Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on July 15-16/2023
Qornet El Sawda tensions take a judicial turn: Municipality alleges pressure on real estate judge
LBCI/July 15/2023
Tension has resurfaced in the Qornet El Sawda file, but this time through the judicial gateway. A few days ago, the municipality of Bqaa Safrin submitted a request to transfer the case to the Court of Cassation due to legitimate suspicions, as they allege that the real estate judge has faced unprecedented pressure from activists and MPs regarding the jurisdiction of the real estate judge in delineating the borders. This is a legal point that Bqaa Safrin Municipality rejects. Bqaa Safrin Municipality also affirmed that the real estate judge, who should have recused herself after this pressure, refused to provide them with documents in the file and concealed forged maps that could form the basis of her decision, which justifies the suspicion. On the other hand, Bcharre Municipality questioned the reason behind Bqaa Safrin Municipality's four-year wait to request the case transfer after making significant progress in the legal proceedings of this dispute. Bcharre Municipality added: If the other party has the right, documents, evidence, and arguments, then why do they fear the decision of the real estate judiciary? However, Bcharre MPs Strida Geagea and Melhem Tawk issued a joint statement emphasizing that the interventions and pressures faced by some judges, as well as the request to transfer the case and the judge's response after nearly completing his file, are described as two crimes aimed at promoting discord and instigating division between Bcharre and Bqaa Safrin.

Israeli military delegation will not attend Monday trilateral meeting in Naqoura
LBCI/July 15/2023
Sources told LBCI on Saturday that the UNIFIL leadership has informed the Lebanese side that the Israeli military delegation will not attend the trilateral meeting in Naqoura on Monday. The meeting was supposed to discuss the issue of addressing remaining Lebanese border reservations and developments in areas outside the town of Marjayoun, extending to the hills of Kafr Shouba and the occupied Shebaa Farms. The information reveals that the Israeli side has cited the ongoing assessment of events taking place in recent days in certain areas along the Blue Line as a reason for not participating.

Lebanon-Israel border dispute: Implications of canceled meeting amid escalating tensions
LBCI/July 15/2023
On Monday, in the presence of UNIFIL, a scheduled indirect trilateral meeting between Lebanese and Israeli military delegations was supposed to take place in Naqoura. The meeting aims to discuss the disputed points along the land border and the recent developments in Mari, Ghajar, and the two Hezbollah camps in Chebaa Farms. However, the meeting, initiated by Israel through UNIFIL, was canceled after the UNIFIL leadership informed the Lebanese side that the Israeli military team would not attend, citing the need to assess recent events in certain areas along the Blue Line. Was the primary reason for canceling or postponing the meeting truly to evaluate events on the Blue Line, or is it related to the dispute over the B1 point, which has always been a fundamental point of contention in maritime delineation? The known B1 point refers to the Ras Naqoura, which the Lebanese army included within what is known as Basket A. It is worth noting that Israel had previously refused to discuss the B1 point during negotiations on Basket A, which includes Aalma El Chaeb, Al-Boustane, Marwahin, Yaroun, Meiss el-Jabal, and Odaisseh-Kfarkela. Israel argues that Lebanon's annexation of the B1 point would compromise its security as it overlooks an Israeli tourist site. Nonetheless, Lebanese experts assert that Israel's insistence on this point is primarily due to oil resources in that area. If this point had been returned to Lebanon before maritime delineation, Lebanon's maritime borders would have been significantly wider. Among the remaining contentious points is what the army has designated as Basket B, which extends into Lebanese territory by a depth of 25 meters and includes: two points in Aalma El Chaeb, Rmeich, Blida, Odaisseh, and Metula Wazzani. However, delineating the borders in these disputed points is no less complicated than the dispute over Chebaa Farms and the northern part of Ghajar. Lebanon considers Chebaa Farms to be Lebanese territory fully occupied by Israel after it advanced beyond the withdrawal line. Thus, the issue of land demarcation resurfaces amid almost daily developments on the border, during which Lebanon holds a new negotiation card represented by the two camps set up by Hezbollah beyond the Blue Line drawn by UNIFIL in the Bastara farm of Chebaa. But, the Lebanese state does not officially recognize these camps. Has the situation now shifted to removing the two camps in exchange for withdrawing from northern Ghajar and disclosing borders at the B1 point?

Israeli tear gas injures Lebanese MP during border fracas
Najia Houssari/Arab News/July 15, 2023
BEIRUT: A Lebanese MP and several journalists suffered minor burns after Israeli troops launched smoke and tear gas grenades at the group during a visit to the border of Shebaa Farms, a disputed strip of territory near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, on Saturday. The media delegation, accompanied by MP Qassem Hashem, advanced to within a few meters of Israeli troops before the soldiers took up combat positions and warned the group against coming any closer. The Lebanese army went on high alert following the attack, while UN peacekeeping patrols rushed to calm the situation. Hashem later told Arab News: “We were standing on Lebanese land, but Israeli forces — being naturally aggressive — did not spare anyone and used all kinds of intimidation bombs to push us back. “I was hit in my leg and hand, but the burns and wounds are minor.”The MP said he shouted at the Israeli soldiers: “This land is ours and you are aggressors. This is our right and we will not give it up.”He said the media delegation visited the area to remind Israel that “this is our land and it is not susceptible to annexation.”The visit had nothing to do with the renewal of the UNIFIL forces’ mandate next month, the MP said. Hashem, who is from Shebaa Farms, said that his family has inherited land in the area that was listed in the Lebanese land registry in 1943 before the establishment of Israel.
“This right is non-negotiable.”
He added that neither Shebaa Farms nor the area north of the town of GHajjar are included in the demarcation of the Blue Line or within the withdrawal line, and Lebanon views the area as Lebanese territory. Israel has established winter resorts on these fertile and productive lands, he said.
The Shebaa Farms, Kfarchuba Hills and the Golan Heights form a strategic triangle between Lebanon, Palestine and Syria. Candice Ardell, deputy director of the UNIFIL Public Information Office, said that dozens of people crossed the southern Blue Line near Bustra early on Saturday, and the Israeli army fired tear gas in response. UNIFIL peacekeepers, as well as Lebanese and Israeli troops, were all present at the site, and the situation was calm now, she said. Gen. Aroldo Lazaro, head of the UNIFIL mission and its force commander, spoke with the authorities on both sides of the Blue Line, she said.
Ardell said that several incidents had raised tensions in recent days. “Thanks to the commitment of the parties on both sides of the Blue Line, these incidents did not escalate further,” she said. “We encourage everyone to continue exercising the same level of restraint in the coming hours and days.”The UN Security Council is expected to renew the UNIFIL forces’ mandate in southern Lebanon for another year by the end of August. The Lebanese Foreign Ministry said in a statement on Saturday that the foreign minister “did not request any amendment to UNIFIL’s mission in the upcoming resolution regarding the freedom of movement of these forces.”

Ardel: The situation in the south is now calm, and we encourage everyone to exercise restraint
NNA/July 15/2023
"Dozens of people crossed this morning to the south of the Blue Line in the Bastra area, in response to which the Israeli army fired tear gas," said Candace Ardel, UNIFIL's deputy director of media, in an issued statement this afternoon. She indicated that "UNIFIL peacekeepers, the Lebanese army and the Israeli army are all at the site, and the situation continues but is calm now."Ardel added, "UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Arold Lazaro, speaks with authorities on both sides of the Blue Line." She added: "A number of incidents in recent days have raised tensions, and thanks to the commitment of the parties on both sides of the Blue Line, these incidents have not escalated further. We encourage everyone to continue to exercise the same level of restraint in the hours and days ahead."

Israeli forces fire smoke bombs at a gathering that included a deputy in southern Lebanon
AFP/July 15/2023
Israeli forces launched smoke bombs towards a gathering that included Lebanese MP Kassem Hashem as he was touring near the border in southern Lebanon, according to a correspondent for Agence France-Presse (AFP) and the National News Agency. The border between Lebanon and Israel, which are officially in a state of war, has witnessed tensions in recent weeks between Hezbollah and the Israeli army, who engaged in a major war in July 2006. According to an AFP correspondent, Israeli forces launched a number of sound and smoke bombs toward MP Kassem Hashem, a member of the Development and Liberation Bloc led by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, and the accompanying journalists at the border near the occupied Chebaa Farms in Bastara Farm, which is one of the Israeli-occupied Chebaa Farms. The National News Agency reported that Hashem and the journalists suffered from suffocation due to the incident. Hashem also suffered minor injuries as a result of slipping when the smoke bombs were launched, according to an AFP correspondent. There has been no comment from Israel. However, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) stated that the Israeli forces launched tear gas canisters after "dozens of individuals crossed south of the blue line" in Bastara Farm. The blue line is the ceasefire line drawn by the United Nations after Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. It passes through 13 disputed points between the two sides. Following the incident, the head of the UNIFIL mission and the Force Commander, Major General Stefano Del Col, according to the statement, made contact with the Lebanese and Israeli sides. UNIFIL emphasized that "several incidents have caused tensions in recent days, but thanks to the commitment of the parties on both sides of the blue line, their intensity has not escalated beyond that." It called for "continuing to exercise the same level of restraint in the coming hours and days." Three Hezbollah members, the country's most prominent military and political force supported by Iran, were slightly injured on Wednesday due to the Israeli army's firing of a sound bomb, according to a Lebanese source and Agence France-Presse. The Israeli army said in a statement that "several suspects approached the northern security fence and attempted to sabotage it in the area," noting that its forces "spotted the suspects and used means to disperse them."
This incident came less than a week after the Israeli army fired several shells toward Lebanese territory in response to an anti-tank missile it claimed was launched from Lebanon and exploded in the town of Ghajar, which Lebanon demands the return of its northern part. Israel has recently completed the construction of a fence around Ghajar, which the Lebanese authorities considered an "attempt to annex it by Israeli occupation." Lebanon demands the return of the northern part of Ghajar and the return of border areas from the occupied Chebaa Farms and the Kfarchouba Hills. Weeks ago, Hezbollah erected two tents in the Chebaa Farms, one on the Israeli-occupied side. It also announced on June 26 the downing of an Israeli drone after it penetrated the southern border. Hezbollah is a major player in Lebanon's political arena and possesses a vast arsenal of weapons, including precision missiles that Israel has long warned against.

Israeli army fires smoke grenades at Lebanese MP and journalists
Naharnet/July 15/2023
MP Qassem Hashem and a number of journalists suffered suffocation injuries after Israeli troops fired smoke grenades at them as they were touring the border near the occupied Shebaa Farms on Saturday, the National News Agency said.
“It is our right to reach any spot in the Kfarshouba Hills and the Shebaa Farms and what we’re suffering is a normal thing in light of the Israeli enemy’s hostile nature,” Hashem said after the incident. Israeli stun grenades wounded three members of Hezbollah on Wednesday near the border. The incidents come amid tensions along the Israel-Lebanon border area and ten days after the Israeli army struck southern Lebanon following an anti-tank missile launch from Lebanon. The missile exploded in the border area between the two foes. That same day, Hezbollah had denounced Israel for building a concrete wall around the town of Ghajar. The Blue Line cuts through Ghajar, formally placing its northern part in Lebanon and its southern part in the Israeli-occupied and annexed Golan Heights. The Foreign Ministry on Tuesday said Lebanon would file a complaint with the United Nations Security Council over Israel's "annexation" of the north of Ghajar.

Foreign Ministry: We are continuing to mobilize support & contacts with embassies in order to issue a decision that guarantees UNIFIL's freedom of...
NNA/July 15/2023
In an issued statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it denied circulated news about a request by Foreign Affairs and Emigrants Minister, Abdallah Bou Habib, to amend the UN Security Council resolution regarding the freedom of movement of UNIFIL that was ababdoned by the caretaker government. The statement stressed that Minister Bou Habib works in coordination with the Prime Minister and in accordance with government policy and its ministerial statement. It added that "the Foreign Ministry continues to mobilize support and contacts with the concerned foreign embassies in Lebanon, and through the Lebanese embassies in these capitals, and the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations in New York, for the issuance of a decision to extend the mandate of UNIFIL that guarantees UNIFIL's freedom of movement in coordination with the government and the Lebanese army, as implemented in the field, for the success of its mission, and to maintain calm and stability in southern Lebanon and the region for the success of its mission, in accordance with the agreement of the work of these forces known as SOFA."

MP Ali Khreis: What is required now from the Lebanese government is to confront the European Parliament's decision on Syrian refugees
LBCI/July 15/2023
In a statement representing the head of the Amal Movement, Nabih Berri, MP Ali Khreis affirmed that the decision made by the European Parliament to keep Syrian refugees in Lebanon and prevent their return to their country while accusing the Lebanese people of racism is a rejected notion. He emphasized that this decision constitutes interference and aggression against Lebanon and Syria. Furthermore, it comes at a time when Lebanon is preoccupied with internal crises and developments on the border with occupied Palestine. Khreis stressed that what is required now from the Lebanese government is to confront this decision and have full coordination with the Syrian government to facilitate the voluntary and safe return of refugees to their homeland. He pointed out that the cost of the Syrian displacement in Lebanon is no less than 2 to 4 billion annually, which is the burden Lebanon bears in the face of this crisis. He emphasized that this was a deliberate conspiracy by the countries that produced such a decision. Khreis reiterated the necessity of fully implementing the Taif Agreement, stating, "Lebanon cannot be divided, and division advocates want to wreck Lebanon. On the Amal-Hezbollah duo and national levels, we adhere fully to the Taif Agreement and its implementation. Let them reconsider their suspicious ambitions aimed at tearing the country apart. Let us engage in meaningful dialogue and distance ourselves from destructive rhetoric so that we can elect a new president for the republic."

Hasbani on EU's decision: We will continue to clarify the matter & find solutions
NNA/July 15/2023
Member of the "Strong Republic" parliamentary bloc, MP Ghassan Hasbani, said today: "We were not surprised by the European Union's statement because we were aware of its issuance for some time."Speaking in an interview with "Radio Free Lebanon" this morning, Hasbani added: "What surprised us was the final vote on the clause that the Syrian refugees remain in Lebanon, because there are some parties that are not in line with us in regards to the Syrian refugees issue, and they insisted on securing the vote for it. Therefore, the European People's Party was unable to secure a majority to vote against this clause."
Hasbani pointed to the campaign that began in Lebanon a week before the vote on the issue, "as wrong and misleading words started to leak in the media considering that the visit of the Lebanese parliamentary delegation to Germany was aimed at consolidating the presence of the displaced Syrians in Lebanon, at a time when the aim of our visit was completely different, for we were seeking to find safe ways that contribute to their return to their homes." Hasbani referred to the huge cost and burden that Lebanon has incurred due to the Syrian displacement, especially under the current dire living circumstances. He stressed on seeking to find safe ways that contribute to their return to their homes, as the Syrian displacement needs to be dealt with as soon as possible. "We will continue with our partners in the European Union to clarify the picture and find solutions, and we have previously drawn up a road map and we're working to implement it and find a comprehensive solution to this issue," he maintained. Moreover, Hasbani highlighted some positive parts in the decision, saying: "It is remarkable that there are names that were mentioned in terms of obstructing the presidential elections and justice...The issue of Hezbollah, its weapons, and its inclusion as a terrorist organization was dealt with in a very advanced language."Over approving the establishment of an international fact-finding commission regarding the Beirut port blast, the MP said: "This supports our recommendation to the Human Rights Committee, as we have submitted petitions to the United Nations, one to the Secretary-General to reach the General Assembly and the other to the Human Rights Commission, which is the closest to completion because it deals with these matters and does not require an official request from the Lebanese state..."Hasbani noted that a statement was issued at the previous meeting, urging officials and the Lebanese state to support the judiciary and free it from any interference to carry out its work as a first warning step. He revealed that a meeting will take place upcoming September which will be followed up with the families of the victims to try to extract a decision. However, he deemed that this step is not easy since some of the participating countries may use the veto because they may not want to reveal the truth about what happened. "The objective of the fact-finding committee is to uncover those who obstruct the judiciary and investigations, and to strengthen the Lebanese judiciary,” Hasbani underlined.

"No defamation or slander in Dima Sadek's tweet," says Makary
NNA/July 15/2023
Caretaker Minister of Information, Ziad Al-Makary, refused, in an interview with "Voice of Lebanon" Radio Channel, that journalists be imprisoned no matter the circumstances, considering the judiciary related to the media law as being old and trial matters unclear. He referred to "working on a new media law emanating from the existing law within the Administration and Justice Parliamentary Committee, in terms of abolishing the Publications Court, and considering media cases by the ordinary law, with an emphasis on non-imprisonment, regardless of felonies, and by replacing imprisonment with a fine, which removes ambiguities."He added, "The new amended law differentiates between publishing through social networking sites and the virtual digital presence of media institutions with an administrative structure on these sites."Makary emphasized the "ineffectiveness of the complaints filed by the partisan authorities," saying, "I do not see defamation and slander in Dima Sadek's tweet," referring to "the positive amendments to the law, which note the rapid technological advancement in cooperation with UNESCO." He believed that "there is no perfect law," announcing his intention to "cooperate with the parliamentary blocs to endorse this law and implement it in order for Lebanon to remain a country of freedoms and to protect journalists."

Jumblatt visits Naameh Monastery: We hope that Lebanon overcomes its ordeal
NNA/July 15/2023
Head of the Progressive Socialist Party, MP Taymour Jumblatt, visited today Al-Naameh Monastery accompanied by a delegation including MPs Marwan Hamadeh and Raji Al-Saad and party officials. Jumblatt and the accompanying delegation were received by the General Head of the Lebanese Maronite Order, Abbot Hadi Mahfouz, the head of the Naameh Monastery, Father Samir Al-Ghawi, as well as a number of officials from the order and heads of monasteries. A luncheon banquet was held in their honor, during which Abbot Mahfouz spoke about the "historical relationship linking the Mukhtara, the Jumblatt family and the Progressive Socialist Party to the Lebanese Monastic Order."He thanked Jumblatt and his accompanying delegation for their visit and hoped for the "continuation of cooperation for the good of the Mountain and Lebanon," congratulating Jumblatt on assuming the presidency of the Progressive Socialist Party, succeeding his father Walid Jumblatt, who enjoys great respect among the Lebanese Monastic Order. Jumblatt, in turn, thanked Abbot Mahfouz and the Lebanese Order for their warm reception, emphasizing "the cooperation that existed with the former heads of the Order, including Abbot Basil Al-Hashem, whom the Order lost last week."The PSP Chief hoped for improved conditions for the country and for Lebanon's recovery from its ordeal, so as to continue the process of cooperation in the future.

MP Hassan Khalil: We want the election of a president for the republic as soon as possible
LBCI/July 15/2023
The Political Assistant to the Parliament Speaker, MP Ali Hassan Khalil, expressed his views on the Israeli enemy, stating that "clearly, the Israeli enemy is fully engaged in the issue of control, attempts to encroach on rights, and creating tensions in our southern region." He emphasized that confronting the occupation should remain a prominent issue, and we should not allow the challenges within our country to weaken our position against any attempt by this enemy to breach our borders, violate our rights, or attempt to surpass what we have achieved through bloodshed since 2000 and in 2006. Khalil affirmed that "when we demand the demarcation of the land borders with occupied Palestine, we should not be misled by some people's good or ill intentions regarding expressions related to demarcating the borders with this enemy. However, there are certain points that we have reservations about after the demarcation of the Blue Line with this enemy in 2000. These points should return to Lebanon, and we will not relinquish them, regardless of their size or significance."He stressed that in our understanding of sovereignty, the hills of Kfarchouba and the Chebaa Farms, the land where the tents were erected, the Lebanese part of the Ghajar village, and the reserved points on the Blue Line, including point B1, are all sacred issues in our movement, activities, political work, and follow-up at all levels in the upcoming stage. Khalil stated, "our national pact, the Taif Agreement, and our constitution, which explicitly ratified it, should be the focus and foundation on which all political forces in Lebanon should converge." He considered renewing confidence in these agreements an essential commitment everyone should uphold to preserve Lebanon, its stability, and the smooth relations among its components.
The Political Assistant pointed out to Nabih Berri that they do not want an imposed president with hybrid intersections that do not carry a straightforward political project and do not stem from a solid political or parliamentary base. They want the election of a president for the republic as soon as possible. He emphasized that they are open to all initiatives and discussions, as they have called for dialogues more than once in the past. He called for the understanding of the fundamental political forces to elect a president so that they can establish the process of reviving the country, its institutions, the government, the financial and economic reform plan, and restoring people's confidence in the state and its role. The solution begins with dismantling the existing political stalemate. Khalil also addressed the decision of the European Parliament regarding Syrian refugees, saying, "the decision of the European Parliament is unjust and unfair to Lebanon, the Lebanese people, Syria, and the Syrians. It burdens Lebanon with a responsibility that should be shouldered by a continent like Europe, as it seeks to impose its weight on Lebanon, depriving Syrians of their return to their homeland and placing them in conditions resembling forced residency on Lebanese soil to prevent them from considering heading to European countries via the Mediterranean."

Let’s play out war scenario, which Nasrallah continuously threatens Israel with
Hussain Abdul-Hussain/Twitter/July 15/2023
Let’s play out war scenario, which Nasrallah continuously threatens Israel with, in which Hezbollah, from the north, and Hamas, from the south, attack #Israel and fire thousands of rockets in a bid to overwhelm Israel’s anti-missile Iron Dome and allow rockets to pass. Hezbollah will likely use Precision Guided Missiles (PGM) and Iranian Kamikazi drones to target sensitive Israeli infrastructure targets, such as oil installations and chemical plants in Haifa, Ben Gurion Airport, high density civilian areas. IAF will be busy trying to retaliate or preemptively take out Hezbollah launchpads (often hidden in Lebanese civilian hoods). Both Hezbollah and Hamas might have dug tunnels that they hope can transport them behind IDF lines. Such tunnels are not as dangerous as they sound because they do not allow for massing of fighters, who will trickle in with light arms, and can engage in hit and run or attack non-combatants, but these can be dealt with by police and the general public. If Hezbollah sends in ground troops to attack from the north, Israel’s undisputed control of the sky (no Russian or Iranian technology can tame the F35) will make Hezbollah fighters sitting ducks. This is the maximum damage that Hezbollah and Hamas can hope to inflate on Israel if they engage in war on Israel simultaneously. They can disrupt Israeli life, give Jewish state a bloody nose. However, Israel has firepower that dwarfs that of #Iran regime and all its militias combined. The difference between Israeli firepower and that of Iran+militias is much greater than the difference between Israel and Egypt+Syria in 1973 war. If Israel stops fighting with one arm behind its back (like it usually does in Gaza to avoid civilian casualties), it has the ability to overpower both Hezbollah and Hamas, erode their Command and Control.
Israel will inflict 10 times as much damage as it will take, and if Hezbollah’s best case scenario pans out, Israel might end up flattening both Lebanon and Gaza. Lebanon in particular is too vulnerable to withstand Israeli strikes. Lebanon cannot afford to replace any glass that might get shattered at Beirut’s airport, let alone rebuild bridges or other infrastructure. After 2006, Gulf countries generously funded Lebanese reconstruction. This round, whatever gets destroyed in Lebanon will remained destroyed for a long time. The country is already in shambles.
So what does Nasrallah want out of his harassment of Israel? Attention? Changing rules of engagement to make cross border violence acceptable (unlike total calm since 2006)? Avenge Iranian losses from Israeli strikes in Syria? Whatever it is that Nasrallah wants, short of causing Lebanon razed down, for good this time, his harassment will not really lead to anything.

Yellow Tents Across the Blue Line: Hezbollah’s New Brinkmanship/Assaf Orion/The Washington Institute
خيام حزب الله الصفراء على الخط الأزرق للحدود اللبنانية الإسرائيلية تمثل سياسة الهاوية الجديدة للحزب/عساف أوريون/معهد واشنطن
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/120141/120141/
July 15/2023
The group has been erecting structures and sending armed personnel into Israeli territory, decreasing the margin of error for diplomatic solutions and further eroding the credibility of the post-2006 border security regime.
Seventeen years after Hezbollah forces crossed into Israel, killed three soldiers, and sparked a devastating war, the group no longer bothers to hide its sprawling military presence in south Lebanon, on the border, and even across it. In fact, it seems to view Israel’s recent domestic turmoil and perceived weakness as a window of opportunity. As the Security Council prepares to extend the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), Hezbollah has erected tents and deployed armed men across the Blue Line in the Mount Dov/Shebaa area—the latest in a string of actions that violate the security regime established by UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the war. These illicit activities are blatantly visible to all, as are UNIFIL’s shrinking relevance and the Lebanese military’s collaboration with Hezbollah. Israel has sought to restrain the group’s provocations without deteriorating into all-out war, but its measured approach—coupled with Iran’s growing clout in the region—has only emboldened Hezbollah’s aggression and invited grandstanding from Beirut. Even if the current crisis is resolved quietly, the international community must take immediate action to prevent war and change course to avert deterioration.
Tents on the Blue Line
On June 21, armed Hezbollah personnel reportedly erected two tents on Israeli territory. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) initially refrained from publicizing the violation in order to give Hezbollah a quiet “climb down.” Israeli officials also used political channels with the United States, France, and the UN to clarify that the tents will be forcibly removed if they are not evacuated, while emphasizing that Israel does not want war and will let diplomacy work. In Lebanon, the Hezbollah-affiliated newspaper al-Akhbar has warned that “any Israeli action to remove the tents will lead to war.”
Lebanese officials have repeatedly declared their respect for the Blue Line—the boundary defined by the UN in June 2000 after Israel withdrew from south Lebanon. Yet Beirut also claims sovereignty over the Shebaa Farms, an area south of the line that Israel seized from Syria in 1967. Moreover, the line runs through the village of Ghajar—whose residents are Israeli Alawites—leaving the community’s northern section on Lebanon’s side of the boundary. Hezbollah has exploited both of these disputes to further its ethos of “resisting the occupation” and create a pretext for continued attacks there.
In the wake of the 2006 war, Resolution 1701 sought to prevent future hostilities by removing the main condition that led to the conflict: the presence of Hezbollah forces in south Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were reinforced and tasked with helping UNIFIL create “an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government.” Since then, however, Hezbollah has increased its military more than tenfold, including in the south. And over the past year alone, its elite Radwan assault units have established dozens of positions along the Blue Line.
Although Israel assesses that Hezbollah is not interested in initiating a war at present, senior IDF officials recently warned of the group’s growing appetite for challenges that risk unintended escalation (e.g., the March bombing near Megiddo; the April rocket salvo by Hamas cells in south Lebanon). In the Mount Dov/Shebaa area, Hezbollah military operatives were reported near a local UN observation position (OGL-SO3) dozens of times between January and March, occasionally crossing the Blue Line. In response to the group’s growing presence along this frontier, the IDF began constructing a robust ground barrier that has since reached Mount Dov, spurring Hezbollah-encouraged protests from residents of nearby villages. Last month, al-Akhbar reported that the “resistance” had erected a structure to stop the IDF’s work.
Meanwhile, a senior Israeli official noted that Hezbollah operatives had built a tent about thirty meters inside Israeli territory on April 8, near UN post SO3. The IDF later dropped leaflets in the area warning individuals not to cross the border. On May 30, however, another tent was erected fifty-five meters inside Israel. IDF officials reportedly believe both tents were erected by field operatives without the knowledge of their leaders. Whatever the case, senior Hezbollah figures and media outlets subsequently declared that the tents were located in occupied Lebanese territory. Later, one of the tents was reportedly evacuated, but Hezbollah spokesmen have claimed that both tents are still in place and will be joined by further structures as necessary.
The issue grew more complicated earlier this month when Hezbollah media accused Israel of annexing Ghajar village, which was re-fenced in 2022 at the request of its residents for security reasons. On July 6, a Konkurs antitank missile fired from Lebanon hit Israeli territory near the village. On July 10, Prime Minister Najib Mikati met with UNIFIL commander Aroldo Lazaro Saenz, who conveyed Israel’s demand to “remove the tent”; Mikati responded by demanding that Israel withdraw from the northern part of Ghajar, which is considered Lebanese territory. The same day, parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri declared that the two tents are on Lebanese land and likewise demanded that Israel withdraw from northern Ghajar, Shebaa Farms, the hills outside the Lebanese village of Kfar Shouba, and Point B1, the westernmost location on the Israel-Lebanon coastline.
On July 12, the anniversary of the 2006 war, Hezbollah operatives tried to sabotage the fence and set fire near Israeli border communities, spurring the IDF to disperse them. The group’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, emphasized that any attack on the Shebaa tents would not go unanswered and directed fighters to respond to any Israeli aggression. He also reiterated the demand for Israel to withdraw from occupied Lebanese points along the border. Meanwhile, Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant warned against dangerous provocations, emphasizing Israel’s readiness to act as needed.
It is difficult to ignore the similarity between the emerging developments in Mount Dov/Shebaa, Hezbollah’s wider trend toward more open aggression and overconfidence, and the group’s threats last year in support of Lebanon’s maritime demands. Then as now, a tactical situation (launching drones in 2022; deploying tents and gunmen along the Blue Line in 2023) gradually devolved into a Lebanese political attempt to extort border concessions from Israel under threat of escalation. The current situation’s most dangerous risk is a miscalculated escalation that leads to war—a scenario that might erupt due to additional Hezbollah attacks or a forceful Israeli removal of tents.
Internationally, the situation illustrates the depth of the current challenge to the UN-established Blue Line, the brazenness of Hezbollah’s armed violations of Resolution 1701, and UNIFIL’s utter failure in all aspects of its mandate besides its role as a liaison channel and an interposing force. On the eve of their next report to the Security Council, UN staff will face another credibility test: will they honestly recount the hard reality of an oversize peacekeeping force that is losing ground to Hezbollah every day, or will they once again water down the situation’s severe downward trend and obfuscate the truth? So far, the UN has refrained from publicly declaring that tents and militants are present south of the Blue Line despite being aware of this dangerous situation for several months, and the existing text of the next report indeed fails to mention them.
For its part, Hezbollah has deemed the steady progress of IDF barrier construction on the Israeli side of the Blue Line and in Mount Dov/Shebaa as a suitable pretext for “defending Lebanon’s sovereignty”—and, no doubt, distracting the Lebanese public from the group’s responsibility for the country’s meltdown. As noted above, it is unclear whether Hezbollah originally intended to erect the tents south of the line, but once called on to evacuate them, the group doubled down. Hence its emerging dilemma: quiet withdrawal could dent its image of strength, but leaving the tent in place could spark unintended escalation that wreaks havoc on Lebanon and stokes domestic anger against the group. One potential way out of this dilemma may be to link tent removal to a wider border negotiation.
Israel faces a strategic dilemma as well. The remaining tent presents no military threat, and attempting to answer the challenge with quiet diplomacy is a prudent first step. Yet in seeking to restrain such provocations without deteriorating into all-out war, Israel’s measured use of force (e.g., intercepting last year’s drones without an offensive response; responding to the Megiddo attack in Syria rather than Lebanon; striking harmless targets in response to the April rocket strikes) has emboldened Hezbollah’s aggression and invited political grandstanding in Beirut. Accepting Lebanon’s demands could project weakness and invite additional provocations.
Policy Options
Given that one tent has been evacuated, Israel can allow a short additional period to exhaust the diplomatic path. The option of land border talks seems to be on the table now as well. Yet Israel should not negotiate under threat of Hezbollah aggression.
If the group’s presence in Israeli territory persists, as is now increasingly probable, Israel should prepare to remove it at a time of its choosing—and prepare for possible escalation if Hezbollah forcefully opposes this removal or engages in any other aggression. To reduce potential Hezbollah brinkmanship, Israel should seek to shake the group’s confidence in predicting what shape IDF operations will take. Meanwhile, barrier construction near Mount Dov should be completed, and the Blue Line should be clearly marked in obstacle-free sections.
To establish legitimacy for its actions should war prove unavoidable, Israel should also adopt a higher media profile starting now, including high-resolution documentation of Hezbollah military violations of the Blue Line and UN resolutions. These efforts should be aimed at international audiences beyond just policymakers. The Lebanese public in particular should know who is responsible for dragging them closer to catastrophic war.
Finally, as prescribed in previous PolicyWatches last month and last year, authorities need to urgently adapt the Resolution 1701 and UNIFIL mechanisms to the transformed environment, including through the following measures:
Extend UNIFIL’s mandate by six months rather than a year, since the fast pace of events in Lebanon requires more frequent attention from the Security Council.
Cut UNIFIL’s size by 20 percent this summer and consider further cuts every six months. With the exception of liaison roles and border interposition or buffering, there is no justification to leave 10,000 peacekeepers at grave risk of becoming Hezbollah’s human shields if war breaks out.
Withhold UNIFIL civil projects from villages where patrols are repeatedly assaulted, condition assistance to the Lebanese army on fulfillment of its obligations under Resolution 1701, and decrease UNIFIL’s overall annual budget accordingly.
Condition assistance to the Lebanese government on fulfilling its legal obligations to protect UNIFIL. This includes meaningful, expedited legal proceedings against persons suspected of attacking peacekeepers (e.g., the murdered Irish soldier Sean Rooney).
Upgrade UN reports to include precise location data on where UNIFIL has actually patrolled, where it has been denied access, and where it has come under attack. Instead of simply providing general descriptions of incidents (which often obfuscate more than they reveal), the UN should report trends using graphs rather than just numbers.
Consider a U.S. veto of this summer’s UNIFIL renewal mandate unless changes are made. Although some might argue that this would increase Lebanon’s instability, it would in fact constitute a first step toward stability, signaling to Lebanon that UNIFIL represents not a cash cow to be taken for granted, but a serious commitment to a security regime that must regain some traction against Hezbollah.
*Brig. Gen. Assaf Orion (Res.) is the Rueven International Fellow at The Washington Institute and former head of the IDF Strategic Planning Division.
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/yellow-tents-across-blue-line-hezbollahs-new-brinkmanship

Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on July 15-16/2023
Cyprus says probe backs Mossad claims that hitman plotted to kill Israelis on island
Associated Press/July 15/2023
Cyprus police investigations support claims by Israel's Mossad spy service that an Iranian-backed hit squad planned to kill Israelis and other Jews in the east Mediterranean island nation, an official said. The security official told The Associated Press that Cypriot police had tracked an Iranian national identified as Yusef Shahabazi Abbasalilu following information from "friendly intelligence services." Subsequent probes into his activities indicated there was a plot for such killings, with at least one person on a hit list, the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss the investigations. According to the official, Abbasalilu initially attempted to set up base and recruit others in the ethnically divided island's breakaway Turkish Cypriot north, where its internationally recognized authorities have no access. Cyprus was split in 1974 when Turkey invaded following a coup by supporters of union with Greece. No country recognizes a Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence apart from Turkey, which maintains 35,000 troops in the island's northern third. The fact that the breakaway north isn't a part of the international legal order is a concern for domestic and foreign security services, according to the security official. Cypriot authorities were on Abbasalilu's trail in the island's southern part when he snuck into the north through a crossing point along the 180 km (120 mile) United Nations-controlled buffer zone. Turkish Cypriot authorities then identified him as a potential security risk and deported him to Iran. It's the first time that a Cypriot official has backed Mossad's claims of the alleged plot. The Mossad said last month said that its agents inside Iran seized Abbasalilu who allegedly gave investigators a detailed "confession." Released footage showed Abbasalilu saying on camera that he received his orders from Iran's powerful paramilitary Revolutionary Guard Corps. Abbasalilu also said that he had scoped the target and took photos of the target's home in Cyprus before fleeing the island. It was not clear if the man spoke under duress. Israel considers Iran its greatest enemy, citing the Iranian government's calls for Israel's destruction and support for hostile militant groups. It also accuses Iran of trying to develop a nuclear bomb — a claim that Iran denies. An Azeri man holding a Russian passport is on trial in Cyprus, a close Israeli ally, on suspicion that he planned to carry out the contract killings of Israelis living in Cyprus. The Azeri man also used a similar plan of action as Abbasalilu, the intelligence official said.

US Secretary of State defends Robert Malley amidst investigations and controversies
LBCI/July 15/2023
Where is the US Special Envoy for Iran, Robert Malley?
According to the US Department of State, Malley is on vacation, and no further clarifications have been provided. However, what the US State Department did not mention was revealed by American media outlets. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is investigating Malley on charges of mishandling classified information that may be related to Iran.It is worth noting that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently defended Malley in a television interview. But despite Blinken's remarks, has Malley's work been suspended? This hypothesis gained traction after Malley's name and photo were deleted from the US Special Representative for Iran Affairs' Twitter account on Friday night and replaced by an image and name of his deputy, Abram Paley. Following the change, the account tweeted, "we continue our work with allies and partners to curb Iran's destabilizing behavior, defend human rights, encourage de-escalation, and promote a stable, prosperous, and more integrated Middle East." Does the investigation against Malley affect the course of indirect negotiations between the US and Iran? It is especially considering that the Hebrew newspaper Haaretz confirmed that an unwritten agreement had been reached between Washington and Tehran, based on freezing the nuclear program in exchange for releasing Iranian assets abroad and freeing American prisoners in Iran, with Israel playing an essential role in this equation by not disrupting it. Nevertheless, the Biden administration refuses to officially disclose it as an agreement, fearing a negative reaction from Republicans in Congress.

European Union: Legal action against Hungary after its decision to release migrant smugglers
NNA/July 15/2023
The European Commission has launched legal proceedings against Hungary for its decision to expel 700 migrant smugglers in its custody, AFP reported. The government of Prime Minister Viktor Orban decided in April to release 700 of these smugglers and give them three days to leave the country. Hungary says its prisons hold 2,600 people from 73 countries, making up 13 percent of the country's total prison population, which represents a significant cost to taxpayers. But the European Commission considers that no systems have been put in place to monitor whether these smugglers will serve out the remainder of their sentences in their countries.

Israeli forces storm Nablus and several towns and villages in its vicinity
NNA/July 15/2023
Israeli forces stormed several areas in the Nablus governorate in the northern West Bank, according to "Russia Today". It was reported that a military force stormed the area of ​​Al-Masaken Street and some neighborhoods of the town of Askar, and fired gas and sound bombs at the citizens, and that the force stormed Nablus through Wadi Al-Bathan Street, and stationed itself on the main street adjacent to Askar camp. In a related context, the Israeli forces stormed the towns and villages of: Beit Furik, Madama, Azmut, Rojib, Kafr Qalil, Salem, and Qusin, east and south of Nablus, without any arrests being reported.

Netanyahu hospitalized after feeling 'dizzy'
AFP/July 15/2023
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was taken to the hospital on Saturday after feeling "dizzy," according to his office, which stated that the 73-year-old Netanyahu was likely suffering from dehydration but is in "good condition." The office, quoting a statement from Israel's largest hospital in Tel Aviv, said that "the Prime Minister arrived at the Sheba Medical Center a short while ago."The statement added, "He is in good condition and undergoing medical tests." In another statement, the office said that Netanyahu spent some time on Friday in the intense heat at the Sea of Galilee in northern Israel.
It further stated, "Today, he felt a slight dizziness, and based on the advice of his personal physician, Dr. Zvi Berkowitz, he was transferred to the emergency department at Sheba Medical Center." The office noted that "preliminary tests showed normal results," adding that "the initial assessment is dehydration." The office also indicated that the Prime Minister will undergo a series of additional tests. Netanyahu, who was re-elected at the end of last year, leads a right-wing coalition, and his proposed judicial reforms have sparked weekly protests since January. Additionally, the Prime Minister is facing corruption charges that he denies. In October, Netanyahu was previously taken to the hospital during the night. At the time, his office stated that he felt unwell during the conclusion of the Yom Kippur prayers.

US sending F-16 fighter jets to protect ships from Iranian seizures in Gulf
Associated Press/July 15/2023
The U.S. is beefing up its use of fighter jets around the strategic Strait of Hormuz to protect ships from Iranian seizures, a senior defense official said, adding that the U.S. is increasingly concerned about the growing ties between Iran, Russia and Syria across the Middle East. Speaking to Pentagon reporters, the official said the U.S. will send F-16 fighter jets to the Gulf region this weekend to augment the A-10 attack aircraft that have been patrolling there for more than a week. The move comes after Iran tried to seize two oil tankers near the strait last week, opening fire on one of them. The defense official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to provide details of military operations in the region, said the F-16s will give air cover to the ships moving through the waterway and increase the military's visibility in the area, as a deterrent to Iran. The U.S. Navy said in both instances the Iranian naval vessels backed off when the USS McFaul, a guided-missile destroyer, arrived on the scene. In addition, the defense official told reporters the U.S. is considering a number of military options to address increasing Russian aggression in the skies over Syria, which complicated efforts to strike an Islamic State group leader last weekend. The official declined to detail the options, but said the U.S. will not cede any territory and will continue to fly in the western part of the country on anti-Islamic State missions. The Russian military activity, which has increased in frequency and aggression since March, stems from growing cooperation and coordination between Moscow, Tehran and the Syrian government to try to pressure the U.S. to leave Syria, the official said. The official said Russia is beholden to Iran for its support in the war in Ukraine, and Tehran wants the U.S. out of Syria so it can more easily move lethal aid to Lebanese Hezbollah and threaten Israel. The U.S. has seen more cooperation, collaboration, planning and intelligence sharing, largely between mid-level Russian and Iranian Quds force leaders in Syria, to pressure the U.S. to remove troops from Syria, the official added. There are about 900 U.S. forces in the country, and others move in and out to conduct missions targeting Islamic State group militants. The U.S. does not believe Russian aircraft plan to drop bombs on U.S. troops or shoot down manned aircraft. But there are concerns that Russian pilots will knock a Reaper drone out of the sky and that Moscow believes that type of action would not get a strong U.S. military response, the official said. As an example, in March, a Russian warplane poured jet fuel on a U.S. surveillance drone and then struck its propeller, forcing the U.S. military to ditch the MQ-9 Reaper into the Black Sea. The incident spiked tensions between the two countries and triggered a call between their defense chiefs, but led to no direct military response.
Last week, Rear Adm. Oleg Gurinov, head of the Russian Reconciliation Center for Syria, said the Russian and Syrian militaries have been doing joint training. In comments carried by Syrian state media, he said Moscow is concerned about drone flights by the U.S.-led coalition over northern Syria, calling them "systematic violations of protocols" designed to avoid clashes between the two militaries. U.S. and Russian military commanders routinely communicate over a deconfliction phone line that has been in place for several years to avoid unintended clashes in Syria, where both sides have troops on the ground and in the air. There are often many calls a day, and at times result in angry threats as commanders argue over an ongoing operation, said the U.S. official. Describing a conversation, the official said the Russians will often declare an area of space a restricted operating zone and say they are doing military exercises there.
The U.S. sees no exercises, and tells Russia that American forces are on a counterterror mission against the Islamic State group and plan to fly in that area. The Russians then say they can't guarantee U.S. aircraft safety if they go there. And once the mission begins, and the aircraft move into the zone, "it sometimes gets very heated," said the official, as both sides loudly protest and reject the other's assertions. The most recent incident was Friday morning, when a Russia aircraft flew repeatedly over the at-Tanf garrison in eastern Syria, where U.S. forces are training Syrian allies and monitoring Islamic State militant activity. The official said the Russian An-30 aircraft was collecting intelligence on the base.
The U.S. did not have fighter aircraft in the area and took no direct action against the Russian flight.

UN says Damascus conditions for cross-border aid 'unacceptable'
Agence France Presse/July 15/2023
The United Nations is concerned about "unacceptable conditions" set by Damascus for allowing aid to flow through its Bab al-Hawa crossing to rebel-held areas in northwest Syria, according to a document reviewed by AFP.
The delivery of humanitarian aid through the crossing has been stalled since Monday, when a 2014 U.N. deal expired. A letter this week from Syrian authorities allowing use of the border crossing between Turkey and Syria "contains two unacceptable conditions," according to a document sent to the U.N. Security Council from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OCHA said it was concerned that the Syrian government had "stressed that the United Nations should not communicate with entities designated as 'terrorist.'" The second condition it bridled at was that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) should "supervise and facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid" in northwest Syria. The U.N. says more than four million people in northwest Syria are in need of food, water, medicine and other essentials. Through an arrangement that began in 2014, the UN largely delivers relief to northwest Syria via neighboring Turkey through the Bab al-Hawa crossing. Syria announced on Thursday that it would authorize the UN to use Bab al-Hawa to deliver vital humanitarian aid to millions of people in rebel-held areas for six months.Syria's ambassador to the UN Bassam Sabbagh told reporters on Thursday that his country had taken a "sovereign decision" on allowing the aid to continue.
'Comprehensive and unrestricted'
That announcement followed the expiration on Monday of a mechanism that has allowed U.N. convoys to use the crossing to rebel areas without authorization from Damascus. U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres's spokesman Stephane Dujarric said on Friday that "there's been no crossings in Bab al-Hawa with United Nations humanitarian aid," adding that authorities were reviewing Syria's authorization. "We're taking a look at... what exactly was expressed in the letter," he said. "These things need to be studied carefully," he added, reiterating the U.N.'s "commitment to delivering humanitarian assistance guided by humanitarian principles of non-interference, of impartiality."The OCHA document seen by AFP also called for the need to "review" and "clarify" parts of Damascus' letter, saying the deliveries "must not infringe on the impartiality... neutrality, and independence of the United Nations' humanitarian operations." Damascus regularly denounces the UN aid deliveries as a violation of its sovereignty, and major ally Moscow has been chipping away at the deal for years. Russia on Tuesday vetoed a nine-month extension of the agreement, and then failed to muster enough votes to adopt a six-month extension. The 15 U.N. Security Council members had been trying for days to find a compromise to extend the cross-border aid deal. Syria's conflict has killed more than 500,000 people, displaced millions and battered the country's infrastructure and industry. "The scale of needs in Syria requires a comprehensive and unrestricted approach to humanitarian aid," the ICRC delegation in New York told AFP. "We stand ready to support in ways that fall within our capabilities and with the consent of all parties involved."

Bab al-Hawa crossing suspended: Will Syrians receive timely aid?
LBCI/July 15/2023
In a significant development, the mechanism for aid deliveries from Turkey to opposition-held areas in northwest Syria through the Bab al-Hawa crossing has changed without Damascus' permission. This deliberate alteration marks a departure from the established procedure since 2014. The change on the ground comes after the failure of the United Nations Security Council last Tuesday to agree on extending the mechanism. The deadlock resulted from Moscow, a Syrian ally, exercising its veto power to prevent the adoption of a resolution that would have extended the mechanism's operation. However, the two conditions set by Damascus, which the United Nations deemed unacceptable, prompted the suspension of aid shipments. One of the conditions demanded that the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent supervise the aid distribution. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs considered this requirement incompatible with UN independence and impractical. The other condition set by Syria was that the United Nations refrain from engaging with entities classified as terrorist organizations. Meanwhile, the United Nations and its partners emphasize non-interference and neutrality in delivering humanitarian aid. As the United Nations continues to study Damascus' conditions, the use of the Bab al-Hawa crossing remains suspended until further notice. Will aid reach Syrians on time?

Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on July 15-16/2023
Pro-Assad activists seek to get Elizabeth Tsurkov killed
Jonathan Spyer/July 15/2023
The pro-Assad activists at Electronic Intifada, in an article entitled ‘What we know about Elizabeth Tsurkov’ are trying their feeble best to get a Jewish woman currently held in Iraq murdered.
I’m not going to link to their site, so if you want to see the piece in full, you’ll need to head there yourself. But re. the substance of their claims, they imply that Tsurkov is a spy in the pay of the Israeli government (of which she is in fact a bitter opponent). It is difficult to see why anyone would seek to spread rumors of this kind except if their intention was to do all in their power to cause harm to Tsurkov, and if the claim sticks, to place her in yet greater physical peril than she already finds herself. I suppose it would be mistaken to seek even the most elementary level of moral development among supporters of the murderous Assad regime. Saying that an Assad supporter lacks a moral framework is kind of a tautology. I do find it astonishing tho that taking positions and actions of this kind apparently has no cost in terms of access to a certain part of the mainstream in media and research circles.
I want to focus on a slightly different aspect, tho. Tsurkov’s gleeful tormentors at EI apparently think that Jewish and Israeli researchers and journalists should meekly accept the pronunciation by Arab nationalist and Islamist dictatorships and movements, that our right to pursue our profession in their countries is forbidden – at the same time that anti-Israel and anti-Jewish outlets like al-Jazeera and al-Mayadeen are freely permitted to operate in Israel.
No deal. For a decade and a half, as those who know my work will be aware, I ignored their efforts to shut down the pursuit of news – and worked up close and very deep into their countries and organizations, from every front and every side. Thanks, I think, to a somewhat more meticulous attitude than Elizabeth Tsurkov’s to op-sec, a quite developed ability to read situations and, not least, a great deal of luck, I was never caught by the dictatorships that Electronic Intifada supports.
The ethical questions regarding protection of sources in these situations are real and substantive. Without going into detail, (and you can assume that where shills for Assad may be reading, I certainly wont be having a discussion re. sources and methods), journalists and researchers of our ilk take meticulous care in this regard. I regard myself as having stumbled in this area only once, In Baghdad in 2015, in a situation I regret but which did not result in tragedy, only some worry for a person who did not deserve this. But in this regard, again, those who profess concern should address their concerns to the regimes that try and stop us from pursuing our profession on grounds of our nationality/ethnicity. Ultimately, they are the ones responsible.
Try and imagine, if you will, if, say, the white minority regime in Rhodesia had tried to ban foreign black African journalists from researching or writing on its conflict. Would people of conscience have instructed such journalists to meekly concede to such an edict? or would they, rightly, have encouraged them to defy such an outrageous demand in all ways possible? This is a direct parallel to the situation vis a vis Israeli Jewish journalists and work in such countries as Syria and Iraq.
I agree with Elizabeth Tsurkov on very little, and have some reservations re her work. I think her research on Israel’s support of militias in south west Syria, nevertheless was ground breaking and among the most valuable of such work in the Syrian context. Regardless, I wish for her safe return from captivity to her home and homeland in the shortest possible time. As for the ghouls at ‘Electronic Intifada’, their moral level as evidenced by their latest activity makes them truly worthy and suitable servants of the blood-soaked Assad dictatorship, the Iraqi Shia militias and their backers in Teheran.
They and Tsurkov largely agree on the Israel-Palestinian conflict (both EI and Tsurkov are strongly anti-Zionist and anti-Israel). The reasons for their extreme hostility to her, I think, are a combination of two factors: 1. the fact that she is an Israeli-Jewish woman, and they are motivated by a violent hatred of Israeli Jews which applies regardless of the opinions or preferences of the Israeli Jew in question, and 2. Tsurkov was in her work a strong critic of the Assad dictatorship, and the people at EI are among its supporters. The Assad dictatorship, probably not coincidentally in this regard in terms of the habits of thought of its supporters, is a regime based consciously and directly on European fascism.

إدارة بايدن تمول تجارب القنابل النووية الإيرانية وتهدد إسرائيل لأنها تحاول منعها؟
د. ماجد رفي زاده / معهد جيتستون/ 15 تموز 2023
ترجمة موقع غوغل
Biden Administration Funding Iran’s Nuclear Bomb Tests, Threatening Israel for Trying to Prevent Them?
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Gatestone Institute./July 15, 2023
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/120136/120136/
Secret attempts by the Biden Administration to reach an interim deal with the mullahs threaten not only to add an estimated $100 billion into the treasury of the Iranian regime’s struggling economy, but, worse, catapult an Iranian nuclear menace onto the world.
Iran’s aggression threatens not only its own brutalized citizens – Iran has executed more than 200 people in just the first half of this year and deliberately poisoned more than 1200 schoolgirls — but also the entire region, Europe and the United States.
Reports also indicate that the Iranian regime’s illegal nuclear activities have escalated in 2023 under the Biden Administration’s watch.
In spite of these factors and the strong opposition from the Congress — including a warning from U.S. Rep. Michael McCaul that according to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, any agreement, even an informal one, with Iran about its nuclear weapons program, must be approved by Congress and no funds released until after 60 says — the Biden Administration has been holding​ ​secret talks in Oman…
Along with this Iranian plan to join the “nuclear club,” abetted by the Biden Administration, this same Biden Administration, in the face of Iran’s openly stated commitment to Israel’s destruction is, according to one report, now pressuring Israel to “commit suicide” or risk losing American support.
The dangerous legacy the Biden Administration appears to want to leave includes threats to the only democracy in the Middle East while capitulating to the world’s most vicious dictators in Afghanistan, China, Venezuela and Iran — which the US State Department has called the “top state sponsor of terrorism” — and soon, thanks to the Biden Administration, armed with nuclear bombs.
Secret attempts by the Biden Administration to reach an interim deal with the mullahs threaten not only to add an estimated $100 billion into the treasury of the Iranian regime’s struggling economy, but, worse, catapult an Iranian nuclear menace onto the world. (Image source: iStock)
Thanks to the Biden Administration’s appeasement of the Iranian regime, the mullahs have apparently become more emboldened than ever to test their nuclear bomb. Secret attempts by the Administration to reach an interim deal with the mullahs threaten not only to add an estimated $100 billion into the treasury of the Iranian regime’s struggling economy, but, worse, catapult an Iranian nuclear menace onto the world.
Iran’s aggression threatens not only its own brutalized citizens – Iran has executed more than 200 people in just the first half of this year and deliberately poisoned more than 1200 schoolgirls — but also the entire region, Europe and the United States.
New European intelligence reports recently disclosed that the Islamic Republic of Iran has sought to skirt sanctions imposed by the European Union and the United States in order to accelerate testing an atom bomb.
The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) published the intelligence documents with translations. According to Ayelet Savyon, director of MEMRI’s Iran Media Project:
“The reality is that Iran has not in any way backed off from its efforts to build nuclear weapons, has taken every opportunity to advance its technological capabilities to this end and has for years misled the international community and lied about its intentions while at the same time widely publicizing its goal to legitimately attain nuclear-threshold status and continues doing so to this day.”
Reports also indicate that the Iranian regime’s illegal nuclear activities have escalated in 2023 under the Biden Administration’s watch. According to the 2022 report of the Netherlands General and Intelligence Security Service:
“Last year, Iran proceeded with its nuclear program. The country continues to increase stocks of 20% and 60% enriched uranium. By means of centrifuges, this can be used for further enrichment to the 90% enriched uranium needed for a nuclear weapon. Iran is further ignoring the agreements that were made within the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). And by deploying increasingly more sophisticated uranium enrichment centrifuges it is enlarging its enrichment capacity.”
In addition, the Swedish Security Service noted in its annual report for 2023:
“Iran engages in industrial espionage, which is mainly aimed at the Swedish high-tech industry and Swedish products that can be used in nuclear weapons program.”
Adam Samara, a spokesperson for the Swedish Security Service, told Fox News Digital:
“The Swedish Security Service can confirm that Iran are conducting security-threatening activities in Sweden and against Swedish interests…
“Examples of these activities are industrial espionage targeting Swedish high-tech industries and unlawful intelligence gathering targeting Swedish higher education institutions. Iran seeks Swedish technology and knowledge that can be used in their nuclear weapons program.
“The Swedish Security Service has an ongoing collaboration with our international partners, but we do not however go into details concerning that collaboration.”
In spite of these factors and the strong opposition from the Congress — including a warning from U.S. Rep. Michael McCaul that according to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, any agreement, even an informal one, with Iran about its nuclear weapons program, must be approved by Congress and no funds released until after 60 says — the Biden Administration has been holding​ ​secret talks in Oman to reward the Iranian regime with a nuclear deal that will pave the way for it legally to obtain as many nuclear weapons as it likes, empower the ruling mullahs with billions of dollars, lift sanctions, allow it to rejoin the global financial system and enhance the theocratic regime’s legitimacy on the global stage.
The Biden Administration also reportedly wants immediately to pump $17 billion into the Iranian regime’s treasury — “for humanitarian purposes” — as if the administration has no idea that money is fungible and will obviously free up previously allocated “humanitarian funds” for nuclear and terrorist work. These benefits will not only enable Iran to complete its nuclear weapons program, but also to send more arms to Russia to attack Ukraine, as well as to enable the regime’s ongoing expansion even further over the Middle East — in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and the terrorist groups in the Gaza Strip — as well as throughout Latin America.
Ever since the Biden Administration assumed office, Iran’s ruling mullahs have been rapidly advancing their uranium enrichment to levels just below the those needed for a nuclear bomb, and reports state that they may be planning to test one. In March 2023, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl told the House Armed Services Committee that Iran’s nuclear program had made “remarkable” progress.
At present, according to Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, Iran reportedly has enough enriched uranium to produce five nuclear bombs. “Make no mistake,” Gallant told his Greek counterpart Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos during a visit to Athens on May 4, 2023, “Iran will not be satisfied by a single nuclear bomb. So far, Iran has gained material enriched to 20% and 60% for five nuclear bombs… Iranian progress, and enrichment to 90%, would be a grave mistake on Iran’s part, and could ignite the region.”
Along with this Iranian plan to join the “nuclear club,” abetted by the Biden Administration, this same Biden Administration, in the face of Iran’s openly stated commitment to Israel’s destruction is, according to one report, now pressuring Israel to “commit suicide” or risk losing American support.
The dangerous legacy the Biden Administration appears to want to leave includes threats to the only democracy in the Middle East while capitulating to the world’s most vicious dictators in Afghanistan, China, Venezuela and Iran — which the US State Department has called the “top state sponsor of terrorism” — and soon, thanks to the Biden Administration, armed with nuclear bombs.
*Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a business strategist and advisor, Harvard-educated scholar, political scientist, board member of Harvard International Review, and president of the International American Council on the Middle East. He has authored several books on Islam and US Foreign Policy. He can be reached at Dr.Rafizadeh@Post.Harvard.Edu
© 2023 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.

Turkiye and Erdogan on the rise after NATO summit
Luke Coffey /Arab News/July 15, 2023
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s leaders gathered this week for a major summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. Of course, the main focus was on Ukraine, and a new NATO-Ukraine Council was established to help boost cooperation.
The alliance also agreed that Ukraine will someday join the club. To the disappointment of many, however, it fell short of issuing an immediate formal invitation.
One aspect of the summit that is not getting as much attention as it deserves, though, is the role of Turkiye. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, fresh from his recent election victory, seemed to be everywhere and meeting everyone at the gathering. His new foreign policy team has also hit the ground running. He set the right tone from the beginning of the summit, when it was announced that Turkiye would finally support Sweden’s entry into NATO.
For the first time since entering the White House, US President Joe Biden also met his Turkish counterpart. It is no secret that leading up to the meeting, relations between the two heads of state were somewhat frosty. It is hoped that their meeting might pave the way for improved bilateral relations between their nations. They certainly greeted each other warmly and had positive things to say about the future of US-Turkiye relations. Erdogan even described his American counterpart as “my dear friend” when speaking to the media.
There was also a major breakthrough in their relationship when, after months of uncertainty, it was finally agreed that the US would sell F-16 fighter jets to Turkiye.
Erdogan also had a positive meeting with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis during the summit. Both sides agreed to arrange a meeting of the Turkiye-Greece High-Level Cooperation Council in Thessaloniki, Greece, this autumn. Considering how tense relations between the two countries have been in recent months, this is a very good development for regional stability. The fact that the meeting was possible because both countries are NATO members serves as a reminder of how significant the alliance is on the diplomatic front.
While Erdogan has made an effort to improve his relationships with his American, Greek and Swedish counterparts, he will, not unreasonably, expect this warmer engagement to be a two-way street. For example, in return for Turkish support for Sweden becoming a member of NATO, it is likely Ankara expects some degree of reciprocity when it comes to restarting negotiations for its membership of the EU. Erdogan will also expect progress to be made on a visa liberalization agreement with the EU.
Given that this is Erdogan’s last term in office, he is acutely aware it is his final opportunity to create a long-lasting legacy.
After he won the presidential election in May, many international observers wondered which path Turkish foreign policy would take as a result. There were also concerns that Ankara was getting too cozy with Moscow.
In the run-up to his reelection, Erdogan was presiding over a stagnant economy made worse by the devastating earthquakes in February. For better or worse, this was the main motivation for Turkiye maintaining its economic ties with Russia at a time when Western nations were imposing sanctions on Moscow. Considering that Turkiye is a member of NATO, this was viewed by many as being particularly problematic.
When one looks more closely at the current situation, it is clear that Ankara is not aligning with Moscow. Because of its history, Turkiye enjoys a privileged geopolitical position in the Black Sea region. This has meant that Turkiye and Russia have been competitors, and at times adversaries, in the region on numerous occasions. By some counts, the countries have fought at least 12 major wars since the 1500s.
The current situation with Ukraine offers a good example of the geopolitical tensions that exist between Ankara and Moscow. Even though there have been no public announcements by Turkish authorities, there is plenty of social media evidence suggesting that Turkiye has provided Ukraine with a number of weapons systems. These include armed drones, laser-guided multiple-launch rocket systems, dozens of armored vehicles, and self-propelled artillery systems.
It was also reported that Turkiye gave Ukraine cluster munitions last year, months before the US finally agreed to do so. In addition, Turkiye is building two corvettes for the Ukrainian Navy, and Ukrainian-built engines will be used in the latest generation of Turkish drones.
Soon after Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Turkiye closed the straits connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean to foreign warships. This affected Russia more than any other country.
These are hardly the policies of a “pro-Russian” government. They are the policies of a country acutely aware of its special and historical role in the Black Sea region. Even so, Turkiye has shown itself to be the only international actor that can speak to both sides in the conflict. It was, for example, able to lead the negotiations for a deal between Ukraine and Russia over the much-needed export of Ukrainian grain to North Africa and the Middle East.
Turkiye has also orchestrated multiple, high-level prisoner swaps between Kyiv and Moscow. And it is the only country that has been able to get the Ukrainian and Russian foreign ministers to sit at the same negotiating table since hostilities began.
Given that this is Erdogan’s last term in office, he is acutely aware it is his final opportunity to create a long-lasting legacy as part of the history of the Turkish republic. With the outcome of last week’s NATO summit, he is off to a good start in terms of international affairs.
He was praised by the Western media for finally giving the green light to Sweden’s entry into the alliance and for supporting Ukraine’s bid to join NATO. One major German newspaper even described him as “Superman” and wrote that “nothing works without him.” Coming from a German press that is normally very critical of Erdogan, this was high praise indeed.
The summit was therefore a clear example of the ascendancy of Turkish diplomacy on the international stage. During the remainder of Erdogan’s final term in office, expect even more Turkish diplomacy in global affairs. This can only be a good thing.
• Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. Twitter: @LukeDCoffey

Unity in the Maghreb is more distant than ever
Hafed Al-Ghwell/Arab News/July 15, 2023
During the tumult of the 1980s, a vision for the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) emerged in which the five principal states in the region — Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia — would form a union characterized by fraternity, equality and peace.
Now, however, the state of affairs in the subregion stands in stark contrast to the transient pan-African ideals of yesteryear. Two of its most populous countries, Algeria and Morocco, have effectively disconnected from each other, wreaking havoc across the region. Their rivalry is far-reaching, influenced by a deep-rooted distrust and tense geopolitical competition over hegemony in northwestern Africa and beyond.
An improvement in relations between Algeria and Morocco is perhaps the key to unlocking the Maghreb’s successful integration into a new era of intraregional cooperation, and also to revive the spirit of the AMU. Unfortunately, an as-yet unresolved question over the Western Sahara, now thrust into the spotlight due to reverberations from normalization agreements elsewhere, is feeding into an all-too-familiar dynamic.
Both countries have become more determined to pursue damaging zero-sum mentalities, whereby one country’s fortunes widens rifts and reduces future opportunities for rapprochement.
Beyond abysmal trade relationships and the characteristic exchange of barbed comments, the challenges plaguing the Maghreb region are manifest and deep-rooted. The AMU’s last intergovernmental summit took place in 1994, yet another indicator of the severe dysfunction consuming the region.
This level of deterioration calls for immediate intervention, not more fruitless discussions of whether the Maghreb can “regionalize” without integrating, which only sidestep the issue or demonstrate a remarkable misunderstanding of the Maghreb’s political economies.
The failure to act has spawned new risks and revived old threats, leaving the subregion descending further into disarray and instability. A dream of unity, equality and prosperity that once inspired the formation of the AMU is fast fading.
The AMU, with all its unmet aspirations, finds itself in an economic quagmire that also holds back much-needed integration, trade liberalization, and enhanced cooperation. The culprits are many: Excessively stringent trade and investment policies, punishing tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and the subpar infrastructure that links AMU nations.
Export and import border compliance costs, which are among the highest in the world, are other significant contributors. Furthermore, intra-regional trade infrastructure is sorely lacking. Take, for example, the lack of commercial transportation between the ports of AMU nations, despite their coastal locations.
Tellingly, AMU member states consistently look toward Europe, shaping trading policies to mirror European ideals and markets, and becoming living proof of the saddening reality of how relative trading costs supersede absolute ones.
In other words, trade experts argue that proximity to booming trading hubs, such as the European Common Market, tends to discourage intra-regional trade rather than promoting it. Consequently, the AMU is also missing out on golden opportunities to become a trade and investment intermediary between Europe and a developing Africa. This unforced error plays right into the broader issue at hand: A damning lack of regional integration that is thwarting the Maghreb’s place on the global value chain.
The curious case of duplicate trade agreements is another compounding factor. A majority of AMU countries are enmeshed in a web of bilateral and regional economic agreements, all supplemented by their memberships in the World Trade Organization. This convoluted mesh of overlapping agreements is colloquially termed the “spaghetti bowl” phenomenon, which creates its own share of headaches. Each country must navigate different terms of trade, tariffs, non-tariff measures, and so-called “rules of origin.”
Juggling these diverse and often conflicting rules can be incredibly burdensome, particularly for countries with limited institutional capacities or compliance abilities. The irony is that instead of accelerating trade, they slow it down, increase costs, and cause diversions in trade among AMU countries. Rather than greasing the wheels, these overlapping agreements cause everything to grind to a halt, and reveal that the road to integration is filled with economic potholes.
The mounting tensions in the Maghreb remind us of a crucial truth: Events in this part of the world tend to ripple far beyond its borders, stirring up waves of instability in their wake.
It is not all doom and gloom, however. The AMU still exists, in some capacity, so the spirit of its creation still survives. Moreover, even the feuding pair, Morocco and Algeria, have had brief periods during which cooperation blossomed, especially at the time of the regional upheavals in 2011.
During the uprisings that toppled seemingly unassailable regimes, both countries recognized a shared threat to the region’s status quo and hastily adopted a cooperative stance. During that lull in tensions, they struck a delicate balance between gradual and radical reforms, ultimately becoming role models for other beleaguered Arab states caught in a domino effect of revolutions and forced transitions.
For a brief moment, there was at least some hope that a joint pursuit of self-preservation might provide a foundation upon which future cooperation, greater collaboration and, ultimately, renewed prospects for integration could stand.
Regrettably, the hopes were short-lived, quickly overtaken by reignited rivalries. Thus, the dream of an integrated and cooperative Maghreb region remains unfulfilled and will, arguably, be much harder to realize than when the AMU was established 34 years ago.
The initial aspirations of the organization have shriveled, weakened by distrust and ceaseless political tensions. A glaring testament to this disintegration is the dismal figure for intra-regional trade, which stood at a mere 2.4 percent of total trade in 2021, ranking among the world’s lowest, and it is expected to shrink even further.
Sadly, not only has the prospect of prosperity and unity in the Maghreb region been heavily damaged, it appears set to regress even further, possibly even descending into all-out aggression. The closure of the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline in November 2021 was another reminder of just how far-gone the situation is in the region.
The pipeline, once a shining example of mutual benefits and regional consolidation, channeled Algerian natural gas to Morocco, Spain and Portugal. Inaugurated in 1996, it was viewed as the Maghreb’s analogous infrastructure to the European Coal and Steel Community, which was a driving force behind the formation of the EU. The closure of the pipeline, after a 25-year transit deal that was not renewed, signifies, in grim terms, a premature epitaph for regional prosperity founded on shared interests.
The region is now characterized by a number of harsh realities. An important gas pipeline shut down. Land borders sealed. Airspaces closed. Diplomatic relations in tatters. Algeria and Morocco still embroiled in a torrent of tensions, with the slightest spark igniting malevolent accusations against each other.
In 2022, Morocco established a new military zone bordering Algeria, sparking alarm. This year, Algeria went further, all but declaring the end of its diplomatic relationship with Morocco. Their dispute is punctuated by live ammo military exercises near the border. It is a tragic drama that has unfolded over three years, during which both nations have endlessly pointed the finger of blame at each other for their broken relationship.
It is as though we have reached a point of no return but can a resolution be found even in such tumultuous times? Simply put, no.
The mounting tensions in the Maghreb remind us of a crucial truth: Events in this part of the world tend to ripple far beyond its borders, stirring up waves of instability in their wake. To date, members of the AMU seem to contribute more to destabilizing the subregion than shoring up its security, stability, sustainable development and resilience.
Of course, the simmering undercurrent of this strange dynamic comes from the quasi-cold war between Algeria and Morocco. However, Tunisia is also battling a socioeconomic crisis that has been escalating since President Kais Saied’s takeover of the country in July 2021. And Libya remains shackled by decades of instability, plus the scars of armed conflict, and thwarted attempts to mend deep-seated divisions and build credible state institutions.
The situation in the Maghreb is precariously balanced. It would take nothing more than a spark, accidental or deliberate, to set off this powder keg, spewing chaos to Mediterranean neighbors in the north and an already volatile Sahel region to the south. As such, calls for regional integration in the Maghreb sound like a broken record. They echo a fantasy that is increasingly out of touch with a grim and, frankly, disappointing reality.
Yet, ironically, there has never been a more pivotal time for signs of unity among these long-standing AMU member states, given the bleak outlook should they persist in their own isolation. Indeed, it is very difficult not to feel despondent about the Maghreb’s future, given the magnitude and complexity of the hurdles facing each individual country and the region as a whole.
But even when there is friction, there can still be a potential, albeit slim, for future betterment and advocating for a revival of intra-regional cooperation in the face of adversity.
• Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and executive director of the North Africa Initiative at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC, and the former adviser to the dean of the board of executive directors of the World Bank Group. Twitter: @HafedAlGhwell