English LCCC Newsbulletin For
Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For May 02/2023
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news
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15 آذار/2023
Bible Quotations For today
We speak, not to please mortals, but to please God who tests our hearts
First Letter to the Thessalonians 02/01-12:”You
yourselves know, brothers and sisters, that our coming to you was not in vain,
but though we had already suffered and been shamefully maltreated at Philippi,
as you know, we had courage in our God to declare to you the gospel of God in
spite of great opposition. For our appeal does not spring from deceit or impure
motives or trickery, but just as we have been approved by God to be entrusted
with the message of the gospel, even so we speak, not to please mortals, but to
please God who tests our hearts. As you know and as God is our witness, we never
came with words of flattery or with a pretext for greed; nor did we seek praise
from mortals, whether from you or from others, though we might have made demands
as apostles of Christ. But we were gentle among you, like a nurse tenderly
caring for her own children. So deeply do we care for you that we are determined
to share with you not only the gospel of God but also our own selves, because
you have become very dear to us. You remember our labour and toil, brothers and
sisters; we worked night and day, so that we might not burden any of you while
we proclaimed to you the gospel of God. You are witnesses, and God also, how
pure, upright, and blameless our conduct was towards you believers. As you know,
we dealt with each one of you like a father with his children, urging and
encouraging you and pleading that you should lead a life worthy of God, who
calls you into his own kingdom and glory.”
Titles For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese &
Lebanese Related News & Editorials published
on May 01-02/2023
Universal Syriac Union Party in
Lebanon commemorates 1915 Sayfo Genocide
Lebanon to resume housing financing in US dollars: Antoine Habib
Kanaani: Solution to problems of Lebanese people must come from within Lebanon
and from Lebanese themselves
Report: Election of new president has become imminent
Raja Salameh, Finance Minister expected to attend hearing before European
judiciary
Changes to VAT Calculation: What You Need to Know
Syrian labor and Lebanese unemployment: A complex reality on Labor Day
Lebanon’s Agriculture Ministry urges not to panic from sharks, calls for its
protection
GM cuts several hundred full-time contract workers
Lebanese mark Labor Day with protests demanding improved healthcare and social
security
Lebanon Develops Plan to Deport Syrian Prisoners
Syrian Refugees Deported from Lebanon Face Arrest, Conscription, Say Relatives
Malevolent voices manipulating the Syria refugee issue/Baria Alamuddin/Arab
News/May 01, 2023
The Intractable Situation in Lebanon, the Vacuum, and Building on A Mistake/Sam
Menassa/Asharq Al Awsat/May 01/2023
Titles For The Latest English LCCC
Miscellaneous Reports And News published
on May 01-02/2023
Pope reveals he is involved in
peace mission after meeting Hungarian prime minister
Sudan conflict descending into ‘full blown catastrophe,’ UN officials warn
Sudan battles risk exodus of 800,000 people - UN
Sudan descends into fierce fighting despite latest truce
Saudi-Iran rapprochement visible in Sudan evacuation effort
Israeli FM to Visit Brussels Aiming to Change EU Positions on Iran, Middle East
Jordan FM: Regional Talks with Syria Step toward Solution
Arab ministers discuss how to normalise ties with Syria
Police Chief Killed by Gunmen in Iran's Balochistan
Israeli opposition leader says no progress on judicial overhaul talks
Israel's judicial proposals prompt startups to relocate -govt agency
Palestinians: Israeli fire kills teen in West Bank raid
Fraught US-Israel ties on display as Knesset reconvenes
Ukrainian defenders oust Russian forces from some positions in Bakhmut - Ukraine
general
Russia is building defenses deep inside its own territory, fearing a sweeping
Ukrainian counterattack: UK intel
Canadian federal workers get May Day deal to end strike
Armenian, Azerbaijani ministers hold talks in US over Karabakh dispute
Emiri decree issued to dissolve Kuwaiti parliament - KUNA
Titles For
The Latest
English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published
on May 01-02/2023
What If Erdogan Wins Next Month’s Turkish Elections?/Sinan Ciddi/The
National Interest/May 01/2023
The Biden Administration's Vacuum of Leadership/Majid Rafizadeh/Gatestone
Institute/May 01/2023
The United States and Saudi Arabia: A Possible Path Forward/Memo/FDD/April
28/2023
Why Did Xi Jinping Suddenly Call Zelensky?/Fred Kaplan/The New York Times/01
May, 2023
No end in sight to Syrian refugee crisis/Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Arab News/May 01,
2023
Latest English LCCC Lebanese &
Lebanese Related News & Editorials published
on May 01-02/2023
Universal Syriac Union Party
in Lebanon commemorates 1915 Sayfo Genocide
Syriac Press/ZAHLE, Lebanon//May 01/2023
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/117860/117860/
On Saturday, the Universal Syriac Union Party (USUP) branch in Zahle, Lebanon,
held an event to mark the 108th anniversary of the 1915 Sayfo Genocide committed
by the Ottoman Empire against Christian communities, including Syriacs (Arameans–Assyrians–Chaldeans–Maronites),
Armenians, and Greeks. The event began with the Lebanese national anthem,
followed by Syriac and Armenian hymns performed by singer Christine Zeno.
Representatives from the Armenian Tashnag Party, the Syriac-Maronite Union, Tur
Levnon, and the USUP delivered speeches at the event. The speeches focused on
the history of the genocide, the systematic killing, displacement, and crimes
committed against the aforementioned peoples, as well as their presence and
development throughout the ages in the region. The speakers emphasized the unity
of these peoples, their shared fate, and their common origins in the land of
their ancestors. The event was attended by a number of political parties,
Members of Parliament, and religious, cultural, and social figures in Lebanon,
including the Lebanese Forces party.
Lebanon to resume housing financing in US dollars:
Antoine Habib
LBCI/May 01/2023
The Chairman of the Board of Directors and General Manager of the Banque de
L'habitat, Antoine Habib, expected the resumption of real estate financing in US
dollars within a few months. This step was taken after the completion of legal
and logistical arrangements for starting the implementation of the provisions of
the loan concluded with the "Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development," at
a value of 50 million Kuwaiti dinar, equivalent to about 160 million US dollars.
In a statement, he said that the decision to stabilize the loan by the
management of the fund opened a "large hole in the wall" of the forced cessation
of credit and advance operations by commercial and investment banks in Lebanon
due to the worsening monetary and financial crises since the fall of 2019.
Kanaani: Solution to problems of Lebanese people
must come from within Lebanon and from Lebanese themselves
LBCI/May 01/2023
Spokesperson for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nasser Kanaani,
announced that Iran considers strengthening its relationships with countries in
the Persian Gulf region to be the most important element in ensuring mutual
security, something it has always emphasized. Regarding the situation in
Lebanon, Kanaani believed that the election of a president could help to solve
and end the complicated impasse. At the same time, he pointed out that the
solution to the problems of the Lebanese people must come from within Lebanon
and from the Lebanese themselves. In terms of the economy, he stated that one of
Iran's priorities is to assist in solving Lebanon's economic problems. He also
mentioned that it is possible to enhance economic relationships if there is a
political will for it in Lebanon.
Report: Election of new president has become
imminent
Naharnet/May 01/2023
Pulling Lebanon out of its presidential vacuum has become imminent, an Arab
diplomat said. "The contacts made major progress over the past weeks and the
continuous political clash in Lebanon does not reflect the reality of what's
happening abroad," the diplomat told al-Joumhouria newspaper in remarks
published Monday. "There is consensus within the Five-Nation Gathering on the
need to end the presidential vacuum that has started to pose a risk to the
Lebanese political situation," the diplomat added. He also revealed that the
agreement would also encompass the designation of a premier and the formation of
a government so that the Lebanese situation "does not face obstacles in terms of
designation and formation following the election of the president."
Raja Salameh, Finance Minister expected to attend
hearing before European judiciary
LBCI/May 01/2023
The European Observatory for the Integrity of Lebanon indicated that the
European judicial delegation would resume its investigations in Beirut on
Tuesday, adding that the brother of the Governor of Banque du Liban, Raja
Salameh, is supposed to appear this week before the French judge, Aude Buresi,
as she insisted on hearing him before leaving. The European Observatory pointed
out that the Caretaker Minister of Finance, Youssef Khalil, is also expected to
attend as he was a former director of operations at Banque du Liban, on Friday
before the European judiciary, stressing that “we hear about political
references asking Khalil not to attend, and if this is true, they must be held
accountable for obstructing the course of justice.”
Changes to VAT Calculation: What You Need to Know
LBCI/May 01/2023
What is the truth behind the current rumors about changes in the calculation of
VAT, and will it affect citizens? What happened is as follows: A merchant who
used to import goods worth $100 had to pay a VAT of $11 on them. However, the
payment was made in Lebanese lira.
The $11 used to be equal to 16,500 Lebanese liras when the exchange rate was
1,500. When the official exchange rate of the dollar became 15,000 LBP, the tax
value became 165,000 LBP. This merchant takes this merchandise to sell it at
retail. Let's assume that its price remained at $100 or 10 million Lebanese
liras at today's exchange rate. Adding the 11% VAT, its price becomes 11,100,000
Lebanese liras. Therefore, the value of the tax on the value added to this
merchandise was 1,100,000 Lebanese liras, based on the black market dollar rate.
Meanwhile, the wholesale trader paid only 165,000 Lebanese liras to the state
because the VAT was calculated based on the official exchange rate of the
dollar. This means that if the wholesale trader sells at retail, they would have
made a profit of 935,000 Lebanese liras. To stop these discrepancies and ensure
more revenue for the treasury, a decree was published in the official gazette
that calculates the VAT based on the customs dollar rate upon import, which is
determined monthly. As for VAT between wholesale traders, it is calculated based
on Sayrafa rate. The VAT is calculated according to the Sayrafa platform, for
invoices issued by official entities in foreign currency, including wired and
wireless communications services, airport fees, and ports set in foreign
currencies.
Syrian labor and Lebanese unemployment: A complex
reality on Labor Day
LBCI/May 01/2023
Even on Labor Day, greetings are divided between Lebanese and Syrian workers.
This is the reality with the increasing presence of Syrian labor in the Lebanese
job market, particularly in the last three years. According to statistics from
the company "Statistics Lebanon," the number of Syrian workers was estimated at
430,000 in 2020, distributed among those who work in construction, decoration,
agriculture, services, and craftsmen who have always worked in these
professions. However, the numbers that must be focused on are the Syrians who
have become self-employed, meaning owners of small or large establishments,
clothing or groceries stores, phone repair shops, taxi drivers, and other
self-employed professions. According to "Statistics Lebanon," their number
is 60,000, which is likely to increase due to the lack of clear data by
authorities and municipalities to monitor violators in any area. But more than
these numbers are needed to estimate the true number of Syrian workers in
Lebanon, as the Ministry of Labor has no official figures. Another problem,
according to the ministry, is the constant changing of the locations of
refugees, as well as the need for more cooperation from international
organizations with official entities. Other numbers that must be examined are
the high unemployment rate among Lebanese citizens, which reached 38% according
to the latest study conducted by "International Information" at the end of 2022.
Between the number of Syrian labor and Lebanese unemployment, it is incumbent on
those concerned to take action to regulate Syrian labor within the legal
frameworks to preserve Lebanese workers.
Lebanon’s Agriculture Ministry urges not to panic
from sharks, calls for its protection
LBCI/May 01/2023
Upon photos of a shark starting to circulate on social media, the Lebanese
Agriculture Ministry mentioned in a statement its interest in highlighting the
importance of these fish to the marine environment since scientific information
confirms that some types of sharks are not unusual in the sea of Lebanon, as
they are present in the Mediterranean and the eastern part for thousands of
years. It mentioned that Lebanon is known for enjoying a biological diversity
that distinguishes it from other countries in the Mediterranean, that these fish
are non-aggressive, and that Lebanon is one of the countries committed to
protecting them. “We wish all fishermen and sea-goers, first, not to panic from
these fish, and secondly, to help protect them because they are in such climatic
conditions, it approaches the beaches, as it is warmer.” According to the
“Convention on Biological Diversity,” the country enjoys a Mediterranean
climate. It has a wealth of habitats, including islands, coastal lands, rivers,
and mountains of an elevation of 3,088 meters above sea level. Additionally,
Lebanon’s sea hosts about 1,790 species, representing almost 2.7 percent of the
world’s marine species.
GM cuts several hundred full-time contract workers
LBCI/Reuters/May 01/2023
General Motors Co (GM.N) on Monday said it had cut several hundred full-time
contract workers over the weekend including at its engineering hub in suburban
Detroit, the latest effort by the US automaker to streamline operations. The
contractors losing their jobs were within global product development at
locations such as the company's Warren Tech Center. The Wall Street Journal
reported the job cuts earlier. GM shares were up 2% to $33.73. GM said in April
that about 5,000 salaried workers had opted for buyouts to leave the company.
Reuters in February reported that GM cut hundreds of executive-level and
salaried jobs. CEO Mary Barra said in a memo to employees last month that the
February job cuts and 5,000 buyouts "have provided approximately $1 billion
towards" the $2 billion target. Price hikes and demand for vehicles have helped
automakers counter inflationary headwinds. GM posted higher-than-expected
first-quarter earnings last week and raised its full-year profit and cash-flow
forecasts. Chrysler parent Stellantis NV (STLAM.MI) last week said it is
offering voluntary exit packages to 33,500 employees as it looks to streamline
North American operations. The offers cover 31,000 hourly workers and about
2,500 salaried workers. Stellantis did not say how many total jobs it is looking
to eliminate. It is also offering some employees in Canada voluntary buyouts.
Ford Motor Co (F.N) recently announced significant job cuts in Spain, Germany
and other parts of Europe, and in August said it would cut a total of 3,000
salaried and contract jobs, mostly in North America and India.
Lebanese mark Labor Day with protests
demanding improved healthcare and social security
Najia Houssari/Arab News/May 01/2023
BEIRUT: Hundreds of Lebanese workers, unionists and foreign female workers in
the country responded to calls to protest as part of the Labor Day activities on
Monday, which was International Workers’ Day. Two major protests took place in
Beirut, the first by the National Federation of Worker and Employee Trade Unions
in Lebanon, also known as FENASOL, and the second by the Lebanese Communist
Party. The protesters assembled in Martyrs’ Square after marching through the
city’s streets, amid tight security measures. “My salary has died,” read one
banner. Another said: “The nation is for the rich and nationalism is for the
poor.” Other banners called for “the right to health and social security.” The
Lebanese Communist Party raised a banner calling for greater “independence of
the labor movement and the protection of public freedoms.” Castro Abdullah, the
president of FENASOL, criticized “Lebanon’s subjugation by its government to the
International Monetary Fund's dictates.”He added that “the country is looted and
stolen but not bankrupt” and called on “all forces, labor unions and public
administration employees to unify their words and positions to escalate the
comprehensive confrontation against the government and reach a declaration of a
comprehensive civil disobedience in all of Lebanon.”
Representatives of rights organizations, including the Kurdish Newroz Cultural
and Social Association, and the Casual Workers’ League, spoke during the rally
in Martyrs’ Square. A representative of foreign female workers called for an end
to their exploitation. Clashes broke out during the two protests after a group
of demonstrators raised a banner that read: “No safe return for Syrian refugees
to Syria with the presence of Bashar Assad (regime).” Tensions run high in
Lebanon over the issue of Syrian immigrants. Many Lebanese say they have become
“an economic burden” and some have demanded that they return home. Some
protesters from the Lebanese Communist Party seized the banner and said “the
timing is not appropriate for raising slogans related to refugees or Assad.”
Riot police intervened to break up the fighting. Lebanon continues to suffer
from catastrophically high unemployment and inflation, and a largely unorganized
labor force, amid a dramatic deterioration in living conditions during which
many workers have slipped below the poverty line. According to official figures
from the Central Administration of Statistics and the International Labor
Organization, the unemployment rate in Lebanon rose from 11.4 percent in 2018 to
29.6 percent in early 2022, amid a severe economic crisis that began in 2019.
About 47.8 percent of unemployed Lebanese are between the ages of 15 and 24,
according to official statistics.
Information International, an independent regional research and consultancy
firm, estimated Lebanon's unemployment rate to be even higher, about 38 percent.
According to these statistics, about 60 percent of all workers in the country
are estimated to be part of the unorganized labor force.
In a message to the Lebanese people, Najib Mikati, prime minister of the
caretaker government, said: “We are aware of the difficult circumstances you are
living in and we appreciate the sacrifices you make to preserve the state’s
entity, institutions and administrations. “The recent measures taken by the
government are only a small part of what you deserve but the resources that you
know have made it inevitable that the benefits are provided in the best way
possible. With mutual understanding, we hope to reach gradual and more equitable
solutions that ensure you a decent living.”
Ten days ago, the Lebanese Cabinet issued a decree that included an increase of
the official minimum wage from 2.5 million to 9 million Lebanese pounds.
However, according to Bechara Asmar, the head of the General Confederation of
Lebanese Workers, even this increased salary, equivalent to about $90 based on
the readily available exchange rate, is not enough for a person to live on, let
alone a family. “This year’s Labor Day is the worst in decades, as the situation
of Lebanese workers is catastrophic, and we warn of famine looming on the
horizon amid the continued collapse of the state and the economy,” said Asmar.
“The salary increases that we are striving to achieve may lose their value with
any new increase in the exchange rate of the dollar on the black market.” He
also warned of “the collapse of social security funds, which are important for
providing a large percentage of the cost of healthcare for workers and
employees.”
Lebanon Develops Plan to Deport Syrian Prisoners
Beirut - Youssef Diab/Asharq Al Awsat/May 01/2023
The Lebanese caretaker government of Prime Minister Najib Mikati has developed a
plan to deport Syrian prisoners, despite faltering in developing political and
legal mechanisms to return the displaced back to their home country. The
ministerial committee tasked with following up on the return of the displaced
tasked Justice Minister Henry al-Khoury with discussing the possibility of
turning over Syrian detainees to their country immediately, according to
relevant laws and agreements. Khoury told Asharq Al-Awsat that the return of
Syrian prisoners in Lebanon to their country is a "sensitive issue and should
not be dealt with hastily." There are 1,800 Syrians, who have committed criminal
offenses, in Lebanese prisons, 82 percent of whom have not completed their
trials. The Minister explained that the issue of Syrian prisoners requires
careful legal consideration, and if the prisoner also has a pending judicial
case in Syria, the procedures may be easier to transfer them and complete their
trial in their country. However, if the detainee does not have a case in Syria,
once released, they might return to Lebanon illegally, warned Khoury. He said a
ministerial and technical delegation will visit Syria to discuss the return of
the displaced, but the detainees and convicts' issue is still under
consideration. A source familiar with the prison issue told Asharq Al-Awsat that
dozens of pre-trial detainees are awaiting judicial verdicts, including 143
Syrian minors, in Lebanese jails. A security source concerned with the prison
file admitted that thousands of Syrians in Lebanese prisons are deepening the
prison crisis and are a burden on state resources. Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat,
the source, who declined to be named, believed that the deportation of prisoners
is usually linked to agreements signed between two countries. He noted that it
was a complex issue and difficult to resolve, questioning the process of
returning convicts and detainees while the state has yet to come up with a
mechanism to return the displaced. Lawyer and human rights activist Diyala
Shehadeh stressed that Lebanon is committed to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance. In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, she warned
against violating the laws that must be followed in repatriating detainees, as
it requires the concerned country to submit an extradition request. Shehadeh
cautioned that handing over these prisoners may expose them to persecution and
physical and economic harm and the possibility of their involvement in the armed
conflict, whether through forced conscription or by joining armed factions.
Syrian Refugees Deported from Lebanon Face Arrest,
Conscription, Say Relatives
Asharq Al-Awsat/Monday, 1 May, 2023
Syrian refugees detained by security forces in Lebanon and deported have been
subject to arrest and forced conscription upon return to their war-ravaged
homeland, their relatives and rights advocates have told Reuters. Some said
their loved ones were being held by the Syrian army's Fourth Division, which is
headed by President Bashar al-Assad's brother and has been sanctioned for rights
violations. Amnesty International says the deportations are a "clear violation"
by Lebanon of international law under the principle of "non-refoulment," which
prohibits nations from forcibly returning anyone to a country where they risk
persecution. The Syrian government did not respond to a request for comment. The
Lebanese army, which has been carrying out the deportations according to Amnesty
International, aid workers and witnesses, declined to comment. Lebanon is home
to some 800,000 Syrians registered with the United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR)
who have fled since the war erupted in 2011. Lebanese authorities say the real
number of Syrians in their country is 2 million. One refugee told Reuters he and
his three brothers were detained in a raid on a camp in Lebanon in late April.
Because his brothers did not have legal residency, they were deported. "They
managed to get in touch with me from inside Syria, saying they were being held
by the Fourth Division. I still don't know if they're alright," he said, asking
to speak anonymously because of fear of reprisals. Another refugee said he was
briefly held by the Fourth Division after being deported but paid smugglers to
return to Lebanon. A senior humanitarian source said more than 450 Syrians were
arrested in more than a dozen raids by the Lebanese army or at ad hoc
checkpoints in April. More than 130 were deported.
'NO EXCUSE' FOR DEPORTATIONS
Another senior humanitarian source confirmed that Syrians registered with the
United Nations had been deported, including unaccompanied minors. The Norwegian
Refugee Council said a beneficiary of one of its youth programs was deported.
Ismail told Reuters his three sons Hassan, Imad and Mohammad were taken by
Lebanese security forces during a raid on their home and deported because they
did not have valid residency papers. "Imad and Mohammad are wanted by the Syrian
army for not completing their military service. They're hiding at a family
friend's house but have to begin their service within the week," Ismail, who
only wanted to give his first name, told Reuters. "Hassan is just 15 and is so
scared he's having heart palpitations." The UN's Commission of Inquiry said in
March that Syria "is still not a safe place to return to," partly because of
ongoing detentions and rights violations by security forces. Amnesty
International said it had documented at least four cases in which Syrians were
arrested following their deportation from Lebanon, in addition to separate cases
of conscription. "There is absolutely no excuse for the Lebanese state to
violate its international legal obligation by summarily returning refugees to a
country where they fear persecution," said Amnesty's regional deputy director,
Aya Majzoub. Majzoub said the April deportations were accompanied by a wave of
hate speech, restrictive measures by Lebanese municipalities hosting Syrians and
comments by officials that created a "coercive environment" that pressured
refugees to leave. Youssef, a Syrian refugee and single father of two, said he
was so afraid of being deported and conscripted that he had stopped leaving his
home in Lebanon. "This permanent discrimination creates a state of fear of
meeting anyone new – even interacting with your neighbor or the local shop owner
downstairs," he said.
Malevolent voices manipulating the Syria refugee issue
Baria Alamuddin/Arab News/May 01, 2023
The Arab nations of Lebanon and Syria share a complex and often fractious
history of mutual dependence, intermarriage, and bitter divisions.
The Syrian regime once sought to occupy and dominate Lebanon, but today many
Lebanese gripe that they are experiencing a very different kind of Syrian
occupation — in the form of about 1.5 million refugees.
But these tensions obscure deeper truths: that Syrians and Lebanese are both
profoundly suffering, and that there are those who are calculatedly plotting to
set the two peoples against each other for political gain. It is not unfair to
ask why the refugee issue has suddenly been forced to the top of the Lebanese
news agenda, and what national priorities this divisive issue is supposed to
distract us from.
Everybody theoretically supports the eventual repatriation of Syrians. Lebanon’s
devastated economy makes it impossible to bear this immense refugee burden,
along with substantial refugee populations from Palestine, Iraq and elsewhere.
The World Bank has placed Lebanon as the highest-ranked country in the world for
food price inflation, with a 261 percent annual increase in the food consumer
price index.
However, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt has raised important questions about who
would guarantee the safety of returning Syrians, and warned that refugees
couldn’t simply be sent back to a slaughterhouse. Amnesty International likewise
urged Lebanon to “immediately stop forcibly deporting refugees back to Syria
amid fears that these individuals are at risk of torture or persecution at the
hands of the Syrian government.”
With the refugee issue becoming frenziedly politicized, Lebanese social media is
suddenly overflowing with anti-refugee hate speech, rumors and abuse. Shiite and
Christian leaders fear the political consequences of the long-term presence of
the mostly Sunni refugee population. Some people have genuine fears of history
repeating itself, given that the unmanageable tensions related to the
Palestinian refugee population were a principal trigger for the Lebanese civil
war from 1975 to 1990.
Self-serving sectarian politicians are cynically fanning the flames. One
minister provocatively warned: “We will become refugees in our own country.”
Another figure who should know better declared: “Military occupation or civilian
occupation — they both lead to the same thing: a 'greater Syria' and the loss of
Lebanon’s sovereignty. We are truly under invasion by a foreign people.”
One popular narrative warns that for every 100 repatriated Syrian families, 200
new Syrian babies are born in Lebanon, while another widespread trope blames the
West for obstructing refugee returns to undermine states such as Turkey and
Lebanon.
A minority of Syrians have exacerbated tensions by publicly badmouthing their
Lebanese hosts. And just as anywhere in the world, a large, impoverished refugee
population has given rise to increased criminality and other social problems.
This is unsurprising when 90 percent of Syrian refugee households live in
extreme poverty with minimal access to healthcare, services or employment. Over
a third of Syrian children aren’t even enrolled in school.
But let’s have the intelligence and self-respect to not use this as a pretext to
denounce all Syrians. Traumatized Syrian refugees faced torture, murder of
family members, rape, chemical weapons attacks and state terrorism. Let’s have a
modicum of empathy and forgive their hesitation to return to Syria to suffer
more of the same.
Syrians and Lebanese are fated to exist alongside each other for eternity. How
we support our Arab brethren in this moment of existential crisis will be always
remembered and will shape that relationship for centuries.
Lebanese and Syrians are all collectively struggling to survive. So let’s
refocus the media agenda back toward those genuinely culpable for our current
predicament. It isn’t the fault of Syrian refugees that corrupt political
factions sabotaged Lebanon’s economy and obstructed all conceivable routes to
national salvation. It isn’t the fault of Syrian refugees that Hezbollah and its
allies are indefinitely blocking the selection of a president and a government
to address Lebanon’s myriad crises. Who are the real criminals here?
Social media fearmongering has real-world consequences — namely an escalation in
violence against refugees and vigilante action to evict Syrians from various
localities. Citizens should be conscious of the sinister agendas behind such
provocations.
In the past two years there has been an escalation in concerted efforts for
forced returns of refugees. Many refugees have nothing to return to after homes
were destroyed on an industrial scale, and vast tracts of land and urban areas
were given to Assad cronies. One of Lebanon’s largest concentrations of refugees
is at Arsal, where many were displaced from the border-straddling Qalamoun
region. Hezbollah has appropriated the agricultural land there and controls the
area as its personal fiefdom.
The levels of coordination between Lebanese and Syrian ministers on this issue
suggest that Assad will be able to handpick those who return — either reliably
loyal demographics or those who can be transported directly into the army or the
torture chamber. After the earthquake in February it took aid agencies days to
reach affected areas in Syria, with the regime exploiting its control of borders
to obstruct access and corruptly profit from goods intended for earthquake
victims.
There is an evolving trend toward rehabilitating Assad, treating his crimes
against humanity as a closed chapter, thus allowing him to believe that his
atrocities were vindicated. Arab diplomats demanded that Assad distance himself
from Tehran, but he bluntly replied that Iran was the one regional ally who
remained with him over the past 12 years. Consequently, there is a risk that
regional states, desperate to draw a line under the Syrian conflict, are
offering normalization without gaining anything in return. If the Arab world and
international community want to close the Syrian refugee file, they must work
much harder to broker a permanent solution that guarantees the rights and safety
of citizens.
It’s said that you can choose your friends, but you can’t choose your family.
Syrians and Lebanese are fated to exist alongside each other for eternity. How
we support our Arab brethren in this moment of existential crisis will be always
remembered and will shape that relationship for centuries. Given Hezbollah’s
energetic efforts to goad Israel into a massively disproportionate retaliation,
tomorrow it could be Lebanese refugees flooding into Syria. What goes around
comes around.
So let’s dig a little deeper into our reserves of tolerance and empathy, and
refuse to allow these malevolent voices to set us against each other.
• Baria Alamuddin is an award-winning journalist and broadcaster in the Middle
East and the UK. She is editor of the Media Services Syndicate and has
interviewed numerous heads of state.
The Intractable Situation in Lebanon, the Vacuum, and
Building on A Mistake
Sam Menassa/Asharq Al Awsat/May 01/2023
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/117844/117844/
In the Lebanese crisis, or what some call the Lebanese question, the malfunction
does not end with the failure to develop solutions. Rather, it goes further, as
it is almost impossible to understand the actions of the political forces in the
country, especially those opposed to Hezbollah and the Axis of Resistance.
Indeed, they have failed to answer one simple question that may seem simple on
the surface but is at the heart of the intractable state of affairs in Lebanon:
Are the political forces genuinely convinced that electing a president is the
solution?
Could a solution emerge if radical agreements regarding points of major
contention (the most prominent of which are the hold that the Syrian-Iranian
axis, as well as its local, regional and foreign allies, have over the country’s
geostrategic position) do not bring this president to office? In other words: To
which axis does Lebanon belong, the Western or Eastern axis? Is it aligned with
the Gulf states that are open to the world or the Iranian-Syrian Axis of
Resistance? Once this question is resolved, its sub-questions will be easy to
overcome, from the controversies surrounding political, financial, economic and
social reforms to how the country is administered, how positions are allocated,
to the powers of different branches of government, to the form of the executive
takes, how the government is formed, and many others.
In 2008, the Doha Agreement was reached following Hezbollah’s incursion on
Beirut and the Mountain, which was referred to as the Black Shirts War. The deal
struck in Doha led to the election of Army Commander Michel Sulieman. Then, in
2016, the Lebanese Forces, the Future Movement, and the Free Patriotic Movement
struck a deal to elect Hezbollah’s candidate, Michel Aoun, as president. This
deal emerged after Hezbollah disrupted the election of a president for over two
years, and in return for the election of Aoun, Hariri was elected prime
minister.
Both of these experiments failed par excellence. The first was nullified after
Hezbollah got involved in the Syrian war, walking back on the terms of the
Baabda Declaration that it had agreed to in 2012, which stressed that Lebanon
would adopt a policy of neutrality and stay away from regional and international
axes and conflicts. As for the second, it did not endure for more than a year,
and it precipitated the most severe financial, economic and political collapse
in the history of modern Lebanon. It also fortified Hezbollah’s grip on the
country, allowing an Iranian official to brag that Tehran controlled four Arab
capitals.
Bringing up the Doha Agreement and the deal of 2016 comes within the context of
the reports that the French are trying to develop a Doha-style settlement. This
new deal would lead to the election of a president without altering the current
balance of power in the country, allowing Hezbollah to maintain control over all
the facets of the state and monopolize decision-making. In fact, such an
agreement would be little more than a repeat of previous failure experiences
that were failed attempts at managing the crisis at best.
While the winds of change have been felt in different parts of the region since
the Saudi-Iranian agreement, they have yet to blow in Beirut. Meanwhile, it has
had implications for more difficult and delicate crises, including the Yemen war
and Saudi relations with the Assad regime.
Several actors have expressed extreme positions. The most prominent of which is
the warning of the head of Hezbollah’s Executive Council, Sayyed Hashem
Safieddein. “Lebanon is going through a very dangerous phase in which it is
going from crisis to total chaos … However, today, we call on some Lebanese to
make use of everything that is happening to accelerate the recovery of the
country, as delays do not serve their interest.
Another example we should mention is the recent statement of Hezbollah Deputy
Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem, who gave the Lebanese two choices:
Suleiman Franjieh or a vacuum. The rockets fired at Israel from South Lebanon
also sent a message, and they coincided with the visit of Hamas Political Bureau
Ismail Haniyeh to Beirut. It was also around this time that Iranian President
Ebrahim Raisi - in an interview addressed directly to the people of Gaza -
stressed his country’s determination to continue supporting the resistance.
We should not ignore Iran’s expansion in the Palestinian refugee camps in
Lebanon either. It has been manifested in parades in support of Iran. Finally,
the cherry on top was the latest visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Amir
Abdollahian to Beirut and its timing. He began his visit with a meeting that
brought him together with Hezbollah officials, not the top brass of the Lebanese
state. After that, he met several Hezbollah deputies at his country’s embassy in
Beirut. In conclusion, Lebanon is becoming increasingly rooted in the Axis of
Resistance by the day. So long as this is the case, could any settlement, be it
a second Doha agreement or a deal struck in Paris or Cairo, bear fruit?
We should not be dragged into the claims being made by some in the Lebanese
“opposition” media, who are claiming that Paris has withdrawn its support for
Suleiman Franjieh’s candidacy and that the French Foreign Ministry and the
Presidency are in dispute around this issue. This analysis sees the matter
through a factional, local Lebanese lens and is based on the foreign ministry’s
claim “France has no preferred presidential candidate” and its call on the
Lebanese to choose their own leaders.
We must set things straight. We are talking about the position of a major
Western country that has strong ties with Lebanon. Its stance probably does not
diverge from that of its allies, be they in Europe or the US. While this does
not imply that the positions of these countries are identical, nor does it mean
that France does not have an eye on its economic interests, especially with
Iran. What it does mean is that these allies agree on two fundamental matters:
preserving a minimal degree of domestic security and stability and avoiding
trouble on the borders in order to allow for the extraction of gas from Lebanese
waters.
This can only be achieved by bringing Hezbollah on board. As we have previously
mentioned, it is the strongest of the weak local actors. None of the forces
opposed to Hezbollah could be considered reliable partners capable of carrying
out his commitments. This is due to the deep schism between these opposition
parties, and Western powers are under no illusions about the domestic balance of
power. That is why France supports Hezbollah’s candidate, while the United
States is silent, and some Arabs are turning a blind eye.
Does this reading of the current state of affairs mean that Suleiman Franjieh’s
accession to the presidency is Lebanon’s interest? Of course not, especially
since it would reaffirm that Hezbollah is the gatekeeper of the Presidential
Palace. Is Suleiman Franjieh’s election as president inevitable? Politics is
variable; nothing is set, so nothing is inevitable. The most pressing question
for the Lebanese “sovereignist” opposition remains the same. Can the Lebanese
crisis be boiled down to the election of a president?
Would any other figure, even from within the ranks of the opposition, make a
difference without a serious settlement with Hezbollah? The answer is no. The
difference would be purely nominal. It might slow things down, but the result
will be the same so long as the political and security decisions remain in the
hands of Hezbollah. Only once these decisions are made by the state, government,
and constitutional institutions can things change.
Lebanese Forces chief Samir Geagea was right last week. He said that “Franjieh
can make commitments regarding the matters in his hands, but how can he commit
regarding what is not his when the matter is in the hands of Hezbollah?”
However, he overlooked the fact that no other figure who comes to power amid the
current balance of power would have a grip over Hezbollah. Thus, we reiterate
this point for the thousandth time: whatever the position in government, so long
as the status quo does not change, changing it is null and void. Maintaining the
vacuum would be better; it could perhaps allow the opposition to fill this
vacuum by coming together and forming a united force that could draw
international and Arab support. They could thus garner the confidence of the
international and Arab communities and develop realistic strategies for engaging
with Hezbollah; building on a mistake can only lead to a mistake.
Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports
And News published
on May 01-02/2023
Pope reveals he is involved in peace mission after meeting Hungarian prime
minister
The Telegraph/May 1, 2023
The Vatican is involved in a peace mission to try to end the conflict between
Russia and Ukraine, Pope Francis has revealed, adding it was also ready to help
repatriate Ukrainian children taken to Russia or Russian-occupied land. "There
is a mission in course now but it is not yet public. When it is public, I will
reveal it," the Pope told reporters during a flight home after a three-day visit
to Hungary. "I think that peace is always made by opening channels. You can
never achieve peace through closure... This is not easy." The Pope added that he
had spoken about the situation in Ukraine with Viktor Orban, the Hungarian prime
minister and with the Metropolitan of Budapest Hilarion, who is a representative
of the Russian Orthodox Church. "In these meetings we did not just talk about
Little Red Riding Hood. We spoke of all these things. Everyone is interested in
the road to peace," he said. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022,
Francis has pleaded for peace practically on a weekly basis, and has repeatedly
expressed a wish to act as a broker between Kyiv and Moscow. His offer has so
far failed to produce any breakthrough. Pope Francis, 86, has said previously
that he wants to visit Kyiv but also Moscow on a peace mission. Denys Shmyhal,
the Ukraine prime minister, met the pope at the Vatican on Thursday and said he
had discussed a "peace formula" put forward by Ukrainian president Volodymyr
Zelensky. Mr Shmyhal also asked for help in the repatriation of children. Kyiv
estimates nearly 19,500 children have been taken to Russia or Russian-occupied
Crimea since Moscow invaded in February last year, in what it condemns as
illegal deportations. "The Holy See is willing to do this [help repatriate the
children] because it is the right thing," Pope Francis said on the plane. "All
human gestures help but gestures of cruelty don't help. We have to do all that
is humanly possible".
Pope’s health
Francis, who appeared in relatively good condition during the trip, also spoke
of his health following his hospitalisation in late March for what the Vatican
said at the time was bronchitis. He said he felt a strong pain at the end of his
general audience on Mar 29 and tried to sleep. "I did not lose consciousness but
I had a high fever and at 3pm the doctor took me to the hospital right away," he
said. "It was a strong and acute pneumonia in the lower section of the lung.
Thank God I can talk about it. The body responded well to the treatment, thank
God," he said. He was released on Apr 1. A part of one of his lungs was removed
when he was a young man in Argentina more than half a century ago. The Pope said
there were no changes to plans to go to Lisbon in August for an international
youth gathering and then separately to Marseilles and Mongolia.
Sudan conflict descending into ‘full blown
catastrophe,’ UN officials warn
Ali Younis/Arab News/May 01/2023
NEW YORK CITY: Millions of people in Sudan are facing a humanitarian disaster as
the armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and paramilitary group the
Rapid Support Forces becomes a “full-blown catastrophe,” UN and Sudanese
officials warned on Monday.
During a briefing at the UN headquarters in Geneva on the latest developments,
officials from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said 16
million people in Sudan, a third of the population, are in need of assistance,
and 3.7 million, mainly from Darfur province, have been displaced from their
homes as a result of the violence that began on April 15.
Hassan Hamid Hassan, the Sudan’s permanent representative to the UN in Geneva,
said the Rapid Support Forces launched unprovoked attacks against the army and
its installations just hours before a scheduled meeting between the leaders of
both forces.
Fighting erupted in the capital, Khartoum, more than two weeks ago between
troops loyal to Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, the head of Sudan’s regular army, and
his former deputy Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, who commands the Rapid Support Forces,
a heavily armed militia previously aligned with the army.
The two generals seized power from a joint military-civilian transitional
authority in a 2021 coup, two years after the country embarked on a shift to
democracy following the overthrow of authoritarian President Omar Al-Bashir
after months of public protests.
Hassan said at least 30 hospitals and other medical facilities in Sudan can no
longer be used as a result of the continuing fighting. Meanwhile tens of
thousands of people have been displaced and are at serious risk because of the
lack of medical assistance and food shortages, he added.
“The situation in Sudan is worrisome,” said Hassan, adding that at least 512
people have been killed and 4,200 wounded since the fighting began, according to
the country’s Health Ministry.
Abdou Dieng, the UN’s acting resident and humanitarian coordinator in Sudan,
said millions of Sudanese are in need of immediate assistance and millions more
are confined to their homes, unable to access basic necessities.
Speaking from the city of Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast, he said that
according to the World Health Organization, one in four of the lives lost so far
as a result of the conflict could have been saved had their been better access
to medical help. Many health facilities have been forced to close while those
that are still operating face challenges, including shortages of medical
supplies and blood stocks, he added. Dieng blamed both sides in the conflict for
the breakdown of order and the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the
country.
“In internal parts of Sudan, mainly in Khartoum and Darfur, we have seen a
complete lack of respect by the warring parties for their obligations under
international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians and civilian
infrastructure, including humanitarian personnel and assets,” he said.
His office and its staff have relocated to Port Sudan and will remain there to
lead the efforts to help Sudanese civilians, he added. Raouf Mazou, a UN
assistant secretary-general and assistant high commissioner for operations at
UNHCR, the UN’s Refugee Agency, said an estimated 73,000 people have arrived in
neighboring countries, including Chad (30,000), South Sudan (20,000) and Egypt,
since the conflict began, and the UN is helping host countries to register and
provide immediate help to refugees. He added: “In consultation with all
concerned governments and partners, we have arrived at a planning figure of
815,000 people that may flee into the seven neighboring countries.” Of those,
580,000 are expected to be Sudanese nationals, and 235,000 South Sudanese
citizens who might return to their country in what the UN describes as “adverse
conditions.”
Anthony Neal, coordinator of the Sudan INGO Forum, which facilitates
communication and action between international humanitarian and development
agencies operating in Sudan, said the country was already facing a difficult and
complex humanitarian crisis before the current conflict began.
He said the current situation is even more complicated and presents many
challenges to nongovernmental organizations, given that many of their staff have
had to relocate because of the fighting, and the effects the conflict is having
on the banking sector, which is limiting the ability of organizations to pay
workers and support their operations.
Sudan battles risk exodus of 800,000 people -
UN
Reuters/May 01/2023
The United Nations warned on Monday that 800,000 people may flee Sudan as rival
military factions battled in the capital despite a supposed ceasefire and
foreign states wound down evacuations. Hundreds of people have been killed and
thousands wounded over 16 days of battles since disputes between the Sudanese
army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) erupted into conflict on
April 15. There seems little prospect of a quick resolution to the crisis, which
has unleashed a humanitarian disaster, damaged swathes of Khartoum, risked
drawing in regional powers, and reignited conflict in the Darfur region. Both
sides agreed on Sunday to extend a much-violated truce by 72 hours and the UN
told Reuters they may hold truce talks in Saudi Arabia. But air strikes and
artillery rang out on Monday as smoke hung over Khartoum and neighboring cities.
UN refugee deputy chief Raouf Mazou said his agency was planning for an exodus
of 815,000 people including 580,000 Sudanese as well as foreign refugees now
living in the country. Some 73,000 have already left Sudan, he said. Sudanese
who ventured onto the streets were shocked by the transformation. "We saw dead
bodies. The industrial area that was all looted. We saw people carrying TVs on
their backs and big sacks looted from factories," said resident Mohamed Ezzeldin.
Many fear for their lives in the power struggle between the army chief and RSF
head, who had shared control of government after a 2021 coup but fell out over a
planned transition to civilian rule. Tens of thousands of Sudanese have fled
their homes, some congregating in hubs like Atbara northeast of Khartoum while
they work out plans or head for the Egypt and Chad borders. At least 528 people
have been killed and 4,599 wounded, the health ministry said. The United Nations
has reported a similar number of dead but believes the real toll is much higher.
Sudan descends into fierce fighting despite latest truce
The Telegraph/May 1, 2023
Fierce fighting broke out again between Sudan’s army and paramilitaries on
Monday despite the formal extension of a truce, as the United Nations warned the
humanitarian situation had reached “breaking point”. More than 500 people have
been killed since battles erupted on April 15 between Sudan’s de facto leader
Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who leads the regular army, and his ex-deputy Mohamed
Hamdan Daglo, who commands the powerful paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
Millions of Sudanese around the capital have been hiding in their homes with
dwindling food, water, and electricity while jets on bombing raids have drawn
heavy fire from anti-aircraft guns. “Warplanes are flying over southern Khartoum
and anti-aircraft guns are firing at them,” said one resident, while another
witness told AFP he was also hearing “loud gunfire” in the area. Mr Burhan and
Mr Daglo have agreed multiple, poorly observed ceasefires, and extended the
latest formal truce on Sunday by 72 hours, with each side repeatedly blaming the
other for the frequent violations. Millions of Sudanese are trapped in the
country, where aid workers are among the dead, humanitarian facilities have been
looted, and foreign aid groups have been forced to essentially halt all aid
operations. Martin Griffiths, a top UN humanitarian official, said on Sunday
that he was heading to the region to help “bring immediate relief to the
millions of people whose lives have been turned upside down overnight”. “The
humanitarian situation is reaching breaking point,” he said. “Goods essential
for people’s survival are becoming scarce in the hardest-hit urban centres,
especially Khartoum. “The cost of transportation out of the worst-hit areas has
risen exponentially, leaving the most vulnerable unable to relocate to safer
areas.”
Fighting triggers exodus
Some 50,000 people have fled the raging conflict, seeking refuge in neighbouring
countries including Chad, Egypt, and the Central African Republic, the UN's
refugee agency said. The fighting has also triggered an exodus of foreigners and
international staff, with countries the world over launching evacuations by
land, sea, and air. Mr Daglo’s RSF is descended from the Janjaweed unleashed by
former strongman head Omar al-Bashir in Sudan’s Darfur region, leading to war
crimes charges against Mr Bashir and others. Further complicating the
battlefield, Central Reserve Police were being deployed across Khartoum to
“protect citizens’ properties” from looting, the Sudanese police said,
confirming an army statement. The RSF had warned police against joining the
fight. The US Treasury Department last year sanctioned the Central Reserve for
“serious human rights abuses” related to its use of “excessive force” against
pro-democracy protests after the October 2021 coup that brought Mr Burhan and Mr
Daglo to power. At least 528 people have been killed and almost 4,600 people
wounded in the violence, according to Sudan’s health ministry, but the death
toll is feared to be far higher. Fighting has spread across Sudan, especially in
the long-troubled Darfur region, where witnesses reported intense conflict and
looting. At least 96 people were reported killed in El Geneina, West Darfur, the
UN said. The UN World Food Programme has warned the unrest could plunge millions
more into hunger in a country where 15 million people were already in need of
aid to stave off famine. Only 16 per cent of health facilities are functioning
in Khartoum, according to the World Health Organisation, with many facilities
shelled. On Sunday, a first Red Cross plane brought eight tonnes of humanitarian
aid from Jordan to Port Sudan, which is so far untouched by the fighting and has
served as an evacuation hub. The aid included surgical material and medical kits
to stabilise 1,500 patients. Regional powers have joined negotiations to help
end the violence. An envoy of Mr Burhan’s met on Sunday in Riyadh with Prince
Faisal bin Farhan, the Saudi Arabian foreign minister, who called for the
restoration of calm in Sudan, his ministry said. Egypt has called an Arab League
meeting of its permanent delegates on Monday to discuss the “situation in
Sudan”.
Saudi-Iran rapprochement visible in Sudan evacuation effort
DUBAI (Reuters)/Mon, May 1, 2023
The growing rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran after years of mistrust was
visible on Monday as Saudi Arabia helped evacuate Iranian citizens fleeing the
war in Sudan. The Saudi navy carried the 65 Iranian citizens from Port Sudan to
Jeddah and they will fly onwards to Tehran. Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesperson
Nasser Kanaani called the transfer "a positive event" that had taken place
thanks to Saudi-Iranian cooperation. Ahmed al-Dabais, a senior Saudi military
officer handling the operation, told Iranian evacuees that the two countries
were good friends and brothers and they should regard the kingdom as their own
country, in a video carried by local television. Saudi Arabia, across the Red
Sea from Sudan, has been a major hub for the evacuation effort as countries have
worked to pull thousands of foreign citizens out of the conflict that suddenly
erupted on April 15. Revolutionary Shi'ite Muslim Iran and conservative, Sunni
Saudi Arabia had feuded for years, backing opposing sides in wars and political
struggles across the Middle East in a tussle for influence that fed conflicts
and inflamed sectarian hatred. Saudi Arabia cut off diplomatic relations in 2016
after Iranian protesters stormed the kingdom's Tehran embassy following Riyadh's
execution of a Shi'ite Muslim cleric. However, the two major oil producers
agreed to end their rift and reopen diplomatic missions in a deal brokered in
March by China.
Israeli FM to Visit Brussels Aiming to Change
EU Positions on Iran, Middle East
Tel Aviv - Asharq Al-Awsat/Monday, 1 May, 2023
Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen announced that he would fly to Brussels on
Tuesday to meet several EU leaders, including European Union foreign policy
chief Josep Borrell, after previously stating that he wasn't welcome in Israel.
Israel wants to open a new page in relations, eyeing to secure European support
against Iran and calming tensions in the Middle Eastern. Political sources in
Tel Aviv said Cohen received signals from Europe that made him rush to Brussels
to improve relations, namely from the President of the European Commission,
Ursula von der Leyen. Von der Leyen had angered Palestinians after she praised
Israel’s democracy in comments to mark the 75th anniversary of Israel's
foundation. In a video message posted by the EU embassy in Israel, von der Leyen
paid tribute to Israel as "a vibrant democracy in the heart of the Middle East,"
adding: "You have made the desert bloom." Cohen is also scheduled to meet the
President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, and the Union
Commissioner for Neighborhood Affairs, Oliver Varhelyi. According to the
sources, Cohen will try to change their views that are opposed to Israel’s
contested judicial overhaul. He also intends to focus on influencing European
positions on Iran. A diplomatic source in the Foreign Ministry said it has
become clear that Iran is seeking nuclear armament, proceeding with its plan for
hegemony in the Middle East, and devoting extraordinary efforts to amplify its
military arsenal and its arms. Cohen aims to ensure that the EU would take a
tougher stance on Iran's repeated violations of its nuclear commitments before
June's meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors.
The FM expects European officials to ask him difficult questions about Israeli
practices in the Palestinian territories, especially in settlement expansion.
Borrell is also expected to address the issue of his visit to the region,
calling on Israel to revoke its decision to impede his trip. The follow-up
committee for National and Islamic Forces in Palestine had condemned von der
Leyen's praise of Israel. In a statement, they said her comments align with the
Israeli narrative that erases the Palestinian people and denies their deep roots
in the land and their inalienable right to self-determination. The committee
called on the European Union to assume responsibility and clarify its position
on von der Leyen's statements. It wondered whether Western democracy and
modernity mean it is acceptable to occupy the lands of others, kill and displace
its people, and establish an apartheid regime.
Jordan FM: Regional Talks with Syria Step
toward Solution
Asharq Al-Awsat/Monday, 1 May, 2023
Jordan's top diplomat said on Monday that regional talks with Syria are a step
in the right direction to end a decade of the war-torn country’s political
isolation and bring Damascus back into the Arab fold. Jordanian Foreign Minister
Ayman Safadi's remarks came as Jordan hosted a meeting of envoys from Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, Egypt and Syria. Before the meeting kicked off, Safadi met
one-on-one with his Syrian counterpart, Faisal Mekdad. Damascus is slowly
returning to the Arab fold after being ostracized over President Bashar Assad’s
brutal crackdown on a 2011 peaceful uprising that descended into a yearslong
civil war. However, as Assad consolidated control over most of the country in
recent years, Syria’s neighbors have begun to take steps toward rapprochement.
The Jordanian Foreign Ministry said the meeting on Monday came as a follow-up to
talks with Arab Gulf countries, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt held in Saudi Arabia last
month and focused on a “Jordanian initiative to reach a political solution to
the Syrian crisis.”“There was clarity and honesty,” Safadi said of the talks in
Amman. “This meeting is the beginning of an Arab-led political path to reach a
solution to the crisis." The diplomats also discussed Syria's humanitarian
needs, especially in light of the devastating Feb. 6 earthquake that struck
parts of Türkiye and Syria, drug smuggling across Syria's borders and the
refugee crisis from the Syrian war. “We agreed on mechanisms to start organizing
their (the refugees') safe and voluntary returns, in coordination with the
United Nations,” he added. The outreach to Damascus picked up pace after the
February earthquake. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan visited
Damascus last month for the first time since the Kingdom cut ties with Syria
more than a decade ago. The Kingdom will host a meeting of the Arab League this
month, where many expect to see the start — if not full return — of Syria's
membership. Safadi declined to comment when asked about a precise date on
Syria's possible return to the league, saying it was up to the member states to
make that decision.
Arab ministers discuss how to normalise ties with Syria
AMMAN (Reuters)/Mon, May 1, 2023
A group of Arab foreign ministers held a landmark meeting with their Syrian
counterpart in Jordan on Monday to discuss how to normalise ties with Syria as
part of a political settlement of the country's more than decade-old conflict,
officials said. The talks are the first between Syria's government and a group
of Arab countries since a decision to suspend Syria's membership of the Arab
League in 2011 after a crackdown on protests against President Bashar al-Assad.
Jordan has called on Syria to engage with Arab states jointly on a step-by-step
roadmap to end the conflict, tackling the issues of refugees, detainees, drug
smuggling and Iran-backed militias in Syria - all of which affect its neighbours.
Before the ministers of Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan sat down to
talks in Amman, Syrian foreign minister Faisal Mekdad met bilaterally with his
Jordanian counterpart Ayman Safadi, according to the Jordanian foreign ministry.
They discussed refugees, water issues and border security, including the fight
against drug smuggling, the ministry said. Amman has been fighting armed groups
smuggling narcotics from Syria, including the highly-addictive amphetamine
captagon. Jordan is both a destination and a main transit route to the oil-rich
Gulf countries for captagon. On Monday, Jordan's state television said the
military had thwarted a drug smuggling operation from Syria, leaving one
smuggler dead and the rest fleeing back into Syrian territory. The meeting comes
two weeks after talks in the Saudi city of Jeddah between the Gulf Cooperation
Council, as well as Egypt, Jordan and Iraq, failed to reach agreement on Syria's
possible return to the Arab fold. Arab states and those most impacted by the
conflict are trying to reach consensus on whether to invite Assad to the Arab
League summit on May 19 in Riyadh, to discuss the pace of normalising ties with
Assad and on what terms Syria could be allowed back. Regional superpower Saudi
Arabia long resisted normalising relations with Assad but said after its
rapprochement with Iran - Syria's key regional ally - a new approach was needed
with Damascus, which is under Western sanctions.
At the Jeddah meeting there was resistance to the move to invite Assad to the
Arab League summit, with Qatar, Jordan and Kuwait saying it was premature before
Damascus agrees to negotiate a peace plan. Safadi on Sunday met with visiting
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf,
officials said. Washington, which said it would not change its policy towards
the Syrian government which it terms a "rogue" state, has urged Arab states to
get something in return for engaging with Assad.
Police Chief Killed by Gunmen in Iran's
Balochistan
London – Tehran – Asharq Al-Awsat/Monday, 1 May, 2023
An Iranian policeman and his wife were shot dead on Sunday by unknown gunmen in
Balochistan province, bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan, according to Iranian
media. Governor of Saravan Saeed Tajlili told Tasnim News Agency that Lieutenant
Colonel Ali-Reza Shahraki had been assassinated inside his car at a crossroad in
Saravan. State-owned IRNA agency announced that Shahraki's wife was seriously
injured in the attack and later succumbed to her injuries. The governor asserted
that an investigation was launched to identify the perpetrators. The attacks,
whose motives remain unclear, have recently increased in the country.
Balochistan is a Sunni-majority province in southeastern Iran and has been one
of the hotbeds of tension over the past months in the wave of protests that
began last fall after the death of a Kurdish woman, Mahsa Amini, in police
custody. The most significant number of deaths during the protests occurred in
Balochistan. Residents have complained for years of persecution and deprivation
for ethnic and sectarian reasons. According to the Oslo-based Iran Human Rights
organization, 134 demonstrators have been killed in various cities of
Balochistan province, and at least 21 protesters are at risk of execution.
Balochistan is still one of the volatile areas in Iran, although the authorities
have managed to quell the protests to a large extent. Friday prayers and the
sermons of the most prominent Sunni cleric, Abdul Hamid Ismaeelzehi, became the
focus of protests. Ismaeelzehi insists in his speeches to hold those responsible
for the shooting accountable, especially on "Bloody Friday," when about 90
demonstrators were killed in Zahedan city. Local news site Haalvsh reported that
the security services arrested Sunni cleric Abdul Aziz Omarzahi, a professor at
Dar al-Uloom in the Makki Mosque in Zahedan.
The Tasnim news agency, affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC),
stated that Omarzahi was an influential figure in the riots. Meanwhile, local
sources reported that at least six people were executed in Zahedan prisons on
charges of retribution and drug trafficking.
Last year, the province recorded 174 executions of Baloch nationals, equivalent
to 30 percent of Iran's total, according to Iran Human Rights. The organization
indicated in its annual statistics that 121 people were executed in the province
on charges of drug trafficking, and 52 people faced retribution sentences,
including three women.
Israeli opposition leader says no progress on judicial
overhaul talks
JERUSALEM (Reuters)/Mon, May 1, 2023
Israeli parties have made no progress towards a compromise over the government's
bitterly disputed judicial overhaul package after a month of meetings, Benny
Gantz, head of the largest opposition party, said on Monday. The planned
overhaul, which would give the government control over naming judges to the
Supreme Court and let parliament override many rulings, was paused after some of
the biggest street protests ever seen in Israel. President Isaac Herzog has
overseen meetings between various political parties, aiming to overcome
divisions. The government says the overhaul is needed to rein in activist judges
and restore balance between parliament and the courts. However, Gantz, defence
minister in the previous government, said the talks were "not really progressing
on any of the issues". In particular, he pointed to a standoff over one of the
central issues, the makeup of the Judicial Selection Committee, which appoints
judges and would be controlled by members from the government camp under current
plans. "We set out with a number of principles, first and foremost that there
will be no politicization of the judicial system. It hasn't changed and it won't
change," he said, as the Knesset parliament returned from its spring break.
Opponents say the proposals would remove vital checks and balances and give
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's nationalist-religious coalition free rein,
threatening minority rights and undermining Israel's democratic foundations.
Hundreds of thousands of protesters have taken to the streets every week since
the start of the year, with opponents including most of the business
establishment, lawyers, academics and significant numbers of military
reservists. The dispute drew in the army, with Defence Minister Yoav Gallant
warning that the divisions were threatening national security and calling for a
halt. The comments prompted Netanyahu to fire Gallant before reversing course
after an outcry. The government and supporters have said they hope for
compromise but have vowed not to back down and have organised large counter
demonstrations.
Israel's judicial proposals prompt startups to relocate -govt
agency
JERUSALEM (Reuters)/Mon, May 1, 2023
The government's plan to overhaul the judicial system is harming investor
confidence and pushing high-tech firms to relocate abroad, Israel's state-backed
agency that supports high-tech companies said on Monday. A survey by the Israel
Innovation Authority found 80% of startups established so far this year were
opened outside Israel and that companies also intend to register their future
intellectual property overseas - which would result in a severe blow to Israel's
tax coffers. Israel's high-tech sector employs 10% of the country's workforce
accounting for around 15% of economic output, more than half of exports and a
quarter of tax income. Proposals by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's
hard-right coalition to give the government greater say in the selection of
judges while limiting the Supreme Court's power to strike down legislation have
worried current and potential investors. Final approval has been delayed after
widespread protests to try and find a compromise between proponents and
opponents. "Even if the legal-judicial crisis is solved, it will take time to
reach a solution, and even after this, it will take time to build confidence
with investors once more," said Dror Bin, chief executive of the Innovation
Authority, adding that the legal plan was exacerbating harm from a weaker
economy. In a report delivered to of Innovation, Science and Technology Minister
Ofir Akunis, the authority cited a significant gap between tech stocks traded in
Tel Aviv and on Nasdaq. While the Nasdaq is up 17% this year, Israel's tech
index is down 4%. Should the gap widen further, "many Israeli hi-tech companies
will find it very hard to raise investment and will be forced to close or move
to other countries," it said. It added that high-tech fundraising in the first
quarter was just $1.7 billion, the lowest quarterly figure since 2019. The
authority recommended a number of steps such as easing regulations, incentives
to encourage investment and incentives for startups to register intellectual
property in Israel. "The findings...require the government to take rapid action
in order to reverse the worrying trends it highlights," said Akunis, a long-time
Netanyahu adviser.
Palestinians: Israeli fire kills teen in West Bank raid
TEL AVIV, Israel (AP)/Mon, May 1, 2023
Israeli forces fatally shot a Palestinian teenager in a raid in the occupied
West Bank on Monday, the Palestinian Health Ministry said, part of a relentless
wave of violence that has rocked the region for the last year. The Israeli
military said gunmen opened fire at soldiers on an arrest raid and the troops
shot back. The military has been staging near-nightly raids in West Bank cities,
towns and villages in what it says is an attempt to stamp out militancy. Dozens
of Palestinians have been killed by Israeli fire this year and 19 people have
been killed in Palestinian attacks against Israelis during that time. The
Palestinian Health Ministry identified the teen as Jibril al-Laada, 17. It said
three others were seriously wounded in the fighting, which took place in the
Aqabat Jabr refugee camp near the West Bank city of Jericho. The camp has been a
frequent target of Israeli raids. Israel launched the raids after a spate of
Palestinian attacks last spring. That set off some of the worst fighting between
Israel and Palestinians in the West Bank in years and while Israel says the
raids are meant to thwart future attacks, violence against Israelis does not
appear to be slowing. Nearly 150 Palestinians were killed in the West Bank and
east Jerusalem last year, making 2022 the deadliest year in those areas since
2004, according to leading Israeli rights group B'Tselem. Casualties have spiked
this year, with 98 Palestinians killed by Israeli fire, with just under half of
those affiliated with militant groups, according to a tally by The Associated
Press. Israel says most of those killed have been armed fighters, but youths
protesting the incursions have also been killed as have people not involved in
the confrontations. The Palestinians see the raids as a further entrenchment of
Israel's 56-year, open-ended occupation. The Palestinians seek the West Bank,
the Gaza Strip and east Jerusalem for their hoped-for independent state. Israel
captured those territories in the 1967 Mideast war.
Fraught US-Israel ties on display as Knesset reconvenes
TEL AVIV, Israel (AP)/Mon, May 1, 2023
Israeli lawmakers are reconvening after a month-long parliament recess on
Monday, resuming the fight over a contentious government plan to overhaul the
judiciary that has split Israelis and drawn concern from Israel's most important
ally, the United States.
The tensions will be on full display when the highest-ranking Republican
politician in the U.S., House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, addresses the Knesset
later Monday. Israel’s government has portrayed McCarthy’s visit as a nod to
bipartisan U.S. support for Israel as it marks 75 years since its creation.
Critics say the rare honor given to McCarthy — he’s only the second House
speaker to address the Knesset, after Newt Gingrich in 1998 — is a pointed jab
at Democratic President Joe Biden. Biden has publicly voiced concern about the
legal overhaul and, largely because of it, has so far denied Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu a typically customary invitation to the White House after his
election win late last year. McCarthy's speech underscores the fraught ties
between Netanyahu and the Biden White House, driven in part by the legal
overhaul and the nationalistic character of the Israel's furthest-right
government in its history. It is also a sign of the gradual transformation of
Israel from a bipartisan matter into a wedge issue in U.S. politics. The trend
goes back a decade, when Netanyahu began openly siding with Republicans against
Democrats. In parallel, some younger progressive Democrats have become more
critical of Israel. McCarthy is addressing the Knesset at a time when both
Republicans and Democrats are steeling for presidential nomination races.
Republicans are seeking to portray themselves to voters, especially to
evangelical Christians, as the best ally to Israel. McCarthy and Netanyahu met
face to face ahead of the Knesset address and the Republican lavished praise on
the Israeli leader, saying his “leadership, character and courage” inspire
Americans. Netanyahu said the Knesset would welcome McCarthy “with open arms.”
Before parliament's break, Netanyahu paused judicial overhaul plans under
intense pressure, which has included large weekly protests, a labor strike and
threats by military reservists to stop showing up for duty. Biden waded into the
criticism, saying Netanyahu “cannot continue down this road.”
While Netanyahu and Biden have known each other for decades, their relationship
has soured since Netanyahu returned to office late last year after a brief break
as opposition leader. The Biden administration has voiced unease about
Netanyahu's government, made up of ultranationalists who were once at the
fringes of Israeli politics and now hold senior positions dealing with the
Palestinians and other sensitive issues.
Over the years, Netanyahu, a lifelong conservative with American-accented
English and deep ties to the U.S., hasn't hidden his Republican leanings even as
he's spoken of the importance of keeping Israel a bipartisan issue. In 2015, he
delivered a speech to Congress against the Iran nuclear deal which was widely
seen as a slight against the Obama administration, which had negotiated the
agreement. He was accused of backing Republican Mitt Romney's candidacy for
president and was one of President Donald Trump's closest international
supporters. That Republican tilt has tested ties with American Jews, most of
whom lean Democratic.
Eytan Gilboa, an expert on U.S.-Israel relations, said there's been “serious
damage” to Israel's ties to Washington, and that Netanyahu himself “broke the
bipartisanship” surrounding Israel. The McCarthy visit, he said, was a way for
both Republicans and Netanyahu to stick it to Biden.
“It's a counterweight to Biden,” he said. “Netanyahu thinks that if McCarthy
visits here it will put pressure on the White House to invite him. Republicans
are fighting over who's the greatest supporter of Israel.” The White House snub
is another sore point for the embattled leader, whose legal plan has plunged
Israel into one of its worst domestic crises, sent his Likud party tanking in
public opinion polls and tarnished the 73-year-old leader's legacy. In an
interview Sunday with the conservative Israel Hayom daily, McCarthy said that if
Biden doesn't invite Netanyahu to the White House, he will invite him to
Congress.
The month-long parliamentary break has allowed Israelis to take stock of the
tensions set off by the legal plan, which had been proceeding at a feverish pace
in the previous session and had reached a boiling point after Netanyahu
dismissed his dissenting defense minister. The future of the plan isn’t clear.
Netanyahu said he was temporarily suspending the drive to change Israel’s
judicial system to allow the coalition and the opposition to come to a
negotiated compromise. But the talks don’t appear to have produced many
agreements and Netanyahu’s allies are pushing him to move ahead if the talks
fail.
He’s also facing pressure from the streets — tens of thousands of people who
support the overhaul filled the area near parliament on Thursday as a show of
force in favor of the legal changes. Protests against the overhaul have
continued for 17 weeks, including during the parliament recess, with as much
intensity.
At a meeting of his Cabinet on Sunday, Netanyahu struck a conciliatory tone. “We
are making every effort to resolve this debate through dialogue. With goodwill
by both sides, I am convinced that it is possible to reach agreements — and I
give this my full backing,” he said.
As parliament reconvenes, Netanyahu is expected to keep a focus on less divisive
issues in the coming weeks, such as passing a budget at a time when Israel’s
economy is on shaky ground and inflation is rising.
But he will also face hurdles. He is up against a court-ordered deadline in
July, which requires the government to legislate a military draft law about the
near-blanket exemptions enjoyed by members of Israel’s ultra-Orthodox community.
Instead of serving in the country’s compulsory military, like the majority of
secular Jews, ultra-Orthodox men are allowed to study religious texts. Experts
say this system keeps the growing community cloistered and does not encourage
its integration into the workforce, something seen as necessary to safeguard the
future of Israel’s economy.
Netanyahu, who is on trial for corruption, and his allies say the overhaul is
necessary to rein in an interventionist legal system that has taken power away
from elected politicians. They want to weaken the Supreme Court, have the
government control who becomes a judge and reduce judicial oversight on
legislation. Critics say the changes will upend Israel’s fragile system of
checks and balances and imperil the country’s democratic foundations.
Ukrainian defenders oust Russian forces from some positions
in Bakhmut - Ukraine general
KYIV, May 1 (Reuters)/Mon, May 1, 2023
Ukrainian counterattacks have ousted Russian forces from some positions in the
besieged eastern city of Bakhmut, but the situation remains "difficult", a top
Ukrainian general said in comments released Monday. During the past few months
the battle for Bakhmut has become the fulcrum of a conflict that has seen little
shift in front lines since late last year, leaving both sides looking for a
breakthrough. "The situation is quite difficult," said Col. Gen. Oleksandr
Syrskyi, the commander of ground forces, in a statement on Telegram. "At the
same time, in certain parts of the city, the enemy was counterattacked by our
units and left some positions."Syrskyi made the remarks while visiting
front-line troops on Sunday, the military said. He added that new Russian units,
including paratroopers and fighters from the Wagner mercenary group, were being
"constantly thrown into battle" despite taking heavy losses. "But the enemy is
unable to take control of the city," Syrskyi said. Russian forces have steadily
made incremental gains in Bakhmut, but a Ukrainian military spokesman said on
Sunday it was still possible to supply the defenders with food, ammunition and
medicine. Ukraine said on Monday its forces had repelled more than 36 enemy
attacks on the part of the eastern frontline that stretches from Bakhmut to
Maryinka, just west of Donetsk. Kyiv is preparing to mount a widely expected
counteroffensive to retake swathes of territory in the east and south that was
occupied by Russian forces following the invasion, which Moscow calls a "special
military operation", 15 months ago.
Russia is building defenses deep inside its
own territory, fearing a sweeping Ukrainian counterattack: UK intel
Kieran Corcoran/Business Insider/May 01, 2023
UK officials on Monday noted extensive Russian defense far from the current
front lines. Some are even behind Russia's own borders, suggesting it is worried
about Ukraine attacking there. Ukraine is preparing a counteroffensive, but it
isn't clear that could invade Russia, or wants to. Russia is building defenses
hundreds of miles away from its borders with Ukraine, fearing a counteroffensive
so sweeping it could push into Russian territory, according to British
intelligence. The UK Ministry of Defence posted an update on Twitter Monday
morning, noting the presence of trench networks "well inside internationally
recognised Russian territory including in the Belgorod and Kursk regions." The
reason, per the update, was "Russian leaders' deep concern that Ukraine could
achieve a major breakthrough."Anticipation is building around a long-promised
counterattack from Ukraine, which has for the past months been building its
strength while trying to hold back the grinding advances of the Russian military
through winter. Ukraine's defense minister last week said that the
counteroffensive was mostly ready to go. Ukraine has been organizing new
brigades and has recently received powerful new weapons from Western allies,
including the Leopard, Challenger, and Abrams tanks. The extra troops and
firepower could help achieve a breakthrough in countering the invasion, which
has been mostly static for months. However, a serious effort to invade Russia is
beyond what most observers consider feasible for Ukraine, which has far fewer
resources than Russia and has been focused on defending its own territory.
Ukraine hasn't made any attempts so far to occupy Russian land, and its stated
aim in the war is to restore control over Ukraine's internationally-recognized
territory, including the Crimea peninsula, which Russia has held since 2014.
The UK update noted that the defenses far from the front line might be more of a
propaganda effort to harden the population's resolve by making them think the
Ukrainian military could come close to their homes. "Some works have likely been
ordered by local commanders and civil leaders in attempts to promote the
official narrative that Russia is 'threatened' by Ukraine and NATO," the update
said. The UK update noted that Russia has also been fortifying defensive lines
inside occupied Ukrainian territory, much closer to the fighting. Some of those,
including the town of Medvedivka in Crimea, have been documented in photographs,
including those analyzed in an April 3 article from The Washington Post.
Canadian federal workers get May Day deal to end strike
OTTAWA (Reuters)/Mon, May 1, 2023
Canada's government struck an agreement with 120,000 federal workers on Monday,
effectively ending the country's largest public sector strike in history, which
had crippled services from passport renewals to immigration. While most strikers
are set to return to work after almost two weeks of deadlock, more than 35,000
revenue agency workers who also went on strike on April 19 are still
negotiating, the Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) union said. That will
continue to slow down the processing of annual tax returns. "This agreement
delivers important gains for our members that will set the bar for all workers
in Canada," PSAC President Chris Aylward said in a statement. PSAC said it had
secured a total wage increase of 12.6% over four years, having turned down an
offer of 9% over three years when it called the strike. The deal includes a
one-off payment of C$2,500 ($1,845). PSAC fell short of getting work from home
enshrined in the collective bargaining agreement as the Treasury Board - the
federal employer - refused. But there is an deal to address remote work requests
individually and in writing, which opens up the government to the employee
grievance process.
This is the first new contract to be negotiated since the COVID-19 pandemic hit,
which forced millions to work remotely. The deal "will have a ripple effect,
quite frankly, for the rest of Canada," said Canadian Labour Congress President
Bea Bruske told Reuters before the agreement had been finalized. "All large
private sector employers and all the other provincial and territorial
governments" are going to take note of the details of the deal, Bruske said. On
remote work, the Treasury Board said that up to three days a week from home
would be allowed - as was the case already - and that departmental panels would
be created to address employee concerns. "These deals are fair, competitive, and
reasonable, and bring stability to public servants and Canadians," Treasury
Board President Mona Fortier said in a statement. PSAC had been in collective
bargaining for a new contract since 2021, causing delays and disruptions in
services such as immigration and passport renewals. ($1 = 1.3547 Canadian
dollars)
Armenian, Azerbaijani ministers hold talks in
US over Karabakh dispute
LBCI/Mon, May 1, 2023
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met the foreign ministers of Armenia and
Azerbaijan in Washington on Monday as part of efforts to ease friction between
the South Caucasus rivals. Tensions have flared anew after Azerbaijan installed
a road checkpoint at the start of the Lachin Corridor, the only route linking
Armenia to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory.
Karabakh is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, but home to mostly
ethnic Armenians. Azerbaijan committed to keeping the route open as part of a
Russian-brokered ceasefire in 2020 that ended a six-week war between the two
countries. Azerbaijan said it had established the
checkpoint in response to what it said were Armenian weapon supplies to
Nagorno-Karabakh. Yerevan denies that charge. The talks - bilaterals between
Blinken and each foreign minister as well as a three-way discussion - were not
expected to yield a breakthrough. A senior State
Department official said Washington's "goal is to make sure that the ministers
are able to sit down and talk to each other... But it's most important that the
two of them are able to continue their negotiations."
Washington previously said it was "deeply concerned" by Azerbaijan establishing
the checkpoint. The official also said the United States was disappointed Russia
had taken a negative view of the meeting taking place in Washington. The
stand-off is seen as a test of Russia's resolve to mediate disputes in the
region. Armenia - formally an ally of Russia through a mutual self-defense pact
- has repeatedly called on Moscow to use its peacekeeping force to stop what it
calls Azerbaijan's "gross violation" of the peace deal.
The parties have agreed to hold talks in Moscow at some point in the
future, though no date has been set yet. Negotiations over a longer-term peace
deal between the two sides after another military flare-up last year quickly
stalled as Armenia pushed for the European Union and France to have a bigger
mediating role, but Azerbaijan rejected.
Emiri decree issued to dissolve Kuwaiti
parliament - KUNA
Reuters/May 01/2023
Kuwait's news agency KUNA said on Monday that an Emiri decree had been issued to
dissolve the parliament. The cabinet submitted the decree to the Crown Prince
Sheikh Meshal al-Ahmad al-Sabah earlier on Monday, according to a previous
statement by KUNA.
The Latest LCCC English analysis &
editorials from miscellaneous sources published
on May 01-02/2023
What If Erdogan Wins Next Month’s Turkish Elections?
Sinan Ciddi/The National Interest/May 01/2023
Should Erdogan be re-elected next month, many will inevitably ask “whose fault
is this” and “what comes next?”
There are intense and often heated differences between Turkey watchers over the
outcome of the presidential elections that are just around the corner on May 14.
Individuals have really dug into their respective camps with little room left in
the middle: folks are convinced that Recep Tayyip Erdogan will definitely win or
lose by a large margin. Both sides cite relatively compelling narratives for
their position based on a myriad of explanatory factors: their experience as
journalists or scholars, or, based on references to polls, the country’s
economic situation.
The truth is, at this point in the calendar, it’s a guessing game. For my part,
I am on record predicting that Erdogan has a greater chance of holding onto
power for a third five-year term than opposition candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu
has of winning. I have attempted to explain my rationale in other opinion pieces
and interviews. At this point, however, it is worth pondering, should my
prediction come to pass, who or what factors will account for Erdogan staying in
office?
To begin, there is the most obvious element: Turkish voters themselves. In the
event that Erdogan scores a legitimate victory, much of that could be attributed
to voter demands. The majority of Turks going to the polls on May 14 will not
prioritize the rule of law, democracy, and other governance issues as their top
priority. If they did, we would not see Erdogan polling in the 40 percent
margins. Instead, voters are primarily motivated by their desire to hedge: “in
voting, who do I believe will take care of my economic interests?” To address
this motivation, Erdogan has turned on the monetary taps in the last few weeks:
bonuses for retirees, free natural gas to households, and increases to the
minimum wage. Kilicdaroglu’s problem here is that he is not in a position to
convince voters that he can deliver better on pocketbook issues than Erdogan—the
latter is already in a position to demonstrate such and thus tempt voters. He
controls the purse strings of state resources, which are already being utilized
to buy citizens’ votes.
By contrast, French and Israeli citizens have recently taken to the streets,
protesting about governance issues they feel threaten the very viability of
their democratic futures. In France, largely over the non-deliberative way in
which the age of retirement was raised, voters are demanding government
accountability. In Israel, in defiance of the government’s attempt to curtail
judicial independence, citizens have engaged in mass protests. In both cases,
voters are motivated by democratic governance issues. If a significant number of
Turks attempted to replicate these two examples, the Erdogan government would
likely use brute force to suppress such challenges, as displayed during the Gezi
Park protests of 2013.
Linked to voter demands is the main opposition, the “Nation Alliance”—the six
opposition parties who took the decision to nominate Kemal Kilicdaroglu as their
candidate. Unfortunately, one can observe that, from the outset, this opposition
bloc never prioritized the rule of law and democratic governance issues beyond
rhetoric. Instead, it has been focused on the division of political spoils. The
process of deciding who the alliance’s presidential candidate would be, for
example, turned into a dysfunctional squabble and nearly broke apart the
alliance. Given that the alliance’s main campaign promise is to transition
Turkey back to a parliamentary system of governance (that would deprioritize the
powers and position of the presidency), one wonders why alliance leaders fought
so hard on who the presidential candidate would be. If the objective was to
defeat Erdogan and re-establish the rule of law and democratic governance in
Turkey, numbers suggest that nominating Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu would have
been the best choice. Kilicdaroglu’s insistence on being the nominee instead
lays bare the limits of the opposition’s democratic priorities. The intense
rivalry to become the presidential nominee has been mirrored in the debates over
determining the list of parliamentary candidates. Until the April 12 deadline
(when all parties have to submit their parliamentary candidate lists), intense
horse-trading over which party in the alliance would allot how many safe seats
was the focus of attention. This basically signaled to voters the one thing they
are already relatively accustomed to: politicians and political parties are only
interested in securing their positions in government.
Throw into the mixture that there are two independent candidates, which divides
the opposition vote, and the chances of defeating Erdogan in the first round of
voting. More importantly, however, the candidacies of Muharrem Ince—who dismally
ran against Erdogan in 2018 and failed—and Sinan Ogan are widely perceived as
opportunistic, spurred on by Erdogan to tarnish and divide the opposition camp.
In the final analysis, supposing an Erdogan victory, voters will be grievously
let down by opposition political elites who did their very best to not defeat
Erdogan. In the event that Kilicdaroglu loses, much of the blame will be
attributed to his lackluster candidacy.
Of course, none of these explanatory factors considers the possibility of
chicanery and foul play that may come to determine who ultimately wins the
presidency. There is a decent chance that undemocratic means may be utilized by
Erdogan and/or state institutions to ensure a third term for the country’s
longest-serving leader. In many ways this is already apparent: the Supreme
Election Council has already accepted Erdogan’s unconstitutional candidacy to
run for president. Additionally, there is little by way of press freedoms and
access to media coverage that is not already exclusively pro-Erdogan.
A third term for Erdogan will likely curtail what remains of Turkey’s faltering
democracy. Erdogan will likely use this opportunity to crack down on what little
remains of critical voices within the country’s media and public space, while at
the same time trying to turn a new page with the country’s allies in the West.
By whatever means Erdogan is able to secure victory, both Washington and Europe
will likely choose to remain silent and find new ways to work with him, based on
their respective interests. If his re-election is perceived to be illegitimate,
don’t expect the West to call this out. A new Erdogan term will likely result in
old ways of finding paths to accommodate him.
*Sinan Ciddi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies, where he contributes to FDD’s Turkey Program and Center on Military
and Political Power. Follow Sinan on Twitter @SinanCiddi. FDD is a nonpartisan
research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
The Biden Administration's Vacuum of
Leadership
Majid Rafizadeh/Gatestone Institute/May 01/2023
The vacuum of leadership can also now be seen in Sudan conflict. The Biden
administration has reportedly abandoned 16,000 US citizens in the country, who
were left there to make "life or death decisions".
"[Y]ou had President Xi in Moscow with Putin earlier this week, you have a China
negotiating relations and some sort of normalization between Saudi Arabia and
Iran is all evidence of a vacuum that's been created... It's a vacuum of
American leadership. It's one of the reasons why we need strong bold leader,
we're the leader of the free world. And if America is not leading in the free
world, the free world is not being led." – Former Vice President Mike Pence,
interview with radio host John Catsimatidis on WABC 770 AM, March 23, 2023.
The ruling mullahs of Iran have also become a major exporter of weapons to
Russia – and are not limiting themselves to exporting just drones.
The vacuum that the Biden administration has left across the world as well as a
result of its failure to lead is not only effectively handing the US over to
China, Russia and Iran; it is also apparently viewed by these rogue states as a
green light to act in whatever malign way they want.
Russia is taking over Sudan, reportedly for its gold and to build a port that
will be able to block shipping through the Suez Canal. Iran's ruling mullahs
have reportedly poisoned "hundreds of schoolgirls" to try to discourage them
from receiving an education. Last week, another oil tanker was seized in the
Gulf of Oman; and an interrogator recently broke the kneecaps of a 70-year old
grandmother, a political prisoner serving 10 years in prison.
Why is the United States allowing this monstrous Iranian regime to acquire
nuclear weapons?
The vacuum of leadership can now be seen in Sudan conflict. The Biden
administration has reportedly abandoned 16,000 US citizens in the country, who
were left there to make "life or death decisions". Pictured: German Army
soldiers return to Wunstorf air base on April 28, 2023 from Sudan, where they
evacuated more than 700 people from over 40 nations. (Photo by Ronny Hartmann/AFP
via Getty Images)
Due to the vacuum of leadership that the Biden administration has left on the
global stage, China, Russia and the Iranian regime have become more empowered
and emboldened than ever -- a situation that helps the Iranian regime to skirt
US sanctions. It also enables the ruling mullahs to gain access to funds and
advanced military materiel, empower its militia and terror groups in region, and
especially accelerate its race towards acquiring nuclear weapons.
The vacuum of leadership can also now be seen in Sudan conflict. The Biden
administration has reportedly abandoned 16,000 US citizens in the country, who
were left there to make "life or death decisions".
"I am incredibly shocked and disgusted by the American lackluster response to
the health and safety of their citizens," a woman named Muna Daoud, whose
parents were trying to get out of Sudan, stated.
"To be honest with you, the State Department was useless, utterly useless
throughout this entire period," said a man named Imad, whose parents were also
trying to get out of Sudan.
According to a report by Politico on April 12:
"China and Russia are in advanced secret talks with Iran to replenish the
Islamic Republic's supply of a key chemical compound used to propel ballistic
missiles, diplomats familiar with the matter say, a move that would mark a clear
violation of United Nations sanctions and possibly help Moscow replenish its
depleted stock of rockets...
"The exact quantity of AP Iran is seeking to purchase isn't clear, but the
diplomats familiar with its plans estimate it would be sufficient to build
thousands of rockets, including the Zolfaghar missile, which has a range of 700
kilometers and has been used by both Iran and its proxies in the Middle East in
recent years. If the deal goes through, some of those rockets could end up being
deployed against Ukraine, the diplomats said."
The ruling mullahs of Iran have also become a major exporter of weapons to
Russia – and are not limiting themselves to exporting just drones.
On another front, the Chinese Communist Party and the ruling Islamist mullahs of
Iran, when it comes to exporting Tehran's oil to China, have been violating US
sanctions. During the Biden Administration, Iran and China have become so
empowered that, in violation of the U.S. law and individual freedoms and rights,
they are increasingly employing repression on American soil.
Recently, for example, the FBI arrested two men, both US citizens, for allegedly
operating a Chinese "secret police station" in Manhattan's Chinatown district.
Safeguard Defenders, a human rights organization based in Europe, was among the
publications reporting the existence of dozens of Chinese police "service
stations" in major cities around the world, including New York and "at least 6
more cities."
According to Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen of the Justice
Department's National Security Division:
"These cases demonstrate the lengths the PRC government will go to silence and
harass U.S. persons who exercise their fundamental rights to speak out against
PRC oppression. These actions violate our laws and are an affront to our
democratic values and basic human rights."
The Iranian regime also hired people to assassinate senior US officials on
American soil and attempted to kidnap a journalist.
"A lot of these are new tactics and lines that are being crossed that we have
not seen China and Iran do on U.S. soil in previous investigations," one FBI
counterintelligence official stated.
"We've really seen an inflection point in the tactics and tools, and the level
of risk and the level of threat that have changed over the past few years,"
another said.
According to the FBI:
"When foreign governments stalk, intimidate, or assault people in the United
States, " , "it is considered transnational repression. It is illegal...
"Transnational repression may take the following forms:
Stalking
Harassment
Hacking
Assaults
Attempted kidnapping
Forcing or coercing the victim to return to the home country
Threatening or detaining family members in the home country
Freezing financial assets
Online disinformation campaigns"
"You're witnessing a vacuum of leadership on the global stage, largely owing to
the failed policies of the Biden administration," former Vice President Mike
Pence noted in an exclusive interview with radio host John Catsimatidis on WABC
770 AM on March 23.
"[Y]ou had President Xi in Moscow with Putin earlier this week, you have a China
negotiating relations and some sort of normalization between Saudi Arabia and
Iran is all evidence of a vacuum that's been created...
"It's a vacuum of American leadership. It's one of the reasons why we need
strong bold leader, we're the leader of the free world. And if America is not
leading in the free world, the free world is not being led."
The vacuum that the Biden administration has left across the world as well as a
result of its failure to lead is not only effectively handing the US over to
China, Russia and Iran; it is also apparently viewed by these rogue states as a
green light to act in whatever malign way they want.
Russia is taking over Sudan, reportedly for its gold and to build a port that
will be able to block shipping through the Suez Canal. Iran's ruling mullahs
have reportedly poisoned "hundreds of schoolgirls" to try to discourage them
from receiving an education. Last week, another oil tanker was seized in the
Gulf of Oman; and an interrogator recently broke the kneecaps of a 70-year old
grandmother, a political prisoner serving 10 years in prison.
Why is United States leadership allowing this monstrous Iranian regime to
acquire nuclear weapons?
*Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a business strategist and advisor, Harvard-educated
scholar, political scientist, board member of Harvard International Review, and
president of the International American Council on the Middle East. He has
authored several books on Islam and US Foreign Policy. He can be reached at
Dr.Rafizadeh@Post.Harvard.Edu
© 2023 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No
part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied
or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.
The United States and Saudi Arabia: A Possible
Path Forward
Memo/FDD/April 28/2023
Bradley Bowman/CMPP Senior Director
Orde Kittrie/Senior Fellow
Ryan Brobst/Research Analyst
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/04/28/the-united-states-and-saudi-arabia/
https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/fdd-memo-the-united-states-and-saudi-arabia-possible-path-forward.pdf
The United States and Saudi Arabia are at a crossroads. The decades-long
arrangement in which the United States essentially guaranteed Saudi security in
return for the reliable export of oil may be on the ropes. Much of Washington is
eager to downsize its commitments in the Middle East to focus on the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and the Indo-Pacific. Meanwhile, Riyadh, for its part,
is contending with a deteriorating regional security environment and declining
trust in American security assurances. Saudi Arabia now reportedly seeks
security guarantees from the United States, reliable and expeditious access to
American weapons, and U.S. cooperation with a civilian nuclear program,
including Saudi enrichment of uranium.1
The Biden administration will likely be unable to agree to Riyadh’s requests
without congressional acquiescence, which seems unlikely owing to anti-Saudi
sentiment among some members of Congress. Riyadh is therefore increasingly
sidling up to Beijing.2 It is not clear whether Riyadh realizes that this
strategy risks sending already-strained U.S.-Saudi relations into a freefall.
Americans of both parties increasingly believe that countries that “side” with
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are not America’s friends (or partners).
So, what comes next? Should the two countries go their separate ways, accepting
a strategic divorce? Or is there a path forward to put the relationship on a
firmer footing and perhaps move toward a strategic partnership agreement that
would be consistent with American interests and address key Saudi concerns? What
could such an agreement look like?
Attempting to answer or at least explore those questions is the purpose of this
memo, which is organized into three sections. The first section describes the
strategic context for the bilateral relationship by detailing what appear to be
the key priorities and concerns in both capitals, summarizing the essential
problems in the relationship, and highlighting the role of the People’s Republic
of China — the elephant (or dragon) in the room. Despite the differences and
disagreements between the United States and Saudi Arabia, the second section
attempts to identify common objectives that the two governments share or around
which they could at least build bilateral consensus. The final section analyzes
seven areas that could perhaps constitute a U.S.-Saudi Arabia strategic
partnership agreement that would serve American interests, address key Saudi
objectives, and garner support in both capitals. Those areas include: security
assurances and cooperation; preventing a nuclear-armed Iran; arms transfers;
oil, gas, and petrochemicals; nuclear energy; terrorism; and human rights.
The Strategic Context
To make sense of what is happening in Washington with respect to Riyadh, one
must take into account the People’s Republic of China. In the United States, a
bipartisan consensus has emerged that Beijing represents the preeminent threat
to the United States. “The PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to
reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic,
military, and technological power to do it,” the Biden administration declared
in its 2022 National Security Strategy.3 “The most comprehensive and serious
challenge to U.S. national security is the PRC’s coercive and increasingly
aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international
system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences,” the Pentagon
assessed in its National Defense Strategy that same year.4
Lest international observers, including those in Riyadh, think this focus on
China is a passing partisan fad that will dissipate when a Republican occupies
the White House, it is worth noting that these assessments regarding the threat
from the PRC are remarkably aligned with the Trump administration’s 2017
National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy.5
Indeed, it is difficult to identify a topic in U.S. foreign policy and national
security thinking that enjoys more consensus among Americans. According to a Pew
Research Center poll published on April 12, 2023, 83 percent of U.S. adults
expressed an unfavorable view of China, including 44 percent who have a very
unfavorable view. Republican and Republican-leaning independents (89 percent)
were only slightly more negative toward China than Democrats and
Democratic-leaning independents (81 percent).6
This bipartisan alignment7 regarding the threat from China has been on full
display in the recent hearings of the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), led by Chairman Mike Gallagher (R-WI) and Ranking Member Raja
Krishnamoorthi (D-IL).8 This negative view of China that spans the American
political divide influences virtually every foreign policy and national security
issue Washington considers. That encompasses most bilateral relationships the
United States manages, including the relationship with Saudi Arabia.
The primary effect has been to incentivize decision makers in Washington to
minimize the investment of finite military resources in the Middle East so that
the Department of Defense can conduct its belated and vital modernization effort
and better deter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. This impulse is grounded in
sound strategic thinking. The essence of strategy, after all, is the
coordination of ends and means and the realization that resources are not
infinite. If the PRC is the leading threat and that threat is most acute in the
Indo-Pacific,9 then risks must inevitably be taken elsewhere (and mitigated as
best as possible).
Accordingly, the United States has reduced its military posture in the Middle
East in recent years. The number of U.S. troops in the Central Command (CENTCOM)
area of operations is down 85 percent from its 2008 peak.10 That is mostly due
to the fact that only about 2,500 U.S. troops remain in Iraq, down from a peak
of over 170,000 U.S. troops there in 2007.11 It is also due, of course, to the
fact that no American forces remain in Afghanistan following the 2021
withdrawal. Approximately 100,000 U.S. troops were there in 2011.12
This reduction in U.S. forces aligns with the prevailing zeitgeist in the United
States. The negative experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan are still fresh for
many Americans. They are often cited by U.S. military leaders as the reason why
the American military is playing catch-up with the Chinese threat.13 A
significant portion of the Pentagon is eager to make the long-awaited “pivot to
Asia.” Meanwhile, longtime proponents of American military withdrawals from the
Middle East on the far left and in the libertarian right are happy to welcome
some hawkish and centrist Americans to the fold, helping to form a potent
coalition pushing for retrenchment.
While these sentiments are understandable on some level, there are a few
problems with them. First, the United States retains important national security
interests in the wider Middle East, including the need to work with partners
there to keep pressure on terror groups so they cannot regain strength and
attack Americans and our homeland.14 The United States also has a vital interest
in countering nuclear proliferation in the region, especially in preventing the
Islamic Republic of Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and avoiding the
potential proliferation cascade an Iranian nuclear bomb could cause.15 Other
important interests include ensuring Israel has the means to defend itself and
securing the freedom of navigation and reliable energy exports that are
fundamental to the security and prosperity of the U.S. and its allies.
Therein lies the fundamental challenge. While the United States must strengthen
its posture and capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, significant additional
military posture reductions in the Middle East could deprive CENTCOM of the
means to secure these interests, increasing the chances that smaller problems
will become bigger crises, potentially forcing Washington to send larger numbers
of U.S. military forces back to the Middle East in the future.16 That is exactly
what happened after the 2011 withdrawal from Iraq, which ignored conditions on
the ground and the advice of commanders.17
That is not an argument for sending tens of thousands of American servicemembers
back to the Middle East. It is, however, an argument for maintaining what the
military calls an “economy-of-force posture” in the region, strengthening
partners, building a combined security architecture (for which Saudi Arabia
would be central), and scrutinizing any further proposed withdrawals. After all,
as former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta wrote, “we must also apply the same
scrutiny to withdrawals” as we do deployments.18
Regardless of American force posture, Washington is eager to avoid any new major
conflicts in the Middle East. A major new war in the Middle East could deal a
body blow to American efforts to deter China in the Indo-Pacific. The paradox,
however, is that when adversaries know the United States will do almost anything
to avoid military conflict, it simply invites more aggression and can increase
the chances of a conflict Washington seeks to avoid.
Another problem with some of the arguments in favor of deeper cuts to U.S.
military posture in the Middle East is that they fail to recognize that U.S.
competition with the PRC is unfolding around the globe, including in the Middle
East.19 The great irony, therefore, is that while the United States is pulling
military forces out of the Middle East to compete with the PRC, Beijing is
increasingly moving into the Middle East.20 Indeed, if additional American
forces depart the region, those smiling and waving goodbye most
enthusiastically, other than perhaps the Iranians, will be the Chinese. The
primary flow of personnel from Beijing to the Middle East has consisted of
diplomats and businesspeople, but Chinese arms sales and security cooperation in
the region are increasing.
Many of America’s partners in the Middle East, including the Saudis, now believe
the United States is a strong power acting like a weak one and that Washington
is interested in little more than finding the nearest exit.21 Meanwhile, even as
American security assurances seem less reliable, Iran is advancing toward a
nuclear weapon, doubling down on its decades-long asymmetrical strategy of
terrorism, and bolstering its drone and missile arsenal.22 These twin
perceptions of increased threat and a less reliable United States are
heightening Saudi Arabia’s sense of insecurity.23
American military power (both deployed forces and the availability of rapid
reinforcements) remains unmatched in the Middle East, but past experiences may
leave Riyadh wondering whether the United States will actually employ its
military strength when push comes to shove. In June 2019, when Iran shot down a
U.S. Global Hawk surveillance drone worth over $100 million, the Trump
administration aborted a military response.24 A few months later, in September,
when Tehran struck Saudi oil infrastructure at Abqaiq and Khurais with a
combination of drones and cruise missiles, the United States again did not
respond with military force.
To be fair, after the Abqaiq attacks, Washington deployed equipment and
personnel to Saudi Arabia to bolster capabilities and deter future attacks,25
but the United States did not respond kinetically.26 Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a
prominent political scientist in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), called the lack
of response “an utter failure and utter disappointment.”27 American inaction
left Riyadh asking fundamental questions about the reliability of American
security assurances.28
The United States now risks being viewed as something akin to a bodybuilder who
looks tough in the gym but is reluctant to throw a punch on the street.
Neighborhood thugs soon learn not to fear him, despite his foreboding
appearance.
Recent events risk confirming such a narrative. U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd
Austin told Congress in March that Iran-backed groups had struck U.S. positions
in Syria and Iraq 83 times since January 2021 — with only four U.S. responses.29
That approach seems tailor-made to invite more attacks and to leave Washington’s
Arab partners with a growing feeling of insecurity. Exacerbating matters, Riyadh
has encountered delays and difficulties in procuring Americans weapons to defend
itself.
To address this growing sense of insecurity, Riyadh appears to be seeking three
things. The first is “firm guarantees that the U.S. will come to the kingdom’s
defense when needed,” according to a March 9, 2023, Wall Street Journal
report.30 The second is more reliable and expeditious access to American
weapons.31 Third, Riyadh wants U.S. support for a civilian nuclear program,
which would include Saudi enrichment of uranium.32
The problem for the Saudis is that in order for the administration to
accommodate these three objectives, Congress must acquiesce. That is virtually
impossible right now, given current sentiment on Capitol Hill stemming from
grievous Saudi actions on the battlefield in Yemen as well as the murder of
Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey in 2018.
Frustrated, Riyadh is increasingly turning to China in a variety of areas. In
recent years, Saudi Arabia has purchased weapons from China after the United
States declined to sell certain systems. Saudi Arabia, for example, ordered
hundreds of Chinese Wing Loong II drones in 2017.33 Saudi Arabia has also signed
partnerships34 with Chinese state-owned firms to design and manufacture other
drones on Saudi soil. And satellite imagery obtained by CNN35 in 2021 revealed
that Saudi Arabia was manufacturing ballistic missiles domestically with Chinese
help.
On the nuclear front, Riyadh and Beijing have reportedly signed several
agreements related to civil nuclear collaboration.36 China is reportedly helping
Saudi Arabia identify and map its mineable uranium ore deposits.37 Unconfirmed
reports also suggest that China has helped the Saudis construct a milling
facility for extracting yellowcake from uranium ore.38
In the diplomatic domain, China brokered a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran in
March 2023 to restore relations.39 Later last month, Saudi Arabia’s cabinet
approved a decision to join the China-dominated Shanghai Cooperation
Organization,40 a clear step away from Washington and toward Beijing.
As troubling as these steps are from an American perspective, it seems unlikely
that Riyadh has made an irreversible decision to break with the United States
and to fully align with Beijing. Instead, Riyadh may be pursuing a strategy to
foster substantive relations with both Washington and Beijing while using
growing ties with Beijing to elicit maximum concessions from the United States —
all the while maintaining the strategic partnership with Washington.
Summarizing the private comments of Saudi officials to them, Wall Street Journal
correspondents Stephen Kalin and Summer Said wrote on March 14, 2023, that “the
crown prince has said he expects that by playing major powers against each
other, Saudi Arabia can eventually pressure Washington to concede to its demands
for better access to U.S. weapons and nuclear technology.”41 That is consistent
with recent comments he made to Graeme Wood, a staff writer for The Atlantic.
“Where is the potential in the world today?” the crown prince asked
rhetorically. Answering his own question, he said, “It’s in Saudi Arabia. And if
you want to miss it, I believe other people in the East are going to be super
happy.”42
Regardless, Riyadh’s moves toward Beijing could backfire in Washington — and
badly. As detailed above, Americans of both parties increasingly believe that
countries that cross certain lines with the CCP cannot be America’s partners. It
is also unclear whether Riyadh realizes that the PRC utterly lacks both the
political will and the military capability to replace the United States when it
comes to countering the Iranian threat. Based on that reality, Riyadh may want
to pause before taking any additional major steps toward the PRC that risk
further aggravating Saudi Arabia’s most powerful partner.
Despite strained relations — and despite changes in world politics and energy
markets in recent years — Saudi Arabia and the United States still need each
other. “The United States needs a responsible Saudi partner, and Saudi Arabia
needs a reliable U.S. one,” Steven Cook and Martin Indyk wrote in a Council on
Foreign Relations report published in June 2022.43 A new U.S.-Saudi Arabia
strategic partnership agreement is needed. The question is where to begin and
what might such an agreement look like.
Common Objectives: A Place to Begin
To put relations on a firmer footing, and perhaps move toward some sort of a
strategic partnership agreement, it may be helpful to identify a few shared
objectives around which Washington and Riyadh could build bilateral consensus.
Much of the suggestions below are informed by the July 15, 2022, “Jeddah
Communique: A Joint Statement Between the United States of America and the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” which was issued by the two countries during President
Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia.
Both governments:
Value their longstanding and strategic security and energy partnership. Saudi
Arabia and the United States have both benefited from their longstanding
partnership, which fulfills vital interests for both governments. Saudi Arabia
has benefited tangibly from U.S. security assistance and military power, and the
United States and allied economies continue to benefit from Saudi Arabian oil,
particularly when the Saudi government is willing to coordinate on oil price and
supply issues. Both governments are committed to fostering a stable global
energy market.44
Oppose aggression and terrorism. The two governments seek to deter Iranian
aggression in the Middle East while advancing toward a more peaceful, secure,
prosperous, and stable region. Both governments have a shared national security
interest in “countering violent extremist propaganda.”45
Oppose armed attacks on Saudi Arabia. Both governments have political, security,
and economic interests in peace and stability in Saudi Arabia as well as
adjacent international airspace and waters. Washington has long articulated that
an armed attack against Saudi Arabia is a threat to important U.S. interests.
Support strengthening Saudi Arabia’s means of self-defense. Both governments
seek to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s military capabilities to deter aggression and
operate more effectively with U.S. forces.46 The two governments aim to
strengthen Saudi Arabia’s ability to detect and defeat cyber, missile, drone, or
maritime attacks on the kingdom. Washington and Riyadh both seek to establish a
regional multilateral security architecture in which Saudi Arabia would play a
leading role.
Oppose a nuclear-armed Iran and Iranian-supported terrorism. Both governments
oppose Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and have opposed Iran’s systematic
campaign of aggression and destabilizing activities, whether undertaken directly
or through Iranian-supported terrorist organizations or other proxies.47
Support retaining a sufficient U.S. military posture in the Middle East.
Understanding that America has global commitments and interests, both
governments have asserted that the United States should retain sufficient
military posture in the Middle East that Washington could quickly reinforce to
promote regional security and defeat aggression.48
Seek peace in Yemen and a durable end to attacks emanating from there. Both
governments seek a durable peace in Yemen and a permanent end to attacks on
Saudi Arabia emanating from Yemen.49 Washington and Riyadh oppose illicit weapon
shipments to Yemen, which enable attacks on Saudi Arabia, fuel conflict, and
inhibit peace — deepening and extending the tragic humanitarian crisis in Yemen.
Support the goals and objectives of Vision 2030. Both governments have asserted
that Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 is a positive effort to modernize and diversify
the Saudi economy.50
Toward a U.S.-Saudi Strategic Partnership Agreement?
Despite these common objectives, negotiating a comprehensive and substantive
strategic partnership agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia may
be challenging under the current circumstances. But there are compelling reasons
for the two countries to avoid the temptation to throw up their hands and walk
away.
In that spirit, this section attempts to identify key elements that could
perhaps be included in a strategic partnership agreement that might serve
American interests and address key Saudi objectives. Admittedly, both
governments may need to abandon some maximalist demands and make difficult
compromises. But if sufficient political will exists, a combination of the
elements below could help to form an agreement.
An executive agreement along the lines of the proposals below need not be a
treaty. Such provisions need not require Senate advice and consent or any other
congressional action. Further-reaching commitments by the United States
(presumably in exchange for further-reaching commitments by Saudi Arabia) could
be included in a subsequent U.S.-Saudi treaty or other agreement requiring
congressional action. The key areas explored are: security assurances and
cooperation; preventing a nuclear-armed Iran; arms sales; oil, gas, and
petrochemicals; nuclear energy; terrorism; and human rights.
SECURITY ASSURANCES AND COOPERATION
According to published analysis by various experts, the Saudis may desire a
written agreement defining U.S. commitments in the event that Saudi Arabia is
attacked.51 The preeminent example of such an agreement, of course, is the North
Atlantic Treaty and its foundational Article 5.52
There is little chance that Washington would extend an Article 5-like commitment
to Riyadh that would legally obligate the United States to consider an attack on
the kingdom an attack on the United States. If that is a non-negotiable demand
of Riyadh’s, then a strategic partnership agreement will be impossible.53
However, if Riyadh is willing to accept something more than the status quo yet
short of an Article 5-like commitment in return for valuable Saudi commitments
to Washington, such an agreement might be possible.
What could the security provisions of such an agreement perhaps look like?54
As a first step, the United States could designate Saudi Arabia a Major Defense
Partner (MDP). To understand why this might be an option and why it might help
facilitate a strategic partnership agreement, it is worth considering the
background.
In a non-binding joint statement issued by President Barack Obama and Prime
Minister of India Narendra Modi on June 7, 2016, the United States “recognized”
India as a “Major Defense Partner.”55 India remains the only country to enjoy
that designation from the U.S. government. President Obama issued this
designation using his executive powers without reference to any statutory
authority or previous congressional action. One month prior (on May 18, 2016),
the House of Representatives passed a bill (the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2017) requiring the U.S. government to “recognize India’s
status as a major defense partner of the United States.”56 But the Senate did
not pass this bill until after the joint statement, and the bill did not become
law until December 23, 2016.
The term “Major Defense Partner” was not defined in the June 7, 2016, joint
statement. Nor has it been defined by legislation. The National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 required the Commerce, Defense, and State
Departments to “jointly produce a common definition that recognizes India’s
status as a ‘Major Defense Partner’ for joint use” by those departments.57 Such
a definition, if it exists, does not appear in the Code of Federal Regulations
and it is not readily available online.
In practical terms, the president publicly committed to strengthening technology
sharing with India, supporting its “Make in India” initiative, and bolstering
its “defense industries and their integration into the global supply chain.”58
That was a prudent step for the United States given the importance of India to
Washington’s efforts in the Indo-Pacific, as part of an effort to forge a
coalition to deter aggression from the People’s Republic of China. India’s
designation as an MDP symbolically boosted the bilateral relationship in the
short-term and helped catalyze a series of subsequent steps that continue to
bolster security and economic cooperation between the two countries.
There appears to be no restriction on the executive branch using the term “Major
Defense Partner” for another country. President Biden could designate Saudi
Arabia as a Major Defense Partner utilizing his current authorities as
president. This would send a powerful signal of the importance the United States
places on its defense relationship with Saudi Arabia without necessarily
committing the United States to take any particular substantive steps. Nor would
it serve as an endorsement of everything the government in Saudi Arabia has done
that Washington does not condone.
The designation, however, would formally recognize the truth: Saudi Arabia has
been and should remain a major defense partner of the United States in practice
despite their differences. Such a formal designation could begin to heal some of
the damage in the relationship, signal that Washington values the security
partnership despite several lingering challenges, provide Washington with more
leverage to encourage reform in the kingdom, counter Riyadh’s drift toward
Beijing, and pave the way to tangibly strengthen security cooperation.
For its part, Saudi Arabia might appreciate being designated as the second U.S.
Major Defense Partner alongside tangible defense and economic benefits that
advance the kingdom’s security and prosperity.
As with the 2016 U.S.-India statement, designating Saudi Arabia as an MDP could
be accompanied by new efforts to facilitate technology sharing. Similar to the
U.S.-India statement, a U.S.-Saudi agreement could (as appropriate) commit to
the provision of license-free access to a wide range of dual-use technologies
focused on defensive capabilities in return for a commitment from Riyadh to
advance export control objectives. The announcement could also be linked to key
elements of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 that are consistent with U.S. interests.
Following Obama’s June 7, 2016, designation of India as an MDP, Congress enacted
legislation, the National Defense Authorization Acts for fiscal years 2017 and
2018 that supported the designation, pushed the Departments of State and Defense
to implement and expand U.S.-India cooperation, and sought to hold the executive
branch accountable for results. This included, for example, congressional
support for the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of
Agreement and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial
Cooperation, two agreements valued by New Delhi that could be replicated in some
way with Riyadh, as appropriate.
Admittedly, unless perceptions of Saudi Arabia change significantly in Congress,
there is no reason to believe the relevant committees and the two chambers would
vote to take analogous actions with respect to Saudi Arabia following its
designation as an MDP. Nonetheless, the important symbolic benefit associated
with an MDP designation of Saudi Arabia could be bolstered with several
accompanying presidential and executive branch actions relying on the
president’s existing authorities. As political perceptions in the relationship
potentially improve, Congress could build on the designation.
In addition to potentially designating Saudi Arabia an MDP, the United States
could perhaps designate Saudi Arabia a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA). This status
under U.S. law “provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of
defense trade and security cooperation,” according to the Department of State.
However, the status “does not entail any security commitments to the designated
country.”59 In other words, MNNA status does not, for example, include a
commitment that an attack on an MNNA shall be considered an attack on the United
States, as is codified in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.60
Nonetheless, MNNA status confers several privileges under U.S. law. As the
Department of State notes, those include eligibility for some types of
cooperative research, development, testing, and evaluation; prepositioning of
stocks; training; excess defense articles; and ammunition.61 Designation can
also make the respective country eligible for cooperative research and
development projects related to defense equipment; allow firms of the MNNA to
bid on certain maintenance-related contracts outside the United States; and
allow potential funding for projects under the auspices of the Department of
State’s Technical Support Working Group.62
The following countries are currently MNNAs: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain,
Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand,
Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, South Korea, Thailand, and Tunisia. Moreover,
under U.S. law, Taiwan is treated as an MNNA even though it has not been
formally designated as such.63 All things considered, it seems difficult to
argue that Pakistan and Qatar should be MNNAs and Saudi Arabia should not.
If the Biden administration decided to take this step, the president would
notify Congress pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2321k at least 30 days before the formal
designation of Saudi Arabia as an MNNA. After the requisite time elapsed, Saudi
Arabia would become an MNNA unless Congress passed a law preventing it and was
able to overcome a presumed presidential veto with a two-thirds majority in each
chamber.64
The designation of Saudi Arabia as an MDP and MNNA may not be sufficient to
persuade Riyadh that it needs to make difficult compromises. Additional American
steps related to military readiness; the deployment of U.S. forces; defense
planning, military exercises, and intelligence sharing; security consultations;
and armed attacks may be necessary and potentially prudent for the United States
to secure its interests.
For its part, Riyadh likely would value assurances that the United States will
maintain — subject to its respective constitutional provisions — the defense
capabilities, capacities, and readiness levels necessary to resist armed attacks
on Saudi Arabia. Notably, this would not represent a collective defense
commitment but rather an intent to maintain the military means to respond to an
attack on Saudi Arabia.
The United States could also commit to keeping forward deployed conventional
forces in the Central Command area of responsibility in addition to other forces
outside the region capable of punishing aggression and quickly deploying to the
region as reinforcements.65 Such a commitment need not delineate how many
forces, which types, where they might be based in the region, or whether they
would be permanent or rotational deployments.
Despite that nuance, some pundits on the political extremes might resist such a
commitment in their eagerness to reduce U.S. military posture in the Middle East
even further. That would be a mistake from an American perspective.66 U.S.
military posture in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility is already
down 85 percent from its 2008 peak, according to March 13, 2023, congressional
testimony by CENTCOM commander General Michael “Erik” Kurilla. U.S. force levels
in the region “decreased 15% over the course of 2022 alone,” he said.67
There is a broad consensus in Washington that the United States must bolster its
military deterrent posture in the Indo-Pacific Command’s area of operations.
Since U.S. military resources are finite, that certainly requires leaders to
scrutinize defense investments elsewhere.
At the same time, it is clear that the competition with the PRC is a global one
that is increasingly taking place in the Middle East. For that reason, and to
counter the grave threat from Iran and multiple terrorist groups in the region,
the United States should maintain an economy-of-force military posture in the
Middle East. Failure to do so will increase the chances that national security
challenges will worsen, likely forcing the U.S. military to return to the region
later in larger numbers and at a higher cost. For that reason, a general
commitment to Saudi Arabia along the lines discussed above would seem to be
consistent with U.S. interests.
In return for such a commitment, Saudi Arabia, in consultation with the United
States, could commit to strengthening and maintaining the infrastructure and
systems necessary to host U.S. military reinforcements should they be deployed,
at Saudi Arabia’s invitation and consistent with the U.S. Constitution, to
address an impending crisis or armed attack. This would encourage proactive
Saudi investment to facilitate American military deployments during a
contingency. Saudi Arabia could encourage other Gulf Cooperation Council
countries to make similar investments as appropriate.
The two governments could in such an agreement commit, subject to U.S.
constitutional requirements, to increase bilateral defense planning to deter and
defeat armed attacks against Saudi Arabia. They could enhance and expand ongoing
exercises and training to identify necessary improvements, increase readiness,
and strengthen the ability of the two militaries to operate together.68
Recognizing that accurate information and sound analysis are at the foundation
of deterring and defeating aggression, the two governments could also commit to
sharing additional relevant intelligence and the exchange of views on
international situations of mutual interest, especially in the Middle East.69
That could include close consultations on relevant threats, defense policies,
military exercises, arms sales, and military postures. Conversations should also
address military capability gaps and building an effective regional security
architecture focused particularly on air and missile defense, maritime security,
and counterterrorism. For example, building on elements of the Jeddah Communique,
Saudi Arabia could provide a permanent staff officer for United States Naval
Forces Central Command’s Task Force 59 to identify appropriate and creative
workarounds to the often lethargic foreign military sales process. That could
help Saudi Arabia procure naval intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities faster to counter common threats and address important military
requirements.
Finally, while an Article 5-like commitment is not realistic, the United States
could note in a strategic partnership agreement that an armed attack on Saudi
Arabia would endanger regional security and threaten important U.S. interests.
That is both a factual statement and one that builds on the Jeddah Communique’s
statement that “affirmed the United States’ continued commitment to supporting
Saudi Arabia’s security and territorial defense.” Finally, the United States, as
a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), could commit,
as appropriate, to requesting UNSC action if such an attack occurs against Saudi
Arabia.
PREVENTING A NUCLEAR-ARMED IRAN
Given Riyadh’s concerns regarding the potential for the Islamic Republic of Iran
to acquire a nuclear weapon and fears that the United States may fail to prevent
such an outcome, it seems likely that Riyadh would insist that any strategic
partnership agreement include a clear statement from Washington related to
Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Such a statement could use language similar to
that in the joint U.S.-Israel declaration, signed by President Biden on July 14,
2022, in which the United States expressed its “commitment never to allow Iran
to acquire a nuclear weapon, and that it is prepared to use all elements of its
national power to ensure that outcome.”70
Riyadh would likely welcome such a U.S. commitment to Saudi Arabia. It would
represent an upgrade over the language contained in the Jeddah Communique: “The
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States stressed the importance of
preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.”71 Admittedly, even if
Washington agreed to this stronger language, Saudi concerns would likely still
not be allayed. Saudi leaders would likely still doubt that the United States
will take such military action if push comes to shove.
On this question, Riyadh should consider whether Saudi Arabia has a genuine
alternative to U.S. protection against the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran.
Specifically, does Riyadh believe Beijing has both the capability and the
political will to employ military force to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon? This seems highly unlikely.
Some in Riyadh might recognize this political-military reality but then note
that Beijing enjoys diplomatic influence in Tehran that Washington obviously
does not. The hope here would be that diplomatic pressure from Beijing might
possibly persuade Tehran not to pursue nuclear weapons. It would be quite a
gamble for Riyadh. It is entirely unclear how Chinese diplomatic influence could
persuade the regime to set aside a nuclear project it has pursued for decades
with dogged determination. Beijing might actually welcome a sprint by Tehran to
such a capability, hoping it would sap and divert American resources and
attention away from the Taiwan Strait.
In short, the Biden administration will presumably be willing to reiterate to
Saudi Arabia a commitment it has already made related to a nuclear-armed Iran.
Such an explicit commitment in the context of a potential strategic partnership
agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia could engender additional
goodwill from Riyadh at a time when it does not appear to have any reliable
alternatives.
ARMS TRANSFERS
An emboldened Iran and declining confidence in security assurances from
Washington are a bad combination from Riyadh’s perspective. When those dynamics
are combined with the delay and difficulty Saudi Arabia sometimes confronts in
procuring American weapons, it becomes clear why Riyadh might be looking for new
partners.72
The Biden administration initially paused arms sales to Saudi Arabia after
taking office.73 But delays associated with arms sales have more often been
driven by Congress. As the Congressional Research Service notes, “Congress has,
by expressing strong opposition to prospective arms sales, during consultations
with the executive branch, affected the timing and the composition of some arms
sales, and may have dissuaded the President from formally proposing certain arms
sales.”74
Congress has certainly expressed disapproval of some arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
During the Trump administration, Congress passed resolutions of disapproval,
eventually overridden by presidential vetoes, to block the sale of certain
weapons to Saudi Arabia.75 After the Biden administration lifted its halt on
arms sales, the State Department announced a sale of AIM-120 air-to-air missiles
to Saudi Arabia, which Saudi Arabia needed to intercept Houthi drones targeting
its infrastructure.76 Nearly a third of the Senate voted for a resolution to
prohibit the sale, although the vote ultimately failed.77
It is not hard to understand that Saudi Arabia is frustrated by this uncertainty
regarding the ability to acquire means of self-defense. Riyadh knows that
Beijing may be willing to eventually provide weapons more quickly and with fewer
questions.
If current realities in the bilateral relationship remain unchanged, it would
not be surprising if Riyadh increasingly looked elsewhere for arms, including
potentially from Beijing.78 Indeed, Saudi Arabia already started to procure
Chinese drones in 2014.79 According to the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), Saudi procurement of Chinese weapons increased by
over 80 percent between 2018 and 2022, compared to between 2013 and 2017.
However, Saudi Arabia still purchases the vast majority of its weapons from the
United States — approximately 68 percent between 2013 and 2022, according to
SIPRI data.80 This includes items like F-15 jets, Apache and Black Hawk
helicopters, Abrams tanks, and numerous missiles and bombs.81
Should Riyadh markedly increase its weapon purchases from China, it would inject
significant additional tension into the U.S.-Saudi relationship and further
undermine perceptions of Riyadh in Washington. The bipartisan consensus
regarding the unparalleled threat from Beijing is only growing. A concerted move
by Riyadh toward the procurement of major Chinese weapons systems or large
quantities of Chinese weapons could play a decisive role in transforming a
potentially manageable set of disagreements into a divorce in the strategic
partnership.
From an American perspective, if U.S.-origin weapons were steadily replaced by
Chinese weapons in Saudi Arabia, U.S. interests would be compromised. Indeed,
the provision of U.S. weapons to security partners can reduce America’s security
burden, improve the ability of the recipient country’s military to operate with
U.S. forces, facilitate U.S. military access, facilitate favorable regional
balances of power, enable valuable training opportunities, strengthen the U.S.
defense sector, reduce U.S. weapons costs for the Pentagon and the American
taxpayer, and accrue decades-long diplomatic benefits and leverage for
Washington. When a country such as Saudi Arabia procures American weapons, it
also deprives competitors and adversaries from accruing these benefits.82
Some in the United States shrug in response to such benefits and argue that
Washington should not engage in a “race to the bottom,” providing weapons to
partners who might misuse them. To be sure, there is a moral component to arms
sales. It would, for example, be wrong and inconsistent with U.S. law and
policy83 to provide U.S. technology and weapons to a partner if there is reason
to believe the partner will use those weapons systematically or deliberately in
an unacceptable manner.84 There is a widespread view in Washington that Saudi
Arabia, unfortunately, did exactly that in Yemen for several years.
During the 2015-2018 timeframe, Saudi forces repeatedly used U.S.-provided
air-to-ground munitions in strikes in Yemen that resulted in tragic civilian
deaths.85 In response, the U.S. Senate and House passed a resolution in
March/April 2019, which was eventually vetoed by the President, that would have
prohibited U.S. personnel from participating in the war in Yemen.86 This
followed several previous attempts by Congress to limit U.S. support for Saudi
Arabia and involvement in the war in Yemen.87 Saudi-caused civilian casualties
tapered off significantly in the following years, but that did not stop some
legislators from introducing another resolution,88 in July 2022, to prohibit
intelligence sharing and logistical support for Saudi forces in Yemen, months
after a truce had already been reached in Yemen.89
Clearly, the Islamic Republic of Iran was fueling the conflict with illicit arms
transfers to the Houthis, who regularly employed human shields and other illegal
tactics.90 Indeed, the Houthis have launched hundreds of Iranian-made or
Iranian-designed drones at Saudi Arabia over the past several years91 — facts
that some in Washington ignore.
Riyadh’s learning curve in Yemen has been steep. Riyadh may now understand that
strikes that result in avoidable civilian casualties are self-inflicted wounds
that can damage the bilateral relationship and impact the U.S. provision of
weapons Saudi Arabia needs, especially “offensive” weapons that could be misused
in Yemen. Indeed, Riyadh may now see that its actions in Yemen often played
right into Tehran’s hands, stoking tension with Washington and driving a wedge
between Saudi Arabia and its most powerful partner. That realization, combined
with the tentative ceasefire in Yemen, hopefully will put the Yemen conflict in
the rearview mirror. As a result, perceptions in Washington regarding arms sales
to Saudi Arabia may begin to evolve over time.
Of course, some legislators may remain indefinitely opposed to arms sales to
Saudi Arabia based on past actions in Yemen. From a practical standpoint,
however, the question is whether the administration and a bipartisan majority in
both chambers and leaders on key committees will support the provision of
appropriate arms to Saudi Arabia. There is reason to believe such support
already exists for “defensive” arms that could not be misused in Yemen. For
example, Congress rejected efforts to block the sale of AIM-120 and Patriot
missiles, which the Saudi military uses to defend Saudi airspace from incoming
missiles and drones.92
With arms transfers to any country, it is important for the United States to
take all reasonable measures to ensure U.S.-provided weapons are used in a
manner consistent with U.S. interests and with “international humanitarian law
and human rights,” as noted in the United States Conventional Arms Transfer
Policy the Biden administration issued on February 23, 2023.93 That policy
establishes a standard that “no arms transfer will be authorized where the
United States assesses that it is more likely than not that the arms to be
transferred will be used by the recipient” in unacceptable ways, including to
commit “serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law.”
If Saudi Arabia is able to persuade the U.S. Congress and executive branch that
its use of weapons scrupulously avoids violations of international humanitarian
and human rights law, a modus operandi might be possible between the two
countries that could facilitate a more reliable transfer of weapons, especially
those related to air and missile defense and maritime security. If there is a
bilateral political consensus, the United States could commit in a strategic
partnership agreement to providing Saudi Arabia arms of a defensive character
reliably and expeditiously. This would be subject to constitutional processes,
congressional review, and robust Saudi implementation of its commitments to
comply with all end-use requirements and employ such weapons in a manner
consistent with international law.
To facilitate the more timely consideration of potential arms transfers to Saudi
Arabia, the administration could submit a formal legislative proposal to
Congress that 22 U.S.C. 2776 subsections (b)(1)(P); (b)(2); (c)(2)(A); (c)(5);
and (d)(2)(A) be amended to include Saudi Arabia, along with appropriate
conforming edits. These amendments would reduce the congressional review period
for qualified transfers from 30 days to 15 days between congressional
notification and the ability of the administration to issue a letter of offer or
to approve an export, technical assistance, or manufacturing license. The
current countries subject to such a reduced congressional review period are NATO
members, Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Israel, and New Zealand.94
To be clear, even if such legislation were adopted and became law, Congress
would still be able to adopt a joint resolution of disapproval blocking a
particular sale until the arms were delivered. However, Congress has never
successfully used a joint resolution of disapproval to formally block an arms
sale proposed by an administration, according to the Congressional Research
Service.95 That is because opponents of such arms sales have been unable to
muster enough votes in both chambers to overturn a presidential veto of a joint
resolution to block the sale.
The willingness of Congress to adopt legislation adding Saudi Arabia to the list
of countries receiving a reduced congressional review period would depend on
congressional perceptions of Saudi reliability. Those inclined to indefinitely
oppose arms sales to Saudi Arabia even if Riyadh persuasively demonstrates
scrupulous compliance with weapons-use restrictions should consider whether they
believe Washington or Beijing will apply more pressure on Riyadh to avoid
civilian casualties in future conflicts. They also may want to consider whether
the purchase by Riyadh of American weapons — instead of Chinese weapons — might
retain and extend leverage that can be used for other beneficial purposes in the
future.
Some in Riyadh may therefore wonder whether attempting to procure American arms
is worth the hassle. In the end, that is a decision only the Saudi government
can make, of course. Regardless, it is a decision that Riyadh may want to
consider carefully.
First, in many, if not most, cases, American weapons remain the best in the
world. Second, Saudi procurement of certain advanced military systems from China
could guarantee that the United States would not want to sell Saudi Arabia other
advanced systems that Washington would not want operated or stationed in
proximity to some Chinese systems. Washington’s eviction of Turkey from the F-35
program following Ankara’s procurement of the Russian S-400 air defense system
provides a cautionary case in point.96
Similarly, if Saudi Arabia purchases major weapon systems from China (or
Russia), it could make continued progress toward the establishment of a mutually
beneficial U.S.-Saudi-led regional security architecture difficult, if not
impossible.97 An effective security architecture requires the integration of
sensors, command and control elements, and “shooters” that can communicate and
share information quickly and seamlessly with one another. If Saudi Arabia
procures major Chinese military systems, the United States would not support
their integration into a security architecture that includes American systems
and networks. Even some Chinese systems operating independently in close
proximity might present a challenge for the establishment or operation of such
an architecture. Without a U.S.-led regional security architecture, Riyadh
becomes more vulnerable to Tehran and other malign actors. Once again, China is
currently unprepared to fulfill the American security role that Riyadh may seek
to replace.
It is further worth noting that Saudi Arabia possesses a huge arsenal of
American weapons that require spare parts and sustainment for decades to come.
If Riyadh pursues a divorce from Washington and jumps with both feet into
China’s sphere of influence, perceptions of the kingdom will almost certainly
enter a freefall in Washington. In such a scenario, Riyadh might find Congress
attempting to block the spare parts and services that Riyadh needs to keep its
American-origin equipment and weapons functional, never mind the updates and
upgrades that are periodically required.
Finally, Saudi political leaders unfamiliar with military hardware and software
may want to ask their engineers and military experts about the difficulty
associated with transitioning from one system to another and the challenges of
maintaining a “mixed fleet.” As a general rule, such transitions are often far
more difficult and time consuming than imagined. In addition, Riyadh may want to
seriously consider how Beijing’s growing relationship with Tehran could
influence the reliability of Chinese weapons and China as an arms provider.
In short, there are strong reasons for both Washington and Riyadh to come to an
understanding when it comes to American arms sales. The core elements of such an
agreement are clear. They feature a commitment by Riyadh to scrupulously avoid
repeating the mistakes it made in Yemen and a commitment by the United States to
provide the kingdom more reliable and expeditious means of self-defense.
OIL, GAS, AND PETROCHEMICALS
The U.S.-Saudi relationship has long been characterized as Saudi Arabia
receiving American security protection in exchange for the Saudis providing the
United States and the global oil market with access to affordable oil
supplies.98 Since at least 1974, the U.S.-Saudi arrangement has also included
the Saudis both insisting that all purchasers pay for Saudi oil with U.S.
dollars and also investing billions of their petrodollar revenues into buying
U.S. debt from the Treasury.
Over the last 20 years, Saudi Arabia has ceased to be a major source of
petroleum for the U.S. market. In 2022, only 7 percent of U.S. petroleum imports
were from Saudi Arabia (behind 52 percent from Canada and 10 percent from
Mexico).99 Imports from Saudi Arabia represented less than 3 percent of total
U.S. petroleum consumption.100
However, Saudi Arabia continues to wield pivotal influence over global oil
market supply and prices. Saudi Arabia’s unique ability to influence the global
oil market stems from its status as the world’s largest exporter of crude oil
and its maintenance of the world’s greatest spare production capacity. Saudi
Arabia has typically kept more than 1.5 million barrels per day of spare
capacity on hand for “market management.”101 Tensions between the United States
and Saudi Arabia over how the Saudis exercise their influence over the global
oil market came to a head in October 2022, when the Saudis played a leading role
in the decision of the OPEC-Plus group of oil-producing countries to slash oil
production by two million barrels per day.102
The October 2022 OPEC-Plus decision contradicted assurances the Biden
administration thought it received from Saudi Arabia.103 Biden publicly vowed to
impose “consequences” on Saudi Arabia. His staff said it would “review” the
U.S.-Saudi relationship, and leading Democratic Senators accused the Saudis of
siding with Russia against the United States. They even raised the possibility
of a freeze in arms sales and of passing “NOPEC” legislation to punish the
Saudis by allowing lawsuits for price fixing.104
Saudi Arabia reportedly responded by threatening to sell its U.S. Treasury
bonds.105 With Saudi Arabia holding approximately $120 billion of such assets
during 2022,106 a sell-off could negatively impact the U.S. economy.
The Saudis have repeatedly discussed the possibility of ending their policy that
all purchasers pay for Saudi oil with U.S. dollars.107 This policy supports the
dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency, which in turn helps offset U.S.
deficit spending.108 It also provides the United States with sanctions leverage.
(U.S. financial sanctions often depend on the fact that most large transnational
financial transfers use dollars, which briefly transit the U.S. financial
system.)109
As of mid-April 2023, the Biden administration had reportedly taken no steps to
punish Saudi Arabia for the OPEC-Plus decision.110 The administration and
Congress had a milder response to an output cut announced on April 3, 2023.111
However, Washington continues to have a strong national security, foreign
policy, and economic interest in Riyadh’s policies relating to the production
and pricing of Saudi oil, the primacy of the dollar, and investment of oil
revenues. Renewed and enhanced Saudi commitments in this arena might go a long
way towards enabling Washington to make commitments on issues important to the
Saudis in other arenas.
As part of a potential strategic partnership agreement, the two governments
could agree on a global oil market cooperation formula similar to, or even more
forward-leaning than, those set forth in the Jeddah Communique of 2022.112 In
the communique, the two countries “reaffirmed their commitment to a stable
global energy market” and the United States “welcomed Saudi Arabia’s commitment
to support global oil markets balancing for sustained economic growth.” The two
countries also “decided to consult regularly on global energy markets in the
near- and long- term.” A strategic partnership agreement could reify such a
consultation commitment through a formal structure, such as a high-level
bilateral working group on global energy market issues.
As part of such a strategic partnership agreement, Saudi Arabia could recommit
to its longstanding requirement that all purchasers pay for Saudi oil exports
with U.S. dollars. In addition, it could commit to maintaining a level of
investment in U.S. Treasury securities. For example, Saudi Arabia could commit,
subject to exceptions for specified extraordinary circumstances, to maintaining
an investment in U.S. Treasury securities equivalent to the $119.7 billion that
Saudi Arabia held on December 31, 2022,113 plus an adjustment for inflation
since that date.
NUCLEAR ENERGY
Although Saudi Arabia contains the second largest proven oil reserves in the
world,114 it has long expressed interest in nuclear power. A 2010 royal decree
reportedly stated: “atomic energy is essential to meet the kingdom’s growing
requirements for energy to generate electricity, produce desalinated water and
reduce reliance on depleting hydrocarbon resources.”115 Currently, developing a
nuclear energy program is an integral part of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s
Vision 2030 plan to diversify the Saudi economy and its energy resources.116
Over the past dozen years, Saudi Arabia has entered into bilateral civil nuclear
arrangements, of various levels and types, with countries including Argentina,
China, France, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Russia, South Korea, and the United
States.117 While Saudi Arabia does not currently possess any nuclear
reactors,118 it has announced its intent to build 16 of them.119 It has started
construction of its first in partnership with Argentina.120
Despite Saudi interest and the United States’ status as the world’s foremost
producer of nuclear power,121 U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation has remained at a
low level. Riyadh and Washington entered into a non-binding memorandum of
understanding in 2008 that provided for low-level nuclear energy collaboration
(and stated Saudi Arabia’s intent “to rely on existing international markets for
nuclear fuel services as an alternative to the pursuit of enrichment and
reprocessing”).122 The Trump administration controversially123 issued seven
authorizations enabling U.S. companies to share unclassified nuclear technology
with Saudi Arabia for marketing purposes.124 In 2022, the two countries entered
into a nuclear safety cooperation memorandum of understanding.125
Since 2012, Riyadh and Washington have periodically attempted to negotiate an
agreement pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act.126 Section 123
outlines the process for, and mandatory elements of, an agreement authorizing
U.S. exports, for civilian purposes, of major nuclear material and equipment,
including components of nuclear reactors. These “123 agreements” are subject to
review by Congress, which can block them.127
As of December 2022, the United States had “123” nuclear cooperation agreements
that govern cooperation with 47 countries, the IAEA, and Taiwan.128 In addition
to the several nonproliferation commitments required by Section 123 itself, two
of the agreements (Taiwan and the UAE) include a further legal commitment, by
the recipient country, to forgo enrichment and reprocessing of any nuclear
material (whether or not the United States is the source).129 Enrichment can be
used to produce fuel for nuclear reactors, and enrichment and reprocessing can
produce highly enriched uranium or separated plutonium, respectively, for
nuclear weapons. The additional commitment to forgo enrichment and reprocessing
is often referred to as the nonproliferation “gold standard.”130
U.S.-Saudi negotiation of a 123 agreement has reportedly stalled over Saudi
rejection of “gold standard” language similar to the U.S.-UAE agreement.131 The
Saudis have noticed that while the United States has been conditioning
U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation on a commitment to forgo enrichment and
reprocessing, the Iranians have not only enriched uranium but do so at
near-weapons-grade levels132 and in a manner inconsistent with any Iranian civil
nuclear power needs (Iran’s one nuclear power reactor — at Bushehr — does not
require Iranian enrichment because its nuclear fuel is supplied by Russia).133
While the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) placed restrictions on
Iran’s enrichment activities,134 it abandoned the previous international
requirement that Iran cease “all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities.”135 The JCPOA’s restrictions were also to expire in a specified
number of years,136 arguably legitimizing Iran’s development of an enrichment
capacity capable of fueling a nuclear arsenal.
Another obstacle to a U.S.-Saudi 123 agreement is reportedly the U.S. insistence
that Saudi Arabia supplement its agreement by entering into an Additional
Protocol with the IAEA.137 The Additional Protocol provides the IAEA with
additional inspection authorities. One hundred forty countries, plus the 27
member states of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), have entered
into Additional Protocol agreements with the IAEA.138 The UAE entered into such
an Additional Protocol in conjunction with the U.S.-UAE 123 agreement.139
Indeed, in recent years, the United States has not negotiated any 123 agreements
with countries that have not entered into an Additional Protocol.140
Congress has supported the executive branch’s nonproliferation policy toward
Saudi Arabia, including on supplementing a 123 agreement with the “gold
standard” and Additional Protocol. The Consolidated Appropriations Act for
Fiscal Year 2023 (and several of its predecessors) prohibits the use of
appropriated funds for Export-Import Bank support of nuclear exports to Saudi
Arabia unless the kingdom has a 123 agreement “in effect;” “has committed to
renounce uranium enrichment and reprocessing on its territory under that
agreement;” and has “signed and implemented” an Additional Protocol with the
IAEA.141
Both Congress and executive branch officials have repeatedly expressed concern
that the Saudi nuclear program may be intended in part to position the kingdom
for developing nuclear weapons.142 Saudi Arabia is a party to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, pursuant to which it is legally obligated
“not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.”143 However, several
senior Saudi officials, including Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, have stated
that if Iran acquires a nuclear bomb, the kingdom will follow suit. For example,
in March 2018, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said, “Saudi Arabia does not
want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt if Iran developed a
nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.”144 Moreover, press
reports have for two decades alleged that Saudi Arabia funded Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons program and that Pakistan may be prepared to transfer nuclear weapons
and technology if the Saudis request it.145
In recent years, Saudi Arabia has increased its nuclear cooperation with China,
reportedly resulting in part from frustration with Washington’s strict terms and
conditions.146 Riyadh and Beijing have reportedly signed at least three
agreements on civil nuclear collaboration.147 The two countries are also
actively mapping untapped Saudi deposits of mineable uranium ore.148 While some
press reports have described the deposits as “potentially vast,”149 a joint
publication by the IAEA and the Nuclear Energy Agency, released on April 3,
2023, described the Saudi search as thus far finding deposits that would be
“severely uneconomic” to mine.150
Separately, China has provided Riyadh with technology the Saudis have recently
started using to build ballistic missiles — the typical delivery system for
nuclear weapons.151 There have also been unconfirmed reports152 that China has
helped the Saudis construct a milling facility for extracting yellowcake from
uranium ore.
The Saudi government has expressed strong interest in mining and milling uranium
ore for both domestic use and export. In January 2023, the Saudi energy minister
reiterated the kingdom’s desire to use domestic uranium resources for producing
low-enriched uranium as nuclear fuel.153 Uranium mining could both facilitate a
Saudi nuclear bomb program154 and provide the country with export revenue.
The United States does not have a monopoly on nuclear reactor technology. Other
countries, including China and Russia, are capable of providing a full range of
civil nuclear products and services and are highly unlikely to demand
nonproliferation commitments as rigorous as those in 123 agreements, let alone
insist on the Saudis forgoing enrichment and reprocessing.155
A U.S.-Saudi strategic partnership agreement would almost certainly address the
following nuclear-related issues: a 123 Agreement; a “gold standard” or similar
renouncement of enrichment and reprocessing; the Significant Quantities
Protocol; the Additional Protocol; and uranium exports. The analysis below
addresses each of these in turn.
As a matter of law, the United States cannot engage in major nuclear cooperation
with Saudi Arabia, including the export of nuclear reactor components, without
meeting the requirements of Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. In practice,
this means the two countries must negotiate an agreement containing the elements
set forth in Section 123.
The U.S government has long insisted that a U.S.-Saudi agreement for major
nuclear cooperation not only meet the standard nonproliferation requirements of
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act but also include the “gold standard”
renouncement of enrichment and reprocessing which was added to the U.S.-UAE
agreement.156
Because the “gold standard” is not required by Section 123,157 its inclusion is
more flexible from a legal perspective. Robert Einhorn, who served in senior
nonproliferation positions during the Clinton and Obama administrations, has
delineated what he calls “a compromise that serves US interests, including its
nonproliferation objectives, without undermining the kingdom’s ability to meet
the practical needs of its civil nuclear energy program.”158 It is unclear if
Einhorn’s 2018 proposal represents his current view. The most important points
in the compromise include Saudi Arabia agreeing to the gold standard for the
first 15 years of the 123 agreement, after which the United States could approve
Saudi enrichment and reprocessing on a case-by-case basis.
Einhorn describes his compromise proposal as “serv[ing] US nonproliferation
objectives without completely shutting the door to [Saudi enrichment and
reprocessing] if, at some future time, the kingdom develops a genuine practical
need to pursue such a capability for its civil nuclear program.” Einhorn defends
his deviation from the “gold standard” on the grounds that since “in the case of
Saudi Arabia, the gold standard is not realistically attainable,” the “real
choice” for the United States is between a compromise and not having a 123
agreement with Saudi Arabia. Not having an agreement “could produce a net loss
for nonproliferation” because the Saudis would simply purchase from Chinese,
Russian, or other “nuclear suppliers less committed to rigorous nonproliferation
conditions.”159
It is important to note that a U.S.-Saudi deviation from the “gold standard”
would have implications for the United States’ already-existing 123 agreement
with the UAE. The United States has committed to the UAE that if Washington
enters into a 123 agreement with “any other non-nuclear weapon State in the
Middle East” that contains less restrictive terms, the United States will, if
requested by the UAE, “consult” with the UAE “regarding the possibility of
amending” the Emirati agreement so as to match the terms of the less restrictive
agreement.160 Thus, if the United States acquiesces to Saudi Arabia, it would
likely come under considerable pressure from the UAE to renegotiate the
agreement with them to match the Saudi terms.
To make matters more complicated, if the United States weakens nonproliferation
criteria in the Middle East, and Saudi Arabia pursues enrichment and
reprocessing with U.S. approval, this will potentially lead other American
allies in the region (for example Egypt and Jordan) to demand the same
capabilities or treatment. This would mean that these countries could get
technically close to nuclear weapons and that the United States opened the door
for this by loosening its own nonproliferation criteria for the Saudis.
On the other hand, if Russia, China, or another party provides enrichment and
reprocessing technology to the Saudis, the United States could seek to counter
these developments at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a non-binding export
control regime that commits members to apply nonproliferation criteria,
including the Additional Protocol, for transfers of this nature.161 Washington
could also use diplomatic and economic tools outside the NSG to attempt to
pressure Riyadh to reverse course.
The Saudis have in force with the IAEA an outdated version of the Significant
Quantities Protocol, which exempts the Saudis from some obligations relating to
IAEA safeguards inspections, which are contained in the Saudi Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA.162 In order to maximize the IAEA’s
ability to monitor the Saudi nuclear program, the U.S. government will likely
insist that the Saudis rescind their Small Quantities Protocol and agree instead
to subsidiary arrangements and other measures. This would be consistent with
standard practice among IAEA member states, especially those that are developing
nuclear power plants and other major nuclear facilities.163
The Additional Protocol is an agreement designed by the IAEA to supplement its
CSA by giving IAEA inspectors greater access to sites and information relating
to a country’s nuclear program.164 While NPT member states are required to enter
into a CSA with the IAEA, the Additional Protocol is considered voluntary.
However, 140 countries (plus the 27 member states of Euratom) have entered into
Additional Protocols165 and the United States has not negotiated any 123
agreements in recent years with countries that have not entered into an
Additional Protocol.166 Given U.S. concerns about possible Saudi interest in a
nuclear weapons program, Washington seems certain to continue to insist on
conditioning a U.S.-Saudi 123 agreement on Saudi entry into an Additional
Protocol with the IAEA.
Saudi officials have repeatedly expressed interest in deriving export revenue
from their unmined uranium ore. While uranium mining could provide the kingdom
with both fuel for its own reactors and export revenue, it could also feed an
enrichment program for a Saudi nuclear bomb program. As part of a package deal
on nuclear issues, the United States will presumably be agreeable to assisting
the Saudis with mining uranium ore and exporting it in its unprocessed state.
Yellowcake may be more complicated. The first step in processing mined uranium
ore is called “milling,” which turns uranium ore into a substance called
yellowcake.167 Most uranium is shipped as yellowcake because it is more
cost-effective than transporting unmilled ore.168 Potential proliferators
typically seek to acquire yellowcake rather than unmilled ore.
The IAEA defines 10 metric tons of yellowcake as a “significant quantity,”
sufficient to fuel one bomb if the yellowcake is converted into highly enriched
uranium. The more yellowcake a country produces, the easier it could be for some
of the yellowcake to be diverted to a nuclear weapons program.
In 2020, Saudi officials denied press reports claiming that the kingdom had,
with China’s help, built a facility for milling uranium oxide ore. The Saudi CSA
requires Riyadh to declare such a facility to the IAEA.169
As part of a comprehensive agreement, it is possible that the United States may
be amenable to agreeing to assist the Saudis with producing and exporting
yellowcake. If Saudi Arabia indeed has vast untapped deposits of mineable
uranium ore, U.S. assistance in milling and exporting it could serve as a
significant incentive.
TERRORISM
U.S.-Saudi cooperation on countering terrorism has come a long way since the
September 11 attacks of 2001. In its most recent annual country reports on
terrorism, the State Department assessed that, as of 2021, “Saudi Arabia
continued to work closely with U.S. and international counterparts to deploy a
comprehensive and well-resourced counterterrorism strategy that included
security measures, threat detection and deterrence, measures to counter
terrorist financing, and counter-radicalization efforts.”170
The report lists several Saudi-funded and U.S.-implemented programs designed to
improve Saudi counterterrorism capacities. These include “training to protect
critical infrastructure sites such as maritime ports, aviation assets, energy
infrastructure, and desalination plants from terrorist threats.” Saudi Arabia
also hosts “the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center that brings together the
United States and Gulf partners to confront new and evolving networks and lead
efforts on anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing measures.”171
These actions are particularly valuable from an American perspective, given
Saudi Arabia’s unique leadership role among Arab and majority-Muslim nations.
The Jeddah Communique of July 2022 underscored the centrality of countering
terrorism to the U.S.-Saudi partnership.172 The communique made numerous
references to shared counterterrorism priorities of the two countries,
including:
“the need for supporting governments in the region facing threats from
terrorists or proxy groups backed by outside powers;”
“the need to further deter Iran’s . . . support for terrorism through its armed
proxies;”
the importance of enabling Lebanon to “resist the threats of violent extremist
and terrorist groups” and of Lebanese government control “over all Lebanese
territory” so that Lebanon “does not become a launching point for terrorists,
drug smuggling, or other criminal activities that threatens the stability and
security of the region;”
the need to “address the threat posed by Afghanistan-based terrorists;”
“continued commitment to countering al-Qaeda and ISIS, stemming the flow of
foreign fighters, countering violent extremist propaganda, and cutting off
terrorist financing streams;”
“joint efforts through the Terrorist Financing Center,” which is based in Saudi
Arabia; and
the need for continuation of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and “to make
long-term and multi-year efforts to return both detained ISIS fighters and the
tens of thousands of ISIS family members from northeastern Syria to their home
countries.”173
Expressing continued commitment to these efforts and strengthening them where
possible could represent a key feature of a new strategic partnership agreement.
There are multiple areas of mutual interest.
Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism and support for destabilizing forces across the
region present persistent challenges to U.S. interests at a time when Washington
is simultaneously attempting to counter Russian aggression in Europe and China’s
growing power in the Pacific. Tehran’s sponsorship of terrorism is a leading
concern for Riyadh too, given how often Tehran has targeted Saudi interests.
This shared perspective creates several avenues for deeper cooperation.
The State Department Country Report on Terrorism for Saudi Arabia highlighted
Houthi cross-border attacks, noting that such attacks “surpassed 400 in 2021,
more than double the number of attacks in 2020.”174 A U.S.-Saudi strategic
partnership agreement could bolster combined diplomatic, economic, and
intelligence efforts to prevent such attacks in the future. A new agreement
could also help ensure Saudi Arabia has the strongest possible air and missile
defense capabilities to protect its citizens should Iran, the Houthis, or other
Iranian proxies target Saudi Arabia.
A U.S.-Saudi strategic partnership agreement should also build upon current
counterterrorism initiatives relating to: countering al-Qaeda and ISIS; rolling
back Iranian proxies; protecting critical infrastructure; detecting and
deterring threats; cutting off terrorist financing streams; stemming the flow of
foreign fighters; and intercepting illicit weapons shipments. Any agreement
should also strengthen bilateral cooperation in countering violent extremist
propaganda and ideology.
To counter Iran more broadly, the agreement could also provide for Washington
and Riyadh to supplement existing cooperation to wage economic warfare designed
to isolate Iran, and to reduce the revenues with which it sponsors terrorism and
finances its nuclear program. For example, Riyadh could agree to put key Chinese
and other international companies to a choice between doing business with Saudi
Arabia and its trillion dollar economy175 or doing business with Iran and its
far smaller $360 billion economy.176
HUMAN RIGHTS
The Saudi government has significantly loosened restrictions on women’s rights.
The kingdom has lifted its longstanding ban on women driving as of June 2018 and
has amended male guardianship rules restricting women’s autonomy.177
However, U.S.-Saudi tensions over human rights linger over the death of Jamal
Khashoggi, a Saudi national, U.S. permanent resident, and writer for The
Washington Post.178 Khashoggi was killed by fellow Saudi nationals in 2018
during a visit to the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.179 The killing deeply damaged
perceptions of the Saudi government in the United States. Repairing that damage
will require tangible positive action and the passage of time.
But the problem runs deeper than the Khashoggi affair. Members of Congress
advocate regularly for improved Saudi human rights practices.180 According to a
March 2023 Congressional Research Service report, “[m]ore aggressive human
rights restrictions have accompanied recent social change,” and “[c]hannels for
Saudis to express dissent appear to have narrowed considerably since 2017.”181
The State Department’s 2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Saudi
Arabia includes a list of “[s]ignificant human rights issues,” including
“credible reports that members of the security forces committed numerous
abuses,” such as: “extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearances; [and]
torture.” The report also highlights “serious restrictions on freedom of
expression and media [and the] inability of citizens to choose their government
peacefully through free and fair elections.”182
The most recent version of the annual Freedom House rating of political rights
and civil liberties in 210 countries and territories worldwide ranks Saudi
Arabia as tied for 13th worst,183 assigning it a “not free” label and a score of
one out of a possible 40 points for political rights and seven out of a possible
60 points for civil liberties.184
The Biden administration would undoubtedly find it much easier to make
concessions to the Saudis on other issues if the Saudi government were to
improve its human rights practices and commitments. One way for the Saudi
government to signal improvement would be by releasing non-violent political
prisoners. The State Department human rights report lists dissidents and critics
who have “neither espoused nor committed violence” yet have been detained or
arrested on security-related charges.185 A March 27, 2023, letter to the crown
prince from a bipartisan group of House members, led by Reps. Jamie Raskin
(D-MD) and Nancy Mace (R-SC), called attention to the plight of Saudis
imprisoned merely for sending tweets criticizing the Saudi government.186
Amnesty for such prisoners could be a helpful step.
A second way to signal improvement would be to definitively change Saudi
practices that violate both Saudi law and fundamental international human rights
obligations to which Saudi Arabia is a party. One such practice, listed in the
State Department’s 2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, is the regular
use of torture to coerce confessions.187
A third way to signal improvement would be for Saudi Arabia to announce and
implement, perhaps in partnership with the U.S. government, a robust mechanism
for monitoring and otherwise ensuring its compliance with key international
human rights treaties and other instruments to which Saudi Arabia is already
committed. These include: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women;188 the Convention Against Torture;189 the Gulf
Cooperation Council Human Rights Declaration;190 and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.191
A fourth way to signal an improved approach to human rights would be for Saudi
Arabia to join additional international human rights treaties. Saudi Arabia is
currently a party to relatively few international human rights treaties. One
obvious and important treaty which Saudi Arabia has not yet joined is the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been joined by
173 other countries including the United States and several of the kingdom’s
fellow members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.192
Some Final Thoughts
If Washington neglects its partners in the Middle East out of a desire to
further reduce commitments in the region and focus elsewhere, the United States
could find itself in a position of having to send additional forces back to the
region in the future in response to events that could have been avoided,
deterred, or managed. Riyadh, for its part, risks making too many maximalist
demands of Washington. If Riyadh, owing to its impatience with Washington,
deepens its partnership with Beijing, Saudi Arabia’s stock in Washington will
plummet, making constructive negotiations with the United States less likely and
propelling the two governments toward a painful divorce after decades of a
strategic partnership. Riyadh would then quickly realize that Beijing is no
substitute for Washington when it comes to the political will and military
capability to counter Iran.
Thankfully, neither outcome is inevitable. With the strategic context in mind
and an appreciation for the objectives the two governments share, there is a
possible path forward. The purpose of this memo has been to offer a range of
ideas that — in some form or combination — could perhaps contribute to a new
U.S.-Saudi Arabia strategic partnership agreement. There is still a window to
pursue such a path, but if both sides are not careful, that windo
Why Did Xi Jinping Suddenly Call Zelensky?
Fred Kaplan/The New York Times/01 May, 2023
Earlier this week, Chinese President Xi Jinping called up Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky for the first time since Russia invaded last year. Is Xi’s
peace overture to Ukraine for real? He has several reasons for sincerely hoping
that the war between Ukraine and Russia ends soon. Is his overture likely to
achieve the goal? That’s a different question. Unless the underlying geopolitics
change, probably not.
Two months ago, Xi issued a vague 12-point “peace plan,” and Zelensky found it
intriguing enough to request a conversation. On Wednesday, Xi followed up, and
they had an hourlong call that Zelensky later described as “long and
meaningful.” China’s official readout emphasized the need for a “political
settlement of the Ukrainian crisis.” Zelensky has since named an ambassador to
Beijing, and Xi is sending his envoy for European affairs to Kyiv.
What’s going on, and why is it happening now? Xi hasn’t spelled out his
reasoning publicly, but some plausible explanations can be inferred from recent
events and context.
First is the basic backdrop: Xi must realize that the alliance he struck with
Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2022—less than a month before Putin’s
invasion of Ukraine—was, on some level, a strategic error. The two leaders
talked at the time of a “no-limits” partnership, but Xi has slapped on a lot of
limits since. Notably, though he continues to give Russia lots of money and
technical gear, he has not supplied any weapons for the war. He watched the
Russian army’s recent offensive that failed to move the lines of battle. He has
no doubt read reports that Ukraine’s upcoming offensive—likely to get underway
next month, as planeloads of new Western weapons, including tanks and other
armored vehicles arrive—could recapture substantial swaths of territory. If that
happens, Putin’s position—military and political—could face rapid erosion, as
could Xi’s by affiliation.
Second, this past Monday, Xi’s other big diplomatic campaign—to make
politico-economic inroads in Europe, partly for China’s own sake, partly to
sever the continent’s transatlantic links to the United States—took a major
smackdown. It happened when Lu Shaye, China’s ambassador to France, said in a TV
interview that former republics of the Soviet Union, which gained independence
in 1991, were not sovereign states under international law. These states would
include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and—most significantly—Ukraine. Lu, one of
the most flamboyant hardliners in China’s diplomatic corps, clearly hadn’t got
the message that Xi was striking a softer image as a prospective mediator
between Russia and Ukraine.
Xi’s economic support of Russia, and his failure to denounce Putin’s invasion,
had already diminished the credibility of this image. Lu’s statement, extreme
even by Beijing standards, threatened to pulverize the image into dust. In an
unusual step, Chinese spokesmen quickly disavowed Lu’s words. Perhaps not by
coincidence, just two days later, Xi made his phone call to Zelensky—affirming
that, whatever his stance toward Putin, he regards Ukraine as a sovereign state
indeed.
Zelensky has long wanted direct contact with Beijing, in hopes of breaking up
Xi’s already dangling alliance with Moscow. He is reportedly upbeat about the
conversation—but that doesn’t necessarily mean peace is at hand.
As he has in the past, Zelensky emphasized that any cease-fire must be preceded
by Russia’s military withdrawal from all occupied Ukrainian territory and a
restoration of the 1991 borders between the two countries. This would mean the
return not only of Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region but also of Crimea, which
Russia annexed in 2014. Whatever happens on the battlefield in the next few
months, US officials seriously doubt Putin would give up Crimea, which, among
other things, holds the port of the Russian navy’s Black Sea Fleet. (Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev handed Crimea to Ukraine as a gift in 1954, but the
deed was symbolic, as the Soviet Union was the only viable political entity at
the time. Many Crimeans regarded themselves as Russian, at least until recently;
when Russian troops occupied the peninsula in 2014, they did so without firing a
shot.)
Zelensky’s insistence on retaking Crimea may be a bargaining position. Either
way, he is completely reasonable to demand a Russian withdrawal from all other
Ukrainian territory. A cease-fire that left both sides’ troops in their present
positions would only give the Russians a chance to rest, regroup, rearm, and
mobilize more troops for the next round of fighting.
So these are the questions: Would Putin withdraw from any captured land, despite
the utter humiliation? Would he do so if he were allowed to keep Crimea, perhaps
pending the results of a truly free and fair referendum (which, even now, Russia
might well win)? Would Zelensky allow that to happen without first pushing for a
fight? Finally, who would negotiate and enforce this arrangement?
That is the ultimate question. There is no higher power with the leverage to
make this work. If the United States and China worked together—Washington
pressuring and providing security guarantees to Ukraine, Beijing doing the same
to Russia—there might be a chance of pulling this off. But US-Chinese relations
are in tatters these days, with little chance of mending any time soon, except
perhaps on marginal issues such as trade deals.
Even if relations warmed rapidly, there is no guarantee that Putin or Zelensky
would go along with any such deal, as long as either thought he had a chance of
winning the war—and both still have some basis for thinking they could. Putin
could still draft more men, even if just to soak up Ukrainian ammunition (not
since World War I has the world seen a more horrifying spectacle of using troops
as cannon fodder). Zelensky is on the verge of receiving more Western arms,
including armored vehicles, which could propel the coming counteroffensive to
some success.
The next few months could be crucial. If Ukraine’s counteroffensive fails to
break through Russia’s defensive lines, if the war appears to be headed for a
perpetual stalemate of carnage and devastation, the Western nations may stop
sending more military aid and press for a diplomatic solution. This is Putin’s
most plausible hope at this point. If Ukraine does break through the lines and
seems on the verge of “winning” by some reasonable definition of the term, then
Putin’s hold on power could collapse and, sometime before that moment, Xi could
face his own challenge of switching sides or doubling down to break his own
isolation. This is Putin’s—and Xi’s— most dreadful nightmare, and it goes some
distance in explaining why Xi is trying to end the war before it plows into its
next uncertain stage. The problem is, he might have moved too late.
No end in sight to Syrian refugee crisis
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Arab News/May 01, 2023
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/117855/117855/
When the unrest began in Syria on March 15, 2011, it was difficult to imagine
that it would lead to one of the worst refugee crises in the modern era. But the
unrest led to a prolonged civil war, which is considered the second-deadliest
conflict of the 21st century — after the Second Congo War — and the worst
humanitarian crisis of our generation. The Syrian civil war has resulted in an
estimated 600,000 deaths. And, since 2011, almost 14 million people, equivalent
to more than half of the Syrian population, have been displaced by the conflict.
One of the reasons behind the intensity and scope of the Syrian conflict is that
several concentric circles of tension were happening at the same time in the
country. Some rebel groups were not only fighting the government, but also each
other. Some proxy and militia groups from other countries were involved in the
conflict as well. There was an international stalemate between the US and
Western countries on the one hand and Russia and China on the other. And global
terror groups such as Daesh also gained prominence at different points during
the conflict.
And, after more than 12 years of conflict, Syria remains the largest refugee
crisis in the world. The UN Refugee Agency reported last month that more than
“14 million Syrians have been forced to flee their homes in search of safety.
More than 6.8 million Syrians remain internally displaced in their own country,
where 70 percent of the population is in need of humanitarian assistance and 90
percent of the population live below the poverty line.”
Such a large number of refugees was always going to affect many countries in the
region and beyond. The first impact is usually felt by the countries that share
borders with the conflict-affected nation. In this case, these countries are
Lebanon, Turkiye, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq. The UNHCR stated: “Approximately 5.5
million Syrian refugees live in the five countries neighboring Syria … Germany
is the largest non-neighboring host country with more than 850,000 Syrian
refugees.”
Refugees can have a significant impact on the social, economic, political and
even environmental landscapes of host countries. The hosts tend to face
political and economic strain if not prepared for the situation. Problems arise
when host countries do not have the resources, or are not prepared economically
and socially, to deal with a huge influx of refugees.
Such a situation not only has a negative impact on the host country, but also on
the living standards and future prospects of the refugees. In other words, the
situation of the refugees will differ depending on the social and economic
situation of the host country. One example is Lebanon. Lebanon is currently
facing its “worst socioeconomic crisis in decades. It hosts the highest number
of refugees per capita worldwide. The government estimates 1.5 million Syrian
refugees and 13,715 refugees of other nationalities. Ninety percent of Syrian
refugees are living in extreme poverty,” according to the UNHCR.
Peace, stability and security are vital and necessary for the sustainable return
of Syrian refugees.
On the other hand, countries that are better equipped to provide the basic needs
that refugees initially require — such as education, healthcare, shelter, etc. —
will most likely benefit in the long term. The Lutheran Immigration and Refugee
Service states: “Understanding refugees’ economic impact is important to any
nation that receives them. There is an initial cost to cover basic necessities
and services to those starting over in a new country, such as housing, career
navigation, language classes, and healthcare. After this initial investment,
however, the host country receives far greater economic benefits from these
refugees. As they find their footing, refugees contribute significant tax
revenue, stimulate the economy, raise productivity, improve local worker wages,
boost innovation, and often generate international trade because of their
connections to various countries.”
There are two important steps to take when it comes to the Syrian refugee
crisis. The most effective approach is to facilitate the safe return of those
Syrian refugees who desire to return to their home country. This requires that
the international community help with the process of reconstruction in Syria,
including reestablishing security across the country. The more stable Syria
gets, the more likely it will be that Syrian refugees in Turkiye, Lebanon, Iraq,
Egypt, Jordan and other countries in the region will decide to return home.
But it is important to point out that peace, stability and security are vital
and necessary for the sustainable return of Syrian refugees.
Secondly, the international community ought to continue helping the host
countries that lack resources so that they can provide the required social
services to refugees. And if the host countries have the capability to cover the
needs of the refugees and help them integrate into society, this initial
investment can have several benefits for them in the long term.
In a nutshell, Syria remains the world’s largest refugee crisis. Unfortunately,
as long as there is no peace, stability or security in Syria, and as long host
countries lack the resources to deal with the refugees, this crisis will not be
resolved.
• Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a Harvard-educated Iranian-American political
scientist.
Twitter: @Dr_Rafizadeh