English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News &
Editorials
For August 29/2026
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news
The Bulletin's Link on the lccc Site
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/aaaanewsfor2026/english.August
29.26.htm
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Bible Quotations For today
King Herod, Herodias's Daughter & The
Beheading Of John The Baptist
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Mark 06/14-29/:"King Herod
heard of it, for Jesus’ name had become known. Some were saying, ‘John the
baptizer has been raised from the dead; and for this reason these powers are at
work in him.’But others said, ‘It is Elijah.’ And others said, ‘It is a prophet,
like one of the prophets of old.’But when Herod heard of it, he said, ‘John,
whom I beheaded, has been raised.’For Herod himself had sent men who arrested
John, bound him, and put him in prison on account of Herodias, his brother
Philip’s wife, because Herod had married her. For John had been telling Herod,
‘It is not lawful for you to have your brother’s wife.’And Herodias had a grudge
against him, and wanted to kill him. But she could not, for Herod feared John,
knowing that he was a righteous and holy man, and he protected him. When he
heard him, he was greatly perplexed; and yet he liked to listen to him. But an
opportunity came when Herod on his birthday gave a banquet for his courtiers and
officers and for the leaders of Galilee. When his daughter Herodias came in and
danced, she pleased Herod and his guests; and the king said to the girl, ‘Ask me
for whatever you wish, and I will give it.’ And he solemnly swore to her,
‘Whatever you ask me, I will give you, even half of my kingdom.’She went out and
said to her mother, ‘What should I ask for?’ She replied, ‘The head of John the
baptizer.’Immediately she rushed back to the king and requested, ‘I want you to
give me at once the head of John the Baptist on a platter.’The king was deeply
grieved; yet out of regard for his oaths and for the guests, he did not want to
refuse her. Immediately the king sent a soldier of the guard with orders to
bring John’s head. He went and beheaded him in the prison, brought his head on a
platter, and gave it to the girl. Then the girl gave it to her mother. When his
disciples heard about it, they came and took his body, and laid it in a tomb.
Titles For The English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News &
Editorials published on August 28-29/2026
Statement of Condemnation and Solidarity with Lebanese Sovereignist
Writer and Director Youssef El Khoury/Elias Bejjani/August 29/2026
Yes to peace with Israel & no the Jihadist-Iranian Hezbollah/Elias Bejjani/August
28/2026
Elias Bejjani / Who Was Queen Esther, Who Saved the Jews from Annihilation
During the Reign of the Persian King Ahasuerus?/Prepared, Compiled, Edited, and
Summarized by Elias Bejjani
Writer and Director Youssef El Khoury’s
Response to a Lawsuit Filed Against Him by the Higher Islamic Shiite Council on
the Charge of “Insulting the Event of Karbala and the Martyrdom of Imam Hussein
and His Companions”: You Filed a Lawsuit Against Me in Hussein’s Name? Then Let
Us Open Your File in His Name...
Sanctions Are the Solution/Abu Arz/Facebook/August 28, 2026
US Source: Washington Has Not Given Israel the Green Light for a Large-Scale
Operation in Ali al-Taher
Ministry of Health Publishes Cumulative Toll of Hezbollah's Terrorist Wars
Washington Pressures Lebanon to Implement its Obligations; Ali al-Taher a
Regional Issue
Bombing Targets Houla and Wadi al-Salouqi, Explosions in Mansouri and Hadatha
Israeli Army: We Destroyed Over 400 Infrastructure Sites in Southern Lebanon
French Invitation for Lebanese Army to Paris Meeting: International Support
Expected for Military and Security Institutions
A Fierce Prelude and Field Isolation: Is Israel Nearing a New Ground Battle in
Southern Lebanon?
Israel Expands Target Bank in the South: Health and Relief Institutions Under
Scrutiny
Israeli General: Our Army Is Stuck in Lebanon Like a 'Swiss Cheese'
America Controls Israel's Regional Actions... Strikes in Lebanon Continue
Escalation Intensifies Around Ali al-Taher Hill: Surrender to the Army or
Confrontation?
Lebanon Demands Extension for UNIFIL; UN Rejects Undermining Resolution 1701
Issa's Message to the State: Disarm Before Anything Else... Don't Misplace
Priorities!
The State Pays Salaries to Clerics, Yet Their Platforms Attack It... Where is
the Accountability?
Lebanon Must Take Off UNIFIL’s Training Wheels
Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News
published on August 28-29/2026
Amid his absence from the public eye, Mojtaba Khamenei addresses the Iranian
people
Pezeshkian: We Must Not Delay Establishing Good Relations with Neighboring
Countries
Revolutionary Guard Claims: We Maintain "Complete Control" of the Strait of
Hormuz
Washington Pressures Israel to Prevent Escalation in Syria and Iran
Washington Intensifies Economic Paragon Campaign... Tehran Threatens Diplomacy
Again / Trump Doesn't Rule Out Sanctions on Chinese Banks if They Deal with Iran
“Sleeper Cells”: Is Iran Circumventing the Plan to Dismantle Iraqi Factions?
Iran’s “Shadow Fleet”: How Does Tehran Defy Sanctions and Keep Oil Flowing?
Iran's Secret Service Raises Alert Over Alleged Plot to Assassinate Barron
Trump; Tehran Responds: "If We Wanted, We Would!"
From “Woman of Courage” to US Terrorist List: Former Iraqi Minister’s Visa
Revoked
Turkish Drone Approaches Alexandroupoli Airport; Greek F-16s Intervene
ISIS Emerges from Within Israel: Attack Plot Targeting Al-Aqsa and an Army Base
Israel announces the elimination of two Hamas and Islamic Jihad commanders in
Gaza
No Alliance Between Ben-Gvir and Smotrich: Another Blow to Netanyahu's
Calculations
Zelensky: I ordered the army to launch 1,000 drones daily into Russia/Kiev
indicates that “technical” talks on the war with Moscow will be held “soon.”
Titles For The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials
from miscellaneous sources published
on August 28-29/2026
Syria: Turkey's New Battleground Against Israel/Con Coughlin/Gatestone
Institute/August 28, 2026
From Neom to wartime logistics, Saudi Arabia has learned to pivot/Ali Shihabi/Arab
News/August 28, 2026
Question: Why does God allow natural disasters?/GotQuestions.org/August 29/2026
Selected Face Book & X tweets on August 28/2026
Iran’s Future Under Collective Leadership/Huda Al-Husseini/Asharq Al-Awsat/August
28, 2026
How Did Universities Surrender?/Sousan Al-Abtah/Asharq Al-Awsat/August 28, 2026
Latest English LCCC Lebanese &
Lebanese Related News & Editorials published
on August 28-29/2026
Statement of Condemnation and Solidarity with
Lebanese Sovereignist Writer and Director Youssef El Khoury
Elias Bejjani/August 29/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/08/157044/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=009wMFHGnf8
I, Elias Bejjani, in my own name and on behalf of the Lebanese in occupied
Lebanon and the Diaspora who share my national and faith-based aspirations for a
free, sovereign, independent, democratic Lebanon, liberated from the Iranian
Jihadist occupation and from the domination of its Lebanese mercenary tools,
condemn in the strongest terms the lawsuit filed by the Higher Islamic Shiite
Council against the Lebanese sovereignist writer, director, and activist Youssef
El Khoury, against the backdrop of his political views and national positions,
which he expressed freely and responsibly within the framework of his natural
and constitutional right to freedom of expression.
This lawsuit cannot be separated from the climate of intimidation that has
prevailed in the Lebanese arena for decades, where religious, political, and
judicial institutions are often used as tools of pressure to silence free and
independent voices that refuse to submit to Iran’s project of domination over
Lebanon and call for the restoration of the sovereignty of the state and for the
exclusive possession of weapons by the Lebanese legitimate authorities.
The Higher Islamic Shiite Council was established to serve as a national
reference concerned with the affairs of members of the Lebanese Shiite community
and to defend their interests and rights within the framework of the Lebanese
state. However, its non-Lebanese and Iranized positions and practices have led a
broad segment of Lebanese, including many free members of the Shiite community,
to regard it as a political institution completely aligned with Hezbollah’s
choices and with the expansionist and terrorist agenda of the Iranian regime,
rather than expressing the aspirations of free Lebanese Shiites who aspire to a
free, sovereign, and independent state.
Turning political and intellectual disagreement into judicial prosecutions, and
summoning public prosecution authorities and security agencies to confront an
opinion, a position, or a historical interpretation, constitutes a serious
violation of the principles of freedom, democracy, and pluralism upon which
Lebanon was founded. Ideas are not confronted with lawsuits, opinions are not
answered with intimidation, and intellectual debate is not settled in
courtrooms.
Youssef El Khoury, this resounding voice in the wilderness of the Land of the
Cedars, has exercised nothing more than his legitimate right to express his
political opinion and his reading of historical events and their contemporary
repercussions. Every citizen has the right to agree or disagree with him, to
debate or criticize him, but no religious or political authority has the right
to monopolize history, faith, or patriotism, or to impose upon the Lebanese a
single interpretation of events and facts under threat of prosecution and
intimidation.
Youssef El Khoury is a free Maronite committed to the words of Our Lord Jesus
Christ to the scribes and Pharisees who asked Him to silence His disciples and
the crowds: “If these were silent, the stones would cry out.”Luke 19:39–40,
What is most dangerous in this case is the continued use of the Lebanese
judiciary in political and ideological battles targeting opponents of
Hezbollah’s criminal project and of the disguised Iranian occupation of Lebanon.
Instead of the judiciary being used to protect citizens, safeguard their rights,
and hold accountable those responsible for the wars, destruction, corruption,
and collapse that have afflicted the country, it is being employed to pursue
sovereignist voices and free national voices.
Together with all the free and honorable Lebanese, I declare our full solidarity
with Youssef El Khoury, and I consider that targeting him is an attack on every
free Lebanese who refuses to submit to the logic of weapons and foreign
tutelage, and on every person of opinion who calls for the establishment of a
genuine sovereign and independent state that is subject to no foreign or militia
influence.
I also affirm that defending Youssef El Khoury’s freedom is a defense of the
freedom of all sovereignist Lebanese, and of their right to think, express
themselves, criticize, and hold others accountable, without fear of
intimidation, accusations of treason, or prosecution.
The Lebanon in which we believe is the Lebanon of freedom, pluralism, and
democracy, not the Lebanon of intellectual repression and silencing of voices.
It is the Lebanon of sovereignty and independence, and of the supremacy of the
state over all external loyalties and axes.
Full solidarity with Youssef El Khoury. And full condemnation of the attempts
to silence free voices through lawsuits and intimidation, and through the
exploitation of religious and judicial institutions to serve political agendas
that have nothing to do with the interests of Lebanon and the Lebanese.
Yes to peace with Israel & no the Jihadist-Iranian
Hezbollah
Elias Bejjani/August 28/2026
To Iran’s mercenaries and the scum of hatred, extremism, and the business of
“resistance”: Yes, a thousand times yes to peace and normalization with the
State of Israel. And Lebanese Jews are above you, and more Lebanese than you
are, you agents of the terrorist mullahs.
Elias Bejjani / Who Was Queen Esther, Who Saved the
Jews from Annihilation During the Reign of the Persian King Ahasuerus?
Prepared, Compiled, Edited, and Summarized by Elias Bejjani
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/08/156807/
Queen Esther is one of the most prominent female figures in the Old Testament,
and her story is told in full in the Book of Esther. She was a Jewish girl who
became queen of the Persian Empire, and God used her to save her people from
annihilation.
The Book of Esther recounts an event of great importance that took place after
the Persians conquered the Kingdom of Babylon and destroyed its capital. A
community of Jews remained living in exile, among whom was a young woman named
Esther who found favor with King Ahasuerus and became his wife. However, the
king’s wicked advisor, Haman, sought to destroy the Jews and wipe them out in
order to seize their wealth and possessions. Esther intervened with wisdom and
courage, thwarted his plot, and saved her people from a terrible fate. Haman
himself was eventually executed, proving the saying that evil ultimately turns
upon the evildoer. To this day, the Jewish people commemorate this deliverance
through the Feast of Purim.
The central theme of the book is God’s providence and power. God preserved and
protected His people even while they were living in exile. He turned all things
to their good when they prayed, fasted, and cried out to Him. Their hope was not
in vain, and He delivered them from Haman’s grasp. It is noteworthy that God
accomplished His will through human beings rather than through direct
intervention.
Writer and Director Youssef El Khoury’s Response to a
Lawsuit Filed Against Him by the Higher Islamic Shiite Council on the Charge of
“Insulting the Event of Karbala and the Martyrdom of Imam Hussein and His
Companions”: You Filed a Lawsuit Against Me in Hussein’s Name? Then Let Us Open
Your File in His Name...
You Filed a Lawsuit Against Me in Hussein’s Name? Then Let Us Open Your File in
His Name...
Writer and Director Youssef El Khoury/August 28, 2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/08/157037/
The Higher Islamic Shiite Council has filed a judicial complaint against me on
the charge of “insulting the Event of Karbala and the martyrdom of Imam Hussein
and his companions.”
I heard about this lawsuit through widespread reports, and I have not yet been
officially notified of it. But since Ali Al-Khatib’s Council publicized its
lawsuit against me in the media, let us then open the file of Karbala; but not
through slogans, banners, and chest-beating rituals. Rather, let us bring
Hussein himself before us and ask the question that the Council apparently does
not want to ask:
Who among us insulted Hussein?
I said that Naim Qassem, when he threatens to wage a “Karbala battle,” is in
fact calling for a confrontation that I see as a losing one. Going deliberately
into a battle that you know your people will pay the price for, while lacking
the means of victory, is, in my political and military reading, suicide.
So, first and foremost, I spoke about a historical battle that failed
militarily, called Karbala, and the death of Hussein bin Ali is linked to it. I
did not insult Hussein, nor did I attack the religious doctrine that glorified
the Event of Karbala to the point of placing it above any critical historical
reading. Rather, I objected to invoking Karbala to justify a new war against
Lebanon.
So if you want to make that a crime, then let us first talk about Hussein.
Hussein, whom we read about and mourn every year, if he were among us today...
whose supporter would he be?
Hussein, who personally bore responsibility for his decisions and remained in
the field with his men until he paid for his position with his life, would he
have accepted a Secretary-General who sends other people’s sons to the
frontlines while he himself is fortified in a tunnel, far away from them?
Hussein, who paid with his own blood and the blood of his family for his choice
in Karbala, would he have asked mothers to offer their sons to death as a
sacrifice for a political project, and then forced them to call the tragedy a
wedding celebration?
Hussein stood at the forefront of those who paid the price, not at the rear of
those who ask others to pay it.
And Hussein, of whom the sources narrate that he gave water to his opponents and
their horses when they arrived thirsty, would he have scorned the Lebanese
Shiites who were displaced from the South and lost their homes and livelihoods,
as Ali Al-Khatib did?
Then we come to the question that hurts the most:
Hussein, had he lived in Lebanon, to whom would his loyalty have belonged?
To the land that embraced him and to the people among whom he lived, or would he
have placed his decision in the service of a guardian beyond the borders?
And did Hussein even need to tell people that he was Hussein, or would his
actions have spoken for that?
Do not look for Hussein for me in banners. Nor in slogans. Nor in invoking
Karbala every time treason needs religious legitimacy.
And if you want to know where Hussein would have stood, do not ask who cries for
him more. Ask who resembles him more.
Then, to the Higher Islamic Shiite Council itself.
Today, you say that you are with the state. And Sheikh Ali Al-Khatib himself
said before the President of the Republic that “the weapon is not sacred,” and
that what is sacred is the unity of the country, the dignity of the people, and
their security. He even said that he does not want the Shiites’ relationship
with the state to be through the Council, but rather directly with the state.
Excellent words.
And I agree with them.
So why did this state not become your sole reference point throughout the
decades during which Hezbollah continued to destroy Lebanon and distort the
image of Hussein under your cover?
And why does the dignity of the sect become so mobilized—to the point of the
Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Information Branch—when Youssef El Khoury
speaks?
You found a lawyer, drafted a complaint, went to the Public Prosecutor at the
Court of Cassation, and the file reached the Information Branch because Youssef
El Khoury expressed an opinion!
If only every home that was destroyed, every piece of land that was violated,
and every citizen who was displaced had received a judicial or institutional
mobilization equal to the mobilization that a sentence I uttered received.
Then understand one more thing well:
Lebanon is greater than your Higher Islamic Shiite Council.
And dearer to my heart than any sectarian or religious component.
I am a Maronite, and proud of it. But if the interest of my sect conflicts with
the interest of Lebanon, then Lebanon comes first. And if my religious authority
wrongs Lebanon, I will stand with Lebanon against my authority.
This is the citizenship in which I believe.
Therefore, do not expect anyone to come to you in my name to appease you, nor
for anyone to undertake a tour of apologies on my behalf, nor to explain to you
that Youssef “did not mean it.” Lebanon has already witnessed mediations and
visits to contain political and religious disputes; among them were the visits
of Father Abdo Abu Kassm to Ali Al-Khatib’s Council as an envoy of Patriarch
Bechara Al-Rahi, while MP Farid Al-Khazen went on to justify the position taken
by Al-Rahi.
I know exactly what I mean.
I do not apologize for political criticism. Nor do I ask permission from any
sect in order to read history. Nor do I accept that Hussein be transformed into
intellectual property registered in the name of a religious institution that
determines for the Lebanese how they may understand Karbala and how they may
not.
Hussein is a figure from the history of Islam and humanity, and Karbala is a
historical event before it became a sectarian symbol. I have the right to read
it politically and militarily, just as I read Waterloo, Troy, and any other
battle, and I may be wrong or right, and others may debate me.
Debate me. Respond to me. Defeat my argument with an argument.
As for the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Information Branch, they will not
turn a weak opinion into a strong one, nor a doctrine into a historical truth
binding upon all Lebanese.
You filed a lawsuit against me in defense of Hussein?
Very well.
I too defend Hussein.
But I defend the Hussein who bore the cost of his decision, not his name when it
is used to market a decision whose cost is paid by others.
I defend the Hussein who gave water to his opponent, not a Karbala transformed
into a political slogan.
I defend Hussein the human being, courageous and responsible for his choice.
And I refuse for him to be summoned from his grave fourteen centuries later in
order to grant any party in Lebanon a blank religious check for a new war.
So if this is my crime... proceed with the lawsuit.
And I will continue speaking.
Sanctions Are the Solution
Abu Arz/Facebook/August 28, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
President Trump, to his credit, has shown particular interest in Lebanon, both
in word and deed, and a sincere desire to rescue it from its suffocating
predicament.
However, the “leaders” of the deep state in Lebanon have not responded to
President Trump’s efforts; rather, they have harnessed all their negative
energies to obstruct them, serving the enemies of Lebanon, especially Iran and
its Lebanese proxy. In our view, the solution begins with imposing strict
American sanctions on these leaders, as a prelude to removing them from the
political arena.
We are at your service, Lebanon.
US Source: Washington Has Not Given Israel the Green Light for a Large-Scale
Operation in Ali al-Taher
Riyadh - Al Arabiya / August 28, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
A US source revealed to Al Arabiya/Al Hadath on Friday that the United States
has not given Israel the green light to launch a large-scale military operation
in the Ali al-Taher Heights in the Nabatieh district of southern Lebanon. The
source emphasized that Washington understands any limited Israeli escalation
related to what it describes as the security threat in the region. The source
added that the Ali al-Taher issue, along with security arrangements and pilot
zones, will be central to the discussions during the upcoming Rome round of
talks, noting that Washington will not agree to a large-scale Israeli war before
this round takes place. The source also confirmed that the United States will
pressure Lebanon to fulfill its commitments to prevent a slide into a major
confrontation. This comes as a source close to Hezbollah stated earlier on
Friday that reports circulating about reaching a settlement regarding the Ali
al-Taher Heights are inaccurate, asserting that the issue is nearing its
conclusion, "even if militarily." The source explained that Hezbollah has not
backed down from its position of refusing to hand over Ali al-Taher Hill to the
Lebanese Army, indicating that any settlement regarding the hill's surrender
would mean the party gaining concessions in return. The source added that
Hezbollah would engage in military confrontation should Israel decide to enter
the Ali al-Taher area, emphasizing that its stance on the hill remains
unchanged. The Ali al-Taher Heights are among the most strategically important
hills in southern Lebanon, located in the Nabatieh district, specifically
between the towns of Nabatieh al-Fawqa and Kfar Tebnit, north of the Litani
River. They are considered one of the most strategically important heights in
southern Lebanon because they overlook vast areas of Nabatieh and the Iqlim al-Tuffah
region, offering a view towards parts of southern Lebanon, reaching areas close
to the border with Israel. The hills also contain installations and sites that
were historically used for military and surveillance purposes due to their
elevation and commanding position.
Ministry of Health Publishes Cumulative Toll of Hezbollah's
Terrorist Wars
LCCC/August 28, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The Ministry of Public Health's Emergency Operations Center announced in a
statement that "the total cumulative toll of Hezbollah's terrorist wars from
March 2 to August 28 is as follows: 4,352 dead and 12,318 wounded."It should be
noted that the Ministry of Health lacks credibility, as its minister is
affiliated with Hezbollah.
Washington Pressures Lebanon to Implement its Obligations;
Ali al-Taher a Regional Issue
Al-Markazia/August 28, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
An American source clarified today, Friday, that "Washington did not give Israel
the green light for a large-scale military operation on Ali al-Taher Hill." The
source added that "Washington understands Israel's limited escalation related to
the security threat posed by Ali al-Taher Hill." He added: "Washington has made
it clear to Tel Aviv that Ali Taher is a regional problem that extends beyond
Lebanon, and considers him 'not merely an internal issue related to Hezbollah.'"
He continued, "Security arrangements, Ali Taher, and the pilot zones will be the
focus of the Rome round." He emphasized that "Washington will not approve a
large-scale Israeli war before the upcoming Rome round and will pressure Lebanon
to fulfill its commitments to prevent a slide into confrontation."
Bombing Targets Houla and Wadi al-Salouqi, Explosions in
Mansouri and Hadatha
Al-Markazia/August 28, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The Israeli escalation in southern Lebanon continues, coinciding with the
stalemate surrounding the political and negotiation process. Attention is
focused on developments on the ground, particularly in the Ali al-Taher area,
and on American efforts to keep negotiation channels open. In a related
development, Israeli aircraft carried out an airstrike on a house between the
towns of Hadatha and Haris in the Bint Jbeil district. Israeli warplanes also
launched an airstrike targeting the Wadi al-Salouqi area in the Bint Jbeil
district, simultaneously with another strike on the town of Bani Hayyan in the
Marjeyoun district of southern Lebanon. Israeli warplanes also bombed the Marj
area between Mayfadoun and Nabatieh al-Fawqa, coinciding with artillery shelling
targeting the town of Mansouri. An Israeli airstrike targeted the Doha Kfar
Rumman area in the Nabatieh district of southern Lebanon. An Israeli drone
carried out an airstrike targeting the vicinity of the public park in Nabatieh
al-Fawqa. An Israeli helicopter dropped explosives on the village of Kafr Rumman,
while artillery shelling targeted the outskirts of the town of Haris.
The Israeli army carried out a large explosion in the town of Kfar Tebnit in the
Nabatieh district of southern Lebanon. Israeli artillery also targeted the town
of Mansouri in the Tyre district. This afternoon, an Israeli army force advanced
towards the town of Aita al-Jabal from the town of Haddatha and set fires on the
outskirts of the town. This coincided with the movement of Israeli military
vehicles on the outskirts of Haddatha-Aita al-Jabal in the Bint Jbeil district,
following a morning incursion during which they blew up the house of citizen
Najib Zahir. Israeli artillery shelling targeted Houla and Wadi al-Salouqi,
accompanied by machine gun fire. This afternoon, the village of Kafr Rumman and
the area surrounding Tell al-Dabsha were subjected to intermittent artillery
shelling. This afternoon, Israeli forces carried out explosions in the towns of
Kafr Tebnit, Tallousa, and Arnoun, preceded at dawn by a large explosion that
struck the town of Mansouri. Yesterday, the Israeli army expanded its military
operations in a clear escalation in southern Lebanon, combining airstrikes,
artillery shelling, ground incursions, bombings, and search operations. The
attacks extended from the heights of Ali al-Taher, Nabatieh al-Fawqa, and the
Iqlim al-Tuffah region, to Mays al-Jabal, al-Mansouri, Haris, Kfarshouba, and
Arab Salim.
Israeli Army: We Destroyed Over 400 Infrastructure Sites in
Southern Lebanon
Al-Markazia/August 28, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
Israeli Army Spokesperson Ella Wawiya wrote on the "X" platform: "During the
past week, IDF forces operated in the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, and
southern Lebanon to neutralize terrorists, destroy infrastructure and weapons,
and prevent attempts to strengthen the capabilities of terrorist organizations,
with the aim of eliminating threats to the forces and citizens of the State of
Israel. In the areas under the responsibility of the Central Command, in Judea
and Samaria, 60 arrests were carried out; these included terrorists who planned
to carry out terrorist attacks in the immediate future, inciters on social
media, arms dealers, Fatah operatives, inciters, Hamas operatives, members of
popular terrorism, carriers of long weapons, and members of the Islamic Jihad
terrorist organization." Wawiya added: "In the eastern border and Jordan Valley
region, an attempt to smuggle over 20 kg of drugs across the eastern border in
the Jordan Valley was thwarted. Additionally, in the Jordan Valley, an attempt
to smuggle 10 pistols across the eastern border was foiled, and two suspects
involved in the smuggling attempt were arrested. Earlier this week, following a
pursuit, IDF forces apprehended the terrorist who carried out the stabbing
attack in the Auja area. In the Southern Command area of responsibility, the
IDF attacked five weapons depots, a launch site, a weapons production site, and
a Hamas ambush point near the Green Line throughout the Gaza Strip.
Simultaneously, the circle closed with terrorists involved in the October 7th
massacre, as the IDF and Shin Bet eliminated two elite terrorists this week who
had infiltrated Israeli territory and the Re'im military base. One of them
served as a bodyguard for Yahya Sinwar. Recently, the two terrorists had been
working to carry out terrorist attacks against Israeli forces." The IDF and the
citizens of the State of Israel attempted to rebuild Hamas's capabilities,
constituting a systematic violation of the ceasefire.
She continued: "This week, the Paratroopers Brigade completed a lengthy period
of activity in the Gaza Strip, during which it identified and destroyed
terrorist infrastructure, underground tunnels, weapons depots, and Hamas launch
sites. As part of the operation, a lathe used for manufacturing rockets was also
located and destroyed. This week, Chief of the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Eyal
Zamir, conducted a field tour of the Gaza Strip and held discussions with
brigade and battalion commanders operating in the Strip. The Chief of Staff
emphasized that the IDF is working to prevent its enemies from rebuilding their
capabilities and that the operational doctrine has changed following the lessons
learned from the October 7th War. In areas under the responsibility of the
Northern Command, the IDF attacked warehouses storing weapons belonging to the
Hezbollah terrorist organization, which were intended to target IDF forces and
Israeli citizens. The strikes were carried out in response to Hezbollah's
attempt to carry out an attack against IDF forces operating in the Ali Taher
Heights area within the security zone, in which two explosive-laden drones were
launched toward the forces."
The statement concluded: "This week, the Paratroopers Brigade completed a
lengthy period of activity in the Gaza Strip, during which it identified and
destroyed terrorist infrastructure, underground tunnels, weapons depots, and
Hamas launch sites. She said: "In addition, the Golani Brigade's combat group
continues its operations in the security zone in southern Lebanon to eliminate
threats. In recent weeks, the forces have destroyed over 400 terrorist
infrastructure sites and located numerous weapons, including anti-tank missiles,
anti-aircraft missiles, explosive devices, weapons, and mortars. This week, the
'Re'im Coalition' assistance mission, led by the Home Front Command in
cooperation with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
returned to Israel after completing 12 days of activity in Colombia following
the earthquake. The mission, comprising approximately 80 rescuers, engineers,
and experts, helped locate and rescue 29 missing persons in the city of Cali and
returned to Israel aboard an Air Force aircraft." She emphasized that "from
Gaza, through Judea and Samaria, and into southern Lebanon, the IDF will
continue to operate offensively and systematically against emerging threats,
thwarting attempts by terrorist organizations to strengthen their capabilities
and protecting the citizens of the State of Israel."
French Invitation for Lebanese Army to Paris Meeting:
International Support Expected for Military and Security Institutions
Janoubia/August 28, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
Army Commander General Rodolphe Haykal received the Chargé d'Affaires of the
French Embassy in Lebanon, Bruno Da Silva, and a delegation from the embassy at
his office in Yarzeh. Discussions focused on several issues related to
cooperation and support for the Lebanese military. During the meeting, Da Silva
presented the Army Commander with an official invitation to participate in the
preparatory meeting for the international conference dedicated to supporting the
Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces, scheduled to be held in
Paris. Military delegations and experts from several countries are expected to
participate in the meeting, with discussions focusing on the needs of the
Lebanese Army and Internal Security Forces, and ways to coordinate support for
military and security institutions. The meeting is part of the preparations for
the international conference on supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces and
Internal Security Forces, which aims to address logistical, equipment, and
training needs, as well as ways to enhance the capabilities of Lebanese security
institutions. The move comes in the context of the existing military and
security cooperation between Lebanon and France, which has participated in
programs over the past years to support and train the Lebanese army and internal
security forces, along with a number of partner countries.
A Fierce Prelude and Field Isolation: Is Israel Nearing a
New Ground Battle in Southern Lebanon?
Janoubia/August 28, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The southern Lebanese front is witnessing a growing field escalation, with the
military focus concentrated around the city of Nabatieh and the strategic Ali
Taher Heights, amidst intense Israeli airstrikes and concentrated artillery
shelling. As the scope of operations widens, questions are mounting about
whether the Israeli strikes are exceeding the bounds of mere exchanges of fire,
constituting a military prelude to a new phase aimed at imposing a different
security reality in the region. At the heart of this escalation lies the
question of whether the military pressure on the Nabatieh area and the isolation
of surrounding regions represent logistical and fire preparation for a potential
ground battle to seize the Ali Taher Heights.The Ali Taher Heights, located
north of the Litani River, hold significant geographical and military
importance, placing them at the heart of both Israeli and Hezbollah
calculations. The high ground, reaching approximately 600 meters above sea
level, overlooks the city of Nabatieh, the Iqlim al-Tuffah region, and Mount
Rihan, in addition to the eastern sector of southern Lebanon and the entrances
to the western Bekaa Valley. Lebanese sources confirm that controlling this
location grants any military force significant capabilities for observation,
fire control, directing operations, and securing supply lines. This explains the
intense firepower with which the Israeli army has targeted the high ground and
its surroundings recently. The raids have also targeted the Ali al-Taher forest,
Tell al-Dabsha, the town of Nabatieh al-Fawqa, and Doha Kfar Rumman. Sources
told Eram News that the hill has historically been one of the most prominent
fortified military sites in the region. It was targeted by the Israeli army
after the 1982 invasion, along with Beaufort Castle (Qalaat al-Shaqif), and was
among the last sites from which they withdrew in 2000. The sources believe that
the recent airstrikes are not conventional bombing, but rather employ a tactic
of what they describe as the "surgical isolation" of supply and communication
lines between Nabatieh and the surrounding villages on one side, and between the
city and the highlands on the other. They explain that targeting the surrounding
road networks and valleys, such as Wadi al-Salouqi and the valleys of Qabrikha
and Touline, aims to limit the fighters' ability to move and maneuver
logistically, leaving the highlands geographically isolated under the pressure
of a continuous artillery siege. On the diplomatic front, the sources say that
Ali al-Taher Hill has become one of the thorny issues in the ongoing
negotiations under international and American auspices. The report indicates
that proposals have been put forward behind the scenes concerning a mechanism to
ensure the withdrawal of Israeli fighters and the army from the heights, with
the Lebanese army taking over the site and verifying that it is free of any
military infrastructure or underground facilities. However, according to the
sources, this proposal faces significant complications given Hezbollah's
reservations about evacuating the area, fearing that this would expose its
defensive lines or that Israel would exploit any withdrawal to subsequently
seize control of the heights under various pretexts. For his part, political
analyst Tanios Sabri al-Hajj believes that the battle raging around Nabatieh and
the Ali al-Taher heights represents a true test of the rules of engagement and
the shape of southern Lebanon in the coming phase. Al-Hajj tells Eram News that
Israel may not necessarily resort to a large-scale and costly ground invasion of
the heights, given the complex terrain and the potential presence of tunnel
networks and fortifications that could transform any ground advance into a
protracted war of attrition. He believes that the Israeli leadership, on the
other hand, might prefer to rely on air superiority, artillery bombardment, and
drones to establish widespread fire control and gradually destroy military
infrastructure before deciding on any ground operation. Estimates and media
reports point to three possible paths for the region's future, with the most
likely, and simultaneously the most dangerous, being a "limited localized
operation." This scenario involves intensifying airstrikes and artillery fire,
followed by a rapid ground incursion to seize the peaks and key passes in the
Ali Taher Heights, establishing control as a fait accompli and a bargaining chip
in any subsequent negotiations. Between the intense bombardment and attempts to
isolate the area, the Ali Taher Heights remain at the heart of the
confrontation. Israel seeks to reduce its adversaries' ability to move and
establish positions, while Hezbollah monitors the course of operations, fearing
that the artillery barrage could transform into a ground offensive that would
impose a new military and security map in southern Lebanon.
Israel Expands Target Bank in the South: Health and Relief
Institutions Under Scrutiny
Janoubia/August 28, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
Israel is no longer limiting what it describes as Hezbollah's "infrastructure"
to military sites, weapons depots, and tunnels. It is expanding its accusations
to include health, social, and reconstruction institutions active in villages of
southern Lebanon, a move that raises concerns about the targeting of facilities
providing civilian services to the population. In this context, the Israeli
Broadcasting Corporation (Kan) published a report focusing on the "Islamic
Health Authority" and the "Ta'awanu" Association, based on assessments from an
Israeli center specializing in monitoring armed organizations. The center
claimed that the two institutions are linked to Hezbollah or operate under its
influence. According to the Israeli narrative, Hezbollah relies on medical,
relief, and reconstruction institutions to maintain its presence in southern
villages and compensate for some of the decline in its military and political
structure caused by the war, destruction, and the increased deployment of the
Lebanese army. However, the report did not provide independent evidence proving
that the medical services or reconstruction work provided by the two
organizations constitutes military activity. Nor did it present documented
evidence of their facilities being used to store weapons or manage field
operations. This leaves these claims within the realm of Israeli assessments
that are not independently substantiated. The report's significance lies in its
reflection of a broadening of the Israeli definition of "Hezbollah's influence."
While the focus was primarily on weapons, personnel, and military sites, health,
relief, and reconstruction activities are now presented as part of the system of
influence that Israel seeks to monitor and potentially target. This shift is
particularly important as the reconstruction phase in southern Lebanon
approaches, given the state's limited resources and the delays in foreign aid.
This situation compels local institutions and associations to play a crucial
role in providing services to the population. According to this approach, Israel
seeks to link the service-oriented role of these institutions to Hezbollah's
political and security agenda, which could influence the positions of donors and
the conditions for funding the reconstruction of southern Lebanon. This could
open the door to demands to exclude specific institutions from the
reconstruction process, place them on sanctions lists, or expand the scope of
Israeli targets to include civilian facilities under the pretext of their
affiliation with Hezbollah. This argument coincides with Israel's repeated
criticism of the Lebanese army's performance. Tel Aviv claims that the army has
failed to dismantle Hezbollah's military infrastructure, while simultaneously
accusing the party of attempting to reassert its presence through institutions
and associations. Thus, the Israeli narrative seeks to portray the transfer of
field control to state institutions as not necessarily signifying the end of
Hezbollah's influence, which Israel asserts is capable of maintaining its
presence through health, relief, and reconstruction channels. This trajectory
suggests a potential shift in the confrontation in the south from a focus on
weapons and military sites to a struggle for influence, services, and
reconstruction. While the residents of the south desperately need institutions
capable of providing medical treatment, aid, and rebuilding what the war
destroyed, including these entities under Israeli suspicion could complicate the
delivery of support and funding. Thus, the upcoming battle in the south does not
appear to be limited to weapons alone, but may extend to a fundamental question:
Who has the ability to treat the population, help them, and rebuild their
villages? With the inclusion of civil and service institutions in the circle of
accusation, reconstruction itself turns into a new arena of conflict.
Israeli General: Our Army Is Stuck in Lebanon Like a 'Swiss
Cheese'
Janoubia/August 28, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
Retired Israeli Brigadier General Oren Avman sharply criticized the Israeli
army's operations in Lebanon, arguing that Israeli forces are engaged in
localized attrition battles within what he termed the "security zone," without a
clear political objective or the ability to dictate the course of events.
Speaking to Israeli radio station 103FM, Avman, the former commander of the
Eitan Division and the Kfir Brigade, said the army's situation in Lebanon
resembled the film "Home Alone 2," describing its deployment as akin to "Swiss
cheese full of holes," given the absence of a "clear political compass." He
added that the Israeli army is now managing limited attrition engagements,
questioning whether the Lebanese front has become a "ping-pong game," where the
other side launches a drone, and Israel responds with an F-16 or another
military operation. Avman pointed out that "the Israeli army is confined within
a security zone," arguing that the fundamental problem in the confrontation with
Hezbollah is that the realities on the ground are now dictating Israel's
reactions and actions, rather than allowing it to dictate the course of events
and set the rules of engagement. Avman expressed doubts about the potential
outcomes of diplomatic efforts related to Lebanon, while emphasizing the
importance of continued dialogue and political action. He stated that the core
question concerns the direction these efforts might take and whether they will
compel Israel to make concessions. He concluded by warning of two major problems
facing Israel on various fronts: the absence of clear political decisions and
the increasing pressure on the army, stemming from what he described as a lack
of understanding of the true situation within the reserve forces, the active
duty service, and regular units.
America Controls Israel's Regional Actions... Strikes in
Lebanon Continue
Janoubia/August 28, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
Al-Arabiya sources revealed intensive American efforts toward Israel, attempting
to control the pace of escalation on several regional fronts, particularly Syria
and Iran, in parallel with the continuation of Israeli operations in Gaza and
Lebanon. According to the sources, Washington seeks to prevent the expansion of
the confrontation or the opening of new fronts by keeping Israeli actions within
a coordinated and limited scope. The sources also indicated that the United
States is pressuring Israel to prevent any further clashes or escalation in
Syria, given the sensitivity of the Syrian arena and the multitude of military
forces and entities deployed there. Washington fears, according to available
information, that any further escalation could complicate the regional landscape
and increase the likelihood of a wider confrontation. In response, Israel
informed the American side of its intention to continue carrying out periodic
and limited strikes in both Gaza and Lebanon, as part of military operations
that it claims target security threats on both fronts. These stances come at a
time when Israeli military activity continues on multiple fronts, from Gaza and
Lebanon to Syria, amidst US efforts to prevent the escalation from spreading to
new fronts. Regarding Iran, sources indicated that the US administration warned
Israel against carrying out any unilateral strikes against Iranian targets,
while communication continues between Washington and Tel Aviv concerning the
management of military developments in the region. The US position reflects
Washington's keenness to ensure that any potential military steps against Iran
remain within the framework of prior coordination, to avoid actions that could
lead to reciprocal responses or a wider confrontation. Data suggests that
Washington is currently seeking to keep Israeli military movements within the
bounds of US coordination, especially on the most sensitive issues, primarily
Iran and Syria. Thus, the US administration is working on multiple fronts to
manage the regional landscape, as Israeli operations continue in Gaza and
Lebanon, and to prevent the escalation from spreading into a broader
confrontation involving Iran or other fronts.
Escalation Intensifies Around Ali al-Taher Hill: Surrender
to the Army or Confrontation?
Janoubia/August 28, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The Israeli escalation in southern Lebanon continues amidst the escalating
tensions surrounding Ali al-Taher Hill. Field operations have reached a new
level of bombings and arson, coinciding with Israeli troop movements in several
southern towns. In the town of Houla, reports indicate that Israeli forces are
transporting explosive containers into civilian homes. These developments
coincided with bombings in Markaba, Tallousa, Rabaa Thalathin, and Hadatha, as
well as fires being set on the outskirts of Aita al-Jabal as Israeli forces
advanced. An Israeli bombing was reported in Markaba, coinciding with ongoing
military operations in the area. A bombing was also reported in Tallousa, while
Israeli forces detonated a house in Rabaa Thalathin. In Aita al-Jabal, Israeli
forces set fire to several areas on the outskirts of the town as they advanced.
In Hadatha, an Israeli bombing was reported, coinciding with a machine gun sweep
towards the town. This escalation coincides with the ongoing dispute over Ali
al-Taher Hill, which has become a key flashpoint in the southern security and
political landscape. A source close to Hezbollah told Al-Hadath that talk of a
settlement regarding Ali al-Taher Hill is “inaccurate,” indicating that the
party has not backed down from its position of refusing to hand over the area to
the Lebanese army. According to the source, Hezbollah will engage in
confrontation should Israel decide to enter Ali al-Taher, while any settlement
to hand over the hill would mean the party gaining concessions in return. These
developments come amidst continued Israeli operations in large areas of southern
Lebanon, while the Ali al-Taher issue remains unresolved, caught between
political proposals and the realities on the ground, amid fears that any change
in the status quo there could trigger a new round of escalation.
Lebanon Demands Extension for UNIFIL; UN Rejects
Undermining Resolution 1701
Security Council Upholds Resolution Protecting its Borders and Disarming
Hezbollah
Washington: Ali Barada/Asharq Al-Awsat/August 28, 2026 (Google translation from
Arabic)
During a closed session, members of the Security Council rejected Israeli
attempts to undermine or revoke Resolution 1701. This came amidst serious
discussions regarding Lebanese demands for an additional, albeit short,
extension of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
The Trump administration clearly desires a "supportive UN role" for the
tripartite framework between the United States, Lebanon, and Israel. Under
Resolution 2790, adopted by the Security Council last summer, UNIFIL's current
mandate expires on December 31. The resolution also requests a report from UN
Secretary-General António Guterres outlining "alternatives" to the UN mission to
ensure the continued implementation of all provisions of Resolution 1701.
According to well-informed diplomatic sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, the
Security Council, meeting at France's request, discussed ways to implement
Resolution 1701 as the "framework governing relations between Lebanon and
Israel," in addition to the report submitted by Guterres to the Security Council
last June. Guterres' proposals include establishing a reinforced monitoring
force of thousands of personnel to take over post-UNIFIL operations, through
"three options." The first option involves "the presence of 350 unarmed UN
military observers, alongside an armed UN force to protect the mission,
comprising four infantry battalions of 750 armed soldiers each, and a reserve
force of 700 armed soldiers." The second option calls for the presence of 285
unarmed UN military observers, along with an armed UN force protection force
comprising two infantry battalions of 750 armed soldiers each, and a reserve
force of 450 armed soldiers. The third option requires “215 unarmed UN military
observers, in addition to two light infantry battalions of 450 armed soldiers
each, and a rapid reaction force of 350 armed soldiers to protect the troops.”
While the Lebanese government appeared to favor the first option, a diplomat
told Asharq Al-Awsat, “The developments that followed Hezbollah’s disastrous
intervention in the American-Israeli war against Iran,” considering that “the
initiatives that have taken place since 2014, including the cessation of
hostilities agreement of November 27 of that year,” in addition to the
tripartite framework agreement between Lebanon, Israel, and the United States,
have become a means of implementing Resolution 1701, which clearly stipulates
the preservation of Lebanon’s international borders. Furthermore, operative
paragraph eight of the resolution calls for the disarmament of armed groups,
including, of course, Hezbollah.
Given Israel’s unwillingness to implement all provisions of Resolution 1701 and
its focus solely on the tripartite framework agreement, Lebanese diplomacy has
been actively engaged, based on positions—some public and others behind the
scenes—of President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. These efforts
have involved “extensive consultations for months with countries concerned with
the Lebanese issue, particularly members of the Security Council, especially the
five permanent members, in order to convey and clarify the Lebanese position
before the Security Council meeting.” Representatives of member states showed
understanding for a message Lebanon submitted weeks ago regarding the extension
of UNIFIL's mandate. A diplomat told Asharq Al-Awsat that US efforts are focused
on "preserving a UN role that supports the tripartite framework agreement"
reached by Lebanese, Israeli, and American negotiators, without explicitly
responding to Israeli demands to "disregard Resolution 1701." Diplomats also
noted during the session that "the situation has changed significantly since the
problem created by Hezbollah's intervention in the war." All Security Council
members, including the United States, emphasized "the necessity of preserving
the UN role," stipulating that the US-sponsored negotiations between Lebanon and
Israel should be "complementary" to the "multilateral track represented by the
Security Council and the United Nations." The administration of US President
Donald Trump reiterated its position that it "does not support the extension" of
UNIFIL, stressing that "any new international presence must be closely linked to
the concrete objectives of the tripartite framework." But it expressed its
willingness to discuss “arrangements that support the disarmament of
(Hezbollah).” A US official said: “The country has witnessed seven rounds of
conflict during the time of (UNIFIL)’s presence, and (Hezbollah) has built a
massive military infrastructure around its positions, sometimes exploiting the
proximity of UN peacekeepers to protect its infrastructure or operations. We are
not interested in replacing an ineffective open-ended mission with another.”
Issa's Message to the State: Disarm Before Anything Else...
Don't Misplace Priorities!
Lara Yazbek Al-Markazia/August 28, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
Al-Markazia - Some within Lebanon were preoccupied with US Ambassador to Lebanon
Michel Issa's statement that his country is ready for dialogue with Hezbollah.
They added this stance to US envoy to Syria Tom Barrack's remarks about the
necessity of including the party in the current negotiations to end the war
because it is the one holding the weapons. However, according to sovereign
political sources speaking to Al-Markazia, these individuals apparently failed
to hear the condition for this "supposed dialogue," which is Hezbollah's
acceptance of US demands, namely, surrendering its weapons to the Lebanese
state. Issa stated yesterday, "We want them to surrender their weapons, and we
don't want anything more from them." Perhaps these individuals, most of whom
revolve in the orbit of the resistance, believe that the United States is
negotiating with the party on its own demands—political, military, and
governmental—which are new illusions for an axis accustomed to selling and
buying illusions! In addition to this crucial observation, sources note the
American ambassador's clear assertion that Hezbollah bears responsibility for
the stalled negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, or for the continued
Israeli airstrikes on southern Lebanon. Speaking from Dar al-Fatwa on Wednesday,
he explained that "no agreement has yet been reached to halt Israeli attacks
because Hezbollah has not surrendered its weapons and the party does not want to
do anything," asking, "Why should we ask Israel to do everything?" He added, "We
have not yet agreed with them on a cessation of hostilities, because it must be
clear that these attacks are caused by Hezbollah, which has not adhered to the
ceasefire." His condition is always that he will retain his weapons as long as
Israel does so, and all they ask is for Israel to withdraw from southern
Lebanon, without him pledging to hand over his weapons to the army. Issa's words
clearly reflect the American viewpoint, which considers the surrender of weapons
a prerequisite for any political, negotiating, or military breakthrough on the
ground. This is not new, but it clarifies the situation for those still
confused: if Hezbollah believes that Washington will negotiate with it over its
weapons, it is mistaken, as the demand is for their disarmament, period. And if
the Lebanese state also believes that it can reschedule priorities, placing
Israeli withdrawals first, or demand Israeli concessions without first
demonstrating its own seriousness about disarmament, it is also mistaken. Herein
lies perhaps the most important message in Issa's position. Washington is
telling Lebanon that it understands, supports, and stands by it, but that no
progress in the negotiations or the liberation of the land will be achieved
until the process of consolidating weapons under the control of the legitimate
authorities actually begins, the sources conclude.
The State Pays Salaries to Clerics, Yet Their Platforms
Attack It... Where is the Accountability?
Najwa Abi Haidar/Al-Markazia/August 28, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
Al-Markazia - From the Imam Hussein Mosque in Burj al-Barajneh, the
distinguished Jaafari Mufti, Sheikh Ahmad Qabalan, left no room for ambiguity.
President Joseph Aoun was the target of his criticism, and the entire executive
branch appeared, in Qabalan's speech, to be the primary culprit in a highly
dangerous phase for Lebanon. "The country today has a presidency without a
president," Qabalan said, accusing the authorities of "manipulating national
issues and having no other purpose than to sift water through a sieve." He then
escalated the confrontation further: "A fiefdom is useless, and a national
presidency begins in southern Lebanon and its front lines," warning that
"political isolation alienates you from your people." The escalation did not
stop at criticizing political performance; Qabalan went so far as to say that
"Lebanon is waging a national struggle from the south without any presence of
the executive branch or state institutions," calling on the Lebanese to
"reorganize themselves," and declaring that the current phase is a period of
national testing. But the question that arises here is not only: What does
Sheikh Ahmad Qabalan want from the President of the Republic? It is also: By
what authority does he address the state? And from where does he derive the
right to place himself, and by extension the religious pulpit, in the position
of guardian of its national choices, especially since the state only became a
"farm" when it was destroyed by the partisan political faction he defends,
serving its Iranian patrons? Sheikh Qabalan's stance is neither an isolated
incident nor a slip of the tongue. Since the current government came to power,
harsh political messages have been repeatedly directed at President Joseph Aoun
and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, while some religious platforms have been
transformed into arenas for political escalation that goes beyond criticism to
accusations of treason, doubt, and serious charges. Is the goal to transform
religious platforms into political operations rooms, while some of those making
these accusations hold positions in state institutions and receive their
salaries and benefits? The question is not directed at any particular sect, nor
is it about any religious figure's right to express his opinion. The issue
concerns a simple principle: one cannot be part of the state while receiving its
salary and then become its adversary when standing on the pulpit. Sovereign
sources, speaking to Al-Markazia, focused on this particular contradiction,
stating: “It is unacceptable for someone holding an official position and
receiving a salary from the treasury to treat senior state officials with
accusations of treason and collaboration.” This raises the question for the
Public Prosecutor and all relevant judicial authorities: Where are the limits of
the law? When does a public accusation of treason or collaboration become an act
warranting prosecution? Is the law applied only to ordinary citizens, while
religious and political platforms become off-limits to the judiciary? Even more
dangerous is that the discourse doesn't merely attack the government; it goes so
far as to redefine patriotism itself according to a single criterion: the South,
the resistance, and weapons. When it is said that “national leadership begins in
the South and its fronts,” it becomes legitimate to ask: Does disagreeing with
the resistance option render one unpatriotic? Does the Lebanese state, its
institutions, its presidency, and its government become less patriotic simply
because they don't adopt a specific political discourse? This is not a minor
detail; it strikes at the very core of the Lebanese state. The question, the
sources added, is also directed to Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri: How long
will this kind of rhetoric continue to be met with silence? Is the goal to keep
the political arena open to all forms of escalation, or are there limits that
must be drawn, especially when the escalation comes from figures who combine
religious authority with official positions? The goal is not to silence anyone,
nor to confiscate the right of religious figures to speak. Rather, it is to
apply the same rules to everyone. Whoever wants to be a political religious
figure, let them be. Whoever wants to oppose the authorities, let them oppose
them. But whoever wants to be a state employee, receiving a salary from public
funds, and then uses their platform to attack the state and its symbols, must
answer a clear question: Are they within the state or outside of it? And
consequently, who holds accountable those who accuse the state and its
officials? And who protects the state's prestige when some of those who receive
its salaries are in a position to attack it?
Lebanon Must Take Off UNIFIL’s Training Wheels
Makram Rabah/Now Lebanon/August 28/2026
Before UNIFIL arrived in southern Lebanon In 1978, some villages reportedly had
no dry-cleaning services not even basic urgent care units. The international
force brought foreign soldiers, salaries, rental income, restaurants,
supermarkets and, yes, cleaner suits.
This may be a charming footnote in the history of rural development, but it is
hardly a compelling doctrine of national security. A country does not recover
its sovereignty one pressed shirt at a time.
Yet much of the current campaign to extend UNIFIL’s mandate rests on this same
confusion between economic convenience and strategic necessity. Lebanon’s
political establishment speaks as though the departure of the peacekeepers would
create an intolerable void. President Joseph Aoun has described extending UNIFIL
as the preferred option, while preparing to request an alternative international
force should the current mission end. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has likewise
emphasized Lebanon’s need for an international presence capable of monitoring,
reporting, coordinating and maintaining liaison.
But after almost half a century, the question is no longer what UNIFIL is
supposed to do. It is what UNIFIL has actually done—and what Lebanon has avoided
doing because UNIFIL was there.
The force did not prevent southern Lebanon from becoming a vast military
infrastructure for Hezbollah. It did not stop the construction of tunnels, the
accumulation of weapons or the transformation of villages into forward operating
positions for Iran’s regional project. Hezbollah and other components of the
Iranian axis operated throughout its area of deployment while an international
force mandated to assist the Lebanese state in restoring its authority watched
the landscape around it change.
UNIFIL became a witness unwilling—or unable—to testify.
The murder of Lokman Slim offered a particularly disturbing illustration. Slim,
a publisher, researcher and outspoken critic of Hezbollah, was abducted and
murdered in February 2021 only a short distance from one of UNIFIL’s positions
in southern Lebanon. Yet the force did not meaningfully cooperate with his
family’s effort to uncover what had happened in territory supposedly monitored
by thousands of international peacekeepers.
The symbolism was difficult to miss. A prominent Lebanese citizen could be
assassinated virtually within sight of a United Nations presence, while that
presence behaved as though proximity created no corresponding responsibility—not
even a responsibility to help establish the truth.
Then came the murder of Irish peacekeeper Private Seán Rooney in December 2022.
His UN-marked vehicle was surrounded and fired upon in an area under Hezbollah’s
influence. The Lebanese military court eventually convicted six defendants in
2025, but the principal defendant, Mohammad Ayyad, was sentenced to death in
absentia after having been released on bail and subsequently failing to appear.
Other defendants received comparatively minor sentences or fines, while the
senior leadership of Hizballah were never put on trial .
UNIFIL welcomed the conclusion of the trial and praised the Lebanese
government’s commitment to accountability. Rooney’s family was considerably less
impressed. His mother described the proceedings as a “sham” and insisted that
justice had neither been done nor seen to be done.
The contrast was revealing. If UNIFIL cannot stand its ground and insist on
credible, transparent accountability when one of its own soldiers is killed,
what exactly should the Lebanese population expect it to do when Hezbollah
intimidates, abducts or kills Lebanese citizens? Expressions of concern are not
accountability, and a conviction in absentia means little if the main
perpetrator remains beyond the reach—or protection—of the state.
This is not primarily an indictment of the individual soldiers serving beneath
the blue flag. Many have performed difficult duties under dangerous conditions,
and some, like Rooney, have paid with their lives. The failure is political and
structural. UNIFIL was asked to operate in territory where the Lebanese state
declined to exercise real sovereignty and where Hezbollah dictated the
boundaries of what international personnel could see, inspect or report. The
mission remained present, but presence was repeatedly mistaken for
effectiveness.
Worse, UNIFIL provided the Lebanese establishment with the perfect alibi.
Whenever violence erupted, officials demanded that the international community
act. Whenever Hezbollah expanded its military infrastructure, the state
explained that it lacked the capacity to confront the problem. Whenever the
question of sovereignty arose, responsibility was divided among the United
Nations, the army, local “sensitivities,” regional circumstances and an
endlessly postponed national dialogue.
Everyone was responsible, which meant that no one was.
The Lebanese state now resembles a child refusing to remove the training wheels
from his bicycle. The child insists that he wants to ride independently but
panics whenever an adult reaches for the wrench. Nearly five decades after
UNIFIL’s establishment, Lebanon’s leaders continue to demand sovereignty while
subcontracting the risks and duties that sovereignty entails.
The south does not need another international formula designed to protect the
state from its own responsibilities. It needs the Lebanese Armed Forces to
become the sole military authority on Lebanese territory.
This requires money, equipment, training and political backing. UNIFIL operates
with thousands of personnel and a substantial annual budget. Redirecting a
meaningful portion of the international resources currently devoted to
sustaining this indefinite mission toward strengthening the Lebanese Armed
Forces would have a more lasting impact. Lebanon does not need parallel
structures that manage instability. It needs a national institution capable of
ending it.
Funding alone, however, will not solve the problem. The army must receive an
unambiguous political mandate to deploy throughout the south, inspect suspected
military sites, prevent the reconstruction of Hezbollah’s infrastructure and
enforce the state’s monopoly over arms. An underfunded army is a serious
problem; an army denied the authority to act is an even greater one.
Ending UNIFIL’s mission would also send a necessary message to European
governments, whose troops and taxpayers have carried much of its burden: the
Lebanese people do not wish to remain permanently trapped beneath Hezbollah’s
hegemony. The international community should help Lebanon escape that condition,
not finance the arrangements that make it sustainable.
Hezbollah has benefited from UNIFIL’s presence more than it admits. The blue
helmets provide a buffer against Israel while Hezbollah retains the weapons,
tunnels and operational freedom that repeatedly expose the south to war. In this
arrangement, international troops become involuntary shields, the inhabitants of
southern Lebanon become hostages, and Hezbollah preserves the right to decide
when the battlefield will reopen.
Israel must withdraw from Lebanese territory and cease its attacks. But Lebanon
cannot make Israeli compliance a precondition for exercising sovereignty over
its own land. Nor can it indefinitely link the dismantling of an Iranian-backed
armed organization to the goodwill of the Israeli government. A sovereign state
fulfils its obligations because they are sovereign obligations, not bargaining
chips.
Extending UNIFIL would not resolve the crisis. It would merely kick the can
farther down a road already littered with destroyed villages, abandoned
resolutions and recycled promises.
UNIFIL was created as a temporary instrument. Its longevity has become evidence
not of success, but of Lebanon’s prolonged refusal to graduate from
international supervision.
The dry cleaners may survive its departure. The more important question is
whether the Lebanese state is finally prepared to clean house.
**Makram Rabah is the managing editor at Now Lebanon and an Assistant Professor
at the American University of Beirut, Department of History. His book Conflict
on Mount Lebanon: The Druze, the Maronites and Collective Memory (Edinburgh
University Press) covers collective identities and the Lebanese Civil War. He
tweets at @makramrabah
The Latest English LCCC
Miscellaneous Reports And News published
on August 28-29/2026
Amid his absence from the public eye,
Mojtaba Khamenei addresses the Iranian people
Riyadh - Al-Arabiya.net / August 28, 2026
(Google translation from Arabic)
Amid his continued absence from public view, both in image and voice, Iranian
Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei addressed the nation today, Friday, with a new
message. In it, he called for preventing "any practices or statements" that
could harm social cohesion in the country. In the written message, the text of
which was published by the Tasnim News Agency, Khamenei urged authorities to
avoid making any "discouraging statements that could weaken national and public
morale." He also warned against discussing weaknesses, considering that
revealing them serves the enemy. Khamenei praised the performance of the
government and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, noting the measures taken by
the authorities despite the restrictions and sanctions imposed on the country.
On the economic front, Khamenei emphasized the need to address the challenges
related to inflation, unemployment, prices, and the goods and services market,
in addition to promoting growth, investment, and domestic production. He called
for making reliance on domestic production a cornerstone of economic policies,
while utilizing imports "correctly and wisely" when domestic production is
insufficient to meet needs. The Iranian Supreme Leader also addressed the
importance of leveraging the technologies and innovations offered by young
people, urging a move beyond traditional methods and the utilization of modern
capabilities in various fields, including agriculture, industry, culture,
education, communications, and social affairs. This message comes at a time when
Iran is facing increasing economic and political pressure due to ongoing US
sanctions against Tehran. The Supreme Leader, who was seriously wounded, has
remained completely out of the public eye since the death of his father, Ali
Khamenei, in the US strikes during the early days of the war on Iran last
February, amid growing questions about his health and his actual role in running
the country. Khamenei's messages to the Iranian people have been limited to a
few written statements read by broadcasters on news programs, and he was absent
from his father's funeral last month. This absence comes at a time when Iran
faces critical decisions regarding a war that has drained the country and
inflicted further damage on its fragile economy, while fears grow about its
political and economic repercussions.
Pezeshkian: We Must Not Delay Establishing Good Relations
with Neighboring Countries
Riyadh - Al-Arabiya.net / August 28, 2026
(Google translation from Arabic)
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stressed that "we must not delay
establishing good relations with neighboring countries." In remarks on Friday,
Pezeshkian said, "We must correct our perspective to elevate our relations with
neighboring countries." He added, "We must reach a common language with
neighboring countries to ensure the region's security." Regarding the economic
situation, Pezeshkian revealed that the government will make a decision to raise
gasoline prices in coordination with all relevant institutions, noting that US
sanctions and the embargo have caused a decline in Iran's exports and imports by
about 35%.
Revolutionary Guard Claims: We Maintain "Complete Control" of the Strait of
Hormuz
Riyadh - Al-Arabiya.net/August 28, 2026 (Google
translation from Arabic)
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy rejected US statements that the Strait of
Hormuz is open, describing them as "a blatant lie." The Revolutionary Guard Navy
claimed in a statement on Friday that it maintains "complete control" over the
strait, adding that the waterway is "closed to ships seeking to cross it without
coordination with Tehran."
Washington Pressures Israel to Prevent Escalation in Syria
and Iran
Riyadh - Al-Arabiya.net/August 28, 2026
The US administration is pressuring Israel to prevent any friction that could
lead to a new escalation in Syria, amid efforts to maintain existing
de-escalation arrangements. This comes as the US warns Tel Aviv against carrying
out unilateral strikes against Iran. Sources told Al-Arabiya on Friday that
Washington is pressuring Israel to avoid friction and escalation on the Syrian
front and is demanding that it maintain the de-escalation arrangements with
Damascus. These moves come as the United States seeks to prevent the opening of
new fronts or the expansion of confrontations in the region, especially given
the continued tension on the Gaza and Lebanon fronts, in addition to the
confrontation with Iran. According to the sources, Israel informed the US that
it will continue to carry out "periodic and limited" strikes in the Gaza Strip
and Lebanon. The Israeli message indicates Tel Aviv's desire to maintain freedom
of military action against what it considers security threats, despite US
efforts to prevent limited operations from escalating into a wider
confrontation. On the Iranian front, Al-Arabiya sources revealed that the US
administration warned Israel against carrying out any unilateral strikes against
Iran. This warning is particularly significant given recent US moves toward
Tehran, as Washington is working to combine military and economic pressure with
maintaining the possibility of returning to the diplomatic track. Iranian
Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi affirmed on Friday that restoring diplomacy to
its proper course "is not impossible," but he linked this to the United States
realizing that its policy of pressure, as he put it, "is ineffective." His
remarks came after talks with Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh
Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, as part of regional efforts aimed at
de-escalating tensions and reopening channels of negotiation between Washington
and Tehran. Meanwhile, in Syria, Washington is trying to maintain arrangements
that prevent direct clashes between Israeli and Syrian forces, while security
issues in the south of the country and the Israeli military presence remain
among the most prominent points of tension. Israel has previously carried out
strikes inside Syrian territory, claiming they target threats to its security,
while Damascus demands a halt to the attacks and respect for Syrian sovereignty.
Recent US messages reveal an attempt to manage several fronts simultaneously:
containing the situation in Syria, preventing the escalation of the conflict in
Lebanon and Gaza, and deterring Israel from taking unilateral action against
Iran that could reignite a wider regional conflict. Conversely, according to
sources, Israel is maintaining a margin for military action in Gaza and Lebanon,
making the success of US efforts contingent on its ability to distinguish
between what Tel Aviv describes as "limited" operations and any steps that could
push the region back toward a broader escalation.
Washington Intensifies Economic Paragon Campaign... Tehran
Threatens Diplomacy Again / Trump Doesn't Rule Out Sanctions on Chinese Banks if
They Deal with Iran
Washington - London - Tehran: Asharq Al-Awsat/August 28, 2026
Six months after the war that reshaped the security and political landscape in
the Gulf, US President Donald Trump confirmed that Washington is not holding
talks with Tehran, but rather focusing on punishing it economically within the
framework of the "economic pariah" campaign announced on August 24. This
campaign aims to sever as many of Iran's ties as possible with the global
financial and commercial system. In response to a journalist's question about
China, Iran's largest trading partner, Trump said that sanctions could be
imposed on Chinese banks if they deal with Iran. For its part, Iran is trying to
keep the window of diplomacy open, but on conditions that include the United
States abandoning its "pressure" policy and fulfilling its commitments under the
memorandum of understanding signed in June before it collapsed weeks later, in
parallel with resolving the dispute over the Strait of Hormuz. As part of
diplomatic efforts, Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed
bin Abdulrahman Al Thani met with senior Iranian officials in Tehran on
Thursday, in a move aimed at de-escalating tensions and reviving the stalled
diplomatic process. During his meetings, the Qatari minister emphasized the
importance of restoring the situation to its pre-war state and reopening the
international waterway to maritime traffic. For his part, Iranian Foreign
Minister Abbas Araqchi described the talks on Friday as "constructive and
innovative," reiterating his call for Washington to halt military and economic
pressure on his country and return to negotiations. Araqchi wrote on the X
platform: "Restoring the diplomatic track is not impossible," but added that it
depends on the United States realizing "a simple truth" that "pressure is
ineffective." Iran has been holding talks with Oman for weeks regarding
arrangements for the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
announced on Wednesday that Iran and Oman had reached an agreement in principle
on how to manage traffic in the strait and share revenues. However, a senior
Iranian source later clarified that the two countries were still working on the
details of the agreement. The source said that work is underway to finalize the
details of an agreement concerning the waterway, as Tehran and Muscat discuss a
formula that would allow for more organized management of maritime traffic.
These contacts grant the Sultanate of Oman a pivotal role in any future
arrangements, given its geographical location and its relationship with both
parties. The diplomatic activity was not limited to Qatar and Oman, as Tehran
witnessed two notable visits within a single week: one by Pakistani Army Chief
Asim Munir and Interior Minister Mohsen Naqvi, and the other by Omani Foreign
Minister Badr al-Busaidi. Meanwhile, the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National
Security Council, Mohsen Rezaei, stated that Tehran is preparing a list of
conditions necessary for reopening the Strait of Hormuz, following a request
from mediators. In a televised interview, Rezaei said that Iran and Oman have
agreed on a shipping lane through the strait, part of which lies in Omani waters
and the other part in Iranian waters. He added that ships would use a designated
route in the middle of the strait if the United States meets Iran's conditions.
“Sleeper Cells”: Is Iran Circumventing the Plan to Dismantle Iraqi Factions?
Janoubia/August 28, 2026 (Google
translation from Arabic)
An intelligence study reveals what it describes as an alternative Iranian plan
to adapt to the political path imposed by the government of Iraqi Prime Minister
Ali Abdullah Saleh. This path entails collecting weapons from factions and
militias loyal to Tehran and reorganizing their military structure. With the
Iraqi government's September 30 deadline for weapons collection approaching,
coinciding with the end of the international coalition's mission in Iraq,
attention is turning to the future of armed factions and Iran's role in
maintaining its influence within the country. According to the study, Tehran
does not appear ready to easily relinquish its military tools of influence in
Iraq. Rather, it is working to adapt its strategy to the new realities by
seeking alternatives that allow it to preserve its capabilities and influence
while minimizing the cost of political confrontation and international pressure.
A study issued by the Alma Center for Security Studies in Israel stated that,
according to the center's assessment, Iran has begun a shift in its approach to
managing its influence within Iraq. The study, citing political and military
sources in the Middle East, stated that the Quds Force of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps is working to establish clandestine networks comprised
of small cells, each with between five and ten members, operating under civilian
fronts and outside the traditional structures of armed factions.
According to the study, this structure could allow Tehran to maintain
operational capabilities, including missiles and drones, while reducing its
reliance on large, overt armed formations that have become more vulnerable to
political pressure and sanctions. The study also mentioned proposals, according
to its sources, discussed behind the scenes during Iranian Parliament Speaker
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf's visit to Baghdad and his meetings with several
faction leaders. These proposals concerned the possibility of transferring and
temporarily storing heavy weapons within Iranian territory or concealing them to
prevent Iraqi authorities from accessing them. The study concludes that the
armed landscape in Iraq is divided into two main trends. The first trend
represents the forces that have shown initial willingness to integrate into
official institutions or hand over parts of their arsenals. According to the
study, these include the Peace Brigades and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, in an attempt to
preserve their political gains and position within the state. The second trend
comprises the more hardline factions, most notably Kata'ib Hezbollah and Harakat
al-Nujaba, which refuse to relinquish their weapons and link any such step to
broader conditions. These conditions, the study argues, are not limited to the
withdrawal of US forces but also include ending the Turkish presence,
dismantling the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, and expelling American companies.
Faced with this division, the study suggests that the al-Zaidi government has
begun to shift its rhetoric from "disarmament" to "regulation of weapons," while
allowing a longer timeframe to avoid a direct clash between Shiite forces. The
study then compares the Iraqi situation to the Lebanese one, arguing that Iran's
margin for maneuver in Iraq differs from that in Lebanon. According to its
assessment, Tehran views Iraqi factions as a multi-component network more
amenable to reorganization, whereas Hezbollah represents a central military
structure and a key pillar of its regional strategy. The study argues that the
multiplicity of Iraqi factions grants the central government greater room to
maneuver and attempt to reintegrate or control them, while Hezbollah in Lebanon
possesses a more centralized and institutional structure, combining military,
political, and social activities. It also contends that Hezbollah's importance
to Iranian strategy surpasses the role played by Iraqi factions, as it
represents one of the most prominent arms of Iranian military influence in the
region and the front most closely linked to the confrontation with Israel. The
study concludes that the success of any Iraqi plan to control weapons will not
be measured by the number of weapons officially surrendered, but rather by the
state's ability to dismantle undeclared command networks and prevent the
emergence of parallel armed structures outside its control. If the study's
assessments regarding the establishment of small, clandestine cells prove
accurate, Baghdad's challenge will not be limited to collecting visible weapons,
but will extend to confronting the possibility of some factions transitioning
from overt military organization to less visible and more difficult-to-monitor
networks. Between the integration process and attempts to regulate weapons, the
most prominent question remains: Will the Iraqi state succeed in imposing its
monopoly on weapons, or will the factions reconstitute themselves with new
structures that ensure the continuation of their influence outside official
frameworks?
Iran’s “Shadow Fleet”: How Does Tehran Defy Sanctions and
Keep Oil Flowing?
Janoubia/August 28, 2026 (Google
translation from Arabic)
Sanctions on Iranian oil exports no longer necessarily mean a halt to the flow
of crude. Over the years, Tehran has developed a complex maritime network that
allows it to keep its shipments moving, away from the eyes of international
monitoring and sanctions agencies. At the heart of this system is what is known
as the “shadow fleet,” a network of oil tankers, companies, and brokers that
employs various methods to conceal the identity of ships, the origin of
shipments, and their routes, thus allowing Iranian oil to reach buyers despite
US restrictions. The Eritrean government revealed on Friday that the oil tanker
“Sibu 1,” which appears on ship tracking websites as flying the Eritrean flag,
is not registered in Eritrea. The tanker was hijacked off the coast of Yemen
last week, before its hijackers were believed to have changed course towards
Somalia. The United States imposed sanctions on the “Sibu 1” last December,
considering it part of the “shadow fleet” used to transport Iranian oil products
and circumvent US sanctions. The International Maritime Organization's database
also showed that the tanker's current flag status is listed as "Eritrea –
Invalid," meaning its registration under the Eritrean flag is not recognized as
valid, according to Reuters. The "Cebu 1" incident reveals one of the most
prominent mechanisms for concealing the identity of vessels used in the
sanctioned oil trade. Changing registration data or using unrecognized flags can
complicate the process of identifying the ship's owner and the parties
associated with the shipment. The "shadow fleet" does not rely on fixed tankers
operating for a single entity, but rather on a sprawling network of ships and
companies whose ownership, management, and registration data can change as
sanctions tighten. The US Treasury Department indicates that networks involved
in smuggling Iranian oil use tankers linked to various entities, along with
front companies and entities registered in multiple countries, making it more
difficult to identify the true owner or the ultimate beneficiary of the sales.
Therefore, in many cases, US sanctions target the vessel, the companies that own
or manage it, and the intermediaries associated with it, in an attempt to reach
the entire commercial network behind the shipments, not just the tanker itself.
One of the most prominent tools used to conceal tanker movements is the
Automatic Identification System (AIS), which allows for the identification of
ships, their movements, and their identities. The US Treasury Department says
that networks linked to the Iranian oil trade use deliberate interruptions in
AIS data transmissions and signal manipulation to obscure ship movements,
leaving gaps in the voyage log and making it more difficult to determine the
ship's location or the origin of its cargo. A tanker's reappearance on tracking
systems does not necessarily mean its route is clear, as it could reappear after
a period of absence in a different location, complicating the process of
reconstructing its journey and verifying its loading and unloading operations.
These tactics demonstrate that countering Iranian oil exports is not limited to
tracking tankers, but extends to a complex network of ownership, registration,
intermediaries, and navigational data. While the United States continues to
impose sanctions on entities and vessels linked to the Iranian oil trade, the
networks that constitute this "shadow fleet" are working to change the
identities, routes, and methods of operation of ships in an attempt to maintain
the flow of crude oil to markets despite the sanctions.
Iran's Secret Service Raises Alert Over Alleged Plot to
Assassinate Barron Trump; Tehran Responds: "If We Wanted, We Would!"
Janoubia/August 28, 2026 (Google
translation from Arabic)
Iran's National Security Advisor, Mohsen Rezaei, categorically denied reports
circulating in international media and referenced by the Israeli Prime Minister,
alleging that Tehran was planning to assassinate Barron Trump, the youngest son
of US President Donald Trump. He accused Israel of fabricating these claims and
spreading baseless propaganda. In a televised statement broadcast on Friday by
official media outlets, Rezaei explained that these allegations were merely
"big, fabricated lies through which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
was able to manipulate Trump and influence his decisions."
Rezaei added, emphasizing his country's capabilities on the ground, "If we had
made the decision (to assassinate him), nothing would have stopped us." These
heated exchanges come in the wake of escalating media and field activity
stemming from Iranian media outlets broadcasting content threatening the US
president and his family, following recent military developments. The content of
the video: The Iranian state broadcaster IRIB aired a nearly three-minute video
featuring a direct question in English: "Where do we kill Barron Trump?!" Maps
and security tracking: The video included maps, diagrams, and footage of
locations where Trump's son is believed to spend time, most notably Trump Tower
in New York City. Western security circles considered this an indication of
media and intelligence surveillance targeting the Trump family. The US Secret
Service's response and measures: In response, the video's broadcast and the
ensuing political reactions prompted a heightened state of alert and intensive
security scrutiny by the US Secret Service, which is responsible for the
official protection of VIPs, officials, and their families. The US Secret
Service officially announced that it was fully aware of the content of the video
broadcast by Iranian state media and that it was taking the implications of this
content very seriously. Official Spokesperson's Statement: Secret Service
spokesperson Nate Herring stated in a press release that "the U.S. Secret
Service is aware of the video and is thoroughly investigating any indication or
activity that could be considered an immediate or future threat to the lives of
individuals under our legal responsibility." Secrecy and Security Protocols: In
response to inquiries regarding the nature of the intelligence measures taken to
protect Barron Trump or to enhance security around his residence and movements,
Herring emphasized the strict procedural frameworks, stating, "In the interest
of operational security and the integrity of field protection protocols, we do
not discuss intelligence details or security measures related to the protection
of individuals." In connection with the context of the threats circulating about
the families of leaders and officials, reports and news material circulated
under the title (After Barron Trump.. Yair Netanyahu leaves Miami following an
Iranian threat), indicating that Yair Netanyahu (son of Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu) left the city of Miami in Florida, following warnings and
security concerns related to threats and pursuits by Tehran targeting the
children of senior officials.
From “Woman of Courage” to US Terrorist List: Former Iraqi
Minister’s Visa Revoked
Janoubia/August 28, 2026 (Google
translation from Arabic)
Fox News reported on Friday that the US State Department revoked the visa of
former Iraqi Finance Minister Taif Sami Mohammed after adding her name to the US
terrorism watch list. This marks a significant shift for an official previously
honored by the administration of former President Joe Biden as one of the
world’s “Women of Courage.” According to the network’s report, Taif Sami is
currently outside Iraq and is unable to enter the United States following the
revocation of her visa this week, according to a US State Department official.
The report noted that four years ago, Sami was widely praised in Washington,
with then-Secretary of State Antony Blinken describing her as an “iron woman,”
commending her role in combating corruption, stopping bribery, and exposing
attempts by corrupt officials to enrich themselves. In March 2022, the US State
Department selected her for the International Women of Courage Award when she
was serving as Deputy Minister of Finance and Director of the Budget Department
in Iraq. The State Department at the time described her as a “frontline leader
in the fight against corruption.” Fox News quoted Assistant Secretary of State
for Global Public Affairs Dylan Johnson as saying that the State Department
under President Donald Trump revoked Sami’s visa as part of what he described as
a crackdown on individuals the administration considers a threat to U.S.
security. Johnson told the network that the current department is “revoking
their visas” and seeking to prevent those it describes as suspected terrorists
from remaining in the United States. According to the report, the State
Department did not disclose when Sami’s name was added to the terrorism watch
list, nor did it clarify the intelligence upon which the decision was based. The
network stated that Sami’s diminished presence in Washington began more than a
year ago, after Republican lawmakers accused her of helping facilitate terrorist
financing through the Iraqi financial system and called on the Trump
administration to take action against her. Fox News quoted Republican
Representatives Joe Wilson and Greg Steubi describing Sami as a “key facilitator
of terrorist financing in Iraq” and urging the administration to impose
sanctions on her. These accusations, according to published information, remain
separate from the details of the recent US decision, as Washington has not
revealed whether her inclusion on the watch list is specifically related to
these accusations or to other intelligence information. The irony in Sami's case
is evident in the way the Biden and Trump administrations have treated her. In
2022, the US State Department honored her and praised her role in combating
corruption, while today, according to Fox News, she is on the terrorism watch
list and her US visa has been revoked. During the honoring ceremony, Blinken
said that Sami had stopped bribes and exposed attempts to inflate government
employee payrolls and enrich corrupt officials. Blinken hosted the ceremony,
which honored 12 women whom the State Department said had demonstrated
exceptional courage and leadership. Taif Sami later assumed the position of
Iraqi Minister of Finance, where she oversaw the federal budget, government
spending, and financial relations between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region. This
US development coincides with judicial developments in Iraq. Reports in August
indicated that an Iraqi court summoned her and placed her on a wanted list as
part of a broader investigation into corruption cases involving officials and
political figures. However, a summons does not constitute a conviction in
itself, nor does it prove any wrongdoing. Thus, Taif Sami's case has moved from
the realm of investigations and political controversy in Iraq to a more
sensitive level in Washington, following the revocation of her visa and her
placement, according to the US report, on a terrorism watch list. US authorities
have yet to disclose the intelligence basis for this action.
Turkish Drone Approaches Alexandroupoli Airport; Greek
F-16s Intervene
Janoubia/August 28, 2026
Greek airspace witnessed a notable incident on Friday when a Turkish drone
entered the Athens Flight Information Region (FIR) without authorization, near
the city of Alexandroupoli in the northeast of the country. This prompted the
Greek Air Force to scramble F-16 fighter jets to intercept and escort it away
from the area. According to Greek state television, the Turkish drone approached
a point close to the end of the runway at Alexandroupoli Airport, coinciding
with a passenger plane preparing for takeoff. This led to an immediate
mobilization of the air force and air traffic control authorities. Greek F-16s,
which were on alert, took off and within minutes approached the drone to
identify it and intercept its flight path. The drone then withdrew from the area
and, according to reports, headed towards the island of Samothrace. A Greek
military source confirmed the incident, noting that the swift response prevented
any endangerment to civilian air traffic. As a precautionary measure, the flight
path of the passenger plane at Alexandroupoli Airport was altered, and it was
kept at a low altitude until the drone moved away, before resuming its normal
flight to Athens International Airport. According to the Greek military, the
incident falls within the scope of the monitoring and interception operations
frequently conducted by the Greek Air Force in the Aegean Sea, particularly when
military aircraft or drones are detected that do not adhere to established
flight procedures. Greek authorities distinguish between violating national
airspace and violating air traffic regulations within the Athens Flight
Information Region (FIR). Entering national airspace without authorization is
considered a violation, while entering the FIR without a flight plan is
considered a violation of air navigation rules. The Alexandroupoli incident is
particularly significant because it occurred near a civilian airport and at a
time when a passenger plane was preparing for takeoff, necessitating direct
coordination between the civil aviation authorities and the Greek Air Force to
ensure flight safety. This comes amid heightened tensions over the Aegean Sea,
where monitoring and interception incidents between Greece and Turkey are
frequent, fueled by ongoing disputes between the two countries regarding
airspace and navigation regulations.
ISIS Emerges from Within Israel: Attack Plot Targeting Al-Aqsa
and an Army Base
Janoubia/August 28, 2026
The Israeli police and the Shin Bet security service have uncovered a new
security case in northern Israel, following the arrest of a 16-year-old minor
and a 19-year-old man suspected of pledging allegiance to ISIS and planning
attacks targeting Israeli security forces and soldiers. According to a report by
journalist Or Ravid on the Israeli news site N12, the police and Shin Bet
announced this morning that the prosecution is preparing to file indictments
against the detainees after the completion of their interrogations. At the
beginning of the month, authorities arrested a 16-year-old resident of the
Galilee after investigations, according to the Israeli account, revealed that he
had contacted individuals linked to ISIS and pledged allegiance to the
organization. According to the investigation, his activities were not limited to
communication and pledging allegiance; he also began searching online for
content containing instructions on preparing explosive belts. The investigation,
according to the police and the Shin Bet, concluded that the minor intended to
carry out an attack targeting Israeli police and army personnel inside the Al-Aqsa
Mosque compound. Days after the minor's arrest, authorities detained another
suspect, 19-year-old Ibrahim Kaabiya from Haifa, on suspicion of also pledging
allegiance to ISIS. The investigation, according to the police and the Shin Bet,
revealed that Kaabiya was planning an attack inside an Israeli army base in the
northern region. With the investigations of the two suspects concluding on
Friday morning, the Haifa District Attorney's Office is expected to file
indictments against them, along with a request to keep them in custody until the
conclusion of legal proceedings. The Israeli police and the Shin Bet emphasized
that they take seriously any activity by Israeli citizens that could endanger
the security of the state and its citizens, stressing that they will use all
available means to pursue those involved in such activities. The case has
reignited concerns among Israeli security agencies about the recruitment of
individuals through extremist online content, particularly when activity
progresses from simply following propaganda to communicating with extremist
groups, and then to the practical planning of attacks.
Israel announces the elimination of two Hamas and Islamic Jihad commanders in
Gaza
Janoubia/August 28, 2026 (Google
translation from Arabic)
The Israeli army launched an airstrike on the city of Jenin in the northern
occupied West Bank on Friday, the first such attack on the city in months, amid
a mobilization of occupation forces in the vicinity of the targeted area. Media
outlets reported that the strike targeted a car carrying three people, noting
that occupation forces cordoned off the targeted area after the attack. For its
part, the Israeli army announced that it had carried out an airstrike, claiming
it targeted a number of Palestinians in Jenin. In a brief statement, the army
said that Air Force planes "precisely attacked a number of militants in Jenin a
short while ago," without revealing the identities of those targeted or
clarifying the results of the strike. No official information has yet been
released by the Palestinian side regarding casualties or injuries resulting from
the airstrike, while occupation forces continue to deploy around the targeted
area. The Israeli army later announced that it had killed two commanders from
Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip. Army spokesperson Ella Wawiya stated
on Friday that an Israeli airstrike on Thursday targeted Ibrahim Nabil Ibrahim
al-Bas in the Shati area, describing him as a commander in Hamas's military
wing. She noted that he was among those who infiltrated Israel on October 7,
2023. She added that another airstrike targeted Hamdi Ahmed Hamed Kahil in the
Sabri area, describing him as a reconnaissance unit commander in Islamic Jihad.
The spokesperson said that the two commanders participated in operations against
Israeli forces and attempted to rebuild the capabilities of their respective
movements, adding that this constituted a "systematic violation of the
ceasefire."
No Alliance Between Ben-Gvir and Smotrich: Another Blow to
Netanyahu's Calculations
Janoubia/August 28, 2026 (Google
translation from Arabic)
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is attempting to contain the growing
rift within the right-wing camp, having urgently invited Ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir
and Bezalel Smotrich to a meeting next Sunday in an effort to reunite allies
before the elections. Netanyahu urged both sides to unite, emphasizing that "not
a single vote should be wasted" and that maintaining the unity of the right-wing
parties is essential for his camp in the upcoming elections. However,
Netanyahu's move was met with a firm stance from Ben-Gvir's Otzma Yehudit party,
which announced its refusal to run in the upcoming elections on a joint list
with Smotrich's Religious Zionism party. The party confirmed in a statement that
its decision is "final and decisive and will not change under any
circumstances," stressing that there will be no contacts or meetings, direct or
indirect, to discuss the possibility of the two parties running together. This
situation reveals the extent of the rift within the Israeli right-wing camp, at
a time when Netanyahu is trying to prevent the vote from being split among
allied parties, especially with the competition intensifying in opinion polls. A
poll published by the Maariv newspaper showed the Yashar party, led by Gadi
Eisenkot, leading in hypothetical elections, winning 25 seats in the Knesset,
compared to 20 seats for Netanyahu's Likud party. These figures present
Netanyahu's camp with an additional challenge, as the right-wing parties running
on separate lists could lead to a division of votes among them, while the
Israeli prime minister is trying to reorganize his allies before the election
campaign begins.
Zelensky: I ordered the army to launch 1,000 drones daily into Russia/Kiev
indicates that “technical” talks on the war with Moscow will be held “soon.”
Kyiv: “Asharq Al-Awsat”/August 28, 20216 (Google
translation from Arabic)
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Friday that he had ordered the
army to increase its long-range drone attacks on Russia to 1,000 per day, up
from about 300 currently. He stressed in his evening speech: “There must be
more; There is a specific goal, and we will accomplish this mission,” according
to what was reported by Reuters news agency. The Ukrainian President announced
that the United States had provided Kiev with information about a number of
meetings held in Moscow during the past few days. Zelensky said via the Telegram
application: “Today we received information from the American side about the
meetings that were held in Moscow these days. A number of meetings were held
there,” he said, without giving details about the identity of the participants
in those meetings. He added: “I thank them for this information and for the
necessary tone in the talks with Russia.” The Wall Street Journal reported on
Wednesday that John Ratcliffe, director of the US Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), went to Moscow to warn Russia against launching any attack on a member
state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Kremlin denied the
validity of this news, while US President Donald Trump said that his Russian
counterpart, Vladimir Putin, would not attack any NATO member state, ignoring
media reports about Ratcliffe’s visit. Kirilo Budanov, director of the Ukrainian
president's office, said on Friday that "technical" talks on the war with Russia
are likely to take place in the near future, but he added that he does not
expect any agreement to be reached quickly. He added: “I think everyone will
witness the start of negotiations very soon, but they will focus mainly on the
technical aspects and preparations for a major event, which I hope we will reach
in the end.” US-sponsored talks have not yet yielded any tangible results to end
the war, which has entered its fifth year. The previous round of tripartite
negotiations was held in February.
The Latest LCCC analysis & editorials from
miscellaneous sources published
on August 28-29/2026
Syria: Turkey's New Battleground Against Israel
Con Coughlin/Gatestone Institute/August 28, 2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/08/157029/
Turkey's continued financial support for Hamas and its provision
of safe haven to Hamas terrorists only adds to Israel's view of Turkey as a
hostile actor, an attitude that is not helped by Erdogan's constant use of
anti-Israel rhetoric in political campaigning and official communications. In
June, for example, Turkey's interior minister called for the "liberation of
Jerusalem."Israel's intelligence establishment, though, presented the US with evidence that
Erdogan has other ambitions, which include expanding and solidifying Turkey's
military presence at Syrian bases previously used by the Assad regime's Iranian
and Russian allies. In addition, Erdogan has stated that "Jerusalem is ours," and as recently as
March 30, 2025, "May the Lord make Zionist Israel destroyed and devastated."Erdogan published a 758-page document that outlines his long-term phased plan to
take over "Israel, the Middle East and the Free world."
Amichai Chikli, Israel's Minister of Diaspora Affairs, said, "Ahmed al-Sharaa's
military is Erdoğan's military. Al-Sharaa's ideology is Erdoğan's ideology.
Erdoğan and al-Sharaa's ideology is Al Qaeda and ISIS ideology," and cited what
he described as their barbaric treatment of non-Muslim minorities in the region.
[I]t is vital that Erdogan not be allowed to pursue his expansionist aims in
Syria and certainly not to have F-35 stealth fighter jets.
Israel has become increasingly concerned about Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan's attempts to expand his influence in neighbouring Syria, where he
played a key role in helping the country's Islamist president, Ahmed al-Sharaa,
to overthrow the Assad regime and seize power in December 2024. Pictured:
Amid deepening tensions between Turkey and Israel over Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan's attempts to extend his influence over Syria, Israel's decision
to strike a Syrian air base on the outskirts of Idlib is designed to send a
clear signal to the Turkish leader to rein in his ambitions.
Since the overthrow of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Syria
has increasingly become the focus of the deepening hostility between Israel and
Turkey.
In particular, Israel has become increasingly concerned about Erdogan's attempts
to expand his influence in neighbouring Syria, where he played a key role in
helping the country's new Islamist president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, to overthrow the
Assad regime and seize power in December 2024. Despite repeated Israeli warnings, Erdogan has taken little notice of Israel's
concerns, and has continued to expand Turkey's presence into northern Syria,
ostensibly to counter the efforts of Kurdish separatists to establish their own
autonomous state. Israel's intelligence establishment, though, presented the US with evidence that
Erdogan has other ambitions, which include expanding and solidifying Turkey's
military presence at Syrian bases previously used by the Assad regime's Iranian
and Russian allies. It is significant, therefore, that the Israeli airstrikes launched against a
Syrian air base in the northern city of Idlib on August 18 took place just hours
after a visit by a Turkish delegation to the base. The Turkish officials appear
to have been undertaking a reconnaissance mission of the base to assess its
suitability for use by the Turkish military. Syria's state-run Ekhbariya television, citing a military source, reported that
Israel had carried out eight air strikes on the runway and storage facilities
at the Abu al-Duhur base in northwest Syria.The attacks, which were seen as a warning sign to Turkey to stop its military
expansion in Syria, drew a sharp response from the Trump administration, which
has emerged as a surprise supporter of the new jihadist Syrian regime, and
criticised what it called an "unnecessary escalation."A statement subsequently issued by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
said the aim of the attack was to stop Turkish military forces from deploying at
the base. The statement said Israel and Syria had "agreed to a status quo in
security matters" but that Damascus was "on the verge of breaching" the
agreement by allowing Turkish troops to deploy at the airbase.Israel had "repeatedly warned Syria" of the risk, the statement said, but "Syria
chose to ignore these warnings."
Turkey dismissed the allegations as "frivolous".
The airstrikes nevertheless highlight the mounting concern within Israeli
intelligence circles over Erdogan's expansionist designs in Syria.
Erdogan is one of the Middle East's most enthusiastic supporters of the extreme
Islamist Muslim Brotherhood movement, as well as Islamist terror groups such as
Hamas, among others. The Turkish leader was instrumental in helping Syria's
jihadist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham organisation seize power in Damascus under the
leadership of al-Sharaa, who previously had close affiliations with Osama bin
Laden's al-Qaeda organisation. After al-Sharaa was installed as Syria's new president -- a move backed by US
President Donald J. Trump as well as other Western leaders -- Israel's
intelligence establishment has become increasingly concerned about Turkey's
growing influence in Syria, which Israel regards as posing a direct threat to
its security. Israeli officials increasingly regard Erdogan's aggressive posture, both
domestically and across the region, as a matter of concern, as they do his
constant efforts to reclaim the legacy of the Ottoman Empire.Turkey's continued financial support for Hamas and its provision of safe haven
to Hamas terrorists only adds to Israel's view of Turkey as a hostile actor, an
attitude that is not helped by Erdogan's constant use of anti-Israel rhetoric in
political campaigning and official communications. In June, for example,
Turkey's interior minister called for the "liberation of Jerusalem."In addition, Erdogan has stated that "Jerusalem is ours," and as recently as
March 30, 2025, "May the Lord make Zionist Israel destroyed and devastated."
Erdogan published a 758-page document that outlines his long-term phased plan to
take over "Israel, the Middle East and the Free world."Amichai Chikli, Israel's Minister of Diaspora Affairs, said, "Ahmed al-Sharaa's
military is Erdoğan's military. Al-Sharaa's ideology is Erdoğan's ideology.
Erdoğan and al-Sharaa's ideology is Al Qaeda and ISIS ideology," and cited what
he described as their barbaric treatment of non-Muslim minorities in the region.
Also increasingly questioned is the neutrality of Tom Barrack, US Ambassador to
Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria (here, here and here), amid announcements of
his departure. It is to be hoped that he will not be granted a "key role"
managing US policy in Syria and Iraq. In an attempt to defuse tensions between Jerusalem and Ankara on the Syria
issue, Israel and Turkey conducted talks in Azerbaijan in 2025 intended to agree
on an understanding about the two countries' priorities in post-Assad Syria.While details of the meeting were not made public, the two countries reached
broad agreement on a status quo, the essence of which was to respect full Syrian
sovereignty over its territory. Despite this arrangement, Israeli intelligence officials have become
increasingly uneasy about Erdogan's plans to expand and entrench Turkey's
presence in the country.
Turkish forces currently occupy about 5,000 square kilometres of territory in
northern Syria. Turkey has also reportedly taken control of Syrian military and
naval bases previously used by Iran and Russia under the Assad regime, at a time
when Moscow and Tehran were close allies of Damascus.
There are also concerns about Turkey's wider role in the region after it emerged
that Erdogan personally intervened with Trump to block a proposed US-Israel
operation whereby thousands of Kurdish fighters, supported by American air
cover, would invade Iran with the aim of overthrowing the mullah regime, a plan
many Israeli officials believe had a good chance of success had it not been for
Erdogan's intervention. Another potential threat that Syria could pose to Israel's long-term security
concerns is the recent discovery of an undeclared nuclear base by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), where inspectors found several tons
of nuclear material which Rafael Grossi, the IAEA's head, said "could be put to
bad use."These are among the many reasons that Israeli security officials are becoming so
concerned about Turkey's deepening involvement in post-Assad Syria. They are
increasingly of the view that, if Israel is to safeguard the future security of
its people, it is vital that Erdogan not be allowed to pursue his expansionist
aims in Syria and certainly not to have F-35 stealth fighter jets.
**Con Coughlin is the Telegraph's Defence and Foreign Affairs Editor and a
Distinguished Senior Fellow at Gatestone Institute.
© 2026 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No
part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied
or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.
From Neom to wartime logistics, Saudi Arabia has learned to pivot
Ali Shihabi/Arab News/August 28, 2026
When Neom was unveiled in 2017, it embodied the maximalism of early Vision 2030:
a futuristic city on the Red Sea, powered by clean energy and data, that would
leapfrog the constraints of an older state. The renderings were dazzling and the
ambition genuine. But so, in retrospect, was the risk that the concept would
outrun its execution.
What matters today is not simply that Saudi Arabia has recalibrated Neom. It is
that the Kingdom did so decisively, without pretending that the original
blueprint had to remain sacrosanct. This willingness to pivot is not a weakness.
It is becoming one of the Saudi state’s defining strengths.
Critics have treated Neom’s rescoping as evidence of failure. A more sober
interpretation is that Riyadh chose discipline over vanity. The Public
Investment Fund’s new strategy shifts Neom away from its earlier emphasis on
tourism and futuristic urban design, and toward renewable energy, industry, and
data centers. The wider PIF strategy is also placing greater weight on
logistics, minerals, artificial intelligence, and clean energy.
Saudi officials have been unusually candid about the change. Economy and
Planning Minister Faisal Alibrahim told Reuters that the government would not
“shy away” from acknowledging when a project needed to be shifted, delayed, or
rescoped. That is not the language of retreat. It reflects a government learning
to allocate capital more rigorously under increasingly demanding circumstances.
The war that began in late February has provided a much harsher test of that
mindset. In recent months, Saudi Arabia has had to operate not in the world of
master plans but under direct military and market pressure. The same government
that was prepared to redesign Neom before its costs became overwhelming has
demonstrated an ability to absorb shocks, redirect trade, and make difficult
operational decisions quickly. In both cases, the principle is the same: When
circumstances change, the Saudi system does not blindly defend its original
plan. It adjusts.
Critics have treated Neom’s rescoping as evidence of failure. A more sober
interpretation is that Riyadh chose discipline over vanity.
Nothing illustrates this better than the East-West Pipeline. When the war
effectively halted crude exports through the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia’s
route to Yanbu on the Red Sea became a key crude export outlet. The pipeline can
carry as much as 7 million barrels a day to the west coast, with about 5 million
available for export.
That infrastructure gave Saudi Arabia an option its neighbors largely lacked.
Iraq, Kuwait, and other producers were forced into deeper cuts because they had
fewer alternatives once Hormuz became unusable. Redundancy, sometimes dismissed
as costly insurance during normal times, proved to be an essential strategic
asset.
Yanbu also gives Saudi Arabia flexibility within the Red Sea itself. If the Bab
Al-Mandab Strait at its southern entrance is threatened, crude shipped from the
Kingdom’s west coast can move north through the Suez Canal toward Mediterranean
and European markets. Even customers in Asia can still be supplied by routing
cargoes through Suez and then around the Cape of Good Hope, although the much
longer journey would impose higher shipping costs on Saudi Arabia. This
additional layer of flexibility leaves the Kingdom better positioned to adapt
not only to a closure of Hormuz but also to disruption at the Red Sea’s other
principal chokepoint — another example of how geographic options and
infrastructure investment reinforce national resilience.
The same has been true for imports. Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast has emerged as
a logistical backstop for the wider Gulf. Cargo volumes into Jeddah rose
massively after the conflict began, with other Red Sea ports, including Neom,
also dramatically increasing traffic as the crisis disrupted access to Gulf
ports east of Hormuz.
In practice, Saudi Arabia has become not only more resilient itself, but also a
logistical lifeline for its neighbors. That is a strategic development with
implications well beyond the present crisis.
None of this means that Saudi Arabia is invulnerable. It plainly is not. Its
energy facilities have been attacked, at times temporarily reducing production.
But resilience does not mean avoiding damage altogether. It means retaining the
ability to operate, reroute supplies, restore capacity, and keep markets
functioning after a blow.
Saudi Arabia has institutional experience on which to draw. Following the
September 2019 attacks that removed 5.7 million barrels a day of production,
Aramco restored capacity to 11.3 million barrels a day within 11 days, according
to Reuters. Last October, Aramco’s chief executive said the company could
maintain production of 12 million barrels a day for a year, while the
International Energy Agency estimated Saudi spare capacity at 2.43 million
barrels a day. Spare capacity, alternative export routes, and recovery plans may
appear excessive in peacetime. In wartime, they look like prudent statecraft.
This is why the Neom story should be reconsidered. The shift from spectacle to
sequencing, and from futuristic design toward industrial and logistical assets,
is more than a correction to one project. It reflects a decisiveness in Saudi
policymaking. A state willing to confront difficult questions about what can be
built, when it should be built, and in what order is less likely to become
paralyzed when conditions deteriorate.
China offers a cautionary comparison. Its decentralized development model
encouraged local officials to build aggressively in pursuit of economic growth.
The result was trillions of dollars invested in underused infrastructure, empty
developments, and excessive industrial capacity. Saudi Arabia risked moving in a
similar direction but applied the brakes much earlier. It reassessed priorities
before ambition hardened into an irreversible burden.
California’s high-speed rail project offers another cautionary example.
Initially presented to voters with an estimated cost of about $33 billion, the
planned San Francisco-Los Angeles system is now projected to cost about $126
billion under a revised and streamlined design — and as much as $231 billion
without those proposed optimizations. Despite years of expenditure and extensive
civil construction, the project has yet to lay its first section of high-speed
track. The contrast reinforces the value of reassessing an ambitious project
early: Changing course may invite criticism, but postponing difficult decisions
can allow costs and institutional commitments to compound until adjustment
becomes vastly more expensive.
Saudi Arabia’s transformation remains unfinished, and much can still go wrong.
But a country that can rescope Neom before costs spiral, redirect crude exports
when Hormuz closes, retain the ability to supply customers when Bab Al-Mandab is
threatened, turn Jeddah into a supply artery for the Gulf, and maintain
operations after an attack is demonstrating something more valuable than
futuristic imagination. It is demonstrating the ability to recognize changing
realities and act on them. In today’s Middle East, that may matter more than any
rendering.
• Ali Shihabi is an author and commentator on the politics and economics of
Saudi Arabia.
X: @aliShihabi
Question: Why does God allow natural disasters?
GotQuestions.org/August 29/2026
Answer: Why does God allow earthquakes, tornados, hurricanes, tsunamis,
typhoons, cyclones, mudslides, flash floods, avalanches, wildfires, and other
natural disasters? Tragedies like the 2026 flash flood and avalanche in
Nepal-Tibet cause many people to question God’s goodness. It is distressing that
natural disasters are often termed “acts of God” while no “credit” is given to
God for years, decades, or even centuries of peaceful weather. God created the
whole universe and the laws of nature (Genesis 1:1). Most natural disasters are
a result of these laws at work. Hurricanes, typhoons, and tornados are the
results of divergent weather patterns colliding. Earthquakes are the result of
the earth’s plate structure shifting. A tsunami is caused by an underwater
earthquake.
The Bible proclaims that Jesus Christ holds all of nature together (Colossians
1:16-17). Could God prevent natural disasters? Absolutely! Does God sometimes
influence the weather? Yes, as we see in Deuteronomy 11:17 and James 5:17.
Numbers 16:30-34 shows us that God sometimes causes natural disasters as a
judgment against sin. The book of Revelation describes many events which could
definitely be described as natural disasters (Revelation chapters 6, 8, and 16).
Is every natural disaster a punishment from God? Absolutely not.
In much the same way that God allows evil people to commit evil acts, God allows
the earth to reflect the consequences sin has had on creation. Romans 8:19-21
tells us, “The creation waits in eager expectation for the sons of God to be
revealed. For the creation was subjected to frustration, not by its own choice,
but by the will of the one who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself
will be liberated from its bondage to decay and brought into the glorious
freedom of the children of God.” The fall of humanity into sin had effects on
everything, including the world we inhabit. Everything in creation is subject to
“frustration” and “decay.” Sin is the ultimate cause of natural disasters just
as it is the cause of death, disease, and suffering.
We can understand why natural disasters occur. What we do not understand is why
God allows them to occur. Why did God allow a tsunami to kill over 225,000
people in Asia? Why does God allow hurricanes to destroy the homes of thousands
of people? For one thing, such events shake our confidence in this life and
force us to think about eternity. Churches are usually filled after disasters as
people realize how tenuous their lives really are and how life can be taken away
in an instant. What we do know is this: God is good! Many amazing miracles
occurred during the course of natural disasters that prevented even greater loss
of life. Natural disasters cause millions of people to reevaluate their
priorities in life. Hundreds of millions of dollars in aid is sent to help the
people who are suffering. Christian ministries have the opportunity to help,
minister, counsel, pray, and lead people to saving faith in Christ! God can, and
does, bring great good out of terrible tragedies (Romans 8:28).
Iran’s Future Under Collective Leadership
Huda Al-Husseini/Asharq Al-Awsat/August 28, 2026 (Google translation from
Arabic)
Iran has entered a new phase following months of war and assassinations
targeting a number of senior military and security leaders.
The consequences of these strikes were not limited to weakening state
institutions. They also brought about changes at the top of the power structure
and opened the way for a new generation of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
commanders to assume positions previously held by influential figures.
According to a Western security source, the wave of assassinations has reshaped
Iran’s leadership hierarchy. The country lost a number of experienced and
influential figures and was forced to appoint replacements quickly while the war
continued and pressure intensified.
As a result, the transition did not take place according to carefully prepared
arrangements. Rather, it was imposed by military necessity and the fear of a
vacuum at the centers of decision-making.
This transformation follows the killing of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei
and the assumption of the Supreme Leadership by his son, Mojtaba Khamenei.
However, the new leadership has failed to dispel questions concerning Mojtaba’s
health and his ability to exercise his powers.
The official narrative maintains that he is running state affairs and following
military and political files. However, his limited public appearances and the
nature of the images released of him have kept alive doubts about his health and
his actual influence.
The issue is not merely the Supreme Leader’s health. The more important question
is: Who is making the decisions in Tehran?
Officially, the Iranian system is based on the centrality of the Supreme Leader,
who has the ultimate authority over foreign policy, security, defense, and the
nuclear program. But limitations on his ability to function could mean that some
of these powers are being transferred, either openly or unofficially, to a group
of military and security leaders.
The Western source points out that the IRGC has become increasingly involved in
running the country, now that its role is no longer limited to protecting the
regime or directing military operations.
The Guards participate in setting political priorities, managing the war,
controlling the domestic front, and monitoring state institutions. Their
economic influence also gives them additional power over resources at a time
when Iran is suffering from financial crises and a sharp rise in prices.
The new generation that has risen within the IRGC differs from the old
generation in several respects.
Previous commanders gained their positions during the Iran-Iraq War and
subsequently built extensive networks of relationships both inside and outside
the state. By contrast, many of the new commanders have built their influence
through work in intelligence services, internal security, missile and drone
programs, as well as through managing operations involving Iran’s allied groups.
They appear to be more closely tied to direct security operations and less
dependent on the traditional power balances within the regime.
However, their rapid rise does not necessarily mean that they possess the
political experience of those who preceded them.
The new leadership therefore faces a difficult test: It must continue the war
and protect the regime while, at the same time, preventing competition among the
various institutions and agencies attempting to fill the vacuum left by the
disappearance of the old leadership.
Tehran understands that revealing the details of how power is distributed could
make the regime appear confused and vulnerable. It has therefore maintained a
considerable degree of ambiguity.
The authorities do not clearly disclose who attends sensitive meetings, who
approves military operations, or who determines the limits of negotiations with
the United States and intermediary countries.
This silence may be a deliberate attempt to conceal vulnerabilities and prevent
adversaries from identifying the individuals who now constitute the new center
of decision-making.
Yet ambiguity also carries risks.
During wartime, military institutions require a clear chain of command, while
mediators need to know which authority is capable of making commitments and
implementing them.
If power is distributed among the Supreme Leader and military and security
commanders, decision-making could become more complicated, and disagreements
could emerge over whether to accept a ceasefire or continue the confrontation.
As for the president, the government, and civilian institutions, their role
appears to have weakened in the face of the growing influence of the security
apparatus.
The government is expected to deal with the economy and public services, secure
salaries, and contain popular discontent, but it does not have sole authority
over the course of the war or foreign policy.
The longer the fighting continues, the greater the power of the military
establishment is likely to become at the expense of elected institutions,
particularly when the authorities justify domestic restrictions by invoking the
need to protect the country.
The damage suffered by the old leadership does not mean that the Iranian regime
is on the verge of collapse. The regime has demonstrated during previous crises
that it is capable of replacing its officials and preserving the cohesion of its
institutions.
However, the current situation is more dangerous because the losses have
affected senior levels of leadership within a short period, while the regime is
simultaneously facing an external war, economic pressures, domestic protests,
and questions about the legitimacy of the new leadership.
Iran, therefore, is not merely witnessing a change of names. It is undergoing a
gradual transition toward a leadership that is more military and
security-oriented.
This could lead to greater rigidity both domestically and internationally,
because the emerging commanders view the survival of the regime as being tied to
deterrence, force, and control.
But it could also make them more cautious, after the assassinations demonstrated
that their positions and networks are not beyond penetration. In conclusion, the
assassinations did not bring down the Iranian regime, but they have changed the
way it is governed. The influence of the old leadership has declined, while
greater authority has shifted to the IRGC and a group of security and military
officials responsible for managing the war and protecting the regime.
At the same time, the role of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei remains unclear
because of questions surrounding his health and his ability to exercise his
powers.
Iran therefore appears today to be governed by an undeclared collective
leadership, with the IRGC at its core, while Mojtaba Khamenei retains the
highest official position.
This arrangement may help the regime navigate the current phase, but it also
carries the risk of internal disputes if the war continues for a prolonged
period or the economic crisis deepens.
Ultimately, Iran’s future will not be determined by the name of its Supreme
Leader alone. It will depend on the ability of the new leadership to remain
united, manage the war, and contain the anger of the Iranian people at home.
How Did Universities Surrender?
Sousan Al-Abtah/Asharq Al-Awsat/August 28, 2026 (Google translation from
Arabic)
It is difficult to imagine the magnitude of the transformation that has struck
educational institutions within just a few years, amid a disturbing silence and
lack of transparency. In only three years, schools and universities have moved
from fighting artificial intelligence, banning its use, and punishing students
who relied on it, to encouraging them to use it, organizing educational
workshops, and establishing specialized institutes to integrate AI into
curricula and academic subjects.
In a remarkably short period, the unimaginable happened. When ChatGPT was
launched in 2022 and teachers discovered its potential dangers, the New York
State Department of Education quickly banned its use on its devices. In Europe,
as well as in Asian and Arab countries, universities mobilized to prevent
students from using the application, identify violators, and prohibit what they
regarded as blatant academic cheating.
To combat this alarming development, which caused anxiety and fear throughout
academic circles, institutions turned to AI-detection tools designed to identify
machine-generated texts. Universities and schools competed to protect their
educational systems, shield their students from the threat, and preserve the
academic value of their degrees. It took no more than two years for educators to
realize that all the detection and tracking tools they had been provided
with—and initially welcomed with optimism—were failing to expose cheating or
produce conclusive results. Meanwhile, the number of students turning to this
“magical” technology continued to increase. Indeed, educators found themselves
incapable of keeping up with their students, let alone using these tools with
the same level of skill.
Studies have shown that a majority of students are succeeding academically while
relying on various AI applications, even when preparing their master's and
doctoral theses. Turnitin, the largest provider of plagiarism-detection systems,
has acknowledged that it failed to detect thousands of AI-generated research
papers.Even worse, large numbers of non-native English-speaking students in the
United States, for example, were falsely accused of cheating simply because
their writing was basic, their expressions repetitive, and their language
resembled the supposedly poor-quality style of electronically generated texts.
An analysis of 250 research papers examined by Turnitin's systems found that
three-quarters had been partially or entirely generated by artificial
intelligence.
The result was that the golden age of these detection systems—which were
supposed to rescue education—lasted only a few months before universities and
research centers effectively surrendered in the face of the tsunami of
AI-generated texts.
The developments and technological leaps came so suddenly that educational
institutions had no opportunity to catch their breath, hesitate, raise the
necessary questions, or engage in serious debate about them.
The question is no longer how to catch a student red-handed stealing information
from artificial intelligence and presenting it as his or her own. The question
has become: How do we help a student who cannot be deterred from using AI so
that he or she does not become merely a human being who asks questions while the
machine provides the answers—without actually possessing the knowledge or
skills?
A survey conducted by the well-known Gallup organization showed that half of
university students had considered changing their fields of study because of
artificial intelligence, while 16 percent had actually changed them.
What is the value of a doctoral degree when a robot writes the dissertation?
What is the value of a human researcher who spends months producing a scholarly
paper that a small device can generate in moments—and perhaps produce a better
one?
And is it really wise for a person to deprive himself or herself of the benefits
of an ocean of knowledge, refusing to draw from it simply because doing so is
considered theft?
Everyone is racing against time. Universities are training their professors so
that they can catch up with students who have already advanced several steps
ahead of them, often without revealing their electronic tricks. And the
professor remains— even after discovering the deception—unable to find a way
out, because the available options have become extremely limited.
For the time being, the solution is to return to traditional methods of
assessment.
Let students do whatever they want during their research and preparation, and
then make the decisive moment the examination itself—an examination that
increasingly relies on writing in the classroom, away from electronic devices.
Oral examinations and direct conversations can then be used to determine how
well the student actually understands the material and how independent he or she
is from the machine that wrote the work and supplied the information.
The objective is no longer simply to prevent cheating. That has become an
accepted reality. The real objective is to save students from the catastrophe of
losing their own analytical abilities and critical thinking skills, and to
demonstrate that they can function independently of the machine when
circumstances force them to do so.Some compare teachers' acceptance of
artificial intelligence to their acceptance of calculators in mathematics
classes. But there is an enormous difference between the two.
We are dealing with a tool capable of doing almost everything: writing a
research paper, solving a programming problem, analyzing a text, and even
creating a complete engineering project.
The difficult task is not banning these programs. The difficult task is first
understanding their capabilities and potential, and then figuring out how to
deal with them.
But how can we understand the limits and capabilities of a machine that evolves
every moment—especially when what it may be capable of doing tomorrow is
something that even the most fertile human imagination cannot yet conceive?
Selected Face Book & X tweets
on August 28/2026
Hiba Nasr
I was born and raised in southern Lebanon, with UNIFIL alongside us throughout
our lives. In my village, the UN peacekeeping forces were Norwegian.
Every now and then, during our school days, some teenage boys would deliberately
throw garbage bags in the middle of the road, making them suspicious enough to
be mistaken for an explosive device. The UN forces, coming from a Scandinavian
country, would handle the serious incident with the highest level of
professionalism: they would close the road and bring in specialized teams to
inspect the suspicious bag. By the time the situation was resolved, the school
bus would have been delayed, and the boys would have spent part of the day
outside the school gates.
Today, as I read the stories about the alleged fake mines in the Strait of
Hormuz — without asserting whether they are true or not — those images come back
to me.
In any case, the region is capable of producing geniuses when it comes to
manufacturing illusions.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent
Treasury promised to sever every economic lifeline Tehran has left and finally
end the threat of the Iranian regime. We also warned that Iran’s enablers cannot
continue to enjoy access to the U.S. dollar and the global financial system.
Banque Misr UAE decided to find out the x.com/USTreasury/sta…
Paul Sperry
BREAKING: A RealClearInvestigations analysis finds that Islamic activists now
hold at least ten (10) high-ranking positions at New York city hall under Mayor
Mamdani, including several alumni of terror-tied Council on American-Islamic
Relations, which the FBI says is a "Hamas front." Some of the new Muslim
officials are in a position to influence the city's anti-terror policies and the
selection of judges, RCI has learned.
Darin LaHood
China is Iran’s largest trading partner, providing resources used to fund their
terrorist proxies, weapons programs, and drone technology. They must face
consequences if they continue to support a regime that openly threatens America
and global security.
Breanna Morello
JUST IN
The State Department has revoked the U.S. visa of Iraqi national Taif Sami
Mohammed Al Shakarchi after she was placed on the FBI Terror Watchlist. She is
no longer in the United States.
In 2022, the Biden administration gave her the International Woman of Courage
Award.
Then-Secretary of State Antony Blinken and then-First Lady Jill Biden presented
it, citing her anti-corruption work and advocacy for “gender equity.”
Walid Phares
Do not demobilize the Afghans, train them!
Instead of flying 24k Afghans to Britain, demobilize them, and run the risk of
having them penetrated and recruited by jihadists, the UK should have sent the
able ones to British and US training bases in the region such as Diego Garcia,
Somaliland, Iraqi Kurdistan, and even Israel to get training and have them join
the Afghan United Front for the resistance against the Taliban. Why would London
demobilize the free Afghanistan forces and expose them to heavy jihadization
inside the UK?
Dr. Maalouf
Outrage in Germany after it became public that a Syrian migrant with 3 wives, 32
children and 25 grandchildren, with 70% of the entire family having a criminal
record, receives €100,000 a year in welfare.