans, holds tax-exempt status as an educational charity. American policymakers should examine and assess these organizations according to their financial records, governance structures, and official documentation, which indicate they function primarily as instruments of the Turkish state and the Erdogan family.
Erdogan has never hidden his intentions. In 2012, he declared that his administration sought to raise a generation of religious youth. Five years later, at Ensar’s general assembly, he expressed disappointment that, after fourteen years in power, his movement had not yet achieved dominance in social and cultural spheres or produced the desired religious generations. At the same event, he contrasted the Gezi Park protesters with the youth who resisted the 2016 coup attempt, characterizing the latter as committed to religious observance and national symbols.
Subsequent domestic policies reflected this vision. Enrollment in religious imam-hatip schools (schools with a historic mandate and focus to educate future imams in Turkey) increased from approximately 84,000 in 2002 to about 1.3 million by 2017. The 2017 curriculum eliminated the teaching of evolution and mandated that imam-hatip students study jihad as a patriotic concept. The 2024 “Century of Türkiye” curriculum prompted a lawsuit from opposition parties who argued that it was ideologically motivated, and Erdogan has criticized Turkish schools for concentrating exclusively on “materialistic” content. In 2018, he told a six-year-old in military uniform that, if she became a martyr, she would be wrapped in the Turkish flag. The overarching vision emphasizes Sunni religious devotion, nationalism influenced by Ottoman heritage, reverence for martyrdom, and a historical perspective that characterizes Western-style education as materialistic and bereft of the teachings of Islam.
Erdogan’s educational ambitions have not stopped at Turkey’s own borders, but Ankara’s international educational vision predates Erdogan. During the ruling party’s alliance with the late, reclusive imam Fethullah Gulen, schools affiliated with Gulen’s movement served as instruments of Turkish soft power in countries such as Azerbaijan. Turkish officials later identified 688 Gulen-affiliated schools operating in 113 countries, and shortly before severing ties with the network Erdogan himself participated in the movement’s 2013 Turkish Language Olympics, which featured participants from 140 countries.
Following the 2016 coup attempt, he encouraged African leaders to transfer these schools to the newly established Turkish Maarif Foundation. The president of Maarif has acknowledged that approximately one-third of its network resulted from such transfers. Ankara’s efforts also target American educational institutions, as it has opposed the over 100 schools Gulen-linked charter schools believed to operate in the United States.
Maarif does not function as a charity in any substantive sense. Legally, it is the sole organization aside from the Education Ministry authorized to establish schools abroad on behalf of Turkey; a 2024 presidential decree signed by Erdogan allocated up to 5.7 billion lira ($115 million) in ministry funds to Maarif. The organization currently reports 601 facilities in 64 countries and serves over 75,000 students. In South Africa, for instance, its schools incorporate a character development curriculum in addition to the national syllabus. Maarif’s newsletter articulates its mission as cultivating virtuous individuals who are müzahir, or supportive, of Turkey. Erdogan positions Maarif as the vanguard of an educational model anchored in fıtrat, the Islamic concept of innate human nature, and asserts that this education is provided by a nation with “no stain of colonialism” in its history, in direct contrast to Western counterparts. The organization’s former vice president, a Turkish diplomat, described it as Turkey’s educational presence in Africa.
Africa represents Maarif’s most significant area of operation. In 2023, 24 out of the 51 countries hosting its institutions were located on the continent. At the inaugural graduation ceremony for its school in The Gambia, participants observed a minute of silence for the “martyrs” of Turkey’s coup attempt. The local Maarif representative outlined the foundation’s strategy: identify high-achieving students, immerse them in Turkish language and culture, and encourage further education in Turkey.
Maarif constitutes only one component of a wider system. The Turkish Diyanet Foundation, for example, facilitates the enrollment of international students in Turkish imam-hatip schools and theology faculties. In 2024, the foundation supported 2,853 scholarship recipients from 114 countries and referred to its 10,755 alumni as “voluntary ambassadors” for Turkey. According to a senior foundation official, these graduates return to their home countries to represent both the foundation and Turkey. A 2025 government agreement linked the program, which attracts students from 95 countries, to the “Century of Türkiye” initiative. The Yunus Emre Institute serves as the initial point of contact, teaching Turkish to approximately 91,000 individuals across 68 countries in 2024, with the explicit goal of expanding Turkey’s network of allies. In Germany, a Diyanet attaché reported that Turkish language classes had commenced in mosque associations in collaboration with the institute, despite objections from secular Turkish teachers’ and parents’ organizations regarding the qualifications of imams as language instructors.
These activities have already had ramifications in European countries. German prosecutors conducted searches of imams’ residences after Diyanet instructed clerics to report information on Gulen sympathizers to Turkish diplomatic missions. In 2018, Austria initiated the deportation of Turkish-funded imams following the emergence of photographs depicting boys in a Diyanet-affiliated mosque in Vienna reenacting the Gallipoli campaign and simulating death beneath Turkish flags; a congregation representative told the weekly Falter that the events shocked them. Swiss media reported a comparable war game involving Turkish children, apparently with embassy involvement.
Ultimately, Berlin reached an agreement with Ankara in 2023 to phase out the use of imams employed by the Turkish state—an arrangement, as the Associated Press reported, that had served as a conduit for Ankara’s influence over the diaspora for decades.
A similar network operates within the United States. The Turkish government financed the $110 million Diyanet Center of America in Lanham, Maryland, which a center spokesperson stated Erdogan intended to serve the wider Muslim community—not solely Turkish nationals. The center offers a Sunday school program for children aged 4 to 16, focusing on Qur’an memorization and Islamic studies. In 2024, its mosque hosted Ankara’s official July 15 commemoration of the 2016 coup attempt. Maarif’s inaugural American school, located in Clifton, New Jersey, provides instruction in both Islamic and secular subjects, and the Yunus Emre Institute has maintained centers in Maryland and Washington, D.C. since at least 2017.
The most convincing evidence that the initiatives are political rather than philanthropic resides in their leadership structures. Turgev, another Turkish foundation, was founded in 1996 under Erdogan’s direction, with his daughter Esra Albayrak serving on its board; his son Bilal has also served on the board. The Turkish government acknowledged that Turgev received nearly $100 million in foreign funds between 2008 and 2012, but did not disclose the sources. During the 2013 corruption investigations targeting the Erdogans, prosecutors later dismissed Bilal’s alleged use of the foundation to facilitate bribes, an allegation Erdogan denied.
Ensar Foundation is another entity with similarly close ties. Bilal Erdogan has served on its general assembly and has publicly said that, aside from his wife, he interacted most often with Ensar’s chairman. In 2017, the Education Ministry authorized nearly 1,000 public education centers to host Ensar courses—an expansion that occurred one year after a teacher at the foundation’s Karaman branch was convicted of sexually abusing ten boys. A cabinet minister defended the foundation by asserting that the abuse was an isolated incident.
In 2014, Turgev and Ensar jointly established the Turken Foundation in the United States. The organization’s founding document bears Bilal Erdogan’s signature, and Esra Albayrak was listed as a board member. Turken is registered under FARA, with Turgev and Ensar designated as its foreign principals. According to the foundations themselves, registration occurred only after U.S. authorities initiated efforts to bring it under the law. Turken reports $117 million in assets, yet it supported only approximately 50 students in 2022. Ensar has stated that Turken’s Manhattan dormitory tower enables Turkish students to reside in the United States “away from the grip of ‘FETO’” (the Fetullah Gulen Terrorist Organization, Ankara’s designation for the Gulen movement). In 2024, it expended $6.3 million on lobbying activities, according to FARA data compiled by OpenSecrets.
Ankara’s proponents characterize these activities as standard cultural diplomacy. Berlin’s tourism website compares the Yunus Emre Institute to Germany’s own Goethe-Institut, for instance. Maarif has committed to implementing Afghanistan’s national curriculum in the schools it assumed control of there. Somalia’s deputy education minister has commended Maarif’s educational institutions. German prosecutors concluded the imam surveillance investigation without filing charges, and a Vienna court reversed most of Austria’s 2018 mosque closures. Ankara dismissed the closures as Islamophobic, and Turken has informed the Justice Department that its political engagement is limited to discussions regarding a housing construction project.
However, these arguments do not address the central concerns surrounding these state-sponsored religious institutions. Unlike the Goethe-Institut, these organizations share governance with a head of state’s children. Curricular content becomes secondary when character development initiatives and graduation ceremonies explicitly honor Ankara’s preferred martyrs. And despite the investigation’s closure, Berlin ended Diyanet’s deployment of imams. Furthermore, a foundation with $117 million in assets that supported only about 50 students in 2022 does not match the typical profile of a scholarship fund.
Washington should cease extending to these organizations the presumption of legitimacy typically afforded to genuine charities.
First, the Justice Department should rigorously review Turken’s disclosures and assess whether other Turkish state-funded entities in the United States, such as the Diyanet Center and Maarif’s American school, should face additional registration requirements.
Second, the State Department has an existing precedent: in 2020, it designated the Confucius Institute U.S. Center as a foreign mission and required disclosure of personnel and property. Turkish state-run educational and religious institutions should be held to comparable transparency standards.
Third, Congress should mandate an annual public report on foreign-government-funded religious and K-12 educational programs operating within the United States.
Fourth, Washington should collaborate with Germany, which is already phasing out Diyanet’s state-employed imams, and encourage African partners—where Maarif is most active—to disclose funding and governance sources for these schools.
Erdogan has consistently articulated his intention to shape a particular generation. Washington should similarly acknowledge that this effort now goes beyond Turkey’s borders, with affiliated classrooms and dormitories established in New Jersey, Maryland, and Manhattan.
*Sinan Ciddi is a senior fellow and director of the Turkey program at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, D.C.

Iran’s Ongoing War against the Arabs!
Radwan al-Sayyed/Asharq Al Awsat/October 23/2026
Since 2008, the Iranians have taunted us with the claim that they have seized control of four Arab capitals: Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Sanaa. Except for Syria, which barely escaped the full grip of their militias, the remaining capitals and countries have remained either occupied or under constant threat. Consequently, the Gulf states and Jordan, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, have become targets for missile and drone strikes launched by Iranian proxies. Iran is now threatening that if it faces renewed American strikes, it will resume its bombardment of the Gulf countries, echoing its actions during previous confrontations with the United States and Israel.
There is no longer any difference between Israel and Iran when it comes to waging war on Arab countries. Since Syria expelled the Iranians, the Russians, and their respective militias from its territory in 2024, Israel has rushed to open a front in southern Syria, which is now subjected to near-daily attacks. Just as Iran and its militias do not bother to justify their assaults, Israel occasionally cites the protection of the Druze in Sweida, while repeatedly ignoring the underlying pretexts for its aggression.In Lebanon, both the Iranians and Israel align in their total disregard for the state, the land, and the security of its population. While Arab League Secretary-General Nabil Fahmy visited Beirut to announce his support for the Lebanese government, Hezbollah - Iran’s armed faction in the country - threatened dire consequences after authorities intercepted a truck transporting hundreds of kilograms of explosives from the Bekaa Valley to the southern suburbs of Beirut. The other development involves the Lebanese military delegation that traveled to the US to meet with an Israeli military delegation for a ninth or tenth round of negotiations. Ahead of this meeting, Netanyahu issued threats stating that the Israeli army, which has occupied hundreds of kilometers in southern Lebanon and reached the outskirts of Nabatieh, will not withdraw from its occupied positions until the Lebanese government disarms Hezbollah. Knowing that the Lebanese army is incapable of doing so, he implies that the occupation will remain.
The Iraqi government, which had previously demonstrated strong enthusiasm for disarming pro-Iranian militias, suddenly fell silent on the matter and proceeded to grant concessions and ministerial portfolios to the ruling Iraqi-Iranian militias in the country. This time, the Americans also remained silent and withdrew from Iraq late last month without explaining this abandonment - a move that has terrified the Kurds and delighted the Iranians.
These state-destroying disasters pale in comparison to the resurgence of massive Houthi attacks in Yemen, aimed at seizing control of Bab al-Mandeb, Taiz, al-Mokha, and potentially other regions. Iran has returned to utilizing the Houthis, directing them not against Israel and the US, but against Yemen and Saudi Arabia. This is the same course of action that we have come to expect from Iran for decades. The Iranians will not change despite appeals and incentives, as they believe themselves to be cleverer than everyone else!
To make matters worse, thousands of Houthi missiles and drones spare no region of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in their aggression, extending even to the Grand Mosque and Madinah. These strikes have particularly targeted civilian airports, causing casualties among dozens of civilian Umrah pilgrims, workers, and travelers.Virtually every party, both Arab and non-Arab, has condemned these actions. Yet, such is the hypocrisy of the Iranians that they have offered to mediate, despite the fact that all of the Houthi weaponry and the commanders of their brigades come from Iran's Revolutionary Guard, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and Iraqi volunteers!
We, the older generation, still remember how the Kingdom and everyone else rallied during the wars of 1967 and 1973 to support Egypt and Syria. Alliances are forged either through a unity of vision and shared interests, or through a tribal solidarity akin to Ibn Khaldun's "Asabiyyah". Both forms are readily available to Arabs, and to Gulf citizens in particular. People, there are ten million Arabs from your nations working in the Gulf, so where is the collective resolve? The UK has offered to protect Saudi airspace, while millions of workers from both the West and the East reside in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries. Will Iran's "sincere" friends not step up to compel it to halt its aggression and that of its proxies, especially since they claim that relations with the Gulf countries have transcended mere alliances to become strategic partnerships?What we are witnessing right now are lessons that should not be forgotten, whether in terms of friendship or in terms of alliance and partnership.This is the ongoing Iranian war against the Arabs, aimed at toppling or weakening stable and developing nations. While the Arabs of the Peninsula have successfully built prosperity over the past decades, they are undoubtedly capable today of protecting their achievements and deterring the aggression of destructive militias acting on behalf of Iran!

Iraq Says: We Have No Houthis
Mishary Dhayidi/Asharq Al Awsat/October 23/2026
The headline on Al Arabiya's website reads: "Iraqi Government: No Houthi Headquarters in Iraq."
In the report, Haider al-Aboudi, the Iraqi government's official spokesperson, told the Iraqi News Agency: "No such headquarters have been identified inside Iraq," adding that "the matter does not require any government action or decision concerning something that does not exist in the first place."Al-Aboudi also stressed that "Iraq will not serve as a launching point for attacks against neighboring countries, nor will it harbor any armed group involved in a particular conflict."
As for everything being said about Houthi activities originating from Iraq, whether military, political, intelligence-related or social, these are merely "narratives circulating on social media," according to the Iraqi government spokesperson. The fact is that anyone who cares about Iraq's stability and peace, and about protecting the entire region from the devastation of chaos and the evils of militias that spread destruction and discord, sincerely hopes this is true. Iraq has suffered enough from its own domestic league of militias. The last thing it needs is a "foreign player."Still, it is worth recalling that Houthi activity in Iraq is not merely a collection of social media narratives. Here are just a few examples. In September 2024, then-US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller spoke of the Houthis opening "secret offices" in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad. The New York Times also published a report on the matter. Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari previously said on the program Baghdad Hour, hosted by journalist Mustafa Saadoun, that information pointed to Houthi activity inside Iraq, citing the deaths of Houthi members in strikes targeting armed factions in the country. Zebari added that "information indicates the Houthis had a hand in the attack on Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline."
Al Jazeera, of all outlets, reported on a figure named Abu Idris Ahmed al-Sharafi, the Houthi group's representative in Iraq. It also published a photograph of him being received by Qais al-Khazali, a man who hardly needs an introduction!An earlier article in this very column provided further details.But that is not what matters most.What matters is the statement made by Mr. Al-Aboudi, spokesperson for the Iraqi government headed by Mr. Ali al-Zaidi. His words deserve to be acknowledged and welcomed. More importantly, they must be followed by genuine, detailed and sustained action, rather than becoming empty words scattered by the wind. It is in Iraq's interest, in the interest of its neighbors and Yemen, and indeed in the interest of peace throughout the world, that Iraq should never become a refuge or launching pad for groups that care nothing for the interests of Iraq, its state or its people.
And one final point: Iraq's example should draw attention to other places around the world where the Houthis operate, whether financially, through the media, politically, militarily or logistically.
These activities must be brought into the light, and the networks behind them contained and dismantled until these dark pockets are eliminated.

Selected Face Book & X tweets on October 24/2026
عبدالله بن الحسين@KingAbdullahII
·The terrorist attack against Karak will be met with the harshest retaliation. Those who delude themselves into thinking that they can divide Jordanians with their bullets have no chance in the face of our unity. All Jordanians, from north to south, are partners in land and fate, and nothing stands between them. Our deepest condolences to the families of the martyrs and we wish a speedy recovery to those injured. Every Jordanian life is precious, and we will strike with an iron fist against those who dare to threaten our nation

Rev. Johnnie Moore
Terrible news from Jordan. Sending all my prayers to the Christian community of Karak, where gunmen opened fire on mourners at a funeral at St. George Orthodox Church. Christians & Muslims have buried their dead side by side in that village for centuries. Praying for those killed & wounded, for their families, for Jordan, & for the day no one mourns under fire.

U.S. Embassy Beirut
43 years ago, Hezbollah terrorists attacked U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, and killed 241 Americans. We will never forget their sacrifice. 🇺🇸 The attack was directed, financed and ordered by the same evil Iranian regime that President Trump is fighting today.”

The White House
@WhiteHouse
43 years ago, Hezbollah terrorists attacked U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, and killed 241 Americans. We will never forget their sacrifice. The attack was directed, financed and ordered by the same evil Iranian regime that President Trump is fighting today.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain
Wow! Geagea!
Says his party debated firing Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Haykal (a Hezbollah asset) for refusing to enforce cabinet resolutions to disarm Hezbollah. Like cabinet convenes to approve him, it can replace him, but no one (Prez Aoun, PM Salam) dared to do so (in fact, Aoun has been showering him with medals and praise).