English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For  May 20/2026
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news

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Bible Quotations For today
Whoever serves me must follow me, and where I am, there will my servant be also
Saint John 12/26-30:”Whoever serves me must follow me, and where I am, there will my servant be also. Whoever serves me, the Father will honour. ‘Now my soul is troubled. And what should I say “Father, save me from this hour”? No, it is for this reason that I have come to this hour. Father, glorify your name.’ Then a voice came from heaven, ‘I have glorified it, and I will glorify it again.’The crowd standing there heard it and said that it was thunder. Others said, ‘An angel has spoken to him.’Jesus answered, ‘This voice has come for your sake, not for mine.”

Titles For Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on 19-20 May/2026
The May 17, 1983, agreement between Lebanon and Israel was a fair opportunity for peace that Lebanon lost/With the Agreement/Elias Bejjani/May 17/2026
Updated on SOUL Press Statement — NYC Parks to Revisit and Revise Al Qalam Monument Text/Pierre A. Maroun//Face book/May 18, 2026
Lebanon warns continued Israeli escalation jeopardizes negotiations
Israeli security meeting weighs Hezbollah tactics as cross-border tensions escalate: The details
Hezbollah will fight any future US-Israeli 'collaborator army', Fadlallah says
War in south Lebanon and truce in Washington
Israeli strikes on southern Lebanon kill 19, including children and women, officials say
Israel launches strikes across Lebanon, warns dozen towns to evacuate
Israeli strikes have killed more than 3,000 in Lebanon since March
Israeli army says soldier killed in combat in southern Lebanon, toll rises to 21
Raad warns state's conduct in negotiations will lead country to 'disasters'
Salam says there's increased US involvement in ceasefire efforts
Sky Lounges Services wins bid to operate and invest in René Mouawad Airport – Qlayaat
Veterinary Syndicate chief calls for release of activist Ghina Nahfawi: Protecting animals from abuse is a moral and legal duty
Animal rights activist Ghina Nahfawi detained over video documenting alleged animal abuse

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on 19-20 May/2026
Report: Trump held meeting on Iran war plans after pausing attack
Trump's tough-talk foreign policy hits wall with Iran
US derailed Iran’s strategy that was 47 years in the making, CENTCOM chief says
Vance says Iran talks making 'good progress'
US State Department: Rubio discussed Strait of Hormuz file with Guterres
Iran army warns will 'open new fronts' against US if attacks resume
Top NATO commander says ‘thinking’ about NATO role in Strait of Hormuz
Car bomb in Damascus kills soldier
Qatar says US-Iran negotiations need 'more time'
Global energy balance highlights gap between production and reserves, reshaping geopolitical competition
UAE's image as Middle Eastern haven is tested by Iran war
US seizes oil tanker linked to Iran in Indian Ocean
US resident released from Iranian prison, returns home: Rights group
Global energy balance highlights gap between production and reserves, reshaping geopolitical competition
US not in a hurry to extend China trade truce, Bessent says
Russian soldiers, who were involved in the country's military campaign in Ukraine, march in columns during a military parade on Victory Day, in Red Square in central Moscow,
Nigeria says joint US strikes kill 175 ISIS militants, senior leaders
US sanctions several over Gaza aid flotillas, alleged Hamas support

Titles For The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on 19-20 May/2026
The Plan to Eliminate Israel/Khaled Abu Toameh/ Gatestone Institute/May 19, 2026
Saudi Arabia: The Fruits of the Vision in Times of Chaos/Yousef Al-Dayni/Asharq Al Awsat/May 19/2026
Netanyahu pushes for US military aid drawdownHome » Military and Political Power/Bradley Bowman and Justin Leopold-Cohen/FDD's Long War Journal/May 19/2026
Turkey’s Missile Ambitions Should Alarm Europe and the United States/Sinan Ciddi/Real Clear Defense/May 19/2026
Iran Refuses Defeat While the US Hesitates/Sam Menassa/Asharq Al Awsat/May 19/2026
China and Today’s World/Dr. Nassif Hitti/Asharq Al Awsat/May 19/2026
The Strangers in the Streets: Hezbollah, the War That Made It, and the Stages of Its Unraveling/By: Makram Rabah/Hover Institution/May 19/2026
Peace, War, and the Lost Certainty/Amr el-Shobaki/Asharq Al Awsat/May 19/2026

Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on 19-20 May/2026
The May 17, 1983, agreement between Lebanon and Israel was a fair opportunity for peace that Lebanon lost/With the Agreement
Elias Bejjani/May 17/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/05/118293/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHNz-oADuiw&t=1s
Today, we recall the May 17 Agreement, signed between the Lebanese Republic and the State of Israel on May 17, 1983, after months of difficult negotiations in Naqoura under American sponsorship. The Lebanese negotiating delegation, with remarkable national skill and professionalism, succeeded in asserting all elements of Lebanese sovereignty and rights, and in securing a full, peaceful, and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Lebanese territories.
The agreement was approved by Parliament by a majority (65 votes) on June 14, 1983, and was cancelled on March 5, 1984, after President Amin Gemayel refused to sign it out of fear of Assad and as a result of his lack of vision for the future. His action was the greatest sin committed against Lebanon.
At the time, the agreement received widespread support from the Presidency, the Parliament, and the Cabinet, and was welcomed by the majority of the Lebanese people. It was also endorsed by most Arab countries and all nations of the free world, who saw it as a bold and realistic step on the path to peace. In truth, it represented a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to lift Lebanon out of the cycle of war, occupation, and proxy conflicts, and to put it on the track of peace and stability—just as Egypt had done in 1979, and Jordan would later do in 1994.
However, the Syrian Baathist regime, which had effectively occupied Lebanon since 1976, rushed to sabotage the agreement by force through its local proxies—mercenaries, fake “resistance” profiteers, extremist Islamists, and leftist chameleons who wore a thousand disguises but had no loyalty to Lebanon’s identity, history, or sovereignty. These groups served hostile regional agendas and were merely tools of Syrian influence. The Syrian regime and its agents resorted to assassinations, terrorism, and defamation campaigns to silence those who supported the agreement and to block its implementation.
The May 17 Agreement was a golden key to restoring sovereignty and ending the crime of “Lebanon the battlefield.” It could have brought an end to the destructive myths of “resistance” and “defiance,” which produced nothing but ruin, collapse, poverty, isolation, and chaos for Lebanon. Instead of embracing the opportunity, Lebanon surrendered to the will of the Syrian regime and its apparatuses, forfeiting a rare and invaluable chance for peace, development, and prosperity.
Ironically, President Amine Gemayel—under pressure from his father, Sheikh Pierre Gemayel, certain Kataeb leaders, and Arab states that feared early normalization with Israel—ultimately decided to suspend, and later cancel, the agreement. This was despite the fact that international powers did not pressure him to reverse course, as he himself confirmed in his memoirs. Sheikh Pierre Gemayel was known to repeat his famous phrase: “We don’t want to close 21 doors (Arab countries) just to open one (Israel),” reflecting the fear of Arab isolation—a fear that heavily influenced the cancellation decision.
But today, after Israel has dismantled Iran’s military arm in Lebanon—namely the terrorist group Hezbollah—eliminated its commanders, and forced it to sign a humiliating ceasefire… After the fall of the Assad regime… After the empty slogans of “resistance and defiance” were exposed as tools of destruction, takfir, and displacement… After Iran’s agents were expelled from several Arab countries… The time is ripe for Lebanon to reassess its strategic choices with a realistic and patriotic mindset.
Lebanon must sign a full peace agreement with the State of Israel—an agreement that ends the chronic state of war and grants the Lebanese people their rightful chance to live in peace and dignity, just as Egypt, Jordan, and most Arab nations have already done.
Enough hypocrisy. Enough trading in innocent blood. Enough gambling with Lebanon’s future in the name of a false and imaginary resistance that has brought nothing but devastation. Enough hollow slogans that have proven to be mere delusions, hallucinations, and fantasies.
The time has come for Lebanon to break free from the rule of the mini-state, from Iranian occupation, and to build a future that reflects the hopes and aspirations of its people.

Updated on SOUL Press Statement — NYC Parks to Revisit and Revise Al Qalam Monument Text
Pierre A. Maroun//Face book/May 18, 2026
NYC Parks Confirms It Will Revisit and Revise Al Qalam Monument Text; Lebanese Consulate Acknowledges SOUL Inquiry
NEW YORK — SOUL for Lebanon announced today that NYC Parks has confirmed it will revisit and revise the historical text displayed at the “Al Qalam: Poets in the Park” monument, following SOUL’s request for clarification and correction.
In an official written response to SOUL, Jonathan Kuhn, Director of Art & Antiquities at NYC Parks, stated: “We will revisit the historical sign text associated with this art project, and revise it for greater accuracy and clarity,” noting that any revision would remain within NYC Parks’ “style, content and word count graphic template.”The Consulate General of Lebanon in New York has also acknowledged receipt of SOUL’s communication. The Consul General has been briefed, and a follow-up response is expected.
“We welcome this prompt and constructive response from NYC Parks,” said Pierre A. Maroun, President of SOUL for Lebanon. “Ensuring accurate representation of the poets and the cultural history behind this monument is essential, and we appreciate NYC Parks’ willingness to revisit the text for greater accuracy and clarity.”SOUL for Lebanon will continue coordinating with relevant authorities as the review process moves forward.
Pierre A. Maroun
President
Shields of United Lebanon, Inc. (SOUL)
soulforlebanon@gmail.com
SOUL for Lebanon

Lebanon warns continued Israeli escalation jeopardizes negotiations
Naharnet/May 19/2026
The continued Israeli escalation in southern Lebanon will jeopardize the negotiations with Israel, a Lebanese official warned on Tuesday. "The continued violations will either lead to us not participating in the negotiations or to our participation with the sole condition of a ceasefire," the official told Al-Jazeera. "We have informed Washington that a ceasefire is key to everything, and this situation cannot continue," the official added, noting that "Washington is determined to achieve a breakthrough in the Lebanese track, but (Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin) Netanyahu does not want a ceasefire."
"The U.S. sponsor of the negotiations must assume its responsibilities and impose a decisive and comprehensive ceasefire," the Lebanese official urged. "We have informed Washington that Israel cannot eradicate the weapons by destroying Lebanon," the official added. Confirming that "a draft declaration of intent with Israel, sponsored by the U.S., is being studied," the official said the Lebanese Army will not create a unit dedicated to disarming Hezbollah. "We want to form a joint Lebanese-American committee to monitor the army's implementation of its commitments," the official said. "We want to activate the work of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to monitor Israeli violations," the official added. "Our goals with Hezbollah are the same, which is to reach a ceasefire, but our approach is different," the official said.Lebanese sources meanwhile told Al-Arabiya that "the efforts to consolidate the ceasefire witnessed a decline over the past hours."

Israeli security meeting weighs Hezbollah tactics as cross-border tensions escalate: The details
LBCI/May 19/2026
Israeli security officials are debating whether the current confrontation with Hezbollah amounts to guerrilla warfare or a broader struggle for survival, according to discussions reported during a recent security meeting reviewing developments along the Lebanon border. The meeting came amid escalating cross-border clashes and rising tensions on both sides, with reports that at least one million residents in northern Israel have returned to shelters. Israeli military and intelligence officials say Hezbollah has shifted its operational pattern toward what they describe as a war of attrition, using small, mobile cells operating across villages in southern Lebanon and relying on opportunistic strikes rather than organized large-scale operations. Other Israeli officials described Hezbollah’s activity as guerrilla warfare, saying it presents a sustained challenge to the Israeli military.
According to Israel’s Northern Command, Hezbollah has also adjusted its strike methods, moving away from large rocket barrages toward the use of explosive drones and limited, low-intensity rocket fire in isolated attacks. These, officials said, have targeted areas stretching from western Galilee to the Finger of the Galilee and the Golan Heights.
Israeli officials said the objective of this approach is to preserve Hezbollah’s weapons stockpiles and operational capabilities while maintaining a prolonged pattern of pressure on Israel’s home front. In parallel, the Northern Command has sought to counter domestic pressure from residents calling for intensified military operations, by publishing assessments claiming that approximately 60% of Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon has been destroyed. An Israeli military officer said operations in Lebanon are divided into two main zones. The first extends to what Israel calls the “Yellow Line,” where forces focus on destroying Hezbollah infrastructure and clearing militants from the area, according to Israeli terminology. The second zone lies north of that line, where targeted operations and assassinations are carried out, the officer added.

Hezbollah will fight any future US-Israeli 'collaborator army', Fadlallah says
Naharnet/May 19/2026
Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah warned Tuesday that his group would fight any army unit formed by the U.S. and Israel to counter the resistance.
"If Israel and the U.S. manage to form a collaborator army to fight the Resistance, we will fight it just like we fight Israel," Fadlallah said in a press conference, as he warned against free "gifts" to the U.S. "We will confront any American-Zionist attempt to produce a new Antoine Lahad under any guise or name, just like we confront the occupation and its collaborators. We will not allow any internal or external considerations to stop us. Our people, who are making sacrifices at this level, will not accept any enemy infiltration into our country."Fadlallah stressed that Hezbollah's relationship with the army is "excellent", and that the army is dedicated to protecting the country and will refuse to be a tool for the enemy. However, Hezbollah would confront a "collaborator armed force similar to the Free Lebanon Army in 1978 and the South Lebanon Army in 1984."
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio had announced that Washington is developing a plan to pursue Hezbollah’s disarmament by building up trusted units within the Lebanese Armed Forces. "We’re working towards establishing… a system that actually works where vetted units within the Lebanese Armed Forces have the training, the equipment, and the capability to go after elements of Hezbollah and dismantle them, so Israel doesn’t have to do it," Rubio said in an April 27 interview with Fox News.
Delegations from the Lebanese and Israeli militaries will meet in Washington on May 29. Negotiations will later be held between Lebanon and Israel on June 2 and 3, after three rounds of direct talks. Fadlalalh said Hezbollah has tasked him with communicating with President Joseph Aoun, as he criticized Aoun's choice to engage in direct talks with Israel. "The president's choice has proven to be ineffective, and we call for it to be reconsidered."The Hezbollah lawmaker argued that the majority of the Lebanese people, across all sects and not only the Shiites, refuse to recognize Israel and are against "so-called peace" and normalization. "Those promoting it are a minority whose high-pitched media voice is paid for," he said. Fadlallah warned that any agreements or security arrangements that the authorities agree upon with Israel at the expense of the nation's sovereignty "will have no effect on the ground," adding that betting on the U.S. administration has proven to be a "failure". He contended that the Resistance does not need "national consensus" as long as the occupation exists, re-iterating that Iran has suspended negotiations with the U.S. for the sake of Lebanon. Fadlallah argued that Hezbollah is not fighting for Iran, but in self-defense for Lebanon after a 15-month window for diplomacy to work failed. Hezbollah entered the war after the U.S.-Israeli killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei but also after 15-monthes of Israeli violations to a ceasefire reached in November 2024.
Hezbollah largely adhered to the November 2024 ceasefire, but Israel persistently violated the truce by launching thousands of airstrikes and maintaining a military occupation over "strategic hills" inside south Lebanon.

War in south Lebanon and truce in Washington
Associated Press/May 19/2026
At least six people were killed Tuesday and 3 others wounded in strikes on south Lebanon. A strike on a home in Kfarsir killed four people and wounded two, while a separate strike targeting a car in Harouf killed one person and wounded another.In the southern town of Froun, a strike on a motorbike killed one person. In a border area on the outskirts of Rashaya al-Fakhar, an Israeli force kidnapped three farmers and confiscated their mobile phones. Israeli artillery meanwhile shelled Beit Yahoun and Debbine, while white phosphorus shells hit al-Mansouri. Israeli strikes also targeted overnight into Tuesday Shehabiyeh, al-Rihan, Kafra, Kfardounin, Kfardjal, Qalaway, al-Maashouq, Zawtar, Debbine, al-Majadel, Majdal selem, Hanaway, Kfar Remman, Kfarsir and al-Mansouri. The Israeli army later warned the residents of the southern and eastern towns of Nabatieh Tahta, Toura, Habboush, Bazourieh, Tayrdeba, Kfarhouna, Ain Qana, Lebbeya, Jebshit, Shehabiyeh, Burj Shmali, and Houmin al-Fawqa to evacuate ahead of imminent strikes. "Hezbollah's continued violations of the ceasefire compel the IDF to operate against it. The IDF does not intend to harm you. For your safety, we urge you to distance yourself from the area and immediately move at least 1,000 meters away," the military's Arabic-language spokesman Avichay Adraee posted on X. A strike on Maarakeh wounded at least five people, The death toll in Lebanon surpassed Monday 3,000, including 292 women and 211 children. More than a million people have been displaced in Lebanon by the fighting, with some sheltering in tents along roads and the sea in Beirut. Israel, meanwhile, has struggled to halt frequent Hezbollah drone attacks targeting both their troops on Lebanese soil and in northern Israeli border towns. Hezbollah on Monday claimed attacks on Israeli troops, equipment, and drones and warplanes over south Lebanon. On Tuesday, the group targeted Israeli troops and equipment in the southern border towns of Debel and Taybeh with attack drones. It also launched attack drones on troops and military bases in Arab al-Aramsha and Ras el-Naqoura in north Israel. Israeli strikes on Lebanon have continued daily, even after groundbreaking ongoing talks between Lebanon and Israel in Washington produced a ceasefire that began on April 17 and has been extended into June. Israeli troops remain in large swaths of southern Lebanon. The ceasefire has been largely nominal so far, especially in south Lebanon, where strikes and clashes continue unabated, as if there were no truce.
Negotiations press on despite fighting -
Israeli officials have focused on disarming Hezbollah and described the negotiations with Lebanon as a precursor to a potential normalization of diplomatic relations. Lebanese officials have said they seek a security agreement or armistice that would stop short of normalization, focusing on Israeli troop withdrawal from Lebanon, while maintaining their commitment to disarming the Iran-backed group. Despite the ongoing attacks, the two sides agreed Friday to extend the ceasefire by 45 days and announced that military delegations will take part in direct talks of their own on May 29. U.S. President Donald Trump has publicly called for a meeting between Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. However, Aoun has declined to go to Washington to meet or speak directly with Netanyahu at this stage — a move that would likely generate blowback in Lebanon, where talks with Israel were met with protests.

Israeli strikes on southern Lebanon kill 19, including children and women, officials say
AP/May 20, 2026
BEIRUT: Israeli airstrikes on southern Lebanon on Tuesday killed at least 19 people, including four women and three children, Lebanon’s Health Ministry said, the latest in near-daily attacks from both sides that have not stopped despite the fragile, US-brokered ceasefire in the Israel-Hezbollah war.
Israel did not comment on the reports of casualties in Lebanon. The Israel-Hezbollah latest fighting began on March 2 with the Lebanese militant Hezbollah group firing rockets at Israel, two days after the United States and Israel attacked Iran. In Beirut, the government said a single strike on the village of Deir Qanoun al Nahr in the coastal Tyre province killed 10 people, including three children and three women. Three were wounded, including a child. The ministry provided no further details about the strike but state-run National News Agency said it destroyed a house, leaving several people under the rubble. Their bodies were pulled out later in the day. According to the ministry, another airstrike — this one on the southern city of Nabatieh — killed four people and wounded 10 others, including two women. A third strike in the nearby village of Kfar Sir killed five people, including one woman.
The latest deaths came a day after the death toll in the latest round of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah surpassed 3,000, and two days after the US-brokered truce that has been in place since April 17, was extended for 45 days. Israel has since invaded southern Lebanon and bombarded its capital, Beirut, and other areas, saying it is targeting Hezbollah infrastructure. Hezbollah, both a militant group and a powerful political organization in Lebanon, has resisted pressure to disarm, including by the Lebanese government. More than a million people have been displaced in Lebanon by the fighting, with some sheltering in tents along roads and the Mediterranean Sea in Beirut.Israel, meanwhile, has struggled to halt frequent Hezbollah drone attacks targeting its troops on Lebanese soil and northern Israeli border towns. Israel’s military said one of its soldiers was killed on Tuesday in battle in southern Lebanon, raising the Israeli troops’ death toll to 21 since the latest conflict started.

Israel launches strikes across Lebanon, warns dozen towns to evacuate
AFP/19 May ,2026
readThe Israeli military on Tuesday launched a series of strikes across Lebanon, particularly the south, while warning residents of a dozen towns to flee ahead of attacks despite an ongoing truce in the war with Hezbollah. Lebanon’s state-run National News Agency and AFP photographers said the strikes targeted several areas in the Tyre district and Nabatieh province in the country’s south. The top two floors of a building in Maashuq in the Tyre district collapsed after an airstrike, according to AFP images. It also damaged neighboring buildings and parked cars. A strike on the same town a day prior destroyed a primary healthcare center managed by the Hezbollah-linked Islamic Health Committee, the Lebanese health ministry said. An airstrike on Tuesday on the Saray neighborhood in Nabatieh, which includes shops, an old mosque, and traditional residential buildings, destroyed a large part of it. AFP images showed a plume of smoke rising from the targeted area. The Israeli military had previously issued evacuation warnings for 12 Lebanese towns, 11 of them in the south and one in the eastern Bekaa area.
It later repeated the same warning.
In a separate statement, the army said it intercepted a drone from Lebanon.
Hezbollah meanwhile said it carried out several attacks against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, in addition to targeting Iron Dome platforms in Jal Alam and Margaliot in northern Israel. The Lebanese civil defense on Tuesday said it had lost contact with seven citizens after an Israeli incursion in the southern town of Rashaya al-Fukhar. It said that Israeli forces later released four of them, while the other three remain “in Israeli captivity.” Hezbollah drew Lebanon into the Middle East war on March 2 by firing rockets at Israel in support of its backer Iran. Since the start of the ceasefire on April 17, Israel has continued to launch strikes, carry out demolitions and issue evacuation orders in south Lebanon, saying it is targeting the Iran-backed armed group. It has also repeatedly issued evacuation warnings for dozens of towns, reaching places far from the border that were housing displaced people from other areas.
Israeli strikes on Lebanon have killed more than 3,000 people since March 2, according to Lebanese authorities. The Israeli military says it has lost 20 soldiers and one civilian contractor in southern Lebanon since the war began.

Israeli strikes have killed more than 3,000 in Lebanon since March
Agence France Presse/May 19/2026
Israeli strikes have killed more than 3,000 people in Lebanon since the start of the war between Hezbollah and Israel on March 2, the health ministry said on Monday, after an April 17 ceasefire failed to stop the fighting. "The total cumulative toll of the aggression from March 2 to May 18 is now as follows: 3,020 martyrs and 9,273 wounded," the ministry said, with 211 people aged 18 and under and 116 healthcare workers among the dead.

Israeli army says soldier killed in combat in southern Lebanon, toll rises to 21
LBCI/May 19/2026
The Israeli army announced the death of one of its soldiers “in combat” in southern Lebanon, bringing the total toll to 21. The army said the killed soldier was 27-year-old Major Itamar Sapir, deputy company commander in Reserve Brigade 551.

Israeli army issues renewed evacuation warning for multiple southern Lebanese towns
LBCI/May 19/2026
Israeli military spokesperson Avichay Adraee said in a post on X that residents of several villages in southern Lebanon should evacuate immediately. The warning included the towns of Tora, Nabatieh al-Tahta, Houbboush, Bazouriyeh, Tayr Debba, Kfar Houna, Ain Qana, Labaya, Jibshit, Shahabiya (Tayr Zibna), Bourj El-Shemali in Tyre, and Houmine El-Fawqa. Adraee said that, following what he described as continued ceasefire violations by Hezbollah, the Israeli military would act against the group “with force,” stressing that it does not intend to harm civilians. He urged residents to leave their homes immediately and move at least 1,000 meters away toward open areas, warning that anyone near Hezbollah members, infrastructure, or weapons could be at risk.

Raad warns state's conduct in negotiations will lead country to 'disasters'
Naharnet/May 19/2026
MP Mohammad Raad has lamented that "the reality confirmed by the rounds of direct negotiations between Lebanon and the enemy (Israel) is that the ruling authorities have practically adopted the occupation's narrative against the resistance." "Based on this, it has been arranging the internal political situation on the premise that the Lebanese accept coexistence with the occupation in exchange for the government's support in enforcing the state's monopoly on the use of force," Raad said in an op-ed he published in al-Akhbar newspaper. "Submitting to the enemy and yielding to its conditions only emboldens it to expand, bully, and tyrannize, and to continue launching wars and invasions whenever possible and political circumstances allow," Raad warned. He added that, however, when Israel "becomes certain that its occupation will be met with staunch resistance, even if protracted and costly, it will inevitably be wary of underestimating its aggression.""Conversely, if it senses defeatism, weakness, or a willingness to compromise at the expense of the sovereignty and interests of the Lebanese people on the other side, it will intensify pressure in all directions to force surrender and submission to its conditions and objectives," the top Hezbollah lawmaker cautioned. He noted that the country now stands at "a dangerous crossroads, fraught with the threat of major disasters." "The responsibility for all the resulting consequences will fall squarely on the shoulders of this ruling authority, which is being applauded by all the enemies and adversaries of true, noble and honorable sovereignty and independence in Lebanon," Raad said. He added: "The Lebanese people have the right to know where this ruling authority is leading them today. They also have the right to understand that all the sacrifices made in the resistance struggle pale in comparison to the disasters awaiting the country if this ruling authority continues down the path of submission and surrender to the enemy's demands and conditions."He warned that "reliance on the occupation to disarm the resistance, while the enemy continues its aggression against Lebanon, is a heinous crime against the nation and its citizens."Raad added: "We, along with our honorable, patient and sacrificing people, confront the brutal Israeli occupation in defense of our existence, our homeland and all Lebanese who cherish sovereignty and national dignity. We endure the bloodshed, displacement and wounds, persevering and remaining steadfast to preserve our existence, freedom and the sovereignty of our country.""As for those who support our enemy, incite against our country and its interests, and provide services to the criminal Zionist aggression, we call for their accountability under the law. We affirm that the path of concessions is destined for disappointment and failure," Raad went on to say.

Salam says there's increased US involvement in ceasefire efforts
Naharnet/May 19/2026
Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has stated that there is "increased American involvement in the efforts to solidify the ceasefire."Asked about the reported idea of ​​reciprocity in security measures -- an Israeli withdrawal from the south followed by the Lebanese Army taking control of the areas vacated by the occupation -- Salam told the Asas Media news portal that "this idea is on the table but hasn't yet been finalized."

Sky Lounges Services wins bid to operate and invest in René Mouawad Airport – Qlayaat
LBCI/May 19/2026
Public Works and Transport Minister Fayez Rasamny announced the opening of bids in the public tender for the operation and investment of René Mouawad Airport in Qlayaat, marking a major step toward reactivating Lebanon’s second civilian airport after decades of delay. The contract was awarded to Sky Lounges Services following procedures carried out in accordance with the Public Procurement Law, ensuring transparency and legal and administrative competitiveness, while safeguarding the interests of the Lebanese state and securing optimal operational and investment conditions. The ministry said the development comes after direct and sustained follow-up by Minister Rasamny, who has prioritized the René Mouawad Airport file since taking office. The project is viewed not only as an investment initiative but also as a strategic national step aimed at strengthening Lebanon’s aviation infrastructure, easing pressure on Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport, and expanding the country’s civil aviation capacity. The project is also expected to serve as an economic and development driver for northern Lebanon and Akkar, by boosting tourism, commerce, and logistics activity, and creating both direct and indirect job opportunities. The Ministry of Public Works and Transport said the process reflects the state’s commitment to launching key infrastructure projects in accordance with legal procedures and good governance standards, while restoring confidence in the ability of Lebanese institutions to implement long-awaited strategic projects. The ministry also thanked all official, administrative, and technical bodies involved in the process, as well as residents of Akkar, northern Lebanon, and all Lebanese citizens who see the René Mouawad Airport project as a national initiative aimed at fostering development and strengthening Lebanon’s role in regional transport and services.

Veterinary Syndicate chief calls for release of activist Ghina Nahfawi: Protecting animals from abuse is a moral and legal duty
LBCI/May 19/2026
The head of the Veterinary Doctors Syndicate in Lebanon, Dr. Ihab Shaaban, has condemned the detention of animal rights activist Ghina Nahfawi, calling for her immediate release. Nahfawi was arrested over a post in which she expressed her rejection of an incident involving a dog allegedly being dragged by a car, a case that was treated as defamation against a religious figure. Shaaban said that defending an animal subjected to abuse and calling for accountability should not be treated as a crime, stressing that the case involves a documented act of violence that is morally and humanely unacceptable, and a matter of society’s right to object to cruelty against animals.He emphasized that protecting animals from abuse is both an ethical and legal duty, and that the voices of activists in this field should be protected rather than prosecuted.
He added that efforts should instead focus on investigating the incident and holding those responsible accountable under applicable laws. Shaaban further said that animal welfare is a measure of societal progress, warning that attempts to intimidate activists or silence them under defamation charges set a troubling precedent, especially when criticism targets an act of violence rather than a religious or social identity. He called for Nahfawi’s release, an end to the prosecution of those defending animals through peaceful expression, and a serious investigation into the incident, stressing that mercy is not a crime and justice begins with protecting the most vulnerable.

Animal rights activist Ghina Nahfawi detained over video documenting alleged animal abuse
LBCI/May 19/2026
Appellate Public Prosecutor in Mount Lebanon Bilal Halawi ordered the detention of animal rights activist Ghina Nahfawi after she refused to remove a video showing a cleric allegedly abusing animals by tying a dog to his car and dragging it in Al-Azzounieh, Aley district. Nahfawi had reportedly received a call two days earlier from the Baabda police station requesting her presence following a complaint filed by Sheikh Samir Sharafeddine on charges including defamation and “inciting religious tensions.” The controversy centers on the judicial decision, which critics say overlooked the fact that causing harm or suffering to animals constitutes a violation of Lebanon’s Animal Welfare Law No. 47/2017, while penalizing Nahfawi instead of holding the alleged offender accountable.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on 19-20 May/2026
Report: Trump held meeting on Iran war plans after pausing attack
Naharnet/May 19/2026
U.S. President Donald Trump convened a meeting on Iran with his top national security team on Monday evening that included a briefing on military options, two U.S. officials told U.S. news outlet Axios on Tuesday. The meeting took place several hours after Trump announced he was suspending attacks he claimed were planned for Tuesday. Trump continues to claim Iran has only a few days to reach a diplomatic breakthrough. He said Monday that the deadline was "two-three days, maybe Friday or Saturday, early next week."While Trump has repeatedly threatened military action during the ceasefire without following through, the fact that he was briefed on military plans on Monday suggests he's seriously considering resuming the war. U.S. officials say Trump hadn't actually made a decision to strike Iran before announcing a pause. On Tuesday, he said he'd been "an hour away" from giving the order. Some officials did expect Trump to decide on strikes in a meeting with his national security team that was expected on Tuesday, but ultimately took place on Monday evening. His decision to hold off was partially due to concerns raised by several Gulf leaders about Iranian retaliation against their oil facilities and infrastructure, U.S. officials and regional sources say. The U.S. officials said the Gulf leaders urged Trump to give negotiations another chance. U.S. Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, White House envoy Steve Witkoff, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine, CIA Director John Ratcliffe and other senior officials attended the meeting, the sources said. It focused on the way forward in the war with Iran, the status of the diplomatic efforts and various U.S. military plans for strikes on Iran.
A U.S. source close to Trump said that several Iran hawks who have spoken to the president since his announcement on Monday got the impression that "he is in the mood of cracking their head open to get them to move in the negotiations."
Many other U.S. officials were surprised by Trump's announcement on Monday, and admit they're confused as to which direction Trump is heading. Some think he might punt on a decision again if no diplomatic breakthrough is achieved.
Trump claimed there were "serious negotiations" underway, though a senior U.S. official told Axios the latest Iranian counter-proposal did not show significant progress.A regional source said the mediators are working to get the Iranians to present a more flexible position that addresses the U.S. nuclear demands.
"We may have to give Iran another big hit. I am not sure yet. You will know soon," Trump said on Tuesday.U.S. President Donald Trump convened a meeting on Iran with his top national security team on Monday evening that included a briefing on military options, two U.S. officials told U.S. news outlet Axios on Tuesday. The meeting took place several hours after Trump announced he was suspending attacks he claimed were planned for Tuesday. Trump continues to claim Iran has only a few days to reach a diplomatic breakthrough. He said Monday that the deadline was "two-three days, maybe Friday or Saturday, early next week."While Trump has repeatedly threatened military action during the ceasefire without following through, the fact that he was briefed on military plans on Monday suggests he's seriously considering resuming the war.
U.S. officials say Trump hadn't actually made a decision to strike Iran before announcing a pause. On Tuesday, he said he'd been "an hour away" from giving the order. Some officials did expect Trump to decide on strikes in a meeting with his national security team that was expected on Tuesday, but ultimately took place on Monday evening.
His decision to hold off was partially due to concerns raised by several Gulf leaders about Iranian retaliation against their oil facilities and infrastructure, U.S. officials and regional sources say. The U.S. officials said the Gulf leaders urged Trump to give negotiations another chance.
U.S. Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, White House envoy Steve Witkoff, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine, CIA Director John Ratcliffe and other senior officials attended the meeting, the sources said. It focused on the way forward in the war with Iran, the status of the diplomatic efforts and various U.S. military plans for strikes on Iran.A U.S. source close to Trump said that several Iran hawks who have spoken to the president since his announcement on Monday got the impression that "he is in the mood of cracking their head open to get them to move in the negotiations."Many other U.S. officials were surprised by Trump's announcement on Monday, and admit they're confused as to which direction Trump is heading. Some think he might punt on a decision again if no diplomatic breakthrough is achieved. Trump claimed there were "serious negotiations" underway, though a senior U.S. official told Axios the latest Iranian counter-proposal did not show significant progress. A regional source said the mediators are working to get the Iranians to present a more flexible position that addresses the U.S. nuclear demands.
"We may have to give Iran another big hit. I am not sure yet. You will know soon," Trump said on Tuesday.

Trump's tough-talk foreign policy hits wall with Iran
Associated Press/May 19/2026
President Donald Trump has considered himself an effective dealmaker above all else, but he appears to have hit a wall with Iran as his tough talk, threats and even military action have not moved Tehran from its long-established positions. With shifting goals that make it difficult to judge the status of the U.S. effort, Trump and his top aides have insisted the United States has already won the war and that Iran is ready to reach an agreement in the wake of escalating U.S. threats during a tenuous ceasefire. But Trump once again backed down, saying Monday that he had put plans for an imminent resumption of attacks on hold at the request of Gulf Arab states because "serious negotiations are now taking place, and that, in their opinion, as Great Leaders and Allies, a Deal will be made, which will be very acceptable to the United States of America, as well as all Countries in the Middle East, and beyond."Although he said he had called off strikes planned for Tuesday, Trump kept up the bravado, saying he told military leaders "to be prepared to go forward with a full, large scale assault of Iran, on a moment's notice, in the event that an acceptable Deal is not reached." Trump has repeatedly set deadlines for Tehran and then backed off. Despite growing internal unrest, a crippled economy and the deaths of many of its leaders, there is no evidence Iran is set to meet Trump's demands — many of which it has long rejected. In fact, it has dug in. That has left Trump's stated top objectives unrealized: Iran has yet to agree to abandon its nuclear program or its ballistic missile development, or cease support for its proxies in the region, including those in Gaza, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen.
The White House on Monday defended the president's approach, saying, "Trump's preference is always peace and diplomacy" but he will only accept a deal that puts America first. "President Trump holds all the cards and wisely keeps all options on the table to ensure that Iran can never have a nuclear weapon," spokesperson Olivia Wales said in a statement to The Associated Press.
Iran has leverage with the Strait of Hormuz
Crucially, Iran still has a chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz, the vital shipping lane for global oil supplies, even as the U.S. military has enforced its own blockade on Iranian ports. The wild shifts in the global energy market that followed have raised gasoline prices, hurting U.S. consumers and causing potential problems for Trump's Republican Party ahead of congressional midterm elections in November. Trump's playbook of turning up the pressure — economically and militarily — to bend foreign governments to his will is not playing out in Iran as it has in Venezuela, Cuba and elsewhere. Oil blockades have squeezed those two countries and the Trump administration quickly ousted Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, but they do not hold a bargaining chip as effective as Iran's control over the Strait of Hormuz. With the Iran war driving up costs for Americans, Trump's approval rating on the economy has slumped, according to an AP-NORC poll conducted last month, with even Republicans showing less faith in his leadership. For all of Trump's rhetoric, Iran has been unwilling to accept limitations on any of its policies that amount to more than what it conceded during the negotiations for a nuclear deal with world powers during the Obama administration. Trump called it the "worst ever" agreement negotiated by the U.S. and pulled out of it in his first term in 2018. Since a fragile truce in the war went into effect last month, Trump has lashed out over the slow pace of negotiations to reach a permanent deal. "For Iran, the Clock is Ticking, and they better get moving, FAST, or there won't be anything left of them," Trump posted on social media Sunday shortly after a call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The Iranian response was quick. "Our armed forces' fingers are on the trigger, while diplomacy is also continuing," Mohsen Rezaei, a military adviser to Iran's supreme leader, said on state television.
Neither side sees defeat, expert says
Ali Vaez, Iran director at the International Crisis Group who has watched years of fruitless diplomacy between Washington and Tehran, said the longtime adversaries do not see themselves as being defeated by the latest conflict. "Since the ceasefire took effect, both Washington and Tehran seem to be working on the assumption that time acts in their favor: Each believes that the blockade and counter-blockade in the Strait of Hormuz raises the costs for the other side, while giving a reprieve to prepare for a potential resumption of hostilities," Vaez said. Despite the impact of America's economic pressure campaign, Iranian officials have not reached the pain threshold "to the point of accepting what it perceives as capitulatory demands," he said. David Schenker, a former assistant secretary of state for the Middle East in Trump's first administration who is currently at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, described the current situation as "a stalemate." He said Trump likely has "misgivings" about returning to full-on military conflict, especially because of Gulf Arab anxieties about Iranian retaliation and the volatility in the energy markets, with its political implications in the U.S. Rich Goldberg, an Iran hawk and former National Security Council official in both of Trump's administrations who is now with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank, insisted that Trump is still operating from a position of strength, including with the Strait of Hormuz. Goldberg, who has a special interest in American energy dominance, said that while reopening the strait would ease the "pain at the pump" felt by many Americans, it was not critical. "The short-term pain at the pump is distracting people from U.S. overall energy dominance," he said. "This is not a permanent crisis."

US derailed Iran’s strategy that was 47 years in the making, CENTCOM chief says
Al Arabiya English19 May ,2026
A top US admiral said Tuesday that the war against Iran derailed Tehran’s strategy that was 47 years in the making. “Since 1979, the Iranian regime has terrorized the region. Its network of proxies exploited openings wherever found, undermining neighboring governments and exporting its unique brand of state-sponsored terror,” US Central Command (CENTCOM) Adm. Brad Cooper said. Cooper said the US military, in less than 40 days, systematically dismantled what Iran spent four decades and tens of billions of dollars building. “The capabilities on which the regime relied to threaten our forces, coerce our partners, and project power across the region have been substantially degraded,” he told lawmakers during a House Armed Services Committee (HASC) hearing. Cooper vehemently defended the latest war against Iran, but was repeatedly attacked by Democratic lawmakers before the committee chairman, Rep. Mike Rogers, spoke out and said this was “a personal attack” and was “unfair.” The top US admiral was visibly angered after Democratic Rep. Seth Moulton said he “would like to know how many more Americans we have to ask to die for this mistake,” referring to the Iran war, which he claimed was a failure. “I think that’s an entirely inappropriate statement from you, sir, with all due respect,” Cooper responded.
US military follows law ‘to the T’Cooper was also asked about the Feb. 28 strike on an Iranian girls’ school, which killed more than 175 children and teachers, according to Tehran. He said the US military investigation was coming to an end, adding that the school was located on “an active IRGC cruise missile base.” He said this was “more complex than the average strike.”During his opening remarks, Cooper said the US military was committed to the Law of Armed Conflict. “The United States does not target civilians. We take all civilian casualty reports seriously,” he said. Later during questioning, he doubled down on those remarks, saying his forces follow the law of war “to a T.”

Vance says Iran talks making 'good progress'
Agence France Presse/May 19/2026
U.S. Vice President JD Vance said Tuesday that Iran talks are making good progress but Washington was "locked and loaded" to restart military operations if there is no deal. Vance's comments came hours after President Donald Trump said he had come within an hour of ordering fresh strikes and gave Tehran "two or three days" to reach an agreement. "A lot of good progress is being made, but we're just going to keep on working at it, and eventually we'll either hit a deal or we won't," Vance told a briefing at the White House.
Vance -- an Iran war-skeptic who led a U.S. delegation to Pakistan in April for talks that failed to produce a deal -- said Iran had to accept that it could not have a nuclear weapon. "We're in a pretty good spot here -- but there's an option B, and the option B is that we could restart the military campaign," said the U.S. vice president. "We're locked and loaded. We don't want to go down that pathway, but the president is willing and able to go down that pathway if we have to."

US State Department: Rubio discussed Strait of Hormuz file with Guterres
LBCI/May 19/2026
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed on Tuesday with U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from laying mines and imposing transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz, a matter addressed in a U.N. Security Council resolution.
State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott said in a statement: “The Secretary emphasized the broad support these efforts enjoy from a wide range of U.N. member states.”Reuters

Iran army warns will 'open new fronts' against US if attacks resume
Agence France Presse/May 19/2026
Iran's army warned on Tuesday it would "open new fronts" against the United States if it resumes attacks, after President Donald Trump said he had held off launching a new offensive in hopes of striking a deal. "If the enemy is foolish enough to fall into the Zionist trap again and launches new aggression against our beloved Iran, we will open new fronts against it, with new equipment and new methods," said army spokesman Mohammad Akraminia, according to Iran's ISNA news agency.

Top NATO commander says ‘thinking’ about NATO role in Strait of Hormuz
AFP/May 19/2026
NATO’s top commander said Tuesday he was “thinking” about how the alliance could help in the Strait of Hormuz, but no formal planning had begun yet. “Am I thinking about it? Absolutely. But there’s no planning yet until the political decision is taken,” US General Alexus Grynkewich, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, told journalists. US President Donald Trump has blasted Washington’s European allies in NATO for their response to his war on Iran – which has seen the crucial waterway closed. European countries spearheaded by Britain and France have been scrambling to put together a possible plan for how they could help keep the strait open if the war ends. So far US-led alliance NATO has steered clear of seeking any direct involvement in the conflict – despite pressure from Trump. “Each nation is considering their response, with many, including Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, sailing ships to the region,” Grynkewich said. “We all agree it’s in our interest to ensure freedom of navigation in international waters.” European diplomats at NATO have played down of the prospect of the alliance playing a major role in the strait given internal divisions. But they say it could be involved in some way in any eventual operations led by France or Britain if they materialize. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has had a major impact on global energy prices and is already taking a toll on economies in Europe. Read more: Trump says US could attack Iran again but that Tehran wants deal

Car bomb in Damascus kills soldier
Agence France Presse/May 19/2026
A car bomb in Damascus killed a soldier on Tuesday, a Syrian civil defense source told AFP, with a security source saying an explosive was likely planted in a vehicle near a building affiliated with the defense ministry. The civil defense source said at least one person was killed, while the security source told AFP an initial investigation had found the blast was likely caused "by an explosive device planted in a car". An AFP correspondent in the area heard an explosion before seeing a car burning near a building affiliated with Syria's defense ministry, adding that security forces had cordoned off the area.

Qatar says US-Iran negotiations need 'more time'
Agence France Presse/19 May/2026
Qatar said Tuesday that US-Iran negotiations, mediated by Pakistan, require more time to reach a deal, a day after President Donald Trump said he had postponed attacks to give the process a chance. "We are supportive of the diplomatic effort by Pakistan that has shown seriousness in bringing parties together and finding a solution, and we do believe it needs more time," Qatari foreign ministry spokesman Majed al-Ansari said at a press conference.

Global energy balance highlights gap between production and reserves, reshaping geopolitical competition
LBCI/19 May/2026
A comparison of global oil and gas data underscores a widening gap between leading producers and countries holding the largest reserves, highlighting how technology, investment capacity, and geopolitical constraints shape global energy output. The United States, Russia, and Saudi Arabia are the world’s top three oil producers, according to figures cited from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). The United States produces approximately 13.58 million barrels per day, followed by Russia at 9.87 million barrels per day, and Saudi Arabia at 9.51 million barrels per day. However, when it comes to proven oil reserves, the ranking shifts significantly. Venezuela holds the largest reserves with approximately 303 billion barrels, followed by Saudi Arabia with about 267 billion barrels, and Iran with roughly 209 billion barrels, according to OPEC data. The United States, despite being the world’s largest oil producer, does not rank among the top three countries in reserves and is estimated to hold about 46 billion barrels. A similar divergence is seen in natural gas. The United States leads global gas production at approximately 1,033 billion cubic meters per year, followed by Russia at around 630 billion cubic meters and Iran at about 263 billion cubic meters, according to the Energy Institute Statistical Review 2025.In terms of gas reserves, Russia ranks first with about 47.8 trillion cubic meters, followed by Iran with 34 trillion cubic meters and Qatar with 23.9 trillion cubic meters. The contrast between production and reserves reflects broader structural differences, with analysts noting that the United States’ technological capacity, financing, and export infrastructure allow it to rapidly increase output, while countries such as Iran and Venezuela hold significant reserves but face constraints due to sanctions, conflict, and investment limitations. The global energy landscape is further shaped by the continued dominance of fossil fuels, which still account for roughly 80% of global energy consumption compared with 20% from renewable sources. Energy policy debates in Washington have emphasized expanding domestic production and exports as a tool of geopolitical influence, particularly toward Europe and Asia.At the same time, global competition over energy security is intensifying amid conflicts in key producing regions, including Iran, as countries reassess supply risks and diversify sources. China, the world’s largest energy importer, is also rapidly expanding its renewable energy sector, having invested more than $1 trillion in clean energy between 2019 and 2025, according to industry estimates. Beijing is also a major processor of critical minerals used in renewable technologies, strengthening its position in the clean energy supply chain. The shifting balance between fossil fuels and renewables is increasingly shaping strategic competition between major powers, as countries seek to secure both traditional energy resources and future energy technologies.

UAE's image as Middle Eastern haven is tested by Iran war
Associated Press/19 May/2026
The United Arab Emirates for decades has advertised itself as a haven for international business in a Middle East awash in violent upheaval. Those waves have now crashed into this nation, testing its economic model like never before.
The UAE, a close ally of the United States and Israel, faced more missile and drone attacks from Iran during the war than any other country. The attacks — and Iran's chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz — have more than halved the Emirates' exports of crude oil and natural gas. Its tourism and conference sectors have also suffered.
The country, which sits just across the Persian Gulf from Iran, has portrayed itself as unfazed, even as it makes significant changes. It recently announced plans to build another pipeline to reduce its reliance on the strait, and it dropped out of the OPEC oil cartel so it can boost energy production longer-term, something that had been under consideration since before the war.
While the U.S. and Israel started the war, the UAE is firmly entangled. A drone attack Sunday on its Barakah nuclear power plant underlines the continued risks — even if a shaky ceasefire holds.
Because the Emirates boasts a large surplus of cash, the war's economic disruptions so far do not appear to have caused major job losses or an exodus of foreign business. The longer the standoff drags on and prevents business as usual in the Emirates, the greater the risk to its image that has been key to drawing international business and investment.
Emirati officials' increasingly accuse Iran of piracy and even terrorism, while threatening to take military action.
The UAE "will not tolerate any threat to its security and sovereignty under any circumstances," its Foreign Ministry said Sunday night. "It reserves its full, sovereign, legitimate, diplomatic, and military rights to respond to any threats, allegations or hostilities."
UAE's ruling family directs a more aggressive foreign policy
It's hard to know how the UAE will respond to the Barakah attack, which caused no radiological release and hasn't stopped the nuclear plant in Abu Dhabi's far western desert from operating. The UAE is a federation of seven autocratically ruled sheikhdoms, including Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Its top ruling body is the Federal Supreme Council, comprised of the hereditary rulers of its seven emirates. But decision-making is dominated by Abu Dhabi's Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and his family.
The ruling family, analysts say, has directed a more aggressive foreign policy in the last decades, including entering the war in Yemen against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels. The UAE helped bring Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi to power in 2013, and is alleged to have sent arms to parties in Sudan and Libya's civil wars, which it denies.
Sheikh Mohammed, who rarely speaks publicly, gave his only brief remarks on the war for state media while visiting those wounded by Iranian attacks at a hospital in March.
"The UAE is attractive, the UAE is beautiful, the UAE is a model. But I say to them: do not be misled by the UAE's appearance," the sheikh warned at the time. "The UAE has thick skin and bitter flesh; we are no easy prey."
But that doesn't mean there has been no pain.
Economic warning signs
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has impeded the UAE's ability to sell crude oil and natural gas, though a few of its tankers have made it out. It can export approximately 1.8 million barrels of crude a day through a pipeline to Fujairah, a city with an oil terminal on the Gulf of Oman outside the strait. The Emirates is trying to speed up the construction of a second pipeline to double that capacity. The UAE's tourism and conference market — estimated to be more than 12% of its economic output — has also been hit hard.
Since the war started Feb. 28, over 70 scheduled events in the UAE have been postponed, canceled or otherwise affected, according to Northbourne Advisory, a communications firm based in Qatar that's been tracking the effects of the war. The Emirati government did not issue a blanket ban for events, but organizers likely changed their plans over "insurance withdrawal and liability exposure," the firm said. On May 4, the country's airline, Emirates, announced it had resumed nearly its entire schedule of flights out of Dubai International Airport, the busiest worldwide for years for international travel. But the same day, Iran launched multiple drone and missile attacks, setting off alerts on mobile phones and groans among the Emirates' business community, which is eager to return to some sense of normalcy. The airport appears to be building a protective cage around its jet fuel tanks, something officials there declined to discuss.
Hotels, including Dubai's iconic, sail-shaped Burj Al Arab, have closed for renovations as occupancy rates have fallen to around 20%. Moody's Analytics estimates that rate will fall to 10% in the June quarter, down from 80% before the war.
Moody's warned that occupancy rates will likely stay down through the rest of 2026, with travelers likely to remain hesitant even after hostilities subside.
In an analysis published on Monday, the Institute of International Finance said: "Dubai's openness makes it vulnerable to shocks in travel, logistics, and confidence, while Abu Dhabi's balance sheet and energy assets give the federation the capacity to absorb the blow."
Coin-operated fighter jet art
Dubai in particular has been trying to show it is still open.
This past weekend, Dubai hosted an abbreviated version of its annual Art Dubai show. The war felt close by, not only because the show's preview happened the same day Iran seized a ship anchored off Fujairah. One piece of art was a coin-operated black fighter jet, covered in pairs of black Nike tennis shoes. One artist, Solimán López of Spain, came with a piece centered on the idea of him claiming ownership of a metal-rich asteroid that's the target of a NASA mission. The artwork is meant to reflect on how countries and companies extract oil and other commodities. The conflict made it a challenge to attend with his work, he said. "But I said I have to do my best, because I do believe that it's the perfect context to talk about this in the region," he said. Another artist, Alfred Tarazi of Beirut, noted his grandparents lived through two world wars. "Life doesn't stop in a world war," he said. "We can only counter a narrative of violence with culture."

US seizes oil tanker linked to Iran in Indian Ocean
LBCI/19 May/2026
The United States seized an oil tanker linked to Iran in the Indian Ocean overnight, the Wall Street Journal reported on Tuesday, citing three U.S. officials. The report said the tanker, named “Sky Wave,” had been sanctioned by the United States in March for its role in transporting Iranian oil, and was believed to have loaded more than one million barrels of crude from Iran’s Kharg Island in February. Reuters said it was not immediately able to verify the report. Reuters

US resident released from Iranian prison, returns home: Rights group
AFP/19 May/2026
An Iranian citizen who holds permanent residency in the United States has been released from prison in Iran and has returned to the US, a rights group said Tuesday. “Shahab Dalili, an Iranian citizen and US permanent resident who had been imprisoned in Evin Prison, was released after serving 10 years in prison. Following his release, he returned to the United States,” the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) said in a statement. It said the man, who was sentenced for allegedly “cooperating with a hostile government,” travelled after his release from Iran to the Armenian capital Yerevan before returning to Washington “where he is now safe and reunited with his family.” It did not specify the date of his return. Dalili was jailed in 2016 when he visited Iran for his father’s funeral. He strongly denied the charges he was detained on. Both he and his son went on hunger strike in 2023 after he was not included in a deal to free US citizens. That deal saw the US authorize the transfer of six billion dollars in Iranian funds frozen in South Korea and the release of five Iranians to facilitate the release of five Americans jailed by Iran in 2023.

Global energy balance highlights gap between production and reserves, reshaping geopolitical competition
LBCI/19 May/2026
A comparison of global oil and gas data underscores a widening gap between leading producers and countries holding the largest reserves, highlighting how technology, investment capacity, and geopolitical constraints shape global energy output.
The United States, Russia, and Saudi Arabia are the world’s top three oil producers, according to figures cited from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). The United States produces approximately 13.58 million barrels per day, followed by Russia at 9.87 million barrels per day, and Saudi Arabia at 9.51 million barrels per day. However, when it comes to proven oil reserves, the ranking shifts significantly. Venezuela holds the largest reserves with approximately 303 billion barrels, followed by Saudi Arabia with about 267 billion barrels, and Iran with roughly 209 billion barrels, according to OPEC data. The United States, despite being the world’s largest oil producer, does not rank among the top three countries in reserves and is estimated to hold about 46 billion barrels.
A similar divergence is seen in natural gas. The United States leads global gas production at approximately 1,033 billion cubic meters per year, followed by Russia at around 630 billion cubic meters and Iran at about 263 billion cubic meters, according to the Energy Institute Statistical Review 2025.In terms of gas reserves, Russia ranks first with about 47.8 trillion cubic meters, followed by Iran with 34 trillion cubic meters and Qatar with 23.9 trillion cubic meters. The contrast between production and reserves reflects broader structural differences, with analysts noting that the United States’ technological capacity, financing, and export infrastructure allow it to rapidly increase output, while countries such as Iran and Venezuela hold significant reserves but face constraints due to sanctions, conflict, and investment limitations. The global energy landscape is further shaped by the continued dominance of fossil fuels, which still account for roughly 80% of global energy consumption compared with 20% from renewable sources. Energy policy debates in Washington have emphasized expanding domestic production and exports as a tool of geopolitical influence, particularly toward Europe and Asia. At the same time, global competition over energy security is intensifying amid conflicts in key producing regions, including Iran, as countries reassess supply risks and diversify sources. China, the world’s largest energy importer, is also rapidly expanding its renewable energy sector, having invested more than $1 trillion in clean energy between 2019 and 2025, according to industry estimates. Beijing is also a major processor of critical minerals used in renewable technologies, strengthening its position in the clean energy supply chain.
The shifting balance between fossil fuels and renewables is increasingly shaping strategic competition between major powers, as countries seek to secure both traditional energy resources and future energy technologies.

US not in a hurry to extend China trade truce, Bessent says
Reuters/ 20 May ,2026
The Trump administration is “not in a rush” to extend a tariff and critical minerals trade truce with China that ends in November, as there is time to renew it in meetings later this year, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said on Tuesday.
In his first interview since attending last week’s high-stakes summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, Bessent said that he believes China will accept the restoration of prior US tariff rates through new Section 301 duties, as long as they don’t go higher. China in recent months had “gotten a deal” on lower tariffs as a result of the US Supreme Court’s decision striking down President Donald Trump’s global emergency duties, he said on the sidelines of a G7 finance leaders meeting in Paris. “I think we’re not in a rush to extend it,” Bessent said of the November 2025 tariff truce. “Things are stable.”He added that China has “been satisfactory, but not excellent in terms of their fulfillment on their side on critical minerals. So we’re seeing them again.”Xi is expected to travel to Washington to meet with Trump at the White House in September. Prior to that summit, Bessent said that he will meet with his counterpart, Vice Premier He Lifeng, to work out more details on trade matters.Trump and Xi also may meet at an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in November in China and a Group of 20 leaders summit in December in Florida. The US-China truce negotiated over several months last year averted a total collapse of trade between the world’s two largest economies after Trump’s new tariffs on Chinese goods prompted retaliation and escalation that took tariffs to triple digits.
The deal brought down extra tariffs on Chinese goods to about 20 percent, in addition to about 25 percent on many Chinese industrial products imposed during Trump’s first term. The extra tariffs are currently at 10 percent as a result of a temporary tariff that expires in July.Bessent said that deals for China to order 200 Boeing jetliners and make annual purchases of $17 billion in American farm goods resulting from the Trump-Xi summit are considered separate from the November trade truce.
Tariff cuts on consumer goods
He said that he views the most important achievements as the establishment of bilateral managed trade, investment and artificial intelligence protocols with Beijing, which will be discussed in subsequent negotiations. In the “Board of Trade,” the two sides will initially determine about $30 billion of non-strategic goods on which they can lower or eliminate tariffs. “We’ll pick a number. My sense is the first number is there’s going to be 30 by 30 (billion dollars), and then both sides will try to fill up the capacity there,” he said, adding that the US agricultural sales will not be included in these totals. He said that China could reduce tariffs on US energy products, medical equipment and medical devices, while the US would likely cut tariffs on Chinese consumer goods that will not be produced in the US again, such as fireworks or Halloween costumes. The US maintains tariffs of 7.5 percent on a raft of Chinese consumer products imposed in 2019 at the height of Trump’s first-term trade war with China, including flat-panel television sets, flash memory devices, smart speakers and bed linens. The Board of Investment will deal with two-way investment issues, and for inward investment from China, it will focus on identifying deals that would not run afoul of national security and head off investments that the US is not ready to consider. “I would think this board of investment would either A, keep things from getting to CFIUS, or B, just be like, ‘We’re not really up for that,’” Bessent said. In the run-up to the Beijing summit, lawmakers, auto and steel groups had urged Trump against opening the door to Chinese investments in US auto plants, for fear that China’s state-supported firms would hollow out a core domestic industry.The Committee on Foreign Investment in the US, a powerful and opaque committee led by the Treasury Department, polices foreign investment in the US for national security risks. In recent years it has stepped up bans on Chinese investments in sensitive US tech firms, slowing them to a trickle. Chinese investment in the US plummeted from $56.6 billion in 2016 to just $3.5 billion last year, according to Rhodium Group. Bessent said that investments from Chinese retailers are among those less likely to draw a CFIUS review. “Luckin Coffee is great, but buying a whole bunch of land next to an Air Force base probably isn’t,” Bessent said, referring to the Chinese coffee chain expanding in the US to challenge Starbucks. AI consultations US and Chinese officials will likely start to consult with each other on AI guardrails within the next four to eight weeks, Bessent said. The effort is aimed at halting proliferation of powerful AI models, such as Anthropic’s Mythos, or tools from China’s DeepSeek to non-state actors, he added.Concern is growing over the national security risks posed by powerful AI systems, which companies and analysts have warned could supercharge complex cyberattacks by identifying and exploiting previously unknown vulnerabilities faster than companies can repair them.

Russian soldiers, who were involved in the country's military campaign in Ukraine, march in columns during a military parade on Victory Day, in Red Square in central Moscow,
Reuters/19 May ,2026
China’s armed forces secretly trained about 200 Russian military personnel in China late last year and some have since returned to fight in Ukraine, according to three European intelligence agencies and documents seen by Reuters. While China and Russia have held a number of joint military exercises since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Beijing has repeatedly stated that it is neutral in the conflict and presents itself as a peace mediator. The covert training sessions, which predominantly focused on the use of drones, were outlined in a dual-language Russian-Chinese agreement signed by senior Russian and Chinese officers in Beijing on July 2, 2025. The agreement, reviewed by Reuters, said about 200 Russian troops would be trained at military facilities in locations including Beijing and the eastern city of Nanjing. The sources said around this number subsequently trained in China. The agreement also said hundreds of Chinese troops would undergo training at military facilities in Russia. By training Russian military personnel at an operational and tactical level who then participate in Ukraine, China is far more directly involved in the war on the European continent than previously known, one intelligence official said. The Russian and Chinese defense ministries did not respond to requests for comment on the details outlined in this article.
“On the Ukraine crisis, China has consistently maintained an objective and impartial stance and worked to promote peace talks, this is consistent and clear and is witnessed by the international community,” China’s foreign ministry said in a statement to Reuters. “Relevant parties should not deliberately stoke confrontation or shift blame.”The intelligence agencies spoke on condition they not be identified in order to discuss sensitive information.
European powers, which see Russia as a major security threat, have watched warily at increasingly close relations between Russia and China, the world’s second largest economy and an important European Union trade partner.
The two nations announced a “no limits” strategic partnership days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and pledged to conduct military exercises to rehearse coordination between their armed forces. As the West tried to isolate Russia, China provided a lifeline by buying its oil, gas and coal. Chinese leader Xi Jinping is due to host Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday and Wednesday, less than a week after US President Donald Trump’s high-profile visit. China and Russia have cast Putin’s trip - his 25th visit to China - as further evidence of their “all-weather” partnership, even as the West urges Beijing to pressure Moscow into ending its war in Ukraine.
Drone warfare
Drones have proved to be a vital weapon in Ukraine. Both sides use long-range models to attack targets hundreds of miles away, while on the battlefield, smaller drones remote controlled by pilots using first person view equipment (FPV) and armed with explosives dominate the sky, making it hazardous for armored vehicles or infantry to move. In September, Reuters reported that experts from private Chinese companies had conducted technical development work on military drones for a Russian attack drone manufacturer, according to European officials. China’s foreign ministry said then it was unaware of the collaboration. The two companies identified in the article were sanctioned by the EU last month. According to the training agreement reviewed by Reuters, the Russians would be schooled in disciplines such as drones, electronic warfare, army aviation and armored infantry. The agreement prohibited any media coverage of the visits in either country and said no third parties should be informed. Visits by Chinese troops to Russia for training have been taking place since at least 2024, but Russian personnel training in China is new, two of the intelligence agencies said. While Russia has extensive combat experience in Ukraine, China’s vast drone industry offers technological know-how and advanced training methods such as flight simulators, they said.China’s People’s Liberation Army has not fought a major war for decades, but it has expanded quickly in the past 20 years and now rivals US military might in some areas. A significant number of Russian personnel who received training in China were ranking military instructors in a position to pass knowledge down the chain of command, the two intelligence agencies said.One of the agencies said they had confirmed the identities of a handful of Russian military personnel who trained in China and had since been directly involved in combat operations with drones in Ukraine’s occupied Crimea and Zaporizhzhia regions.
The rank of those people ranged from junior sergeant to lieutenant colonel, the agency said. The names of the individuals appeared in a Russian military document seen by Reuters that listed the servicemen going to China. Reuters was unable to independently confirm the subsequent involvement of those individuals in the Ukraine war. The same intelligence agency said it was highly probable that many of those who trained in China had gone to Ukraine.
Mortars and flight simulators
Internal Russian military reports reviewed by Reuters described four of the training sessions for Russian troops in China after they had taken place. One report dated December 2025 described a training course on combined arms warfare for about 50 Russian military personnel at the PLA’s Ground Forces Army Infantry Academy branch in Shijiazhuang. The report said the course involved training soldiers to fire 82mm mortars while using unmanned aerial vehicles to identify their targets. A second report described air defense training at a military facility, including with electronic warfare rifles, net-throwing devices and drones to counter incoming drones. Two officials said the facility was located in Zhengzhou. All of these types of equipment are relevant to the war in Ukraine. Electronic warfare rifles are aimed at incoming drones to interfere and disrupt their signals, while nets can be thrown around drones to ensnare them as they get close. Both sides use fiber-optic aerial drones connected to their pilots by fine thread which cannot be jammed electronically. Fiber-optic drones typically operate with a range of 10 km to 20 km, but some can go as far as 40 km (25 miles). A third report, dated December 2025 and written by a Russian major, described drone training for Russian personnel at Yibin’s PLA Training Center for Military Aviation, first brigade. The course centered around multimedia presentations and involved the use of flight simulators, training to use several types of FPV drone and two other types of drone, it said. A fourth report described a course in November, 2025 at the Nanjing University of Military Engineering of the PLA Infantry. The training covered explosives technology, mine construction, demining as well as the removal of unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive devices. This report included photographs of Russian soldiers in uniform being taught by Chinese instructors in military uniform. The images also showed Russian soldiers being shown engineering equipment and how to sweep for mines.

Nigeria says joint US strikes kill 175 ISIS militants, senior leaders
Reuters/19 May ,2026
Nigerian forces, working with the United States, have killed 175 ISIS militants in a series of joint air and ground strikes in the country’s northeast in recent days, the Defense Headquarters said on Tuesday. The military said operations conducted with US Africa Command destroyed checkpoints, weapons caches, logistics hubs, and financing networks used by ISIS West Africa Province, which has led a years-long insurgency in the region. Since suffering major setbacks in the Middle East, ISIS has pivoted toward Africa, which accounted for 86 percent of the group’s global activity in the first three months of 2026, according to crisis monitoring group Armed Conflict Location & Event Data. “As of 19 May, assessments indicate that 175 ISIS militants have been eliminated from the battlefield,” Nigeria’s Defense spokesperson Major-General Samaila Uba said in a statement. Strikes that killed Abu-Bilal al-Minuki on May 16, described by both governments as ISIS’s global No. 2, were followed by further raids last weekend that also killed Abd al-Wahhab, an ISWAP leader overseeing attacks and propaganda, Abu Musa al-Mangawi, and Abu al-Muthanna al-Muhajir, a senior media operative and close associate of al-Minuki, the statement said. The Defense Headquarters said the operations formed part of an ongoing campaign to “hunt down and destroy” militants threatening Nigeria and the wider region.

US sanctions several over Gaza aid flotillas, alleged Hamas support
AFP/May 19, 2026
WASHINGTON, United States: The United States on Tuesday issued sanctions against four people associated with a humanitarian aid flotilla to the besieged Palestinian territory of Gaza, accusing them of being “pro-terrorist.”Israeli forces intercepted a Gaza-bound aid flotilla on Monday after it sailed from Turkiye last week, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu denouncing the mission as a “malicious scheme” intended to support Hamas. The flotilla was part of the broader Global Sumud initiative, an international activist and humanitarian coalition that organizes civilian boats attempting to deliver aid to Palestinians in Gaza and challenge Israel’s naval blockade of the territory. “The pro-terror flotilla attempting to reach Gaza is a ludicrous attempt to undermine President (Donald) Trump’s successful progress toward lasting peace in the region,” said US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. Despite a ceasefire, Israeli operations in Gaza have continued and the Palestinian territory continues to face a humanitarian crisis, according to the United Nations. US authorities said the sanctioned individuals were associated with the Popular Conference for Palestinians Abroad (PCPA), a group that Washington says works as a front for armed Palestinian groups, including Hamas. Some were accused of association with the Samidoun Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, which Israel and the United States accuse of being a front for armed groups. The sanctioned individuals include Saif Abu Keshek, a Spanish national of Palestinian origin who was detained in Israel for several days earlier this month after Israeli forces seized him from a previous flotilla off the coast of Greece. He was deported on May 10.Israel’s foreign ministry has accused Abu Keshek of being a leading member of PCPA. An Israeli rights group that represented him in court denied this, arguing that he had resigned from the group more than a year ago.The others to be sanctioned in connection with the aid flotillas included Belgium-based Mohammed Khatib, and Spain-based Hisham Abdallah Sulayman Abu Mahfuz and Jaldia Abubakra Aueda.
HAMAS SANCTIONS
As part of the same announcement on Tuesday, the United States also sanctioned several individuals and entities it accuses of supporting Hamas. These included Marwan Abu Ras and the Palestinian Scholars Association that Washington said he leads. Abu Ras is accused of leading a body that aligns religious discourse in Gaza with Hamas’s ideology.Three individuals accused of being operatives of Hamas or HASM, an Egypt-based group accused of being a “violent offshoot” of the Muslim Brotherhood, were also sanctioned. US State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott said those being sanctioned were “enablers” that Hamas uses “to sustain its position in Gaza, finance its operations, and engage in terrorist violence beyond its borders.”Israel’s war on Gaza — triggered by a Hamas attack on October 7, 2023 — reduced much of the Palestinian territory to rubble, with an estimated death toll of more than 72,000, according to Gaza’s health ministry, which is under Hamas authority and whose figures are considered reliable by the United Nations. More than 770 Palestinians have been killed since an October 10 ceasefire, according to the ministry. Hamas’s October 7 attack resulted in the deaths of 1,221 people, according to an AFP tally based on official Israeli figures.

The Latest LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on 19-20 May/2026
The Plan to Eliminate Israel
Khaled Abu Toameh/ Gatestone Institute/May 19, 2026
The newly uncovered message reveals that the October 7 invasion was never intended to be a limited or isolated terrorist attack. It was conceived as the opening phase of a much broader regional war aimed at destroying Israel and replacing it with an Islamist entity backed by the Iranian regime and its proxies. According to documents captured by the IDF, Hamas leaders had already begun formulating plans for a multi-front war against Israel as early as 2022. Additional evidence of this strategic coordination emerged two months ago, with details leaked regarding a highly aggressive secret letter reportedly sent by Hamas leaders to Iran's new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. In the letter, the Hamas leaders urged Iran to "activate all fronts" simultaneously against Israel. They specifically called for coordinated military escalation from Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and other arenas controlled by Iran-backed militias. Most importantly, the documents expose the true objective behind the October 7 massacre: the total elimination of Israel.... Hamas leaders believed the assault could trigger a region-wide war that would overwhelm Israel totally in a "final solution." [T]he documents demonstrate that ceasefires and negotiations with Hamas do not alter the group's core objective. Even while engaging in diplomatic talks, Hamas leaders were actively coordinating with Iran and Hezbollah regarding scenarios for Israel's complete destruction.
[T]he expose the failure of those in the West who continue to believe that Iran and its terror proxies can be somehow integrated into a stable regional order before fundamentally changing their ideology and behavior.
October 7, 2023 was not the end of the war waged by the Iranian regime and its terror proxies. In their eyes, it was only the beginning.
Documents captured by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the Gaza Strip should finally bury one of the most dangerous illusions: the belief that Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranian regime can somehow be persuaded to halt their jihad (holy war) and accept Israel's existence.
On the morning of the October 7, 2023 Hamas-led invasion of Israel, three senior leaders of the terrorist group – Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, and Marwan Issa – sent a message to Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah requesting support for the attack that had begun.
The message was found by IDF troops inside one of the main tunnels used by the group's leadership. In their message, the Hamas leaders, all of whom were killed during the Hamas-Israel war, demanded active participation from all parties in the Iran-led "axis of resistance," whether through direct participation or cooperation that would allow for the utilization of maximum possible capabilities. The text of the message addressed to Nasrallah stated:
"Our beloved brother, the cost of any hesitation will be high and unbearable, both in terms of our plan and concerning you and the Islamic Republic [of Iran]. The consequences of hesitation will be severe and intolerable, exceeding any imagination."
The wording exposed Hamas's belief that October 7 represented a historic opportunity for a coordinated regional war against Israel.
According to the message, obtained by Israel's Ma'ariv newspaper, the Hamas leaders wanted to ignite a ring of fire around Israel, starting from the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and possibly Jordan and any available place.
The newly uncovered message reveals that the October 7 invasion was never intended to be a limited or isolated terrorist attack. It was conceived as the opening phase of a much broader regional war aimed at destroying Israel and replacing it with an Islamist entity backed by the Iranian regime and its proxies. The message, along with other documents seized by the IDF over the past two years, exposes extensive strategic coordination between Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. They show that Hamas leaders believed they were launching a grand strategic campaign involving the entire "axis of resistance" – Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria, and other jihadist organizations aligned with Tehran.
The October 7 Hamas-led invasion was not simply another round of fighting between Israel and the terrorist organization. It was part of a coordinated regional project whose ultimate objective was the elimination of the Jewish state.
According to documents captured by the IDF, Hamas leaders had already begun formulating plans for a multi-front war against Israel as early as 2022.
Before the October 7, 2023 massacre, the Iranian regime and its proxies engaged in extensive strategic alignment under Iran's "Unity of Arenas" doctrine. According to the Alma Research and Education Center:
"This coordination included high-level meetings, approval of operational plans, allocation of resources, and preparations on the ground in the main arenas of the Gaza Strip and Lebanon (as well as in other arenas: Syria, Iraq, and Yemen) over many months and even years preceding the [October 7] attack..."The practical preparations for a coordinated attack began long before October 2023. Starting in the summer of 2022, steps were taken to coordinate the fronts from Lebanon and Gaza. As early as June 2022, Khalil al-Hayya, a senior member of the Hamas leadership, declared in an interview with the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar (Hezbollah's main mouthpiece) that Hamas was no longer a defensive force but 'an offensive force, whose goal is to liberate the land [to conquer the territory of the State of Israel].' He added that 'we have a plan for the liberation of [Palestine]' and that 'the important thing is to move the next [military] campaign to the very heart of the entity [Israel].'"
According to another document seized by the IDF, then Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh updated Sinwar about a secret meeting organized by Saeed Izadi, head of the Palestine Branch of the Iranian Quds Force, with Nasrallah. In this meeting, Hamas representatives presented scenarios for a campaign against Israel. Sinwar, according to the documents, planned a synchronized attack from the entire Iran-led "axis of resistance" to overwhelm Israel's defenses from all sides. In 2021, he and other Hamas leaders wrote to Quds Force commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani stating their objective: "The great victory and the removal of the cancer," referring to Israel's elimination. "We will never close our eyes, or remain silent, until we achieve this sacred goal."
In another letter to Iran's then Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the Hamas leaders wrote:
"This imaginary entity [Israel] is weaker than people think. With Allah's help, your support, and the backing of our nation, we are capable of uprooting it and removing it as soon as possible. We trust in Allah that we are close to fulfilling this divine promise, from which there is no escape."The plans included exploiting periods of heightened tension, especially Jewish holidays, to ignite a regional confrontation. Hamas leaders also requested extensive financial and military assistance from Iran in preparation for the campaign.
Additional evidence of this strategic coordination emerged two months ago, with details leaked regarding a highly aggressive secret letter reportedly sent by Hamas leaders to Iran's new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. In the letter, the Hamas leaders urged Iran to "activate all fronts" simultaneously against Israel. They specifically called for coordinated military escalation from Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and other arenas controlled by Iran-backed militias.
The significance of these revelations cannot be overstated.
For years, many Western diplomats and analysts insisted that Hamas was primarily a local Palestinian movement focused on the Gaza Strip and the conflict with Israel. Others argued that Hezbollah would avoid a major war because of Lebanon's internal collapse and economic devastation.
The captured documents demolish these assumptions. The documents show that Hamas leaders viewed themselves as an integral part of Iran's regional military alliance. The relationship between Hamas and Iran was not tactical or temporary. It was ideological, financial, and military. The same applies to Hezbollah. Created, armed, trained, and financed by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hezbollah is not just a Lebanese faction. It is Iran's most powerful foreign proxy and a central pillar of the Iranian campaign against Israel.
Most importantly, the documents expose the true objective behind the October 7 massacre: the total elimination of Israel. The attack was not designed merely to murder Israelis, abduct hostages or improve Hamas's political standing. Hamas leaders believed the assault could trigger a region-wide war that would overwhelm Israel totally in a "final solution."
The Hamas documents carry important lessons for the US and Western governments.
First, the October 7 massacre was a component of Iran's broader regional war against Israel. Second, the documents demonstrate that ceasefires and negotiations with Hamas do not alter the group's core objective. Even while engaging in diplomatic talks, Hamas leaders were actively coordinating with Iran and Hezbollah regarding scenarios for Israel's complete destruction. Third, the revelations expose the failure of those in the West who continue to believe that Iran and its terror proxies can be somehow integrated into a stable regional order before fundamentally changing their ideology and behavior. So long as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranian regime continue to exist in their current form, the chances of another October 7-style massacre remain dangerously high. The ideology driving these groups has not changed. Their objectives have not changed. Their leaders continue to speak openly waging jihad against Israel and destroying it. October 7, 2023 was not the end of the war waged by the Iranian regime and its terror proxies. In their eyes, it was only the beginning.
*Khaled Abu Toameh is an award-winning journalist based in Jerusalem.
*Follow Khaled Abu Toameh on X (formerly Twitter)
© 2026 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute.

Saudi Arabia: The Fruits of the Vision in Times of Chaos
Yousef Al-Dayni/Asharq Al Awsat/May 19/2026
Major historical turning points constitute tremendous opportunities, despite how they may be misunderstood if we fail to read the broader context and the context behind the chaos of daily events. There is no doubt that this unprecedented crisis in the history of the Middle East, between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran and its proxies on the other, is one of those historical junctures that could present the moderate states, foremost among them Saudi Arabia, a historic opportunity. This is especially true given that Riyadh, by virtue of its long-established traditions, has dealt with crises wisely and prudently.
Today, it is reaping the rewards of its long-term investment in infrastructure and diversification. An additional factor cannot be overlooked: Vision 2030, which was launched under Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and the proactive involvement of Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Crown Prince and Prime Minister, setting comprehensive and radical reform in motion. It is a grave mistake to reduce these reforms to their economic dimension; at their core, they represented a reconceptualization of national sovereignty in all its dimensions.
For decades, Gulf security relied on international partnerships, and this is a longstanding pattern in the region’s history. For example, in 1979 the United States stood by as its closest regional ally in Iran collapsed. Likewise, it would have remained passive in Bahrain and Egypt during the so-called “Arab Spring,” if not for Saudi Arabia’s distinctive approach to the situation and its support of stability in all the countries hit with the winds of this “spring.” The negative response to the Abqaiq attack was also a major turning point that led to a reassessment. In truth, perhaps the only exception was the liberation of Kuwait in 1991. Otherwise, with every difficult challenge in the region’s history, great powers pursued their own strategic interests, as is their right.
Addressing this reality was at the forefront of Saudi Arabia’s post-Vision transformation. Over the past decade, the Kingdom launched an exceptional vision that cannot be confined to economic diversification alone. One could say that it was a decisive and strategic declaration of a project centered on investment within Saudi Arabia itself: its land, its future, and its citizens.
This is what may be described as the Vision’s doctrine, which runs far deeper than any arms deal or military alliance. Since then, the Kingdom has launched defense initiatives that amounted to a genuine break from historical models of dependency. The Saudi Arabian Military Industries company now aims to localize fifty percent of defense spending by 2030, after it had not exceeded 8 percent before the Vision was launched. Likewise, partnerships with major defense institutions shifted from mere delivery contracts to agreements requiring the transfer of technology and expertise, as well as the capacity building and sustainable industry.
On the diplomatic front, the 2023 agreement improved Saudi-Iranian relations, reduced escalation, and introduced understandings that undoubtedly redrew the map of regional expectations, proving that the Kingdom is capable of crafting settlements instead of waiting for others to impose them. Today, the Kingdom has more leverage than ever before. It has the largest economy in the region, it is home to the largest oil reserves, and it has demonstrated its ability to engage in balanced dialogue with both Tehran and Washington without losing credibility, thanks to the clarity with which it addresses all issues through diplomatic tools previously new to the region.
In light of current conditions, it is impossible to imagine any solution to the accumulated chaos in the region without comprehensive regional treaties with Riyadh at the center, reordering and repositioning to safeguard the common interests of the region’s states and redefines the role of each party in a manner that reflects real balances of power.
What distinguishes the present moment is that the principle of respect for sovereignty is no longer merely defensive rhetoric. It has become a cornerstone of the new international currently taking shape, and it is no secret that Riyadh plays a major role in promoting development projects around the world, from infrastructure initiatives in Africa and Central Asia to projects in several Arab countries, through an extraordinary model that is not grounded in tutelage or interference in domestic affairs.
Today, Gulf security is a shared responsibility among all the states concerned, while coordination cannot and should be identical across every political issue, for this has proven unattainable. Instead, what is needed are practical alliances based on clear and common objectives: shared maritime security in waterways including the Strait of Hormuz, the exchange of early warning data, joint mine-clearing exercises, and economic integration that grants all parties, including Iran, an economic interest ensuring the continued security of maritime routes.
Despite its unprecedented difficulties, this crisis has given the Kingdom the ability to project itself as the pivotal player of the region. This is not solely about military capabilities, though its military ranks among the strongest; it is also underpinned by the infrastructure it has invested for decades. This was magnified many times over through the ambitious projects of Vision 2030, which transformed logistics systems into capital - a strategy now bearing fruit during this crisis, as seen with Jeddah Islamic Port, which has become a regional hub competing with the region’s largest ports. Riyadh’s logistical ambitions also extend to linking East and West through land and maritime corridors that would make the Kingdom an unavoidable point of transit.
With regard to oil policy, Saudi Arabia demonstrated, through management of OPEC+ during years of sharp fluctuations in global oil markets, an unprecedented knack for negotiating and strategizing. It went from merely overseeing production to managing international expectations through foresight regarding supply and demand strategies at sensitive moments. In truth, this Saudi policy of uniting oil reserves, advanced competitive ports, logistical corridors, and market-management strategies has given Riyadh unrivaled leverage as the region is rebuilt.
The war will inevitably subside and reconstruction and economic integration will follow. At that point, Saudi Arabia - with its weight, symbolism, and wisdom - will be in pole position to exercise effective leadership in the Middle East. Indeed, it did not wait for the storm to end; rather, it continued advancing its development project in the midst and height of the crisis, without forgetting to extend a helping hand to neighbors during some of the darkest moments in the history of the Middle East.

Netanyahu pushes for US military aid drawdownHome » Military and Political Power
Bradley Bowman and Justin Leopold-Cohen/FDD's Long War Journal/May 19/2026
Amid unresolved conflicts with Iran and Lebanon, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to promote a plan to move his country away from American military aid. Speaking to 60 Minutes on May 10, Netanyahu argued that Israel should “draw down to zero the American financial support” for the Israeli military. Instead, he called for “joint projects,” with both countries contributing the same amount of funding.
Netanyahu’s proposal comes as he seeks re-election, and public polling and congressional votes in the United States suggest that some Americans’ views toward Israel are changing. While there is a broad consensus that the relationship between the US and Israel should evolve over time from an emphasis on aid to a strategic partnership framework, replacing US foreign military financing (FMF) in the short- or even medium-term may pose challenges, given that Israel’s military requirements are growing and it is already spending an extraordinary share of gross domestic product on defense.
The current US-Israel Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed in 2016 and lays out how much assistance Washington will provide each fiscal year (FY) from 2019 to 2028. It provides Israel $3.3 billion per year in FMF and $500 million annually for cooperative missile defense programs, for a total of $3.8 billion per year for 10 years. The large majority of that FMF must be spent in the United States, and Israel must spend all of those funds in the US by 2028 under the current MOU.
FMF has played an instrumental role in helping Israel become the preeminent military power in the Middle East, securing common interests, and taking the fight to America’s adversaries in the region, including Iran and its terror proxies. The United States and Israel demonstrated an extraordinary ability during the 40-Day War with Iran to conduct combined military operations, and Israel struck thousands of Iranian targets, reducing the burden on the US military. That outcome would have been impossible without the F-35 and F-15 aircraft that FMF helped Israel purchase.
Twenty years ago, FMF amounted to approximately 30 percent of Israel’s defense budget. That proportion then declined, hovering around 15-20 percent for the last decade, before spiking to approximately 35 percent in 2024 due to supplemental US funding after the Hamas-led terror attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. In the absence of another supplemental, the percentage now is on track to fall below 10 percent after Israel’s 2026 budget increased defense spending.
Following the multi-front war that began on October 7, Israel must spend tens of billions of dollars to replenish and expand its arsenal of air- and ground-launched munitions and air defense interceptors. Israel must also procure dozens of expensive but essential aircraft, including more Apache attack helicopters, KC-46 refueling aircraft, and additional squadrons of F-15 and F-35 aircraft, while also addressing ground force shortcomings revealed on October 7.
On one level, it seems reasonable for Israel to increase its defense budget to compensate for an FMF phase-out. Israel’s economy has continued to grow, and the country’s 2026 budget included approximately $49 billion for defense, representing a roughly 6 percent increase compared to 2025.
There are two challenges, however, that this math does not consider. First, Israel is already spending around 7 percent of its GDP on defense — far higher than any member of NATO and more than double the percentage Americans currently spend on defense. From a political perspective, these are extraordinary amounts for a democracy to allocate to defense — and it is unclear whether Israel can spend even more to compensate for a prospective FMF phase out. Second, Israeli procurement plans have apparently already spoken for more than $20 billion in FMF for the 10-year period starting in FY 2029 when the procurement of additional F-15s and F-35s is included in the total.
If FMF is phased out, Israel would have to increase its defense budget to levels that its politics and finances may not support or be able to sustain. If Israel fails to replace lost FMF funding and then some, it could leave Israel less secure and America with a less capable partner in the Middle East. Especially as the United States sells advanced systems to other countries in the Middle East, a premature reduction in FMF may also make it difficult to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge, which is required by US law.
Netanyahu may believe that calling for an end to FMF wins him favor with elements of his right-wing coalition, but the prime minister’s position has provided momentum and perceived legitimacy to those in Washington who have called for an end to the funding. As a result, FMF is likely to end sooner than it would have, creating additional challenges for Israeli and American security.
*Bradley Bowman is the senior director of FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP), where Justin Leopold-Cohen is a senior research analyst. Follow Bradley on X @Brad_L_Bowman and Justin on X @jleopoldcohen. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_CMPP.

Turkey’s Missile Ambitions Should Alarm Europe and the United States
Sinan Ciddi/Real Clear Defense/May 19/2026
For years, European officials viewed Turkey’s growing defense industry as an important asset. Turkish drones proved effective in conflicts from Libya to Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine. Ankara marketed itself as a NATO ally capable of covering gaps in Europe’s deteriorating defense-industrial base. Now, as the European Union (EU) scrambles to rearm in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war and growing uncertainty about long-term American commitments to Europe, Turkey is once again presenting itself as an irreplaceable security partner.
But Europe and the United States are ignoring a critical question: What exactly are Turkey’s military ambitions?
The answer increasingly points to a country pursuing strategic autonomy through offensive missile capabilities designed not simply for defense but for coercion, regional intimidation, and worldwide leverage. As evidenced by the showcasing of its new Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) – the Yildirimhan, Turkey’s accelerating development of ballistic, cruise, and potentially hypersonic missiles should force Washington and Brussels to reconsider whether Ankara is evolving into a stabilizing NATO partner—or a revisionist power armed with increasingly sophisticated strike capabilities.
A recent report documents the extraordinary pace of Turkey’s missile modernization program. What began in the 1990s as a limited effort to build retaliatory missile capabilities has transformed into one of the most ambitious missile-development programs among NATO members.
Turkey is now developing a layered arsenal that includes the Bora, Tayfun, and Cenk ballistic missile families alongside long-range cruise missile systems such as the Gezgin and SOM. According to the report, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan personally ordered the acceleration of missiles with ranges exceeding 800 kilometers and directed the development of systems able of ranges beyond 2,000 kilometers.
This is not the posture of a state focused solely on territorial defense.
The strategic geography of these missile systems matters. As reporting demonstrates, a 2,000-kilometer-range Turkish missile places vast portions of Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean, Israel, North Africa, and the Gulf within reach. Turkey’s Tayfun system reportedly already exceeds Mach 5, while the Cenk missile appears to be designed with maneuverable reentry-vehicle technology associated with advanced medium-range ballistic missile systems. It is worth noting at this point that the reported capabilities of Turkey’s new ballistic missile technology have not been independently verified.
At the same time, Ankara is attempting to position itself as Europe’s future defense partner. Turkish officials increasingly argue that Europe cannot construct a credible post-American security architecture without Turkey’s defense-industrial capacity. Recent cooperation with Spain on the Hürjet trainer aircraft and Ankara’s broader push for involvement in European defense projects reflect this effort. Ankara is simultaneously pushing narratives of its value to European security to reinvigorate its accession to the EU.
European leaders appear increasingly receptive. The logic is understandable: Turkey possesses manufacturing capacity, an expanding defense sector, and a large standing military. Yet Europe risks making a major strategic error by treating Turkish military growth as politically neutral.
Turkey’s missile development program cannot be separated from Erdogan’s wider ideological and international agenda.
Over the past decade, Ankara has repeatedly threatened fellow NATO member Greece, challenged Cyprus’s sovereignty, militarized disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean, and escalated anti-Israel rhetoric to unprecedented levels. Erdogan himself has repeatedly warned that Turkey could “come suddenly one night” against its adversaries—a phrase now embedded in Turkish strategic signaling. Turkish officials have openly threatened Greece over maritime disputes while simultaneously expanding ballistic missile ranges capable of striking Athens and beyond.
Israel faces an even more alarming trajectory. Since the October 7 attacks, Erdogan’s rhetoric toward Israel has grown steadily more confrontational. Senior Turkish officials routinely compare Israeli leaders to Nazis while Ankara continues hosting Hamas-linked figures and preserving ties with Islamist networks across the region. Turkish missile development must therefore be understood not in isolation, but in the context of a government increasingly comfortable with coercive regional posturing.
This is precisely why Ankara’s growing missile arsenal should concern Europe and the United States. For decades, NATO’s shared defense architecture depended upon interoperability, strategic trust, and political alignment. Turkey’s existing trajectory undermines all three.
The problem is not simply that Turkey is building missiles. Many NATO allies possess sophisticated strike capabilities. The problem is that Ankara increasingly behaves like a power pursuing strategic independence from the West while simultaneously benefiting from NATO’s protections and Europe’s economic integration. It does so simultaneously, while entering in defense procurement agreements with Russia. In 2019, Turkey purchased and still maintains the S-400 missile defense system, resulting in Ankara’s ouster from the F-35 program, in addition to being subjected to limited sanctions by Washington.
Indeed, the IISS report shows that Turkey’s missile-development ecosystem emerged partly because Ankara grew frustrated with dependence on NATO systems and Western export controls. Turkey’s pursuit of indigenous propulsion systems, vertical launch systems, and long-range cruise missiles demonstrates a deliberate strategy to decouple itself from Western constraints.
This has serious consequences for transatlantic security.
First, Turkey’s missile advances risk triggering a regional arms race in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. Greece will almost certainly deepen missile-defense cooperation with Israel and France. Israel, already wary of Turkey’s growing hostility, will increasingly treat Ankara as a long-term strategic threat rather than a difficult regional actor. Gulf states may similarly accelerate missile procurement programs.
Second, Turkey’s growing defense-industrial independence weakens Western leverage. The more self-sufficient Ankara becomes in propulsion systems, guidance technologies, and missile production, the less vulnerable it becomes to American or European sanctions pressure. This is particularly important given Turkey’s continued balancing between NATO and revisionist powers such as Russia and China.
Third, there is a growing risk that Europe’s desperation for defense-industrial capacity will lead decision-makers to ignore the political character of Erdogan’s government altogether. Already, some European officials claim that geopolitical realities require “pragmatism” toward Turkey regardless of democratic backsliding or regional aggression. That logic may produce short-term defense cooperation, but it additionally risks empowering a government whose strategic objectives increasingly diverge from those of the transatlantic alliance.
Turkey’s missile program ultimately reveals a deeper ambition: Ankara no longer sees itself merely as NATO’s southeastern flank. It increasingly sees itself as an autonomous Eurasian military power capable of coercing rivals, shaping regional conflicts, and bargaining with both East and West simultaneously.
Europe and the United States must recognize that reality before Turkey’s expanding missile arsenal significantly changes the regional balance of power. The question is no longer whether Turkey can develop advanced missile capabilities. It clearly can. The real question is whether the West fully understands what Erdogan intends to do with them.
**Sinan Ciddi is a senior fellow and director of the Turkey program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).

Iran Refuses Defeat While the US Hesitates
Sam Menassa/Asharq Al Awsat/May 19/2026
After President Donald Trump rejected Iran’s response to his proposals for peace talks to end the war, with Tehran calling the American demands as “unreasonable” nearly two months after the outbreak of the conflict, it is no longer an exaggeration to say that Iran is defying the Americans and behaving like the victor. It insists on setting the terms; meanwhile, Washington seems hesitant, oscillating between short-lived proposals and measures that constantly shift.
The first question that comes to mind is this: how can a country like Iran - even under normal circumstances - remain capable of dictating terms to America and Israel after enduring a war like the two rounds of conflict, in June 2025 and this year? The latest example, according to media reports, is its demand for Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon as a condition for ending the war.
It is no longer useful to keep telling Americans and Westerners in general that the rulers of Tehran and their allies/proxies spread throughout the region have a different conception of victory and defeat. In the logic of ideological regimes, victory is not measured solely by the balance of losses; they also see steadfastness and the regime’s ability to remain intact - even if only outwardly - as part of the equation, as well as the regime’s maintain control domestically, even amid security instability and miserable economic and living conditions. Iran’s pride has overwhelmed any inclination toward surrender or even serious concessions. Moreover, the top brass of the regime appears prepared for another military confrontation aimed at exerting further pressure.
Iran is perhaps convinced that time is on its side, unlike the American administration. The latter faces multiple crises and obligations: the economy and oil prices, then the midterm elections in November, and then divisions over the war itself within both the Democratic and Republican parties. Finally, and most importantly, the war has a fundamental flaw: the absence of a strategic vision regarding its objectives and what comes next.
Does Washington want to overthrow the regime? All indications suggest otherwise. Does it seek to change its behavior? That would prove difficult, as the behavior of the Iranian regime is not merely linked to temporary political decisions that can easily be adjusted. Iran’s approach is shaped by a deeply intertwined ideological, security, and economic structure that makes any shift costly for the regime. Does it want to halt uranium enrichment? That task is also complicated, because for Iran, enrichment is a matter of sovereignty, security, and regional balance, not simply a technological program. Abandoning it is therefore viewed as surrendering a crucial strategic asset.
As for imposing restrictions on the ballistic missile program, that may be the most difficult objective of all. The program is the backbone of Iran’s deterrence doctrine given that it has no air force comparable to those of its adversaries. Iran built its power around missiles, drones, and allied networks.
Abandoning its regional proxies is no less complicated; these networks are not merely instruments of foreign influence that can easily be discarded. They are an essential part of Iran’s security and strategic doctrine and one of the pillars of the regime’s survival. This explains why Tehran links any settlement to Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. As for the Strait of Hormuz, it has become a source of power equivalent to a nuclear bomb, according to Mohammad Mokhber, adviser to the supreme leader.
The United States is unlikely to accept Iran’s conditions, and even if Washington compromises on some issues, Israel, whether under its current government or any leadership that replaces it in the future, would not.
Washington only has difficult options: end the war through an agreement that respects some of Iran’s red lines, avoid military escalation while tightening sanctions and economic isolation - as a slow path with uncertain outcomes; or proceed toward what it considers a “strategic victory” by finishing the confrontation that effectively began with the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation and was consolidated by the 2025 war.
Given this state of affairs, there is a growing sense of anxiety across the region, because it is likely to pay the price of any of these courses of action. Continuing the war means a direct threat to energy supplies, ports, and navigation routes. Returning to the pre-2023 status quo would mean a return to Iran’s policy of attrition and destabilization. The issue is no longer simply what Washington wants from Iran, but rather what kind of Iran will remain? A state capable of deterrence and compromise, or a regime wielding nuclear ambitions, missiles, proxies, and weaponizing the Strait of Hormuz?
The United States has often stumbled in the region, but this moment offers opportunities that Trump could exploit to achieve several breakthroughs that pave the way for containing and besieging Iran, compelling Tehran to adopt different policies: returning to the New York meeting and the resolutions of the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, completing what was begun in Gaza and ending the war in a way that restores the path toward a two-state solution; supporting Syria and providing economic and security assistance to fortify the new regime so it can engage in peace and regional security; and offering serious support to Lebanon that would encourage Arab states to re-engage and help the country free itself from the hegemony of Iran and Hezbollah, facilitating progress in negotiations with Israel.
These rare opportunities come on top of Iran’s enormous losses over the past two years: the collapse to of its “forward defense” doctrine after the war reached its territory, the economic crisis, the loss of Syria, the setbacks of its proxies, the shrinking room for maneuver available to Russia and China, and the rise of projects focused on regional economic and strategic interconnective. If Trump succeeds in investing in these shifts wisely, he could achieve through soft containment what wars failed to accomplish through military force: encircling Iran without overthrowing it.

China and Today’s World
Dr. Nassif Hitti/Asharq Al Awsat/May 19/2026
President Donald Trump’s 43-hour visit to Beijing was very different from his first visit in 2017. Then, some described the trip as an attempt to break the ice, a natural step at that stage that sought to improve their “personal acquaintance” and reinforce dialogue between the two superpowers. The second visit consolidates the course of “normal” relations between Washington and Beijing. Needless to say, normal relations between major international powers entail areas of both cooperation and disagreement, especially in the “post-post–Cold War” world. This trajectory is not predetermined by conflicts or open disputes rooted in the past and entrenched ideological differences that prevent rapprochement or place obstacles before understanding on certain issues. At the same time, this does not mean the two countries will enjoy fully harmonious relations and seamless joint cooperation on the international stage. It is a system that has yet to fully stabilize in terms of its framework and principles. Chinese President Xi Jinping does not see his country in this frame. The People’s Republic of China, rather, is one of the principal powers in a new world divided into a “new bipolar world” of North and the South. That does not mean that this will permanently remain a confrontational binary, nor that there are no disagreements and differences between the two sides.
This new binary is the contemporary version of the Cold War’s “East–West” divide.
The timing of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing, just after Trump’s trip, sent a message about the special nature of relations between Moscow and Beijing, and each side’s affirmation of that special relationship. Accordingly, the normalization of relations and the degree of “warmth” resulting from the broad understandings reached between the United States and the People’s Republic of China does not, from the Chinese perspective, come at the expense of relations with Moscow.
In the same context, the American president warned Taiwan against contemplating a declaration of independence, which would inevitably lead to a Chinese war on Taiwan. In such a scenario, Washington would not stand with or support the latter, as its existing support is intended to preserve the status quo, not to provoke Beijing on an issue of absolute importance for its standpoint. The shift away from the framework of permanent confrontation that once prevailed in the past is also evident in the Middle East. Beyond the “traditional” rhetoric of solidarity on certain regional issues, the People’s Republic of China maintains good relations with rival or competing powers of the Middle East. This is far removed from the image of the old Maoist Communist China that some still try to preserve and upon which they attempt to build their political discourse, narratives, or wishful thinking. Stability in the Middle East is a strategic political and economic interest for China, as well as the relationships Beijing has forged with all parties in the region, all reflect this balanced and pragmatic Chinese approach. It is an approach that speaks to Beijing’s strategic vision of international relations and on the basis of interests, rather than the “discourse of yesterday” on which some still wish to wager.
Strengthening China’s role internationally passes, above all, through the gateway of economics. This naturally reinforces China’s economic position in different regions of the world while also enhancing its political role and strategic standing within the new global order, which the People’s Republic of China will undoubtedly play a fundamental role in shaping.

The Strangers in the Streets: Hezbollah, the War That Made It, and the Stages of Its Unraveling
By: Makram Rabah/Hover Institution/May 19/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/05/154584/
In the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, as West Beirut struggled not only to absorb the scale of its physical devastation but also to grasp the deeper collapse of the political order that had once given the country a semblance of coherence, something unfamiliar began to emerge from within the fractured landscape. It did not merely resemble the militias that had already come to define the war years.
In the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, as West Beirut struggled not only to absorb the scale of its physical devastation but also to grasp the deeper collapse of the political order that had once given the country a semblance of coherence, something unfamiliar began to emerge from within the fractured landscape. It did not merely resemble the militias that had already come to define the war years. It suggested the arrival of a different kind of actor altogether, one that spoke a different language, moved with a different discipline, and, perhaps most importantly, imagined a different society. Beirut had already grown accustomed to armed groups, to ideological militancy, to young men invoking revolution and liberation while navigating a terrain of checkpoints, ruins, and shifting front lines. Yet what appeared in those years was not simply another faction competing for ground in the chaos. It was a formation that sought to regulate that chaos, to reshape it, and ultimately to impose its own order upon it.
They were bearded, austere, often rigid in both demeanor and appearance, and they did not confine their activities to the battlefield because for them the battlefield extended into everyday life, into neighborhoods, into customs, into gender codes, into the very definition of what it meant to belong. Liquor stores were bombed not because they represented foreign occupation, but because they violated an emerging moral order. Women who refused to conform to imposed standards were harassed and assaulted, with acid, not as political adversaries, but as signs of social deviation. What was unfolding in Lebanon in those years was not simply a military phenomenon.
It was the embryonic form of a social and ideological project that would soon harden into something far more durable than an ordinary militia. By the time Hezbollah formally announced itself in 1985, that project had already acquired enough coherence to leave little room for misunderstanding, and its founding document remains one of the clearest texts for understanding the movement not as it later wished to be seen, but as it originally defined itself.
Stage One: The Incubation of War
In their open letter addressed to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and World, Hezbollah spoke in expansive and unambiguous terms, declaring:
We are the sons of the nation of Hezbollah, whose vanguard God granted victory in Iran, where it reestablished the nucleus of the central Islamic state in the world. We are committed to the commands of a single leadership, embodied today in a wise and just authority represented by the qualified Jurist—the Guardian (Wilayat al-Faqih)—may his shadow be prolonged: Ruhollah al-Mousawi al-Khomeini, the rightly guided Imam, the Grand Ayatollah.
This was not the language of a localized resistance movement concerned only with the recovery of territory or the defense of a national border. It was the language of incorporation into a broader ideological order, one that placed authority outside Lebanon, one that subordinated the local to the transnational, and one that defined its purpose not through the logic of state sovereignty but through the logic of revolutionary continuity. For an outside observer, particularly one inclined to reduce Middle Eastern armed movements either to anti-occupation insurgencies or simple foreign proxies, this distinction matters enormously. Hezbollah was never simply a proxy in the narrow conventional sense, nor was it merely an insurgency reacting to occupation. From its inception it was an instrument embedded within a larger architecture of power, one that used Lebanon’s collapse not as a tragic backdrop but as fertile ground.
It is here that the insight of Lokman Slim, one of Hezbollah’s harshest critics gunned down by the group in 2021 becomes indispensable, because Slim refused the comforting falsehood that Hezbollah could be understood primarily as the child of resistance. He insisted, with the clarity that so often made his interventions both devastating and difficult to ignore, that Hezbollah was not the child of resistance but the child of civil war. That formulation is not a slogan. It is a methodological correction. It reorients the entire story away from the mythology Hezbollah later built around itself and back toward the conditions that made its rise possible. It asks us to look not first at Israel, nor even at Iran, but at the internal collapse of Lebanon’s political order, at the long process by which sovereignty thinned out while the shell of the state remained standing. Civil war in this reading did not merely create chaos. It created a political environment in which the state survived as a façade while authority was redistributed among militias, foreign armies, intelligence services, parties, sectarian bosses, and revolutionary intermediaries. In such an environment, actors like Hezbollah do not appear as exceptions. They appear as logical products.
Slim’s 2018 lecture entitled Deciphering Hezbollah on war, Iraq, Iran, and the birth of Hezbollah remains one of the sharpest articulations of this point. He begins from what appears to be a simple premise but is in fact a foundational one: in civil wars that take place in countries theoretically governed by central governments, the sovereignty of those governments shrinks and contracts. In the Lebanese case this truth was especially stark. When people think of the Lebanese Civil War and the erosion of Lebanese sovereignty, they think first of the PLO, of Syria, of Israel. But Slim reminds us that another major actor is often forgotten, and that forgetting is not accidental.
It obscures the true ecology of war from which Hezbollah emerged. Iraq, and specifically Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, had a deep, organized, and significant presence in Lebanon long before Hezbollah formally declared itself. It had allies, parliamentary representation through the Ba’ath, links to Palestinian organizations such as the Arab Liberation Front, and a real foothold in Lebanese political life. To understand the rise of Hezbollah, one must first recover this more crowded field. Lebanon was never a stage on which only one or two foreign powers competed. It was a revolving door of actors entering and exiting, each seeking clients, influence, legitimacy, and armed leverage.
Iran’s presence in Lebanon during those crucial years was also more elusive than later narratives suggest. Slim notes that it is in many ways harder to trace Iran’s early role than Iraq’s, even though Iran would become far more decisive in the long run. There are several reasons for this. The first is that before the overthrow of the Shah, Iran’s presence did not yet take the form that it would later assume under Khomeinism. The second is that the period between the fall of the Shah in 1979 and the consolidation of Khomeinist control by 1981 was itself a period of internal Iranian contestation, and those contests were reflected abroad, including in Lebanon. The third is Syria’s own ambiguous policy under Hafez al-Assad, which complicated the mapping of Iranian activity. In other words, Iran did not descend upon Lebanon in a fully consolidated ideological form. Its early involvement was fragmented, personalized, and partially concealed. Slim makes a striking point when he says that in remembering that period people often remember names rather than organizations. They recall figures such as Hossein Ali Montazeri or Mohammad Montazeri, but not always the precise structures through which Iranian influence operated. This matters because it reminds us that Hezbollah began not as a fully visible institution but as an assemblage of networks, relationships, clerics, intermediaries, armed cells, and ideological committees.
Stage Two: Shadow Formation
This brings us to the second stage of Hezbollah’s evolution: the stage of shadow formation. Before Hezbollah declared itself, before it became a recognized brand, it existed as a process of coordination, ideological preparation, and armed experimentation. The Israeli invasion of 1982 accelerated this process, but it did not invent it. That invasion certainly shattered what remained of the Lebanese order in Beirut and South Lebanon, but the project that would become Hezbollah was already gathering shape through a convergence of Iranian revolutionary ambition, Syrian strategic permissiveness, and local social transformation inside parts of the Shiite community. What made the period so important was not merely that Israel invaded, but that invasion interacted with an already fractured domestic scene. This allowed a new actor not only to fight but to define itself as morally and politically superior to the older currents around it.
The mythology of Hezbollah has always depended on presenting its formation as a direct, organic answer to occupation. That myth is politically effective because it simplifies causality. It says: there was invasion, therefore there was resistance. Yet the historical record, and Slim’s intervention in particular, makes clear that the truth is both darker and more revealing. The early Khomeinist networks in Lebanon were not simply preparing to resist Israel. They were also preparing to reorder the Shiite political field itself. Slim is blunt on this point. He argues that the war between Iraqi and Iranian influence on Lebanese soil, often trivialized in memory as the so-called “War of the Embassies,” was not merely a spectacle of foreign missions clashing. It marked the beginning of what he explicitly calls political cleansing within the ranks of Lebanese Shiites. That phrase is crucial. The process was not incidental. It was constitutive.
Stage Three: The Elimination of Competitors
Here, then, lies the third stage: the elimination of competitors. Before Hezbollah could become the dominant expression of Shiite politics in Lebanon, the pluralism of that space had to be broken. Iraqi influence had to be pushed out. Ba’athist currents had to be destroyed or marginalized. Leftist and communist influences had to be contained. Independent Shiite voices who did not fit the emerging ideological mold had to be intimidated, isolated, or removed. Slim names this directly when he recalls the killings of prominent Shiites figures like Riyad Taha and Musa Shuayb and evokes the broader pattern in which others, not necessarily Ba’athists and not necessarily tied to Iraq, were also swept aside. The point is not to assign every killing mechanistically to one center, but to understand the political logic of the moment. A new ideological order cannot consolidate in a crowded field unless that field is narrowed. Hezbollah did not inherit an empty communal space. It had to create one.
This is where the relationship with the Amal Movement must also be understood with precision. Too often the history is flattened into a neat succession in which Amal represented an earlier Shiite mobilization and Hezbollah a later, more radical alternative. But the reality was messier and more revealing. As Slim notes, there was no formal Hezbollah yet in the full sense, and Amal itself had become a site of contestation, institutional weakening, and instrumentalization. It was not simply that Hezbollah emerged after Amal. Rather, Amal in certain moments functioned as a vessel, a terrain, or a compromised intermediary through which parts of the Iranian project could move before a distinct Hezbollah identity was fully declared. To recognize this is not to collapse the two movements into one another, but to see that the prehistory of Hezbollah runs through the fragmentation and repurposing of existing Shiite institutions. What we later call Hezbollah did not leap fully formed into existence. It coalesced through infiltration, duplication, ideological selection, and the gradual creation of parallel loyalties.
Stage Four: Ideological Revelation
If the first stage of Hezbollah’s evolution was the contraction of sovereignty, the second its shadow formation within a shattered landscape, and the third the liquidation of opponents, then the fourth stage was ideological revelation. This came with the 1985 Open Letter, but the importance of that document is often misunderstood. It was not a beginning. It was a declaration of something already underway. By the time Hezbollah announced itself publicly, the movement had already established enough armed, clerical, and social presence to define itself in maximal terms. This is why the document matters so much. It does not speak like a movement improvising under duress. It speaks like one already confident in its place within a larger revolutionary chain of command. The document placed Wilayat al-Faqih at the center, rejected the legitimacy of Western influence, condemned the Lebanese political system, and framed Hezbollah as part of a historical and theological struggle larger than Lebanon itself. This was the moment when the child of civil war named itself and did so without embarrassment.
To say that Hezbollah was born of war rather than resistance does not mean occupation was irrelevant. Occupation gave the movement rhetorical power, operational opportunity, and real targets. It allowed Hezbollah to fuse social discipline with military action in a way that older actors could not. But occupation alone cannot explain why Hezbollah took the form it did, why it developed the organizational culture it did, why it insisted on subordination to an external religious-political authority, or why it devoted so much energy not only to fighting Israel but to policing its own community and eliminating alternative political expressions within it. Resistance can explain part of Hezbollah’s appeal. It cannot explain the fullness of its project, Civil war can.
Stage Five: Strategic Exceptionalism
The fifth stage in Hezbollah’s evolution came after the formal end of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) with the Taif Agreement. This is the stage that might be called strategic exceptionalism. It is perhaps the most consequential stage of all because it is where Hezbollah ceased being merely a wartime formation and became a durable political structure. Taif ended the war in name and disarmed most militias in practice, yet Hezbollah retained its arsenal under the justification that it was not a militia but a resistance movement. This single asymmetry would shape postwar Lebanon more than perhaps any other arrangement. While other actors were folded into the state, diminished by it, or neutralized through its institutions, Hezbollah was allowed to preserve the very instrument that gives any armed actor real political leverage: an autonomous monopoly over organized violence inside its own domain.
This phase is often described in the language of pragmatism, as though Hezbollah simply took advantage of a loophole in the postwar settlement. But that description is too thin. What actually happened was that the wartime logic identified by Slim was preserved under a peacetime façade. The state returned, but not really. Institutions reopened, elections resumed, ministries functioned, reconstruction began, and downtown Beirut rose from the rubble. Yet beneath this apparent return of normal life, one crucial wartime exception remained intact. Hezbollah’s weapons meant that war had not really ended. The condition of exception was merely redistributed. Slim’s point that war is Hezbollah’s incubating environment and the condition of its survival becomes especially important here. War, in this sense, does not need to exist only as literal frontline combat. It can persist as a governing condition, as a permanent rationale, as a deferred emergency, as a structure of suspended sovereignty. Hezbollah survived Taif not because peace failed to arrive, but because peace arrived in a partial, compromised, and uneven form that still left intact the logic of exceptional arms.
During this postwar period Hezbollah displayed extraordinary strategic patience. Unlike many Lebanese actors, it did not rush to assume the burdens of full governance. It let others manage the corruption, compromise, and public resentment that came with state administration while it built a parallel order of its own. Amal and Nabih Berri, elected speaker in 1992, absorbed much of the representational labor within formal politics. The Syrian regime managed the broader architecture of coercion and elite bargaining. Hezbollah, meanwhile, concentrated on constructing a dense ecosystem of schools, clinics, welfare associations, media platforms, religious institutions, local municipal influence, charitable networks, and cadre formation. This was not merely constituency service. It was the conversion of wartime loyalty into long-term social infrastructure.
That social infrastructure also tells us something about Hezbollah’s internal self-understanding. Movements born in insurgency often romanticize decentralization, improvisation, and heroic sacrifice. Hezbollah certainly cultivated martyrdom and discipline, but its deeper genius lay elsewhere. It was organizational. It built systems. It catalogued families, managed payments, standardized rituals, cultivated internal memory, and turned community management into a sophisticated apparatus. This is why later revelations such as the exposure of its logistical systems and even something as mundane-sounding as its central kitchen matter so much. They reveal not just operational detail but institutional character. Hezbollah ceased long ago to be simply a guerrilla movement. It became a bureaucratized armed order, a state within a state not only in military terms, but in provisioning, welfare, socialization, and everyday governance.
Stage Six: Permanent Resistance After Liberation
The sixth stage came with the year 2000 and the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon. Here Hezbollah confronted what should have been a strategic contradiction. If resistance had been built around liberation from occupation, then Israel’s withdrawal ought to have forced a transition from revolution to statehood, from exception to normalization. Instead, Hezbollah transformed victory into a new basis for continued exception. It claimed the withdrawal not as the fulfillment of its mission, but as proof of the necessity of preserving its arms. Resistance became less a temporary instrument than a permanent identity. This was a critical shift. The organization no longer needed occupation in its earlier form. It needed only the perpetual possibility of conflict, along with contested points such as Shebaa Farms, detainees, violations, and broader regional confrontation, to sustain the argument that disarmament would be premature and dangerous. In other words, the end of one chapter of conflict became the justification for keeping the entire wartime architecture alive.
This is precisely why Slim’s warning remains so sharp. If one accepts the premise that Hezbollah is the child of resistance, then Israeli withdrawal should have clarified its future: the movement would either demilitarize or transform into a normal political force. But if one recognizes that Hezbollah is the child of war, then the opposite becomes legible: any step toward normalcy becomes a threat to its reason for existing as an autonomous armed entity. It is not resistance that must be preserved, but the condition that makes resistance endlessly necessary. War, understood as a permanent exception, becomes the oxygen of the organization.
Stage Seven: Forced Visibility and Domestic Coercion
The assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 marked the beginning of the seventh stage- forced visibility. Up until then Hezbollah had benefited from a complex Syrian-managed order that allowed it to operate with substantial autonomy while avoiding direct ownership of the entire system. Syrian tutelage, for all its brutality and manipulation, offered Hezbollah strategic cover. It managed the broader field of elite coercion and inter-communal bargaining. Hariri’s murder and the subsequent withdrawal of Syrian forces stripped away that cover. For the first time Hezbollah had to operate more directly in a Lebanese field no longer governed by the same Syrian framework. This changed the movement. It pushed it from being a protected armed actor inside a larger authoritarian arrangement to being a more visible pillar of Lebanon’s fragmented sovereignty.
The 2006 war with Israel allowed Hezbollah to preserve and even amplify its image as the spearhead of resistance. That war remains central to Hezbollah’s mythology because it offered a moment in which endurance under bombardment could be narrated as victory. Yet even that war contained contradictions that later developments would expose. It deepened Hezbollah’s militarization, expanded its prestige in parts of the Arab world, and reinforced the belief among many Lebanese that its arms retained a national function. But it also entrenched the country’s dependence on an actor structurally outside the state, and it reinforced the pattern by which national destruction could be justified through the moral prestige of armed “steadfastness.”
The decisive rupture, however, came in May 2008. When Hezbollah turned its weapons inward against political rivals and against the government of Fouad Siniora, any lingering illusion that its arsenal was reserved solely for external confrontation was shattered. This was not a side episode. It was a revelation. It showed that Hezbollah’s weapons were not simply deterrents against Israel; they were also instruments for setting the limits of domestic politics. In that moment Hezbollah crossed a threshold that matters historically and morally. It ceased to be merely an armed movement with a national narrative and became unmistakably the coercive arbiter of a domestic order. The arms of resistance became the arms of veto. Consequently, the May 7 coup was rewarded in what was hammered out in the Qatari capital in the form of the Doha Accord which gave Hezbollah and Amal veto powers over the Lebanese political system, thus doing away with what remained of the idea of sovereignty.
Stage Eight: Regional Transnationalization
The eighth stage unfolded through Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria. If May 2008 revealed the domestic function of Hezbollah’s arsenal, the Syrian war revealed the regional function of the organization itself. The movement that had built its legitimacy on liberation from occupation now openly crossed borders to preserve Bashar al-Assad’s regime, suppress a largely Syrian uprising, and operate as a transnational expeditionary arm of Iranian power. No rhetorical maneuver could fully conceal this transformation. Hezbollah could still speak the language of resistance, but its actions made clear that it had become something broader and more imperial in function: a regional military actor embedded in the architecture of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Under the guidance of figures such as the infamous IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani, Hezbollah evolved in Syria from a Lebanese hybrid actor into a trainer, organizer, and field commander within a regional project. It accumulated experience in urban warfare, population control, irregular combat, logistical integration, intelligence fusion, and transnational militia management. On paper this made Hezbollah look stronger than ever. It had expanded from a Lebanese armed group into a key node in a regional axis. Yet this expansion contained its own distortions. Fighting in Syria is not the same as fighting Israel. Managing sieges, suppressing local opponents, coordinating with Russian air power, and assisting in the recapture of devastated towns are not the same as preparing for sustained confrontation with a technologically advanced state military capable of deep penetration, intelligence adaptation, and long-range precision strikes. Hezbollah gained experience, but not all experience is fungible. A movement can become more militarized while also becoming strategically miscalibrated.
Stage Nine: Exposure
This matters enormously for understanding what came after October 7, 2023, and the most recent stage in Hezbollah’s evolution: exposure. When Hezbollah entered what it called a support war for Gaza after Hamas’s attack on Israel, it did so under the familiar assumption that ideological alignment and regional obligation outweighed Lebanese national calculation. Yet this decision revealed something that had been maturing for years. Hezbollah had become accustomed to operating in environments where its advantages were significant and its enemies were fragmented or inferior. It had learned how to dominate internal spaces, how to govern shadow territories, how to intimidate rivals, how to survive with support from Iran, how to manage loyal constituencies through welfare and ideology. But the kind of confrontation it now flirted with required a different kind of military and organizational resilience.
The pager attack became one of the most telling symbols of this new phase. Its importance lay not only in the immediate human or tactical damage, but in what it communicated about Hezbollah’s internal condition. For decades Hezbollah cultivated an aura of secrecy, impermeability, and almost mystical operational discipline. It was the organization that knew how to disappear, how to conceal, how to compartmentalize. Yet the ability of its adversary to penetrate its communications, identify patterns, and exploit internal vulnerabilities revealed a profound transformation. Hezbollah had become legible. Its systems could be mapped. Its routines could be predicted. Its secrecy had not vanished, but it had hardened into forms that themselves became targetable. What the pager attack exposed was not merely infiltration. It exposed institutional density.
The pager attack did not emerge in a vacuum, nor was it a purely technical anomaly. It must be situated within a broader pattern of signals intelligence penetration and counter-organizational warfare that has increasingly defined the confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel over the past decade. As Hezbollah expanded geographically and operationally—moving fighters, coordinating across borders, and relying on layered communication systems—it also multiplied the number of nodes through which information flowed. The pager system, once considered a low-tech and relatively secure method of internal coordination, became part of this expanded architecture. Its compromise suggested that Israeli intelligence had not only accessed isolated channels, but had developed a sustained capacity to monitor, map, and anticipate organizational behavior at scale. In that sense, the attack was less about the device itself than about the ecosystem it represented: a network no longer invisible, but increasingly exposed to systematic surveillance and exploitation.
That same logic applies to what was revealed about Hezbollah’s broader logistical apparatus, including the now much-discussed central kitchen. On one level, a centralized provisioning system is a mark of organizational maturity. It means that Hezbollah had evolved beyond improvised militancy into something capable of feeding, managing, and sustaining a large body of fighters and affiliates through routinized systems. But on another level, it was a sign of bureaucratization. A central kitchen is not just a kitchen. It is a metaphor for the organization itself. It signifies regularity, density, repeated patterns, administrative centralization, and a form of embodied dependence. Guerrilla movements survive by dispersal, improvisation, and opacity. Institutions survive by systems. But systems create targets.
This is why the recent war and the exposures it generated matter more than the immediate battlefield headlines alone. They revealed the distance between Hezbollah’s image and its reality. The image remained that of a uniquely adaptive resistance force forged in anti-Israeli struggle. The reality increasingly resembled a hardened, bureaucratic, regionally entangled institution whose combat culture had been shaped not only by anti-Israeli warfare, but by years of internal repression, Syrian counterinsurgency, transnational militia management, and domestic coercion. Such an institution can be formidable, but it can also become rigid, predictable, and strategically overextended.
This overextension also deepened Hezbollah’s alienation from the original society in whose name it had claimed to act. The more it became a regional actor, the less it could plausibly embody a specifically Lebanese national cause. Its rhetoric remained rooted in liberation and dignity, but its behavior increasingly reflected the imperatives of Tehran’s regional strategy. That contradiction is now impossible to hide. It is visible not only in the wars Hezbollah chose to fight, but in the kinds of enemies it defined as legitimate, the kinds of domestic silence it demanded, and the costs it imposed on Lebanon without national consent.
Stage Ten: Peace as Strategic Threat
This is where the question of peace becomes so politically explosive. Many observers continue to imagine that peace or even serious negotiations between Lebanon and Israel would somehow be a concession that strengthens Hezbollah’s argument that Lebanon has capitulated where resistance once stood firm. But this gets the strategic logic backward. For Hezbollah, peace is threatening not because it defeats the organization militarily, but because it undermines the ontological condition that sustains it. If war, or permanent exception, is the environment in which Hezbollah reproduces its legitimacy, then diplomacy, stabilization, and state-to-state arrangements pose a deeper challenge than periodic military pressure. Military confrontation can be folded back into the mythology of sacrifice and steadfastness. Peace cannot. Peace demands transition. It demands accountability. It demands the transfer of authority back to institutions that claim exclusive sovereignty. It demands that the party of war become either a political actor like any other or an openly exposed anomaly.
That is why even the prospect of direct or indirect peace talks between Lebanon and Israel, particularly under strong American sponsorship, carries such destabilizing implications for Hezbollah. The significance of those talks lies not simply in border arrangements, ceasefires, or diplomatic symbolism. Their deeper significance is that they challenge the perpetual-war logic on which Hezbollah thrives. For decades Hezbollah has presented itself as the only serious deterrent force capable of protecting Lebanon because diplomacy was portrayed as illusion, compromise as surrender, and peace as betrayal. Yet what recent developments suggest is that diplomacy may in fact be more effective at constraining Hezbollah than endless military posturing. The organization does not need Israel to remain in Lebanon. It needs the Lebanese political imagination to remain trapped in the belief that war, or the threat of war, is the only language history understands.
Here again Lokman Slim’s insight proves devastatingly relevant. When he argued that Hezbollah is the child of war, he did not mean merely that it was born during wartime. He meant that war itself, as a state of exception, as moral panic, as suspension of normal political life, is Hezbollah’s most natural habitat. This is why, in his lecture, he insists that war should not be understood only in the literal sense. Hezbollah can live inside war as a condition even when large-scale battles are absent. It can thrive in a society organized around fear, emergency, communal siege, endless mobilization, and suspended sovereignty. Peace, by contrast, is dangerous because it asks society to exit that condition.
Slim pushes the point further in one of the most personal and revealing parts of his lecture, when he speaks of being born and raised in Haret Hreik, in what later became the political, financial, cultural, and security capital of Hezbollah. He describes seeing with his own eyes the successive births of what would eventually be called Hezbollah and recalls one of the earliest slogans painted by Khomeinists on the walls of his neighborhood: “My sister, your veil is more precious than my blood.” The significance of this memory is profound. It shows that Hezbollah’s war was never only military. The assigned front stretched from the bedroom to the school, from social life to private morality, from the body to the street, from family order to regional theater. This is not incidental. It tells us that Hezbollah’s project has always been totalizing. It seeks not only to fight enemies, but to shape the moral and social universe in which its own authority appears natural.
Stage Eleven: The Crisis of Normalization
This is why the organization’s current vulnerability should not be measured only in terms of rockets destroyed, commanders killed, supply chains exposed, or communications penetrated. Its deeper vulnerability lies in the erosion of the narrative ecology that once sustained it. The generation that first accepted Hezbollah’s arms as exceptional did so in a historical context shaped by occupation, Syrian domination, civil-war memory, and the visible weakness of the Lebanese state. The younger generation lives amid a different reality: economic collapse, corruption, urban ruin, mass emigration, institutional bankruptcy, and the spectacle of a supposed resistance movement dragging the country into wars whose logic is increasingly detached from any recognizable national interest. The aura has thinned. The language remains grand, but the material consequences have become intolerably concrete.
And yet it would be a grave mistake to conclude from this that Hezbollah’s decline, if it is indeed underway, will necessarily produce Lebanese sovereignty by itself. This is where Slim’s final warning is perhaps most unsettling. The problem is not only Hezbollah’s strength. It is Hezbollah’s normalization. It is the extent to which Lebanese society, political elites, and even foreign observers have adjusted themselves to living inside the conditions that make Hezbollah possible. The absence of sovereignty has become routinized. Permanent crisis has become ordinary. Survival has been confused with stability. People no longer ask how a state can function while an armed movement claims a superior strategic mandate. They ask only how to manage the coexistence. That is precisely the trap. A country can become so accustomed to exception that exception feels like normal life.
In that sense, Hezbollah is more than a militia and more than a party. It is a manifestation of a political condition. It is the institutional form taken by a system in which sovereignty is perpetually deferred, accountability diluted, and war preserved as justification. To dismantle Hezbollah, therefore, would require more than disarmament. It would require transforming the environment that made it viable in the first place. It would require restoring the authority of state institutions not rhetorically but materially. It would require a political class willing to stop using Hezbollah as both alibi and threat. It would require a society willing to reject the seductions of permanent exception. It would require an international approach that stops mistaking temporary de-escalation for structural resolution.
This is also why fantasies of abrupt military eradication are so dangerous. Hezbollah itself thrives on the notion that any challenge to its power must take the form of civil conflict. It has long presented its opponents with a false binary: either accept the armed status quo, or plunge Lebanon into chaos. That binary serves Hezbollah because war, even domestic war, returns the country to the very condition from which the organization once drew life. The answer to Hezbollah cannot be a theatrical assault that confirms its self-understanding as the indispensable manager of communal siege. The answer must be slower, more political, and more ruthless in a different sense: ruthless in reasserting sovereignty, ruthless in exposing the fiction that arms protect the state while operating above it, ruthless in refusing the sentimental mythology that equates endless militarization with dignity.
Stage Twelve: The Final Question
The stages of Hezbollah’s evolution now become clearer in retrospect. First came the contraction of Lebanese sovereignty, the civil-war environment that made new armed orders possible. Then came the shadow phase, in which Iranian influence, Syrian ambiguity, and Shiite communal fragmentation produced embryonic Khomeinist networks. Then came political cleansing, through which competing currents within the Shiite field were removed, marginalized, or absorbed. Then came the formal revelation of 1985, in which Hezbollah announced itself not as a Lebanese nationalist resistance movement, but as part of a transnational ideological order under the jurisprudent ruler. Then came the post-Taif phase of strategic exceptionalism, in which the organization preserved its arms under the banner of resistance while building a parallel society. Then came the transformation after 2000, in which liberation did not produce demobilization but instead furnished a new rationale for permanent armed exceptionalism. Then came forced visibility after 2005, culminating in May 2008, when Hezbollah’s domestic coercive role could no longer be denied. Then came regional transnationalization through Syria, which expanded Hezbollah’s role even as it altered its military culture. And finally, there is the current stage, exposure, in which the organization’s internal density, strategic rigidity, and dependence on perpetual war have become more visible than ever before.
Yet even this stage of exposure does not guarantee dissolution. Organizations such as Hezbollah rarely disappear simply because their contradictions are visible. They endure because the systems around them remain broken. Lebanon today still suffers from the same underlying ailment that Slim diagnosed in another register: a political order unable to reclaim sovereignty except as slogan, unable to separate survival from submission, unable to imagine peace except through the categories supplied by those who profit from war. If Hezbollah has begun to unravel, it is doing so inside a country that is itself still unresolved. That is why the danger is double. One danger is that Hezbollah persists. The other is that it declines without Lebanon changing, in which case the country may simply reproduce a new version of the same pathology under a different name.
This is what makes the current moment so consequential. Hezbollah is no longer at the peak of its mythology. Its fighters are no longer cloaked in the unquestioned prestige they once enjoyed. Its regional mission has stripped away too many illusions. Its domestic coercion is too visible. Its strategic judgment is too entangled with Tehran. Its supposed invulnerability has been punctured by intelligence failures, logistical exposure, and the inability to translate accumulated experience into real deterrent credibility under present conditions. But whether that erosion becomes a Lebanese opening depends on whether Lebanon is prepared to exit the ecosystem of war from which Hezbollah was born.
The real challenge, then, is not merely to describe Hezbollah’s decline. It is to describe the historical trap that made Hezbollah plausible in the first place. Lokman Slim understood that the deepest danger was never just the movement’s military capacity. It was the willingness of society to accommodate the world it created. He understood that once a country internalizes fragmentation, permanent crisis, and suspended sovereignty as ordinary facts of life, the armed actor who thrives in that environment no longer needs to win in any dramatic sense. It needs only to endure. That is what Hezbollah has done better than any other Lebanese militia. It transformed endurance into ideology, ideology into infrastructure, infrastructure into normalized exception, and normalized exception into political common sense.
To undo that legacy requires breaking the spell that war is natural and peace naïve. It requires rejecting the sentimental lie that sovereignty can be postponed until a more perfect strategic moment. It requires recognizing that Hezbollah’s greatest weapon was never only the rocket or the missile, but the ability to make Lebanese society believe that it could not exist without permanent mobilization. That is the idea that must be dismantled if the organization itself is ever to be dismantled in any durable sense.
Seen in this light, the future of Hezbollah is inseparable from the future of Lebanon as a state. If Lebanon continues to live inside exception, Hezbollah or something like it will always find a way to survive. If the country finally reclaims the idea that no armed body can exist above national authority, then Hezbollah’s narrative begins to rot from within. This is why the prospect of diplomacy, even imperfect diplomacy, matters so much. Not because negotiations are morally pure or strategically sufficient, but because they restore the grammar of statehood. They shift the terrain from myth to institution. They force the armed exceptional actor to justify itself in peacetime language, and that is where its discourse becomes weakest.
There is a final irony here. Hezbollah long claimed that only through war could Lebanon preserve dignity. Yet what its history actually shows is that war preserved Hezbollah far more effectively than it preserved Lebanon. War gave Hezbollah birth. War protected its exception. War allowed it to eliminate rivals. War shielded it from demobilization. War expanded its regional mission. War justified its domestic coercion. War nourished its mythology. And now, as its contradictions accumulate, it is again war that it seeks to use as shelter. The organization’s tragedy, and Lebanon’s, is that too many people confused the survival of Hezbollah with the survival of the country. They are not the same. In many respects they have become opposites.
The question now is whether Lebanon can finally confront that fact. Can it accept that the movement so long described as its shield has in fact become one of the principal barriers to the restoration of genuine sovereignty? Can it recognize that the normalization of an armed party outside the state is not a temporary compromise but a mechanism for reproducing national weakness? Can it see that the choice is not between Hezbollah and civil war, but between endless exception and the difficult reconstruction of politics? These are not abstract questions. They are the questions on which the next stage of Lebanese history depends.
If Lokman Slim’s formulation remains the sharpest entry point into this debate, it is because it forces a kind of historical honesty. Hezbollah was not born from a clean story of liberation. It was born from a dirty story of war, shrinking sovereignty, ideological penetration, political cleansing, and the patient construction of a parallel order inside a broken state. To say this is not to deny that Israel’s invasions, occupations, and wars were real or brutal. It is to refuse the simplification through which Hezbollah converted those facts into an all-purpose alibi. History is more complicated, and because it is more complicated, it is also more politically revealing. Hezbollah is what happens when a state remains formally alive but substantively fractured, when communal trauma is organized rather than healed, when war becomes environment rather than event, and when ideology learns to inhabit the ruins of sovereignty more effectively than institutions do.
That is why the final question is not simply whether Hezbollah can be defeated, weakened, or dismantled. The final question is whether Lebanon can leave behind the environment that made Hezbollah possible. Unless that environment is transformed, unless the logic of permanent war is replaced by a real commitment to statehood, accountability, and undivided sovereignty, the story will not end with Hezbollah. It will continue in new forms, carrying forward the same condition under a different banner. Slim understood this with unsettling precision. The danger was never merely that Lebanon would lose another war. It was that Lebanon would continue to live inside one, long after convincing itself that the war was over.
And perhaps that remains the most important truth of all. Hezbollah was not simply made by war in the past tense. It is sustained by war in the present tense, even when war disguises itself as deterrence, symbolism, exception, or strategic necessity. To unravel Hezbollah, Lebanon must do more than disarm a movement. It must disarm the political imagination that made endless war seem like the price of dignity. Only then can the country begin to emerge from the shadow of the child of civil war and attempt, however belatedly, to become a state again.
https://www.hoover.org/research/strangers-streets-hezbollah-war-made-it-and-stages-its-unraveling
**Makram Rabah is an Assistant Professor at the American University of Beirut, Department of History. His book Conflict on Mount Lebanon: The Druze, the Maronites and Collective Memory (Edinburgh University Press) covers collective identities and the Lebanese Civil War.

Peace, War, and the Lost Certainty
Amr el-Shobaki/Asharq Al Awsat/May 19/2026
Israel did not stop bombing Lebanese territory during the ongoing negotiations between delegations from the two countries in Washington under American sponsorship, not even temporarily. It has undermined the Lebanese government, which is trying, through every “safe” means, to confine weapons to the hands of the state. It has thereby weakened trust among communities that do not support Hezbollah and have been horrified by Israel’s systematic targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure, and are becoming increasingly doubtful of the government’s ability to deter the brutal occupying power that continues its bombardment unchecked.
Lebanon’s situation is more complicated than that of any country that has entered peace or war negotiations with Israel, because it was not Lebanon but an armed organization operating on its territory that triggered this conflict to “support for Iran.” That had not been the case for Egypt, for example, which fought the 1973 war to liberate its occupied land and then entered into “disengagement” negotiations that were followed by President Anwar Sadat’s initiative, his visit to Jerusalem, and a separate peace agreement through which Egypt regained its occupied territories. Meanwhile, the remaining Arab-Israeli conflict issues, foremost among them the Palestinian question, had remained unaddressed until the 1993 Oslo Accords, which Israel ultimately foiled through settlement expansion in the West Bank and its siege of Gaza.
The conduct of the current Israeli government breaks with the approach of its predecessors. Israeli society has fundamentally changed. The division is no longer between the Likud and Labor parties, nor between right, left, and center, but rather between extremists and even more extreme factions. This shift has shaken in peace as a guaranteed and secure alternative for all.
The contrast with the Sadat era is stark. He and his supporters were confident that peace would bear fruit and even regarded it as synonymous with prosperity, development, and solving Egypt’s economic problems. Moreover, his peace process yielded immediate results on the ground through Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai and its return to Egyptian sovereignty. The Camp David Accords became a “pillar of the region” for nearly half a century. Many things changed, but not this agreement, which endured and remained a bulwark against war between Cairo and Tel Aviv.
This confidence in peace made war seem unlikely, especially since those who raised its banner at the Arab level at the time were the so-called “Steadfastness and Confrontation Front” and fought one another rather than Israel. Things changed after the Iranian Revolution, with Iran building regional alliances and fostering proxies who all raised the banner of war and armed resistance, eventually leading to Hamas’s October 7, 2023 operation, which followed by Lebanon’s wars with Israel, ignited by Hezbollah “in support of Gaza” and then “in support of Iran”, and culminated in the American-Israeli war against Iran and all its negative repercussions for the region and the world.
In truth, the results of these wars were not a step toward the liberation of Palestine, nor can they be described as “popular wars of liberation” waged for independence and freedom. Instead, they consolidated the occupation and expanded it to Gaza and Lebanon, weakened Iran, and fueled skepticism within every constituency that had raised the banner of war and armed resistance regarding their usefulness in the current context, and even their ability to achieve the goals they proclaimed.
The choice between war and peace in the trajectory of the Arab-Israeli conflict has always been accompanied by confidence bordering on certainty in each choice. Those who fought on the Arab side in 1948, 1967, and 1973, regardless of performance, victory, or defeat, believed that war was the only path to liberating the land and restoring rights. The Egyptian soldier who crossed the Suez Canal had no doubt that this was the sole means through which Sinai and the Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967 could be liberated. This certainty later returned “in reverse form” with Sadat’s peace initiative. He had no doubt that he would achieve his objective through peace and that Sinai had “fully returned to us” through his bold move, even if many opposed it.
Confidence in the regional choices, whether to seek peace or war, was shaken with the invasion of Iraq in 2003. It has almost entirely disappeared over the past three years. War and armed resistance no longer inspire the same confidence and certainty that they once had during the war to liberate southern Lebanon in 2000, for example, when there was a conviction that armed resistance, including Hezbollah, would force Israel to withdraw.
The situation today has changed fundamentally. The wars of armed organizations have failed, while those committed to moderation, peace, and civil and legal resistance to occupation cannot abandon deterrence. They must also recognize that the “new Israel” no longer has “friend and foe,” and that any state shielded from accountability and the rule of law poses a threat to everyone.

Selected Face Book & X tweets for May 19/2026