English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For October 02/2026
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news

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Bible Quotations For today
A wicked and adulterous generation asks for a sign! But none will be given it except the sign of the prophet Jonah.
Matthew12/38-45: Then some of the Pharisees and teachers of the law said to him, “Teacher, we want to see a sign from you.” He answered, “A wicked and adulterous generation asks for a sign! But none will be given it except the sign of the prophet Jonah. For as Jonah was three days and three nights in the belly of a huge fish, so the Son of Man will be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth. The men of Nineveh will stand up at the judgment with this generation and condemn it; for they repented at the preaching of Jonah, and now something greater than Jonah is here. The Queen of the South will rise at the judgment with this generation and condemn it; for she came from the ends of the earth to listen to Solomon’s wisdom, and now something greater than Solomon is here. “When an impure spirit comes out of a person, it goes through arid places seeking rest and does not find it. Then it says, ‘I will return to the house I left.’ When it arrives, it finds the house unoccupied, swept clean and put in order.Then it goes and takes with it seven other spirits more wicked than itself, and they go in and live there. And the final condition of that person is worse than the first. That is how it will be with this wicked generation.”

Titles For The English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on October 01-02/2026
The Annual Feast of Saint Thérèse of the Child Jesus/Elias Bejjani/October 01/2026
Joseph Aoun: The Diabolical Clone of Michel Aoun and Emile Lahoud
With Ambassador Mouawad and With All Lebanese Who Believe in Peace With Israel and With All Peoples of the World, We Pray for the Healing of the Son of the Israeli Ambassador to America/Elias Bejjani/September 29/2026
A Cheap and Fake Theatrical War of Words Between Hezbollah and Gebran Bassil/Elias Bejjani/September 28, 2026
Syria says it thwarted Hezbollah plot; Israel likely target/Ahmad Sharawi/ FDD's Long War Journal/October 01/2026
A Speech from Another Planet/Abu Arz/ X/ October 01, 2026
Canada Issues "Do Not Travel" Warnings for Several Countries; Lebanon at "Red Level"
With the Exception of Beirut Airport... European Warning Remains in Effect!
Secret Meeting Between the Syrian Government and Hezbollah in Turkey
Syrian Foreign Ministry: Reports of Contacts with Hezbollah Are Groundless
Washington to Lebanon: Limiting weapons first.. Will it disappoint the hopes of the sovereigns?
Netanyahu Campaigns from Lebanon... Capitalizing on Realities as a Winning Card
Israel Tracks $157 Million in Hezbollah Military Purchases in 2024
Qaani Places "The Party" Back at the Forefront of Iran’s Rhetoric Regarding Lebanon
Israeli Army Blows Up Homes in Al-Mansouri and Targets Over 370 Sites in Southern Lebanon
Lebanon Informed of Date for New Round of US-Sponsored Direct Negotiations with Israel in Florida
Hezbollah’s Shadow Economy in Post-Assad Syria/Ahmad Sharawi/FDD/October 01/2026

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on October 01-02/2026
More bombing of Iran 'possible' after midterms, Trump says
UAE probes possible 'terror' link in attack on flight to Israel
Flydubai" plane escapes a new "9/11"
Initial Saudi investigations into Flydubai incident: Assault by co-pilot
Trump threatens Iran with "a very strong strike" if its involvement in Flydubai plane incident is proven / "Potential" intensification of attacks against Iran after midterm elections
Saudi Arabia: Investigation indicates assault on Flydubai captain by his co-pilot
Saudi Arabia: Flydubai captain and co-pilot left for UAE accompanied by security team / Riyadh confirmed it deals with emergencies in accordance with its international and humanitarian obligations
British-Iranian arrested on suspicion of terrorism in Fairford case/Interrogation of another citizen and search of two properties in central London
Third US carrier and about 10,000 troops to the region / Trump expects resumption of bombing of Iran in November
US imposes new economic sanctions on Iran / Sanctions target major automakers and prominent companies in railways and manufacturing
Putin shows readiness for peace talks and Zelensky announces use of first Ukrainian ballistic missile /Russia does not intend to strike Western companies supplying weapons
Yemeni Armed Forces: Carry out raids on valuable targets in Saada, Sanaa and Taiz / 27 air raids across Taiz fronts
Arab condemnations of Houthi militia targeting power station feeding the Prophet's Mosque / "A blatant provocation to the feelings of Muslims and a flagrant violation of the sanctity of holy sites"
Houthis target station supplying Prophet's Mosque with electricity / GCC considered attack a blatant provocation to Muslim feelings

Titles For The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on October 01-02/2026
The Emirati Plane and the Major Crisis Averted./Colonel Charbel Barakat/October 01/2026
'October 7 Will Return': Hamas, Like Iran, Will Not Voluntarily Give Up the Fight/Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/October 1, 2026
Le Liban et l’entre-deux-guerres/Dr. Charles Chartouni/Ici Beyrouth/October 01/2026
Lebanon and the Interwar Period/Dr. Charles Chartouni/Ici Beyrouth/October 01, 2026
UN Human Rights Council, European Governments Launch Economic Warfare Against Israel/Ben Cohen/FDD-Policy Brief/October 01/2026
UN Human Rights Council, European Governments Launch Economic Warfare Against Israel/Ben Cohen/FDD-Policy Brief/October 01/2026
Anti-Taliban resistance claims attacks across Afghanistan in September/Will Selber/ FDD's Long War Journal
US forces complete departure from Iraq as anti-Islamic State mission in Iraq ends/Seth J. Frantzman/FDD's Long War Journal/October 01/2026

Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on October 01-02/2026
The Annual Feast of Saint Thérèse of the Child Jesus
Elias Bejjani/October 01/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/10/157998/
Who is Saint Thérèse of the Child Jesus whose annual Feast Day falls on October 1st
1- Birth and Early Life
Saint Thérèse of the Child Jesus, born Marie-Françoise-Thérèse Martin, was born on January 2, 1873 in Alençon, Normandy, France. She was the ninth and youngest child of a holy family: Louis Martin, a jeweler, and Zélie Guérin, a lace-maker. Both parents were later canonized on October 19, 2008. She lost her mother at age 4, and her father moved with his five daughters to Lisieux, where she spent the rest of her life. All five sisters became nuns.
2- Entry into the Carmelite Order – Her Age
From a young age she felt called to Carmel. On May 29, 1887 she asked her father to enter, but faced refusal from the parish priest, the Bishop of Bayeux, and the prioress because of her young age. She did not give up. She traveled with her father to Rome to meet Pope Leo XIII and childishly begged him to allow her to enter at age 15. The Bishop finally allowed it, and she entered the Discalced Carmelite convent of Our Lady in Lisieux on April 9, 1888, at only 15 years old, where three of her sisters had already entered. She received the habit on January 10, 1889. She made her religious vows on September 8, 1890 – the Nativity of the Virgin Mary.
3- Her Illness and Healing by the Virgin – “Our Lady of the Smile”
At age 10, after her beloved sister Pauline entered Carmel, she suffered a serious, mysterious nervous and psychological illness with hallucinations and severe pain. Doctors could not explain it. Her family prayed fervently before a statue of the Virgin Mary in her room. As she writes in her autobiography “Story of a Soul”: On May 13, 1883, Pentecost day, I was looking at the statue of the Virgin, and finding no help on earth, I turned my whole heart toward my heavenly Mother and begged her to have mercy on me… Suddenly the Virgin appeared to me so beautiful, more beautiful than I had ever seen, and she smiled at me with a tender smile, and immediately the pain disappeared and my health returned. Hence the Virgin in Lisieux is called “Our Lady of the Smile – La Vierge au Sourire”. Thérèse called this healing “the grace of the smile of the Queen of Heaven” that saved her from depression.
4- Her Prayer to the Virgin
Thérèse loved the Virgin with a deep filial love, not seeing her as a distant Queen but as a close and small mother like herself. One of her most famous prayers to the Virgin is: “O Mary, O Virgin, O Mother of Jesus and our Mother, you who with a clear smile deigned to console and heal your daughter, Saint Thérèse of the Child Jesus from depression, restore to us the smile of life…” She also wrote a long poem titled “Why I Love You, O Mary”, saying: “You know that I love you, you who made yourself small to embrace me… More than Queen, you are my Mother.”
5- Date and Cause of Death
On the night of Holy Thursday to Good Friday in 1896, she suffered a sudden hemorrhage from her mouth. It was the beginning of pulmonary and intestinal tuberculosis. She hid her illness and endured terrible pain for months with a constant smile, experiencing a dark night of faith and spiritual darkness. She received the Anointing of the Sick and Holy Communion for the last time on August 19, 1897, and died in the convent on September 30, 1897 at 7:20 PM, at only 24 years old. Her last words were: “My God, I love You!”
6- Miracles
Before her death she promised: “I will spend my heaven doing good on earth. I will let fall from heaven a shower of roses.” As soon as her autobiography “Story of a Soul” was published in 1898 (first edition 2000 copies), letters poured in from all over the world about miracles through her intercession: Medically documented cures of incurable diseases, which were the cause of her beatification and canonization
Sudden conversions of sinners, especially the story of the criminal condemned to death, Henri Pranzini, who converted before his execution through her prayer when she was 14
Protection of soldiers in World War I, where French soldiers carried her picture in the trenches
The appearance of a strong scent of roses as a sign of her presence and intercession – the most famous sign until today.
7- Date of Canonization by the Vatican
Her cause was one of the fastest in modern Church history:
April 29, 1923: Beatified by Pope Pius XI after two miracles
May 17, 1925: Canonized in Rome by Pope Pius XI himself
1927: Declared by Pope Pius XI as Patroness of the Missions and Missionaries in the world, although she never left the convent, alongside Saint Francis Xavier.
October 19, 1997: On the centenary of her death, Pope John Paul II declared her a Doctor of the Universal Church, the third woman to receive this title after Teresa of Avila and Catherine of Siena. She is the youngest Doctor in Church history.
8- Her Characteristics as a Nun and Saint
She did nothing extraordinary in appearance, her holiness was in “The Little Way – La petite voie”: Childlike Confidence: She lived like a small child in the arms of a loving Father, trusting blindly in God’s mercy, not His justice.
Absolute Humility: She considered herself a “little flower” only fit to adorn the altar of Jesus, not a cedar of Lebanon.
Love in Small Things: She washed dishes, smiled at difficult sisters, endured cold and small humiliations for love of Jesus. She said: “To pick up a pin from the ground for love of Jesus is an act that saves souls.”
Prayer for Priests and Sinners: She offered her life as a sacrifice of love for the Church and the world.
Evangelical Simplicity: She taught that holiness is not in great deeds but in doing small things with great love.
Hence she was called “The Little Flower of Jesus” and “The Flower of Lisieux”.
9- Prayer Through Her Intercession for Peace in the World and for Peace in Lebanon
Prayer to Saint Thérèse of the Child Jesus for Peace
O Little Saint Thérèse, O fragrant rose of Lisieux, you who promised to shower the earth with roses from heaven, you who lived war in your heart and transformed every small pain into a prayer of love,
We ask you today on your feast day to intercede for our suffering world.
Look at the wars tearing apart Ukraine, the Holy Land, Sudan and all corners of the earth, and at the hardened hearts that have forgotten we are all children of one Father.Teach us your little way: to overcome hatred with a smile, violence with prayer, and despair with childlike trust. Shower upon us roses of peace, roses of forgiveness, roses of mercy.
Prayer for Lebanon
Your second homeland, Lebanon, that loves you so much: O beloved Saint of Lebanon, O patroness of our families and our churches that bear your name from Jounieh to Souhaila, Bcharre and every village, Intercede for wounded Lebanon. This homeland that knows suffering like you – illness, war, emigration, fear for tomorrow. Give its children the smile of the Virgin that healed you, to heal its despair and depression. Give its youth the hope to stay, its leaders the wisdom of humility, and its families the peace of the house of Nazareth that your holy family lived. O Our Lady of the Smile, O Mother of Thérèse and our Mother, protect Lebanon under your mantle, and make it a land of holiness and peace, as the saints dreamed. Amen.
Note: The information contained in this study is compiled from numerous documented ecclesiastical, theological, academic, and media sources.
The author, Elias Bejjani, is a Lebanese expatriate activist
Author’s Email: Phoenicia@hotmail.com
Author’s Website: https://eliasbejjaninews.com
Elias Bejjani
Canadian-Lebanese Human Rights activist, journalist and political commentator
Email phoenicia@hotmail.com& media.lccc@gmail.com

Joseph Aoun: The Diabolical Clone of Michel Aoun and Emile Lahoud
Elias Bejjani/September 30, 2026
Where was Joseph Aoun on the day he delivered his oath speech, and where is he today? An exposure and a backward U-turn that has dashed hopes, and a blatant replication of Emile Lahoud and Michel Aoun.

With Ambassador Mouawad and With All Lebanese Who Believe in Peace With Israel and With All Peoples of the World, We Pray for the Healing of the Son of the Israeli Ambassador to America
Elias Bejjani/September 29/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/09/157939/
With Ambassador Mouawad and With All Lebanese Who Believe in Peace With Israel and With All Peoples of the World, We Pray for the Healing of the Son of the Israeli Ambassador to America. With a heart wrenched with pain, and with an unwavering faith in the value of man and the sanctity of life, I stand today, as I stood the moment I heard the news of the heinous crime, to raise my prayer in reverence and supplication for the healing of the young man Neriya Leiter, the son of His Excellency the Ambassador of Israel to the United States, Mr. Yechiel Leiter.
This faithful young man, a family man and a father of four children, was subjected to a cowardly terrorist attack in the West Bank, where a Palestinian Jihadi terrorist deliberately rammed his car into him at full speed while he was on reserve duty. The terrorist criminal was killed in the confrontation with the Israeli security forces, while the Ambassador's son was transported with extremely serious wounds and injuries to Shaare Zedek Medical Center in Jerusalem, where he underwent several delicate surgical operations, and he is still to this moment between life and death, unconscious.
The bitter cup of death is being tasted by the Ambassador's family for the second time. Just recently, at the beginning of the Gaza war, he lost his eldest son, who was a father of six children and fell defending his country and his people. And today, the same terror of hatred comes to target his second son. Yet despite all this pain, he remains a pillar of the wisdom of peace, and heads his country's delegation in the peace talks with Lebanon, believing deeply that peace is our destiny.
What happened is not merely a ramming attack. It is a direct attack on peace itself. It is a despicable attempt to assassinate everyone who believes in peace and works for it. They target you because you are a man of peace. They target you because you chose the language of dialogue instead of the language of rockets, and the culture of life instead of the culture of death.
Therefore, I repeat today what I said on the day he was injured: I, Elias Bejjani, the Lebanese expatriate activist, together with every free, honorable, faithful, and patriotic Lebanese who shares my national, political, and faith-based orientations, bow before your pain, and we pray with you and with your family, and we join our prayers to the prayers of hundreds of thousands around the world whom you yourself asked to pray for your son. "Bear one another's burdens, and so fulfill the law of Christ." (Galatians 6:2)
And in this painful yet honorable context, I must pause with reverence and respect before the noble humanitarian and moral stance of Her Excellency the Ambassador of Lebanon to the United States, Mrs. Nada Homsi Mouawad, who heads our country's delegation in the peace talks with Israel alongside her colleague Ambassador Leiter. Israeli media reported that Ambassador Mouawad, out of purely humanitarian motives, contacted her Israeli colleague and wished his son a speedy recovery. This is the bare minimum dictated by human conscience, and the most basic rule of peaceful, moral, and diplomatic values.
But, as expected in an occupied and hijacked Lebanon, a savage, barbaric, and hateful campaign was launched against her by the groups of hatred, bigotry, obscurantism and inhumanity, represented by the terrorist, jihadi, and criminal Hezbollah, its media mouthpieces and its electronic flies, and she was forced to deny this humanitarian contact.
Today I extend a salute of admiration and reverence to Ambassador Nada Mouawad for her courageous humanitarian and moral gesture. She represents the true Lebanon, the Lebanon of the message, the Lebanon of peace, the Lebanon that the majority of my Lebanese people want. As for those who criticized and attacked her, they represent nothing but the culture of death and graves, the culture of hatred that has destroyed our homeland and turned it into a cemetery for the living.
I say to them loudly: "Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own eyes." (Proverbs 26:5)
And I conclude my prayer and solidarity with these holy words which are the constitution of my life:  "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called children of God." (Matthew 5:9). "Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good." (Romans 12:21)
O Lord, God of Peace, place Your healing hand upon the body of Neriya Leiter. Bring him back safely to his wife and his four children, and to his bereaved father and mother. Grant the Leiter family strength and hope. And let his healing be a message that life will always triumph over death, and that peace will inevitably triumph over terrorism. I pray, and all free Lebanese who support my positions pray with me.

A Cheap and Fake Theatrical War of Words Between Hezbollah and Gebran Bassil
Elias Bejjani/September 28, 2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/09/157883/
Gebran Bassil, who is listed under U.S. OFAC sanctions, and Nawaf Moussaoui, a member of Hezbollah, exchanged insults and verbal attacks on social media through a series of accusations, disparaging remarks, and personal attacks. We note here that this media campaign is a coordinated theatrical performance between the two sides aimed at boosting Gebran Bassil’s Christian popularity, which has fallen to very low levels., Bassil is a hypocrite, a charlatan, an opportunist, and a corrupt politician. He is a product of Hezbollah, just like the rest of the MPs in his Trojan-style political party. This type of media deception is well known among party leaders who come to each other’s aid in order to raise their popularity through verbal campaigns that, in practical terms, mean nothing, since they are all corrupt and cut from the same narcissistic cloth.

Syria says it thwarted Hezbollah plot; Israel likely target
Ahmad Sharawi/ FDD's Long War Journal/October 01/2026
On September 29, Syria’s Internal Security Forces (ISF) announced that the agency, in coordination with the General Intelligence Directorate, had “thwarted a sabotage plot in the Yarmouk Basin in Daraa” and arrested a three-member cell affiliated with Hezbollah. The ISF described the raid as a preemptive security operation conducted after “precise monitoring” revealed that the cell was attempting to prepare rocket-launching platforms for use in attacks. The statement identified the three suspects only by their initials—”F.K,” “Z.M,” and “L.A.”—and said that the launch platforms were “completely dismantled” following the operation. The location of the arrest in the Yarmouk Basin suggests that the rocket platforms may have been intended for attacks against Israeli territory or Israeli forces deployed in the buffer zone established by Israel following the fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al Assad’s regime in December 2024.
At its peak in Syria in 2017, Hezbollah, which intervened in the Syrian civil war in support of the Assad regime, maintained an estimated 7,000–10,000 fighters in the country. The group also developed cells in southern Syria composed of local recruits rather than Lebanese Hezbollah fighters. One of these networks, known as the “Golan File unit,” was headed by Ali Daqduq, who orchestrated the 2007 raid on the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center that killed five US soldiers.
Despite the fall of the Assad regime, Hezbollah’s ambitions to maintain a foothold in Syria have not disappeared. The group continues to seek ways to destabilize the country, both to reestablish the weapons corridor it relied on during the Assad era and to use Syrian territory as a staging ground for attacks against Israel. So far, however, the Syrian government has been relatively successful in disrupting a number of these efforts.
In July, Syria’s Ministry of Interior announced that it had foiled an “attempt to smuggle a large shipment of sophisticated weapons across the Syrian-Iraqi border,” adding that evidence gathered during the operation indicated that the shipment was intended for Hezbollah.
Two months earlier, Damascus said security forces had disrupted a major Hezbollah plot to assassinate Syrian officials. In coordinated operations across Aleppo, Rif Dimashq, Homs, Latakia, and Tartus governorates, Syrian forces arrested 11 militants allegedly linked to Lebanese Hezbollah. On April 19, the Ministry of Interior also announced that it had “thwarted a sabotage plot orchestrated by a cell linked to the terrorist Hezbollah militia” in Quneitra Governorate. According to the ministry, the operatives had disguised a civilian transport vehicle to conceal rocket-launching equipment intended for a surprise attack, likely against Israel. Lebanon has also highlighted armed networks composed of former officers and members of Bashar al Assad’s security forces now operating from Lebanese territory, alongside individuals affiliated with Hezbollah. Following judicial proceedings, confessions from detainees, including former Syrian Air Force Intelligence colonel Manaf Ali Safi, revealed that more than 40 former Assad officers and security personnel were smuggled from Syria’s coastal region into northern Lebanon through illegal crossings, generally in groups of five.
Yasser Alaa al Din, an alleged Hezbollah operative who remains at large, reportedly oversaw the smuggling and training of members of the network. According to the investigation, recruits received instruction at Hezbollah-run camps in the use of drones, explosives, military-grade weapons, and sniper rifles before being sent back to Syria to conduct security operations. The network was allegedly directed by Major General Mohammad Jaber, a former commander in Assad’s Forces.
This is consistent with many of the arrests targeting Hezbollah cells in Syria over the past year. For example, among the members of a cell arrested in May, one was a former member of the Syrian army under Assad from Aleppo Governorate, while another had served in Liwa al Qods, a predominantly Syrian-Palestinian paramilitary group aligned with the Assad regime that was later fully integrated into Assad’s army.
**Ahmad Sharawi is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies focused on Iranian intervention in Arab affairs and the Levant.

A Speech from Another Planet
Abu Arz/ X/ October 01, 2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
Nawaf Salam’s speech to the United Nations was feeble:
He spoke about the challenges of artificial intelligence, while in Lebanon, the electricity sector remains unable to meet people's most basic needs.
He spoke about UN reform, while Lebanese institutions are riddled with corruption from top to bottom—yet we have not seen a single corrupt official behind bars.
He emphasized the dangers of a UNIFIL withdrawal, despite the fact that for decades, the force has been a passive witness to the violation of Lebanese sovereignty by the various terrorist organizations that have successively operated in the South.
He spoke of returning to the 1949 Armistice Agreement, whereas the "Framework Agreement" is the only path capable of reclaiming the South.
The bottom line: A giant country ruled by pygmies.
At your service, Lebanon.

Canada Issues "Do Not Travel" Warnings for Several Countries; Lebanon at "Red Level"
Al-Markaziya/ October 01/2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
The Canadian government has advised against all travel to Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen, according to the latest risk levels published on the government’s travel advisory platform, "Travel.gc.ca." Conversely, it recommended avoiding non-essential travel to Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The advisory classified the first group under the "Red Level" and the second under the "Orange Level," directing travelers to consult the specific destination page on the official website for detailed guidelines.

With the Exception of Beirut Airport... European Warning Remains in Effect!
Al-Markaziyah/October 01, 2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has extended the validity of the warning regarding Lebanese airspace until November 16, 2026, without altering the risk level or recommendations. The warning covers the entire Beirut Flight Information Region (FIR), with the exception of flights to and from Beirut Airport—provided that approach and departure maneuvers take place over the sea and are subject to continuous risk assessment.
nder the “Red Level” and the second under the “Orange Level,” directing travelers to consult the specific destination page on the official website for detailed guidelines.

Secret Meeting Between the Syrian Government and Hezbollah in Turkey
Janoubiya/October 01/2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
Six informed sources reported that representatives from the Syrian government and Hezbollah held direct talks in Turkey in an attempt to reduce tension between the two sides—marking the first known meeting between the two parties in years. The sources—including two Syrian officials, a US official, and a senior Lebanese security source close to Hezbollah—told Reuters that Syrian officials and representatives of the Iran-backed group met secretly at least once last month.
Who attended the meeting?
The six sources stated that last month's meeting included Hezbollah representatives alongside officials from Syrian intelligence and the Foreign Ministry; it was convened at the invitation of Turkish security and intelligence agencies in an effort to de-escalate the situation. All sources spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the previously unannounced meeting. The Syrian Foreign Ministry, the Turkish Foreign and Defense Ministries, and the US State Department did not immediately respond to Reuters' inquiries regarding the meeting, while Hezbollah’s media office declined to comment. The meeting focused on addressing points of friction between the two sides; a US official, Syrian officials, and the Lebanese source indicated that the encounter went well.
No hostility between us?
One of the Syrian officials stated that both parties agreed they harbored no hostility toward one another, and that Damascus reassured Hezbollah it would not intervene militarily in Lebanon to disarm the group. In turn, Syrian officials asked Hezbollah to help halt cross-border smuggling attempts and dismantle its remaining sleeper cells, particularly in southern Syria. On Tuesday, Syria had announced the interception of a Hezbollah cell preparing to launch rockets in the country's south. On Wednesday, Hezbollah denied any connection to the matter, asserting that it has "no presence whatsoever on Syrian soil and does not participate in any security or military activity there." The Syrian official stated that Hezbollah representatives did not provide a direct answer regarding the request to stop arms smuggling and dismantle cells within Syria, but they pledged not to interfere in Syrian affairs.
"Significant" Progress
A Lebanese security source with direct knowledge of the meeting and its outcome said that the two sides had "made significant progress on security issues." He added, "Hezbollah wants to protect its flank," alluding to fears of a Syrian attack on the group inside Lebanon. Both the Syrian official and the Lebanese source confirmed that no final agreement was reached and that no public announcement regarding the meeting had been planned. The Lebanese source told Reuters that contacts between the two sides via Turkey had begun about two months ago. Reuters was unable to determine the meeting's location in Turkey, its duration, or whether other meetings had taken place before or after it. Both sides had previously signaled a willingness to engage in dialogue; in July, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani stated that Damascus was open to meeting with the group, and a month later, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem said in a televised address that the group had no objection to meeting the Syrian leadership. Ankara positions itself as a key regional player in Syria’s reconstruction and stabilization; under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, it also seeks to act as a facilitator for regional dialogue.
Iranian Displeasure
Three sources stated that Turkey—a key ally of Syrian figure Ahmad al-Sharaa—pushed for the meeting, seeking direct involvement in these efforts. However, Iran, the primary backer of Hezbollah, did not participate. A Lebanese security source noted that Hezbollah attended the meeting with Iran’s knowledge, but Tehran was displeased by its own lack of direct participation and by al-Sharaa’s rejection—at least for the time being—of any idea of ​​establishing direct relations with Iran. The source added that this dissatisfaction was the primary reason why no final agreement was reached and why the meeting was not publicly announced. There was no immediate comment from Iran’s Permanent Mission in Geneva.

Syrian Foreign Ministry: Reports of Contacts with Hezbollah Are Groundless
Al-Markaziya/October 01/2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
The Syrian Foreign Ministry denied allegations of a meeting between Syria and the Hezbollah militia, asserting that relations with Lebanon are conducted exclusively through legitimate state institutions. The Ministry reiterated its support for Lebanon extending its control over its entire territory. Reuters had previously reported that representatives from the Syrian government and Lebanon’s Hezbollah held direct talks in Turkey in an attempt to defuse tensions between the two sides—marking the first known meeting of its kind between the parties. The sources—comprising two Syrian officials, a U.S. official, and a senior Lebanese security source close to Hezbollah—told Reuters that Syrian officials and Hezbollah representatives met secretly at least once last month. For years, Hezbollah had sent fighters to Syria to defend the government of former President Bashar al-Assad during the country's war. Following Assad's ouster in late 2024, tensions escalated between the new Syrian government and Hezbollah; Damascus accused the group of moving weapons through Syria, while the United States encouraged the Syrian army to deploy troops to Lebanon to fight Hezbollah. The six sources told Reuters that "last month's meeting included Hezbollah representatives as well as officials from Syrian intelligence and the Foreign Ministry, and was convened at the invitation of Turkish security and intelligence agencies in an effort to de-escalate the situation." All sources spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive meeting, which had not been previously reported. In this context, the U.S. official, the two Syrian officials, and the Lebanese source stated that the meeting "focused on resolving points of tension between the two sides and went well." One of the Syrian officials noted that the two sides "agreed there was no hostility between them, and that Syria assured Hezbollah it would not intervene militarily in Lebanon to disarm it." Furthermore, the U.S. official said that "Syrian officials, in turn, asked Hezbollah to help halt cross-border smuggling attempts and dismantle its remaining sleeper cells, particularly in southern Syria." For his part, the Syrian official told Reuters that "Hezbollah representatives did not provide a direct response to the request to stop arms smuggling and dismantle their cells in Syria, but they pledged not to interfere in Syrian affairs." The Lebanese source, who was directly informed about the meeting and its outcome, commented that the two sides "made significant progress on security issues." Both the Syrian official and the Lebanese source stated that "no final agreement was reached, and there was no plan to issue a statement." The Lebanese source also told Reuters that "communication between the two sides via Turkey began about two months ago." Reuters was unable to confirm the location of the September meeting in Turkey, its duration, or whether other meetings had taken place before or after it. On Tuesday, Syria announced the arrest of a Hezbollah-linked cell that was preparing to launch rockets in southern Syria—a claim denied by the party, which stated that it has "no presence whatsoever on Syrian soil, nor any involvement in any security or military activity there."

Washington to Lebanon: Limiting weapons first.. Will it disappoint the hopes of the sovereigns?
Lara Yazbek/Al Markaziya/October 01, 2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
Central - President Joseph Aoun informed US Congressmen Darin Lahoud and Josh Gottheimer, on Tuesday, “that Lebanon attaches great importance to the United States of America in pressuring Israel to force it to implement the framework agreement,” pointing out that “Israel is still refraining from adhering to the provisions of the agreement, even though Lebanon is fully committed to implementing it.” He considered that "any delay in Israel's implementation of the agreement will maintain tension in the south and prevent the state from being able to extend its authority over its entire southern territory, remove armed manifestations, and return the displaced southerners to their villages and towns." He also stressed "the importance of providing the Lebanese Army with the necessary capabilities to be able to extend state authority, given the broad tasks it carries out outside the south, including combating terrorism and smuggling, preserving the eastern and northern borders, preserving civil peace, and protecting institutions." Almost the same position was conveyed by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri to the American delegation, while Prime Minister Nawaf Salam was conveying it directly to the American administration during a series of meetings he held in Washington. Official Lebanon is therefore counting on American pressure on Israel that precedes any measures taken by it regarding the issue of spreading south, disarming illegal weapons, or “fighting” Hezbollah and its influence. According to what sovereign political sources told Al-Markazia, it is considered that the Israeli must first make some concessions or gestures of good faith towards Beirut, so that the latter can resume implementing its obligations under the framework agreement. However, the official American response to this Lebanese approach was decisive and negative. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stressed that the "tripartite framework" is the only path to reaching lasting peace between Lebanon and Israel. He stressed that the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south, despite its importance, is not sufficient alone without actual steps that lead to the disarmament of Hezbollah and the confiscation of weapons in the hands of the state. Rubio linked the paths of arms and withdrawal, as he made it clear that Lebanon must achieve additional progress in this file before demanding a new Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory. This, then, is the United States’ answer to what Lebanon is asking of it: Lebanon must move first, not Israel. According to the sources, it is a logical equation, whether we like it or not, given the existing balance of power, and the fact that Lebanon is occupied, not Israel. It has become clear, then, that the path to liberation begins with disarming the party...and this is what Washington understood this time, very clearly, to official Lebanon, so the ball is now in its court: Will it begin the path of arms control, which, as a reminder, is a Lebanese demand before it is the demand of any other country? Or will he continue to wait for changes in the region that may either end the party’s weapons or allow it to be turned a blind eye to again, in a setback for the Lebanese dreaming of a true, free and sovereign state?

Netanyahu Campaigns from Lebanon... Capitalizing on Realities as a Winning Card
Najwa Abi Haidar/Al-Markaziya/October 01/2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
Two major electoral events loom on the horizon—one in Israel and one in the United States—sandwiched between them is an open conflict between Washington and Tehran that could reignite at any moment. None of these issues appear settled, leaving the entire region in a state of suspense and uncertainty that directly impacts Lebanon; indeed, regional and international battles are practically being fought on Lebanese soil. Washington offers Lebanon plenty of promises, yet few are actually fulfilled. For its part, Israel approaches agreements and arrangements based on its own security and operational calculations, taking advantage of waning American pressure and Washington’s preoccupation with other matters. Amidst this vacuum, southern Lebanon appears to be an open arena for establishing facts on the ground—realities that could later be leveraged as political and negotiating assets. Official Lebanese circles have been informed—as a relevant ministerial source confirmed to *Al-Markaziya*—that neither the United States nor Israel seeks "a single inch of Lebanese territory." Yet, the true test lies not in what is said, but in how it translates into action on the ground. Who will monitor the withdrawal, and what are its stages? Who determines whether Lebanon has met its obligations? And what happens if Israel deems the security conditions unfulfilled? Thus far, negotiations in Rome have failed to resolve these issues. According to Western political and diplomatic sources monitoring the negotiations, insufficient progress has been made to move beyond the initial experimental phase to subsequent stages; disagreements persist regarding the role of a third party and the mechanisms for verifying army deployment and the fulfillment of obligations. Sources tell *Al-Markaziya* that Israel is in no rush to transition to a phase that might place a full withdrawal on the implementation agenda—particularly on the eve of elections, where Netanyahu is leveraging the situation in Lebanon as a key political asset. There is, however, an Israeli inclination to focus on strategic points in the south—such as Deir Mimas, Nabatieh, and Al-Mansouri—allowing for a reduction in direct military deployment while maintaining the firepower and operational capability to control a vast swathe of the region. If this approach holds, a reduction in troop numbers does not necessarily equate to a loss of influence. This is where the electoral factor comes into play. Netanyahu, facing an upcoming election, needs to project an image of Israel as a strong power capable of dictating its own security terms. Every position seized by the Israeli army, every strike, and every adversary retreat can be transformed into material for the electoral narrative in which he presents himself to Israeli voters as a champion of security and deterrence. In this sense, Netanyahu need not explicitly declare Lebanon part of his campaign; it suffices for the realities created on the ground there to be translated into achievements showcased within Israel. More critically, according to the sources, international disarray may grant Israel the time needed to cement these facts on the ground: Washington is preoccupied with Iran and its associated challenges, while Lebanon attempts to solidify an agreement it lacks the unilateral means to enforce. While Lebanon awaits the election results and major settlements, Israel may use this interim period to impose new facts on the ground—developments Netanyahu could leverage to wage his election campaign from the southern front.

Israel Tracks $157 Million in Hezbollah Military Purchases in 2024
Al-Markaziya/October 01/2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
An Israeli report—published by *Russia Today*—has revealed figures reaching hundreds of millions, detailing everything from missiles and drones to small arms, ammunition, and media spending. The report attempted to outline the financial and military scope of Hezbollah’s procurement and armament efforts during 2024, estimating the value of the acquired weaponry at approximately $157 million. Citing open-source information, the Israeli Center for Terror Financing Research stated that Iran provided about $129 million worth of weapons and military equipment as an in-kind grant, while Hezbollah spent roughly $28 million in cash on its purchases. Sharon Gal, the Center’s CEO, stated that treating Hezbollah’s finances like those of a corporation could help lawmakers and operatives identify and disrupt key supply chains, thereby creating pressure points on Iran-backed groups. Meanwhile, researcher Mark Cohen noted that the Center plans to launch an interactive tool to help the public understand Hezbollah’s financial data, aiming to raise awareness regarding what he described as the group's negative impact on the Lebanese economy. Due to the secretive nature of arms procurement, researchers employed three methods to estimate the volume of weaponry acquired by Hezbollah in 2024: analyzing the historical rate of arsenal replenishment, assessing Iran’s manufacturing and delivery capabilities, and comparing global benchmarks for armament costs. The first method relied on the growth of the group’s arsenal over the past two decades; the report estimated an increase from approximately 15,000 missiles in 2006 to around 150,000 by 2024. Researchers estimated that disruptions to supply and manufacturing chains during the 2024 hostilities resulted in the group acquiring between 4,500 and 6,500 missiles and projectiles.
The second method was based on estimates of Iran’s supply capacity. The report noted that Iran produces between 50 and 240 ballistic missiles monthly and between 1,800 and 3,000 attack drones annually. These capabilities are distributed between Iran’s own forces and its proxies, thereby setting an upper limit on what Hezbollah could acquire. According to the Center’s estimates, Hezbollah acquired approximately 4,000 short-range Katyusha rockets, 400 Falaq missiles, 120 Burkan missiles, and 600 Fajr-class missiles in 2024, at a cost ranging from $2,000 to $10,000 per unit. It also estimated the acquisition of 60 Zelzal missiles, 40 Fateh-110/M-600 missiles, 150 guidance kits, and approximately 12 Paveh land-attack missiles. The report noted that guided anti-tank missiles accounted for about 20% of Hezbollah’s attacks following October 8, 2023, likely representing the most valuable category of weaponry. Estimates suggest the group acquired approximately 700 Kornet missiles, 500 Dehlavieh missiles, 500 Almas missiles, and 400 Konkurs/Metis missiles, alongside 30 launchers. Other estimates included around 800 RPG launchers and 15,000 rounds of ammunition; 300 Mirsad and Ababil UAVs; 200 loitering munitions; 400 commercial and FPV drones; as well as MANPADS and "358" loitering surface-to-air missiles. Regarding small arms, the center estimated the acquisition of approximately 5,000 rifles, 900 crew-served weapons, 80 mortar tubes, 15,000 mortar rounds, and 8 million rounds of ammunition, in addition to an investment in 2,000 improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In terms of media spending, the report estimated that Hezbollah spent between $26 million and $28 million in 2024, with the Al-Manar channel alone accounting for between $16.5 million and $17.2 million of that total.

Qaani Places "The Party" Back at the Forefront of Iran’s Rhetoric Regarding Lebanon
Nidaa Al-Watan/February 2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
Esmail Qaani, Commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), stated that the killing of the "Master of the Resistance" and several commanders has not prevented the new generation of Hezbollah from continuing the fight. Qaani added that Hezbollah resistance fighters have attacked approximately 373 tanks and armored personnel carriers during this period. In a message addressed to Israel, Qaani declared, "Your inevitable fate—whether in Palestine or Lebanon—is for these holy lands to be cleansed of your presence." He further stated that "resistance fighters" in both Palestine and Lebanon would work to drive the Israelis out of these lands if they did not leave of their own accord.

Israeli Army Blows Up Homes in Al-Mansouri and Targets Over 370 Sites in Southern Lebanon
Janoubia/February 2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
Israeli forces carried out a series of massive explosions in the town of Al-Mansouri, located in the Tyre District of southern Lebanon. The blasts caused powerful tremors and loud, sharp explosions that were heard in the city of Tyre and surrounding villages.
The National News Agency (NNA) reported that Israeli forces had previously rigged a number of residential homes in Al-Mansouri with explosives before detonating and completely destroying them. Israeli Army Statement: Tally of Strikes Over the Past Month on the Lebanon and Gaza Fronts
In a related development, the Israeli army announced in an official statement that its air force had struck more than 500 targets in both Lebanon and the Gaza Strip over the past month. This action was part of ongoing military operations across various fronts aimed at "eliminating threats and supporting ground forces in offensive and defensive operations," according to the statement. The airstrikes were distributed as follows: On the Lebanese front, air raids—directed by command echelons and military intelligence—targeted over 370 Hezbollah-linked sites in southern Lebanon during the month. In the Gaza Strip, more than 140 targets were struck; the Israeli army claimed these strikes eliminated three Hamas brigade commanders and targeted operatives who had participated in planning attacks and posed a threat to its forces.

Lebanon Informed of Date for New Round of US-Sponsored Direct Negotiations with Israel in Florida
Janoubia/October 02/2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
Attention is turning to the upcoming US-sponsored Lebanese-Israeli negotiations as Prime Minister Nawaf Salam returns to Beirut on Thursday from Washington and New York. These developments unfold amidst intense diplomatic activity focused on activating the "tripartite framework" and defining the scope of mutual obligations, all while field tensions escalate and Israeli airstrikes continue against towns in southern Lebanon.
Upcoming Round of Military Negotiations in Florida
New details have emerged regarding the indirect negotiation process between Beirut and Tel Aviv: Resumption of Negotiations: Lebanon has been officially notified of arrangements to resume US-sponsored negotiations at the US Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters in Tampa, Florida, prior to the Israeli elections.
Nature of the Round and the Lebanese Delegation: October 20 is the likely date for the meeting. This round is characterized by its direct military and operational focus; the Lebanese delegation will be led by Ambassador Simon Karam, with the participation of Ambassador Nada Hamada Moawad.
US Pressures and Conditions: Information has surfaced indicating that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, during his meeting with Salam, emphasized the necessity for Lebanon to take practical, executive steps toward disarmament and the dismantling of illicit infrastructure—a fundamental condition for securing any Israeli withdrawal or obtaining security guarantees. The Lebanese Government’s Position and Washington Meetings
Prime Minister Nawaf Salam reiterated the constants of the official position during his discussions with US officials and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington:
Exclusivity of Arms and Decision-Making: Salam affirmed that Lebanon has made a definitive choice regarding the extension of state sovereignty, ensuring that the possession of arms and the decision on war and peace rest solely with legitimate institutions and the Lebanese Army.
Timeline for the Tripartite Framework: A call to activate the "Tripartite Framework" through phased, reciprocal steps that guarantee a full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory and establish a reliable verification mechanism.
Economic Support: Holding talks with the IMF and Congress to secure financial support and pave the way for an IMF delegation visit to Beirut to finalize the reform agenda.
The Southern Front: Raids and Casualties in Nabatieh
On the ground, military tension persists along the southern front:
Airstrikes: Israeli warplanes launched raids targeting the towns of Bani Hayyan and the outskirts of Mifdoun in the Nabatieh district.
Nabatieh al-Fawqa Incident: A Lebanese Army soldier and three civilians were injured when a suspicious object exploded while a military patrol was escorting residents to inspect their homes and property in the Nabatieh al-Fawqa area.
Withdrawal of the Golani Brigade: The Israeli Army announced the withdrawal of the "Golani Brigade" combat team forces from the Beaufort (Shqif) Heights and the vicinity of the Litani River for repositioning, following seven months of field operations.

Hezbollah’s Shadow Economy in Post-Assad Syria
Ahmad Sharawi/FDD/October 01/2026
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/10/01/hezbollahs-shadow-economy-in-post-assad-syria/
The United States government is offering up to $10 million for information on Mohammad Qasim al-Bazzal, a Hezbollah financier sanctioned by Washington for moving Iranian oil money through Syria and into the hands of Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).1 That bounty underscores Hezbollah’s persistent use of Syria as a financial base despite the downfall of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. While Hezbollah’s fighting forces can no longer operate openly in Syria in the absence of Assad’s protection, the commercial networks associated with its former financial facilitators have not entirely disappeared.
The Assad family’s 53-year rule — first under Hafez al-Assad and then under Bashar, his son — collapsed decisively on December 8, 2024, after more than a decade of civil war.2 Throughout the conflict, the regime survived by relying on Iran and its network of proxies, most notably Hezbollah.3 The group embedded thousands of fighters across Syria, providing offensive striking power that Assad’s forces lacked, and used Syrian territory as a conduit for weapons, money, and logistical support destined for Lebanon. At its peak, Hezbollah deployed roughly 10,000 fighters in Syria and lost thousands of them in a war that earned Hezbollah as much enmity from the Syrian people — especially Sunni Arabs — as Assad himself.4
In the war, Hezbollah fought against opposition groups ranging from secular factions to jihadist forces such as al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra.5 Ultimately, Ahmad al-Sharaa — formerly known as Abu Muhammad al-Jolani — emerged as the war’s victor. Sharaa commanded Jabhat al-Nusra, then merged it with other jihadi forces to create Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 2017. After years of controlling no more than an enclave in northwest Syria, Sharaa launched a lightning offensive that toppled the regime in just 11 days, establishing himself as the new ruler in Damascus.6
The new leadership is no ally of Hezbollah. Under Sharaa, Syria has shifted from a central partner in Iran’s regional axis to a government openly hostile to Tehran and its Lebanese proxy. The Islamic Republic’s then-supreme leader, the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, delivered a public address days after Assad fled to Moscow, acknowledging defeat for Iran’s axis of resistance. Khamenei attributed the setback to the axis’s “negligence toward the enemy.”7 Hezbollah’s overt military presence in Syria nearly vanished, and its political cover in Damascus disappeared. However, that is only part of the story.
A year and a half after the fall of the Assad regime, parts of the Assad-era commercial ecosystem tied to Hezbollah financiers appear to remain active in Syria. Despite Sharaa’s hostility toward Iran and Hezbollah, he has waged only a limited campaign against the group’s economic infrastructure. The problem is not only a lack of capacity but also a deficit of willingness. The Syrian government has opted for financial settlements with businessmen who played a critical role in financing the Assad regime, including figures linked to Hezbollah’s wartime commercial ecosystem, turning them into a source of much-needed revenue rather than dismantling the networks they operated. In doing so, Damascus risks allowing companies tied to Hezbollah’s financiers to remain in the market.
That gap is even more important given Washington’s evolving Syria policy. President Donald Trump has extended sanctions relief to Syria as a goodwill gesture to aid reconstruction,8 an understandable move considering the country’s humanitarian and economic collapse during the civil war. Yet Trump offered this relief without even the most basic conditions attached, such as putting in place measures to counter illicit finance, whether for criminal or terrorist purposes.9 Washington had tremendous leverage because of Syria’s desperation and Sharaa’s personal need to have himself and HTS removed from the terror blacklists of the United States and the United Nations. But that leverage was never used.
Syrian government records, combined with social media documentation, show that companies with ownership, management, or address ties to designated Hezbollah financiers and sanctioned entities remain active in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime. These companies span battery manufacturing, metals trading, livestock, agribusiness, import-export activity, real estate, and investment. They include companies already under sanctions because they are part of the network run by Mohammad al-Bazzal, the Hezbollah financier,10 and his brother Rashid al-Bazzal,11 both of whom the U.S. Treasury Department has listed as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT).12 Equally important, the available documentation identifies eight companies, seven that are unsanctioned and Al-Ahed (sanctioned in 2026) that warrant further investigation and, where the legal criteria are met, may merit separate designation by Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). (See Figure 1.)
Figure 1
Company Name (English and Arabic)
Registration No.
Location
Nature of Bazzal-Network Connection
Al-Ahed Trade and Investmentشركة العهد للتجارة والاستثمار
Registration No. 1582July 14, 2016Damascus Governorate13
Damascus Governorate
Corporate and management link through individuals associated with the Bazzal-linked company Houkoul S.A.L.; shareholder in other companies within the network
Najm al-Sharq LLCنجم الشرق شركة
Registration No. 207September 201614
Rif Dimashq Governorate
Ownership by a designated Hezbollah procurement facilitator and a direct personnel connection to three designated Bazzal-controlled companies
Riyada Lead Manufacturing LLCشركة ريادة لصناعة الرصاص
RegistrationNo. 38January 16, 201815
Adra Industrial City, Rif Dimashq
Direct ownership, management, and address-based links
Rayyana LLCشركة ريانة
Registration No. 629March 4, 201816
Rif Dimashq Governorate
Bazzal-family ownership and direct managerial control
Al-Shuaa Copper Companyشركة شعاع للنحاس
Registration No. 799March 20, 201817
Rif Dimashq Governorate
Direct ownership link through a Bazzal-controlled company
Rimas Feed Companyشركة ريماس للأعلاف
Registration No. 3626September 25, 201818
Hasya Industrial City, Homs
Ownership through a Bazzal-controlled company
Al-Sanabel al-Khadra LLCشركة السنابل الخضراء
Registration No. 2977October 16, 201819
Rif Dimashq Governorate
Direct majority ownership and managerial control
Afaq Livestock Development LLCشركة الآفاق للثروة الحيوانية
Registration No. 3380November 18, 201820
Rif Dimashq Governorate
Direct majority ownership and managerial control
All eight companies listed above have a majority owner (or owners) already under U.S. sanctions. That should trigger OFAC’s 50 Percent Rule, under which any entity that is owned 50 percent or more, directly or indirectly, by one or more Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) — a category that includes SDGTs like the Bazzal brothers — is blocked by operation of law. This means it is subject to sanctions even if it does not appear by name on the SDN list.21 In legal terms, blocking under the 50 percent rule is not as restrictive as SDN status, so designating these firms by name would exert further pressure on their operations.
For these eight companies, direct ownership is only one aspect of their ties to the Hezbollah financiers network. Other linkages include managers, addresses, minority shareholders, or unusually broad commercial mandates. These connections justify further investigation by U.S. and Syrian authorities, but they do not independently establish that each company meets the criteria for a sanctions designation under Executive Order 13224, which authorizes sanctions to counter terrorist finance.22 Further investigation would need to show that these companies are controlled by, act on behalf of, or provide support to another SDGT.
The strongest evidence that one of these companies meets the designation criteria relates to Al-Ahed Trade and Investment. In June 2026, the Treasury Department stated that Mohammad al-Bazzal helped initiate contracts under which Al-Ahed acted as the local representative of a designated company, G.M. Farm, as part of a project worth nearly $10 million. Treasury further stated that profits from the project were divided among Talaqi Group, Al-Ahed, and Globe Technology Providers SARL. Treasury designated Al-Ahed for materially supporting G.M. Farm. This transaction-level evidence provides a substantially stronger basis for action than corporate overlap alone. Public operational evidence concerning the remaining companies is more limited; accordingly, this memo treats them as priority investigative leads unless additional transactional evidence independently establishes their eligibility for designation.
Even as the United States supports Syria’s reconstruction, it should press Damascus to prioritize enforcement by reviewing licenses held by firms linked to Hezbollah-financiers and entities, and strengthening legal foundations for counterterrorism financing, including an effective mechanism for identifying and freezing assets linked to Hezbollah and its financiers. Syria already has a financial intelligence body within its central bank empowered to receive and analyze suspicious-transaction reports and oversee implementation of the country’s anti-money-laundering and counterterrorism-financing laws. Damascus has also announced a national strategy in this area that promises international cooperation in dealing with counterterrorism financing, but Washington should press it to translate that strategy into measurable enforcement.23
For Syria, rebuilding the economy should entail not just a restoration of growth, but the creation of institutions capable of upholding international standards for investigating and punishing terror finance and other illicit economic activities. Perhaps Sharaa’s government will recognize that its own self-interest favors the stamping out of terrorist and criminal finance. If not, Washington should make its support contingent on such action.
Hezbollah’s Financial Networks Under Assad
During Assad’s rule, Syria served as a sanctions evasion and illicit finance hub for Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF).24 As Washington’s maximum pressure campaign against Iran’s economy intensified during Trump’s first term, networks tied to Hezbollah and the IRGC-QF increasingly used Syria to move money across the region.25
At the center of that system was Mohammad Qasir, a Hezbollah operative whom the U.S. Treasury Department described as “a critical conduit” for Iranian financial schemes.26 Qasir headed Hezbollah’s Unit 4400, the branch responsible for transferring weapons from Syria into Lebanon.27 The networks surrounding Qasir operated through Syrian import-export firms and commercial intermediaries. Qasir’s closest associates included Mohammad al-Bazzal. As Qasir’s son-in-law, Bazzal also had direct family ties to Hezbollah’s inner circle.28 Israel eliminated Qasir in October 2024.29
The Bazzal network facilitated IRGC-QF-linked oil shipments to Syria through U.S.-sanctioned companies such as Talaqi Group, Houkoul S.A.L. Offshore, Nagham al-Hayat, Tawafuk, and ALUMIX.30 Talaqi Group was co-founded by Bazzal and his wife, Qasir’s daughter, and became a primary commercial vehicle for the network.31 In 2019, Treasury revealed that Bazzal tried to remove his name from the company’s ownership documents to shield the business from sanctions scrutiny.
Damascus Targets Hezbollah’s Guns, Not Its Money
For decades, Syria functioned as Hezbollah’s strategic depth. It provided a corridor for weapons transfers, and a permissive arena for logistical operations.32 Assad’s fall deprived Hezbollah of the political protection needed for such efforts, but the group shifted from visible military entrenchment to covert networks designed to survive in an unfriendly environment.33
That transition has become visible along the smuggling corridor stretching from Syria’s Qalamoun mountains to the Lebanese border. Syrian authorities have spent the past year intercepting a steady flow of Hezbollah-linked weapons shipments. In September 2025, security forces uncovered a cache in the towns of Sasa and Kanaker in Rif Dimashq that contained 19 Grad rockets, anti-tank weapons, and ammunition.34 By December, the scale of trafficking appeared to intensify. Syrian authorities seized 1,250 landmines in Rif Dimashq.35 Days later, they captured rocket-propelled grenades in Zabadani, a town long associated with Hezbollah’s cross-border logistics infrastructure.36
But the weapons flow reveals only part of Hezbollah’s post-Assad adaptation. The group has also preserved covert operational networks inside Syria itself. On April 19, 2026, Syria’s Ministry of Interior announced that it had “thwarted a sabotage plot orchestrated by a cell linked to the terrorist Hezbollah militia” in Quneitra governorate near the Israeli border.37
Hezbollah’s infrastructure appears rooted in the remnants of its Assad-era ecosystem. This includes smugglers, former regime officers, local auxiliaries, and facilitators with years of experience moving weapons and money across Syria’s porous borders.38
Damascus has shown that it understands the security threat posed by Hezbollah’s residual presence in Syria. Its repeated interdiction of weapons shipments is a testament to its willingness to act when facing a security threat. Yet Damascus has not applied the same urgency to confronting Assad-era commercial entities tied to Hezbollah financiers, a deficit most clearly visible in the forgiveness shown to Assad-era business leaders.
Damascus has focused heavily on reviving economic activity, strengthening company registration procedures, and integrating into the formal economy businessmen tied to the former regime.39 The emphasis has been on stabilizing the private sector instead of scrutinizing potentially illicit ownership structures.40
Years of war hollowed out Syria’s regulatory and financial oversight capacity, leaving authorities with limited ability to conduct forensic financial review. Syrian officials themselves have acknowledged the scale of the problem. Basel al-Suwaidan, head of Syria’s National Committee for Combating Illicit Gain, described the challenge as confronting “interconnected economic systems” in which “ownerships overlapped, and assets were distributed among individuals, companies, and multiple fronts inside and outside Syria.”41 He further admitted that some actors moved quickly to “transfer assets or restructure them” once they sensed scrutiny.42
These dynamics closely mirror the ownership structures and overlapping commercial relationships seen throughout the Bazzal network. Institutional weakness extends into Syria’s financial system. Economist Zaki Mehchy warned that Syria still suffers from weak compliance with anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing standards and limited transparency.43 Similarly, former Central Bank Governor Abdulkader Husrieh acknowledged the need to strengthen “governance, supervision, and institutional capacity” before Syria can responsibly reconnect to the international financial system.44
In March 2026, the Ministry of Economy and Industry issued a circular standardizing commercial registry procedures. Officially, the ministry framed the changes as an effort to reduce administrative disorder and organize Syria’s commercial registry system.45 Yet the measure also institutionalized a major loophole, allowing companies to register up to five nonhomogeneous commercial activities under a single license, including import-export operations.46 This allows firms to maintain extraordinarily broad commercial mandates spanning import-export activity, investment, agriculture, industry, real estate, logistics, and general trade under one corporate structure, often without meaningful scrutiny of their financing sources or operational control.
This matters because many Hezbollah-linked firms have historically operated through precisely these broad wartime trade structures. Syrian commercial registries do not appear to protect against indirect operational control by unseen third parties. Companies tied to sanctioned networks may continue to exist behind layers of intermediaries and partially obscured ownership arrangements while formally appearing compliant inside the new Syrian economy.
The Rehabilitation of Assad-Era Business Networks
An even greater source of illicit finance risk is Damascus’s decision to address the criminal legacy of Assad-era business networks through a process of “settlement” and reintegration.47 In January 2026, Syria’s National Committee for Combating Illicit Gain announced a formal settlement with businessman Mohammad Hamsho under a “voluntary disclosure” program designed to recover assets and resolve financial liabilities in exchange for legal normalization.48 Subsequent reporting pointed to additional settlements or asset-transfer arrangements involving other business leaders who played a critical role in financing the Assad regime, including sanctioned figures such as Samer Foz.49
The Syrian government itself framed these measures as part of a broader post-conflict economic stabilization strategy. According to a source within the National Committee for Combating Illicit Gain, more than 900 individuals connected to the former regime had applied for settlements by the end of 2025.50
The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Foz in 2019 for operating a sprawling business empire tied to the Assad regime and wartime profiteering.51 Treasury identified companies connected to Foz, including Aman Holding, ASM International Trading in Dubai, and Lebanese offshore entities such as BS Company Offshore and Synergy SAL Offshore. Treasury further stated that BS Company Offshore facilitated support for the Baniyas refinery and participated in the importation of Iranian crude oil into Syria.52 Although Foz was not publicly identified as a direct member of Hezbollah’s financial apparatus, his companies operated inside the same sanctions-evasion ecosystem that sustained Iranian oil flows.
Some businessmen who thrived under Assad’s wartime economy have remained embedded in Syria’s post-Assad commercial landscape, including figures tied more directly to Hezbollah’s financial infrastructure. One is Fadel Balwi, a U.S.-designated businessman53 who has been photographed multiple times alongside cabinet-level officials in the new Syrian government.54 According to OFAC, “as of mid-2021, Al-Fadel Exchange also facilitated payments from the Assad regime to U.S.-designated Hizballah financial official Muhammad Qasim al-Bazzal in return for shipments of Iranian oil.”55 In June 2025, the Syrian Central Bank revoked Al-Fadel Exchange’s company license and removed it from the official registry of exchange companies, a positive step, but not enough when other companies tied to the same wartime financial ecosystem continue to operate.
One example of these companies is owned by Fouad Assi, the general manager and principal shareholder of Al-Haram for Money Transfer.56 Assi sparked controversy after videos circulated online showing him freely moving through Damascus while citizens accused him of acting as an economic proxy for Yassar Ibrahim, Bashar al-Assad’s former economic adviser and a key member of the Bazzal-Hezbollah network in Syria.57 Despite the backlash, Al-Haram for Money Transfer continues to operate normally.58 Lebanese outlet Al-Modon reported that Assi, during the civil war, had maintained direct ties with the “secret economic office” at the Presidential Palace, reportedly overseen by Ibrahim and First Lady Asma al-Assad. According to the report, Assi was among those accused of extracting millions of dollars from Syrians and funneling them into Assad’s treasury through speculative operations against the Syrian pound conducted via money-transfer companies.59
If the Syrian government is willing to normalize the status of major businessmen who operated inside Assad’s wartime economic system, it remains unclear whether Damascus genuinely intends to dismantle the broader commercial ecosystems that bolstered the Assad regime and facilitated sanctions evasion. The settlement model may ultimately recycle old wartime capital into Syria’s new economy without fully exposing the underlying networks that sustained it. The state may recover portions of illicit wealth, but that does not necessarily mean it is conducting deep forensic reviews into companies that may have functioned as fronts or commercial partners for Hezbollah- and Iran-linked entities.
The Bazzal Network: Sanctions Targets in the Assad Era
During the first Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign against Iran and its proxies, and continuing through the Biden administration, the United States extensively targeted the revenue streams that enabled Hezbollah’s activity. Washington focused on financial networks and key individuals within this ecosystem. Yet the pressure on Iran’s economy also made Syria a more important hub for sanctions evasion and illicit finance, increasing Hezbollah’s and the IRGC’s reliance on the Syrian economy to move money. Despite years of U.S. targeting, an important layer of subsidiaries, partially owned entities, and commercial partners tied to these financial networks remained untouched.
Throughout the civil war, Hezbollah had embedded its commercial infrastructure within Syria’s economy. Corporate entities tied through ownership or management to designated Hezbollah financiers have continued operating across manufacturing, import-export, real estate, and cross-border trading sectors, and Bazzal-linked companies continue to operate today. At the center of the network sit the Bazzal brothers. Around them revolves a cluster of already designated companies — Talaqi Group, Houkoul S.A.L., Tawafuk LLC, and Nagham al-Hayat — that Washington linked to Iranian oil smuggling, Hezbollah money laundering, and sanctions evasion tied to Syria. Within the ownership structure of these companies, the Bazzals hold a 99 percent stake, while Firas Nizar Sanduq, a Syrian accountant who is not sanctioned by the United States, holds the remaining 1 percent.
The significance of the network lies less in the companies already sanctioned than in their successor firms, along with partially owned entities that remained operational even after sanctions designations accumulated.
Bazzal-Linked Commercial Companies in Syria
This section examines eight companies identified within the Bazzal-linked commercial network. The companies fall into three overlapping categories. First are entities that may be automatically blocked under OFAC’s 50 Percent Rule based on corporate records that confirm majority ownership by sanctioned individuals. Second are entities that may separately qualify for designation under Executive Order 13224 because they are controlled by, act for, or materially support a blocked person. Third are companies displaying risk indicators, including overlapping managers, shared addresses, low declared capitalization, and unusually broad commercial licenses, that warrant further investigation but do not independently establish a legal basis for designation.
Although the Assad regime’s institutions were opaque and deeply corrupt, Syria continued to maintain relatively detailed corporate registration records throughout the civil war. These documents contained information on each company’s shareholders, ownership percentages, registered addresses, directors, and amendments.
There is no publicly searchable online database of Syrian corporate filings. However, researchers have obtained and digitized a complete collection of official gazette issues of Syria’s Ministry of Internal Trade and Consumer Protection, spanning the Bashar al-Assad era through the present, making it possible to track corporate registrations and subsequent changes over time. These records have been compiled and published through platforms such as The Syria Report.60 By reviewing dozens of corporate filings dating back to the civil war, it becomes possible to identify these entities’ names, addresses, ownership structures, ownership changes, and management records.
More importantly, these records help show which companies appear to remain active. Under standard practice in Syria, when a company is dissolved or becomes defunct, the official gazette typically publishes a follow-up announcement to that effect. These records establish ownership, control, management, and commercial integration with sanctioned individuals and entities. For each company, the review included its founding charter and a name-based search of the available official-gazette indices for later amendments, dissolution notices, management changes, and changes to registered capital.
These eight companies, all unsanctioned except for Al-Ahed, stretch across multiple sectors, including battery manufacturing, copper trading, agribusiness, livestock development, import-export firms, and investment companies registered in Damascus, Rif Dimashq, and Homs. On paper, many of these businesses appear ordinary. In practice, the same names, addresses, shareholders, and directors repeatedly surface across companies tied to Hezbollah financiers, Assad-linked businessmen, and entities already sanctioned for supporting Hezbollah.
The available evidence is strongest concerning corporate structure and uneven concerning actual commercial activity. Treasury’s June 2026 designation supplies transaction-level evidence for Al-Ahed, including contracts, project value, designated counterparties, and profit-sharing arrangements.
Riyada Lead Manufacturing
Riyada Lead Manufacturing is a battery and lead smelting company established in January 2018 in Adra Industrial City, northeast of Damascus.61 According to Syrian corporate filings, the ownership structure was divided almost perfectly into thirds. Talaqi Group — already sanctioned by the United States — controlled 33.3 percent. Another 33.3 percent belonged to Al-Ahed Trade and Investment, a Damascus company half-owned by sanctioned Assad financier Yassar Ibrahim.62 The remaining stake at the time of its founding belonged to Arab Renewable Energy, a Lebanese company that appears in public records almost nowhere, except for one revealing detail: It shares the same address as the sanctioned Talaqi Group.63
The overlap goes deeper. Riyada’s original managing director was Mohammad al-Bazzal, according to the official gazette. In 2022, an updated decision showcased that the management had shifted to Ahmad Khalil Khalil, a Syrian businessman sanctioned by both the United Kingdom64 and the European Union65 for supporting the Assad regime. Still, Bazzal maintained ownership.66 The EU identifies Khalil as a co-owner of Sanad Protection and Security Services, a Wagner Group-supervised Syrian company involved in protecting Russian phosphate, gas, and oil interests that generated revenue for the Assad regime. The United Kingdom similarly sanctioned him for supporting and benefiting from the Syrian regime through his control of businesses and associations with other regime-linked persons. Neither notice names Riyada, Houkoul, Al-Ahed, or the other companies examined in this memo.
Khalil also serves as managing director of Houkoul S.A.L., another Bazzal-linked company sanctioned by the U.S. government.67
According to Riyada’s charter, the company is licensed to smelt lead from used batteries and manufacture industrial battery cells containing manganese dioxide, mercury oxide, and silver oxide. Riyada remains operational today, openly advertising its production through social media pages inside Syria.68
Al-Shuaa Copper Company
Al-Shuaa Copper Company was established in March 2018 in Rif Dimashq.69 Tawafuk LLC, a sanctioned Hezbollah-linked front company, owns half the company.70 Zakaria Ali al-Abras, a Syrian businessman, owns the remaining 50 percent.71 Officially, Shuaa trades copper products, invests in assets, leases property and vehicles, and participates in public and private tenders.72 Those broad authorities mirror the same multifunctional commercial activity repeatedly associated with Hezbollah financial tradecraft.
Rimas Feed Company
Rimas Feed Company was registered in September 2018 in Hasya Industrial City, Homs governorate.73 At first glance, the company appears to be a conventional agribusiness enterprise specializing in animal feed, meat products, dairy, fish, flour, and agricultural imports.74 But the ownership structure again reveals a familiar constellation of actors. Twenty-five percent belongs to Nagham al-Hayat, another sanctioned Bazzal-linked entity.75 Another 25 percent belongs to Al-Ahed Trade and Investment, tying the company directly back to Ibrahim and Khalil, both of whom were Assad financiers and sanctioned individuals.
Rimas Feed Company’s founding charter was approved in September 2018. An amendment to Article 7 followed in December 2018, and the official gazette index records another general assembly decision in May 2023. The general assembly refers to the company’s principal shareholder/owner decision-making body and consists of all shareholders of the company’s equity interests. None of the charters showed any change in ownership or directorship.
The remaining shares expose additional connective tissue within the network. One shareholder, Mohammad Zuheir Qazweeni, is a Syrian businessman active in veterinary pharmaceuticals and agriculture. He also co-owns Afaq Livestock Development with Mohammad al-Bazzal.76
Al-Sanabel al-Khadra LLC
Al-Sanabel al-Khadra LLC, founded in October 2018 in Rif Dimashq, is 80 percent owned by Mohammad al-Bazzal, who also serves as managing director.77 The company’s business mandate is strikingly broad. It can trade food products, establish slaughterhouses, import fruits and vegetables, and sell furniture, electronics, tires, plastics, vehicles, construction materials, machinery, and mechanical supplies.78 Such expansive licensing appears to allow the company to justify an enormous range of commercial transactions under a single legal umbrella and gives it the kind of flexibility that makes front companies difficult to isolate.
Afaq Livestock Development
Afaq Livestock Development, founded in November 2018, follows a nearly identical template. Mohammad al-Bazzal owns 80 percent of the company, with Qazweeni holding the remaining stake.79 Officially, Afaq focuses on livestock, poultry farms, slaughterhouses, and agricultural trade. But its charter also grants broad import-export authorities and access to tenders and auctions.80 A general assembly decision was approved on May 31, 2020, as per the official gazette. The updated gazette clarified that Bazzal’s original 80 percent stake persisted.
Rayyana LLC
Rayyana LLC, founded in March 2018, adds a technology-focused company to the cluster of firms linked through Bazzal-family ownership. Rashid al-Bazzal owns 90 percent of the company, per the official gazette, while Ahmad Mohammad Zuheir al-Raie, a Syrian businessman, holds the remaining shares.81 Rayyana’s authorities extend into construction materials, contracting work, software, information technology, electronics, networks, machinery, and stock ownership in other companies. Before 2023, Mohammad al-Bazzal served as managing director.82
Al-Ahed Trade and Investment
Threaded through nearly every company is Al-Ahed Trade and Investment, perhaps the clearest bridge between Hezbollah-linked financial actors and Assad’s inner economic circle. Founded in Damascus in 2016, Al-Ahed is equally owned by Ibrahim and Bassel Nader Mansour, one of Ibrahim’s business associates.83 The company’s license allows it to establish investment companies, participate in tenders, create industrial and agricultural projects, and conduct import-export operations across multiple sectors. Khalil is managing director and sits on the board of multiple aforementioned companies.84
Najm al-Sharq LLC
Najm al-Sharq, or Oriental Star LLC, was founded in September 2016.85 Ninety-nine percent of the company is owned by Ali Abdulnour Shaalan, a Lebanese national sanctioned by the United States in 2015 for serving as Hezbollah’s “point person for the procurement and transshipment of weapons and materiel for the group and its Syrian partners.”86 Shaalan was also close to Qasir, Mohammad Bazzal’s father-in-law, and served as his business partner in illicit activity benefiting Hezbollah.87
The remaining 1 percent stake is owned by Firas Naser Sanduq, one of the Bazzals’ business partners and a co-founder of the three designated companies in the network. Sanduq is a licensed accountant with a degree from Damascus University.88 In July 2016, he rented a property in Yalda, Rif Dimashq province, which has served as Oriental Star LLC’s registered address, according to the July 20, 2016, edition of Al-Baath newspaper.89 The company’s listed business activities include textile products and contracting, and Sanduq is also listed as its managing director.
A Surprising Lack of Capital
The network’s structure mirrors the ownership patterns and corporate profiles of sanctioned entities operating within Hezbollah’s financial orbit. Although open-source evidence directly tying these companies to material support for Hezbollah remains limited, their ownership, control, or management by SDGTs linked to Hezbollah sanctions-evasion schemes — combined with their unusually broad commercial licenses — strongly suggests that they remain part of Hezbollah’s residual financial infrastructure in Syria.
Another revealing feature of these companies is the striking gap between the scale of their supposed business activities and the small amounts of capital they officially declared. On paper, many of these firms present themselves as major commercial and investment enterprises that typically require substantial financing and liquidity. In practice, their registered capital often amounts to little more than a few thousand dollars.
Al-Ahed Trade and Investment illustrates this pattern. According to its trade registration, the company is licensed to engage in expansive activities, including “importing and exporting all goods allowed in the agricultural and commercial sectors,” establishing real estate projects, and creating and managing investment companies.90 Yet despite these sweeping authorities, the company’s registered capital in 2016 stood at just 1 million Syrian pounds, equivalent to roughly $2,000 at the time.91 It is difficult to reconcile such minimal capitalization with the scale of operations the company purportedly intended to conduct.
The same pattern appears across the broader network. Shuaa Copper declared a capital of only 5 million Syrian pounds, while Afaq Livestock Development reported similarly negligible capitalization despite operating in a sector that ordinarily requires significant investment in land, feed, transportation, and equipment. These discrepancies suggest that these companies fit the profile of firms that maintain the outward appearance of legitimate business activity while relying on opaque financing streams and hidden beneficial ownership structures to facilitate broader financial operations.
Eligibility for Sanctions
Under OFAC’s 50 Percent Rule,92 any entity that is owned 50 percent or more, directly or indirectly, individually or in aggregate, by one or more SDNs is itself considered blocked — that is, subject to sanctions — even if it does not appear by name on the SDN List. In practice, this means that an entity becomes sanctioned “by operation of law.” Such entities are treated as blocked persons under U.S. sanctions authorities, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them, regardless of whether OFAC has publicly designated them.93
Some of the eight companies analyzed above exceed the 50 percent threshold by a wide margin. The cleanest direct-majority cases are Rayyana, whose founding records show 90 percent ownership by Rashid al-Bazzal; Al-Sanabel and Afaq, each shown at formation as 80 percent owned by Mohammad al-Bazzal; and Najm al-Sharq, whose founding records show 99 percent ownership by designated Hezbollah procurement facilitator Ali Abdulnour Shaalan.
In contrast, three others — Riyada, Rimas, and Al-Shuaa — depend on aggregated or exact-threshold ownership to trigger the 50 Percent Rule. Riyada’s founding records show more than 50 percent held collectively by Talaqi Group and al-Ahed. Rimas’s original records show 25 percent held by Nagham al-Hayat and 25 percent by al-Ahed, reaching exactly 50 percent. Al-Shuaa’s founding records show Tawafuk holding exactly 50 percent.
Entities that currently meet the 50 percent threshold must be treated as blocked in transactions subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The 50 Percent Rule does not, by itself, make their continued operation inside Syria unlawful. Their licensing and operation nevertheless warrant scrutiny by Damascus where ownership, management, or operational control remains tied to Hezbollah financiers and designated sanctions-evasion networks.
Policy Recommendations for Washington
1. The United States should treat Hezbollah’s commercial infrastructure in Syria as a counterterrorism issue.
The collapse of the Assad regime may have disrupted Hezbollah’s military entrenchment in Syria, but it left behind Assad-era companies with ownership and management ties to Hezbollah financiers and entities. Washington should treat these ties and any resulting illicit-finance risks both as a counterterrorism problem and as a component of its broader economic campaign against Iran.
2. The United States should treat the remaining Bazzal-linked companies as priority enforcement and designation leads.
Treasury should investigate and, where the evidence supports a determination under Executive Order 13224, designate the companies whose current records show ownership and managerial ties of at least 50 percent by one or more SDGTs. These companies, including Al-Sanabel al-Khadra, Afaq Livestock Development, Rayyana, Najm al-Sharq, Riyada Lead Manufacturing, Rimas Feed Company, and Al-Shuaa Copper Company, are already blocked by operation of OFAC’s 50 Percent Rule. But 50 percent ownership alone does not substitute for the affirmative determination required for a separate designation. Treasury should develop the evidentiary record needed to establish an applicable Executive Order 13224 criterion, such as that an entity is owned, controlled, or directed by a blocked person; acts for or on behalf of one; materially assists with, sponsors, or provides financial, material, or technological support to one; or supplies goods or services to one.
Separate designation would add value even where a company is already blocked by operation of law. Publicly naming the entity on the SDN List would make its status more visible to banks and other counterparties whose compliance systems screen directly against OFAC-listed names. It would also sharpen the sanctions risk for foreign financial institutions that knowingly conduct or facilitate significant transactions for designated people under Executive Order 13224.
3. The United States should issue a public advisory on Hezbollah-linked financial typologies in Syria.
Treasury should alert banks and investors to warning signs, including unusually broad trade licenses, low declared capitalization inconsistent with business scope, and overlapping managers and ownership with already sanctioned actors.
4. The United States should press Damascus to review, suspend, and revoke suspect licenses.
The Trump administration has built a warm relationship with Damascus, extending sanctions relief and signaling support for Syria’s recovery. That goodwill gives Washington leverage. U.S. support for Syria’s recovery cannot become cover for the survival of Hezbollah’s wartime financial infrastructure. If the new Syrian government wants continued international confidence, it should demonstrate that it is not merely hostile to Hezbollah politically but also serious about dismantling Hezbollah’s financial networks. Washington and its partners should push Syria to examine firms linked to designated Hezbollah facilitators, sanctioned entities, and Assad-era sanctions-evasion actors. Companies operating under broad commercial mandates should face scrutiny when their ownership or management overlaps with U.S.-designated individuals.
5. The United States should push Syria to work with the Financial Action Task Force.
The Financial Action Task Force is an intergovernmental body dedicated to countering money laundering and terror finance. It establishes global standards and seeks to evaluate whether countries are taking sufficient action to mitigate threats. Given that the Assad regime functioned in a manner akin to a criminal syndicate, Damascus will have to build, essentially from scratch, the legal and institutional infrastructure to prevent and punish illicit finance of all kinds. Yet there is presently no indication that Syria has undergone a meaningful on-site FATF assessment since the fall of the Assad regime.
Washington should encourage Damascus to facilitate such an evaluation and use the process to identify gaps in Syria’s anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing regime. Cooperation with FATF should become a benchmark for determining whether Syria’s financial opening is matched by credible enforcement reforms. But it should not be the only benchmark. FATF has shown that it often focuses more on whether appropriate laws and institutional structures exist, rather than asking if they function as intended. Therefore, Washington will likely need to determine, potentially in concert with allies, if Damascus is making a serious commitment to countering illicit finance. To that end, Washington can offer technical assistance to the financial intelligence unit Damascus has established within its central bank while monitoring the unit’s performance to ensure it serves as more than a fig leaf.
6. The United States should insist that Damascus monitor and hold accountable rehabilitated Assad-era business leaders.
Sharaa’s government is allowing leading figures in the Assad regime’s business networks to essentially buy forgiveness for their crimes by reaching a financial settlement with the new government. This is a flawed policy reflective of a broader failure by the post-Assad authorities to hold their predecessors accountable for their immense crimes. It may be difficult to undo these arrangements, but Washington can insist that these settlements do not become carte blanche for returning to illicit finance with impunity. If the parties to such settlements return to enabling terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah, and participate in or facilitate sanctions evasion, Washington should insist that Damascus investigate and prosecute them. If Sharaa’s government does not do so, the United States and its partners should work with FATF to hold Damascus accountable.
Conclusion
Hezbollah’s military presence in Syria has largely disappeared, but the financial networks the group built under Assad have proven far more durable. The continued presence of the Bazzal network demonstrates that Damascus’s break with Iran and Hezbollah has not yet extended to systematically dismantling the financial infrastructure that once sustained them. Washington should therefore press Syria to strengthen its counter-illicit-finance enforcement while Treasury investigates and, where the evidence satisfies the criteria under Executive Order 13224, designates companies and individuals still operating within Hezbollah-linked commercial networks. If the United States fails to address this infrastructure now, Syria’s economic reopening could allow Hezbollah to preserve — and eventually rebuild — the financial networks it needs to regenerate.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on October 01-02/2026
More bombing of Iran 'possible' after midterms, Trump says
Associated Presst/ 01 October/ 2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
U.S. President Donald Trump has said in a Time magazine interview published Thursday that it’s “possible” he’ll ramp up bombing in Iran after the Nov. 3 midterms. When pressed further by Time journalists, Trump continued: “I can’t tell you that because look, you know, you’re asking, where are you going to bomb?”He said in the interview, conducted Sept. 28, that he rejected the latest ceasefire proposal from Iran because “things that I wouldn’t have approved a year ago I wouldn’t have today.”Trump cited as an example an offer from Iran to “open up the Strait” of Hormuz, but said the overall proposal was “not good enough.”

UAE probes possible 'terror' link in attack on flight to Israel
Agence France Presse (Translated from Arabic by AI)
The United Arab Emirates announced on Thursday it was probing a possible "terrorist" link to an apparent attack by a pilot on board a flight to Israel that saw passengers reroute the plane to stop it from crashing. The dramatic events on Wednesday ended with passengers being given a hero's welcome by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu back home in Israel as they arrived from Saudi Arabia, where the plane made an emergency landing hours earlier.Netanyahu credited the flydubai pilot, Indian national Smit Machchhar, as well as passengers with averting catastrophe, after a co-pilot allegedly stabbed him and tried to crash the plane. Passengers described rushing the cockpit after the plane suddenly plummeted, losing around 17,000 feet of altitude in the span of a minute, according to the Flightradar24 website.
The UAE's chief prosecutor said an investigation had been launched into the incident, including the possibility of "terrorist activity or intent". Israeli officials have called the incident "an attempted terrorist attack", though in an interview with CBS News, Netanyahu did not rule out the possibility that mental health was to blame.
'Heroes' -
Netanyahu said he expected the United Arab Emirates to take the lead in the investigation, but that Israel would join. "He'll be, I assume, moved very quickly to Dubai," Netanyahu told CBS News of the alleged attacker, who was being questioned in Saudi Arabia.
Israel's far-right national security minister, Itamar Ben Gvir, called it a "jihadist" attack, while Defense Minister Israel Katz also described the incident as "an attempted jihadist terror attack".Airline flydubai has said all the passengers -- of whom 166 out of 174 were Israeli, according to media reports -- were safe, but that the reasons for the altercation were unknown."During the flight, as they approached the country, one of the pilots stabbed the other pilot, and apparently tried to crash the plane with everyone on board," Netanyahu said in a video message. "I salute these heroes," he said of the passengers, adding "they prevented a major disaster".He later hailed the wounded pilot, Machchhar, "for his extraordinary bravery", saying he prevented a "catastrophic mid-air disaster". In a Fox News interview, Netanyahu also praised an Israeli passenger who helped overpower the attacker, identifying him only as Yanik and describing him as a plumber. "An amazing act of heroism -- of his, of the Indian pilot, of the people who helped them. They stopped a disaster that could have been global," he said. India's embassy in Saudi Arabia said Machchhar was being treated at a hospital in the country and India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi described him as a "HERO". "His valor helped save hundreds of lives," Modi said.
'Out of control' -
AFPTV images showed another flydubai plane carrying the passengers touch down at Tel Aviv airport, hours after their initial flight was diverted to Saudi Arabia's Tabuk. Footage shared by Netanyahu's office showed the premier meeting passengers after their arrival in Tel Aviv and embracing a man in a bloodied shirt. Passenger Miryam Shira Ohayon described the plane as being "pretty much out of control" as the incident unfolded over Jordan. "The co-pilot tried to murder the pilot and basically carry out a suicide attack on the plane," she told reporters by speakerphone held up by her mother at Ben Gurion Airport.
"It was really on the way to crashing, and it was simply the resourcefulness of many people who took control of the co-pilot and neutralized him," she said. The airline said it was another "on-duty flydubai crew travelling on the flight who diverted and landed the aircraft safely" and that it was suspending flights to Israel while an investigation took place. The director general of Israel's foreign ministry called it "an attempted terrorist attack against Israelis, the United Arab Emirates, and the Abraham Accords", referring to the 2020 deal establishing formal ties between the two countries. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar said he had spoken with his UAE counterpart Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and agreed "to collaborate against extremist elements seeking to harm security and undermine stability".U.S. President Donald Trump, after discussing the incident with Netanyahu, said: "It seems as though the co-pilot was perhaps a terrorist or perhaps a whack-job."

Flydubai" plane escapes a new "9/11"
Nidaa Al-Watan/October 02/2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
In one minute, the plane lost almost half its altitude, and 174 passengers nearly lost their lives. On board the Flydubai】 flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv, the danger, according to passenger testimonies and the Israeli narrative, was inside the cockpit: an Indian pilot stabbed, an Omani co-pilot trying to crash the plane, and a fight to decide who controls its fate. Between passengers rushing to the front and the intervention of other pilots, control was regained before disaster struck. The plane landed safely, but the incident brought back the nightmare of 9/11 and raised security and political questions that go beyond the fate of a single flight. It was notable that an Israeli official estimated that the Omani pilot was planning to crash the plane in Israel and was looking for a symbolic target, confirming that he would not have succeeded, as he would have been intercepted on the way, according to the newspaper "Yedioth Ahronoth".
Flight FZ1073 took off from Dubai on Wednesday morning. After about two hours, its course turned into a race against decreasing altitude. According to Flightradar24 data reported by Agence France-Presse (AFP), the plane lost about 17,000 feet in one minute, after flying at an altitude of nearly 34,000 feet. Passenger Almog Itali described what he experienced as being like riding a roller coaster, amid a feeling of huge turbulence. While passengers were facing the sudden descent, a battle for control of the aircraft was taking place at its front.
According to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the co-pilot stabbed the captain and tried to crash the plane, and then those who intervened found him trying to sabotage its systems. Passengers said that Israelis who were sitting near the front rushed to the cockpit and clashed with the attacker. Every moment of delay consumed the chance of survival, while regaining the cockpit remained a condition for regaining control of the plane. Here, the presence of two other pilots among the passengers emerged. According to testimony reported by the Jerusalem Post, they were sitting in the back, and seemed shocked at first, before one of the passengers urged them to move.
The group managed to get the attacker out and get them into the cockpit, so one of them took over control, while an Israeli dentist provided first aid to the stabbed pilot. These narratives intersect with Flydubai's confirmation that members of its crew were on board the flight, secured the plane, diverted it, and landed it safely. As for the reasons for the quarrel and its motives, the company left them to the official investigation. It also announced the suspension of Flydubai flights to and from Israel while the investigation continues.
At 9:45 AM local time, the plane landed at Tabuk Airport in Saudi Arabia. The two injured pilots were taken to hospital, and passengers gathered in the airport hall amid tight security measures. Pictures summarized what the flight left behind: children waiting, travelers lying on the floor, and a white shirt stained with blood. The danger of falling ended, but the shock of survival remained present while awaiting the return flight.
Some passengers initially refused to board an evacuation plane belonging to the same company, and demanded an Israeli plane. According to Israeli reports, the crew of the return flight was vetted by Mossad and Shin Bet before being approved. Reuters quoted two security sources as saying that Saudi Arabia refused to allow Israeli military planes to transport the passengers. The arrangement settled on a civilian Flydubai plane, after the evacuation operation imposed a delicate balance between humanitarian necessity and sovereign and security considerations.
At Ben Gurion Airport, the incident moved from a scene of survival to the political forefront. Netanyahu received the passengers accompanied by Transport Minister Miri Regev, and hugged Yaniv Hayoun, one of those who intervened in the fight, whose shirt still bore traces of blood. Defense Minister Israel Katz described the incident as a "jihadist terrorist attack attempt," at a time when Netanyahu directed the security services to prepare for additional threats.This scene carries double political weight ahead of the elections on October 27. A day before the incident, Netanyahu spoke about indications of possible attacks before the vote, and the opposition accused him of stirring fear. The incident gives him material to reinforce the discourse of permanent danger and the priority of security, and puts the government before practical questions about protecting flights to Israel, vetting crews, and dealing with a potential threat arising inside the cockpit. And the comparison with the history of hijackings reveals another face of danger. In past decades, planes and their passengers were used as hostages to extract political and security gains or release prisoners, and the hijacking of an Air France plane to Entebbe in 1976 encapsulates part of that history. Today, the narrative of the attempted crash raises fears of a rapid transition from controlling the plane to destroying it.
In parallel, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar's talk about his contact with his Emirati counterpart Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed carried a message aimed at strengthening relations and cooperation in confronting extremism. This message was complemented by Israeli Minister of Culture and Sports Micky Zohar thanking the Saudi people for the warm welcome of the rescued Israeli passengers, and expressing his hope for peace. Between affirming the partnership with the UAE and praising the Saudi welcome, an Israeli tendency emerged to turn a moment of danger into an opportunity for rapprochement, suggesting that attempts to destabilize may push towards closer relations rather than undermining them. The Israeli Foreign Ministry informed its diplomats that what happened was an attempted terrorist attack against Israelis, the Emirates and the "Abraham Accords". It was telling that the Diplomatic Advisor to the UAE President, Anwar Gargash, confirmed that the UAE will remain a beacon of tolerance and a fortress against extremism and terrorism and a force for positive change in the region.
Amid this atmosphere, the words of the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Mohsen Rezaei, acquire special gravity, as he directs a threat to the Emirates against the backdrop of Netanyahu's visit to it, warning that hosting whom he described as the "butcher of Gaza" will not have "benign consequences". By linking the visit to hosting American bases, Tehran's language is revealed, which deals with the sovereign decisions of neighboring countries as violations that deserve punishment, as if it were the guardian of these countries' relations and alliances. As for his call to stop "igniting wars," it reverses roles: Tehran launches the threat, then accuses those it threatens of igniting war. The timing of the statement coinciding with the incident increases the weight of this intimidation, without the reported speech constituting an admission of responsibility for the attempt to crash the plane.
And the sensitivity of this discourse increases with the announcement by British Prime Minister Andy Burnham of the existence of "strong indications" of an Iranian role in the Fairford base incident, which is used by American forces. With Burnham's statement, suspicion moved to a declared governmental position, with the investigation continuing and Tehran denying. Five detainees were released on bail, while police announced the discovery of gasoline without explosives. The British position gives the fears of the confrontation extending to distant arenas additional weight.
In the background of this scene, Tehran received the American response to its proposal to end the war. Reuters reported that Qatar carried the response to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, and that the disagreement focuses on the arrangement of the steps of the seven-day plan, despite convergence on its components. The divergence remains over who starts and how commitments are guaranteed. Between diplomacy seeking a sequence for de-escalation and threats expanding the geography of fear, the passenger plane arrived at its destination, and the region remained suspended between an opportunity for settlement and the possibility of the next disaster.

Initial Saudi investigations into Flydubai incident: Assault by co-pilot
Al-Modon/01 October/ 2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
The Saudi Ministry of Interior announced today, Thursday, that preliminary investigations into the Flydubai plane incident showed an assault by the co-pilot on the captain, during flight No. FZ1073. The ministry explained that the investigations were conducted by competent authorities in the Kingdom with the participation of a UAE technical team, and that the two pilots left this morning for Abu Dhabi after their condition improved, accompanied by a UAE security team. The same source said that the Kingdom deals with emergency cases in accordance with its international and humanitarian obligations, and as stipulated in the regulations and instructions adopted by the concerned authorities, to ensure the safety and security of air navigation and the readiness of the aviation and security systems in the Kingdom and its ability to respond quickly and effectively to exceptional cases.
It also announced the provision of necessary care for all 174 passengers of the plane, and the flight crew consisting of eight members, clarifying that "at exactly 5:40 pm yesterday (Wednesday) all passengers completed their journey on a replacement aircraft via Flydubai airlines, while the flight crew returned to the city of Dubai via another aircraft of the same airlines, with the exception of the captain and his assistant who were transferred to the hospital to receive the necessary treatment, based on an assessment of their health condition".
Emirati investigation
For its part, the UAE Public Prosecution announced the opening of an investigation into the incident, and the Emirates News Agency said that Attorney General Hamad Al Shamsi ordered the formation of a team of competent prosecution members to determine the circumstances of the incident and its motives and whether it was linked to terrorist activity or premeditation. The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the judicial authorities in the country have jurisdiction to investigate given that the aircraft is registered in the UAE and bears its flag, calling for reliance on official sources and avoiding speculation until the results are announced. In parallel, Israeli reports indicated that Tel Aviv intends to participate in the investigation with the co-pilot with the authorities in Abu Dhabi. According to Israeli reports, Israel wants to send a delegation in the coming days to participate in the investigations.
Political hints.. and motive not determined
In contrast, political parties hinted at a possible Iranian role without providing evidence. US President Donald Trump said: "According to what I heard, Iran is involved in the attempted attack." And Trump threatened that Iran would be subject to a "very strong" strike if it is proven to be behind the attack on the Flydubai captain, saying he leans towards this possibility. Trump's words came in response to a journalist who asked him whether Washington would respond if Tehran's responsibility was proven, so he said the Iranians "will receive a very strong blow". In a meeting with journalists at the White House, Trump explained that he believes Iran is involved, without taking a final position. He continued: "I say the answer is yes, based on what I hear, but we are working on this issue right now specifically". In an interview with Time magazine published Thursday, Trump pointed to the possibility of intensifying strikes against Iran after the midterm elections scheduled for early November. For his part, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said today that the co-pilot "underwent indoctrination of extremist Islamic ideas", considering that he "was a suicide bomber", and pointing to a gap in pilot screening that is being worked on to address in cooperation with the UAE. Netanyahu had mentioned last evening in two interviews with CNN and Sky News America that there are no prior intelligence warnings nor specific information linking Iran to the incident so far, and that the investigation into the motive is still ongoing. For his part, Israel's envoy to the UAE told Reuters that the suspect is an Omani citizen and that the motive has not yet been determined and it is too early to draw conclusions, confirming that Israeli intelligence services are in contact with their counterparts. The website "Ynet" mentioned that Netanyahu spoke by phone with the President of the UAE Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed after the incident and they agreed to coordinate on the file of flight security, without official Emirati confirmation about Israel's participation in the investigation. On the aviation procedures front, Flydubai announced the suspension of its flights to and from Israel, while the Israeli El Al company said that as of tomorrow, Friday, it will operate two special rescue flights from Dubai to Tel Aviv to return stranded Israelis.

Trump threatens Iran with "a very strong strike" if its involvement in Flydubai plane incident is proven / "Potential" intensification of attacks against Iran after midterm elections
AFP/01 October/ 2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
US President Donald Trump threatened Iran on Thursday with "a very strong strike" if its involvement in the assault on the captain of a Flydubai plane in mid-flight is confirmed, adding that he leans towards this hypothesis. In response to a question posed by a journalist about whether the United States would respond if Tehran's responsibility was proven, Trump said the Iranians "will receive a very strong blow". During a chat with journalists at the White House, Trump said he believes Iran is involved, without announcing a decisive position. He added "I say the answer is yes, based on what I hear, but we are working on this matter at this very moment". In an interview with Time magazine published Thursday, Trump spoke of a "potential" intensification of attacks against Iran after the midterm elections scheduled for early November. According to the Wall Street Journal, the Pentagon will send an aircraft carrier and other ships to the region, as part of reinforcements ranging between nine thousand and ten thousand military personnel expected to arrive by the end of November. Saudi Interior: Flydubai co-pilot assaulted the captain.

Saudi Arabia: Investigation indicates assault on Flydubai captain by his co-pilot
Al-Markazia/ October 01/ 2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
The Saudi Ministry of Interior revealed clarifying details about the Flydubai plane incident, noting that preliminary investigations were conducted with the participation of a UAE security team. And the results of the security investigations according to the Saudi Interior Ministry statement showed an assault on the plane's captain by his assistant, which resulted in them sustaining various injuries. In a related context, a responsible source in the Saudi Ministry of Interior explained that the competent authorities initiated the necessary procedures to deal with the emergency that was declared on Flydubai flight No. (FZ1073), and granted it permission for an emergency landing at Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz International Airport in the city of Tabuk on Wednesday 19 Rabi' al-Akhir 1448 AH corresponding to September 30, 2026 AD. The statement indicated that the plane landed safely at exactly 9:45 am and on board it were 174 passengers, in addition to the flight crew consisting of 8 members, and necessary care was provided to all of them. The statement noted that at exactly 5:40 pm all passengers completed their journey on a replacement aircraft via (Flydubai) airlines, while the flight crew returned to Dubai via another aircraft of the same airlines, except for the captain and his assistant who were transferred to the hospital to receive the necessary treatment, based on an assessment of their health condition. The source confirmed that the plane's captain and his assistant – after their health condition improved and the medical team allowed them – left the Kingdom heading to (Abu Dhabi) this morning, Thursday 20 Rabi' al-Akhir 1448 AH corresponding to October 01, 2026 AD, accompanied by the UAE security team. And the source stressed that Riyadh deals with emergency cases in accordance with its international and humanitarian obligations, and as stipulated in the regulations and instructions adopted by the concerned authorities, to ensure the safety and security of air navigation and the readiness of the aviation and security systems in the Kingdom and its ability to respond quickly and effectively to exceptional cases.

Saudi Arabia: Flydubai captain and co-pilot left for UAE accompanied by security team / Riyadh confirmed it deals with emergencies in accordance with its international and humanitarian obligations
Riyadh: Asharq Al-Awsat/01 October/2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
The Saudi Ministry of Interior reported that the preliminary investigations into the Flydubai incident, which were carried out by the competent authorities in the Kingdom with the participation of a security team from the Emirates, indicated an assault on the plane's captain by his assistant, which resulted in them sustaining various injuries. A responsible source at the ministry said, in a statement, Thursday, that the competent authorities in Saudi Arabia initiated the necessary procedures to deal with the emergency that was declared on Flydubai flight No. (FZ1073), and granted it permission for an emergency landing at Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz International Airport in Tabuk on Wednesday. The source explained that the plane landed safely at exactly 9:45 am and on board were 174 passengers, in addition to the flight crew consisting of 8 members, and necessary care was provided to all of them, indicating that all passengers completed their journey at exactly 5:40 pm on a replacement aircraft via Flydubai airlines, and added that the flight crew returned to Dubai via another aircraft of the same airlines, except for the plane's captain and his assistant who were transferred to the hospital to receive the necessary treatment, based on an assessment of their health condition. And the source confirmed that the plane's captain and his assistant left Saudi Arabia heading to Abu Dhabi Thursday morning, accompanied by the UAE security team, after their health condition improved and the medical team allowed them. And the statement stressed that Saudi Arabia deals with emergency cases in accordance with its international and humanitarian obligations, and as stipulated in the regulations and instructions adopted by the concerned authorities, to ensure the safety and security of air navigation and the readiness of the aviation and security systems in the country, and its ability to respond quickly and effectively to exceptional cases.

British-Iranian arrested on suspicion of terrorism in Fairford case/Interrogation of another citizen and search of two properties in central London
London: Asharq Al-Awsat/01 October/2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
British counter-terrorism police announced Thursday the arrest of a 27-year-old man holding British and Iranian dual nationality in Westminster, central London, on suspicion of "preparing for terrorist acts," in connection with the incident that occurred near Fairford Air Base in southwest England. Police said, according to the BBC, that another British man, 26, was also questioned under legal caution, while two properties in the area were searched. Vicki Evans, Senior National Coordinator at Counter Terrorism Policing, said investigators are looking at "all possible angles, including the possibility of foreign state involvement," adding: "I would like to thank the public for its continued support, and patience, while we continue to work on this investigation". The arrest came a day after British Prime Minister Andy Burnham suggested that Iran "played a role" in the incident. He told the BBC: "We will say more in due time, but we can confirm... that we believe Iran played a role". In parallel, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel had warned Britain that Iran was planning an attack on an air base, adding that the warning came before Burnham's government announced, on September 8, imposing sanctions on Israeli settlement products in the occupied West Bank. Burnham's statements led to Iran summoning the British ambassador in Tehran, Hugo Shorter, according to the official Iranian news agency IRNA. The Iranian Foreign Ministry denounced what it described as "baseless accusations". The US forces use Fairford base in "defensive" operations against Iran. Police had revealed that vehicles seized near the base did not contain explosives, but a quantity of gasoline. British police had arrested, at dawn on Sunday, five British men aged between 23 and 25 after receiving a report of "three suspicious vehicles" in the village of Welfford located directly to the east of the base. Four of the five men live in Westminster, while the fifth lives in Camden, and their homes were searched. All were released on bail. Police described the decision to release them, Monday, as "a decision that falls under investigation procedures," and based on "experience and strategy". The incident led to the evacuation of residents of 85 homes in a neighboring village, and the declaration of a "major incident," according to AFP. The Times newspaper reported that one of the men called emergency services before his arrest, while the BBC later confirmed that one of the five suspects himself called the emergency number 999 before the group was arrested. The newspaper said investigators are studying several possibilities, including that the men's presence near the base was for surveillance, or to conduct a "security test" to find out the level of protection, or to carry out a symbolic move to send a message to the British government. It has not been resolved whether the contact of one of the suspects with the police stemmed from his backing down at the last moment, or whether it was part of the plan itself.

Third US carrier and about 10,000 troops to the region / Trump expects resumption of bombing of Iran in November
London: Asharq Al-Awsat/ 01 October/ 2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
The Pentagon is sending a third aircraft carrier and ships carrying Marines to the Middle East, adding between 9 and 10 thousand troops, as President Donald Trump considers resuming strikes on Iran after the midterm elections, according to the Wall Street Journal. The newspaper reported on Thursday, citing US officials, that the ships, fighter jets, Marines and sailors will arrive in the region by the end of November. The newspaper had reported that Trump recently told his aides that he expects to resume bombing Iran in the same month. The aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt left its port in San Diego on Sunday in a deployment that was already scheduled, while the USS Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group, which includes three amphibious ships carrying elements of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, sailed on Monday.
Currently in the Middle East are the aircraft carriers USS George H.W. Bush and USS George Washington. If the latter remains after the arrival of the Roosevelt, the number of carrier strike groups in the region will rise to three for the first time since April, before a fragile ceasefire was reached that temporarily ended fighting that erupted on February 28. The ceasefire later collapsed, and the two sides have exchanged attacks intermittently since then. The newspaper pointed to the possibility that the George Washington will leave the region returning to its port in Japan, which would bring the number of carriers back to two. The White House and the Department of Defense did not respond to the newspaper's requests for comment. There are also ships from the USS Boxer Amphibious Ready Group in the region. One official said that the military personnel on board the ships that sailed this week will join more than 50,000 US troops already in the region. The reinforcements come days after Trump rejected the latest Iranian proposal, and after he told Time magazine, in an interview published Thursday, that he may resume striking Iran after the midterm elections if there is no agreement. The Wall Street Journal said that keeping a third carrier in the region will give Trump more options and firepower if he decides to launch an attack. The proposal that Trump rejected would have led to the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, through which about a fifth of the world's oil usually passes, and the resumption of talks on Iran's nuclear program, in exchange for lifting the US blockade on Iranian ports.In recent weeks, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth extended the deployment of other units essential for major combat operations, including air defense units that counter Iranian missiles and drones, and the US Army's 82nd Airborne Division.
The newspaper explained that the 82nd Division is capable of carrying out multiple missions, including countering threats and parachuting into hostile territory to secure airports and land sites. According to US Navy officials, the United States has for months maintained about 20 warships in the region to enforce the blockade and help escort commercial ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

US imposes new economic sanctions on Iran / Sanctions target major automakers and prominent companies in railways and manufacturing
Riyadh - Al Arabiya 01/October / 2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
The United States announced today, Thursday, new sanctions targeting major automakers in Iran, in addition to prominent companies in the fields of railways, manufacturing and metals. The new sanctions come as part of the United States' efforts to intensify pressure on Iran in its war with it. A statement by the US Treasury Department said: "Given that the railway and automotive sectors represent some of the largest remaining sources of revenue for the regime and its logistical capabilities, today's action directly strikes the vital arteries that Iran relies on to sustain its economy and evade sanctions," according to AFP. The new sanctions target Iran's two largest automakers, Iran Khodro (IKCO) and SAIPA, which provide their products to the local market and also export to regional trading partners. The new sanctions included a total of seven automotive manufacturing companies, as part of its efforts to deprive the Iranian government of sources of revenue. The sanctions also affected "Niroo Motor" which is the largest motorcycle manufacturer in Iran, and the decision also targeted entities in other countries that are partners of the Iranian automotive sector, including the Indonesian company "Golden Motorcycle", and auto parts companies in the UAE, Turkey and Hong Kong. The new sanctions also hit key companies in the Iranian railway sector, including the state-owned "Railway Company", the passenger train company "Raja", and the private freight company "Rahahan Hamal va Naql".Among the entities concerned by the sanctions are also major companies in the field of steel manufacturing and other industries in Iran, including the heavy equipment production company "HEPCO", which the US Treasury Department described as "one of the largest manufacturers of mining and road construction equipment in the Middle East". Washington also imposed sanctions on HEPCO's branch in Shanghai, and the newly updated sanctions list also included companies in the UAE and Germany accused of assisting Iranian steel companies. The new measures finally targeted what was described as a complex network for exporting steel and oil run by two citizens holding Iranian and Dominican nationalities, residing in Hong Kong.

Putin shows readiness for peace talks and Zelensky announces use of first Ukrainian ballistic missile /Russia does not intend to strike Western companies supplying weapons
Riyadh: Al Arabiya.net and agencies/ 01 October/ 2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Ukraine has made resuming peace talks more difficult by carrying out drone attacks during the Russian State Duma elections, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that his army used for the first time a locally developed ballistic missile.
Putin said at the Valdai Discussion Club in Moscow in front of an international audience that Moscow was ready to resume negotiations on Ukraine on September 21, the day after the State Duma elections. He added that more than 1,600 drones were launched at Moscow, and pointed out that polling stations in other regions of Russia were under continuous attack. Putin added that Ukraine was mistaken in betting on the success of attacks against Russia. He said: "The enemy expected our society to disintegrate, but anyone can be mistaken". The Kremlin leader explained that Russia remained ready to enter negotiations and end them as soon as possible. He added: "But, certainly, with conditions that are also acceptable to the Russian Federation, and to the Russian people". However, Kyiv and its Western allies and observers strongly doubt that Moscow is genuinely willing to engage in talks. Ukraine has been defending itself against a full-scale Russian invasion since February 2022. On the other hand, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Thursday that the Ukrainian army used for the first time in the war against Russia a tactical ballistic missile of the "FB-7" type, developed locally. Zelensky wrote in a post on social media: "First combat mission. Thank you for this result." He added that the next mission is to increase missile production. Zelensky did not specify the target, but he published a video clip of a missile launch at night. The Ukrainian defense company "Fire Point" had postponed on several previous occasions the first combat use of its ballistic missile. The company's management had initially announced that the first missile strikes on the Russian capital, Moscow, would be carried out in the middle of the year. A few days ago, the company, which is rumored to have a link to Zelensky's inner circle, retracted its previous date and announced that the first use of the missile will take place later in the year. Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday that Russia does not intend to launch strikes on Western companies supplying weapons that produce military equipment for Ukraine, but described the situation as a threat that Moscow is monitoring. Putin explained, during a speech he delivered before the Valdai Discussion Club in Moscow in the presence of an international audience, that the biggest threat is that Western countries provide Ukraine with satellite data to carry out attacks on Russia. His remarks came after Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, threatened to launch direct strikes on military production facilities in Germany. Putin added: "We are not threatening anyone, and we do not intend to attack anyone – not in 2029, not in 2030, not in 2050." The Russian president has repeatedly denied accusations made by Germany and other countries in the European Union that Russia intends to attack a member state of NATO. Before launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin also repeatedly confirmed that it does not intend to attack its smaller neighbor. Putin continued: "But if we are subjected to aggression, we will have to respond."

Yemeni Armed Forces: Carry out raids on valuable targets in Saada, Sanaa and Taiz / 27 air raids across Taiz fronts
Riyadh: Al Arabiya.net/ 01 October/2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
The official spokesman for the Yemeni Armed Forces, Colonel Majed Al-Nazili, announced Thursday evening that the Yemeni Air Force targeted high-value sites in the capital Sanaa. Al-Nazili said that the Yemeni army targeted 11 high-value targets in Saada.
The Yemeni Armed Forces had announced earlier that its air forces carried out 27 precise and focused air raids across the Taiz fronts, targeting an integrated military system of the terrorist Houthi militia, including a missile depot, command and control centers, advanced supply and arming points, gatherings of militia elements, and military vehicles and machinery. The strikes hit hostile targets on Sixtieth Street north of Taiz city, Bani Omar, the Humayr front in Maqbana district, east of Al-Wazi'iyah, Al-Ahkoum and Al-Athawir in Haifan district, Al-Kadha and Jabal Noaman, Al-Karifat, Aqabat Munif, Al-Tashrifat, Al-Aqroud, Same'a, and Al-Shaqab in Sabr Al-Mawadim. The Yemeni forces' statement confirmed that the raids achieved precise and direct hits on their targets, and resulted in the destruction of dozens of vehicles and military capabilities and the neutralization of large numbers of militia elements between dead and wounded. The Yemeni government forces and the popular resistance in Taiz had thwarted, during the past 24 hours, a series of attacks and infiltration attempts launched by the Houthi militia on a number of fronts in the governorate, in a wide field escalation extending from Maqbana and Jabal Habashi in the west to Al-Aqroud and Same'a in the south, and the fronts surrounding the city of Taiz. The Taiz axis command said that more than 100 Houthi militia elements were killed and dozens injured during the confrontations, which were accompanied by air bombardment targeting the group's sites and gatherings, noting the destruction and disabling of a number of military vehicles and burning of a weapons depot.According to a military source for the Armed Forces Media Center, the army and resistance forces managed to break a series of Houthi attacks that began since Wednesday evening, during which dozens of elements were killed, wounded and captured, including field leaders. Warplanes launched a series of raids on Houthi sites and gatherings in southeastern Taiz, the Humayr front in Maqbana district west of the governorate, and Bani Omar south of the governorate, amid ongoing confrontations on a number of axes.

Arab condemnations of Houthi militia targeting power station feeding the Prophet's Mosque / "A blatant provocation to the feelings of Muslims and a flagrant violation of the sanctity of holy sites"
Riyadh: Al Arabiya.net/ 01 October/2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
Arab condemnations continued for the Houthi militia's targeting of a power station feeding the Prophet's Mosque, where the Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council for Arab States, Jassem Mohammed Al-Budaiwi, condemned the Houthi militia's targeting of an electrical facility feeding the Prophet's Mosque. He stressed that this targeting is a blatant provocation to the feelings of Muslims and a flagrant violation of the sanctity of holy sites. And constitutes crossing all red lines, as it is considered a dangerous transgression in violating the sanctity of Islamic holy sites. Al-Badawi stressed that this targeting reveals a hostile approach that does not value religious and human values nor international laws and norms, especially with repeated attempts to target the Two Holy Mosques and surrounding areas.
The UAE strongly condemned the Houthi targeting of a power station feeding the Prophet's Mosque in Medina. The UAE Foreign Ministry affirmed the UAE's full solidarity with the Kingdom and its support in everything that preserves its security and stability. Kuwait also expressed its strong condemnation of the Houthi targeting, describing it as a blatant violation of the Kingdom's sovereignty, and a provocation to the feelings of all Muslims. For its part, Bahrain condemned the Houthi militia targeting the station supplying the Prophet's Mosque with electricity in Medina. And Jordan condemned the attack, considering this attack a blatant violation of Saudi sovereignty, and a threat to its security, stability and territorial integrity, and a blatant violation of international law and the UN Charter. The Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs affirmed Jordan's absolute solidarity with Saudi Arabia, and standing with it in all steps it takes to protect its security, stability, capabilities and safety of its citizens and residents. The State of Qatar also condemned, in the strongest terms, the Houthi group's targeting of the station and considered it a dangerous assault on the sanctity of Islamic holy sites, a clear provocation to the feelings of Muslims, an unacceptable disregard for civilian lives, and a blatant violation of Saudi sovereignty and a flagrant breach of international law. Egypt on Thursday strongly condemned the attack. Cairo affirmed its denunciation of this blatant violation and the continuation of attacks and attempts to destabilize the security and stability of the Kingdom. Egypt indicated that this approach of escalation increases the severity of tension in the region as a whole. The Egyptian statement stressed the country's categorical rejection of attempts to undermine the security and sovereignty of the Kingdom. Cairo affirmed its full solidarity with any measures taken by the Kingdom to preserve its stability and safety, stressing that the security of the Kingdom is an integral part of Arab national security and is closely linked to Egyptian national security.

Houthis target station supplying Prophet's Mosque with electricity / GCC considered attack a blatant provocation to Muslim feelings
Medina: Asharq Al-Awsat/01 October / 2026 (Translated from Arabic by AI)
The Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen announced a terrorist attack at 5:11 AM on Tuesday, on the Taibah power distribution station in Medina, adding that the results of investigation and evidence from the competent authorities proved the involvement of the terrorist Houthi militia in planning and executing it through operational review and remnants of the wreckage of the drone used. Major General Turki Al-Malki, the Coalition spokesman, said in a statement Thursday that this cowardly terrorist act targeted a civilian facility providing electrical services to the Prophet's Mosque, noting that it caused a transformer to go out of service without affecting the network. The Coalition spokesman added that the attack comes as an extension of this extremist militia's approach in attempts to target the Two Holy Mosques, and continuing to deliberately provoke the feelings of millions of Muslims around the world by targeting Mecca and Medina.Major General Al-Malki stressed the Coalition's continuation in taking and implementing measures to deter the terrorist Houthi militia; in a way that ensures protection of the Two Holy Mosques and safety of the guests of Rahman in Mecca and Medina, which millions of Muslims annually head to from around the world.Arab and Islamic countries and organizations condemned in the strongest terms the Houthis' targeting of the station that supplies the Prophet's Mosque with electrical energy, affirming that it represents a blatant violation of international and humanitarian law and the UN Charter, and of Saudi sovereignty, and a threat to its security and stability. The countries and organizations, in statements, expressed their categorical rejection of the recurrence of these shameful and cowardly hostile attacks that target civilian objects, stressing full solidarity with the Kingdom, and its support in everything that would preserve its sovereignty, security, stability and capabilities of its citizens and residents. Jassem Al-Budaiwi, Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, said that this terrorist attack crossed all red lines, and is considered a blatant provocation to the feelings of Muslims around the world, and a dangerous transgression in violating the sanctity of Islamic holy sites. The Secretary-General said that this Houthi aggression reveals a hostile approach that does not value religious and human values nor international laws and norms, especially with repeated attempts to target the Two Holy Mosques and surrounding areas, stressing that the security of Saudi Arabia and its holy sites is an integral part of the security of the Gulf states, and any threat to it is a threat to the security of all Council states. Al-Budaiwi renewed, in a statement, affirming the full and firm standing of Gulf states with Saudi Arabia, and their full solidarity with it in facing everything that targets its security, stability, sovereignty and holy sites, and supporting all its measures to protect its territories, citizens, residents and guests of Rahman.
Dr. Mohammed Al-Issa, Secretary-General of the Muslim World League, President of the Association of Muslim Scholars, condemned the terrorist approach of the Houthi group, and what it does of attacks that affect the sanctity of holy sites, and a number of civilian objects, in a blatant violation of religious values, and the simplest humanitarian principles, and what their actions reflect of a terrorist approach that violates religious sanctities and faith and humanitarian feelings. Al-Issa added that this misguided group by its successive terrorist crimes, indeed betrayal of religion and Muslims and deviation from the guidance of God and His Messenger, peace be upon him, renewing - on behalf of the League's assemblies, bodies and global councils and Islamic peoples under its umbrella - affirmation of full solidarity with Saudi Arabia in all measures it takes to deter the aggression of aggressors, and to preserve the sanctity of holy sites and the lives of Muslims.The Organization of Islamic Cooperation affirmed that targeting vital objects and facilities in Medina constitutes a dangerous escalation and a blatant violation of the sanctity of holy places and all international and humanitarian laws and norms, stressing its full solidarity with Saudi Arabia in its measures to protect its territories and preserve its security and stability, and to defend Islamic holy sites and preserve the safety of its citizens and residents.
The "Presidency of Religious Affairs in the Two Holy Mosques" condemned the continuation of the terrorist Houthi group's targeting of Mecca and Medina, affirming that these criminal acts represent a blatant assault on the sanctity of the holy places, and a blatant violation of the teachings of Islam which prohibited aggression and corruption on earth, and mandated glorifying holy sites and preserving their security. The Presidency stressed that targeting civilians, facilities and holy sites is a crime forbidden by Sharia, condemned humanely, and contrary to international charters and norms, indicating that these attacks will not undermine Saudi Arabia's security and stability, and will only increase its leadership and people in steadfastness and determination to protect its holy sites, and preserve the security of the Two Holy Mosques, and confront everything that targets the homeland's security and safety of its visitors.
The Bahraini Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered this attack a blatant breach of religious values and moral norms, and a dangerous escalation that comes in the context of repeated targeting of the Two Holy Mosques and Islamic holy sites, and a provocation to the feelings of Muslims around the world. Bahrain pointed to Saudi Arabia's inherent right to self-defense guaranteed under Article 51 of the UN Charter, noting the firm religious status it enjoys in the conscience of the Arab and Islamic worlds as custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. Manama renewed its call to the UN Security Council to assume its responsibilities and take a firm stance to stop the repeated terrorist attacks by the Houthis that target civilian objects and religious holy sites, and terrorize the guests of Rahman and visitors to the Two Holy Mosques and safe civilians, and hold their perpetrators accountable. The Bahraini Foreign Ministry also called on the Security Council to ensure full implementation of its relevant resolutions, foremost Resolution No. 2216 of 2015, and Resolution No. 2817 of 2026 and what it included of a demand to stop support for proxies; in a way that contributes to preserving regional and international peace and security.
The wide condemnation of the Houthi terrorist attacks on holy sites, which have a special status for two billion Muslims around the world, stems from a religious duty, as mosques from the perspective of Sharia enjoy sanctity guaranteed by explicit texts that mandated their preservation, and prohibited exposure to them or turning them into arenas of conflict in times of peace and war alike.
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz denounced the attempt by the terrorist Houthi militias to repeatedly target Mecca; for what this heinous crime represents as a violation of the sanctity of holy sites and a provocation to the feelings of Muslims around the world, whose hearts turn to it five times a day. King Salman bin Abdulaziz, while chairing a session of the Council of Ministers in Jeddah last week, appreciated the role of the Saudi military and security sectors and their brave heroes in defending the homeland, and firmly confronting any aggression on holy places and guests of Rahman and citizens and residents on the land of the country. The audacity of the terrorist militia, supported by Iran, to target holy sites reflects that it is a functional tool to serve regional agendas aimed at destabilizing the security of the region, transcending legitimate and Islamic values, which reveals its explicit enmity to Islam and its use of the religious cover as a tool for political deception and covering up its violations against civilian objects and houses of worship. The Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Dr. Saleh Al-Fawzan, described in a statement last week, the Houthi group as "the gang of evil, and the intrigue of enemies", confirming that it "was founded on corruption in creed and method, so it rebelled against its rulers, in successive seditions for many years, until it divided the country and the people". Sheikh Al-Fawzan added addressing the coalition forces: "Know that you are fighting an enemy (the Houthis), who has corrupted the country, divided the people, rebelled against its rulers, and intended evil against Muslim holy sites, but God Almighty is lying in wait for them", asking the Almighty to preserve Saudi Arabia and Yemen from all evil, and to support the stationed with His help, and cut off the militia, and those who help them and support them. The Mufti of Saudi Arabia said, in a speech with the opening of the "International Conference on the Kingdom's efforts in confronting intellectual deviations", last Sunday, that the Houthi militia is among the misguided and misleading groups that target the unity of homelands, adopt aggression, and spread corruption and ruin in countries, explaining that it rebelled against the rulers in its country, violated the blood of Muslims, and dared to attack their holy sites.

The Latest LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on October 01-02/2026
The Emirati Plane and the Major Crisis Averted.
Colonel Charbel Barakat/October 01/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/10/157993/
Yesterday, an Emirati plane belonging to 'flydubai' was subjected to a major sabotage operation, the likes of which the world had begun to forget. It boils down to the Omani co-pilot's desire to commit suicide on the model of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, apparently carrying out orders from Tehran. This incident reminds us of the Egyptian plane that crashed shortly after taking off from John F. Kennedy Airport in New York, carrying 217 passengers, including an Egyptian military delegation of officers who had completed their training in the United States. At the time, it was said that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was behind the incident, and the Egyptian authorities did not wish to speak about it out of fear of increasing the Brotherhood's influence in Egypt, as it would be considered a heroic act among the Brotherhood—a habit behind which all Arab regimes hide.
The same thing happened after Hamas's attack on southern Israel, which led to a failure to confront terrorism from an Arab standpoint; instead, it contributed to inciting public opinion against Israel rather than targeting those who initiated the attack, killed civilians, and kidnapped peaceful people. Consequently, this prompted Israel to retaliate against Palestinians in Gaza because the killers and hostages were hiding among them, and because all their budgets were spent on digging tunnels and fortifications under hospitals and civilian buildings. This is identical to what happened with Hezbollah in Lebanon, which caused villages to be bulldozed and residents displaced to minimize casualties among civilians. Today, as we approach the third anniversary of the catastrophe that led to the destruction of Gaza, the death of many of its residents, and the halt of the peace process that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was trying to lead—and at a time when the Revolutionary Guard is drawing its last breaths after the fierce war on Iran, particularly amid financial and moral bankruptcy—it is once again trying to exploit Israeli civilians through the United Arab Emirates. The UAE is considered the only state that went far in adopting the Abraham Accords, thereby allowing tourism and business to flow between the two countries, in order to kill Israeli civilians who were visiting the Emirati capital or using its airlines to return home. It is as if killing civilians is the only way to regain some support from the masses who are weary of their hateful slogans and reckless behavior. The explanations adopted by the media machinery of hateful organizations and the states managed by backward totalitarian regimes remain a weapon that harms their own people more than their enemies. Consequently, they reap what they sow, and the hatred they spread is bound to bounce back on them multiplied every time. We thank God, who once again saved the world from the consequences of indiscriminate killing.
We also ask Him to stop the wicked in their tracks and rid the world of them, so that the peoples of Iran may find peace and return to exercising their right to life, production, and the competition in doing good among neighbors. We ask Him to bury attempts to create distance between neighbors under any slogan or theory—no matter how embellished from the outside—and to spread openness and cooperation among the peoples of this region, ridding it of the scourge of Sunni terrorism represented by the Muslim Brotherhood (the creation of the Ottoman Sultanic system that dreamed of controlling the peoples of the Middle East under the banner of the Caliphate, a banner Erdogan is now reusing, which is why he supports the Brotherhood through his regime and prevents free Turks from expressing differing viewpoints). We also ask Him to rid the region of Shia terrorism represented by the Velayat-e Faqih system, which seeks to control a diverse world, starting with the Middle East, where the Revolutionary Guard tries to seize key control points and prevent any cooperation among its peoples. Some say that what happened was a miracle that spared the world from dire consequences and saved the people of Israel in particular from a horrific crime. While we thank God for this blessing, we hope that everyone will make room for peace and cooperation, and rid themselves of hatred and its causes once and for all, so that we may live in lasting peace and serious cooperation among the peoples of this Middle East, which has borne much hardship and deserves to finally enjoy stability, peace, open borders, and constructive cooperation among its peoples. May the UAE's experience with the Abraham Accords be the catalyst for joining a complete and comprehensive peaceful system that ends all outstanding issues among the peoples of the region. And may this test be the final act of hatred produced by the Mullahs' regime, so that it falls definitively and fades from the memory of the peoples, especially in Iran, which is situated at the crossroads of many peoples and nations.

'October 7 Will Return': Hamas, Like Iran, Will Not Voluntarily Give Up the Fight
Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/October 1, 2026
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/22890/hamas-october-7-will-return
The chants matter because they reveal what speeches about peace and reconstruction conceal.
These slogans raise a fundamental question for anyone discussing the future of the Gaza Strip: What exactly has changed? The answer is particularly important because the international framework for the Gaza Strip explicitly calls for something very different.
US President Donald J. Trump's 20-point peace plan states that Gaza is to become a "deradicalized terror-free zone" that poses no threat to its neighbors. The plan calls for the decommissioning of weapons, demilitarization and the establishment of an International Stabilization Force. It also envisages a process intended to change Gazan mindsets and narratives by emphasizing tolerance and peaceful coexistence.
On paper, the objective is peaceful coexistence. Public gatherings are proclaiming that Gaza belongs to Hamas and rejecting international forces.
This is the main problem facing any attempt to transform the Gaza Strip.
Reconstruction can rebuild buildings. It cannot dismantle an ideology.
The answer will determine whether Gaza's reconstruction becomes part of a genuine transition toward stability, or whether reconstruction takes place alongside the reorganization of the same forces that brought the Hamas terrorists to power in the Gaza Strip and the region into war.
Has the ideological and military foundation for another October 7 massacre actually been removed? On the eve of the October 7 anniversary, the world should pay close attention when people in the Gaza Strip say they want the October 7 massacre to happen again.
It is crucial to remember what senior Hamas official Ghazi Hamad said shortly after the October 7 massacre: "The Al-Aqsa Flood [what Hamas calls the October 7 massacre] is just the first time, and there will be a second, a third, a fourth, because we have the determination, the resolve, and the capabilities to fight." Chants can be heard in the streets of the Gaza Strip during funeral processions for Hamas commanders and members killed by Israel: "October 7 will return! It is coming back!" Pictured: The funeral procession for Hamas commanders Izz al-Din al-Beik and Mohannad Abu al-Foul in Gaza City on September 29, 2026. (Photo by Faiz Qreqa/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images)
Nearly three years after Hamas-led terrorists invaded Israel on October 7, 2023, murdered roughly 1,200 people and abducted 251, some of the voices emerging from the Gaza Strip are sending a disturbing message: October 7 is regarded by Hamas and its supporters as an operation they plan to repeat.
Chants can be heard in the streets of the Gaza Strip during funeral processions for Hamas commanders and members killed by Israel: "October 7 will return! It is coming back!"
Others include: "Eid [holiday] for you, Eid; October 7 is the day of the Eid," and "Gaza is all Hamas... Gaza is all Hamas." At one recent funeral, Hamas supporters chanted: "Listen, listen, all the people, all of Gaza is for Hamas, no international forces, only eternal Hamas."
At another funeral they chanted:
"Put sword against sword... we are the men of Mohammad Deif!" (Referring to the slain commander-in-chief of the Al-Qassam Brigades). "O martyr, rest, rest... we will continue the struggle!" "Say Allah and raise your voices... either we liberate it [Palestine], or we die!"
At another procession, participants chanted: "Khaybar, Khaybar, O Jews... October 7 will return," referring to the 628 CE Battle of Khaybar, an oasis near Medina inhabited by Jewish tribes who were besieged and defeated by forces under the Islamic Prophet Mohammed.
The chants matter because they reveal what speeches about peace and reconstruction conceal.
These slogans raise a fundamental question for anyone discussing the future of the Gaza Strip: What exactly has changed? The answer is particularly important because the international framework for the Gaza Strip explicitly calls for something very different.
US President Donald J. Trump's 20-point peace plan states that Gaza is to become a "deradicalized terror-free zone" that poses no threat to its neighbors. The plan calls for the decommissioning of weapons, demilitarization and the establishment of an International Stabilization Force. It also envisages a process intended to change Gazan mindsets and narratives by emphasizing tolerance and peaceful coexistence.
The Board of Peace's July 30, 2026 roadmap, goes even further. It calls for the decommissioning of heavy weapons, military production sites, weapons depots and tunnels, and says that at the end of the process only the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza should hold, store, or control weapons in the Gaza Strip. The roadmap explicitly describes its objectives as a Gaza governed without Hamas control and without "rule by the gun," under the principle of "One Authority, One Weapon, One Law."
On paper, the international plan speaks about deradicalization. On the streets, the funeral chants coming from parts of the Gaza Strip present a dramatically different picture. Hamas supporters are chanting "October 7 will return."
On paper, the objective is peaceful coexistence. Public gatherings are proclaiming that Gaza belongs to Hamas and rejecting international forces.
This does not establish that every Palestinian in the Gaza Strip shares these views. Gaza contains many Palestinians with different experiences, opinions, and political loyalties -- and some perhaps afraid to express them. The continued public expression of these slogans nevertheless demonstrates that Hamas's ideological message remains capable of mobilizing thousands of supporters in the Gaza Strip.
It is significant that there has not been a sustained, broad-based public revolt to displace Hamas as the dominant armed and political force in the Gaza Strip. There have been expressions of anger and opposition to Hamas, including calls for protests, but Hamas has demonstrated an ability to mobilize supporters publicly.
The London-based Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper reported that a planned June 26 mobilization against Hamas failed to attract significant participation, while Hamas continued to display flags and organize funerals for its members.
This is the main problem facing any attempt to transform the Gaza Strip.
Reconstruction can rebuild buildings. It cannot dismantle an ideology. New roads, hospitals, schools, housing projects, and economic opportunities cannot guarantee that the next generation will reject the ideology that produced October 7.
The deployment of international personnel cannot substitute for a fundamental change in the status of terrorist organizations such as Iran-backed Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
Has the ideological and military foundation for another October 7 massacre actually been removed?
On the eve of the October 7 anniversary, the world should pay close attention when people in the Gaza Strip say they want the October 7 massacre to happen again.
It is crucial to remember what senior Hamas official Ghazi Hamad said shortly after the October 7 massacre:
"The Al-Aqsa Flood [what Hamas calls the October 7 massacre] is just the first time, and there will be a second, a third, a fourth, because we have the determination, the resolve, and the capabilities to fight."
Khaled Abu Toameh is an award-winning journalist based in Jerusalem.
Follow Khaled Abu Toameh on X (formerly Twitter)
© 2026 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute.

Le Liban et l’entre-deux-guerres
Dr. Charles Chartouni/Ici Beyrouth/October 01/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/10/158011/
Étrange est le sort de ce pays qui n’arrive pas à fixer des seuils à partir desquels il peut se définir un parcours alternatif qui l’aiderait à effectuer une transition. L’accord de trêve, comme l’accord-cadre, n’ont pu en poser les jalons. Nous avons affaire à des impasses cumulées qui nous instruisent suffisamment sur les problèmes structurels qui font échec aux projets de fin d’hostilité et aux négociations de paix.
Rien ne fonctionne et le pays est renvoyé à ses fragilités, aux turbulences d’une région en état d’ébullition et à l’échec répété des médiations tentées tout au long du parcours conflictuel sinueux. En effet, le Liban est en passe de rater des opportunités renouvelées après de longs marasmes qui ont étouffé toutes tentatives antérieures de sortie des emboîtements conflictuels. Les raisons ne sont plus difficiles à scruter et se déploient au croisement de l’intérieur et de l’extérieur, si tant est que cette notion s’avère compatible avec les dynamiques conflictuelles en cours.
Les conflits au Liban se définissent à l’intersection d’enjeux multiples : ceux de la légitimité nationale, de la souveraineté nominale, des imaginaires disparates et au gré des interventionnismes qu’ils suscitent. Les dynamiques régionales ont à leur actif un passé lourd d’interventionnisme qui nous a valu des guerres répétées tout au long des sept dernières décennies. Les crises récurrentes de gouvernance, quel qu’en soit le degré de gravité, sont occasionnées par l’état d’instabilité endémique et ses effets destructeurs greffés sur des structures étatiques érodées et des pactes de concorde civile mis à rude épreuve. Somme toute, la grammaire des conflits n’a rien d’inédit, cependant elle s’enrichit de nouveaux acteurs et de nouvelles configurations.
L’accord de trêve conclu le 27 novembre 2024 était censé mettre fin à la dynamique de militarisation des conflits. Il y est parvenu après la destruction de l’hiérarchie aussi bien politique que militaire du Hezbollah. Cela concernait l'enrayage de la dynamique putschiste qui l’avait porté au pouvoir et la mise à terme de la stratégie des plateformes opérationnelles intégrées mise en œuvre par le régime islamique en Iran. Il s’agissait bien d’une politique d’annihilation qui avait abouti et qui avait mis fin à trois décennies de maillages politiques et stratégiques. La transition politique devait inévitablement bénéficier du changement de la donne géostratégique, or il n’en est rien.
Le nouvel exécutif qui devait hypothétiquement relayer un état de domination bien étayé, a été délibérément sabordé pour des raisons de complicités renouvelées, de sabotage intentionnel et d’absence de courage civique. Ceci avait permis au Hezbollah de se reconstruire et de passer de nouveau à l’offensive. La guerre du 2 mars 2026 marque le départ d’une nouvelle étape qui a restructuré le champ militaire et stratégique et pavé la voie à des choix géopolitiques alternatifs. Cette configuration dépend fortement des évolutions stratégiques régionales, de l’élimination des hauts cadres de la révolution islamique et de la mise en place d’une guerre d’usure. Elle l'est également par la réactivation des mandataires régionaux et leurs incidences sur un conflit aux ossifications multiples.
La situation au Liban est revenue aux verrouillages d’antan, à la réédition des scénarios des conflits croisés, aux politiques de satellisation et des condominiums impériaux alors que les tissus sociopolitiques se défaisaient au gré des conflits renouvelés. Il serait illusoire d’envisager un épilogue à ce fouillis en dehors de la désintrication de l’écheveau conflictuel. Le Liban est simultanément un pays-otage, un État-lige et une plateforme directement liée aux conflits par procuration conçus et démarrés par la politique de subversion chiite pilotée par le régime iranien. Autrement, la dynamique des conflits en cours et ses effets de surdétermination compliquent la donne intérieure, et la texture des discordes civiles s’enrichit de greffes nouvelles. L’exécutif est mis au défi afin d’opérer des retournements, de mettre fin au chantage du duo chiite et de relancer le pays sur une nouvelle trajectoire.
Le redémarrage des réunions de Rome est devenu impératif pour ne pas perdre l'élan rendu possible par la finalisation de l'accord-cadre. L'exécutif a eu tort de s'extraire des négociations nécessaires pour maintenir l'élan de l'accord-cadre. Le fait de reprendre la rhétorique du Hezbollah et de revenir sur les engagements contractés lors de la signature de l'accord-cadre nous ramène au degré zéro des négociations. Ces dernières ont pourtant débouché sur une feuille de route qui met fin aux extraterritorialités politique et militaire qui ont permis à la politique de subversion chiite de prendre pied.
Le désarmement du Hezbollah n'est en réalité que le revers de la souveraineté rétablie. Il est impossible de reprendre les négociations et de restaurer le partenariat avec l'État d'Israël en l'absence d'une volonté de normalisation. Le diktat idéologique est incompatible avec le principe même de négociation. Cette incompatibilité se manifeste par une version étriquée qui repose sur les prémisses du retrait unilatéral, de la reconduite de la FINUL et du maintien des extraterritorialités, lesquelles ne relèvent en vérité que d'un paralogisme conceptuel et diplomatique. La référence aux résolutions 1701 et 1559, ainsi qu'à la trêve de 1949, ne fait plus sens désormais. Elle n'a aucune valeur opérationnelle, à moins de s'inscrire dans le prolongement d'un accord de paix qui mette fin aux enchaînements conflictuels et à l'animosité idéologique qui les sous-tend. Il s'agit de négocier un accord de paix et non de reporter des conflits en état de latence.

Lebanon and the Interwar Period
Dr. Charles Chartouni/Ici Beyrouth/October 01, 2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/10/158011/
Strange is the fate of this country, which has been unable to establish thresholds from which it can define an alternative path that would help it achieve a transition. Neither the ceasefire agreement nor the framework agreement has been able to lay down such foundations. We are confronted with accumulated deadlocks that sufficiently reveal the structural problems undermining projects aimed at ending hostilities and advancing peace negotiations.
Nothing is functioning, and the country is being driven back to its vulnerabilities, to the turbulence of a region in a state of upheaval, and to the repeated failure of mediation efforts attempted throughout a long and winding conflict-ridden trajectory.
Indeed, Lebanon is on the verge of missing renewed opportunities after prolonged periods of stagnation that have suffocated all previous attempts to break free from overlapping conflicts. The reasons are no longer difficult to discern; they lie at the intersection of internal and external factors, assuming that such a distinction remains compatible with the conflict dynamics currently underway.
Conflicts in Lebanon are defined at the crossroads of multiple issues: national legitimacy, nominal sovereignty, disparate collective imaginaries, and the interventionism they generate. Regional dynamics carry a heavy legacy of interventionism that has brought repeated wars over the past seven decades. Recurrent governance crises, regardless of their degree of severity, stem from endemic instability and its destructive effects upon eroded state structures and civil concord pacts subjected to severe strain. In sum, the grammar of conflict is nothing new, though it is continually enriched by new actors and new configurations.
The ceasefire agreement concluded on November 27, 2024, was intended to put an end to the militarization of conflicts. It succeeded in doing so after the destruction of Hezbollah’s political and military hierarchy. This involved halting the coup-like dynamic that had brought it to power and terminating the strategy of integrated operational platforms implemented by the Islamic regime in Iran. It was indeed a policy of annihilation that succeeded and brought an end to three decades of political and strategic networks. Political transition was inevitably supposed to benefit from the changed geostrategic environment; however, that has not happened.
The new executive authority, which was theoretically expected to succeed a deeply entrenched system of domination, was deliberately sabotaged due to renewed complicity, intentional obstruction, and a lack of civic courage. This enabled Hezbollah to rebuild itself and once again go on the offensive. The war of March 2, 2026, marked the beginning of a new phase that restructured the military and strategic landscape and paved the way for alternative geopolitical choices. This configuration depends heavily on regional strategic developments, the elimination of senior figures of the Islamic Revolution, and the establishment of a war of attrition. It is also influenced by the reactivation of regional proxies and their impact on a conflict marked by multiple layers of entrenchment.
The situation in Lebanon has reverted to the old deadlocks, the repetition of intersecting conflict scenarios, and policies of satellization and imperial condominiums, while sociopolitical fabrics continue to unravel amid renewed conflicts. It would be illusory to expect an end to this disorder without disentangling the web of conflicts. Lebanon is simultaneously a hostage country, a vassal state, and a platform directly linked to proxy wars conceived and launched through the Shiite subversion policy directed by the Iranian regime. Otherwise, the dynamics of the ongoing conflicts and their overdetermining effects further complicate the domestic landscape, while civil discord continues to acquire new dimensions. The executive authority is challenged to reverse these trends, put an end to the blackmail of the Shiite duo, and relaunch the country on a new trajectory.
The resumption of the Rome meetings has become imperative in order not to lose the momentum made possible by the finalization of the framework agreement. The executive made a mistake by withdrawing from the necessary negotiations required to sustain the momentum of the framework agreement. By adopting Hezbollah’s rhetoric and backtracking on the commitments undertaken upon signing the framework agreement, it has brought negotiations back to square one. Yet those negotiations had produced a roadmap aimed at ending the political and military extraterritorialities that enabled the Shiite subversion project to take root.
The disarmament of Hezbollah is, in reality, merely the other side of restored sovereignty. It is impossible to resume negotiations and restore partnership with the State of Israel in the absence of a willingness to normalize relations. Ideological diktat is incompatible with the very principle of negotiation. This incompatibility is reflected in a narrow approach based on the premises of unilateral withdrawal, the renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate, and the maintenance of extraterritorialities, all of which amount in reality to a conceptual and diplomatic fallacy.
Reference to Resolutions 1701 and 1559, as well as to the 1949 Armistice Agreement, no longer carries meaning today. It has no operational value unless it forms part of a peace agreement that ends the chain of conflicts and the ideological hostility underlying them. What is required is the negotiation of a peace agreement, not the postponement of conflicts in a state of latency.

UN Human Rights Council, European Governments Launch Economic Warfare Against Israel
Ben Cohen/FDD-Policy Brief/October 01/2026
International opprobrium towards the presence of Israeli communities in Judea and Samaria, commonly known as the West Bank, is discernibly shifting from rhetorical condemnation to economic and legal warfare.
Three episodes reported during the last week illustrate the trend. On September 26, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) issued an updated version of its database — described by Israel as a “blacklist” — that identifies Israeli and international businesses allegedly “involved in certain activities in illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory.” On September 28 — less than a week after The Netherlands’s ban on the import of goods from these communities went into effect — passengers who arrived at Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport on a flight from Tel Aviv were subjected to “intrusive” searches of their baggage by Dutch customs officers. On September 29, three weeks after the British government announced a ban joined by 11 other western states, passengers disembarking a flight from Tel Aviv to the United Kingdom’s Luton Airport similarly reported extra screening of their baggage by the UK Border Force. In addition, at the beginning of September, Luxembourg’s financial authority confirmed that it would no longer approve the prospectuses required under EU law to enable the sale of Israel government bonds.
These developments demonstrate that the architecture of sanctions and other punitive measures traditionally aimed at the adversaries of western democracies are now being applied to the State of Israel. Moreover, because supply chains connecting Israel with Judea and Samaria are closely intertwined, tracing a product’s origin to one side of the Green Line is practically impossible, meaning that measures ostensibly designed to affect a narrow set of targets, negatively impact the Israeli economy as a whole.
UN Human Rights Council Expands Database ‘Blacklist’
Launched in 2016 under Resolution 31/36 of the UN’s Human Rights Council — which during its existence has passed 116 resolutions condemning Israel, 16 on Iran, and 13 on Russia — the database naming companies allegedly involved in activities connected to Israeli communities in the disputed territories has been significantly expanded, with 214 companies now included compared to 158 in 2025. While the great majority of the companies listed in the database are Israeli, it also includes American and European businesses. Six U.S. companies — Airbnb Inc., Booking Holdings Inc., Expedia Group Inc., Motorola Solutions Inc., RE/MAX Holdings Inc., and TripAdvisor Inc. — have been present since 2020. Two more were added this month: the nonprofits Friends of Ir David and HaYovel.
European Measures Now Given Legal Teeth
The OHCHR database is designed to galvanize both governments and private businesses, but it does not have the force of law underpinning it. This is not the case with the three European countries, two of whom are EU members. In the Dutch case, the importation of goods from Judea and Samaria as well as the Golan Heights can result in custodial sentences of up to six years and fines of up to 1.1 million euros. Similarly draconian penalties could be imposed in the United Kingdom once it completes the implementation of its ban over the next six to nine months.
In the case of Luxembourg, while no legal penalties are envisaged, preventing the sale of Israel bonds sends the unmistakable signal that the EU is ready to take measures punishing Israel on both sides of the Green Line. This may well encourage EU states hostile to Israel, such as Ireland and Spain, to push for the suspension or revocation of the EU-Israel Association Agreement in force since 2000.
The U.S. Must Protect American Companies Trading With Israel
The United States should act immediately to stymie economic warfare against Israel, particularly as it negatively impacts American companies, which conduct over $54 billion worth of trade with the Jewish state annually.
The Trump administration should tie the payment of $4 billion of arrears to the United Nations to a verifiable end to the OHCHR’s campaign of pressure against Israel. It should also seek to protect U.S. entities from exposure to the campaign, if necessary through reciprocal measures against participating UN entities and foreign governments.
*Ben Cohen is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from the author and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow Ben on X @BenCohenOpinion. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

UN Human Rights Council, European Governments Launch Economic Warfare Against Israel
Ben Cohen/FDD-Policy Brief/October 01/2026
International opprobrium towards the presence of Israeli communities in Judea and Samaria, commonly known as the West Bank, is discernibly shifting from rhetorical condemnation to economic and legal warfare.
Three episodes reported during the last week illustrate the trend. On September 26, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) issued an updated version of its database — described by Israel as a “blacklist” — that identifies Israeli and international businesses allegedly “involved in certain activities in illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory.” On September 28 — less than a week after The Netherlands’s ban on the import of goods from these communities went into effect — passengers who arrived at Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport on a flight from Tel Aviv were subjected to “intrusive” searches of their baggage by Dutch customs officers. On September 29, three weeks after the British government announced a ban joined by 11 other western states, passengers disembarking a flight from Tel Aviv to the United Kingdom’s Luton Airport similarly reported extra screening of their baggage by the UK Border Force.
In addition, at the beginning of September, Luxembourg’s financial authority confirmed that it would no longer approve the prospectuses required under EU law to enable the sale of Israel government bonds.
These developments demonstrate that the architecture of sanctions and other punitive measures traditionally aimed at the adversaries of western democracies are now being applied to the State of Israel. Moreover, because supply chains connecting Israel with Judea and Samaria are closely intertwined, tracing a product’s origin to one side of the Green Line is practically impossible, meaning that measures ostensibly designed to affect a narrow set of targets, negatively impact the Israeli economy as a whole.
UN Human Rights Council Expands Database ‘Blacklist’
Launched in 2016 under Resolution 31/36 of the UN’s Human Rights Council — which during its existence has passed 116 resolutions condemning Israel, 16 on Iran, and 13 on Russia — the database naming companies allegedly involved in activities connected to Israeli communities in the disputed territories has been significantly expanded, with 214 companies now included compared to 158 in 2025.
While the great majority of the companies listed in the database are Israeli, it also includes American and European businesses. Six U.S. companies — Airbnb Inc., Booking Holdings Inc., Expedia Group Inc., Motorola Solutions Inc., RE/MAX Holdings Inc., and TripAdvisor Inc. — have been present since 2020. Two more were added this month: the nonprofits Friends of Ir David and HaYovel.
European Measures Now Given Legal Teeth
The OHCHR database is designed to galvanize both governments and private businesses, but it does not have the force of law underpinning it. This is not the case with the three European countries, two of whom are EU members. In the Dutch case, the importation of goods from Judea and Samaria as well as the Golan Heights can result in custodial sentences of up to six years and fines of up to 1.1 million euros. Similarly draconian penalties could be imposed in the United Kingdom once it completes the implementation of its ban over the next six to nine months. In the case of Luxembourg, while no legal penalties are envisaged, preventing the sale of Israel bonds sends the unmistakable signal that the EU is ready to take measures punishing Israel on both sides of the Green Line. This may well encourage EU states hostile to Israel, such as Ireland and Spain, to push for the suspension or revocation of the EU-Israel Association Agreement in force since 2000.
The U.S. Must Protect American Companies Trading With Israel
The United States should act immediately to stymie economic warfare against Israel, particularly as it negatively impacts American companies, which conduct over $54 billion worth of trade with the Jewish state annually.
The Trump administration should tie the payment of $4 billion of arrears to the United Nations to a verifiable end to the OHCHR’s campaign of pressure against Israel. It should also seek to protect U.S. entities from exposure to the campaign, if necessary through reciprocal measures against participating UN entities and foreign governments.
*Ben Cohen is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from the author and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow Ben on X @BenCohenOpinion. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

Anti-Taliban resistance claims attacks across Afghanistan in September
Will Selber/ FDD's Long War Journal
As the Taliban enters its sixth year in power, a resistance against its rule remains active despite lacking a sanctuary or an official state sponsor. Throughout September, eight anti-Taliban resistance groups claimed to have conducted 37 targeted operations, consisting mostly of ambushes or assassinations.
The attacks took place in the southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, and Zabul; the eastern province of Nangarhar; the southeastern province of Ghazni; the northern provinces of Baghlan, Badakhshan, and Sar-e Pol; the western province of Badghis; and the central provinces of Kabul, Panjshir, Kapisa, and Ghor. Sustained engagements with Taliban forces were also reported in the northeastern province of Badakhshan and the eastern province of Nuristan.
Over the past month, Ahmad Massoud’s National Resistance Front (NRF) claimed two attacks in mid-September, both in the northeastern province of Badakhshan, which has been the focus of much of the anti-Taliban activity over the past few months. The NRF claimed that the attacks left 10 Taliban members killed or wounded.
The Andarab Resistance Front, an NRF affiliate that operates in the Andarab valley of Baghlan province, claimed to have conducted a joint attack with the newly formed New Horizon Organization on September 5 in Andarab, reportedly killing three Taliban members and wounding three others.
The NRF’s September kinetic operations were comparatively light compared to previous months, a drop likely attributable in part to the death of senior NRF commander Hasib Panjshiri, whom the Taliban killed on August 19 in northern Salang, an area of Parwan province north of Kabul. On September 4, the NRF announced that Commander Mukhtar Shoresh, one of Panjshiri’s closest comrades, would replace him.
Relatedly, on September 25, the NRF announced that former Afghan parliamentarian Saleh Mohammad Registani had been appointed its general operational commander. On the same day, the NRF posted a video purportedly showing Registani in Afghanistan, announcing his return to fight the Taliban.
The Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), led by former Afghan National Army Chief of General Staff Yasin Zia, claimed to have launched seven targeted operations in Kapisa province near Kabul, the eastern province of Kunar, the northern provinces of Badakhshan and Sar-e Pol, and the Afghan capital of Kabul, killing 15 Taliban members and wounding 13.
In early September, the AFF claimed to have repelled a Taliban assault on its fixed positions in the Zibak district of Badakhshan province. The AFF claimed to have repelled Taliban assaults on its positions in Zibak since late July.
On September 26, the AFF claimed to have repelled a Taliban assault on its outposts in the northeastern province of Nuristan. The next day, the group said it had liberated villages in the Kamdesh district of Nuristan and the Nari district of Kunar from the Taliban, allegedly killing 37 Taliban personnel and wounding 24 others. The AFF disputed Taliban videos circulating on X claiming to show AFF fighters surrendering to the Taliban. Additional footage posted on X purports to show AFF fighters standing alongside captured outposts in Kamdesh, Nuristan.
The Afghan United Front (AUF), led by former Afghan National Army 215th Corps Commander Lieutenant General Sami Sadat, claimed to have conducted 21 attacks across Afghanistan in September, allegedly killing 21 Taliban members and wounding at least nine. Of the 21 attacks, six took place in Kandahar and three in Helmand, both in southern Afghanistan, underscoring Sadat’s intention to challenge the Taliban in its stronghold.
Nearly all of the AUF’s operations were either ambushes or assassinations targeting lone Taliban members. A handful targeted Taliban outposts or checkpoints. Notably, on September 28, the AUF claimed responsibility for an attack on the Taliban governor’s office in Ghor province in central Afghanistan. According to Afghan press reports, the Taliban detained at least 10 people for involvement in the attack.
Other smaller anti-Taliban resistance groups also conducted attacks throughout September. In mid-September, the Afghan Green Trend, led by Amrullah Saleh, former first vice president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, claimed to have killed three Taliban members in Badakhshan province and destroyed two Taliban vehicles in a separate attack in Panjshir province north of Kabul.
On September 28, the National Mobilization Front (NMF) claimed to have killed two Taliban members in Baghlan province in northern Afghanistan. On September 29, the NMF also claimed responsibility for the attack on the Ghor provincial headquarters. It is unknown whether the NMF or AUF conducted the attack, though the AUF has shown the capacity to attack Taliban headquarters during its two months on the battlefield.The Afghan Liberation Movement, a smaller group focused primarily on southern Afghanistan, claimed that a sniper attack on September 11 in Helmand province killed two Taliban members.
The Afghanistan Republican Front (ARF), a new anti-Taliban resistance group that reported its first attack in early August, claimed a grenade attack on a Taliban checkpoint in Kabul’s 13th district on September 4. The ARF also announced an attack on the Ghor provincial center on September 12. Tahir Zamir, a former governor of Bamyan province in central Afghanistan, leads the ARF. In May 2023, Zamir surrendered to the Taliban before taking up arms again.Qayyum Malang’s Homeland Soldiers Front did not claim any attacks in September. Afghan media reported that the Taliban sent a senior delegation to Badakhshan to persuade Malang to end his armed struggle. However, Malang reportedly rebuffed the offer. The Homeland Soldiers Front briefly captured the Yaftali Sufla district center in Badakhshan province on July 17, marking the first time the Taliban had lost control of a district center since regaining power in August 2021.Although the anti-Taliban resistance is not currently an existential threat to Taliban rule and is unlikely to emerge as one in the near to medium term, it continues to conduct attacks across Afghanistan. The United Nations reported that security incidents in the country from May 1 to July 31 increased by 11% compared with the same period in 2025. However, that figure includes attacks by resistance groups and by terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State.
**Will Selber is a retired US CENTCOM foreign area officer with over 4 years in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is the owner of Grumpy Combat Veteran on Substack.

US forces complete departure from Iraq as anti-Islamic State mission in Iraq ends
Seth J. Frantzman/FDD's Long War Journal/October 01/2026
US forces deployed as part of Operation Inherent Resolve, the anti-Islamic State mission, completed their departure from Iraq on September 30. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaidi held a ceremony to mark the occasion and called it “Sovereignty Day” for Iraq. The US withdrawal was expected and in process throughout the last year. Iranian-backed militias in Iraq released several statements indicating that they felt emboldened by the development.
Admiral Brad Cooper, commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM), praised the tens of thousands of Americans who had supported the war on the Islamic State in Iraq. “As we step back and hand full primary responsibility for Iraq’s security to the Government of Iraq and the brave people of Iraq, U.S. and Coalition forces stationed across the region will remain ready to respond to any ISIS [Islamic State] threats that arise,” he added.
CENTCOM noted that US forces had begun departing Iraq last October. The statement also said that most of the forces had been based in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Region, over the last year. US forces had largely shifted to Erbil after Iranian-backed attacks in Iraq in 2019–2020.
The US also handed over facilities in Baghdad. The Diplomatic Support Center at Baghdad International Airport was transferred to Iraqi officials in the wake of a deal signed on September 25. The facility had been targeted by Iranian-backed militias numerous times in 2026 and in past years. In May, a State Department official said these groups had attacked US facilities in the country 600 times since US and Israeli strikes on Iran began in February.
Iraq’s prime minister and other officials marked the occasion of the US leaving Iraq, presenting it as Iraq regaining its sovereignty. “The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces announced, in a speech delivered on this occasion, the official conclusion of the International Coalition’s mission to combat ISIS, affirming that Iraq is today reaping the fruits of immense sacrifices and heroic efforts that extended over years, until our security apparatus, in all its branches, established its control over the security and field landscape across all of Iraq,” Zaidi’s office said. Iraq held events to celebrate the US leaving, none of which appear to have included any US officials or a public handover ceremony.
US forces had arrived in Iraq in 2014, at the invitation of the Iraqi government, to help Baghdad fight a resurgent Islamic State. “After September 30, not a single foreign soldier will remain anywhere in Iraq,” Sabah al Numan, spokesperson for the commander in chief of Iraq’s armed forces, said. This includes the Kurdistan Region.
Across Iraq, reactions to the US withdrawal have varied. In the Kurdistan Region, there is concern about what comes next. Rudaw Media Network in Erbil noted that Iraq now faces an air-defense challenge, which is particularly significant after more than 1,000 Iranian missile and drone attacks on the Kurdistan Region since February. Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Masrour Barzani thanked the US and Coalition forces for their role and noted that the region stood ready to confront future threats.
Iranian-backed militias see the US withdrawal as a turning point. “Asaib Ahl al-Haq [a US-designated terrorist group] described the completion of the US forces’ withdrawal as a historic milestone,” Shafaq News noted. Kataib Hezbollah, also a US-designated terrorist group, threatened to shoot down “hostile” aircraft in the wake of the withdrawal.
Four Iranian-backed militias reiterated their demand for various conditions to be met before they disarm as part of a government initiative. The militias include Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Harakat al Nujaba, and Ansar Allah al Awfiya. Among their demands is for the Kurdistan Region’s Peshmerga military to be dissolved. This has raised concerns in Erbil about future pressure on the Peshmerga.
Iraq’s Council of Ministers also voted on a new draft law for the Popular Mobilization Forces, a state-sanctioned security force comprising dozens of militias, including many Iran-backed Shiite groups, on September 29, referring the bill to the parliament in Baghdad. The draft law has faced some US opposition, and it is unclear if the timing of the referral was linked to the coalition withdrawal.
The US withdrawal could also lead to a new type of partnership with Iraq. “Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi’s special security adviser Qasim Al-Araji said on Wednesday that the end of the US-led Coalition’s mission and troop presence in Iraq does not end security ties, but shifts them toward bilateral intelligence and security cooperation,” Shafaq noted on September 30. “Parliament Speaker Haibat al Halbousi said on Wednesday that the conclusion of the Global Coalition’s mission did not mean the end of cooperation relations,” Iraq’s state Iraqi News Agency reported.
Reporting from Israel, Seth J. Frantzman is an adjunct fellow at FDD and a contributor to FDD’s Long War Journal. He is the senior Middle East correspondent and analyst at The Jerusalem Post, and author of The October 7 War: Israel’s Battle for Security in Gaza (2024).

Selected Face Book & X tweets on October 01/2026
mika
On a day like this, it's important to remember Daniel Levin, may his memory be a blessing. An American Jewish successful entrepreneur, who immigrated to Israel to enlist and fought in the Sayeret Matkal unit. Daniel was on the first plane that crashed into the Twins, he knew Arabic and understood what was happening. With superhuman bravery, with his bare hands he fought the hijackers, until he was stabbed to death. Daniel was the first victim in the Twin Towers disaster.

Nadim Koteich
Two incidents this week are being read as possible Iranian fingerprints. On the FlyDubai flight to Tel Aviv, President Trump said what he is hearing points to an Iran link, though that is still being checked. In Britain, five men arrested near RAF Fairford, a base used by US bombers, were bailed, then a dual UK–Iranian national was detained on suspicion of preparing terrorist acts. Prime Minister Andy Burnham cited “strong indications” of Iranian involvement; Tehran denies it. Nothing is proven yet, but if the links hold, they would suggest Tehran is probing Western and Israeli targets through proxies and dual nationals, testing air routes and a bomber base rather than striking openly. This is closer to a campaign than anything else.

Shiri_Sabra
Bilal Mahmoud Suleiman Samiri, a terrorist in Islamic Jihad's Rocket Array, was eliminated by an Israeli airstrike on Khan Yunis yesterday (Wednesday). -Eretz Yisrael

Sidhant Sibal
Captain Smit Machchhar is recovering well, it has been a relief for us; says Indian ambassador to UAE Deepak Mittal after meeting him a UAE hospital; Thanks UAE authorities for support.
"He is being given best medical care"

Nadine Barakat
That Israeli plumber saved lives, he took a huge risk! His will & good intentions gave him power & strength .. History will remember him as THE HERO! “Abou Astal” Joseph Aoun has all the power & support, with ZERO intentions to save his country and ZERO vision.. it’s as simple as getting on a flight to Tel Aviv and shake hands! He would be saving a COUNTRY NOT just 180 passengers ! Unfortunately, some are human, others are dumb …and hungry..
#shameful