English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News &
Editorials
For August 05/2026
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news
The Bulletin's Link on the lccc Site
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05.26.htm
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Bible Quotations For today
For where your treasure is, there your heart will be also
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Luke 12/33-40:
“Sell your possessions, and give alms. Make purses for yourselves that do not
wear out, an unfailing treasure in heaven, where no thief comes near and no moth
destroys. For where your treasure is, there your heart will be also. ‘Be dressed
for action and have your lamps lit; be like those who are waiting for their
master to return from the wedding banquet, so that they may open the door for
him as soon as he comes and knocks. Blessed are those slaves whom the master
finds alert when he comes; truly I tell you, he will fasten his belt and have
them sit down to eat, and he will come and serve them. If he comes during the
middle of the night, or near dawn, and finds them so, blessed are those slaves.
‘But know this: if the owner of the house had known at what hour the thief was
coming, he would not have let his house be broken into. You also must be ready,
for the Son of Man is coming at an unexpected hour.”
Titles For Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related
News & Editorials published on August 04-05/2026
The Sixth Anniversary of the Beirut Port Explosion By The Terrorist
Hezbollah: The Crime of the Century and the Obstruction of Justice/Elias Bejjani/August
04/2026
The 81st Lebanese Army Day: A Shackled Leadership, a Cowardly Authority, and a
Homeland Held Hostage by Hezbollah’s Occupation/Elias Bejjani/August 01/2026
Six Years After Beirut Port Blast, Victims’ Families Say ‘Wound Has Not Healed’
Beirut blast, six years later: Will justice finally move forward?
US Embassy says clarity and justice remain essential in port blast case
UN coordinator stresses 'urgency of securing justice' in port blast case
Nassar says port blast indictment expected within 60-90 days
Samy Gemayel: Justice for Beirut Port blast victims must run its course
When justice sleeps… the law of the jungle awakens/Abu Arz/Facebook/August 4,
2026
Lebanese sources: Rome meeting split into political and military tracks
Smuggled Grad Rockets Seized in Arsal Outskirts!
Customs Seizes Large Quantity of Drones
US State Department: Israel-Lebanon Talks to Continue Until August 6 to Discuss
Exploration Zones and Hezbollah Disarmament
Syrian Army Reinforcements to Secure the Borders Do Not Paves the Way for an
Operation Against Hezbollah
A report reveals, with figures, what Labora considers a hemorrhage of the
Christian presence in the country
Baabda sources to LBCI: Lebanon presents proposal on land border during first
day of Rome 2 talks
Lebanon and Israel Hold New Round of Direct Talks in Rome
As direct talks with Lebanon resume, Israel lays groundwork for prolonged
southern presence: The details
Hurdles Remain Ahead of 7th Round of Lebanon-Israel Negotiations in Rome
Salam Hits Back at Qassem: Hezbollah's Wars Helped Israel Against Lebanon
Lebanese Army Says It Seized Grad Rockets Smuggled from Syria
Lebanon Arrests ex-Palestinian Envoy at Ramallah's Request over Graft Charges
Hezbollah’s Sheikh Qassem Calls on Lebanese Authority to Reject Concession:
Resistance to Endure/August 04/2026
Lebanon: The Port Awaits Justice/Hanna Saleh/Asharq Al-Awsat/August 04/2026
Is the Framework Agreement Turning into a Missed Opportunity?/Brigadier General
Khaled Hamade/Al-Lewaa/August 04/2026
Should We “Resort” to Syria? The War of Words Between Alfred Mady and Dr. Samir
Geagea/Ghassan Chiha/Liban News/02 August/2026
Faut-il « recourir » à la Syrie? La passe d’armes entre Alfred
Mady et le Dr Samir Geagea/Ghassan
Chiha/Liban News/2 jours/2026
Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News
published on August 04-05/2026
Trump says Iran facing 'last chance before decapitation'
US sees progress in Hormuz Strait talks, hopes for deal very shortly, Rubio says
US Treasury Secretary Says Chance of Hormuz Deal with Iran by Wednesday
US Energy Secretary Wright says fuel prices should come down in coming weeks
Qatar Says Progress Made Toward US-Iran Talks on Ending War
Report: US Military Asks For ‘Creative and Unconventional’ Ideas to Punish Iran
Cargo Ship Hit after Trump Insists Iran Talks Could Reopen Hormuz
Saudi Proposal Lays Groundwork for Regional Maritime Defense Alliance
Trump Board Reassures Israel After Objections on Gaza Pullout
Hamas Voices ‘Unease’ Over Board of Peace Comments on Gaza
Israel Targets Gaza Arms Dealers, Expands Strikes on Weapons Production Sites
Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah Seeks to Expand ‘Resistance’ Arsenal
Gazans Bury Nearly a Whole Clan Found in Rubble in Mass Funeral for 112
Syria Says will Restore Iraq Oil Pipeline Link within Three Years
46 Syrians Remain Detained by Israel Since Assad’s Ouster
Fighter Desertions Disrupt Houthi Escalation Against Gov’t Forces
Titles For The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials
from miscellaneous sources published
on August 04-05/2026
A Dangerous Deal: Trump's Board of Peace and Hamas/Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone
Institute/August 04/2026
The Postponed Agreement Between Washington and Tehran/Basel Al-Hajj Jassim/Al-Nahar/August
4, 2026
Why the Settlement Will Fail, and Why War Will Break Out Again/Dr. Abdulghani
Al-Kindi/Asharq Al-Awsat/August 04/2026
On the Anniversary of Kuwait’s Invasion... Dangers Remain/Abdulrahman Al-Rashed/Asharq
Al-Awsat/August 04/2026
Is Trump Redefining the Relationship with Israel?/Sam Menassa/Asharq Al-Awsat/August
04/2026
The War of Ambiguity and Uncertainty/Yousef Al-Dayni/Asharq Al-Awsat/August
04/2026
Maximum Gulf Solidarity to Confront the Critical Stage/Abdul Wahab Badrakhan/Al-Watan/Al-Nahar
Al-Arabi/August 4, 2026
Parallel Militias!/Adel Al-Harbi/Riyadh/August 4, 2026
Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese
Related News & Editorials published on August 04-05/2026
The Sixth Anniversary of the Beirut Port Explosion By The
Terrorist Hezbollah: The Crime of the Century and the Obstruction of Justice
Elias Bejjani/August 04/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/08/132851/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2obIBOSX9gA
(Isaiah 33: 01) Woe to you, destroyer, you who have not been destroyed! Woe to
you, betrayer, you who have not been betrayed! When you stop destroying, you
will be destroyed; when you stop betraying, you will be betrayed.
On the sixth anniversary of the Beirut Port explosion, we look back at August
04/2020—a dark day that witnessed one of the largest non-nuclear catastrophes in
modern history. This horrific blast resulted in the deaths of over 200 people,
thousands of severe injuries, the displacement of hundreds of thousands, and the
transformation of half of Lebanon’s capital into a crippled city overflowing
with destruction and ruins.
First: The Criminal Nature of the Cargo and Its Regional Uses
The Beirut port explosion was not a coincidence or mere administrative
negligence, but rather the inevitable result of storing about 2,750 tons of
ammonium nitrate for years without the bare minimum of safety standards or
regard for human life. Multiple international and local intelligence and
judicial reports have confirmed the following:
The Connection to the Syrian Regime and Hezbollah: Investigations showed that
the shipment arriving on suspicious vessels was largely intended for uses beyond
the local market. Parts of this ammonium nitrate—similar to materials imported
through convoluted methods by the Syrian regime with logistical support from
Hezbollah—were used to manufacture the barrel bombs that destroyed Syrian cities
and claimed the lives of thousands of innocent civilians.
International Networks and External Evidence: European investigations and
security agencies (particularly in Germany, Cyprus, and Britain) revealed that
Hezbollah cells were involved in storing similar explosive materials or linked
ammonium nitrate shipments in European countries to carry out terrorist
operations, reflecting the cross-border nature of the party’s logistical and
financial activities tied to Iran’s Quds Force.
Second: The Course of the Explosion and Evidence of Hezbollah’s Responsibility
Technical data and security testimonies consistently indicate that Hezbollah
exercised de facto security and administrative control over the port facilities
(specifically Warehouse 12 and its surroundings) through a network of loyal
officials, corruption, money laundering, and smuggling operations maintained for
years to serve its military and financial power.
When the disaster struck, the threads of truth gradually began to untangle
regarding who brought these materials in and who protected their storage,
prompting the party to use various methods of intimidation to prevent any
uncovering of the facts.
Third: Assassinations and Direct Intimidation to Conceal the Truth
Hezbollah and its security apparatus resorted to a series of direct
assassinations and systematic intimidation to silence anyone possessing
technical or security information regarding the port and its shipments, most
notably:
Assassination of Security and Technical Cadres: Such as the assassination of
retired port customs colonel Mounir Abu Rjeili, retired brigadier general Joe
Skaff, and photojournalist Joe Bejjani, who was assassinated in cold blood
outside his home in the town of Kahaleh after documenting sensitive data related
to the site.
Direct Threats to Investigators: Led by prominent Hezbollah security official
Wafiq Safa, who stormed the Palace of Justice and delivered clear, explicit
threats of terror and intimidation to former investigator Fadi Sawan and current
Judicial Investigator Judge Tarek Bitar, using the well-known phrase (“Qashtilina,”
meaning the removal of the judge by force and coercion).
Obstructing Justice through Force of Arms and Political Vacuum: The party
escalated its obstruction of the investigation by refusing to lift immunities,
launching political slander and intimidation campaigns, targeting the judiciary
continuously, and ultimately freezing the sessions of the judicial investigator
through obstructive lawsuits and political-security maneuvers. This completely
paralyzed the Lebanese judiciary and protected wanted ministers, deputies, and
former security officials affiliated with its axis.
Fourth: The Cry of the Victims’ Families and the National Stance
On this painful anniversary, the Committee of the Families of declarative Beirut
Port Explosion Victims holds continuous protests in front of the Emigrant statue
and judicial headquarters, raising pictures of loved ones who fell victim to
militia-backed crime, negligence, and corruption. These families embody
Lebanon’s living conscience, demanding an end to the dominance of weapons and
intimidation over the Lebanese judiciary, the completion of investigations with
absolute transparency, and the accountability of everyone involved—whether
through importation, storage, cover-up, or obstruction.
Conclusion
"Give glad tidings of killing to the killer, even if after a while, and give
glad tidings of poverty to the adulterer, even if after a while."
In short, the Beirut port explosion was not a mere accidental incident or
natural disaster, but rather a full-fledged terrorist crime resulting from the
dominance of an illegitimate weapons system over state capabilities and vital
ports. Lebanon cannot rise, nor can a secure and stable future be built, unless
the cycle of impunity is broken, the judiciary is freed from the grip of
intimidation, and the whole truth is revealed to the public so that every
criminal and negligent party receives a just punishment.
The author, Elias Bejjani, is a Lebanese expatriate activist
Author’s Email: Phoenicia@hotmail.com
Author’s Website:
https://eliasbejjaninews.com
The 81st Lebanese Army Day: A Shackled Leadership, a Cowardly Authority,
and a Homeland Held Hostage by Hezbollah’s Occupation
Elias Bejjani/August 01/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/08/156378/
On the 81st anniversary of the Lebanese Army, a heartfelt salute goes out to the
military institution—its ranks and personnel—and a thousand mercies upon the
souls of its righteous martyrs who offered their blood as pure sacrifices on the
altar of the Land of Cedars.
However, on this national day, no free and sovereign Lebanese can stand idly by
without raising their voice high, ringing out like the voice of John the Baptist
in the wilderness, to strongly condemn the inaction and cowardice of the
political and military leadership that paralyzes the army’s role and prevents it
from performing its supreme duty to liberate Lebanon from the Iranian occupation
represented by Hezbollah.
From this perspective, today’s congratulations are exclusively for the personnel
and soldiers, while it is a scathing indictment—free of complacency,
subservience, or blindness—directed at the military leadership, the President of
the Republic, and the Council of Ministers.
The Lebanese Army possesses competence, capabilities, and courage, but its role
is sidelined and restricted because its political and military leadership
remains subservient to the hegemony of the Iranian occupation and its local
tools (the Amal-Hezbollah Shiites dualism). This enemy not only targets Lebanon
as a whole, but also takes the esteemed Shiites community hostage, abducting it
to serve the absurd, hallucinated, and suicidal project of Iran’s mullahs.
Accordingly, all free people in Lebanon and the diaspora are called upon today
to:
*Raise their voices in condemnation, using all available local, regional, and
international means, against the inaction of both the political and military
leadership.
*Demand immediate action from the leadership to either fully perform their
constitutional duties to liberate the land, or resign immediately.
As for the poetic, parrot-like glorification of the army, and turning a blind
eye to the tutelage and occupation system that shackles it and prevents it from
implementing international resolutions and extending state sovereignty over the
entirety of the national territory—this is a disgrace, a crime, and an
unforgivable sin.
The author, Elias Bejjani, is a Lebanese expatriate activist
Author’s Email: Phoenicia@hotmail.com
Author’s Website:
https://eliasbejjaninews.com
Six Years After Beirut Port Blast, Victims’ Families Say
‘Wound Has Not Healed’
Asharq Al-Awsat/August 04/2026
Families of victims of the Beirut port explosion gathered on Tuesday demanding
answers and accountability on the sixth anniversary of the catastrophe, in a
country long plagued by official impunity."Until now, we haven't gotten justice.
There has been no accountability and nobody has been arrested," said Hiyam al-Bikai
from a gathering at the port to commemorate victims of the disaster, including
her son Ahmad. "This is an extremely painful anniversary. Our pain has not
stopped and our wound has not healed," she told AFP.The massive explosion on
August 4, 2020, killed more than 220 people, injured more than 6,500 and laid
waste to swathes of the capital. Lebanese authorities have said the explosion
was triggered by a fire in a warehouse where tons of ammonium nitrate fertilizer
had been stored haphazardly for years, despite repeated warnings to senior
officials.Nobody has yet been held accountable. "We are waiting for the
indictment in order to know how our children died, who brought the nitrate, who
stored it, who set off the blast... We want them to be held to account," Bikai
said."We want the full indictment, without any cover for anyone," she added. In
March, a judicial official told AFP that judge Tarek Bitar had completed his
probe involving some 70 defendants, including current and former politicians,
security and military officials and civil servants. He referred the case to the
public prosecutor who was to study it, present his opinion and then refer it
back to Bitar to issue the indictment. The case is still with the public
prosecutor, and nobody is in custody in Lebanon over it.
'Great crime' -
Justice Minister Adel Nassar told AFP from Tuesday's commemoration that the
prosecutor was preparing his response. "We expect that within a period of 60 to
90 days, he will refer the case back to the investigating judge, who will then
issue the indictment act," Nassar said.
The move would pave the way for a trial to begin. "It is the right of the
victims, and of the Lebanese people too, in the face of a crime of this
magnitude, for the truth to come out and justice to be served," Nassar said. On
Monday, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said the issuing of the indictment was "a
necessity that can no longer be delayed".Prime Minister Nawaf Salam vowed "no
cover for any official, no matter their position". The case had been bogged down
by political and legal wrangling after Iran-backed Hezbollah led a campaign
demanding Bitar's removal and dozens of lawsuits also sought to remove him from
the case.But Bitar resumed his investigations last year as Lebanon's balance of
power shifted and Aoun and Salam took office following a 2023-2024 war between
Israel and Hezbollah which weakened the group. Several legal impediments to
Bitar's work have also since been removed, including the lifting of a travel ban
against him. Victims' families have not given up on their demand for justice.
"We are here today because it's in this place that the great crime took place,"
said William Noun, 32, whose brother Joe was among the firefighters sent to
their deaths when the blaze erupted at the port warehouse. "I spent 10 days
here, it was hell, until we found something of my brother's remains," he said.
"We're now at the end of the investigation... and are awaiting the indictment"
to know the truth, he added.
Beirut blast, six years later: Will justice finally move
forward?
LBCI/August 04/2026
Between August 4, 2020, and August 4, 2026, 2,191 days, 52,548 hours and
3,155,040 minutes have passed. After all this time, the truth behind the Beirut
Port explosion remains elusive. The families of those killed and injured also
remain caught between despair and hope. Between 2020, when the Beirut Port
explosion occurred — the third-largest non-nuclear explosion in the world — and
the beginning of 2026, a key question remained: Would the judiciary be able to
complete the investigation? The investigation faced around 45 lawsuits filed by
some politicians and judges charged in the case, including requests for the
recusal, transfer and legal challenge of Judicial Investigator Judge Tarek Bitar,
as well as claims of abuse of authority against him. These moves were aimed at
obstructing the investigation. With the election of President Joseph Aoun and
the formation of the new government headed by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, the
situation changed completely. Bitar completed his investigation on March 31 and
referred it to the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation to prepare the
legal submission on the merits.The question then became whether an indictment
would be issued. The answer is yes, due to the determination of Presidents Aoun
and Salam, as well as Judge Bitar and the newly appointed Public Prosecutor at
the Court of Cassation, Judge Ahmad Rami Al-Hajj, to expedite the case. Al-Hajj
assigned Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation Judge Mohammad Saab to prepare the
legal submission. The indictment is expected within a few months. But the more
important question remains: Will the security forces enforce the arrest warrants
that the judicial investigator may issue alongside the indictment against
politicians and influential figures? And will the Judicial Council be able to
overcome attempts to obstruct the trial, particularly through lawsuits seeking
the recusal, legal challenge or transfer of judges, or through the notification
process?Without addressing these two conditions, justice will remain elusive and
accountability absent. At that point, President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam,
together with the judiciary, will face their toughest test yet from the deep
state.
US Embassy says clarity and justice remain essential in port blast case
Naharnet/August 04/2026
The U.S. Embassy in Beirut on Tuesday posted an X message marking the sixth
anniversary of the Beirut port explosion. "Six years ago, the Beirut Port
explosion killed more than 200 people, injured thousands, and forever changed
the city. On this solemn anniversary, we honor the memory of those lost and
stand with the families and communities who continue to seek clarity and
justice," the Embassy said. "Their pursuit remains essential to a stronger, more
stable, and more prosperous Lebanon," it added.
UN coordinator stresses 'urgency of securing justice' in port blast case
Naharnet/August 04/2026
Jean Arnault, Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the United Nations Special
Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL), noted Tuesday that "time has not erased the
pain of those whose lives were irrevocably changed in a matter of seconds" due
to the 2020 Beirut port blast, nor has it diminished "the urgency of securing
justice."In a statement marking the sixth anniversary of the tragedy, Arnault
expressed his "unwavering solidarity with all those affected" and paid tribute
to "their relentless pursuit of truth, justice, and accountability.""A disaster
of this magnitude cannot become an abandoned chapter in history. Rather, efforts
must be redoubled to advance the judicial proceedings and bring them to a
conclusive outcome," Arnault added, calling on all relevant actors to "take the
necessary steps to facilitate swift progress in the case.""Despite the more
recent security and humanitarian challenges facing Lebanon, the silent suffering
of thousands who were directly or indirectly affected by this tragedy remains
profound. Justice delayed is justice denied, and the right of victims,
survivors, and all the people of Lebanon to accountability must be upheld
without further delay," Arnault emphasized.He added that the 2020 explosion is
"a tragic reminder of broader institutional vulnerabilities," adding that "an
impartial, independent and transparent judicial process is essential to breaking
the cycle of impunity, restoring public trust, and upholding the rule of law."
Moreover, Arnault underscored the importance of advancing structural reforms to
"strengthen and safeguard the independence of the judiciary as a cornerstone of
effective state-building and Lebanon’s reform agenda.""On this somber occasion,
the United Nations stands firmly alongside the people of Lebanon and affirms
that the path towards genuine national recovery and the extension of the State’s
authority is inextricably linked to the attainment of justice," Arnault went on
to say.
Nassar says port blast indictment expected within 60-90
days
Agence France Presse/August 04/2026
Families of victims of the Beirut port explosion gathered on Tuesday demanding
answers and accountability on the sixth anniversary of the catastrophe, in a
country long plagued by official impunity. "Until now, we haven't gotten
justice. There has been no accountability and nobody has been arrested," said
Hiyam al-Bikai from a rally at the port to commemorate victims of the disaster,
including her son Ahmad. "This is an extremely painful anniversary. Our pain has
not stopped and our wound has not healed," she told AFP. The massive explosion
on August 4, 2020 killed more than 220 people, injured more than 6,500 and laid
waste to swathes of the capital. Lebanese authorities have said the explosion
was triggered by a fire in a warehouse where tons of ammonium nitrate fertilizer
had been stored haphazardly for years, despite repeated warnings to senior
officials.
Nobody has yet been held accountable. "We are waiting for the indictment in
order to know how our children died, who brought the nitrate, who stored it, who
set off the blast... We want them to be held to account," Bikai said. "We want
the full indictment, without any cover for anyone," she added. In March, a
judicial official told AFP that Judge Tarek Bitar had completed his probe
involving some 70 defendants, including current and former politicians, security
and military officials and civil servants.He referred the case to the public
prosecutor who was to study it, present his opinion and then refer it back to
Bitar to issue the indictment. The case is still with the public prosecutor, and
nobody is in custody in Lebanon over it. Justice Minister Adel Nassar told AFP
from Tuesday's commemoration that the prosecutor was preparing his response. "We
expect that within a period of 60 to 90 days, he will refer the case back to the
investigating judge, who will then issue the indictment act," Nassar said. The
move would pave the way for a trial to begin. "It is the right of the victims,
and of the Lebanese people too, in the face of a crime of this magnitude, for
the truth to come out and justice to be served," Nassar said.
Samy Gemayel: Justice for Beirut Port blast victims must run its course
LBCI/August 04/2026
To mark the sixth anniversary of the Beirut port blast, the Lebanese Kataeb
Party held a memorial gathering to honor the victims and renew calls for truth,
justice and accountability. Kataeb Party leader MP Samy Gemayel said the
Lebanese people had suffered from “decay, criminality, negligence, the absence
of the state and lawlessness,” stressing that “justice is taking its course” and
expressing confidence in the process overseen by the justice minister and
“honest judges.”Gemayel said the party would work tirelessly to ensure that
those who lost their lives defending Lebanon would pave the way for a more
stable future for younger generations, adding that the time had come for Lebanon
to once again become a strong, respected state free from terrorism, thuggery,
collaborators and destructive ideologies.“We promised that this anniversary
would be a catalyst to overcome fear,” Gemayel said, adding that those who gave
their lives were no better than those who remain and that the party would do
everything possible to help Lebanese people live in the country they deserve.
When justice sleeps… the law of the jungle awakens.
Abu Arz/Facebook/August 4, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
A near-nuclear explosion devastates half the capital, killing, wounding, and
displacing tens of thousands… Yet, the perpetrators remain free, roaming with
boundless audacity.
The state is absent, as usual, and the judiciary is politicized and paralyzed.
When justice sleeps… the law of the jungle awakens. A state cannot exist where
the most heinous crimes are buried in the basements of the Ministry of Justice,
instead of the criminals being buried in the depths of prisons. In short:
Nations do not fall when crimes are committed… but when criminals escape
punishment. And more dangerous than the criminals are those who cover for them.
Woe to you, rulers of Lebanon, from the curse of heaven.
Lebanon is at your service
Lebanese sources: Rome meeting split into political and military tracks
Riyadh - Al-Arabiya.net/August 4, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The seventh round of negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, held in the
Italian capital, Rome, entered a new phase of discussions on political and
military issues. The first day focused on the border issue and mechanisms for
verifying the implementation of the framework agreement, while political
discussions were scheduled to continue on Wednesday. Lebanese sources revealed
to Al-Arabiya that the meeting held on Tuesday afternoon split into two separate
tracks: political and military, in an attempt to address the technical and
political issues simultaneously. Sources from the Lebanese presidency added that
the political discussion addressed the border issue, with the Lebanese
delegation presenting its vision for resolving it. Political talks are to
continue during Wednesday's sessions. On the military level, the sources
explained that the meeting focused on the "verification mechanism" for
implementing the agreement, in addition to discussing the entity or "third
party" that will oversee this mechanism. Sources confirmed that Israel did not
provide Lebanon with any answers during today's meeting regarding its commitment
to the ceasefire. They also noted that the discussions did not address the issue
of "experimental zones," which had been raised in previous rounds. The seventh
round of talks began today, Tuesday, with the participation of Lebanese,
Israeli, and American delegations, under international auspices, and will
continue for three days. The Lebanese delegation is headed by Ambassador Simon
Karam and includes Ambassador Nada Hamadeh Mouawad and a number of senior
civilian and military officials. The Israeli side is represented by Ambassador
to the United States Yehiel Leiter and Deputy National Security Advisor Yossi
Draznin, along with civilian and military officials.
The American delegation includes representatives from the State Department, the
National Security Council, and the Department of Defense (the Pentagon). In a
related development, the US State Department announced that the current round of
negotiations between Lebanon and Israel will continue until August 6, indicating
that political and military consultations will continue in the coming days to
finalize discussions on outstanding issues related to the implementation of the
framework agreement, primarily the border demarcation, verification mechanisms,
and ceasefire arrangements. A US diplomatic source explained to Al-Arabiya and
Al-Hadath before the start of the round of talks that technical teams would
address issues related to implementing the framework agreement signed between
the two sides. The source indicated that the discussions would also explore ways
to enhance the operation of the pilot zones, resolve border issues, and ensure
the disarmament of Hezbollah, ultimately leading to progress towards a
comprehensive peace and security agreement. The source emphasized that the
agreement must allow the Lebanese state to restore its full authority in the
south, dismantle Hezbollah's military infrastructure, and confine weapons to
state institutions. Lebanon and Israel reached a framework agreement on June 26,
after five rounds of negotiations, stipulating the gradual disarmament of
Hezbollah, Israel's withdrawal from the areas it controls in southern Lebanon,
and the deployment of the Lebanese army, beginning with pilot zones. The
agreement stipulates that, after its deployment, the Lebanese army will prevent
any armed presence outside the framework of the state, and that the success of
this pilot phase will serve as a basis for expanding the Israeli withdrawal to
other areas. The sixth round of talks resulted in an agreement stipulating the
withdrawal of Israeli forces from the outskirts of the town of Zawtar al-Gharbiya,
prior to the deployment of the Lebanese army there, and allowing residents to
return after security sweeps. Despite ongoing negotiations, several key issues
remain unresolved, most notably the final border demarcation, the mechanism for
monitoring the ceasefire, guarantees for a complete Israeli withdrawal, the
future of Hezbollah's weapons, and the role of the Lebanese Forces in extending
state authority over the entire south. This current round of talks comes as
Israel continues its military operations and demolitions in southern Lebanon,
while insisting on maintaining a military presence within what it calls the
"security zone." Meanwhile, American and international mediators continue their
efforts to push the negotiations toward a final agreement that will bolster
stability on both sides of the border.
Smuggled Grad Rockets Seized in Arsal Outskirts!
Central News Agency/August 4, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The Army Command – Directorate of Orientation announced that “on August 3, 2026,
as a result of ongoing security operations targeting smuggling across the
northern and eastern borders, an army unit in the Arsal outskirts seized 122mm
Grad rockets that had been smuggled from Syrian territory into Lebanese
territory, along with a pickup truck used to transport them. Two Lebanese
citizens, identified as (A.H.) and (M.W.), members of the smuggling network,
were arrested. Raids were also conducted to search for other members of the
network, and ammunition and military equipment were seized.” The Command added
in a statement: “The seized items were handed over, and an investigation was
launched with the two detainees under the supervision of the competent judicial
authorities. Efforts are underway to apprehend the remaining individuals
involved.”
Customs Seizes Large Quantity of Drones
Central News Agency/August 4, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The Lebanese Customs Administration announced today the seizure of a large
quantity of drones in Tripoli, as part of its anti-smuggling operations. The
Administration confirmed the seizure of the drones and the arrest of their
owner, who was taken to the Tripoli Customs Center. An investigation has been
launched under the supervision of the competent judicial authorities to take the
necessary legal measures. In a separate operation, Customs explained that a
force from the Smuggling Investigation Division, after monitoring and
surveillance, seized a number of ATVs that had been cut, re-welded, and
reassembled in a manner that endangered public safety. It added that, after
consulting with the Public Prosecutor's Office, the owner was arrested and the
ATVs were seized pending further investigation and legal action. https://twitter.com/i/status/2084669833317097578
US State Department: Israel-Lebanon Talks to Continue Until
August 6 to Discuss Exploration Zones and Hezbollah Disarmament
Al-Markazia/August 4, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The US State Department confirmed that the US-sponsored talks between Lebanon
and Israel in Rome will continue until August 6, as part of efforts to advance
the understandings between the two sides. A State Department spokesperson
explained that the discussions bring together technical teams from the Lebanese
and Israeli governments and focus on pushing for the full implementation of the
framework agreement and its associated mechanisms. The spokesperson added that
the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations addressed the issue of exploration zones and
the disarmament of Hezbollah. The spokesperson emphasized that the United States
is committed to supporting the negotiation process in a way that contributes to
achieving lasting security for both Lebanon and Israel, working to eliminate
security threats to Israel, and supporting the extension of Lebanese state
authority over the entire southern region.
Syrian Army Reinforcements to Secure the Borders Do Not Paves the Way for an
Operation Against Hezbollah
Al-Markazia/August 4, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The renewed Syrian military deployment along the borders with Lebanon and Iraq
has sparked widespread concern and controversy. Fears have arisen of potential
clashes between Syrian government forces on one side, and pro-Iranian factions
on the other, such as Hezbollah or Iraqi groups like the Popular Mobilization
Forces (PMF) or Kataib Hezbollah. This deployment coincides with statements by
US President Donald Trump expressing his desire to help Syria disarm Hezbollah.
Consequently, questions have been raised about the possibility that the new
Syrian authorities have begun preparatory military measures for a hypothetical
operation. An-Nahar interviewed Ahmed Muwaffaq Zaidan, advisor to Syrian
President Ahmed al-Sharaa, who explained the reasons behind the government's
deployment of these military forces. He indicated that the objective is to
"secure" the Syrian borders in a "volatile" region, but that there is no
justification for the apprehension of any country. Zidan said: “We are living
through a moment of friendly relations, whether at the level of the Syrian
components or the Syrian neighborhood, and during the past two years, Syria has
set the finest examples with regard to healthy relations, whether at the level
of internal relations or with neighboring countries.”
A report reveals, with figures, what Labora considers a hemorrhage of the
Christian presence in the country
August 4, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
Exclusive and very important
We obtained it through our own means... A report reveals, with figures, what
Labora considers a hemorrhage of the Christian presence in the country
This report was not intended for media publication. It was distributed to the
relevant religious, political, and partisan authorities, but we managed to
obtain it through our own means. It is the second report issued by the "Public
Sector Observatory" at the Labora Association for the year 2026, and it bears a
striking title: "The plan to expel Christians from the country is in full
swing." It was accompanied by a message stating: "The dangerous hemorrhage
continues... We await your response." According to informed sources, the report
reached most Christian political and religious authorities, but the response to
it remained very limited, except for a few entities, despite the figures and
facts it contains, which the association considers extremely serious. The report
details dozens of cases that Labora considers violations of the principle of
parity and balance in public service, including:
The hiring of 106 people at Beirut Governmental Hospital, none of whom are
Christian, according to the report. The appointment of 54 trainee accountants in
public administrations, only three of whom are Christian.Promotion projects in
the Ministry of Energy that include four Shiite employees, two Sunni employees,
and only one Christian in several positions. The report notes that the General
Directorate of Water and Electricity Resources comprises 10 departments, and
that the proposed appointments within these departments do not adhere to the
principle of balance. The report also addresses the decline in Christian
representation at Rafik Hariri International Airport, stating that most
leadership positions are divided between the Sunni and Shiite communities, while
the Christian share has fallen to a third or less in some categories. The report
doesn't just present figures; it cites examples from the Ministries of Energy,
Health, Finance, Justice, Public Works, and Tourism, as well as the Beirut
Municipality and Ogero, arguing that these are not isolated incidents but rather
an ongoing trend that undermines the principle of partnership enshrined in the
Lebanese Constitution. Labora warns in its report that the continuation of this
situation will, as it describes it, weaken the Christian presence in state
institutions, calling on political and religious leaders to assume their
responsibilities before it's too late. Regardless of any political or sectarian
bias, the question remains: if the figures in this report are accurate, who is
responsible for this imbalance? And if they are inaccurate, why hasn't anyone
come forward to refute or respond to them? Silence on issues related to the
structure of the state and national partnership doesn't dispel concerns but
rather exacerbates them. The truth lies not in slogans, but in transparency, in
publishing official figures, and in opening a frank national dialogue on how to
respect the Constitution, preserve parity, and guarantee equal opportunities for
all Lebanese citizens, free from any discrimination or monopolization.
Baabda sources to LBCI: Lebanon presents proposal on land
border during first day of Rome 2 talks
LBCI/August 04/2026
Baabda sources told LBCI that two separate meetings were held Tuesday afternoon
on the first day of the second round of Lebanon-Israel talks in Rome. The first
meeting was political and focused on the land border, with discussions set to
continue on Wednesday.
The second meeting was military and addressed the verification mechanism and the
role of the third party. The sources said there has been no response yet from
the senior Israeli political leadership in Tel Aviv regarding a commitment to a
ceasefire and a halt to demolitions.
Lebanon presented its proposal regarding the demarcation and confirmation of the
land border, with discussions set to continue tomorrow, the sources added. The
second day of negotiations will begin on Wednesday at 10 a.m. Beirut time.
Lebanon and Israel Hold New Round of Direct Talks in Rome
Asharq Al Awsat/August 04/2026
Lebanon and Israel are set to begin a new round of US-sponsored direct talks in
Rome on Tuesday, as Beirut seeks Israel's phased withdrawal from the country's
south. At negotiations in Washington in June, Israel and Lebanon agreed to a
framework deal that involves the disarmament of Hezbollah, a gradual withdrawal
of Israeli forces from Lebanon's south and the deployment of the Lebanese army
to the region, starting in test areas known as "pilot zones".This week's
negotiations, set to continue until Thursday, are the seventh round of
US-sponsored talks since Hezbollah drew Lebanon into the Middle East war in
March with rocket fire at Israel in support of its backer Iran. Israel responded
with heavy airstrikes and a ground invasion that Lebanon says have killed more
than 4,300 people. Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem said on Tuesday that the direct
negotiations would bring "nothing but shame, humiliation, and successive
compromises" for Lebanon. In a televised address, he also criticized Lebanon's
President Joseph Aoun, saying he "has not acted as an arbiter, nor as a unifying
figure, but has become biased and divisive, which is incompatible with his role
and with Lebanon's strength". On Monday, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani
urged Lebanon and Israel to "continue in a constructive spirit, identifying
shared solutions that will allow for the full implementation of the framework
agreement", his ministry said. After talks last month, Israel's military
withdrew from the outskirts of the village of Zawtar al-Gharbiya, one of the
first pilot zones. The Lebanese army deployed to the area and has allowed
residents to inspect their homes and businesses.
Pilot zones -
Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam told a cabinet meeting on Monday that his
country was pursuing "efforts towards successive Israeli withdrawals from
Lebanese territory, leading to a full withdrawal". A US State Department
official had told AFP that this week's discussions would "include expanding the
pilot zone process, resolving all outstanding border issues, and working on a
comprehensive peace and security agreement". On Monday, US Ambassador to Lebanon
Michel Issa warned that "moving too quickly risks jeopardizing the very
civilians this process is meant to protect". "It is better to take the time
needed to get this right the first time. Doing so will allow subsequent pilot
zones to move forward more efficiently," Issa said. "Both sides must agree on a
clear, workable process before proceeding."The Lebanese army's deployment is a
major test, with experts expressing doubt over the authorities' ability to
disarm Hezbollah -- which opposes the Israel deal and refuses to surrender its
weapons -- and prevent further non-state military activity. Observers say
Israel's commitment to withdraw will also be tested when pilot zones are
selected in areas fully under its occupation. Violence in Lebanon has decreased
since the Lebanon-Israel deal and the signing in June of a preliminary US-Iran
agreement on the Middle East conflict. But Lebanon continues to report
intermittent Israeli strikes and shelling, as well as detonations and
demolitions in southern villages.
As direct talks with Lebanon resume, Israel lays groundwork
for prolonged southern presence: The details
LBCI/August 04/2026
Israel waited for the launch of the seventh round of direct talks with Lebanon
to reveal that its army is continuing operations in southern Lebanon and plans
to maintain its presence there for at least another year. An examination of the
map of the Israeli presence shows that it extends across varying distances,
covering an area of around 600 square kilometers inside Lebanon and reaching as
far as 12 kilometers from the border in some areas. The army has also
established seven new military bases, five of them along the border and two in
Khiam and Maroun al-Ras. It is also working with civilian construction companies
to build infrastructure extending for kilometers along what it calls logistical
roads. The work involves heavy engineering equipment, including excavators and
D9 bulldozers. Haaretz newspaper was the first to report the development,
quoting a senior military officer as saying that the army had received
instructions to prepare to remain in Lebanon. The army is also making logistical
arrangements for soldiers, most of whom are currently stationed inside civilian
buildings in villages across southern Lebanon.The disclosure that the Israeli
presence could continue for at least another year coincided with the release of
aerial images showing the scale of the changes in the area. The town of Khiam
may be the clearest example. Khiam is located 5 kilometers from the Israeli
border. Roads are being opened there, and a military base is being established
on the site of the former Khiam detention center. The army is also erecting
earth berms and digging trenches along which its soldiers operate, while adding
protective networks against suicide drones. The same is happening in the village
of Maroun al-Ras. There, another military base has been established about 2
kilometers from the Israeli border, while the army has destroyed the vast
majority of the village’s buildings. Khiam and Maroun al-Ras are among 24 towns
and villages whose destruction was highlighted by Israeli Defense Minister
Israel Katz, amid statements from rights groups alleging that war crimes were
committed there.
Hurdles Remain Ahead of 7th Round of Lebanon-Israel
Negotiations in Rome
Beirut: Caroline Akoum/Asharq Al Awsat/August 04/2026
Lebanon and Israel will hold their seventh round of negotiations on Tuesday as
Beirut hopes to achieve progress in the implementation of the US-sponsored
“framework agreement”. However, two main obstacles remain: Israel’s continued
demolitions and detonations in the South and the division over Hezbollah’s
weapons arsenal amid no serious internal Lebanese discussions over the issue and
the Iran-backed party’s refusal to disarm. Tel Aviv, meanwhile, continues to tie
its withdrawal from the South to Hezbollah laying down its weapons. Tuesday’s
talks in Rome will tackle Lebanon’s demands that Israel cease its attacks and
demolitions in Lebanese towns, as well as its full withdrawal from the
country.Informed ministerial sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the dilemma over
Hezbollah’s weapons still remains and no progress has been made over it. “The
issue is not being discussed in Lebanon,” they noted, while Hezbollah continues
to attack the framework agreement and reject the “pilot zones” program. Israel,
on the other hand, is continuing with its detonations and demolitions in the
South. The sources said it was unlikely that a breakthrough would happen before
Israel’s elections in October. They revealed that it had been proposed before
that Hezbollah turn over its heavy weapons as an initial step that would be
followed with a discussion about its entire arsenal at a later phase. The party
refused and Tel Aviv has so far not taken any positive step that may help
achieve progress over the issue. Meanwhile, US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa
said on Monday: “I am encouraged that talks in Rome remain ongoing, and I hope
both governments reach a successful outcome.” “A great deal of technical work
remains to ensure civilian safety on the ground. There is a meaningful
difference between drafting an agreement on paper and implementing it
responsibly — moving too quickly risks jeopardizing the very civilians this
process is meant to protect,” he added in a statement carried by the US Embassy
in Lebanon. “We believe it is better to take the time needed to get this right
the first time. Doing so will allow subsequent pilot zones to move forward more
efficiently. Above all, both sides must agree on a clear, workable process
before proceeding,” he urged. Lebanon’s Agriculture Minister Nizar Hani stressed
that Beirut’s goal are clear: ending Israeli attacks and demolitions, and its
withdrawal from Lebanon. He noted that the US still remains interested in the
Lebanese file, adding that contacts between parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, a
Hezbollah ally, and the party still stand. He hoped that Hezbollah would not
kick off a new conflict with Israel should the situation between the US and Iran
escalate. On the other side of the divide, Hezbollah and Amal movement officials
continued to express their opposition to the framework agreement and
negotiations. Member of Amal’s Development and Liberation bloc MP Hassan Khalil
said the agreement was a failure so long as Israel continues to occupy southern
regions and to carry out killings and demolitions. He called for reviewing the
negotiations, demanding that priority should lie in Israel’s complete withdrawal
from the South, the return of southern residents to their homes, the beginning
of reconstruction, the release of detainees held by Israel, deployment of the
army and return of state institutions to the South. Hezbollah MP Hussein al-Hajj
Hassan declared that the party will not disarm, warning that “any army that
comes to our towns with the mission to remove the resistance’s weapons will be
viewed as an occupier.”He backed Berri’s view that the “framework agreement was
born dead and that it was buried by Israel.”
Salam Hits Back at Qassem: Hezbollah's Wars Helped Israel
Against Lebanon
Asharq Al Awsat/August 04/2026
Hezbollah's chief said on Tuesday that direct talks between Lebanon and Israel
would bring only "humiliation" for Lebanon and accused authorities of helping
Israel, prompting Lebanon's prime minister to hit back. Lebanon and Israel were
holding on Tuesday a fresh round of direct talks in Rome under US sponsorship,
the seventh such meeting since Hezbollah drew Lebanon into the Middle East war
in March with rocket fire at Israel, which responded with heavy airstrikes and a
ground invasion. "All the direct negotiations will bring Lebanon nothing but
shame, humiliation, disappointment and successive concessions," Hezbollah chief
Naim Qassem said in a televised address. He said Lebanese President Joseph Aoun
"has not acted as an arbiter, nor as a unifying figure, but has become biased
and divisive, which is incompatible with his role and with Lebanon's
strength".The head of the Iran-backed group also accused Lebanese authorities of
having "helped Israel instead of helping Lebanon's sovereignty" by continuing
with negotiations that he said had handed Israel "political gains". Prime
Minister Nawaf Salam hit back on X, saying "the greatest help to Israel was
provided by those who unilaterally drew Lebanon into the adventures of futile
wars... and granted it pretexts to attack our country". "Those who unilaterally
take the decision of war and try to continue to seize the state's
decision-making, and to tie Lebanon to foreign calculations and axes, ignoring
the interests of their community and the Lebanese in general, are not fit to
lecture on patriotism, not to mention on sovereignty," Salam added. "Lebanon has
no sovereignty except for the sole independent decision of the state with one
army which extends its authority over all its territory," Salam added.
"Shouldn't the systematic destruction of southern villages and towns... be
reason for the political authorities to say, 'We don't want dialogue with the
Israeli entity'?" Qassem said. He vowed "to make the utmost effort to provide
the means for shelter, repairs and reconstruction", cautioning however that this
would require "patience". Salam instead reaffirmed the state's commitment to end
"the Israeli occupation... and secure the conditions for the dignified and safe
return of people to their towns and villages", and to rebuild.
Lebanese Army Says It Seized Grad Rockets Smuggled from
Syria
Asharq Al Awsat/August 04/2026
The Lebanese Army said in a statement on Tuesday that it has seized Grad rockets
that were smuggled from Syria into Lebanese territory. In the statement, the
Lebanese army said an army unit seized 122 mm Grad rockets in the mountainous
outskirts of Arsal after tracking cross-border smuggling operations along
Lebanon's northern and eastern frontiers. It said the rockets had been smuggled
from Syria into Lebanon. A vehicle used to transport the rockets was also seized
by the army. Two Lebanese men, identified by the military as members of the
smuggling network, were arrested.
Lebanon Arrests ex-Palestinian Envoy at Ramallah's Request
over Graft Charges
Asharq Al Awsat/August 04/2026
Lebanese authorities arrested the former Palestinian ambassador to Beirut on
Monday ahead of his extradition to face corruption charges back home, a Lebanese
judicial official told AFP. Lebanon's public prosecutor "issued an arrest
warrant for former Palestinian ambassador Ashraf Dabbour on Monday after
questioning him", the official said on condition of anonymity. The official
added that the judiciary "transferred the file to the government to inform the
Palestinian Authority that Dabbour is detained in Lebanon, and requested that
his judicial file be sent to Lebanon... in preparation for handing him over" to
the PA. Dabbour, ambassador to Beirut from 2012 to 2025, was previously arrested
upon arriving at the country's airport in April at the request of the PA, over
charges of corruption and embezzlement of funds during his tenure in Lebanon. He
was then placed under a travel ban. In a video posted on his Facebook page in
May, Dabbour denied the accusations, saying they aimed to tarnish his
reputation. In an April Facebook post, Dabbour accused Yasser Abbas, son of
Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas, of "exploiting his control over the
security services and his influence within the authority to use them to settle
his personal scores... by pursuing me with arrest warrants from one place to
another".
Hezbollah’s Sheikh Qassem Calls on Lebanese Authority to
Reject Concession: Resistance to Endure/August 04/2026
Al-Manar English Website
Hezbollah Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem called on Lebanon’s political
authority to halt “gratuitous concessions,” urging dialogue with the resistance,
national unity, and a commitment to national sovereignty until the Israeli enemy
withdraws from occupied Lebanese territories. Speaking during the Arbaeen
commemoration of Imam Hussein (AS) in Baalbek, Qassem criticized the approach of
direct talks with the Israeli enemy amid ongoing occupation and attacks in
southern Lebanon. “Direct negotiations have yielded nothing but shame,
humiliation, and repeated disappointment for Lebanon, marked by a series of
successive concessions.”He questioned whether the destruction in southern
Lebanon was not enough to prompt a firmer stance against Israeli actions.
“Shouldn’t the systematic destruction of villages and towns in the south, most
recently the use of this 700-ton bomb, be enough to make the political
establishment say: We do not want dialogue with the Israeli entity?” his
eminence said, referring to an unprecedented Israeli demolition operation that
employed 700 tons of explosives in the southern Lebanese area of Shaqeef last
week. “The political authority in Lebanon must place national sovereignty at the
forefront by strengthening the army, ensuring enemy withdrawal, advancing
reconstruction, uncovering truth behind Beirut Port explosion, and restoring
depositors’ funds.”Sheikh Qassem argued that Lebanon’s sovereignty requires
confronting Israeli aggression and US involvement, saying that “the Americans
are complicit” and calling on the political authority to rejects external
pressure.
Resistance with Karbala Spirit
The Hezbollah S.G. said the path of the memorandum of understanding between Iran
and the United States was what would secure a ceasefire, crediting the Lebanese
resistance’s battlefield steadfastness and its supporters for preventing the
Israeli enemy from achieving its objectives.“Had it not been for the
steadfastness of the resistance on the ground and the people rallying around it,
nothing would have been achieved, the enemy’s momentum would not have been
broken, and there would be no hope of achieving withdrawal in the near future,”
he said.
Hezbollah Lebanon
Hezbollah fighters operating in south Lebanon (image released by Hezbollah
Military Media).
He stressed that “the enemy’s only option is complete withdrawal,” adding that
Hezbollah supports the deployment of the Lebanese Army south of the Litani River
and would assist in that process. “Israeli enemy’s only option is withdrawal and
it will ultimately withdraw, we support Lebanese Army deployment south of Litani
River.” “The resistance will continue as long as the occupation exists. We will
defend our land, our rights, and our homeland with the spirit of Karbala,”
Sheikh Qassem said.
Iran-US MoU Led to Lebanon Ceasefire
Addressing developments in Iran, Sheikh Qassem said the Islamic Republic had
emerged victorious after confronting US-Israeli efforts to undermine it. He said
Iran’s institutions, people, and leadership stood firm and that the country had
demonstrated its regional and international influence despite predictions of its
collapse. Sheikh Qassem praised Iran’s support for regional allies and said
Hezbollah was “proud to stand with Iran in confronting enemies of humanity.”
Iran Lebanon Hezbollah
A woman holds a sign depicting stencils of Iran’s supreme leaders since 1979
during a rally organized by Lebanese political parties supporting the Hezbollah
movement outside the Iranian embassy in Beirut on March 26, 2026. He stressed
that “what brought the aggression against Lebanon to a halt was the US-Iran MoU,
which made the Israeli withdrawal a prerequisite paving the way for the
ceasefire in Lebanon”
Lebanon Internal Politics
The Lebanese resistance leader emphasized the importance of internal Lebanese
unity, highlighting Hezbollah’s alliance with the Amal Movement as a key pillar
of national cohesion. “We are together not only as two parties, but as a people,
a resistance, a future, and a life,” he said, adding that broader political and
sectarian cooperation represented a national shield. Sheikh Qassem said the
majority of Lebanese people supported “resistance, liberation, national
sovereignty, and the army,” reiterating the formula of “the army, the people,
and the resistance.”
Hezbollah and Amal movement
Hezbollah and Amal flags during a rally in southern Lebanon (image from
archive). Addressing residents of southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and
Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahiyeh), Sheikh Qassem praised their sacrifices and
acknowledged the hardship caused by displacement and destruction. “We understand
that what has befallen our people is painful and heartbreaking,” he said,
pledging that Hezbollah would work to provide shelter, restoration, and
reconstruction while calling on the Lebanese state to assume its
responsibilities.
Regional Issues
On Syria, Qassem called for a “fraternal, positive, and cooperative”
relationship between Beirut and Damascus, expressing hope that Syria would
achieve stability and recover its occupied territories. “There is no objection
to a public meeting between Hezbollah and the Syrian leadership at a time
appropriate for both sides,” he said. Concluding his remarks, Qassem reaffirmed
support for Gaza and Palestine, calling for opposition to brutal aggression
against the besieged enclave, while thanking Iraq and Yemen for their backing of
the Palestinian and Lebanese causes. “We won’t forget Gaza and we firmly stand
against the brutal aggression targeting Gaza.”Talki about the occasion, Sheikh
Qassem stressed that Ashura is based on two fundamental pillars: “Defending what
is right and fulfilling the religious duty even if it leads to martyrdom and
great sacrifices.” His eminence saluted pilgrims taking part in million-man
marches in the holy city of Karbala to express loyalty to Imam Hussein (AS).
“Special greeting to our people in the Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel for these
pioneering and massive marches.”
Lebanon: The Port Awaits Justice
Hanna Saleh/Asharq Al-Awsat/August 04/2026
Today, August 4, marks six years since the explosion that devastated the Port of
Beirut. It reduced the heart of the city to ashes, caused immense destruction,
and killed hundreds. The tragedy placed justice at the front of every demand
made by the capital and its people. Yet despite a series of prosecutorial
decisions, not one official has asked the people for forgiveness. To this day,
no indictment has been issued, and no one has been held to account.Those
responsible kept their posts. For years they took shelter behind the growing
dominance of Hezbollah's "statelet," which threatened to "jail" the
investigating judge, Tarek Bitar. Even now, the questions about the delay in the
indictment go unanswered. What is etched into the memory of citizens is that
they were abandoned on that terrible evening. The dead lay at the port, in the
streets, and inside their homes. The wounded bled. Destruction was everywhere,
and Beirut was no longer Beirut. Yet from beneath the ashes rose young men and
women who came from every part of Lebanon to tend the wounds of the capital and
its people. The chain of events before the blast confirms that Beirut could have
been spared. On May 28, 2020, Major Joseph al-Naddaf completed his report on the
ammonium nitrate stored in Warehouse 12. He called the public prosecutor,
relayed his findings, and warned that if the material caught fire, the explosion
would be powerful enough to destroy the port.
On June 1, 2020, he delivered a written copy of the report to his superiors at
the State Security Directorate and to Public Prosecutor Ghassan Oueidat. Copies
reached Prime Minister Hassan Diab, President Michel Aoun, and other senior
officials.
The port explosion, the engineered financial collapse that preceded it, the
catastrophe of defeat, the occupation drawn in by illegitimate weapons- behind
all of it lies one disaster: the absence of justice and the dominance of a
corrupt establishment. The fear is real that justice will stay obstructed as
long as the domestic balance of power remains distorted, forcing the Lebanese
again and again to choose between injustice and civil war.
Six years on, the executive authority carries a heavy responsibility: to press
for the indictment and to protect it. That would open the door to accountability
and begin to close the chapter on the deep state that concealed grave crimes.
In one publicly disclosed line of the investigation, Judge Bitar moved to
charge, with the felony of "probable intent to kill"- dolus eventualis- anyone
who received a report, was contacted, or was otherwise warned of a possible
catastrophe from the 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate stored at the port, and
still failed to act.Michel Aoun, in whose presidency the Lebanese were sent into
hell, admitted that he had known. He claimed the constitution shielded him from
accountability. The ministers facing charges asked how they could have known a
disaster would come from "a piece of paper they had received."
Yet the evidence available from before the crime of the century points to
Oueidat as more centrally involved than others given the sensitive judicial
position he held.
Is the Framework Agreement Turning into a Missed
Opportunity?
Brigadier General Khaled Hamade/Al-Lewaa/August 04/2026 (Google translation from
Arabic)
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/08/156447/
It must be acknowledged that the visit of President Joseph Aoun to Washington
failed to lay the groundwork for a new phase, nor did it succeed in pushing
toward the implementation of the framework agreement, despite all the promises
carried in the words exchanged between Aoun and President Donald Trump and the
hopes pinned upon them. Despite the Lebanese media coverage surrounding the
deployment of the army in Zawtar al-Gharbiya—as one of the initial pilot areas
proposed within the context of implementing the agreement—the intensity of
Israeli bombings in the occupied southern villages escalated, and drone attacks
renewed, suggesting that what the army is doing falls outside of what was agreed
upon in Washington. Furthermore, there was a complete absence of the United
States in monitoring events on the ground, underscored by the failure of General
"Joseph Clearfield," who heads the "Mechanism" verification committee, to
attend. All of this comes on top of the manufactured controversy surrounding the
army's right to inspect private homes and properties and the necessity of
awaiting judicial orders—a clear disregard for the government's authorities when
commissioning the army with similar tasks in accordance with Article 4 of the
National Defense Law.
The American absence—which has not yet been interrupted by any statement or
signal to correct the course—affirms that there is a clear divergence between
what was agreed upon in Washington during the presidential retreat and what is
being implemented, and that the existing gap is unbridgeable. A rational attempt
to understand this American neglect must take into account all the positions
that followed the Washington meeting, starting with the President's speech at
the "embassy dinner," which constituted a coup against the presidential summit,
and passing through the positions of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri following
his visit to Baabda, which confirmed that the marketing Aoun presented to Trump
regarding Berri's true stance was untrue. Rather, there is a clear alignment
between Aoun and Berri regarding the implementation of the framework agreement
in terms of evading the issue of Hezbollah's weapons. This cannot be separated
from the qualitative escalation in Hezbollah's rhetoric, which found in the
Aoun-Berri meeting enough space to replicate its previous positions and return
to proposing the defense strategy from a position of partnership with the state.
Legal Models
In the context of confirming the nullification of the effects of the
presidential visit to Washington, there was a noticeable absence of any mention
of the visit to Beirut by Saudi envoy "Yazid bin Farhan"—which had been
scheduled for the end of last week—to translate the phone call between Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Aoun while he was at the White House into
practical measures and procedures to assist Lebanon. For its part, Washington
views Aoun's repeated calls for France to participate in the verification
mechanism in the south, and his presidential visit to Turkey—whose reasons
remain ambiguous and outcomes unknown—as attempts to bypass American policy in
the Middle East. So, has Lebanon made its decision to join Tehran and adopt the
Iranian model in dealing with the framework agreement, meaning continuing
negotiations without committing to executive procedures? And what are the limits
of the risk, especially after President Trump's announcement at the end of last
week suspending planned strikes against Iran at the request of Tehran and other
countries in the region? In a related context, it was striking to note the
simultaneity between the suspension of strikes against Iran on the one hand, and
President Trump's announcement on the other hand of a phased plan linking the
disarmament of Hamas with the gradual withdrawal of the Israeli army, and
handing over the Strip to a new interim Palestinian authority backed by an
international force. No less unusual was the approval by the Israeli Ministerial
Committee for National Security (the Security Cabinet) to grant the "Peace
Council" special status to operate inside the Gaza Strip in areas controlled by
the Israeli army, in compliance with Trump's 20-point plan, which—alongside UN
Security Council Resolution 2803—constitutes the international framework guiding
the implementation of the operation.
Executive Bodies
Can the sudden activation of the Peace Council in Gaza be read as anything other
than a shift in American priorities in the confrontation with Tehran? And does
the activation of the Peace Council mean anything other than a final,
American-style separation between Iran and the Hamas movement? And does this
mean anything other than stripping Iran of a major ally and a purported arena
after a new Palestinian authority takes charge in Gaza? It appears that
Washington, which previously considered the downfall of Tehran to be the
inevitable prerequisite for the downfall of its proxies, has altered its
confrontation method so that bringing down the proxies has become the
prerequisite for subduing Tehran. Will Israel's systematic destruction of the
southern villages pave the ground for a "Lebanese Peace Council" in light of
Lebanon's undeclared alignment with Tehran? And will the framework agreement be
added to the missed opportunities that preceded it?
*Director of the Regional Forum for Studies and Consulting
Faut-il « recourir » à la Syrie? La passe d’armes entre Alfred
Mady et le Dr Samir Geagea
Ghassan
Chiha/Liban News/2 jours/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/08/156439/
Faut-il « recourir » à la Syrie? La passe d’armes entre Alfred Mady et le Dr
Samir Geagea
Ghassan Chiha/Liban News/2 jours/2026
Ancien cadre des Kataëb et des Forces libanaises et longtemps proche du Dr Samir
Geagea, l’ingénieur Alfred Mady accuse aujourd’hui le chef du parti des Forces
libanaises d’entrouvrir la porte à un retour syrien. La riposte, virulente, a
viré à la campagne médiatique – à laquelle il a répondu par un tweet cinglant.
Alfred Mady a longtemps été l’un des plus proches du Dr Samir Geagea.
Représentant des Forces libanaises aux États-Unis de 1976 à 1983, où il dirigea
leur bureau à Washington et noua des liens étroits avec les cercles officiels
américains, membre du bureau politique des Kataëb de 1983 à 1992, puis membre
fondateur du comité exécutif du parti des Forces libanaises de 1991 à 1994, il
rompt avec Geagea en 1994. Il dirige depuis 2017 l’Académie Bachir Gemayel de
l’Université Saint-Esprit de Kaslik (USEK) et préside aujourd’hui son propre
mouvement, L’Autre Choix. Son parcours l’a placé, de 1983 à 1994, aux côtés de
Geagea lui-même – un ancrage qui donne à sa critique une portée particulière :
ce n’est pas un adversaire extérieur qui parle, mais un ancien compagnon.
Le président américain Donald Trump a, à plusieurs reprises – notamment en marge
du G7 d’Évian en juin 2026 –, suggéré de confier à la Syrie le soin de «
s’occuper » du Hezbollah à la place d’Israël, estimant qu’Ahmad el-Chareh (Joulani)
y serait « plus précis ». L’émissaire américain Tom Barrack, chargé du dossier
libanais, a envoyé des signaux allant dans le même sens.
Damas, de son côté, a systématiquement démenti toute intention d’intervention
militaire. Joulani a assuré rechercher « des canaux économiques, non militaires
» et ne pas vouloir « rouvrir les plaies du passé ». Lors de sa tournée à
Beyrouth le 2 juillet 2026, le ministre syrien des Affaires étrangères Assaad
el-Chaïbani a rencontré la plupart des dirigeants libanais – dont Geagea –,
exclu toute rencontre avec le Hezbollah et plaidé pour « une nouvelle page ».
C’est dans ce climat – négociations libano-israéliennes parrainées par
Washington, accord-cadre signé en juin, « zones pilotes » au Sud, pression
américaine constante pour désarmer le Hezbollah – que le Dr Samir Geagea a
évoqué, sur MTV, l’idée que la Syrie pourrait aider le Liban à se défaire de
l’influence iranienne. Une phrase qui, dans la bouche d’un homme dont le parti
commémore chaque année la résistance à l’armée syrienne, ne pouvait passer
inaperçue.
L’objection de Mady : la logique du « recours »
Dans un entretien télévisé, Alfred Mady rappelle que les militants du parti des
Forces libanaises célébraient, ces jours-là même, la mémoire de la « guerre des
100 jours » de 1978 et de la libération d’Achrafieh assiégée par les Syriens.
Comment, dès lors, entendre un dirigeant de ce même parti appeler Damas à «
venir » aider le Liban ? « Nous nous sommes débarrassés d’eux ici, pour que tu
réclames à nouveau que le Syrien entre ? », résume-t-il, indigné. Mady reproche
surtout à Geagea ce qu’il perçoit comme une contradiction. Après avoir, selon
lui, publiquement évoqué un recours à la Syrie, le chef du parti aurait ensuite
déclaré au quotidien saoudien Okaz n’avoir « décelé aucune intention chez aucun
responsable libanais » de solliciter l’aide de Damas – ajoutant n’avoir entendu
personne, hormis Donald Trump, réclamer une entrée syrienne au Liban. Pour Mady,
ce revirement relève du « déni » : « Un responsable libanais a demandé : Samir
Geagea. » Et de marteler sa règle personnelle : reconnaître une erreur ou un
lapsus est légitime, mais vivre dans le démenti ne l’est pas.
Interrogé sur le fond, Mady se garde toutefois de prêter à Geagea des intentions
certaines : il dit ne juger que sur pièces, sur la déclaration et sur son «
correctif ». De la critique à la campagne – et la riposte La réplique ne s’est
pas fait attendre. Une campagne, sur les plateaux comme sur les réseaux sociaux,
a accusé Mady de « haine politique » à l’égard de Geagea et exigé des excuses.
C’est à cette offensive qu’il a répondu par un long texte publié sur X,
largement partagé dans les milieux chrétiens.
Le vétéran y relève d’abord une ironie : ses détracteurs n’auraient même pas
diffusé la vidéo dans laquelle il critiquait Geagea, lui préférant un autre
extrait – aveu involontaire, à ses yeux, que sa position était fondée. Surtout,
il refuse le procès en propos « sortis de leur contexte » : son objection,
insiste-t-il, repose sur un enchaînement de positions dont il tire une déduction
politique. Le raisonnement est le suivant. Geagea affirme que la Syrie peut
aider à écarter l’influence iranienne ; or, argumente Mady, la relation entre
Damas et Téhéran est rompue, et la Syrie ne dispose plus du levier nécessaire
pour jouer ce rôle. Geagea soutient par ailleurs, de longue date, que l’État
libanais serait capable de trancher la question du Hezbollah s’il le voulait.
Dès lors, interroge Mady : si Damas n’a de prise ni sur l’Iran ni sur le
processus diplomatique en cours, et si l’État peut agir seul, que reste-t-il à
la Syrie pour « aider », sinon une intervention militaire aux côtés de l’armée
libanaise – c’est-à-dire le retour automatique de ses soldats sur le sol
libanais ? Cette conclusion, écrit-il, est « une déduction politique légitime,
nullement une trahison ni une diffamation ».
Le contre-réquisitoire:
Mady ne s’en tient pas à la défense. Il retourne l’accusation contre les «
Gardiens » du parti, qu’il décrit comme incapables de questionner leur chef et
traitant chaque revirement comme « une révélation divine ». Il déroule alors une
longue liste de griefs, à commencer par le Hezbollah. Le parti des Forces
libanaises a, rappelle-t-il, partagé le pouvoir avec lui au sein des
gouvernements et du Parlement pendant deux décennies. Surtout, l’épouse de
Geagea, la députée Sethrida Geagea, ainsi que certains élus du parti, ont un
temps rangé les morts du Hezbollah parmi les « martyrs de la résistance
libanaise » – avant que ce même mouvement ne soit aujourd’hui dépeint comme
terroriste et hors-la-loi. Mady interroge ensuite la réconciliation de Maarab (où
habite Geagea) avec Michel Aoun et le Courant patriotique libre – avant les
brouilles ultérieures avec Gebran Bassil –, l’invocation d’un « État profond »
pour justifier l’impuissance des ministres du parti, l’envoi passé d’une
délégation à Gaza du temps où le Hamas était érigé en cause, ou encore la rareté
du mot « paix » dans la bouche de Geagea à propos d’Israël.
À la demande d’excuses, il oppose sa propre liste. Celui qui devrait s’excuser,
écrit-il, est celui qui salue la cause palestinienne devant des mères de martyrs
qui n’ont pas encore quitté le deuil ; celui qui envisage « le recours au Syrien
au lieu de lui demander simplement de l’aide » ; celui qui détient le pouvoir
décisionnel depuis des années sans être parvenu à unir les chrétiens ni à leur
proposer une vision stratégique ; celui qui brandit le slogan « il en est
capable et il le veut » quand les faits, selon lui, disent l’inverse. Sa
conclusion, adressée aux partisans du chef du parti, claque comme un défi : ne
me posez pas de questions, « demandez à votre maître Samir quelles sont ses
contradictions… et, si vous en avez le courage, demandez-lui à propos d’Alfred
».
Le spectre de 1985 Cette défiance plonge ses racines dans une mémoire plus
ancienne, que les critiques de Geagea n’ont jamais soldée. Au printemps 1985,
les villages chrétiens de l’Iklim el-Touffah, à l’est de Sidon, tombent sous
l’assaut de miliciens de la Jamaa islamiya, de formations nassériennes et
d’organisations palestiniennes fidèles à Yasser Arafat ; ceux de l’Iklim el-Kharroub
sont emportés par la milice du Parti socialiste progressiste et ses alliés
palestiniens, attaquant depuis le Chouf. Six semaines plus tôt, l’intifada du 12
mars 1985 avait fait du Dr Samir Geagea le chef d’état-major des Forces
libanaises. Le 24 avril 1985, les combattants des FL se retirent de l’est de
Sidon sur ordre de Geagea. Dans le sillage de cette conquête de l’est de Sidon
par les organisation palestinienne s’infiltrent des éléments du Hezbollah : pour
la première fois, la route du Liban-Sud s’ouvre à la milice chiite, qui allait y
bâtir une implantation militaire durable – tournant décisif de son expansion
dans le sud du pays. Aux yeux de ces mêmes critiques, cet épisode reste une
faute originelle que l’actuel débat sur un éventuel rôle syrien ne fait que
raviver.
Sethrida Geagea dit :
« Entre nous, les Forces Libanaises, et nos partenaires du Hezbollah, il existe
de nombreux points de ressemblance.
Les deux partis sont populaires, au sens large et vaste du terme. Les deux
partis sont organisés, ils possèdent des projets politiques clairs et ils
luttent avec sérieux pour atteindre leurs objectifs. Le Secrétaire Général du
Hezbollah, Monsieur Hassan Nasrallah, a vu son fils, Hadi, tomber en martyr en
affrontant l’ennemi israélien. Malgré tout cela, il continue aux côtés de son
public à mener sa lutte, par foi en sa http://cause.Et même concernant le sujet
du gouvernement actuel, le Hezbollah s’est contenté de presque rien, au nom de
sa cause. »
Ibrahim Al-Saker du parti des Forces libanaises : « Si la guerre éclate entre le
président Sharaa et le Hezbollah, et que Sharaa entre au Liban, je me tiendrai à
ses côtés… et je lui dirai : « La place d’honneur de la maison t’appartient, et
le seuil est à nous. »
Should We “Resort” to Syria? The War of Words Between Alfred Mady and Dr. Samir
Geagea
Ghassan Chiha/Liban News/02 August/2026 (translated from French)
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/08/156439/
A former cadre of the Kataeb and the Lebanese Forces and long close to Dr. Samir
Geagea, engineer Alfred Mady is now accusing the leader of the Lebanese Forces
party of opening the door to a Syrian return. The virulent response escalated
into a media campaign—to which he retorted with a scathing tweet.
Alfred Mady was long one of Dr. Samir Geagea’s closest associates. As the
representative of the Lebanese Forces in the United States from 1976 to
1983—where he headed their Washington office and forged close ties with official
American circles—a member of the Kataeb political bureau from 1983 to 1992, and
a founding member of the Lebanese Forces executive committee from 1991 to 1994,
he broke with Geagea in 1994. Since 2017, he has directed the Bachir Gemayel
Academy at the Holy Spirit University of Kaslik (USEK) and currently chairs his
own movement, The Other Choice. His background placed him, from 1983 to 1994,
right beside Geagea himself—an anchoring that gives his critique a unique
weight: it is not an external adversary speaking, but a former companion.
U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly—notably on the sidelines of the G7 in
Évian in June 2026—suggested entrusting Syria with the task of “handling”
Hezbollah instead of Israel, estimating that Ahmad al-Sharaa (al-Jolani) would
be “more precise” in doing so. U.S. Envoy Tom Barrack, charged with the Lebanese
file, has sent signals pointing in the same direction.
Damascus, for its part, has systematically denied any intention of military
intervention. Al-Jolani assured that he seeks “economic channels, not military
ones” and does not wish to “reopen the wounds of the past.” During his tour of
Beirut on July 2, 2026, Syrian Foreign Minister Assaad al-Shaibani met with most
Lebanese leaders—including Geagea—ruled out any meeting with Hezbollah, and
pleaded for “a new page.”
It is in this climate—Lebanese-Israeli negotiations sponsored by Washington, a
framework agreement signed in June, “pilot zones” in the South, and constant
American pressure to disarm Hezbollah—that Dr. Samir Geagea raised the idea on
MTV that Syria could help Lebanon rid itself of Iranian influence. A phrase
that, coming from a man whose party annually commemorates the resistance against
the Syrian army, could not go unnoticed.
Mady’s Objection: The Logic of “Recourse”
In a television interview, Alfred Mady recalled that Lebanese Forces militants
were, precisely those days, celebrating the memory of the 1978 “100-Day War” and
the liberation of Ashrafieh besieged by the Syrians. How, then, could one hear a
leader of that same party call upon Damascus to “come” and help Lebanon? “We got
rid of them here, for you to demand the Syrian enter again?” he summarized with
indignation. Mady mainly reproaches Geagea for what he perceives as a
contradiction. After publicly raising the prospect of resorting to Syria, the
party leader reportedly told the Saudi daily Okaz that he had “detected no
intention on the part of any Lebanese official” to seek Damascus’s help—adding
that he had heard no one, other than Donald Trump, demand a Syrian entry into
Lebanon. For Mady, this reversal amounts to “denial”: “A Lebanese official
asked: Samir Geagea.” He hammers home his personal rule: acknowledging a mistake
or a slip of the tongue is legitimate, but living in denial is not.
When questioned on the substance, Mady refrains from attributing certain
intentions to Geagea: he says he judges solely on facts, on the statement and
its “correction.”
From Critique to Campaign… and the Retort
The reply was swift. A campaign across TV sets and social networks accused Mady
of “political hatred” toward Geagea and demanded an apology. It was to this
offensive that he responded with a long text published on X, widely shared
within Christian circles.
The veteran first points out an irony: his detractors did not even broadcast the
video in which he criticized Geagea, preferring another excerpt—an involuntary
admission, in his eyes, that his position was well-founded. Above all, he
rejects the trial over “taken out of context” remarks: his objection, he
insists, rests on a sequence of positions from which he draws a political
deduction. The reasoning is as follows: Geagea claims Syria can help push aside
Iranian influence; yet, Mady argues, the relationship between Damascus and
Tehran is broken, and Syria no longer possesses the necessary leverage to play
this role. Geagea also maintains, long-standingly, that the Lebanese state is
capable of settling the Hezbollah issue if it wants to. Therefore, Mady asks: if
Damascus has a grip neither on Iran nor on the ongoing diplomatic process, and
if the state can act alone, what is left for Syria to “help” with, if not a
military intervention alongside the Lebanese army—meaning the automatic return
of its soldiers onto Lebanese soil? This conclusion, he writes, is “a legitimate
political deduction, by no means treason nor defamation.”
The Counter-Rebuttal
Mady does not stop at defense. He turns the accusation back against the party’s
“Guardians,” whom he describes as incapable of questioning their leader and
treating every reversal as “divine revelation.” He then rolls out a long list of
grievances, starting with Hezbollah. The Lebanese Forces party, he recalls,
shared power with it in governments and parliament for two decades. Above all,
Geagea’s wife, MP Sethrida Geagea, as well as certain party lawmakers, once
categorized Hezbollah’s dead among the “martyrs of the Lebanese
resistance”—before this same movement was today painted as terrorist and
outlawed. Mady then questions the Maarab reconciliation (where Geagea lives)
with Michel Aoun and the Free Patriotic Movement—prior to subsequent fallouts
with Gebran Bassil—the invocation of a “deep state” to justify the powerlessness
of the party’s ministers, the past dispatch of a delegation to Gaza back when
Hamas was elevated as a cause, and the rarity of the word “peace” on Geagea’s
lips regarding Israel.
To the demand for an apology, he opposes his own list. The one who should
apologize, he writes, is the one who salutes the Palestinian cause before
mothers of martyrs who have not yet stopped mourning; the one who envisions
“recourse to the Syrian instead of simply asking him for help”; the one who has
held decision-making power for years without succeeding in uniting Christians or
offering them a strategic vision; and the one who brandishes the slogan “he is
capable and he wants to” when the facts, in his view, say the opposite. His
conclusion, addressed to the party leader’s partisans, rings like a challenge:
do not ask me, “ask your master Samir about his contradictions… and, if you have
the courage, ask him about Alfred.”
The Spectre of 1985
This defiance is rooted in an older memory that Geagea’s critics have never
settled. In the spring of 1985, Christian villages in the Iklim el-Touffah, east
of Sidon, fell under the assault of militants from al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya,
Nasserist formations, and Palestinian factions loyal to Yasser Arafat; those in
Iklim el-Kharroub were overrun by the Progressive Socialist Party militia and
its Palestinian allies attacking from the Chouf. Six weeks earlier, the March
12, 1985 intifada had made Dr. Samir Geagea the chief of staff of the Lebanese
Forces. On April 24, 1985, LF fighters withdrew from east of Sidon on Geagea’s
orders. In the wake of this conquest of eastern Sidon by Palestinian
organizations, elements of Hezbollah infiltrated: for the first time, the road
to South Lebanon opened up to the Shia militia, which would build a lasting
military presence there—a decisive turning point in its expansion in the south
of the country. In the eyes of these same critics, this episode remains an
original sin that the current debate over a potential Syrian role merely
revives.
What Was Said:
Sethrida Geagea said:
“Between us, the Lebanese Forces, and our partners in Hezbollah, there are many
points of resemblance. Both parties are popular, in the broad and vast sense of
the term. Both parties are organized, they possess clear political projects, and
they struggle seriously to achieve their goals. The Secretary-General of
Hezbollah, Mr. Hassan Nasrallah, saw his son, Hadi, fall as a martyr while
confronting the Israeli enemy. Despite all this, he continues alongside his
public to wage his struggle out of belief in his cause. And even concerning the
issue of the current government, Hezbollah settled for almost nothing, in the
name of its cause.”
Ibrahim Al-Saker of the Lebanese Forces party:
“If war breaks out between President Sharaa and Hezbollah, and Sharaa enters
Lebanon, I will stand by his side… and I will say to him: ‘The seat of honor in
the house belongs to you, and the threshold is ours.'”
https://libnanews.com/faut-il-recourir-a-la-syrie-la-passe-darmes-entre-alfred-mady-et-le-dr-samir-geagea-par-ghassan-chiha/
The Latest English LCCC
Miscellaneous Reports And News published
on August 04-05/2026
Trump says Iran facing 'last chance
before decapitation'
Agence France Presse/04 August ,2026
U.S. President Donald Trump said that negotiations with Iran were ongoing
despite Tehran's denials and the Islamic Republic was facing a "last chance
before decapitation."Trump, speaking to reporters at the White House, said he
agreed to continue to pursue talks with Iran at the request of Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, Qatar and other countries.Iran's foreign ministry denied
on Monday that negotiations with Washington were taking place, but Trump
insisted they were. "We are talking right now," he said. "This is a last chance
for them to sign a good document," the U.S. president added. "I want to give
them every last chance before decapitation."The talks are focused on reopening
the Strait of Hormuz, which Trump said could come "literally by tomorrow," and
the denuclearization of Iran, which he said could "take a little while."
Washington and Tehran have been at war since February 28, when the United States
and Israel launched surprise strikes against Iran, though months of on-and-off
diplomacy have led to periods of relative calm. More than five months later,
Iran remains able to fire missiles and drones at U.S. and allied targets in the
region and retains its enriched uranium stockpiles. Early Tuesday, Britain's
maritime security agency UKMTO said that a cargo vessel was struck by an
"unknown projectile" in the Strait of Hormuz off the coast of Oman. The vessel,
which was not named, reported being hit and authorities were investigating,
UKMTO said, without giving specifics on damage or injuries.
Familiar pattern -
In what has become a familiar pattern, Trump last week had threatened to hit
Iran "very hard" -- potentially with renewed attacks against energy
infrastructure -- only to pull back on Saturday, saying the "perimeters" of a
deal were there. Iran, for its part, said it is not currently negotiating with
the United States. "Our negotiations are with Oman to secure passage through the
Strait of Hormuz," the critical oil corridor, foreign ministry spokesman Esmaeil
Baqaei said. Hormuz has been a major sticking point in efforts to end the war.
Since a ceasefire broke down, Iran has reprised a blockade of the waterway that
it first imposed early in the war, obstructing vessels attempting to pass and
firing on commercial ships. Calling Tehran "duplicitous" for "openly and
proudly" saying it was not negotiating, Trump wrote on social media: "Whether
Iran wants to admit it or not, we are, in fact, talking of a solution to a
problem that they have caused, for decades." He pointed to the United States'
counter-blockade of Iranian ports, adding: "Nothing gets through to Iran, unless
we want it to, and nothing will get through, unless a Deal, or Total Surrender,
is accomplished."Before the war, there was free passage through Hormuz, but Iran
now insists on retaining control and charging fees, something the United States
rejects. Tehran has refused to let ships travel any route other than one that
hugs the Iranian coast. On Sunday, Baqaei told state television that a deal was
close on managing Hormuz together with Oman, which sits on the other side of the
narrow waterway. "We are now going to reach an understanding on a route
acceptable to both sides -- neither the northern route nor the southern route --
but one that respects the sovereign rights of both sides and safeguards our
national interests and security," he said. But he insisted that such an
agreement did not mean the reopening of the strait.
Denuclearization 'has to happen' -
The U.S. president said at the start of the conflict that the war was necessary
to deal with Iran's nuclear program and he repeated on Monday that "the
denuclearization of Iran has to happen."Western nations accuse Iran of seeking a
bomb, though Tehran insists the program is entirely civilian in nature. Speaking
to reporters on Air Force One over the weekend, Trump said he had been asked by
Iran as well as regional U.S. partners to hold off on further strikes, which he
claimed would have been "the biggest attack since World War II."Iranian media
denied that Tehran had asked Trump not to strike. A previous ceasefire deal fell
through last month. It was supposed to open the Strait of Hormuz to ships
carrying vital energy exports from the Gulf to feed the global economy.
US sees progress in Hormuz Strait talks, hopes for deal
very shortly, Rubio says
Agencies/04 August ,2026
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on Tuesday there has been progress made
in discussions with Iran and Oman on getting more ships through the Strait of
Hormuz but no final agreement has been reached. “There’s been progress made in
those talks, but not finality yet. We’re hoping that will happen very shortly,”
Rubio told reporters at the State Department. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent
said that the United States could reach a deal with Iran to reopen the Strait of
Hormuz by Wednesday, adding that this would stabilize energy prices. “We are in
talks with the Iranians, and I think there is a chance we may have a deal today
or tomorrow to open the strait and move towards a more normalized position in
this conflict,” Bessent said Tuesday in an interview with CNBC. Asked if a deal
would allow Iran to charge a toll on shipping using the strait, Bessent said: “I
think it would be freedom of movement.”Bessent’s comments echoed those of US
President Donald Trump on Monday, who insisted the waterway could reopen within
hours after he pulled back from threats of a massive military strike on Iran
over the weekend. Iran’s foreign ministry has denied that negotiations with
Washington were taking place, and on Tuesday, an unknown projectile hit a cargo
ship in the Strait of Hormuz, a key point of tension in the US-Iran conflict.
Bessent was upbeat on the impact a deal with Iran over the strait would have on
energy prices, where he said hundreds of ships are waiting to go out. “Even
though things are still a little dicey there over the past few days, we’ve
(seen) quite a few ships coming out even now,” Bessent said. “So you know, I’d
expect the energy prices to settle back down, which, as I said, will be good for
the entire world.”
US Treasury Secretary Says Chance of Hormuz Deal with Iran by Wednesday
Asharq Al Awsat/August 04/2026
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said that the United States could reach a deal
with Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz by Wednesday, adding that this would
stabilize energy prices."We are in talks with the Iranians, and I think there is
a chance we may have a deal today or tomorrow to open the strait and move
towards a more normalized position in this conflict," Bessent said Tuesday in an
interview with CNBC. Asked if a deal would allow Iran to charge a toll on
shipping using the strait, Bessent said: "I think it would be freedom of
movement."Bessent's comments echoed those of US President Donald Trump on
Monday, who insisted the waterway could reopen within hours after he pulled back
from threats of a massive military strike on Iran over the weekend. Iran's
foreign ministry has denied that negotiations with Washington were taking place,
and on Tuesday, an unknown projectile hit a cargo ship in the Strait of Hormuz,
a key point of tension in the US-Iran conflict. Secretary of State Marco Rubio
said Tuesday the United States is "involved" in negotiations between Oman and
Iran on increasing traffic through the strait, through which around 20 percent
of global oil shipments passed prior to the war. "There's been progress made in
those talks but not finality yet; we're hoping that will happen very shortly,"
the top diplomat told journalists. Bessent was upbeat on the impact a deal with
Iran over the strait would have on energy prices, where he said hundreds of
ships are waiting to go out. "Even though things are still a little dicey there
over the past few days, we've (seen) quite a few ships coming out even now,"
Bessent said. "So you know, I'd expect the energy prices to settle back down,
which, as I said, will be good for the entire world."
US Energy Secretary Wright says fuel prices should come
down in coming weeks
Reuters/05 August ,2026
US Energy Secretary Chris Wright said on Tuesday that fuel prices should come
down in the coming weeks. Another temporary extension of the Jones Act waiver is
likely and has resulted in lower energy prices in California and on the US East
Coast, Wright added while speaking at a press conference in Brownsville, Texas.
“President Trump believes in markets and he believes in capitalism. But he’ll
use every tool he has, including the bully pulpit, to try to encourage and put
pressure to lower energy prices for Americans. I’m proud of his passion,” Wright
said when asked about comments made by President Donald Trump earlier this week
that called on ExxonMobil and Chevron to cut prices at the pump.
Qatar Says Progress Made Toward US-Iran Talks on Ending War
Asharq Al Awsat/August 04/2026
Qatar said mediators were making progress in efforts to end the US-Iran war on
Tuesday, driving oil prices lower, although Tehran has denied President Donald
Trump's assertion that talks are already under way. Benchmark Brent crude fell
more than 4% after the comments from Qatar, extending Monday's steep losses on
hopes that an arrangement could soon be reached to restore traffic through the
blockaded Strait of Hormuz. But for now, the strait remained virtually shut,
with another ship reportedly coming under attack while trying to cross it. Trump
said on Monday that talks with Tehran had started and Iran faced a "last chance"
to reach a deal. Iranian officials insisted no negotiations with the United
States were taking place. Iran says its only talks are with Oman about the
strait, and that no major meetings were planned this week. But senior US
officials struck an optimistic tone on Tuesday, with Treasury Secretary Scott
Bessent and Secretary of State Marco Rubio both pointing to progress in
discussions aimed at reopening the Strait of Hormuz, a corridor that normally
carries about a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments.
"There's been progress made in those talks, but not finality yet. We're hoping
that will happen very shortly," Rubio told reporters at the State Department.
Bessent said a deal with Iran on the reopening of Hormuz could be reached by
Tuesday or Wednesday. Qatar's foreign ministry spokesperson Majed al-Ansari said
diplomatic contacts had reached "very progressive stages". He said mediators
including Qatar, Pakistan and Oman were coordinating closely to facilitate
negotiations and exchange draft proposals between Washington and Tehran. A
senior Pakistani security official said: "A lot is happening in the background
... We are talking to both sides. Our sole goal at this moment is to make both
parties at least agree to start talking."Trump's comments followed his weekend
decision to cancel what he described as "massive attacks" on Iran, extending a
pattern in which he has threatened major military action before later backing
off and pointing to diplomatic contacts.
Report: US Military Asks For ‘Creative and Unconventional’
Ideas to Punish Iran
London: Asharq Al Awsat/August 04/2026
CENTCOM is asking military analysts to propose fresh ways to pressure Tehran and
punish it, in a sign of the limited — and potentially unpalatable —options
available to Trump to force Iran into a deal on his terms, CNN reported on
Monday. “We are looking for new creative and unconventional ways to pressure and
punish Iran,” an officer in US Central Command’s intelligence branch wrote in a
message sent Wednesday to a broad group of military analysts, according to a
source familiar with the message. A second source also said that a senior US
military officer sent the message last week soliciting new ideas for how to deal
with Iran. Military officials said the crowdsourcing-style query was unusual.
Hoping to find an alternative, an official at CENTCOM kicked off the
brainstorming session via email to see if anyone had a better idea. The second
source said CENTCOM is looking at everything, acknowledging it needs to
reevaluate the strategy. “US Central Command has a long history of thinking and
working in innovative ways,” Captain Timothy Hawkins, a spokesperson for CENTCOM,
said in a statement. “Admiral Cooper, in particular, reaches out to members of
our great team, regardless of rank, to achieve the highest levels of operational
performance possible.”
The email preceded Trump’s threat to launch new strikes against Iran, only to
call them off over the weekend on the basis of reaching a deal. For weeks, the
US has hammered Iran with air strikes designed to degrade its ability to
threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and to bring Tehran back to the
negotiating table, but there’s still no sign of a deal. According to CNN, Trump
has been weighing intensifying the military campaign, potentially by relaunching
intense strikes on Iran’s remaining nuclear facilities, while two sources
familiar with the planning say the military has been actively preparing to
launch strikes on Pickaxe Mountain and other Iranian sites believed to contain
either nuclear material or equipment. But the two sources said even with
America’s most powerful conventional weapons, missiles and bombs alone are
unlikely to achieve much because the facilities are buried deeply underground.
To destroy them, the US would likely need to use ground troops — a tremendous
risk that Trump has been unwilling to take. Eighteen US service members have
been killed in the fighting so far. Also, Trump has been considering strikes
akin to a “fireworks” display, another source told CNN, which could hit either
the same or similar sites as those targeted a year ago, in the hopes of a
symbolic victory that would allow him to exit the war without actually
accomplishing one of his initial aims: ridding Iran of its nuclear program. The
president’s most senior military adviser, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Gen. Dan Caine, has acknowledged publicly that bombing alone is unlikely to
accomplish all Trump’s previously stated objectives for the war.
“Air power has its limits,” Caine told lawmakers last month.
Options for escalating the conflict have been presented to Trump for months and
debated at length, and more military assets have flowed to the region in
anticipation of a go-ahead from the president. One plan conceived by CENTCOM
would involve heavy bombardment over the course of one or two weeks to take out
Iran’s missile capabilities, US officials said.Trump could escalate by putting
American boots on the ground or accept a dangerous status quo: endless rounds of
strikes and counterstrikes with Iran that are likely to cost further American
lives and leave the Strait of Hormuz in a state of constant peril that could
resemble the “forever wars” he has criticized.
Cargo Ship Hit after Trump Insists Iran Talks Could Reopen Hormuz
London: Asharq Al Awsat/August 04/2026
An unknown projectile hit a cargo ship in the Strait of Hormuz, a key point of
tension in the US-Iran conflict, on Tuesday as President Donald Trump insisted
the waterway could reopen within hours. Speaking from the White House on Monday,
the US leader continued his now familiar combination of bullish optimism about
diplomacy and bellicose threats, warning that this was Iran's "last chance
before decapitation.”Tehran and Washington have been at war since February 28,
when the US and Israel launched surprise attacks on Iran. Despite a ceasefire
and a preliminary deal in the months since, diplomacy has failed to end the war.
The Strait of Hormuz, a key conduit for global oil and gas supplies, has been
the spark for repeated returns to fighting. Iran wants to maintain control over
and charge tolls for the strait, powers it did not exercise before the war and
which the US fiercely opposes.
In what has become a regular pattern, Trump last week threatened to hit Iran
"very hard" -- potentially with attacks against civilian infrastructure -- only
to pull back on Saturday, saying the "perimeters" of a deal were in place.On
Monday, he said he had agreed to continue to pursue talks with Iran. But Iran's
foreign ministry denied that negotiations with Washington were taking place,
even as Trump insisted they were. "We are talking right now," the US president
said. The talks are focused on reopening Hormuz, which Trump said could come
"literally by tomorrow,” and the denuclearization of Iran, which he said could
"take a little while.”Trump said he expected to know by Tuesday how the talks
were going, "one way or the other,” but insisted "it's not very complex.”Hours
earlier on social media, the president had called Tehran "duplicitous" for
saying it was not negotiating. "Whether Iran wants to admit it or not, we are,
in fact, talking of a solution to a problem that they have caused, for decades,"
he added. Trump pointed to the United States' counter-blockade of Iranian ports,
saying: "Nothing gets through to Iran, unless we want it to, and nothing will
get through, unless a Deal, or Total Surrender, is accomplished." Early on
Tuesday, Britain's maritime security agency UKMTO said a cargo vessel had been
struck by an "unknown projectile" in the Strait of Hormuz off the coast of Oman.
The vessel was not named and authorities were investigating, UKMTO said, without
offering information on damage or injuries.
Saudi Proposal Lays Groundwork for Regional Maritime
Defense Alliance
Riyadh: Abdulhadi Habtor/Asharq Al Awsat/August 04/2026
Saudi Arabia's proposal to establish a Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance
lays the groundwork for a new regional security framework aimed at countering
Houthi threats to international shipping and preventing Iran and its proxies
from turning the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Bab al-Mandab Strait into
tools of political leverage and geopolitical pressure.A study by the Red Sea
Center for Political and Security Studies concluded that the initiative is not
merely a temporary military arrangement to address the current escalation.
Rather, it represents a broader effort to redesign the regional maritime
security architecture by shifting from responding to attacks after they occur to
building a collective deterrence framework led by regional states to protect
commercial shipping and global energy supply routes.
Curbing Iran's Proxy
The study, prepared by Mohammed Al-Walas Bahybah, founder and chairman of the
Red Sea Center for Political and Security Studies, based in Marib, links the
initiative's significance to Iran's use of the Houthis in Yemen to threaten
commercial vessels and oil tankers, turning the security of maritime routes into
a tool of political coercion and bargaining over issues extending beyond the
Yemeni conflict. According to the study, the proposed alliance seeks to close
the operational space exploited by regional powers and non-state actors to
threaten maritime navigation by enhancing intelligence and operational
coordination, strengthening naval capabilities, and building a deterrence
framework that raises the cost of future Houthi attacks. It says a unified
regional position would undermine the narrative the Houthis use to justify
targeting ships, as any future attack would no longer amount to a confrontation
with a single state but rather a challenge to a collective security framework
with the capacity to deter and respond.
Saudi Shift From Containment to Initiative
The study argues that the alliance reflects a shift in Saudi Arabia's approach
from managing crises and containing their repercussions to shaping proactive and
more sustainable security arrangements, based on the principle that safeguarding
the Red Sea is a shared responsibility among its littoral states. According to
the study, the proposed framework would include 14 Arab and Muslim countries,
including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Türkiye, and Pakistan, alongside Yemen's
internationally recognized government, with Riyadh serving as the alliance's
headquarters. It says bringing together countries with differing political
priorities and regional interests under the common objective of protecting
maritime navigation demonstrates Saudi Arabia's ability to forge broad security
consensus while strengthening its role in shaping the future of collective
security in the Middle East. Yemen as a Partner in Securing Maritime Routes. The
study places particular emphasis on the participation of Yemen's internationally
recognized government, noting that the country's coastline overlooks both the
Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, while the Bab al-Mandab Strait constitutes one of
the world's most vital trade and energy supply corridors.It argues that Yemen's
participation would provide an opportunity to strengthen its naval,
intelligence, and operational capabilities, improve the protection of its
coastline and territorial waters, and reaffirm its role as a responsible partner
in the regional and international security architecture.
Joint Base on Mayun Island
The study proposes establishing a joint military base on Yemen's Mayun Island as
one of the alliance's future priorities, citing the island's strategic location
at the heart of the Bab al-Mandab Strait. It concludes that a successful
alliance would usher in a new era of "regional maritime deterrence," sending a
message to the Houthis and their backers that the security of international
trade and global energy supplies is no longer open to political bargaining or
the imposition of faits accomplis through force.
Trump Board Reassures Israel After Objections on Gaza Pullout
Asharq Al Awsat/August 04/2026
US President Donald Trump's Board of Peace on Monday assured Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu that Israel's withdrawal in Gaza would only begin after
Hamas's complete disarmament, following his objections. Two members of
Netanyahu's security cabinet had urged a vote to tear up the deal championed by
Trump after the board released a text that called for Israel to begin a phased
withdrawal. Netanyahu's office said it had raised concerns to the United States,
after Trump on Friday hailed as a "major milestone" an agreement by Hamas to
hand over weapons to a nascent Palestinian governing committee. Nickolay
Mladenov, the high representative for Gaza under the Board of Peace, met with
Netanyahu on Monday for what he acknowledged was difficult work. But the board
said it had reached a "common understanding of the shared objectives" with
Israel. Israel's withdrawal beyond the Yellow Line, which demarcates the area in
which Hamas still has control, "will take place only once decommissioning (of
weapons) is complete, as Hamas committed to the mediators", the board said on X.
Even if Israel withdraws under the plan, it would maintain control of much of
Gaza under a Trump-led October ceasefire. Hamas said late Monday that it was
adhering to "what was agreed upon regarding the implementation of the second
phase of the ceasefire agreement, including the commitments of all parties". The
group was "awaiting a clear and official response" from Mladenov and the
mediators on what was agreed upon, according to the statement posted on
Telegram.
Trump-Netanyahu gap
Israel had objected to the board's Thursday text that called for a phased
withdrawal within the territory and the immediate cessation of Israeli strikes
in Gaza. "Israel has conveyed its comments and concerns on the proposed
framework to our American counterparts. The version that has been made public
does not reflect Israel's positions," Doron Spielman, spokesman for the prime
minister's office, told AFP ahead of the Mladenov meeting. Far-right Finance
Minister Bezalel Smotrich had said that the text was "completely different" to
the one presented to Netanyahu's security cabinet and along with a colleague had
demanded that the cabinet "immediately" hold a new vote on the Gaza plan. Trump
had earlier said that Israel was "very happy" about the disarmament announcement
by Hamas, which triggered the war when it carried out the deadliest attack ever
against Israel on October 7, 2023.It was the latest sign of disconnect between
Trump and Netanyahu, who faces a tough re-election fight in October and has
heavily promoted his relationship with the US leader, whom he met again in
Washington last week. Netanyahu's spokesman said Hamas's actions since the
ceasefire have shown that it was preparing for "further October 7-style
massacres"."The indispensable first step toward any lasting arrangement is the
genuine, verifiable and irreversible demilitarization of Hamas," Spielman said.
Backtracking on announcement -
Trump and Netanyahu have also been at loggerheads on Iran, with Israel skeptical
of his attempts at diplomacy to end the war the two countries launched in late
February. Israeli President Isaac Herzog, who holds a largely ceremonial role,
offered a more upbeat take on Trump's Gaza efforts, saying the latest
development marked "a very positive step with the clear caveat and undertaking
that Hamas must be disarmed". Mohammad Dahlan, a senior Palestinian political
figure who has played a key role in the Gaza plan, said after the Board of Peace
roadmap that he had spoken to Trump's son-in-law and aide Jared Kushner who told
him that Israel would end strikes in Gaza effective Sunday. But he quickly
revised his social media post, instead saying that Kushner was "working with the
Israeli side to halt the attacks" in Gaza. He later accused Netanyahu of working
"to obstruct the most promising opportunity to begin ending this war". On Monday
evening, an Israeli strike on a vehicle west of Gaza City killed two
Palestinians and injured several others, according to Mahmoud Bassal, a
spokesperson for the civil defense rescue service. The Israeli military told AFP
it targeted two fighters in the strike. On Sunday, Israeli attacks killed 19
Palestinians, including women and children, according to the civil defense.
Qatar, Egypt and Türkiye, which are mediating the truce in Gaza, late on Monday
criticized Israel after renewed strikes in the Palestinian territory. They
strongly condemned what they said were "ongoing Israeli violations in the Gaza
Strip, particularly the targeting of health facilities and infrastructure, and
the casualties among civilians, including women and children".
Hamas Voices ‘Unease’ Over Board of Peace Comments on Gaza
Asharq Al-Awsat/August 04/2026
Hamas on Tuesday called for clarifications from US President Donald Trump's
Board of Peace, voicing "unease" over comments it made regarding the group's
prospective disarmament and Israel's withdrawal in Gaza. The Palestinian
movement said on Friday that it had agreed to hand over its weapons, with the
Board of Peace publishing a roadmap including provisions for the group's gradual
disarmament and a "phased Israeli withdrawal" from Gaza. But Israel had remained
defiant against a pullout without the prior completion of verifiable disarmament
by Hamas. Following a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on
Monday, the Board of Peace appeared to reassure Israel, saying that the
withdrawal of the country's forces from its current positions in Gaza would only
begin once Hamas completely disarmed. A Hamas official said Tuesday that Hamas
and other Palestinian factions "are uneasy with the statement issued by (Nickolay)
Mladenov after his meeting with Netanyahu," referring to the high representative
for Gaza under the Board of Peace. "The statement focused solely on the issue of
weapons and failed to address the occupation's obligations, particularly those
related to humanitarian aspects and Israel's commitment to halting its
aggression, including aerial and artillery bombardment, gunfire, assassinations
and military operations in the Gaza Strip," the official told AFP on condition
of anonymity. Another Hamas official said the group was waiting for a "clear and
official response" from Mladenov regarding the "agreed-upon terms, Mladenov's
position on the Israeli military escalation in Gaza, and the ongoing policy of
stalling on the implementation of the agreement." Qatar, Egypt and Türkiye,
which are mediating the truce in Gaza, have criticized Israel after renewed
strikes in the Palestinian territory. Qatar blamed Israel on Tuesday for delays
in implementing the Trump plan for Gaza. "It is clear to the international
community who is obstructing the implementation of the agreement," Qatari
foreign ministry spokesman Majed Al Ansari told reporters. "The full
responsibility lies on the Israeli side."An increase in Israeli strikes in Gaza
over recent days was "nothing more than an attempt to derail the plan's
implementation and block peaceful solutions", he added. Following Monday's
meeting with Netanyahu, the Board of Peace posted on X that Israel's withdrawal
beyond the Yellow Line, which demarcates the area between Hamas and Israeli
military control, "will take place only once decommissioning (of weapons) is
complete, as Hamas committed to the mediators", it posted on X. The stance
appears to contradict what Mladenov said on Friday, when he posted on X that:
"Withdrawal must move in lockstep with decommissioning".
Israel Targets Gaza Arms Dealers, Expands Strikes on Weapons Production Sites
Asharq Al-Awsat/August 04/2026
Israel is intensifying attacks on people involved in weapons manufacturing and
trading, as well as sites suspected of producing arms, in moves linked to its
plans to demilitarize Gaza and maintain security control over the enclave.
Israel broke a lull in fighting on Monday with a new assassination that killed
two Palestinians traveling in a vehicle from Gaza City to central Gaza.
Palestinians in the Nuseirat camp on Tuesday buried Samir Abu Dalal and Mohammed
Darwish, who were killed in the strike. Their funeral coincided with the burial
in Gaza City of 112 members of one clan who were killed during the Gaza war, but
whose bodies could not previously be recovered. Field sources told Asharq Al-Awsat
that Abu Dalal and Darwish had long-standing links to members of Palestinian
factions who bought various weapons from them. The sources said Israeli forces
targeted three arms dealers in July, including one who worked directly for the
supply unit of the Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ armed wing. The Israeli
military said late last month it had killed Mohammed al-Abd, an official in the
supply department of Hamas’ military wing. On July 13, it said it had killed
Mustafa al-Owaisi, accusing him of trying to smuggle military equipment into
Gaza to help the Qassam Brigades rebuild. The sources said Israel had killed
many people involved in trading weapons during the war, including Kalashnikov
rifles, anti-tank missiles, and modern sniper rifles.Israeli strikes also
targeted homes on the grounds that weapons were stored inside them, as well as
workshops Israel said were used to manufacture arms. The sources said Israel
pursued Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives involved in weapons manufacturing as
intensely as those who took part in the Oct. 7, 2023, attack or held Israeli
hostages during the war. No new Israeli air strikes were recorded on Tuesday as
diplomatic efforts continued to consolidate a “roadmap” agreement reached with
Hamas in Egypt last Friday. A Palestinian also died from wounds sustained in an
Israeli strike on a residential apartment early on Sunday, when fighting sharply
escalated. Two Palestinians were wounded on Tuesday by fire from Israeli
military vehicles in the Mawasi area of Khan Younis. Drones also dropped bombs
over areas east of the city and in the Zeitoun neighborhood of southeastern Gaza
City.
Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah Seeks to Expand ‘Resistance’ Arsenal
Baghdad: Fadhel al-Nashmi/Asharq Al-Awsat/August 04/2026
Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah has doubled down on its refusal to surrender what it
calls the “weapons of the resistance,” vowing instead to expand its military
arsenal in a direct challenge to a government deadline for disarming armed
factions by the end of September. The group’s stance underscores the widening
rift between the Iraqi government and Iran-aligned factions, which have become
one of its most pressing security threats and risk exposing the country to
attack if they launch fresh strikes against neighboring states.Neighboring
countries have already warned Iraqi authorities that any new attacks launched
from Iraqi territory would trigger direct, targeted military strikes against
armed factions inside Iraq. Kataib Hezbollah Secretary-General Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi
issued the latest rejection late on Monday, pledging in a statement to “continue
jihad for the sake of God and deter every aggressor, making them pay many times
the price of their aggression.”Al-Hamidawi said the group would neither abandon
nor surrender its weapons, but would instead “develop them and expand its
arsenal.”He also called for efforts to “cleanse our security environment” and
urged strict compliance with security procedures and secrecy measures suited to
the scale of the challenges, “to deter anyone who wishes us harm in the wars of
this period.”In April 2026, the US State Department offered a $10 million reward
for information about al-Hamidawi, who has been on the US terrorism list for
years over accusations that he planned and carried out attacks against US forces
and diplomatic facilities in Iraq and the Middle East. Several armed groups have
joined the disarmament process over the past two months, including the Sraya
al-Salam affiliated with the Sadrist movement, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Imam Ali
Brigades. Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, however, continue to reject
the move, placing Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s government under mounting
pressure as the scheduled withdrawal of international coalition forces
approaches at the end of September. That date is also the government’s deadline
for completing the disarmament campaign. The challenge is compounded by
sustained US pressure on Baghdad to confront Iran’s armed allies, as well as
domestic demands from those who say the factions undermine Iraq’s stability and
threaten its security. Government sources have insisted that disarming the
factions is a domestic Iraqi matter. Several sources, however, said al-Zaidi
asked Iranian officials during his visit last month to help secure their
disarmament, but Tehran rejected the request. A source close to the ruling
Coordination Framework confirmed that Iraq had made the request and cast doubt
on al-Zaidi’s ability to press ahead. The source said the fate of the factions
and Iran’s wider network of allies was tied to the outcome of the current
confrontation between Washington and Tehran, whether through a victory for one
side or some form of settlement. “Otherwise, al-Zaidi’s government is incapable
of taking serious steps in this direction,” the source said. The source said the
disarmament steps taken so far were initiated by influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr
and several faction leaders, not imposed through government pressure or
coercion. “The same applies to the factions that object,” the source said. “If
they do not surrender their weapons voluntarily, the government will not be able
to force them to do so.”The government and political figures are making
intensive efforts to persuade the factions not to launch attacks, the source
said, particularly after warnings that neighboring countries could retaliate.
Media and security reports say Iraqi authorities are preparing tighter measures
in the coming days to prevent rockets or drones from being launched at
neighboring countries. The measures include increased surveillance in parts of
the southern province of Basra and in desert areas around Najaf, Samawa and
Anbar in western Iraq. The reports said security commanders could face severe
penalties if they fail to stop faction movements or attacks.
Gazans Bury Nearly a Whole Clan Found in Rubble in Mass Funeral for 112
Asharq Al Awsat/August 04/2026
The decomposed remains of 112 bodies lay on stretchers shrouded in flags in the
sun's heat: all that could be found of the Al-Hassaynas of Sabra, a Palestinian
clan of proud Bedouin stock all but wiped out by Israel nearly three years ago.
According to Palestinian authorities, 308 members of the extended Al-Hassayna
family, also known as the Abu Sharia, were killed on November 22, 2023, when
Israeli airstrikes brought down a cluster of apartment buildings as residents
slept in Sabra, one of the old neighborhoods of Gaza City. Around half of the
dead were previously recovered and buried, but 153 bodies had remained under the
rubble until now. Nearly three years later, a recovery team of 40 workers spent
17 days painstakingly combing the wreckage, and brought out remains identified
as belonging to 112 of those missing victims. A cluster of neighbors and
surviving members of the clan gathered on Tuesday on a flattened lot of
demolished ruins, where the remains were laid out for what Palestinian
authorities described as the largest mass funeral of the Gaza war. Men lifted
the stretchers and carried them through the streets. A sign was adorned with
portraits of the dead — men, women and children. "This day is mixed with grief,
and it has reopened our wounds three years after this massacre," said Taysir
Al-Hassayna, a surviving member of the clan. "It has brought sorrow back to our
children and women. But our consolation is that we believe they are martyrs
with God." Reuters was unable to locate an Israeli military statement from
November 2023 giving Israel's account of the strike, which took place in the
early weeks of the war launched after Hamas-led fighters stormed out of Gaza
killing 1,200 Israelis. The military did not immediately respond to a request
for comment on its account of the incident. According to Palestinian health
authorities, more than 73,000 Palestinians are confirmed to have died in the
Israeli war in Gaza. Most of the deaths were documented when bodies were brought
to morgues and buried, but around 8,000 more are believed to lie beneath the
rubble.
'THEY ARE PIECES OF ME'
Omar Al-Hassayna, 65, a survivor of the Sabra bombing who escaped Gaza for Egypt
days after the strike, wept as he watched footage from Tuesday's funeral of his
kin on satellite TV in Cairo. His wife was killed in the bombing, along with
four of his adult sons, Abdallah, Abdel-Rahman, Ahmed and Osama. So were his
four grandchildren: two little boys and two little girls, the oldest just 4,
the youngest only a few months old. "They are pieces of me. I have thought about
them every single day. I have seen them in my thoughts and in my dreams," he
said. "The funeral today is the least that could be done for those martyrs. It
is time for those bodies, those little bodies, to rest in peace, and for their
souls to hover in the skies around us." Most of the population of Gaza are
descendants of refugees who arrived from territory now located in Israel, so it
was common for entire extended families to settle together in clusters of
residential buildings. But this meant that one Israeli airstrike could
effectively wipe out an entire clan. The Hassaynas, who lived in the Sabra
neighborhood for decades, were a branch of a prominent clan known throughout
the enclave for their generosity and humility. Omar said the Israeli strikes hit
three residential buildings where members of the extended family had gathered
for shelter, seeking safety in one place as the early days of the war unfolded.
Two of the buildings were completely destroyed, killing almost everyone inside.
He was in the third, which was only partially destroyed, and survived with minor
injuries from flying debris. Two daughters and a son of his also survived.
RECOVERY ONLY POSSIBLE OUTSIDE ISRAELI CONTROL
An October ceasefire that ended major fighting left Israeli forces in control of
over half of Gaza, since expanded to around two-thirds. There, they have
bulldozed remaining buildings and ordered people out. The recovery of bodies can
only take place in the remaining third of the territory, where nearly all of
Gaza's more than two million people now live, mostly displaced in makeshift
tents or shelters in the damaged buildings. Mahmoud Basal, spokesperson for
Gaza's Civil Defense, said identifying the remains of the Al-Hassaynas required
a mixture of forensic evidence and memories gathered from survivors.
"The bodies were decomposed. Relatives identified some through their clothes,
injuries and distinguishing marks. Some victims had bone fixation plates on some
organs, while some women were identified through jewellery they had on or
necklaces bearing their names," Basal said. With this recovery operation now
over, the team would move on to other accessible areas of Gaza. "If we had at
least 10 excavators, bulldozers, excavators, and cranes needed for the work, the
job could be completed in three months," he told Reuters. When Tuesday's funeral
procession reached a vast graveyard amid the ruins of Gaza, men passed the small
shrouded bodies over their shoulders and laid the Hassayna clan to rest in fresh
graves.
Syria Says will Restore Iraq Oil Pipeline Link within Three Years
Asharq Al Awsat/August 04/2026
Syria and Iraq are finalizing negotiations on a contract to restore a key oil
pipeline between the countries, a Syrian official said on Tuesday, laying out a
timeline of around three years to complete the work. Last month, Damascus signed
a memorandum of understanding with Baghdad to revive the Haditha-Banias pipeline
for transporting oil from Iraq to Syria's coast, linking Iraqi production to
export markets in the Mediterranean and beyond. A consortium of three companies
including Chevron are set to carry out the project. The US State Department last
month welcomed the plan, calling it "of bilateral and regional strategic
significance". On Tuesday, Syrian Petroleum Company CEO Youssef Qablawi told a
press conference at the Rmeilan oil field in the country's northeast that
"negotiations have begun to finalise the contract". He expressed hope that the
talks would be completed within three months, followed by engineering studies,
procurement and restoration work, expected to take "three years at most".Syrian
state news agency SANA said the pipeline, vital for Iraqi oil exports via the
Mediterranean, dates to 1952 but went out of service in 2003 after being damaged
during the US invasion of Iraq. Qablawi hailed "a vital project" for Syria,
putting the pipeline's capacity at "between 1.5 million and 2 million barrels a
day" and saying the project would generate significant revenues. The prospect of
a pipeline link to the Mediterranean via Syria has gained new urgency with the
closure of the Strait of Hormuz -- a vital maritime route for Gulf oil and gas
exports -- as a result of the Middle East war. The closure of Hormuz has hit
Iraqi oil exports hard, and in April Baghdad said it began shipping crude
through Syria by truck to circumvent the strait. Syria's new authorities, who
ousted longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, have been seeking to
reboot the country's economy and revive its infrastructure and institutions
after more than a decade of war. Damascus now controls all the country's oil and
gas fields, after taking over areas previously under Kurdish control in the
north and northeast earlier this year, including Rmeilan. Texas-based firm HKN
Energy is operating the fields in the northeast under a contract signed with
Damascus. At Rmeilan, the company's president, Mark Rollins, said Tuesday that
"this is one of Syria's most important oil fields", adding: "Our team has been
here on the ground for about two months." Qablawi said HKN Energy was in charge
of repairing existing wells and drilling new ones. Syria aims to produce one
million barrels of oil per day by 2030 and is seeking to broaden international
cooperation on exploration and production. Qablawi said Syria's own oil
production was currently between 100,000 and 110,000 barrels a day, but was
projected to reach 250,000 by the end of next year.
46 Syrians Remain Detained by Israel Since Assad’s Ouster
Damascus: Muwafaq Mohammed/Asharq Al Awsat/August 04/2026
Forty-six Syrians remain detained in Israeli jails after they were arrested at
various moments after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December
2024.Israel released four Syrians in July after more than a year in detention.
They were arrested during Israeli incursions into Syria.
One of the relatives of the released told Asharq Al-Awsat that the majority of
the detainees don’t even know why they were being apprehended. They were not
interrogated throughout their detention. He revealed that they were not
assaulted by their Israeli captors during their imprisonment. Rather, they were
fed three times a day and were allowed a change of clothes as well. Israel began
carrying out incursions into neighboring Syrian territories in Quneitra and
Daraa after the collapse of the Assad regime and after Tel Aviv declared it was
no longer complying with the 1974 disengagement agreement. It has set up ten
advanced military positions in Syrian territories and carried out numerous
incursions, raids of houses and arrests of civilians.The Syrian Sijil Center
that keeps track of arrests, revealed that Israeli forces have arrested at least
187 people since 2024. The majority have been released.
Ahmed al-Moussa, a Syrian lawyer who has been tracking the detentions, said
international law describes these arrests as enforced disappearance. He told
Asharq al-Awsat that 46 Syrians remains forcibly disappeared in Israeli jails.
The lawyer has documented the arrests to the UN Human Rights Council and the UN
Committee on Enforced Disappearances. Mahmoud al-Sayyed, a resident of
Quneitra’s Khan Arnaba, was detained along with his son and brother on November
15, 2025. His son was released the next day, while he and his brother were held
in the Sde Teiman detention camp until their release on January 19, 2026.
Al-Sayyed told Asharq Al-Awsat that he was likely arrested after informants
working for Israel gave them false information about him. He was instigated once
during his detention during which the information was revealed to be false and
he and his brother were soon released, he explained. He said that he was never
assaulted during his arrest and allowed to perform daily prayers and read the
holy Quran. He was held with some 16 other people. Israel often carried outs
raids and arrests in search of suspected members of armed groups that it views
as a threat to its security.
Fighter Desertions Disrupt Houthi Escalation Against Gov’t
Forces
Sanaa: Asharq Al Awsat/August 04/2026
Houthi fighters have deserted front-line positions across six Yemeni
governorates in recent days after failed infiltration attempts and attacks
triggered counteroffensives by Yemen’s army, military and local sources said.
The group suffered personnel and territorial losses as desertions increased
across several battlefronts, pointing to mounting pressure on its forces, the
sources said. Fighters withdrew from fronts in Bayda, Dhalea, Taiz, Hodeidah,
Marib and Jawf after Houthi attempts to advance failed and army forces regained
the initiative at several positions, according to the sources. The latest
desertions were reported in Marib and Jawf, where dozens of fighters abandoned
their posts in recent days as clashes intensified and the Houthis carried out
repeated battlefield violations, the sources said. Yemeni sources said the
deserters came from Arhab district, north of Sanaa, and left the Marib and Jawf
fronts individually and in groups without informing field commanders. They had
been deployed as part of reinforcements sent by Houthi leaders in the district,
led by commander Fares al-Habbari, the sources said. Informed sources in Sanaa
told Asharq Al-Awsat that desertions had accelerated, with about 400 fighters
returning to their home areas in rural Sanaa, Raymah, Ibb and Dhamar without
coordinating with military commanders or obtaining the permits required to leave
the fronts. The sources linked the rise in desertions to repeated battlefield
setbacks and resulting personnel and material losses, which they said had
deepened confusion within Houthi ranks. Some fighters left their positions
carrying their weapons. Relatives of several deserters said their family members
had fled combat positions in recent days by different routes. They said
escalating clashes and mounting losses drove them to leave the fronts and return
home. Observers said the withdrawals reflected growing military pressure on the
group and continued personnel attrition, which could weaken its ability to send
fresh reinforcements to other battlefronts.
Hunt for deserters
The sources said the group was preparing to carry out orders from its leader,
Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, to form field teams from its Preventive Security and
Security and Intelligence agencies to hunt down deserters, particularly in
Dhalea, Taiz, Jawf and Marib. The teams would also investigate field supervisors
who failed to report desertions or were accused of helping fighters leave their
positions, the sources said. The Houthis had formed similar teams in previous
years to pursue thousands of fighters who abandoned the fronts, part of efforts
to curb desertions. The phenomenon has widened again as fighting intensifies
across several governorates, the sources said.
Previous crackdowns
The latest developments echo previous incidents in which the group threatened
the families of underage recruits who fled fighting in southern Marib and
eastern Jawf, seeking to pressure them to return to the front. Sources said at
the time that hundreds of fighters had abandoned positions after they became
exposed to government forces. Houthi security agencies also arrested about 48
fighters in Hajjah, Dhamar and rural Sanaa during previous campaigns after they
left the fronts and returned home. Some of those detained said they had fled
because of what they described as discrimination within the group’s ranks and at
front-line positions, according to sources at the time. Observers said continued
desertions could further strain the group’s military operations as fighter
numbers fall on some fronts and the need to replace battlefield losses grows
amid continued escalation along the lines of contact.
The Latest LCCC analysis & editorials from
miscellaneous sources published
on August 04-05/2026
A Dangerous Deal: Trump's Board of Peace and Hamas
Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/August 04/2026
The original goal of Trump's peace plan was not to relocate Hamas's arsenal. It
was to eliminate it permanently.
Weapons stored in warehouses remain weapons that function. Explosives stored
today can be easily recovered tomorrow. Rocket factories that are preserved can
resume production. Tunnels that are mapped rather than destroyed can be used
again.
The issue has never been where Hamas keeps its weapons. The issue has always
been Hamas having access them.
Transferring weapons from one Palestinian group to another is not
demilitarization.
Even more disturbing is the new deal's assertion that "no weapons shall be
transferred or handed to Israel or non-Palestinian parties."
Equally disturbing is the new roadmap's conditioning of disarmament on an
Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip....
Why should a terrorist organization that carried out the October 7, 2023
massacre in Israel be allowed to dictate the conditions of its own disarmament?
No country fighting ISIS or al-Qaeda would first withdraw its forces and only
then hope terrorists voluntarily surrender their weapons. Hamas should not be
negotiating the terms of its defeat. It should be compelled to unconditionally
surrender and disarm.
This is the same Ghazi Hamad [senior Hamas official] who publicly vowed that
Hamas would repeat the October 7 massacre time and again until Israel is
eliminated: "The Al-Aqsa Flood [the name Hamas uses to describe the October 7
massacre] is just the first time, and there will be a second, a third, a fourth,
because we have the determination, the resolve, and the capabilities to fight."
Anyone who thinks that the newly established NCAG will somehow confront Hamas
and impose its authority over the terrorist organization is living under an
illusion.
The far more likely scenario is that Hamas will continue to call the shots from
behind the scenes while allowing another Palestinian body to assume
responsibility for governance, civil service salaries, reconstruction, and
collecting international aid.
This would essentially replicate the Hezbollah model in Lebanon, where a
heavily-armed Iran-backed terrorist militia coexists with a formal government
while retaining independent military power and ultimate political influence.
Within hours of the announcement of the roadmap, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps dismissed the plan outright, declaring... that "the resistance"
(Hamas) would remain steadfast until what it called the "final victory" over
Israel.
Iran understands Hamas better than anyone else because it has financed, armed
and trained the terrorist organization for decades. If the Iranian regime is
openly rejecting the prospect of Hamas's disarmament, why should anyone else
believe that Hamas intends to honor the agreement?
The original goal of Trump's peace plan was not to relocate Hamas's arsenal. It
was to eliminate it permanently. Weapons stored in warehouses remain weapons
that function. Explosives stored today can be easily recovered tomorrow. Rocket
factories that are preserved can resume production. Tunnels that are mapped
rather than destroyed can be used again. For nearly a year, the international
community insisted that there could be no future for the Gaza Strip unless Hamas
was stripped of every weapon, every tunnel, every missile factory, and every
military capability.
US President Donald J. Trump's September 2025 peace plan was explicit: Gaza
would be demilitarized, terrorist infrastructure destroyed, and weapons rendered
permanently unusable.
Article 13 of Trump's 20-point plan states:
"All military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and
weapon production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt. There will be a
process of demilitarization of Gaza under the supervision of independent
monitors, which will include placing weapons permanently beyond use through an
agreed process of decommissioning, and supported by an internationally funded
buy back and reintegration program all verified by the independent monitors."
Now, however, that clear objective appears to have been replaced by something
radically different. Instead of eliminating Hamas's arsenal, negotiators are
discussing storing weapons, transferring them to another Palestinian party, and
even allowing Hamas members to retain "personal firearms."
The original goal of Trump's peace plan was not to relocate Hamas's arsenal. It
was to eliminate it permanently. Replacing "demilitarization" with "storage" is
a win for Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups in the Gaza Strip.
The latest deal between Trump's Board of Peace and Hamas, titled "A Roadmap for
Completing the Implementation of President Trump's Comprehensive Peace Plan in
Gaza," states: "A process to decommission and store heavy weapons, military
production sites, depots of weapons, and tunnels, shall begin after completing
the remaining commitments under Sharm Sheikh Protocol, the entry of NCAG
[National Committee for the Administration of Gaza] and deployment of ISF
[International Stabilization Force]."
How did the promise of permanent demilitarization become a discussion about
warehouses full of Hamas weapons? Weapons stored in warehouses remain weapons
that function. Explosives stored today can be easily recovered tomorrow. Rocket
factories that are preserved can resume production. Tunnels that are mapped
rather than destroyed can be used again.
The issue has never been where Hamas keeps its weapons. The issue has always
been Hamas having access them.The assumption that the NCAG or ISF would be able
to prevent terrorists from regaining control over the stored weapons is totally
misleading. Even more disturbing is the new deal's assertion that "no weapons
shall be transferred or handed to Israel or non-Palestinian
parties."Transferring weapons from one Palestinian group to another is not
demilitarization.
Equally disturbing is the new roadmap's conditioning of disarmament on an
Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip: "This process [to decommission and store
heavy weapons, military production sites, depots of weapons, and tunnels] shall
be linked to an Israeli withdrawal, in phases, from the areas under its control
in Gaza and the decommissioning of [Israel-backed] armed militias."Why should a
terrorist organization that carried out the October 7, 2023 massacre in Israel
be allowed to dictate the conditions of its own disarmament? No country fighting
ISIS or al-Qaeda would first withdraw its forces and only then hope terrorists
voluntarily surrender their weapons. Hamas should not be negotiating the terms
of its defeat. It should be compelled to unconditionally surrender and disarm.
While discussions about disarmament were underway, Hamas reportedly began
distributing more automatic rifles to operatives under the guise of "personal
ownership." Israel's Kan News quoted an unnamed Palestinian source as saying
that the goal of the rifle distribution was to ensure that weapons stay in the
hands of Hamas members. "Hamas will not disarm. Period," the source asserted.
Before the first stage had even been implemented, Hamas was already looking for
loopholes. Shortly after the new roadmap was announced, senior Hamas official
Ghazi Hamad said in an interview with Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya TV:
"The weapons will be stored and not handed over, and this is conditional on
Israel's commitment. What we agreed upon with the mediators is storing the
weapons, not surrendering them. Our political and civilian role in Gaza
continues. Hamas has not and will not abandon its national project to reclaim
the Palestinian land. We consider the current phase exceptional due to the
circumstances that the Gaza Strip is going through."
This is the same Ghazi Hamad who publicly vowed that Hamas would repeat the
October 7 massacre time and again until Israel is eliminated:
"We must teach Israel a lesson, and we will do this again and again. The Al-Aqsa
Flood [the name Hamas uses to describe the October 7 massacre] is just the first
time, and there will be a second, a third, a fourth, because we have the
determination, the resolve, and the capabilities to fight."This quote alone
should destroy confidence in Hamas's promises to the Board of Peace. Anyone who
thinks that the newly established NCAG will somehow confront Hamas and impose
its authority over the terrorist organization is living under an illusion. Hamas
has ruled the Gaza Strip since 2007. It controls thousands of armed men,
intelligence networks, clan alliances, financial resources, and a deeply
entrenched political and security apparatus. No technocratic committee can
simply arrive and displace an organization that has spent nearly two decades
ruthlessly consolidating its power.
The far more likely scenario is that Hamas will continue to call the shots from
behind the scenes while allowing another Palestinian body to assume
responsibility for governance, civil service salaries, reconstruction, and
collecting international aid. This would essentially replicate the Hezbollah
model in Lebanon, where a heavily-armed Iran-backed terrorist militia coexists
with a formal government while retaining independent military power and ultimate
political influence.
Supporters of the new roadmap argue that international observers and the ISF
will oversee implementation. International observers may monitor warehouses and
oversee the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and the ISF may train
Palestinian security forces. They will not confront Hamas if it decides to
rearm. They definitely will not risk their lives dismantling some terrorist
infrastructure.
Within hours of the announcement of the roadmap, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps dismissed the plan outright, declaring that the effort to disarm
Hamas "will achieve nothing" and had already failed. Tehran pledged that "the
resistance" (Hamas) would remain steadfast until what it called the "final
victory" over Israel.
Iran understands Hamas better than anyone else because it has financed, armed
and trained the terrorist organization for decades. If the Iranian regime is
openly rejecting the prospect of Hamas's disarmament, why should anyone else
believe that Hamas intends to honor the agreement?
*Khaled Abu Toameh is an award-winning journalist based in Jerusalem.
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/22770/board-of-peace-hamas
*Follow Khaled Abu Toameh on X (formerly Twitter)
© 2026 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute.
The Postponed Agreement Between Washington and Tehran
Basel Al-Hajj Jassim/Al-Nahar/August 4, 2026 (Google translation
from Arabic)
The resumption of US-Iranian talks does not necessarily mean that the region is
on the verge of a comprehensive settlement. Moreover, the absence of a deadline
for reaching an agreement reflects not merely negotiating flexibility, but
rather reveals the extent of the complexities surrounding the issue.
After years of sanctions, military escalation, and direct and indirect wars, the
dispute between Washington and Tehran is no longer limited to the nuclear
program. It has become intertwined with a wide network of security, political,
and regional issues that make any agreement far more difficult than media
statements suggest. In principle, both sides seem to have clear motives for
returning to the negotiating table. The United States realizes that continued
tension in the Arabian Gulf and the Middle East imposes military, economic, and
political burdens on it, at a time when its strategic priorities are
increasingly focused on competing with China and containing Russia. As for Iran,
it has been exhausted by years of sanctions and isolation and is in dire need of
an economic lifeline to alleviate internal pressures and restore some of its
ability to operate in financial and energy markets. But having a shared interest
in dialogue does not necessarily mean having a shared vision for an agreement.
Each side has its own definition of what constitutes success or victory, and
each has red lines it is unwilling to cross. The United States is not merely
seeking to freeze the Iranian nuclear program; it is striving for an agreement
that prevents Tehran from acquiring a military nuclear capability in the future,
ensures long-term monitoring, limits ballistic missile development, and
restricts Iranian influence in the region in one way or another. Conversely,
Iran believes that any agreement must include the actual lifting of sanctions,
guarantees that no future US administration will withdraw from it as happened
previously, and recognition of its right to develop a peaceful nuclear program
and the inviolability of its defense capabilities. Herein lies the greatest gap,
as each side seeks to strengthen its position before making any real
concessions. Therefore, the negotiations become a complex process of testing
intentions, assessing the balance of power, and managing time, rather than a
swift pursuit of a final settlement.
The Complexities of Technical Details
Technical details also present an obstacle no less significant than political
disagreements. The number of centrifuges, uranium enrichment levels, inspection
mechanisms, the timetable for lifting sanctions, and the mechanism for
reimposing them in case of non-compliance are all technical issues that appear,
on the surface, to be procedural matters. However, in reality, they reflect
delicate political and security balances, and these details have often been the
reason for the failure of previous rounds of negotiations, despite agreement on
general principles. Furthermore, the negotiations cannot be separated from the
surrounding regional environment. Israel views any agreement that does not
impose strict restrictions on the Iranian nuclear program as a direct threat to
its security, while the Gulf states monitor the outcome of the talks from the
perspective of their impact on regional security and balances. Russia and China
also have interests tied to the future of the relationship between Washington
and Tehran, both economically and geopolitically. This makes the Iranian issue
part of broader international competition, not merely a bilateral matter.
At the heart of these issues lies the Strait of Hormuz, more than just a
waterway. The world, having suffered supply chain disruptions following the
COVID-19 pandemic and the repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war, has become
more sensitive to any threat to international trade routes, especially those
through which a large portion of global oil and gas exports pass. The security
of the Strait of Hormuz is no longer solely a Gulf or American concern; it has
become an international economic interest where the interests of Asia, Europe,
and the United States intersect. The picture is further complicated by the
internal calculations of both sides. In the United States, the Iranian issue
remains subject to partisan bipartisanship, making any administration wary of
making concessions that could be interpreted as political weakness. In Iran, the
leadership faces pressure from conservative institutions and factions opposed to
any agreement that does not deliver clear gains and preserve what they consider
national sovereignty. It remains to be said that the US-Iranian negotiations
appear more like conflict management than a resolution. While the political will
for dialogue exists, trust remains limited, and the regional and international
stakes are too high to be settled in one or two rounds of negotiations. Between
the desire of both sides to end a costly phase of confrontation and the
insistence of each on maximizing its strategic gains, the chances of reaching a
comprehensive agreement will remain contingent on the willingness to make mutual
concessions, something for which indications remain limited so far.
* Researcher and Political Consultant
Why the Settlement Will Fail, and Why War Will Break Out Again
Dr. Abdulghani Al-Kindi/Asharq Al-Awsat/August 04/2026
War is not always waged for destruction alone. At times it is a means of forcing
out information that negotiation could not uncover. Each side hides its true
strength, its capacity to endure, and the losses it can absorb. A military
strike puts those claims to the test. War then reveals whether a threat is real
or a bluff. It shows whether the weapons work, whether the alliances hold, and
whether a political system can keep fighting. The idea begins with a question
posed by Stanford political scientist James Fearon in his 1995 study
"Rationalist Explanations for War." If war is costly and its participants are
rational, why do they not reach a bargain both would prefer to war? Fearon's
answer rests on three mechanisms: private information that each side has an
incentive to misrepresent, the commitment problem, and issues that appear
indivisible. To these he adds the effect of audience costs, which leave a leader
little room to retreat once public threats have been made. Begin with private
information. A state knows its own capabilities and resolve better than its
adversary does, and it has no incentive to disclose them honestly. To show
weakness is to invite greater demands; to exaggerate strength may be to win
concessions. Negotiation thus becomes an exchange of signals whose credibility
neither side can gauge.
When threats and offers fail to persuade, war becomes the costly method of
discovering what the adversary has concealed - its real capabilities, its
tolerance for loss, the seriousness of its threats. Yet information alone solves
nothing, because it must also be believed. Each side offers data and guarantees;
each suspects the other of hiding part of the truth, or of presenting
information designed to mislead. The problem is no longer a lack of information.
It is the lack of confidence in that information, and the absence of any
reliable means of verifying it.
Consider the reverse case. Both sides hold accurate information, and the
settlement still fails. This is the commitment problem. An agreement may be
acceptable today, but one party may fear the other will break it once the
balance of power shifts in its favor. The weaker side may then conclude that
fighting now would cost less than waiting until its adversary grows stronger and
imposes harsher terms. The difficulty runs further still. Even credible
guarantees may not resolve it if the dispute concerns an issue both sides regard
as indivisible - sovereignty over a territory, or the exclusive possession of a
strategic capability.
Fearon himself is skeptical of this explanation. Most such issues can be divided
through bargains and compensation. The central obstacle, in most cases, remains
the absence of trust that an agreement will be honored.
To this must be added the effect of audience costs. When a leader raises the
pitch of his threats in public, before his own people and his allies, retreat
becomes politically costly, since it can be read as weakness or a loss of
credibility. The room for compromise narrows, and the threats begin to carry
themselves out. Applied to the American-Israeli war on Iran, the framework fits
closely. The failure to reach a settlement was bound up with private
information, weak commitments, a dispute over what appeared indivisible, and
audience costs. Before the confrontation, Washington and Tel Aviv lacked
sufficient information about the progress of Iran's nuclear program, its ability
to shield its facilities, its capacity to withstand attack, and its willingness
and ability to retaliate.
Tehran, in turn, lacked information about its adversaries' aims. Did they want a
stricter agreement, the destruction of Iran's capabilities, or the fall of the
regime itself?
So, each side buried what it knew, and war became the means of forcing it out.
The fighting answered part of the question. Iranian defenses proved effective;
missiles and drones could retaliate; the US and Israel would press on; Iran
could endure. But the information gap did not fully close. Trust had worn so
thin that each side went on suspecting the other's statements of being a
deception. The commitment problem surfaced as well. The US and Israel feared
that Iran would use any agreement to ease the pressure and rebuild its nuclear
capabilities. Tehran feared making nuclear concessions without a guarantee that
sanctions would be lifted or the attacks halted. Enrichment was not technically
indivisible. Its levels could be specified and tied to inspections and the
phased lifting of sanctions, as the Obama-era agreement showed. Yet the absence
of trust made any repetition of such arrangements unconvincing.
Finally, the audience costs came into play. Every side escalated its threats in
public and staked its credibility on carrying them out. Retreat became
politically costly, and the middle ground narrowed. The Gulf states did not
decide to begin the war. But their geography, infrastructure, airspace, and
shipping lanes placed them at the center of its consequences. The conflict
exposed the region's blind spots: no clear knowledge of the parties' aims or
Iran's true reach, little confidence in Tehran's assurances, and no credible
guarantee against Iran's widening the fight. Missiles reached Gulf cities.
Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz was disrupted. The threat to energy
security and trade grew. Neutrality, it became clear, was no shield. Any durable
settlement will require monitoring mechanisms, phased implementation, and
explicit guarantees for Gulf security so that war does not remain the costliest
means of discovering what an adversary can do and intends to do. In sum, this
war arose not from the absence of a possible settlement, but from the parties'
inability to trust the information and the commitments they offered one another.
The Gulf states paid the price, though they did not choose the confrontation.
War will not recur if its causes are met directly, within Fearon's framework:
information that can be verified, commitments that can be believed, settlements
that allow for flexibility, and a lower political cost for retreating from a
threat. Until then, the region's security will continue to rest on building the
arrangements that keep war from becoming, once again, the costliest means of
discovering an adversary's intentions and capabilities.
On the Anniversary of Kuwait’s Invasion... Dangers Remain
Abdulrahman Al-Rashed/Asharq Al-Awsat/August 04/2026
These days, memories of August 1990 are being revived, when Saddam Hussein’s
regime invaded Kuwait and plunged the Gulf into the greatest danger it had faced
up to that point. Was that invasion a surprise? Perhaps in terms of its timing,
but not in terms of its ideological and political roots. Baathist hostility
toward the Gulf monarchies had long been embedded in the political discourse of
the Baath Party. Likewise, the expansionist ambitions of the Iraqi regime had
already become evident through its war with Iran and its attempts to establish
itself as the dominant power in the Gulf. According to many assessments at the
time, the occupation of Kuwait was merely the first step in a broader project to
reshape the regional balance of power through force. It was therefore no
coincidence that the Gulf states had established their own council a decade
before the invasion without including Saddam’s Iraq. Perceiving threats from
both Iraq and Iran, they founded the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 as a
framework for political, security, and defense coordination in an exceptionally
volatile region. Saddam Hussein did not hide his displeasure at the Gulf states’
creation of an exclusive bloc and later sought to establish a rival Arab
grouping through the Arab Cooperation Council. However, that alliance was
short-lived and effectively collapsed following the invasion of Kuwait. On the
other side, the Islamic Republic of Iran was not very different in its regional
ambitions, even if its ideology differed. Since its establishment in 1979, Iran
has promoted a revolutionary doctrine centered on exporting the revolution and
has expanded its influence by building networks of allies and armed groups
across several Arab countries. Over the past four decades, its regional project
has become one of the principal sources of instability in the Middle East. For
that reason, the anniversary of Kuwait’s occupation this year should not be
merely an occasion for remembrance, but an opportunity to reflect on the lessons
of history. What happened in 1990 demonstrated that the collapse of Kuwait’s
sovereignty immediately threatened Gulf security and quickly became a regional
and international crisis that affected the global economy and energy security.
That reality remains true today and may be even more apparent amid the
complexities of the current strategic shifts.
Iran appears increasingly aggressive and malicious, with its attacks extending
even to Jordan and Egypt. Today, Tehran is engaged in a struggle to preserve
both its regime and its regional influence, making it potentially more inclined
toward risk-taking than in previous periods.
To understand Iranian behavior, one must first understand its local
calculations, which are of paramount importance to the regime. Accepting a
settlement that could be interpreted domestically as a defeat might weaken the
regime’s legitimacy among both supporters and opponents, particularly after
years of economic pressure, domestic protests, and setbacks in Syria, Lebanon,
and its wider regional project.
As a result, Tehran may seek to compensate for its losses through other means.
Following these setbacks and Israel’s success in weakening Hezbollah’s
capabilities in Lebanon, Iran appears intent on repositioning itself regionally.
In my view, Iran will place greater emphasis on Iraq and Yemen, where it enjoys
direct influence over armed militias and the Houthis, using these arenas to
exert pressure and compensate for losses suffered elsewhere.
This places the Gulf states before an extremely serious strategic challenge. The
most likely scenario may not be a direct conventional military confrontation,
but rather a return to the model of proxy warfare, in which Iran manages
conflict through its allies and opens multiple fronts against Gulf countries
rather than Israel, under various banners and slogans. At the same time, if the
United States chooses not to confront Iran today, it would be unwise to assume
that Washington will return in the future to fight another war in defense of its
allies in the same manner it did in 1991, even if security partnerships remain
intact.
Therefore, the most important lesson to draw from the anniversary of August 1990
is that Gulf security cannot rest solely on assumptions or external guarantees.
It must be built upon greater self-reliant military strength, deeper defense
integration, the development of a stronger industrial and military base, and
higher levels of political and economic preparedness to confront a period that
may prove more dangerous and complex than anything experienced in recent
decades. After this war, the Gulf will be on its own.
Is Trump Redefining the Relationship with Israel?
Sam Menassa/Asharq Al-Awsat/August 04/2026
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to Washington last month again
brought the nature of the US-Israeli relationship into focus, amid differences
over Gaza, Iran, and the future of the region. The alliance remains strong, yet
these developments raise a broader question: Does Donald Trump truly want to
redefine the relationship with Israel, or merely to reorder its priorities? Are
the disagreements more circumstantial - between the Trump administration and
Netanyahu's hardline right-wing government - than between the United States and
Israel as such? And have Trump's personality and Netanyahu's arrogance together
made the recent frictions more visible? For decades, the US-Israeli relationship
has been among the most stable in international politics, to the point that
American support for Israel seemed unaffected by changes of administration or
shifts in priorities. Yet developments in the region since Trump's return to the
White House suggest that what is changing is not the strength of the alliance,
but the limits of the role Israel plays within American strategy.
The differences that have surfaced over Gaza, Iran, and Lebanon do not reflect
an American turn against Israel. They reveal, rather, Washington's shift from a
policy that adopts Israeli priorities to one that puts American interests first-
even when doing so means restraining some of the options the Israeli government
prefers. A distinction must still be drawn between disagreements tied to Trump's
personality and his deal-driven, often hesitant style, and the long-term
policies of the US.
Netanyahu's government, for its part, has grown more hardline, its political
survival bound to the far right and to the continuation of the war. That has
done more to throw the disagreements into sharp relief than to establish any
fundamental transformation between the two countries. Both men, in this context,
are keenly aware of how much they can shape each other's fortunes in the coming
Israeli elections and the US midterms and the dispute serves neither's interest.
The shift does not concern the scale of military support or the strength of
security cooperation. It concerns who sets the priorities, and who has the final
say when interests conflict. This does not mean the end of the special
relationship; it does mark the end of a period in which American and Israeli
interests were treated as wholly identical. The US administration now appears
more inclined to distinguish between offering Israel strategic support and
letting Israel impose its security agenda on American policy in the Middle East.
The shift is clearest in Gaza, where a new approach has begun to take shape -
one that puts ending the war and starting reconstruction ahead of the complete
elimination of Hamas. The understandings reached in Cairo on Hamas's disarmament
may be evidence of the change.
The weightier disagreement, though, concerns the future of the Palestinian
issue. Trump wants to expand the peace agreements - a process hard to advance
without Israeli concessions on Gaza, settlement activity, and the revival of a
political horizon leading, in some form, to a Palestinian state, an outcome
sought by Saudi Arabia and most Arab countries.
On Iran, Washington oscillates between diplomatic negotiation and military
escalation, reflecting a wish to contain the crisis and keep it from becoming a
regional war. Israel, for its part, continues to see the weakening of Iran as a
fundamental condition for regional security.
In Lebanon, too, the US appears more determined to consolidate the ceasefire and
prevent a slide into a wider confrontation that could draw in Iran and upset
regional balances. Washington no longer treats every Israeli military escalation
as an automatically legitimate option; such actions are now subject to broader
calculations about regional security, the stability of energy markets, and the
safety of international shipping. In Syria, Washington appears to back the
Syrian government and prefers to manage the existing balance of power while
scaling back direct involvement, consistent with a broader American strategy of
enlarging the axis of moderation and peace, reducing overseas military
commitments, and concentrating on competition with the major powers.
These changes cannot be understood simply as personal quarrels between Trump and
Netanyahu, or as a decline in Israel's standing within American decision-making.
They reflect a deeper transformation in the concept of American national
interest after two decades of wars in the region. Israel is no longer the party
that sets the direction of US policy in the Middle East; it has become part of a
broader framework of American calculation that seeks to balance Israel's
security against Gulf security, the stability of energy markets, and the
avoidance of a regional war.Even so, it would be a mistake to overstate these
developments and read them as the start of a fundamental change between the two
allies. The military, intelligence, and political relationship between the US
and Israel remains a central pillar of American policy. It is hard to imagine a
US strategy in the Middle East fundamentally opposed to Israel, just as it is
hard to imagine Israel able to dispense with the US - a reality reaffirmed by
the successive wars since the "Al-Aqsa Flood" attack of 2023. What is changing
today is not the alliance itself, but the role Israel plays within it, and how
far it can unilaterally shape the agenda of American policy in the region.
The War of Ambiguity and Uncertainty
Yousef Al-Dayni/Asharq Al-Awsat/August 04/2026
Ambiguity has always been a tool of war - a way to deceive an adversary, conceal
intentions, or give a commander more room to maneuver. This Iranian-American war
is different. Ambiguity is not one of its symptoms; it is the substance of which
the war is made.
From the outset, the most basic questions went unanswered. Why did the war break
out now? What is its ultimate objective? Is the aim to topple the Iranian
regime, weaken it, eliminate its regional "arms," or force it into a new nuclear
agreement? Does the confrontation take in the whole of Iran's conduct, or only
the nuclear file, in pursuit of terms tougher than those of the Obama-era deal?
These are not minor details. They determine the war's limits, its direction, and
where it can end. A war with no clear, declared political objective blurs every
line. It becomes hard to tell a ceasefire from an escalation, a negotiation from
pressure for a deal, deterrence from a slide into open war.
Trump deepened the confusion. He managed the crisis in a way that struck even
his own supporters, and analysts across American and European think tanks, as
personal and erratic. The world came to hang on a post on Truth Social rather
than on any clear statement from the world's foremost power.
The rhetoric swung widely. It moved between threats to erase "Iranian
civilization," talk of an imminent ceasefire, and threats to seize Kharg Island,
the heart of Iran's oil industry. Washington floated a plan to charge ships
passing through the Strait of Hormuz, then said days later that the strait
should remain open and free to every country in the world. This was not tactical
flexibility. It was the absence of any plan for what would follow the strikes.
And the constant reversals do one thing above all: they spread instability.
Markets are disrupted, and so are the daily lives of ordinary people, East and
West.
There is a fundamental difference between strategic ambiguity and the ambiguity
of confusion. Strategic ambiguity is deliberate. Leaders use it to keep an
adversary under pressure, conceal their intentions, and hold open the door to a
retreat or a settlement, allowing each side to enter negotiations without
appearing defeated. Confusion is the opposite. It sets in when the objectives
are undefined, when force is not aligned with any political aim, and when
neither allies nor adversaries can say what might end the war or make it expand.
Iran, for its part, met the war's ambiguity with a nihilistic logic. It fought
as though this were an existential battle that entitled it to shift the cost
onto others. It did not confine its response to the state fighting it. Instead,
it sought to turn the war into a contest over the economy, energy, and shipping,
striking the infrastructure and strategic assets of its neighbors long after it
was clear the strikes were not aimed at bringing the regime down.
This is where the danger of the "armed factions" model lies. The Iranian state
does not take direct responsibility for its own decisions. It turns instead to
armed groups operating outside any state, groups whose operations Tehran can
disavow in public while still reaping their military and diplomatic gains.
Ambiguity is thereby converted from a means of managing a war into a means of
evading responsibility for one. The militias become a way to wage wars without
declaring them, and to impose their costs without answering for them.
The Strait of Hormuz was not the center of the confrontation at first, but it
soon became its most dangerous point. The memorandum of understanding on the
strait was meant to ease the crisis. It did the reverse: its terms were vague,
and each side could read them to suit itself.
A crisis whose roots run back nearly five decades was never going to be
contained within days by a phrase such as "exerting every possible effort to
ensure the passage of commercial vessels." Washington read the wording as a
commitment to keep the strait open to international navigation. Tehran read it
as implicit recognition of its sovereign right to control the waterway. Between
the two readings, the central question went unanswered. Is Hormuz an
international passage, governed by international law and freedom of navigation?
Or is it a pressure card that one state holds in reserve for its next
confrontation?
Seen this way, Saudi Arabia's persistent calls for de-escalation amount to more
than a defensive posture or an expression of political prudence. They are an
attempt to correct, after the fact, the very climate that produced the war, and
to lead the region out of a cycle of ambiguity, impulsiveness, and
miscalculation. The Saudi approach begins by cooling the crisis and preventing
its spread. An end to escalation is not the conclusion of politics; it is the
precondition for politics to resume at all. The deeper value of that approach,
which many overlook, is that it seeks to move the region away from adventurism,
nihilism, the use of armed factions, and gray-zone warfare, and toward the logic
of statehood and international law - from uncertainty to the virtue of
stability, "the essence of Saudi strategy."
Maximum Gulf Solidarity to Confront the Critical Stage
Abdul Wahab Badrakhan/Al-Watan/Al-Nahar Al-Arabi/August 4, 2026 (Google
translation from Arabic)
Before and at the beginning of the war, there were two assumptions: that the war
would not be long because the United States wanted it to be swift and decisive,
and that it would not expand beyond Iran because the strikes and losses it would
suffer would preoccupy it internally and prevent it from carrying out its
previous threats to "ignite the region." But the war has now become regional,
and Iran has managed to impose three constants: First, that any American
military escalation, no matter how fierce, will not change its options. Second,
that the ideological dimension has regained dominance over its decision-making
through the Revolutionary Guard and its regional proxies. Third, that its
proxies have adhered to their assigned roles and functions, even in countries
that are trying to limit their effectiveness, such as Lebanon and Iraq, or in
Yemen, where it was briefly thought that the war had prompted the Houthis to
consider guarantees that Iran could not provide for their future. The US-Saudi
airstrikes on Iranian-backed factions in seven Iraqi provinces may represent a
declared defensive pattern foreshadowing future actions. There is unconfirmed
information suggesting this was not the first such operation, and that the
initial lack of public announcement was a message to Iran to rein in its
proxies, curb its recklessness, and leave room for future dialogue and perhaps
even reconciliation. However, Iran seems determined that its existential war is
no longer limited to the US and Israel, but also includes the Gulf states. This
has likely always been the objective of its strategy, though US bases have been
an obstacle. The war is entering its sixth month, which is likely to mark the
beginning of a decisive phase. The US wants to test Iran's ability to absorb the
destruction of its oil infrastructure and the effectiveness of the (missile)
assistance it reportedly received from China and Russia. Israel is likely to
participate in this phase, something its prime minister desires in order to
achieve several objectives: delaying the implementation of the recent agreement
on Gaza, stalling negotiations with Lebanon, continuing to evade his lengthy
corruption trial, and, most importantly, demonstrating alignment with the
American ally on the eve of a difficult election (late October) that could
determine his political future. He would be aided in this by Iran resuming its
missile and drone attacks on Israel, and by the Lebanese Hezbollah igniting the
southern front in an attempt to thwart the Lebanese state's efforts to secure an
Israeli withdrawal, which Washington has now "guaranteed" in exchange for
"disarming" Israel.
All eyes will be on the Gulf states and how they will deal with the attacks by
Iran and its militias at this stage, and simultaneously on Iraq and its
government, with which the US-Saudi strikes were coordinated (according to
Donald Trump's statements). On the one hand, this presents an opportunity for
Iran to revitalize its factions and thwart the decision to "monopolize its
weapons," thereby destabilizing the Baghdad government. On the other hand, it is
an opportunity for this government and its military and security forces (and
perhaps the forces of the "coordination framework") to rein in the behavior of
the factions; otherwise, the war will sweep away all the foundations for
rebuilding the state and set back efforts to strengthen it to square one.
Indeed, this may be the historic moment that necessitates the utmost cooperation
and coordination between Iraq and its Gulf neighbors to put Iraq on the path to
stability, after it has paid a very heavy price for its subservience to Iran. As
for the Gulf states, they are now aware that Iran will strive to inflict the
heaviest possible damage on their vital economic infrastructure, whether to
retaliate for the bombing or to underscore its inability to "avenge" itself
against America. While the Gulf states are not required to officially
participate in a war they neither wanted nor decided upon, they are obligated to
demonstrate the highest levels of solidarity, as they did 36 years ago in the
aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait and during its liberation. Certainly, what
they have shown so far in their forced self-defense may not be sufficient to
overcome the coming phases of this war, especially afterward. No Gulf state, or
indeed any other state, has an interest in remaining silent about the presence
of a Houthi militia that has seized control of Yemen and is being used by Iran
to besiege the region or threaten navigation in the Red Sea. In this context,
the success of the "maritime coalition" that Saudi Arabia is working to
establish and activate is essential to prevent maritime navigation from
remaining at the mercy of Iranian-Houthi blackmail.
This is not the first time that mediating countries have halted the US
president's push to launch large-scale strikes to alter the dynamics of the war,
thereby prioritizing diplomatic efforts. However, the conviction is growing that
the war will drag on and that negotiations will not achieve any real progress if
Iran maintains its intransigence on the Strait of Hormuz issue, as demonstrated
by its rejection of the Omani proposal for a "joint regional administration" of
the strait. What options does the Trump administration have if this gamble
fails? Based on past indicators, it is not unlikely that it will opt to be
content with its current gains and maintain the status quo, while intensifying
sanctions. Undoubtedly, such an option, if adopted, would increase the risks for
the Gulf states, especially if the naval vessels enforcing the blockade on
Iranian ports are withdrawn.
Parallel Militias!
Adel Al-Harbi/Riyadh/August 4, 2026 (Google
translation from Arabic)
Our region has been plagued over the past decades by armed groups that challenge
the authority of their governments, dictating when confrontations begin and end,
without recognizing state institutions or submitting to their will. Over time,
these groups have transformed into transnational armed entities with multiple
allegiances, exploiting the weakness of state institutions, the decline in their
prestige, and the loss of public trust in governments that have failed to
establish the rule of law or have become mired in tyranny and corruption. The
Middle East today is experiencing a phase unlike any it has known in past
decades. Countries that have chosen development, investment, and economic
building can no longer tolerate armed groups operating outside the national
consensus, holding the region hostage to crises and ticking time bombs.
Investors seek a stable environment, the economy requires political stability,
and security cannot coexist with the chaos of weapons. Therefore, the issue of
militias is no longer a purely internal matter for a single country, because
uncontrolled weapons threaten not only the state but also the stability of the
entire region. No matter how hard these countries try, and no matter how much
they claim to be turning over a new leaf, they will only succeed on the
fundamental principle of a strong state: no weapons but those of the state, and
no decisions but its decisions. All experiences have proven that parallel armed
groups do not build a nation; rather, they undermine stability and drag everyone
into their crises, because they cannot survive except in the quagmire of chaos.
The people pay the price, their isolation deepens, their development
opportunities vanish, and they remain hostage to endless crises and empty
slogans that mask their addiction to the smell of gunpowder and power. What
further complicates the situation is that some countries still boast of their
relations with certain armed groups, while international actors deal with these
relationships with a degree of leniency, under the pretext of keeping
communication channels open. However, experience has proven that relying on
militias to achieve stability has only produced more chaos and prolonged the
crises plaguing the region. Therefore, it is no longer sufficient for the
countries of the region and the international community to deal with these
organizations as internal problems specific to one country or another, but
rather as a threat that transcends borders and necessitates political and
security cooperation that supports weak governments, strengthens their
legitimate institutions, and contains parallel militias, so that the
nation-state can regain its right to enforce the law and monopolize the use of
force.
Selected Face Book & X tweets
on August 04-05/2026
Prime Minister of Israel
Joint Statement by the Prime Minister's Office National AI
Directorate and the Finance Ministry Accountant General's Department: Israel's
AI Leap – The National Directorate Launches its Flagship Initiative
The Prime Minister's Office (PMO) National AI Directorate, together with the
Finance Ministry Accountant General's Department, is launching today a series of
inaugural applied projects, pursuant to Government Decision 4255, and the
formulation of the national AI strategy. The Special Tenders Committee for
National AI Directorate affairs at the Ministry of Finance Accountant General's
Department has approved the publication of the tenders and RFIs, enabling the
implementation of the national plan.
These initial steps mark the beginning of the implementation phase of the
national plan, aimed at ensuring growth engines, technological sovereignty, and
global leadership for the State of Israel in the coming years.
The transition to the implementation phase is significant news for the local
industry and ecosystem, with the launch of three primary initiatives:
1. Establishment of a locally produced quantum computer: "Project Nexus", a
tender for a national quantum computing platform with the goal of establishing
global leadership and supporting the diverse technologies existing in Israel,
A tender for a national quantum computer is being published under "Project
Nexus." This move will guarantee the existence of a locally produced quantum
computer and the State of Israel’s status as a global leader.
2. Physical AI - Establishment of a national testing ground for the next
generation of AI as part of the national goal to achieve global leadership in
Physical AI.
The National Directorate is publishing a Request for Information (RFI) to
examine the establishment of a national testing ground for Physical AI, which
will serve as a global center for real-world simulations. The complex is
designed to enable the simulation of edge-case scenarios in various
environments, such as highways, medical facilities, advanced manufacturing
environments, agriculture, and more.
This project aims to drive breakthroughs in robotics, edge computing, sensing,
data processing, and more, combining global commercial activity with distinctive
Israeli capabilities.
3. Looking to the Future: Request for Information (RFI) to characterize national
action paths in foundational models against the backdrop of AI models becoming a
critical strategic infrastructure.
The National Directorate is publishing an RFI to advance the establishment of
Israeli sovereignty in foundational models, promote Israeli leadership, map
market capabilities, and examine measures to maximize the State of Israel's
comparative advantages.
Director of the National AI Directorate, Brig.-Gen. (Res.) Erez Eskel:
"Government Decision 4255 aims to secure Israel's place at the forefront of
global AI. Our role is to accelerate the advancement of AI in Israel, which is
why we are transitioning swiftly and professionally from defining vision and
strategy to practical implementation on the ground, together with all government
partners. The steps we are launching now are a central phase in securing our
sovereign infrastructure while continuing to focus our efforts on the State of
Israel's comparative advantages for long-term global leadership."
Senior Finance Ministry Deputy Accountant General for Innovation and Technology
and Chairman of the Special Tenders Committee Evyatar Peretz:
"The Finance Ministry Accountant General's Department is committed to realizing
Israel's national vision in artificial intelligence. The close collaboration
between the Accountant General's Department and the National Directorate enables
us to translate government decisions into practical, contractual mechanisms that
will establish the required infrastructure on the ground. The steps we are
leading today – from quantum computing to Physical AI and foundational models –
provide the industry and the economy with the necessary foundation to lower
barriers, ensure technological sovereignty, and make global breakthroughs."
Ronnie Chatah
Remember Joseph Skaff, Mounir Abou Rjeily, Joe Bejjani & Lokman Slim
And HA’s Unit 121 that took their lives & those before them. These brave men are
heroes for exposing the danger that was waiting to explode, & shined light on
those responsible for ammonium nitrate in our port
Hussain Abdul-Hussain
Dear Lebanese:
Please understand that Israel crushed Hezbollah, and that Israel is merciful
enough to give Lebanon another chance to redeem itself by finishing off what
remained of the Iranian militia.
If you don’t want to do it. Fine. Sit back and enjoy watching the south
depopulated until you do it. Oh, and there is no other route. Understand post
Oct 7 Mideast already.
Tom Harb
Concern-Syria: Jihadist Curriculum, Not Constitution, Training Syria’s New
Forces
Reports confirm Syria’s new army and police recruits are trained through Sharia
instruction rather than a constitutional framework with jihadist figures now
placed in senior military posts. Notably, training reportedly draws on Surah Al-Anfal
(the “Spoils of War” chapter, dealing with jihad and combat) https://corequran.com/8/
rather than civic or constitutional material.A security force built on ideology,
not law, produces loyalty to jihad not to the state or its citizens. This should
alarm anyone who took al-Sharaa’s promises of moderation seriously.
Shadi khalloul שאדי ח'לול
It was fascinating to speak to a group of American pastors today at sea of
Galilee. Exposed our life as Christians in Israel , Aramaic nationality
recognition in Israel and work done by our ICAA NGO.
Peter Germanos
My culture, my French-language education, and a large part of my upbringing
would naturally have led me to wish for Lebanon to remain in France's camp. I
learned its language, studied its legal and political thought, and grew up in an
environment deeply marked by its cultural heritage.Why, then, can I no longer
automatically defend its policy in Lebanon? Because cultural loyalty cannot
impose political blindness. I have come to the conviction that French policy in
Lebanon protects neither the interests of my people, nor the sovereignty of the
State, nor the future of new generations. Loving France does not mean approving
each of its decisions. Francophonie is a free cultural affiliation, not an act
of diplomatic allegiance. Between my personal affinities and the interest of my
country, my choice can admit no hesitation: Lebanon first. Thus, I am not
turning away from France; I simply refuse to be asked, in the name of France, to
accept a policy that I consider contrary to the interests of my people.
U.S. Embassy Beirut
Six years ago, the Beirut Port explosion killed more than 200 people, injured
thousands, and forever changed the city. On this solemn anniversary, we honor
the memory of those lost and stand with the families and communities who
continue to seek clarity and justice. Their pursuit remains essential to a
stronger, more stable, and more prosperous Lebanon.
John Bolton
Trump has declared he will hold Iran responsible for any Houthi attacks against
shipping near Yemen. That sounds serious, but in March 2025, Trump said the same
thing. Strikes against the Houthis lasted only two months and failed to end the
threat. Such mistakes must not be repeated, or Houthi aggression will continue.
Trump’s approach should not be merely retaliating for Houthi attacks, but
stopping them permanently.
Jennifer Hedger
I am not a Jew so I cannot pretend to know how it feels to be Jewish in Canada.
I can however, publicly support Canadian Jews. Loudly. The news this
morning…restaurants burned, bagel shops shot up, blatant attacks on Jews. Speak
out against this blatant antisemitism. It DOES
Gad Saad
I am leaving Canada in part because of the astounding increase in Jew-hatred in
Montreal. It is palpable, at the soccer field, on university campuses, in street
protests. It does not require a prophet to connect the dots. The Quebec and
Canadian governments have allowed this reality to worsen as they now realize
that the Jew-haters (stemming from one common religion) are in greater number
than the Jews. Simple political calculations permit for the cancer of Jew-hatred
to flourish.