English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For 28 July/2022
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news

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Bible Quotations For today
Every kingdom divided against itself becomes a desert, and house falls on house, If Satan also is divided against himself, how will his kingdom stand?
Saint Luke 11/14-23: "Now he was casting out a demon that was mute; when the demon had gone out, the one who had been mute spoke, and the crowds were amazed. But some of them said, ‘He casts out demons by Beelzebul, the ruler of the demons.’ Others, to test him, kept demanding from him a sign from heaven. But he knew what they were thinking and said to them, ‘Every kingdom divided against itself becomes a desert, and house falls on house. If Satan also is divided against himself, how will his kingdom stand? for you say that I cast out the demons by Beelzebul. Now if I cast out the demons by Beelzebul, by whom do your exorcists cast them out? Therefore they will be your judges. But if it is by the finger of God that I cast out the demons, then the kingdom of God has come to you. When a strong man, fully armed, guards his castle, his property is safe. But when one stronger than he attacks him and overpowers him, he takes away his armour in which he trusted and divides his plunder. Whoever is not with me is against me, and whoever does not gather with me scatters."

Titels For English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on July 27-28/2022
From The 2002 Archive: Interview of ex-PM Michel Aoun with MTV Station’s Elie Nakouzi.
Israeli Army Confronts Hezbollah Threats with Extensive Exercises
Protesters storm bakeries, pastry shops as Lebanon’s food crisis deepens
Aoun: Lebanon committed to reforms, IMF negotiations
Ministerial Committee approves financial aid for public sector
Shea urges for quick reforms, timely presidential poll
Report: Maritime dispute on brink of solution
Three Lebanese charged in US for smuggling weapons, tax evasion
Public employees strike goes on as wage demands go unmet
Amnesty urges Berri, MPs to end harassment of women MPs
Mikati says Beirut port silos at serious risk of collapse
Lebanon to build new silos to ease wheat crisis
Geagea wants govt. to accept Iranian fuel, spare Lebanese from 'false rumors'
Jumblat urges Nasrallah to avoid war, calls for 'president with program'
Hariri stresses he won't interfere in any political activity
Salam says 49,000 tons of wheat to enter Lebanon this week
Beirut to host commemoration service for kidnapped Jesuit priest Paolo Dall'Oglio
Lebanon’s Syrian Refugees/Joseph Hitti/July 26, 2022
Sharing Israel’s Natural Gas Revenues With Lebanon Is A Mistake/Yair Ravid/Media/27 July/2022
Missing the Mark …Reassessing U.S. Military Aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces/David Kilcullen/Monograph/July 27/2022

Titles For Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on July 27-28/2022
Russia cuts flow of gas to Europe, raising fresh doubts about Canada's sanctions waiver
Pro-Sadr protesters breach Iraq's fortified Green Zone
Biden tests negative for Covid after completing treatment
Pro-Sadr protesters breach Iraq's fortified Green Zone
Iran says arrested Israel-linked agents were Kurdish rebels
17 fighters killed in south Syria clashes
UAE, Iran discuss boosting ties ahead of possible ambassador return
Rocket fire targets Turkish consulate in Iraq's Mosul
At UN, Iraq and Turkey escalate dispute over deadly attack
Blinken meets kin of slain Palestinian-American journalist
Saudi crown prince: First EU visit since Khashoggi killing

Titles For LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on July 27-28/2022
Will Assad attend the next Astana talks?/Ibrahim Aljabin/The Arab Weekly/July 27/2022
The shadowy economics of ISIS resurgence in Syria/Haid Haid/The Arab Weekly/July 27/2022
Why Europe’s fate matters to the Middle East and North Africa/Afshin Molavi/Arab News/July 27/2022
Lapid’s chance to break with the past/Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib/Arab News/July 27/2022

The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on July 26-27/2022
From The 2002 Archive: Interview of ex-PM Michel Aoun with MTV Station’s Elie Nakouzi.
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/110712/%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a3%d8%b1%d8%b4%d9%8a%d9%81-2002-%d9%85%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a8%d9%84%d8%a9-%d9%85%d8%b9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b1%d8%a6%d9%8a%d8%b3-%d8%b9%d9%88%d9%86-%d8%a8%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%84%d8%ba%d8%aa%d9%8a/

Israeli Army Confronts Hezbollah Threats with Extensive Exercises
Tel Aviv - Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday, 27 July, 2022
In the wake of statements by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah about bombing all Israeli gas fields in the Mediterranean, the Israeli army revealed that it has been conducting extensive exercises to deter such attacks. Defense Minister Benny Gantz said his army would respond painfully to any offensive, stressing that the Karish platform, which Hezbollah claims to be inside the Lebanese Exclusive Economic Zone, was located south of all border lines claimed by Lebanon in the indirect negotiations. Therefore, Hezbollah’s threats are inappropriate, according to Gantz, who noted that his government does not see any reason that prevents it from producing gas from this field on the scheduled date in early September. The Israeli defense minister’s remarks came during a talk show on Israeli Channel 13. “Nonetheless, we want to reach an agreement with the government of Lebanon,” he said, accusing Nasrallah of obstructing the attempt to reach a solution and “harming the Lebanese and the energy sector.”Gantz was asked if he believed that Hezbollah’s threats to Israel were serious. He replied: “I think that Hezbollah knows that Israel is deterring it, and so does the government of Lebanon. But I always take into account the risk of deterioration, for example in the case of sending drones. We are alert and ready… Our response will be painful. I hope we don’t get into a war.”He added: “We must defend our right to extract gas without harming the Lebanese.” Meanwhile, a senior military source announced that the Israeli army was taking Hezbollah’s threats seriously, noting that for months, it has been conducting large-scale exercises to counter various types of attacks, including sending drones not only to Karish, but to all Israeli gas fields in the Mediterranean, at strategic locations inside Israel, and on commercial ships and ports. According to the source, the army raised the level of alert and launched a series of drills to deter missile attacks. Daniel Hagari, Israeli Navy Director of Operations, said that the army sees Hezbollah’s threats as strategic. “Not only the gas fields are under threat; 99 percent of Israeli imports arrive by sea and 5,900 ships arrive at Israeli ports per year, about 53 percent of which reach Haifa port in the north, while 90 percent of wheat reaches Israel by sea. Therefore; the attack on any site needs a deterrent response,” he affirmed.

Protesters storm bakeries, pastry shops as Lebanon’s food crisis deepens
Najia Houssari/Arab News/July 27/2022
BEIRUT: Angry citizens on Wednesday stormed bakeries and pastry shops in Lebanon as the country’s food crisis deepened. Long queues formed outside many stores with residents waiting impatiently in searing heat for subsidized bundles of bread. As stocks and tempers ran short, many people opted to buy other bakery products, some priced at 40,000 Lebanese pounds ($1.5) for 10 thin loaves. Others vented their frustrations by taking to social media platforms, blaming politicians and bakeries for the problem while slamming mafia organizations for selling subsidized flour on the black market and smuggling it to Syria. In some places, soldiers were forced to intervene, removing protesters from shops, and defusing heated arguments between queueing customers.
Lebanese Economy Minister Amin Salam said: “Around 49,000 tons of wheat are expected to arrive in Lebanon by the end of this week. Hopefully the ships will arrive faster. The crisis is the result of flour being stolen from our country.
“A crisis cell headed by the economy ministry will be formed and a new mechanism will be set up for distributing wheat and flour fairly, and prosecuting those creating the crisis.”
Lebanon’s inability to secure US dollars to continue subsidizing medicines, wheat, and fuel, on Wednesday resulted in petrol prices rising by 14,000 Lebanese pounds to reach 617,000 pounds per 20 liters.
Georges Brax, a member of the gas station owners’ syndicate, said: “The central bank used to secure 100 percent of the US dollars needed to import fuel, according to its Sayrafa platform rate. Now it provides only 85 percent. The remaining 15 percent needs to be secured based on the black-market rate.”
Fadi Abu Shakra, a representative of the union for fuel distributors and gas stations in Lebanon, said: “We keep going backward. If the issue is not resolved, I don’t know where we could be heading.”At its Wednesday meeting, a ministerial committee set up to address the repercussions of the financial crisis on public facilities and headed by caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati, reiterated its previous recommendations to meet the demands of public sector employees, who have been on strike for more than a month, pending the approval of the 2022 budget and avoiding any burden on the state treasury.
The committee approved granting additional financial assistance equivalent to the value of a full salary and a daily transportation allowance of 95,000 pounds, provided that employees attended work for a minimum number of days a week.
Members also agreed 4,000 billion pounds to cover hospitalization and medical expenses for the military forces, Ministry of Health employees, and the Cooperative of Civil Servants, as well as 200 billion pounds for the National Social Security Fund, and a contribution of 50 billion pounds to the Lebanese University. Those failing to turn up for work, without justification, for a period of 15 days, were warned that they would be “considered resigned.” Caretaker Minister of Finance Youssef Khalil said: “The proposal provides for a daily lump-sum productivity allowance for employees and workers in the public administration, ranging between 150,000 Lebanese pounds and 350,000 pounds per day, provided that the beneficiary is present at least three days a week, every week during official working hours.” He added: “The ministry drew up a decree in this regard and signed it and transferred it to the PM for it to come into effect.” Meanwhile, US Ambassador to Lebanon Dorothy Shea urged the country’s leaders to hold presidential elections on time and press ahead in carrying out reforms that would satisfy the World Bank and meet the requirements of the International Monetary Fund. And she highlighted the importance of securing cheaper and cleaner energy and electricity for schools, hospitals, and factories.

Aoun: Lebanon committed to reforms, IMF negotiations
Naharnet/27 July/2022
President Michel Aoun on Wednesday stressed that “Lebanon is committed to carrying out the necessary reforms in order to continue the negotiations with the International Monetary Fund as part of the economic recovery plan.”Aoun voiced his remarks in a meeting in Baabda with the new World Bank regional director Jean-Christophe Carret and the outgoing director Saroj Kumar Jha. The President also emphasized “the importance of the ongoing cooperation between Lebanon and the World Bank and the projects that were executed over the past years.”

Ministerial Committee approves financial aid for public sector
Naharnet/27 July/2022
A Ministerial Committee approved Wednesday a financial aid for public sector employees. Employees would be given an aid that is worth a full salary, and a daily transport allowance of LBP 95,000. They will also get extra compensation for every day they work.
Public sector employees have been on an open strike for weeks now to demand an adjustment of their salaries, amid dire living conditions. They had already refused the government's offer, accusing authorities of taking their demands lightly.

Shea urges for quick reforms, timely presidential poll
Naharnet/27 July/2022
U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Dorothy Shea urged Lebanon Wednesday to hold presidential elections on time and not to lose time in carrying out reforms that would satisfy the World Bank. Shea said that the reforms requested by the International Monetary Fund are also for Lebanon's interest. She added that the confidence of the Lebanese in the financial and economic sectors must be recovered, stressing the importance of securing cheaper and cleaner energy and electricity for schools, hospitals, and factories.

Report: Maritime dispute on brink of solution
Naharnet/27 July/2022
U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein will arrive Sunday in Lebanon with a framework for an agreement, an Israeli media report said. Hochstein's awaited response will be a compromise between Israel and Lebanon's demands, the report said. It added that the Karish gas field will be given to Israel, and that the same company will drill in Israel and in Lebanon. As officials in Israel believe that the maritime dispute is on the brink of a solution, Israeli General Amos Gilad warned that Hezbollah's threats must be "taken seriously" and that Israel must be ready for a possible confrontation. Hezbollah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah had repeatedly warned Israel, after it had moved a gas production vessel into the Karish field, that it would not be able to extract gas from Karish without a sea border agreement with Lebanon. He said that "no Israeli target at sea or on land is out of the reach of Hezbollah's precision missiles." Earlier this month, Hezbollah had sent unarmed drones over the Karish gas field "as a message" to Israel. Lebanon says Karish is disputed territory under ongoing maritime border negotiations, whereas Israel claims it lies within its internationally recognized economic waters. Negotiations between Lebanon and Israel to determine their maritime borders commenced in October 2020, when the two sides held indirect U.S.-mediated talks in southern Lebanon. Since taking over the mediation from late 2021, Hochstein has resorted to shuttle diplomacy with visits to both Beirut and Jerusalem.

Three Lebanese charged in US for smuggling weapons, tax evasion
Naharnet/27 July/2022
Three indictments have been unsealed in federal court, detailing charges against three men, two formerly of Northeast Ohio, who are believed to be currently residing in Lebanon, the U.S. department of justice said in a statement. George Nakhle Ajaltouni, 47, formerly of North Olmsted and Jean Youssef Issa, 48, of Batroun were charged "for their roles in a scheme to smuggle and illegally ship firearms from Cleveland to Lebanon."Nakhle “Mike” Nader, 51, formerly of Cleveland was charged in a separate indictment with income tax evasion. "The FBI is seeking information that may lead to the arrests of George Ajaltouni and Nakhle “Mike” Nader," the statement said. It is believed that Ajaltouni and Nader are acquaintances and that the two men are currently residing near Batroun, Lebanon, the statement added. The indictments were originally filed between 2016 - 2019, and efforts to apprehend Ajaltouni and Nader remain ongoing, while Jean Youssef Issa has recently been arrested pursuant to a Red Notice issued by Interpol. "Ajaltouni and Issa are officially charged with conspiracy to smuggle and illegally ship firearms, smuggling goods from the U.S., unlawful delivery of firearms to a common carrier, control of arms exports and imports and unlicensed dealing in firearms. "Ajaltouni is also charged in a separate indictment with naturalization fraud after obtaining naturalization and citizenship in 2009 that he was not entitled to nor eligible to receive," the statement said. The FBI asked anyone who has information on the current whereabouts of Ajaltouni and/or Nader, to contact the FBI. "Your identity can remain anonymous," the U.S. department of justice said.

Public employees strike goes on as wage demands go unmet
Naharnet/27 July/2022
Public sector employees have been on an open strike for weeks now to demand an adjustment of their salaries, amid dire living conditions in Lebanon. The strike has paralyzed all public administrations, frustrating the Lebanese citizens who need to get an identity card, a diploma for university or a driving license.
Authorities say they do not have the means to increase the salaries as requested by the employees. Instead they suggested to increase the employees' daily transport allowance and to give them a monthly financial aid. Employees say their salaries barely cover transport costs as Lebanon's currency has lost around 90 percent of its value. They refused the government's offer, accusing authorities of taking their demands lightly. Amid a worldwide surge in fuel prices, wheat shortages, power cuts, and limited access to their savings in banks, tens of thousands of Lebanese have lost their jobs, and many have left the country.

Amnesty urges Berri, MPs to end harassment of women MPs
Naharnet/27 July/2022
Amnesty International announced Wednesday that it is "shameful" that "women MPs in the Lebanese parliament, especially those who criticize the authorities, are being harassed by their male counterparts and by the Speaker himself simply because they are women in a parliament dominated by men.""Lawmakers , especially Speaker Nabih Berri, must shoulder the responsibility of ending this abuse of women and stop encouraging a hostile environment for women," Amnesty said in an Arabic-language tweet. "Parliament should respect human rights and implement the law criminalizing sexual harassment that was issued in 2020!" it urged. The appeal comes a day after the MPs Halima Qaaqour, Cynthia Zarazir and Paula Yacoubian faced verbal attacks from male colleagues during a legislative session. Zarazir also made shocking allegations about the bullying and sexual harassment she has faced since becoming an MP. “Sit down, wait till the end and be quiet,” Berri told Qaaqour at the beginning of the session when she objected to the manner in which a vote was being conducted. And when Zarazir stood up for her colleague later in the session, MP Qabalan Qabalan of Berri's bloc interfered to make fun of her family name and slam the three female MPs as “cockroaches.”Zarazir later decried in a statement that she has regularly faced sexual catcalling from male colleagues. She also said that she has been bullied over her family name, has been denied a proper parking spot for her car and had been given a "filthy" parliament office in which she found rotten food, "used and unused condoms" and "Playboy magazines."

Mikati says Beirut port silos at serious risk of collapse
Agence France Presse/27 July/2022
Grain silos at Beirut's blast-hit port are at risk of collapsing after a fire this month, caretaker Prime Minister and PM-designate Najib Mikati said Wednesday, a week before the explosion's second anniversary. "The northern group of silos are now in danger of falling," Mikati announced in a statement that said the silos still contained thousands of tons of wheat and corn. The warning comes two weeks after a fire erupted in the port's northern silos due to the fermentation of the remaining grain stocks along with soaring summer temperatures.
The blaze reignited trauma among Lebanese gearing up to mark the anniversary of the devastating explosion that killed more than 200 people and injured more than 6,500 on August 4, 2020. It was caused by a stockpile of haphazardly stored ammonium nitrate fertilizer catching fire. Mikati told the army to prepare for the partial collapse of the silos and warned workers, civil defense members and firefighters to keep a safe distance from the site. Authorities were unable to unload around 3,000 tons of wheat and corn stuck in the silos because doing so might accelerate their collapse, the statement said. The environment and health ministries advised the public to evacuate the port area and use masks in the vicinity of the silos in case they do collapse. They also warned residents of the area to close their doors and windows for 24 hours. Once boasting a capacity of more than 100,000 tons, an imposing 48-meter high remnant of the silos has become emblematic of the catastrophic port blast. The government in April ordered their demolition due to safety concerns, but that move has since been suspended amid objections, including from relatives of blast victims who want the silos preserved as a memorial site. The Lebanese investigation into the blast has faced systematic and blatant political obstruction from day one.

Lebanon to build new silos to ease wheat crisis
Associated Press/27 July/2022
Lebanon plans to build two new grain silos to fight its its worsening food security crisis, the country's caretaker economy minister told The Associated Press on Wednesday. Amin Salam said that several countries and international organizations have expressed an interest in funding and bidding for the new silos, which will cost a total of $100 million. "We have had very serious interest from Germany, the United States, France, and even more serious interest from the United Arab Emirates," Salam said, adding that he will visit Qatar soon to discuss the matter. The small Mediterranean country is in the throes of a crippling economic crisis that has bankrupted the state and pulled over three-quarters of its population into poverty. Lebanon's only grain silos in the Beirut Port are in ruins, after hundreds of tons of explosive ammonium nitrate detonated there almost two years ago. The blast killed over 200 people and wounded over 6,000 others. One of the silos has been on fire for weeks due to fermenting grain, as it heads towards collapse. Sluggish wheat imports as a result of the Russian war in Ukraine and skyrocketing food and fuel prices have sparked panic and scuffles at bakeries for partially subsidized bread. Salam said Lebanon in June received a technical feasibility study by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development greenlighting the construction of two grain silos north of the capital in the Tripoli Port and in the eastern Bekaa Valley.
"Building the silos will be serious crisis management, because we need the (grain) reserves," Salam told the AP. "All the shipments that took one week to 10 days to arrive now take up to a month. And in some cases they are being canceled."
Salam said he is also in talks with the World Bank and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for funding.
The Lebanese Central Bank for years has subsidized wheat imports to keep bread prices stable, but bread prices have slowly increased as the Lebanese pound lost over 90 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar. The Central Bank has slowly reeled back from its subsidies as its foreign reserves continue to shrink.The minister last week accused bakery owners of hoarding subsidized wheat for traditional Arabic bread, a local staple, to sell them at higher prices later for a higher profit. Parliament on Tuesday voted to spend a $150 million World Bank loan on wheat imports, which Salam hopes would keep bread prices steady for at least six months. Lebanon should receive the funding within the next month, he said. The minister said building the two new silos and having them fully operational could happen within a year. But new silos for Beirut will take time, pending a sluggish judicial probe and a virtually non-existent port cleanup and reconstruction plan. Salam said the port silos held 125,000 tons. "We're seeking a similar number for Tripoli, and a smaller number in the Bekaa," he explained. "This way, once we have the three of them, Lebanon is secure with nine months of reserves." Lebanon's economy for almost three years has been collapsing. Experts blame decades of poor economic planning and corruption with no accountability from the country's numerous sectarian political parties. Meanwhile, the government has struggled to implement financial and structural reforms to reach an agreement with the International Monetary Fund for a bailout program and unlock billions of dollars in financial aid.

Geagea wants govt. to accept Iranian fuel, spare Lebanese from 'false rumors'
Naharnet/27 July/2022
Lebanese Forces chief Samir Geagea called the Lebanese government on Wednesday to accept an Iranian fuel offer after Hezbollah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah said he is willing to secure free fuel from Iran for Lebanon’s power plants. Geagea said that the reason of his demand is not that he believes that "this will happen" but rather to avoid "leaving the Lebanese exposed to false rumors." "We all remember what happened with the Iranian fuel," Geagea said. "We ended up with two or three ships," he added. Geagea said that the fuel was paid except for "very few donations" that were given to some social institutions, "like any charitable organization would have donated." Dozens of trucks carrying Iranian diesel had arrived in Lebanon last year to help ease severe fuel shortages that had resulted in crippling power cuts and long queues in front of gasoline stations. Nasrallah said back then a month’s worth of diesel would be donated to public hospitals, nursing homes, orphanages, water stations and the Lebanese Red Cross. He said fuel would also be sold at discount prices to private hospitals, pharmaceutical factories, bakeries and cooperatives that sell food products.

Jumblat urges Nasrallah to avoid war, calls for 'president with program'
Naharnet/27 July/2022
Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblat on Tuesday urged Hezbollah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah to avoid a war with Israel, as he called for electing a new president who has a “clear program.”“There are rockets but will the Lebanese eat rockets?” Jumblat said in an interview on LBCI television. “We tell (Hezbollah chief) Sayyed Hassan (Nasrallah) that he can send drones and missiles but must try to think of the (Israeli) reaction. Even if you think that you have a military balance, you should be careful in these moments, and you should try to avoid war,” he added. “No one can prevent war. If it erupts we have to accept it and what we can do is to draw Nasrallah’s attention to the negative repercussions of war on us,” Jumblat went on to say. Describing a future war with Israel as “mutual self-destruction,” the PSP leader noted the Lebanese people would still show solidarity with each other in the event of a new conflict. As for the upcoming presidential election, Jumblat said the PSP “wants a clear program in all files.”“If no candidate has a clear program, we won’t elect anyone,” he added. “I appreciate the Franjieh family and if Suleiman Franjieh presents a complete program we might accept him,” Jumblat said. Commenting on Archbishop Moussa al-Hajj’s case, the PSP leader said: “Perhaps there has been a mistake in the timing of Archbishop Moussa al-Hajj’s detention, but the latter was carrying money from families present in occupied Palestine who at a certain time collaborated with the enemy and the Israelis.”“We do not need the money of Israel’s Druze because this money is suspicious,” Jumblat added. And warning that the calls for sacking Judge Fadi Akiki would “give Hezbollah an excuse to demand the firing of (Beirut port blast investigator Judge) Tarek Bitar,” Jumblat said that Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea “does not have the right to call Judge Akiki a traitor.”

Hariri stresses he won't interfere in any political activity
Naharnet/27 July/2022
Al-Mustaqbal Movement leader ex-PM Saad Hariri stressed Wednesday that he “will not interfere in any political juncture or project,” denying recent media reports. “Some news websites have been coming up with non-innocent reports and analyses related to ex-PM Saad Hariri’s intentions for the coming period,” Hariri’s press office said in a statement. “The press office would like to remind whom it may concern, especially the aforementioned news websites, that ex-PM Hariri had several times reiterated that he had suspended his political action and that of al-Mustaqbal Movement, and accordingly he will not interfere in any political juncture or project,” the press office added.

Salam says 49,000 tons of wheat to enter Lebanon this week
Naharnet/27 July/2022
Caretaker Economy Minister Amin Salam announced Wednesday that “49,000 tons of wheat will enter the country at the end of this week.”
“We should not see queues (outside bread bakeries) after that and we will prosecute whoever wants to fabricate a crisis,” Salam said in a TV interview. “There is a crisis cell led by the Economy Ministry with the aim of distributing wheat and flour in a fair manner, and what we’re seeing today is the repercussions of what happened last month,” Salam added, hoping wheat ships will arrive in the country in a faster way. “The crisis is the result of everything that has happened, because the flour has been stolen from the country,” he went on to say. Lebanese lawmakers on Tuesday voted to use a $150 million World Bank loan to pay for wheat imports into the cash-strapped country. Already in the throes of a crippling economic crisis, Lebanon is also struggling to cope with a food security crisis that has left half its roughly 6 million people without adequate food.
The war in Ukraine and global inflation have worsened the situation faced by the tiny Mediterranean nation. Three-quarters of Lebanon's population live in poverty and are struggling to cope with rampant power cuts, medicine shortages, and soaring food and fuel prices. The Lebanese pound has lost 90 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar. According to the United Nations World Food Program, Lebanon has one of the highest food inflation rates worldwide. Salam told The Associated Press in an interview in April that the World Bank loan would stabilize bread prices for at least six months, effectively buying the Lebanese authorities more time to reform its broken and ineffective institutions. After the parliamentary vote, Salam said in a news conference that the money could secure wheat for longer than six months, provided prices continue to decline.
Panics and queues at the bakeries are commonplace. Scuffles break out between anxious customers waiting for limited available bread bundles. Bakery owners have warned that wheat supply is limited and operation costs have skyrocketed.
Though Lebanon's foreign reserves continue to drain at a striking rate, the country continues to partially subsidize wheat imports and modify bread prices in line with fuel prices, currency devaluation, and global wheat prices. Critics say the blanket subsidy program is ineffective and expensive, and the government has struggled to manage a targeted cash card program for the country's most vulnerable. Caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati, who was present during Parliament's vote, said that most locally produced bread "goes to non-Lebanese and everyone knows that." Lebanon's economic meltdown is due to decades of corruption and financial mismanagement. For over two years, Lebanon has been negotiating with the International Monetary Fund to unlock billions of dollars in aid and make its economy viable again. But the country has struggled to reform its banking sector and bloated public sector.
Lebanon has been without a fully-functioning government for almost three months, with reappointed Prime Minister-designate Mikati steering a caretaker government.

Beirut to host commemoration service for kidnapped Jesuit priest Paolo Dall'Oglio
Naharnet/27 July/2022
On 29 July 2022, as from 7:00pm, friends of Father Paolo Dall'Oglio will host a vigil at the Jesuit church St. Joseph in Ashrafieh, Beirut. The vigil will be followed by a private screening of the documentary film "Ayouni" (2021) by Yasmin Fedda.
Dall'Oglio was kidnapped by the Islamic State group in Raqqa, Syria, while negotiating the release of hostages from captivity. For 9 years, family and friends of Paolo Dall'Oglio have been waiting for answers about his whereabouts, pressing public authorities in Italy and Syria to release information.
“This Friday, July 29th, 2022, friends of Father Paolo will pay tribute to his life-long dedication to inter-religious dialogue by hosting an Islamic-Christian commemoration at St. Joseph's Church in Beirut, Lebanon. The service is dedicated to all those who disappeared in Syria over the last 11 years of war and oppression,” a press release said.
The 60-minute film “Ayouni” by acclaimed Palestinian director Yasmin Fedda will be screened in the crypt of the church as from 7:30pm. Investigating the nature of forced disappearances during the Syrian conflict, the film highlights the fates of ‘Abuna Paolo’ and of digital rights activist Bassel Safadi, as well as the harrowing experience of those left behind. Hailed by Peter Bradshaw of the Guardian as “a raging lament for Syria's disappeared” this will be the first private screening of the film in Lebanon.
- Order of Events -
18:30 - Regular mass inside St. Joseph’s church
19:00 - Islamic-Christian Vigil in the forecourt of the church
19:30 - Introduction and screening of “Ayouni” inside St. Joseph’s church
21:00 - Conclusion
- Biography of Paolo Dall'Oglio -
Paolo Dall'Oglio, born on 17 November 1954, is an Italian Jesuit Priest and peace activist. At the age of 21, Dall'Oglio entered the Jesuit order in Rome. He studied at Université Saint-Joseph of Beirut, as well as in Damascus, Naples and Rome, earning a PhD from the Pontifical Gregorian University. Known in Syria and Lebanon as Abuna Paolo, he lived for 30 years at Deir Mar Musa, a 6th century monastery, 50km north of Damascus, which he reconstructed and reinvested with a new ecumenical monastic community, Al-Khalil, dedicated to Abrahamic Hospitality. Deir Mar Musa has since become a major center for interfaith dialogue. Abuna Paolo was declared persona-non-grata by the government of Syria in 2012 for denouncing crimes against humanity committed by the Assad regime. He returned to Syria three times before being kidnapped by the IS group on 29 July 2013 in Raqqa. His fate is still unknown. Several reports about his presumed death have been proven wrong.
- About "Ayouni” -
Noura and Machi search for answers about their loved ones – Bassel Safadi and Paolo Dall’Oglio, who are among the over 100,000 forcibly disappeared in Syria. Faced with the limbo of an overwhelming absence of information, hope is the only thing they have to hold on to. ‘Ayouni’ is a deeply resonant Arabic term of endearment -- meaning ‘my eyes’ and understood as ‘my love’. Filmed over 6 years and across multiple countries in search of answers, Ayouni is an attempt to give numbers faces, to give silence a voice, and to make the invisible undeniably visible.

دراسة مهمة للناشط جوزيف حتي، تلقي الأضواء على ملف “اللاجئين السوريين في لبنان، وعلى وخطرهم الوجودي على الديموغرافيا، وتحديداً على المسيحيين
Lebanon’s Syrian Refugees
Joseph Hitti/July 26, 2022
Welcome to a new Lebanese War between Lebanon’s Christians and the Syrian refugees who may not want to return to Syria, and who may try to seize power with the aid of Hezbollah and the pro-Syrian regime of Michel Aoun. On the part of the Christians, I hope they have learned the lessons of 1975, namely the need to win the war first and foremost in the media where they utterly failed in 1975 by meeting Palestinian savagery with their own savagery. If the Christians this time around want to win the war, both militarily and in the media, they have to remain within the bounds of decency and wage a clean and truly ‘Christian’ war.
أهلا بكم في حرب لبنانية جديدة بين مسيحيي لبنان واللاجئين السوريين، الذين قد لا يرغبون في العودة إلى بلادهم، والذين قد يحاولون الاستيلاء على السلطة اللبنانية بمساعدة حزب الله ونظام ميشال عون الموالي لسوريا. من جانب المسيحيين، آمل أن يكونوا قد تعلموا دروس عام 1975، وهي ضرورة كسب الحرب أولاً وقبل كل شيء في وسائل الإعلام، حيث فشلوا تمامًا في عام 1975 من خلال مواجهة الوحشية الفلسطينية بوحشيتهم. إذا أراد المسيحيون هذه المرة كسب الحرب، عسكريًا وإعلاميًا، فعليهم البقاء ضمن حدود الحشمة وشن حرب “مسيحية” نظيفة وحقيقية.
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The Palestinian Precedent
In 1948, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians crossed the borders of Palestine into the neighboring countries of Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt, chased by the Jewish Zionist terrorist organizations Haganah, Lehi, Irgun, Stern and others (later to coalesce and become the “most moral army of the world”, the Israeli Army. Perhaps the ‘moral’ qualifier was a typo error whereby the intended word was ‘mortal’). These Jewish terrorist organizations had been conducting a campaign of terror against the native Palestinian population and against the British mandatory power.
Irgun bombed the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in 1946, killing 91 people and injuring dozens. But most tragically, these European Jewish terrorists, having “trained” under the Nazi regime in Germany before invading Palestine, supposedly as refugees fleeing Europe, became the butchers of their Palestinian hosts.
Lehi assassinated in 1948 in Jerusalem Count Folke Bernadotte, the Swedish envoy of the UN trying to mediate the civil war between the native Palestinians and the foreign Jewish colonists.
More than 600 Palestinian villages were attacked, their inhabitants killed, raped and forced to flee (just as Joshua was commanded to do by his God Yawheh: every man, woman and child of the native Canaanites were to be killed whilst Yahweh gave the Hebrews the Promised land), and while many of these villages became Jewish colonies with new names, the vast majority with their old stone houses and their olive orchards were burned, destroyed, demolished and razed to the ground.
Today, the millions of Palestinian refugees who descend from the original refugees live in the squalor of refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, in the West Bank and in, ironically, Israel itself. Jewish colonists from Brooklyn New York move to Israel, kill a few Palestinians in the West Bank, uproot their olive orchards, claim the lands of the Palestinians by virtue of obsolete and suspicious Ottoman and British laws, and build themselves high-end houses overlooking the very same refugee camps in which they herded the Palestinian owners of the land. Just as white British colonists did in the nascent America of the 1800s with the native Indian population, herded into reservations after their lives, livelihoods and lands were taken from them. No wonder the US and Israel are as united as they are: They share the same barbarity and indecency of their birth and growth at the expense of the millennial native populations.
In 1965, less than two decades after their eviction from their ancestral Palestine, the Palestinians founded the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which proceeded with US and Western collusion to undermine Lebanon. Henry Kissinger, who had sealed the truce between Syria and Israel after the October 1973 war, enrolled the two countries into a programmed destabilization of Lebanon with the goal of making Lebanon a substitute homeland for the Palestinian refugees. All Arab countries joined Syria and Israel in undermining Lebanon, sending money, weapons, mercenaries and terrorists to fan the flames of wars. Those Arab countries included Saudi Arabia, Libya, Irak, Jordan, Kuwait and others, all of whom sided with the Palestinians against the Lebanese Christians.
If the Palestinian refugees settle permanently in Lebanon, they will no longer claim the Right of Return to their ancestral Palestine, thus relieving Israel of that problem. Since the vast majority of the Palestinian refugees are Sunni Muslims, their settlement in Lebanon would demographically favor the Sunni Muslims of Lebanon and by extension the Arab countries. And so it was that, in the aftermath of the Lebanese War between the Palestinians and the Christians of Lebanon, the Lebanese Sunnis came out as victors, a victory personified by one Rafik Hariri who proceeded to Islamize the country and sideline the historic role of the Christians.
The Current Syrian Refugee Crisis
Fast forward to 2011 when millions of Syrian refugees cross their country’s borders into Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Jordan, fleeing not a foreign invader but their own government, the Assad dictatorship. Bashar Assad, aided by the equally barbaric Russian military, destroyed city after city of his own country and murdered close to 600,000 of his own people. Close to half the country’s population lives today in tents and refugee camps in the countries adjacent to Syria.
In Lebanon, an estimated 1.5 million Syrian refugees have settled ‘temporarily’ with the hope of returning some day to Syria, nearly all of them Sunni Muslims. Same pattern as with the Palestinian refugees, thus furthering the demographic collapse of Lebanon’s diversity in favor of the Sunnis. But Bashar Assad, the dictator in Syria, is not Sunni; he is an Alawite Muslim, an offshoot sect of Shiite Islam comprising about 12% of Syria’s population before the Syrian War of 2011. Which means he has no interest in the return of these Sunnis to Syria because, without them, the Alawites now represent 40% of the population after the exodus of the Sunnis.
In Lebanon, the Syrian refugees represent a third of the country’s total population. In addition to 4 million native Lebanese, there are 1.5 million Syrian refugees, and another 0.5 million irregular non-refugee Syrians who cross the border daily, smuggling cheap Lebanese government-subsidized goods (flour, gasoline, medicine, etc.) into Syria where they bolster the decrepit Syrian economy while bleeding the Lebanese economy. Moreover, each Syrian refugee in Lebanon receives $100 a month in aid from Western countries and colluding non-governmental organizations whose sole concern is not the welfare of Lebanon or the welfare of the refugees for that matter; their sole concern is to prevent a wave of emigration to Europe, thus doing all they can to keep the refugees in Lebanon. The argument for not encouraging them to return to Syria is that the Syrian dictator will seek revenge on them, even though the vast majority of the refugees adore Bashar Assad and demonstrate in the streets of Lebanon in favor of the Syrian dictator.
The Syrian refugees receive the same services (electricity, water, Internet, etc.) as the Lebanese population but they do not pay for these services. Not only does this deny the Lebanese Treasury much needed revenue, but it also curtails the availability of these services to the Lebanese the population. This is in part why Lebanon is in the throes of a major economic crisis: The burden of the Syrian refugee population. The refugees have settled in camps, but they also live and work in nearly every municipality of the country. They receive all manner of assistance off the back of the Lebanese population.
The refugees have no environmental concerns for their host country, literally trashing the country everywhere they happen to be. Environmental standards in Syria are abysmal to say the least, and the refugees have brought with them an absolute carelessness when it comes to garbage and waste disposal. Lebanon’s roads, streets, and rivers are littered with plastic, which further exacerbates the garbage problem of Lebanon. The Syrian refugees are responsible for the skyrocketing crime rates (theft, kidnappings for ransom, rapes, murders, etc.), including stealing electric cables off the electricity grid and manhole covers and every possible source of metal they can resell. In addition, having being brainwashed by the Baathist regime of Damascus to hate Lebanon as a renegade country they describe as a former Syrian province that was detached from Syria by the French mandate, the Syrian refugees viscerally hate their Lebanese hosts. Having also ridden the Islamic fundamentalist wave of the past 3 decades, they hate the Lebanese because it has a large Christian population and has a Christian president.
The Syrian refugees work in all sectors of the economy, open businesses, smuggle goods across the border, and overall live better off than the average Lebanese whose income has dwindled to about $75 per month. Finally, we must not forget that the Lebanese people have been more than courteous and generous with a Syrian population whose parent generation constituted the Syrian army of occupation that smothered Lebanon for 30 years, killing and stealing, kidnapping and torturing, shelling and bombing just as it does today in Syria, only to be evicted by an angry populace in 2005.
It has now been 11 years since the Syrian refugees arrived in Lebanon. If the Palestinian refugee saga is any guide, I predict that the Syrian refugees will soon organize into social-political-military groupings to demand their “rights” and a war will ensue between, on one hand, the refugees and their Lebanese allies (Hezbollah and President Michel Aoun’s populist party), and the other political and religious components of the country on the other, thus repeating the War of 1975. There already is a lot of seething anger among the Lebanese, and there are daily reports of local fights and skirmishes in which the Lebanese demand their local authorities to deny entry and housing to Syrians living among the population. Flyers have been found in the mountain villages in the Christian hinterland in which people are demanding that the Syrians leave their villages.
The Lebanese government, essentially Hezbollah and President Michel Aoun’s party, the Free Patriotic Movement, are caught in a bind. On one hand, they love Bashar Assad and do not want to embarrass him by demanding that he take back the refugees, but on the other hand, they know their own governance of the country is in absolute disarray because of what the Syrian refugees are doing to Lebanon and its people. Meanwhile, foreign governments refuse to pressure Assad to take back the refugees.
Since 1972, Lebanon has been in this sordid state of affairs for close to 5 decades. It is disintegrating in a slow death that neither the local politicians – half of whom are traitors affiliated with foreign countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia – nor the foreign governments seem to want to stop. When one thinks of how an armada was assembled in the Indo-Pacific to help 200,000 East Timorese secede from 250 million Indonesians, or of when NATO led by the US forcibly sliced off Muslim Bosnia and Muslim Kosovo from the old Yugoslavia to create two new Muslim nations in the heart of Europe, or how the Europeans are welcoming millions of Ukrainian refugees and NATO is supplying Ukraine with all manner of advanced weapons, while abandoning Lebanon, a founding member of the UN and a co-drafter of its Human Rights Charter, especially its Christians, to 50 years of torment, wars and instability, it becomes difficult to ignore the conspiratorial view that the West is deliberately killing Lebanon with its complex makeup of Christians and Muslims of 18 sects, in order to reduce the entire Middle East to an easy to understand (by dumb Americans and Europeans) simplistic Jewish-Sunni duality that is already on the mend with the ongoing normalization of relations between Israel and virtually all Sunni Muslim Arab countries.
When the West used to interfere in the Middle East, back from Crusader times through the Ottoman occupation, it would cite Lebanon’s Christians as the minority to be protected. Nowadays, the deliberate killing of Lebanon by a colluding West is simply because they no longer need Lebanon’s Christians as a Trojan horse to meddle in the region; today the Middle East question has its newer, more European “victim” in need of protection, and that is the Israeli colonists. While Lebanon’s Christians have been in Lebanon for millennia, before and after they became Christians, Israeli Jews were never a part of historic Palestine, they don’t even descend from the original Hebrews: They converted to Judaism in the 16th and 17th centuries, and with their blond/red hair and blue eyes (Central European Jews), or their African looks (Ethiopian and Egyptian Jews), or the many different ethnic Jewish groups in India, China and elsewhere, cannot have any serious claims to be genetic descendants of the Hebrews or to own the land of Palestine, except perhaps by some horrific tenuous religious claim from the Bronze Age that no sane human being should countenance in this 21st century.
What exit for Lebanon? How can the country return to some normality? Many hypothetical answers to one question that only the history unfolding before our eyes will answer. In the meantime, suffer you miserable Christians of Lebanon. But when war erupts, beware the wrath of the Lebanese Christians. They were patient for 10 years with the mayhem and plunder that the Palestinian refugees did to the country in the late 1960s and 1970s, trying to accommodate their presence with a number of agreements that the Palestinians kept violating. But finally, in a spontaneous uprising they waged a war of liberation that ultimately sent the Palestinians back into their camps.
Nowadays, the Christians have been patient with the Syrian Muslim refugees for a decade now, welcoming them into their villages and towns, working and living with them side by side. But tensions are building, the Syrian refugees are casting a shadow over any sense of humanitarian feelings by a destitute Lebanese population that increasingly sees the refugees as thieves, criminal, rapists, and worse, as supporters of the very Syrian regime that chased them out of Syria.
Welcome to a new Lebanese War between Lebanon’s Christians and the Syrian refugees who may not want to return to Syria, and who may try to seize power with the aid of Hezbollah and the pro-Syrian regime of Michel Aoun. On the part of the Christians, I hope they have learned the lessons of 1975, namely the need to win the war first and foremost in the media where they utterly failed in 1975 by meeting Palestinian savagery with their own savagery. If the Christians this time around want to win the war, both militarily and in the media, they have to remain within the bounds of decency and wage a clean and truly ‘Christian’ war.

Sharing Israel’s Natural Gas Revenues With Lebanon Is A Mistake
Yair Ravid/Media/27 July/2022
BYLINE: AS LONG AS THE NEIGHBOUROING COUNTRY IS CONTROLLED BY HEZBULLA AND IRAN, ANY REVENUE SHARED WITH IT WILL NOT REACH THE LEBANESE CITIZEN BUT WILL BE USED FOR WAR AGAINST ISRAEL.
During the recent visit of US president Biden to the region, Op-ed print praise in favor of promoting a shared distribution agreement of natural gas resources, produced from the sea between Israel and Lebanon, intensified in the local press and mainstream media.
Some writers, including experienced and well-known pundits, have even gone as far as suggesting that sharing natural gas revenue profits with Lebanon will ease the financial plight of the Lebanese citizens whose economy has collapsed and many of whom are struggling to survive. The same pundits even pinged their hope of a military calm between the two countries and a chance for future peace deals shall an agreement as such be pushed forward.
As for that theory, If I may, I will quote one of Israel’s most renowned satirical writers, the late Ephraim Kishon who once wrote “Everything I have written thus far is precise, eloquent and beautiful. The only problem is it has nothing to do with the truth”.
Given the current political situation in Lebanon, which is not about to change in coming years – shall Lebanon receive even partial revenue produced by the natural gas reserves that were discovered and built by Israel, none of it will reach the Lebanese citizens. The price of bread will not be reduced for the suffering population of Lebanon, nor will their daily gas price be reduced. Revenue received by a shared Gas production deal will make its way directly to Hezbollah, an internationally recognized terror organization, who will use the money to continue its war against Israel and Lebanese President Michel Aoun and his son-in-law Gebran Basil who are directly responsible for the country’s financial collapse. The chatter over the need to divide the natural gas resource revenues between the two countries can be heard and read in Lebanon as well. The unity of the opinion, on both sides of the border is not surprising. On the Lebanese side, there will always be support in accepting financial funds without having to invest anything in return. On the Israeli side, you will always find those who will be happy to give up and give in, in exchange for the elusive promise of a peace deal which is as possible as a foundationless castle in the air, given the current political situation in Lebanon. The distribution of gas profits between Israel and Lebanon would be appropriate and acceptable between neighboring countries who are living in peace with each other. That is not the case. Furthermore, as long as Lebanon is controlled by Iran through its proxy terror organization Hezbollah, no profit-distribution agreement or any other agreement will provide a barrier to war against Israel. A war, which is sure to happen, if Iran demands Hezbollah engages in one.
The interception of three unmanned aerial vehicles launched by Hezbollah earlier this month and aimed at the Israeli maritime “Karish” natural gas rig strengthens my opinion. It proves that Lebanon is run by various conflicting factors, each driven by its own agenda, and there is no correlation between the distribution of Israel’s natural gas resources and Iran’s war interests in the region. The issue of the distribution of gas profits from the sea must be the last clause in peace negotiations between Israel and Lebanon should such negotiations ever occur.
Yair Ravid is the former head of Mossad’s operational arm in Beirut, He also served as commander of the Northern Region in a unit that recruited and operated intelligence agents in Syria and in Lebanon, His book “Window to the backyard: The History of Israel-Lebanon relations – facts and illusions” is available on Amazon, kindle edition. OP-ED

ديفيد كيلكولين / مونوغراف: افتقاد الهدف.. إعادة تقييم المساعدة العسكرية الأمريكية للجيش اللبناني
Missing the Mark …Reassessing U.S. Military Aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces
David Kilcullen/Monograph/July 27/2022
Reassessing U.S. Military Aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces
CONTENTS
Introduction
Aim, Scope, & Methodology
Does U.S. Assistance Improve LAF Effectiveness?
Does U.S. Assistance Help the LAF Counterbalance Hezbollah?
Implications for Future U.S. policy
Conclusions & Recommendations
Appendix
Introduction
The United States has funded, trained, and equipped the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to ensure “they serve as an institutional counterweight to Hezbollah,” a senior State Department official testified last August.1 Since 2006, American taxpayers have paid more than $2.5 billion in security assistance to Lebanon in pursuit of four goals, according to the State Department: “to strengthen Lebanon’s sovereignty, secure its borders, counter internal threats, and disrupt terrorist facilitation.”2 The primary (though not the only) source of these internal threats is, of course, Hezbollah.
The LAF is contending with sharp cuts to the Lebanese defense budget, spurred by an economic meltdown that the World Bank says “is likely to rank in the top 10, possibly top three, most severe crises episodes globally since the mid-nineteenth century.”3 In 2020, the LAF stopped serving meat to its troops amid widespread food shortages. The salaries of junior soldiers fell to only $100 a month, one-eighth of their pre-crisis value.4
To help, the French government convened an international donor conference last July to “bolster the cohesion, resilience, and stability of the LAF,” as scholar Aram Nerguizian put it.5 The United States added $15 million to the $105 million military aid package already in the pipeline for 2021 and announced another $67 million in September. The White House has also requested $160 million for the current fiscal year.6
International donors seem committed to continuing or reinforcing their previous policies despite, or because of, the unprecedented nature of Lebanon’s ongoing crisis. Donor states are doing more of the same even as opportunities arise to increase their leverage, alter the political dynamics inside Lebanon, and potentially break the cycle of exploitation, corruption, and violence that has left the Lebanese people impoverished and insecure.7 Rather than doubling down on the status quo, donors should question the basic assumptions behind their policies.
The time has therefore come for a close examination of whether 15 years of substantial American support have enabled Lebanon’s armed forces to serve as an institutional counterweight to Hezbollah. To that end, this monograph examines the LAF’s operational performance since 2006, with an emphasis on the four goals the State Department identified: defense of sovereignty, border security, internal security, and counterterrorism. The evidence strongly suggests a correlation between increased U.S. assistance and greater LAF effectiveness in counterterrorism, but not in the other areas. Yet this constitutes only a partial answer, since improved combat performance is not the same as counterbalancing Hezbollah.
The theory of change animating U.S. military assistance is that “building the security apparatus of the Lebanese state will improve internal stability and public confidence in the LAF,” in turn “creating political space for the Lebanese government to address more complex, politically sensitive issues.”8 This monograph finds that such space has not grown but has instead contracted during the period of enhanced U.S. security assistance, which has coincided with a significant increase in Hezbollah’s influence. The argument for strengthening the LAF rests in part on the assumption that the LAF is in competition with Hezbollah for prestige and influence.
In fact, the two are conjoined at the highest levels because Hezbollah’s influence over Lebanon’s civilian authorities is so extensive. The terror group has effective veto power over the choice of prime minister and the actions of the Lebanese Cabinet. Hezbollah’s coalition holds a majority in parliament, and its allies serve as president and speaker.9
These findings suggest that Washington should move beyond crisis-driven thinking about Lebanon. The crisis there has lasted more than two years and will likely persist. Instead, now is the time to revisit the framework of U.S. support for the LAF, which a different administration conceived under radically different circumstances some 15 years ago. It is clear that aid for the LAF has not enabled it to serve as an institutional counterweight to Hezbollah. The time has come to redesign aid programs to keep pace with Lebanon’s rapidly evolving political and economic landscape.
Aim, Scope, and Methodology
This paper explores two related questions that bear directly on congressional decisions regarding the appropriation of military assistance for the LAF and on the coherence of U.S. policy toward Lebanon as a whole:
How effectively is the LAF performing the functions for which U.S. assistance is provided? Is there evidence that enhanced U.S. assistance, particularly since 2006, has improved LAF performance in the domains of counterterrorism, border security, internal security, and the defense of sovereignty?
Has the LAF become more effective as a counterweight to Hezbollah? To the extent LAF performance has improved, does such improvement help it serve as a counterweight? Does the LAF cooperate with Hezbollah, and if so, in what ways does that collaboration occur and at what level of command is it authorized?
Part 1 of the monograph examines the first question by synthesizing open-source reporting from multiple Lebanese and international sources as well as key informant interviews (KIIs) conducted with individuals in Lebanon, the United States, and Europe.
Part 2 addresses the second question, regarding the LAF’s ability to counterbalance Hezbollah. It begins with a close examination of the theory underlying U.S. military assistance for the LAF. How and why do U.S. policymakers expect the LAF’s improved performance to bring about a reduction of Hezbollah influence? After clarifying the premises of U.S. assistance for the LAF, Part 2 employs two distinct forms of evidence to assess whether the LAF now serves as a restraint on Hezbollah. First, it synthesizes open-source reporting in the same manner as Part 1. Then it draws on a body of anonymized, commercially available cellphone location data that show mobility patterns for electronic devices linked to Hezbollah and LAF personnel.
The appendix provides a full technical description of the data and associated method of analysis and explains how the data are sanitized to protect the identity of individual users. In brief, the data allow objective comparison of the patterns of movement of LAF and Hezbollah personnel, enabling insights into how the LAF’s observed behavior (as distinct from its stated policies) confirms or contradicts the expectation that the force serves as a counterweight to Hezbollah. For example, do LAF personnel maintain freedom of movement, or can Hezbollah effectively exclude them from certain areas? The monograph concludes with a section that summarizes key observations, aggregates them into a set of conclusions, and offers recommendations for U.S. policy toward Lebanon.
Part 1: Does U.S. Assistance Improve LAF Effectiveness?
While not the LAF’s only foreign benefactor, the U.S. government (USG) has been by far its largest, particularly since 2005, when the Cedar Revolution forced an end to Syria’s occupation of Lebanon and created opportunities for enhanced U.S. engagement with Beirut. At the same time, regional instability emanating from the Iraq War convinced U.S. policymakers that deeper engagement was needed.10 U.S. troops had been part of a multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon from August 1982 until their withdrawal in February 1984, four months after a Hezbollah truck bomb killed 241 troops at the Marine barracks in Beirut.11 (Hezbollah denies responsibility for the bombing.) During the 1980s and 1990s, modest USG support for the LAF gave Washington access to Lebanese decisionmakers as well as insight into dynamics in Lebanon that would otherwise have been difficult to achieve.12
Amid the power vacuum left by the withdrawal of Syrian forces in 2005, Washington sought to strengthen the secular Lebanese state against the growing power of Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah.13 One long-time observer suggested that “the struggle over post-Syria Lebanon has also been a contest over the future mission and ideological direction of the LAF.”14 The U.S. objective was to build a viable secular (or at least multi-confessional) Lebanese state and a capable LAF loyal to that state.
Following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War15 — and despite Hezbollah’s increasing influence within the Lebanese government, partly as a result of that war — the George W. Bush administration asked Congress to provide increased funding for the LAF and for Lebanon’s police service, the Internal Security Forces (ISF).16 Congress approved the request as well as subsequent increases, which enjoyed bipartisan support. On average, since 2006, Washington has provided Beirut with $200 million per year in military and economic assistance, making the United States Lebanon’s largest official donor. On the unofficial side of the ledger, however, Iran sends Hezbollah an estimated $700 million per annum.17
According to the State Department, Washington’s cumulative investment of more than $2.5 billion has helped the LAF achieve the program’s four key objectives, namely, “to strengthen Lebanon’s sovereignty, secure its borders, counter internal threats, and disrupt terrorist facilitation.” More broadly, the department writes, “The U.S.-LAF partnership builds the LAF’s capacity as the sole legitimate defender of Lebanon’s sovereignty.”18 The program’s specific successes, according to the USG, have included:
Enabling the LAF to defeat ISIS in Lebanon, “carry out operations against Al Qaeda and expand control over Lebanese territory along its border with Syria”;
Increasing LAF presence “in southern Lebanon to coordinate with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1559, 1680, and 1701”;19 and
Enabling the LAF to clear hazards “emplaced by ISIS to harm civilians along Lebanon’s border with Syria, remove explosive hazards along the Blue Line, in North Lebanon, and in Mount Lebanon, and provide crucial physical security and stockpile management upgrades to ammunition depots for the LAF.”20
Each of these claims requires objective evaluation. Counterterrorism is the first and most important mission, according to many U.S. analysts, so the evaluation begins there.21
LAF Counterterrorism Performance
Since 2006, the LAF has conducted three major combat operations against terrorist groups inside Lebanon. These were the campaign against the al-Qaeda-linked organization Fatah al-Islam (FAI) from May to September 2007; the August 2014 Battle of Arsal against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat an-Nusrah (JN); and the Qalamoun campaign against ISIL and JN’s successor, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), from July to August 2017. These three campaigns offer an opportunity to evaluate whether increased U.S. assistance since 2006 has correlated with detectable improvements in LAF performance over time.
The LAF’s 2007 campaign against FAI was an intensive urban warfare engagement lasting 15 weeks. It involved nine LAF ground assaults, using armor, engineers, artillery, and air support, against a network of heavily fortified insurgent strongpoints in the Nahr el-Bared refugee camp, the second-largest Palestinian camp in Lebanon, near the northern coastal city of Tripoli.22
The 105-day campaign saw some of the heaviest and most destructive ground combat in Lebanon since its civil war ended in 1990. According to Nizar Abdel Kader, it represented “the fiercest battle fought by the LAF since its foundation. It formed a real test of the LAF’s unity, military professionalism, and its ability to fight, with limited resources,” against heavily armed insurgents dug into multi-story buildings with tunnels, rooftop, and underground fortified positions, “seemingly endless amounts of rockets, guns, explosive devices, and a distinct experience in booby-trapping everywhere and everything.”23 LAF losses were heavy: FAI killed or wounded 576 LAF servicemen. For its part, FAI suffered 471 militants killed or captured. At least 67 civilians were killed and an unknown number wounded, while the Nahr el-Bared camp suffered massive damage and the fighting displaced more than 30,000 civilians.24
While several observers praised the LAF’s will to fight at Nahr el-Bared, the battle exposed multiple LAF operational and tactical weaknesses.25 These included a lack of experience in high-intensity combat; ammunition shortages;26 poor maintenance on, and a lack of fuel for, the LAF’s 1950s-vintage armored vehicles; a lack of air-to-ground weapons for the LAF’s few helicopters; a limited casualty evacuation capability; a lack of artillery and targeting systems; poor intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities; a lack of precision-guided munitions (PGMs), night-vision equipment, and sniper weapons; and insufficient helmets and body armor.27 Indeed, the LAF was both outgunned and outfought by FAI at various stages during the battle.
Despite the LAF’s eventual success in clearing FAI from the camp, international donors increased assistance afterward to address these weaknesses.28 Washington ramped up its efforts to train, equip, and fund the LAF and established a small special operations presence in Lebanon.29 Nevertheless, few improvements were evident during the LAF’s next major combat engagement seven years later at the Battle of Arsal.
In early August 2014, the LAF fought a brief but intense battle against JN and ISIL at Arsal, a mid-sized town eight miles from the Syrian border in the Baalbek district of northeastern Lebanon.30 The area had emerged as a weapon-smuggling route into Syria after the Syrian civil war began in 2011. In September 2012 and February 2013, the LAF clashed in Arsal with the Free Syrian Army, an anti-Assad rebel organization, and, separately, with FAI.31 In 2013, a combined offensive by Hezbollah and Syrian government troops cleared rebel strongholds on the Syrian side of the border, pushing insurgents and refugees across the frontier into the Arsal enclave. This turned the area into a support zone for anti-Assad groups, including Sunni jihadists, and a staging ground for attacks into Syria.32 At the same time, Sunni jihadist groups in Syria, including al-Qaeda and ISIL, exploited the Arsal corridor to smuggle car bombs into Lebanon for use against Lebanese civilians in Shiite-majority urban areas.33
The Arsal enclave thus posed a threat both to the Lebanese government and to the interests of Hezbollah and its allies in Damascus.34 The enclave also served as a launchpad for attacks on Iranian interests, which jihadists intended as retribution for Tehran’s support for Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian leader. These attacks included a double suicide bombing against the Iranian Embassy in Beirut in November 2013 and the bombing of an Iranian cultural center in the Beirut suburb of Bir Hasan in February 2014, both of which were claimed by a Lebanese ally of al-Qaeda, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades.35 Facing a common threat, the LAF, Hezbollah, and Syrian intelligence coordinated closely from 2012 into 2014. Their efforts encompassed both a public information campaign directed at Lebanon’s Sunni community to discourage support for terrorism, as well as military efforts that included targeted killings in and near Arsal.36
In July 2014, the LAF struck the jihadists near Arsal in concert with Hezbollah and Syrian government forces. Hezbollah blocked routes east of Arsal and deployed forces into Shiite settlements west of the town, while the Syrian Air Force launched cross-border air strikes into Lebanon and the LAF moved in to clear the area. As one observer noted, the “combination of movements by the LAF, Syrian regime, and Hezbollah forces suggests a coordinated, cross-border effort to isolate rebels in the town of Arsal. Coordination between the Lebanese Armed Forces and Hezbollah is also confirmed in a video showing a convoy of Hezbollah vehicles passing through a LAF checkpoint en route to Arsal without being stopped or searched.”37 This evidence contradicted claims by the Lebanese Defense Ministry that the LAF was working alone.38
ISIL and JN responded with a full-scale assault on Arsal. On August 2, 2014, more than 700 fighters attacked and captured the town, supported by ISIL terrorist attacks in Tripoli.39 On the heels of ISIL’s blitzkrieg-like offensive across Iraq and Syria from May to July 2014, the LAF framed the seizure of Arsal as a potential first step of ISIL expansion into Sunni-majority areas in Lebanon. LAF commandos, along with members of the LAF’s 8th Infantry Brigade and the ISF, fought for five days to recapture the town, sustaining 20 killed, 85 wounded, and 49 captured — of whom 13 were executed by the militants.40 The LAF eventually reoccupied Arsal after Sunni religious leaders brokered a deal that led to the evacuation of the rebels and the release of some surviving LAF prisoners.41 Other prisoners remained unaccounted for.
While the Arsal operation ultimately achieved its objective, LAF losses were relatively severe for the scale and duration of the engagement, and the LAF re-occupied the town only after Hezbollah brokered an evacuation agreement. Overall, the battle suggested the LAF was only slightly more capable in tactical terms than in 2007 and was doing nothing to counterbalance Hezbollah in terms of political influence. Indeed, LAF-Hezbollah cooperation against Sunni militants continued from 2015 to 2017.42 For example, during this period, the LAF constructed multiple observation posts and fortified positions across the region to help control terrain and prevent cross-border movement.43 This improved Lebanon’s border security but also assisted Hezbollah’s efforts to support the Assad regime, by clearing a threat from Syria’s western border.
The events at Arsal also reinforced Hezbollah political narratives. As leading regional analyst Lina Khatib noted at the time, the LAF fought anti-Hezbollah Sunni groups, thereby framing those groups as the primary threat while ignoring Hezbollah’s role as a magnet attracting Sunni jihadists to Lebanon. Khatib added that because of the LAF’s weakness, “Hezbollah upheld the legitimacy of its weapons, depicting them as a prerequisite for Lebanon.”44 Thus, rather than serving as a counterweight, the LAF amplified Hezbollah’s influence.
The most recent major tactical engagement between the LAF and Sunni terrorist organizations occurred during the Qalamoun offensive from May to August 2017, during which the LAF and Hezbollah conducted parallel operations to clear Sunni militants from areas around Arsal and the broader Baalbek-Hermel and Beqaa governorates. Simultaneously, Syrian government troops mounted an offensive in the Qalamoun hills on the Syrian side of the border.45 Hezbollah, through one of its allies in the Lebanese security services, eventually sponsored a cease-fire deal that saw JN (rebranded as HTS) and ISIL militants withdraw into Syria, while Lebanon secured control of its contested border region for the first time since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war.46
During this campaign, the LAF operated on a large scale, committing as many as 7,000 troops, and at a high level of sophistication, conducting combined-arms maneuver warfare across complex mountainous and populated terrain. One experienced observer described the battle as the LAF’s “most proficient [counterterrorism] operation since the end of the 1975-1990 civil war, [which] demonstrated the extent of its improved capabilities since its last major counterterrorism engagement in 2007” at Nahr el-Bared.47
LAF commanders and Lebanese political leaders recognized the 2017 campaign as an opportunity to showcase the LAF’s improved capabilities after a decade of enhanced U.S. security assistance. Yet Hezbollah again played a pivotal role. The group launched its own campaign against HTS in July, coordinating with Syrian forces on the other side of the frontier. HTS controlled 35 square miles inside Lebanon to the east and southeast of Arsal, with 400 fighters dug into defensive positions, caves, bunkers, and mountaintop observation posts. Hezbollah’s offensive — employing special forces, infantry, engineers, and artillery — defeated HTS in a five-day battle, bringing a political-military victory for Hezbollah while largely leaving the LAF on the sidelines. LAF artillery units did use U.S.-provided howitzers to engage HTS militants fleeing into Arsal, which only underscored the LAF’s supporting role.48
The sidelining of the LAF worried international sponsors, especially the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. Perhaps as a result of this concern, the LAF mounted an assault on a major ISIL defensive complex during the second phase of the Qalamoun campaign. The LAF employed air assault and commando troops, PGMs, extensive ISR, aircraft, artillery, and modern armored vehicles, including armored bulldozers, in a combined-arms maneuver. The combination of air and ground ISR with PGMs proved effective, as both international and local observers noted. The PGMs included 155mm Copperhead guided artillery rounds and AGM-114 Hellfire missiles launched from Cessna AC208 aircraft, targeted by LAF special operations forces on the ground.49
However, the appearance — deliberately encouraged by Hezbollah — of coordination between the LAF and Hezbollah fighters undercut claims by Lebanese leaders that the military was restoring state sovereignty and securing the country’s borders. Hassan Nasrallah, head of Hezbollah, praised the LAF after the operation, describing it as a partner of Hezbollah and a pillar of Lebanese security. Nasrallah patronizingly noted that the LAF had played an essential supporting role in “scoring this victory.”50 Hezbollah reinforced the impression of being in command when one of its allies in the Lebanese security services brokered deals with HTS and ISIL that allowed the militants to escape into Syrian territory.51
On the battlefield, U.S. assistance clearly made a difference. Yet improved LAF combat performance redounded to Hezbollah’s benefit. The LAF cooperated with Hezbollah, often playing the role of junior partner. LAF counterterrorism focused almost entirely on Sunni jihadist groups, with little effort to confront or compete with Hezbollah. The LAF’s subordinate role becomes even clearer in relation to the second mission set associated with U.S. aid — that of border security and enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) in cooperation with UNIFIL.
Border Security and UNSCR Enforcement
Under a series of UNSCRs, the LAF is tasked with working with UNIFIL to secure Lebanon’s disputed southern border with Israel. The LAF’s mission is to maintain an area “free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL” between the Blue Line (the UN-monitored disengagement line) and the Litani, the southernmost major river in Lebanon.52 This provision seeks to stabilize the UN-brokered cease-fire that ended the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006 by creating a buffer zone across southern Lebanon free of Hezbollah presence.53 A significant portion of U.S. assistance for the LAF is tied to this mission. As noted earlier, the State Department claims improved cooperation with UNIFIL as a noteworthy success of the assistance program. Yet the evidence suggests otherwise.
After the war in 2006, UNSCR 1701 authorized a six-fold increase in UNIFIL’s ground component, directed the establishment of a new maritime force under the UNIFIL mandate, and created an expectation that the LAF would significantly increase its presence in the buffer zone. LAF troops were to patrol alongside the newly expanded UNIFIL, establish joint checkpoints and control measures, and thereby prevent infiltration by Hezbollah fighters or the introduction of Hezbollah weapons into the area.54 The new mission created “competing priorities for the LAF which [is] traditionally constrained both in terms of available personnel and equipment… Consequently, the Resolution 1701 mandate [required] a redirection of the LAF priorities … despite the existing scarcity of personnel numbers and equipment.”55
As the war in Syria spilled over into Lebanon from 2011 to 2017, the LAF was indeed stretched to achieve its simultaneous counterterrorism and border security missions. Arguably, increased U.S. support allowed the LAF to deploy additional vehicles, weapons, aircraft, and ground units for the counterterrorism mission while preserving its presence alongside UNIFIL. Yet the available evidence suggests the LAF’s increased presence in the UNIFIL area resulted in worse, not better, implementation of UNSCR 1701. The LAF has repeatedly turned a blind eye to Hezbollah activity in the buffer zone, colluded with Hezbollah, and blocked UNIFIL from investigating illegal armed activity.
In late 2018, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched Operation Northern Shield to destroy tunnels dug by Hezbollah from Lebanon into northern Israel, ultimately exposing six tunnels.56 A UN report details an illustrative example:
On 24 December, the Israel Defense Forces neutralized the tunnels in Metulla, south of Kfar Kila, by pouring liquid cement through the shafts [that emerged in IDF-controlled territory] south of the Blue Line. Two days later, UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon observed liquid cement seeping from premises (formerly a concrete factory and currently a poultry farm) in Kfar Kila, some 100 metres north of the Blue Line. As the cement became visible north of the Blue Line, roads leading to the premises were blocked by individuals in civilian clothes, hindering UNIFIL from properly observing the location…
Entry to the premises was subsequently denied however by the Lebanese Armed Forces on the basis that it constituted private property. Despite repeated requests to the Lebanese authorities, [UNIFIL] has not been granted access to the premises. On 29 December, UNIFIL confirmed in a statement that the factory had an opening to the tunnel, which crossed the Blue Line [in] violation of resolution 1701… UNIFIL urged the Lebanese authorities to ensure immediate follow-up actions in accordance with Lebanon’s responsibilities pursuant to resolution 1701 (2006). To date, there has been no demonstrated follow-up action by Lebanese authorities in relation to the tunnels.57
This incident is a particularly clear example of a broader pattern that UNIFIL personnel and others familiar with the area have reported over many years. As Israeli analyst and former IDF Brigadier-General Assaf Orion noted regarding the cement pouring incident, UNIFIL “coordinates its operations with the Lebanese Armed Forces, which in turn coordinate with Hezbollah.” UNIFIL’s “access to illicit sites, both in populated areas and in ‘nature reserves,’ is prevented by the Lebanese government on the pretexts of ‘private property’ and individual rights.” The LAF plays “an active part in concealing Hezbollah’s prohibited military operations.”58
LAF units also prevent UNIFIL investigators from investigating incidents, including several — dating from 2007, 2011, and 2014 — in which UNIFIL peacekeepers were injured or killed.59 More recently, LAF commanders blocked UNIFIL from installing camera systems at static observation posts, citing “local concerns.”60 Under these circumstances, greater LAF presence in the border zone, courtesy of enhanced U.S. assistance, may be making things worse, not better.
Finally, as Hezbollah’s missile capability grows, so does its ability to engage Israeli targets on land or at sea — including, potentially, with PGMs — without entering the UNIFIL-patrolled buffer zone south of the Litani. This undermines the rationale for UNSCR 1701. During the 34 days of the Israel-Hezbollah War in 2006, the group fired 4,000 rockets into Israel from a total stockpile that numbered approximately 15,000. Since then, Hezbollah — the most heavily armed non-state actor in the world and a designated terrorist group according to 26 countries and multiple international institutions — has increased its stockpile more than eight-fold, to at least 130,000 missiles.61 Hezbollah’s arsenal now includes anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, anti-tank missiles, and land-attack missiles of increasing range and precision.62
Several key sites for Hezbollah’s expanded missile capability lie north of the Litani and therefore outside UNIFIL’s area of responsibility.63 Precision-guidance systems for Hezbollah rockets are manufactured in Beirut, according to Israeli analysts, while launch sites for the group’s Yakhont anti-ship cruise missiles are located in the northern Beirut suburbs.64 Israel regards Hezbollah’s possession of PGMs capable of striking Israeli territory or interdicting its seaborne trade as a “red line.”65 Since Hezbollah can now build and launch such missiles without entering the zone south of the Litani, continued U.S. support for the LAF’s mission under UNSCR 1701 does little to reduce the risk of another war, even if the LAF were upholding its obligations. In other words, U.S. support for the LAF and UNSCR 1701 may simply have bought time and political cover for Hezbollah to develop a missile capability that renders the post-2006 agreement obsolete.
Explosive Remnants of War and Conventional Weapons Destruction Programs
The State Department identifies programs for the removal of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD) as the third main success for which U.S. aid for the LAF is responsible. The LAF’s role in these programs is limited, since the State Department funds and trains multiple non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups across Lebanon to implement them and to provide medical assistance and vocational training to landmine survivors. The United States is the largest donor to CWD and ERW programs in Lebanon, spending $82 million since 1998. Annual funding grew significantly after 2015 in response to the spillover of violence — including proliferation of unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive devices — from Syria into Lebanon.66
According to the State Department, the LAF portion of the program has provided “facility upgrades and emergency repairs at LAF ammunition depots, trained ammunition management staff in stockpile management best practices, and assessed sites for possible future assistance.” It has also “trained and provided 13 mine and explosive detection dogs for the LAF.”67 Such assistance has allowed LAF military engineers and mine detection dogs to assist communities and NGOs in clearing or disposing of ERW. While relatively small in scale, ERW and CWD programs have been beneficial. The LAF’s mine-clearing capability has improved; LAF dog handlers train with UNIFIL and support civilian mine action programs; the Lebanese territory affected by mines has diminished; and improvements in ammunition storage and handling have arguably reduced the risk of accidents at, and theft of explosives from, LAF facilities.68
However, some analysts argue that the LAF’s center for action on landmines and cluster munitions — an indirect beneficiary of U.S. funding — collaborates with Hezbollah mine-clearing organizations. These Hezbollah-linked organizations allegedly provide cover for the collection and stockpiling of ammunition and support Hezbollah’s “human shield” strategy of placing military installations and weapons storage sites in populated areas.69 Given the relatively small scale of U.S. assistance for Lebanese CWD and ERW programs and the dispersal of this assistance across multiple organizations, neither the programs’ apparent benefits nor their alleged exploitation by Hezbollah should weigh heavily in the evaluation of U.S. military assistance for the LAF.
Overall Impact of American Assistance on LAF Effectiveness
The evidence suggests a correlation between increased American funding and improved LAF effectiveness. Yet this improvement may not serve American interests.
During the Qalamoun campaign of 2017, the LAF carried out a large-scale combined-arms maneuver in difficult terrain, in sharp contrast with its performance at Arsal in 2014 and Nahr el-Bared in 2007. Yet, during the 2017 campaign, the LAF operated in parallel with Hezbollah and Syrian regime forces, as it had three years earlier at Arsal. Also in 2017, a Hezbollah ally concluded the agreements with Sunni militants that ended the engagement.
Regarding border security, enhanced assistance helped the LAF manage its competing missions of deploying in southern Lebanon while conducting counterterrorism operations along the Syrian border. However, the LAF has repeatedly obstructed UNIFIL activities, thereby advancing Hezbollah’s interests. LAF mine-clearance efforts help protect civilians but may also contribute to Hezbollah’s use of human shields.
Therefore, whereas the State Department contends that Washington’s partnership with the Lebanese military “builds the LAF’s capacity as the sole legitimate defender of Lebanon’s sovereignty,” strengthening the LAF has indirectly enhanced Hezbollah’s ability to exercise authorities that should belong to a sovereign power.
Part 2: Does U.S. Assistance Help the LAF Counterbalance Hezbollah?
A well-planned assistance program should specify the theory of change (TOC) that links the observable impact of assistance to broader political outcomes. Part 2 begins by examining the TOC that connects improvements in LAF capabilities to the strategic goal of turning the LAF into a more effective counterweight to Hezbollah. After clarifying the TOC, Part 2 draws on expert interviews and open-source reporting to assess the theory’s validity. The monograph then turns to a new body of evidence — anonymized cellphone location data — that provides a unique perspective on the LAF-Hezbollah relationship.
What Is the U.S. Theory of Change for the LAF?
Building actions around a clear TOC is best practice for foreign assistance programs. For example, the TOC for the UN Stabilization and Recovery Program for Lebanon states, “If the Government of Lebanon is supported to deliver enhanced access to basic services, economic opportunities and security, at both the national and subnational level, then the capacity of Lebanon to cope with the [current economic] crisis will be enhanced and social stability maintained because the needs of vulnerable communities will be met” (emphasis in original).70 Likewise, the State Department requires contractors for its rule-of-law and civil society programs in Lebanon to propose a “cogent [TOC] that directly links activities to the intended results of the project.”71 The department also employs TOC analysis in evaluating Anti-Terrorism Assistance programs.72
What, then, is the theory of change that underpins USG assistance for the LAF as a counterweight to Hezbollah? While not explicitly stated, one can deduce it from various official statements.
In 2011, the Congressional Research Service noted that “over the long term, U.S. officials hope that building the security apparatus of the Lebanese state will improve internal stability and public confidence in the LAF and ISF, creating political space for the Lebanese government to address more complex, politically sensitive issues ranging from political reform to developing a national defense strategy.”73 A decade later, in August 2021, Mira Resnick, deputy assistant secretary of state for regional security in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, testified that “without the LAF, Hezbollah fills the void. And that is exactly the opposite of what we would like to see in Lebanon.” Resnick added, “The LAF is really the sole legitimate defender of Lebanese sovereignty, the sole legitimate defender of the Lebanese people. And they serve as an institutional counterweight to Hezbollah, which continues to put Israelis and Lebanese at risk with their irresponsible rocket attacks.”74 Similarly, in June 2021, French Defense Minister Florence Parly argued that “the LAF remain an essential pillar of the Lebanese state,” whose “cohesion and … professionalism remain essential to preserve stability.”75
The implicit TOC: If the LAF becomes stronger, enabling it to deliver improved stability and security for the Lebanese people independently of Hezbollah, then public support for the Lebanese government will increase, Hezbollah’s claim to serve as Lebanon’s primary defender will be undermined, and Hezbollah will lose influence relative to the legally constituted government. There are four problems with this theory.
First, and most important, this TOC treats the Lebanese government as an entity that is separate from, and in competition with, Hezbollah. In fact, Hezbollah and its allies hold a majority of seats in Lebanon’s parliament, fill key ministerial appointments in the Cabinet, and have played a central, perhaps even decisive, role in selecting prime ministers. In the years before Hezbollah emerged as kingmaker, the group twice showed that it could bring down Lebanese governments that opposed it, granting Hezbollah an effective veto over government policy.76
Second, the American TOC assumes Hezbollah would accept a loss of influence relative to a strengthened LAF rather than moving against the LAF, co-opting it, or seeking additional assistance from Iran to improve its own capabilities. As demonstrated during the Arsal and Qalamoun campaigns, Hezbollah has integrated the LAF’s operations into its own battlefield plans. The terror group has coordinated activity between its own forces and the LAF, allowing Hezbollah to claim credit for LAF successes against Sunni militants. Meanwhile, Hezbollah co-opted the LAF in southern Lebanon to undermine UNIFIL and support its own anti-Israel operations. In the broadest terms, Hezbollah has consistently exploited the LAF’s operations for its own purposes, yielding strategic outcomes that chiefly benefit Hezbollah while also benefitting the Lebanese government. Essentially, the LAF works for Hezbollah, since, as Lina Khatib notes, Hezbollah “has the military capability and coercive power to take over the Lebanese state.”77 The LAF can act when doing so benefits Hezbollah, but not when their interests clash.
Third, the theory assumes that the optimal way to lessen Hezbollah’s influence is by building up a competitor in the form of the LAF. The United States does not appear to have a parallel plan to diminish Hezbollah by, say, imposing stricter sanctions on Iran that would limit its capacity to help Hezbollah, interdicting Iranian support as it enters Lebanon, or taking direct action against Hezbollah itself.
Finally, the theory presumes that the Lebanese people perceive Hezbollah and the LAF in the same way that U.S. policymakers do or would come around to that point of view if the LAF were more capable. As Resnick testified, the United States considers the LAF to be “the sole legitimate defender” of Lebanon, while viewing Hezbollah as an “irresponsible” actor that endangers its fellow citizens by constantly provoking its Israeli neighbor.78
By contrast, public opinion data from 2016 and 2017 showed that a majority of respondents in Lebanon regarded Israel as the principal outside threat and saw Hezbollah as the country’s main defender against external threats. Meanwhile, they regarded the LAF as a kind of “super-police” whose role, in conjunction with the ISF, is to provide domestic security against threats such as terrorism and to prevent sectarian or civil unrest.79 This is a longstanding perception: The Congressional Research Service noted in 2011 that “statements from Lebanese leaders across the political spectrum suggest that most perceive Israel to be the primary external threat to Lebanon’s security.”80 All of this means that even if U.S. assistance has strengthened the LAF, it may not counterbalance Hezbollah, since the Lebanese people tend to believe that the two forces ought to complement each other.
This leads to the second question: Is there evidence that enhanced U.S. assistance for the LAF since 2007 has indeed reduced the relative influence of Hezbollah within the Lebanese state?
Has Assistance Strengthened the LAF Relative to Hezbollah?
U.S. security assistance, as noted in Part 1, has enhanced the LAF’s counterterrorism capabilities. However, the LAF fought all its major engagements since 2007 against Sunni militant groups that were opponents of Hezbollah. Likewise, almost all the behind-the-scenes counterterrorism work in which the LAF, ISF, and the General Directorate of General Security (Lebanon’s intelligence service) are continuously engaged is directed at Sunni militants. In southern Lebanon, where the LAF’s mission is to prevent Hezbollah from engaging in illegal armed activity or infiltrating the buffer zone, the LAF has instead cooperated with Hezbollah. The LAF’s intelligence and security services reportedly share information and collaborate closely with Hezbollah while allowing it de facto control over key government functions.81
More broadly, far from reducing Hezbollah’s power within the state, the era of enhanced U.S. security assistance has coincided with significantly increased influence for the group. Hezbollah candidates first won election to parliament in 1992, Lebanon’s first election following its civil war. Having originated as one among several sectarian militias in Lebanon’s civil war, Hezbollah’s close relationship with Iran (and, to a lesser extent, Syria) made the group not only a powerful military player but also the center of a broader religious, social, and political movement, using a range of welfare services and other economic and political tools to cement the support of Lebanese Shiite communities.82
By the late 1990s, Hezbollah had become an important force in the Lebanese government. Since 2005, the group has held an average of three seats in every Cabinet. It has allies across the political spectrum, including Shiite and Christian parties, and enjoys close relationships with senior political leaders, including President Michel Aoun and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, who also heads Hezbollah’s parliamentary ally, the Amal Movement.
Thus, the notion that strengthening the LAF might bolster the national government and reduce Hezbollah’s influence is not supported by the evidence, which suggests the opposite. As noted above, the TOC at the center of U.S. military assistance presumes that Hezbollah and the national government are separate and opposing entities. In fact, they are conjoined at the highest levels, with Hezbollah members in Lebanon’s parliament and Cabinet and Hezbollah allies as president and speaker.
In this sense, looking for a “smoking gun” of direct LAF-Hezbollah cooperation or intelligence sharing misses the point. Any given LAF commander or unit could be loyal to the national chain of command, follow orders only from the Lebanese government, observe the principle of civilian control over the military, scrupulously avoid cooperation with members of Hezbollah, and yet still serve Hezbollah’s interests, since the terror group is an integral part of the national government.
To be sure, political conditions can change. The crisis that began in 2019 unleashed anger directed at the entire ruling elite, including Hezbollah.83 The drivers responsible for this change included Hezbollah’s adventurism in Syria, involvement in corruption and misrule, and failure to mitigate the impacts of Lebanon’s ongoing economic and energy crises.84 The October 17 Movement — a mass opposition movement that arose during the enormous anti-corruption protests that brought down the Lebanese government in 2019 — has attacked all establishment groups, including both the pro-Syria, pro-Hezbollah March 8 Coalition and its opponents in the March 14 Coalition.85 Throughout 2021, October 17 gained significant support among the Shiite working class, Hezbollah’s traditional base, even as the movement presented a radical critique of Hezbollah’s role within the cozy institutionalized sectarianism of Lebanon’s political and economic establishment.86
In this sense, Hezbollah’s post-1992 strategy of penetrating, participating in, and influencing establishment politics backfired, inextricably linking the group to the corruption of the establishment.87 This undermined Hezbollah’s populist credentials, rendering it vulnerable to the post-confessional critique of groups such as October 17. The collapsing credibility of the Lebanese state may thus pose a greater threat to Hezbollah’s influence than any American assistance for the LAF. Hezbollah and its allies’ loss of their parliamentary majority in the May 2022 election suggests that public distrust of the establishment is undermining the group’s hold over the government.
Nevertheless, given Hezbollah’s deep involvement in many aspects of the Lebanese administrative state, along with its ongoing influence — both directly and through allies — in the parliament, Hezbollah may again prove able to consolidate its political power despite widespread popular anger. Perhaps equally importantly as a measure of Hezbollah’s influence within the state, no competing political faction has comparable military power or a foreign sponsor that provides as much support as Iran, while Shiites remain a plurality of the Lebanese population.
What the Cellphone Movement Data Reveal
While qualitative, open-source analysis remains indispensable, remotely observable data may independently confirm (or refute) conclusions based on a more traditional approach. The data collected for this report lean toward confirmation. The anonymized movement data provide objective information about the locations frequented by LAF and Hezbollah personnel, showing how the movement patterns of known LAF electronic devices overlap with those of known Hezbollah devices.88
What the cellphone data show is a LAF whose members shop in the same markets, visit the same cafés, and swim at the same beaches as Hezbollah fighters. The data also show how the LAF allows Hezbollah fighters to move freely throughout its territory while itself being constrained to specific movement corridors through Hezbollah-controlled areas. The data show a LAF that permits Hezbollah virtually uncontested control over key air and sea points of entry into Lebanon, notably Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport and the Port of Beirut. These data, covering a two-year period from early 2020 until late 2021, depict a situation that follows 14 years of enhanced U.S. security assistance. LAF capability improved during that time, yet these data indicate no enhanced ability to compete with (let alone confront) Hezbollah.
The appendix describes in more detail the methodology applied for this analysis. Altogether, the author analyzed 178,486 data points. In light of technical limitations described in the appendix, the findings below should be considered illustrative but not definitive.
Conclusion 1: LAF Has Limited Presence on Lebanon’s Southern and Eastern Borders
Although border security is one of the four stated goals of U.S. assistance, the data suggest the LAF is not heavily present in the border regions in Lebanon’s south and east. This is consistent with qualitative evidence showing the LAF is not upholding its obligations pursuant to UNSCR 1701 in Lebanon’s southern border region. As one can see on the heat-map overlay of all LAF and Hezbollah device locations (Figure 1), the southern region shows heavy Hezbollah presence but almost no LAF presence. Likewise, the Baalbek-Hermel and Beqaa regions along Lebanon’s eastern border with Syria show Hezbollah presence in key valleys, a dense concentration of LAF presence in northern Beqaa, and four LAF outposts in the border region but no significant LAF presence on the border itself. This is consistent with the operational history presented in Part 1, which noted that Hezbollah tends to dominate the actual border due to its relationship with the Syrian Arab Army and Iranian forces on the Syrian side of the frontier.
CONCLUSION 2: HEZBOLLAH AND THE LAF ARE NOT SOCIALLY SEPARATE
The overall countrywide movement patterns shown in Figure 1, along with the city-specific movement patterns displayed below (see Figure 2 for Beirut and Figure 3 for Tripoli), indicate considerable overlap between the LAF and Hezbollah in social settings. As the Beirut data indicate, LAF members shop in the same markets, visit the same cafés and cinemas, travel the same streets, and swim at the same beaches as Hezbollah members. This is consistent with the finding above that Hezbollah is not a separate and distinct entity that competes for influence or control with the LAF and the national government. On the contrary, Hezbollah is integrated across Lebanese society and government.
CONCLUSION 3: NO ‘SMOKING GUN’ OF HEZBOLLAH-LAF COLLUSION
Despite the co-location of LAF and Hezbollah devices in social settings, the devices do not generally overlap at the places and times of known combat events or other security incidents. Thus, one cannot infer LAF-Hezbollah cooperation from the available movement data (at the current level of fidelity, discussed in the appendix). This does not mean such collusion is not occurring. As noted above, during the Battle of Arsal in 2014 and the Qalamoun campaign in 2017, field reports and media coverage suggested collusion. In 2018, UNIFIL reported LAF-Hezbollah collusion to prevent UN investigation of Hezbollah’s cross-border tunnels. It is possible that a future incident might provide evidence of collusion through movement-data analysis. Yet, for now, it is the qualitative evidence that favors a collusion hypothesis.
The movement data suggest that Hezbollah devices travel more freely throughout Lebanon than LAF ones. Notice, for example, that Hezbollah devices regularly visit Tripoli (Figure 3) and Saida (Figure 4), both Sunni-dominated locations with a high LAF presence. By contrast, LAF devices are absent across large swaths of Hezbollah territory, such as in southern Lebanon. In other Hezbollah strongholds, such as Baalbek, the location of a major Hezbollah headquarters (Figure 5), LAF devices are identifiable only on highways. Notice also the high density of Hezbollah presence at Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport and on the surrounding roads and perimeter areas, compared with the extremely limited LAF presence in these areas (Figure 2). This observation reinforces reportage that suggests strong Hezbollah control of the airport despite attempts (including U.S. pressure) to encourage the LAF to rein in Hezbollah.
Overall, the movement data strongly suggest the LAF is neither confronting nor competing with Hezbollah. Both organizations overlap considerably in terms of movement across Lebanon, but whereas the LAF has an extremely limited presence in areas critical to Hezbollah — such as the border zones, the airport, and the areas near Hezbollah’s headquarters in Baalbek and Beirut — Hezbollah is able to move freely in areas dominated by the LAF. Members of both organizations shop, socialize, and live in the same areas, and there is no indication of conflict or competition between them in a social sense. Despite the absence of incontrovertible evidence demonstrating collusion between the LAF and Hezbollah, these data therefore suggest the “counterweight” theory underpinning U.S. assistance is unsupported by evidence.
Part 3: Implications for Future U.S. policy
Lebanon remains in crisis, which constrains the possibility of improved outcomes irrespective of changes in U.S. policy. Rather than holding fast to its existing policy, Washington should retire the counterweight theory that has prevailed for 15 years.
Lebanon’s Crisis Evolves
The protests that brought down the Lebanese government in 2019 also generated violent clashes that put the LAF in the unenviable position of enforcing public order against its own population. During the protests, the ISF struggled in its policing role and Hezbollah mostly hung back, letting the LAF bear the brunt of the clashes.89 The crisis deepened throughout the winter of 2019-2020, with Lebanese political elites repeatedly failing to reach consensus on economic and political reforms. COVID-19 brought further disruption in 2020. The enormous explosion at the Port of Beirut on August 4, 2020, killed 200 people, wounded thousands, and devastated the port and surrounding areas. It was a catalyst for major unrest and helped expose Hezbollah’s de facto control of the port and the massive corruption and incompetence involved in the group’s control of the facility. The explosion’s aftermath brought down another Cabinet, and Lebanese politicians took more than a year to form a new government.
In October 2021, Hezbollah and its ally Amal incited protests in an attempt to force the dismissal of a judge whose investigation into the 2020 port explosion was likely to implicate Hezbollah and other members of the government. Sectarian clashes broke out between Hezbollah and Amal militia members, their political opponents, and an anti-Hezbollah Christian militia, killing six and wounding at least 30. After hours of gunfire and street fighting, LAF troops stepped in to secure the area and raided several locations in Beirut in search of militants. The LAF also sought to mediate between the armed parties. President Aoun condemned all parties to the violence (including his parliamentary ally Hezbollah) and announced that the investigation into the explosion would continue.90
Prior to the outbreak of sectarian violence, President Joe Biden in September 2021 authorized the release of an additional $47 million “to provide immediate assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces.”91 When the violence broke out in mid-October, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland happened to be in Beirut to announce further assistance for the LAF, bringing the total for 2021 to $187 million.92 Further assistance followed over the winter of 2021-2022, with $67 million in Foreign Military Financing allocated to support the LAF.93
The Risks of an Incremental Approach
The U.S. government has taken an indirect approach to dealing with the Lebanon crisis, relying heavily on France, the Gulf States, Jordan, and Egypt as well as on international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. However, this approach risks producing an incremental, reactive response to the crisis rather than addressing Lebanon’s issues as part of a longer-term solution. Now is therefore an excellent time to revisit U.S. support for the LAF, especially the enhanced security assistance conceived under radically different circumstances some 15 years ago.
Making policy amid crises is inevitable in foreign policy. Security assistance, in particular, helps partners deal with issues beyond their capacity, which often emerge through crises. Still, it is essential to step back from the immediate concerns of the 2019-2021 crisis, evaluate the outcomes of enhanced U.S. assistance since 2007, and assess U.S. assistance for the LAF within a broader strategy for Lebanon and the region.
As noted, U.S. assistance programs in Lebanon seek primarily to reinforce entities that could help counter Iran, mitigate the risks posed by Hezbollah, and stabilize Lebanon’s economy and government. The State Department pays close attention to end-use monitoring (EUM) to “verify the end-use, accountability, and security of defense articles, services, and training provided under grant-based assistance and FMS [Foreign Military Sales] programs, from delivery through their employment and eventual disposal.” The department claims that even amidst the current crisis, the “LAF continues to comply fully with all EUM reporting and security requirements.”94 At the same time, the risk that U.S. weapon systems intended for the LAF might be diverted to Hezbollah or other terrorist groups in the event of a government collapse or wider unrest remains real. Whatever other decisions are made, the annual EUM certification requirements that Congress mandated for U.S. assistance for Lebanon will remain critical.
Obviously, however, the worst thing that could happen in terms of weapons diversion or proliferation — as recent experience in Afghanistan proves — would be a full or partial collapse of the Lebanese state, leading to a flood of weapons and trained personnel from a fragmenting LAF to sectarian militias. While such a collapse did not occur during the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1990, preventing it was a key USG goal throughout that conflict. After 15 years of enhanced assistance and significant transfers of advanced weapon systems to the LAF, and against the backdrop of a stronger Hezbollah, the risk of a state collapse is even more important today.
Retiring the ‘Counterweight’ Theory of LAF Assistance
It is critical to recognize that the theory of change underpinning U.S. assistance — that enhanced support for the LAF will improve the LAF’s combat performance and enable it to serve as a counterweight to Hezbollah — has been only partially validated, at best. LAF combat performance, as noted in Part 1, has indeed improved over time, and that improvement is closely correlated with enhanced U.S. security assistance. But this applies across a narrow range of missions — primarily, confronting Sunni terrorist groups that also oppose Hezbollah. In tasks that run counter to Hezbollah’s interests (such as working with UNIFIL to secure the Blue Line), the LAF is far less effective and has shown little or no improvement.
The harsh reality is that far from counterbalancing Hezbollah by strengthening the Lebanese state, enhanced U.S. assistance since 2007 has coincided with a significant increase in Hezbollah’s influence, to the point where the terrorist group is now embedded at the highest levels within that state. A stronger LAF that serves the Lebanese Republic cannot counterbalance Hezbollah if that republic operates under an effective Hezbollah veto or is paralyzed by the group’s influence.
Conclusions and Recommendations
A decade and a half of enhanced U.S. military assistance has improved LAF combat performance, particularly in counterterrorism. That progress is visible in the contrast between the difficult and drawn-out campaign of Nahr el-Bared in 2007, the partial success at Arsal in 2014, and then finally the LAF’s competent combined-arms maneuver and effective counter-ISIL operations during the Qalamoun campaign in 2017. Likewise, in dealing with explosive remnants of war, including demining and ordnance disposal, U.S. assistance has improved LAF performance and enhanced civilian safety in key parts of the country.
However, LAF efforts under UNSCR 1701 show the limits of military assistance: The LAF has demonstrated a clear pattern of covering for Hezbollah infiltration, hampering UN efforts to monitor Lebanon’s southern border, and blocking UNIFIL from investigating Hezbollah activity. The dysfunctional LAF-UNIFIL relationship illustrates how, contrary to the “counterweight” theory, U.S. assistance for the LAF does little to strengthen the Lebanese state to the detriment of Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s influence over the institutions of government ensures the LAF does not threaten the group’s vital interests. Thus, LAF counterterrorism operations focus on Sunni jihadist groups that also oppose Hezbollah; LAF operations around Arsal and during the Qalamoun offensive were likely coordinated with Hezbollah. In the final analysis, the theory on which enhanced U.S. assistance was based — strengthening a non-sectarian Lebanese state to compete for influence with Hezbollah — is no longer valid, if it ever was.
Hezbollah has endured significant setbacks, yet they have mostly been self-inflicted rather than the result of American support for the LAF. In the process of co-opting the Lebanese government, Hezbollah became part of the corrupt establishment that people on the streets (including many former Hezbollah supporters) are now protesting. The group’s military adventurism in Syria after 2013 showed Hezbollah to be an Iranian proxy rather than a defender of all Lebanese against Israel. Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israel, far from garnering popular support, led local residents to beat and detain a Hezbollah rocket team in August 2021 as punishment for risking Israeli retaliation. In that incident, the LAF had to step in and rescue the hapless Hezbollah crew.95
Since the onset of Lebanon’s multi-stage crisis in 2019, the LAF has borne the brunt of public anger against the entrenched elites (including Hezbollah) that triggered the crisis. Thus, far from helping counterbalance Hezbollah, U.S. assistance for the LAF since 2007 may merely have helped Hezbollah avoid some of the worst consequences of its own ill-judged decisions.
With these conclusions in mind, the following recommendations seem appropriate:
Maintain the requirement for an annual certification pertaining to the diversion and proliferation of U.S.-provided weapons to ensure they are not diverted to Hezbollah or other terrorist organizations. Whether or not the USG continues providing weapons to the LAF, the force’s existing stocks will require continued end-use monitoring, and Congress may wish to consider asking the Government Accountability Office to review the effectiveness of that monitoring.
Consider refocusing assistance away from LAF units in the UNIFIL area of responsibility that are seen as covering for Hezbollah, and put that assistance to more effective uses.
Continue ERW disposal and related activities that benefit the Lebanese people, but condition future aid on independent monitoring to validate that the LAF is not cooperating with Hezbollah-linked organizations that may be stockpiling munitions under the cover of demining.
Abandon the LAF counterweight theory and focus instead on directly weakening Hezbollah by interdicting Iranian and Syrian support for the group; by maintaining or increasing sanctions on Iranian sponsorship of Hezbollah; by allying with anti-corruption, non-Hezbollah, and anti-Hezbollah components of the civilian government; and by amplifying anti-corruption voices within the opposition movement, whose protests target Hezbollah as much as other elements of the Lebanese establishment.
As a frontline state in the ongoing conflict with Salafi-jihadist terrorism in Syria and elsewhere, Lebanon is an important regional player. And with Hezbollah increasing its reach and continuing to expand its arsenal, the risk of another Israel-Hezbollah war or broader regional conflagration remains real. For both these reasons, U.S. military-to-military engagement with the LAF makes sense and should continue because it provides insight into Lebanese decision making and access to influential leaders. But as noted in this monograph, the evidence suggests mixed outcomes at best for the enhanced assistance program as it has existed since 2007. Amid the extended crisis of 2019-2021, the time is right to review and refocus key elements of the program.
Appendix: Movement-Pattern Analysis Methodology
The movement intelligence analysis in this study utilizes a tool that integrates location services from smartphone applications and internet protocol (IP) addresses. The tool requires at least one known location for a specific device along with collateral movement information or pattern-of-life data. It can track a given device’s movement back in time (within the past 1.5 years) to the present. It can also monitor a device’s current location in near-real time (up to approximately 24 hours behind the time a search is conducted). The analysis examines 178,486 data points associated with 24 Lebanese devices over two years. Figure 6 shows the number of data points for each of those devices.
The tool allows analysts to determine directional movement data showing point of origin, direction of movement, and pauses or stops along a route of travel. It can search within single or multiple geofenced locations, each with a maximum radius of 2,500 meters. Fenced searches detect and flag any devices present within the predetermined geofence during a particular timeframe. The tool allows analysts to set “Signal Filters” to narrow searches, and to identify the latitude and longitude, the user’s advertising ID number and IP address, the date and time, and any anomalies noted for a particular device at that location.
For this study, the author used the geofencing and filter-setting functions in a three-step process to triangulate the locations and movements of mobile devices that collateral data indicate likely belong to Hezbollah or LAF personnel.
The first step was to identify locations where one could be reasonably confident that any mobile device present during certain time periods would be a Hezbollah- or LAF-linked device. For the LAF, those locations included Lebanese Army and Air Force bases as well as the known LAF headquarters in Yarze, a suburb southeast of Beirut. For Hezbollah, because the locations of most of the organization’s bases are secret, and because there is such a dense pattern of Hezbollah sites across some parts of Lebanon, the process was more complicated. Using collateral data, analysts identified several bases (including the one shown below in Figure 7, which media reporting identified), but there were almost no devices detected (“hits”) at these bases. This suggests Hezbollah operatives at these locations were surveillance-aware and had discarded or masked their mobile devices before approaching these sites.
A publicly reported Hezbollah airbase in the northern Bekaa Valley (photo and caption by the Atlantic Council, left) and the geolocation of that base via Google Earth (right). Located over 90 miles north of the Litani River, the base is well beyond UNIFIL’s area of responsibility.
In addition to Hezbollah bases, the author also geo-located places where Hezbollah activity was known to have occurred at specific dates and times over the prior 18 months. This event-data analysis included attacks, demonstrations, funerals, and locations drawn from a leaked database of purported Hezbollah missile production and storage facilities in Beirut. In total, the author identified 79 events involving Hezbollah members and an additional 18 Hezbollah-related locations (such as bases, production facilities, or other Hezbollah sites).
The second step was to identify all mobile devices known to have visited these locations. In some cases, such as for LAF and Hezbollah bases, the author’s protocol was to treat as an associated device any account that visited those locations at any time. In other cases, such as for events (for example, funerals), our geo-location criteria searched the location in question for hits during the time period when an event of interest had taken place.
The third step was to investigate any account that was present in those locations within the time frame in question. This was straightforward for LAF accounts: The author identified 14 mobile devices that had been located within LAF bases for a lengthy period, indicating they belonged to LAF personnel. For Hezbollah, the author identified 104 devices that were present in certain Hezbollah-related locations, but eliminated 94 of those devices after a preliminary analysis because their movement patterns suggested they could have passed through those locations for reasons unrelated to Hezbollah activity.
Note: Hezbollah devices in red; LAF devices in blue
The resulting movement patterns for Hezbollah-linked and LAF-linked devices provided confirmation regarding the affiliation of those devices. As shown in Figure 8 above, Hezbollah-linked devices concentrated in regions that are known Hezbollah strongholds (such as the suburbs south of Beirut and Beqaa in southern Lebanon), while LAF-linked devices were present in regions in which one would expect LAF accounts to travel (such as Saida, downtown Beirut, downtown Tripoli, and the LAF headquarters area near Zahle). These results provided an initial coarse-grain validation of the preliminary analysis identifying likely Hezbollah and LAF devices.
These results are suggestive, not definitive. It is technically feasible to definitively identify each one of these devices as belonging to a Hezbollah or LAF member and to identify specific members by linking their known residential locations (represented by the mean midnight location for each device over the observed time period) with additional collateral information (address records, vehicle licensing, or social media) for that location. However, given that Lebanon is a current and potentially future conflict zone in which both terrorists and state actors are likely to target individuals whose affiliations are published in this way, the ethical determination was made not to connect devices to the specific individuals who own them. Furthermore, the data are presented here in the form of heat maps showing the concentration of Hezbollah and LAF devices rather than specific device movement tracks. This is to prevent any individual or device from being targeted as a result of this research.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on July 27-28/2022
Russia cuts flow of gas to Europe, raising fresh doubts about Canada's sanctions waiver
CBC/Wed, July 27, 2022
Russia's Gazprom finally acted on weeks of threats and hints overnight, cutting the already-reduced flow of gas through the Nord Stream One pipeline to just 20 per cent of its full capacity. The move brought new worries to Germany, Italy and the other European countries that depend heavily on Russian gas piped from Vyborg, Russia to Germany's Baltic coast. But it also brought new questions for the government of Canada — which issued a controversial sanctions waiver that was supposed to enable Gazprom to restore normal flow to Europe, which had been reduced by about 60 per cent since June.
As of 3 a.m. ET today, the flow is reduced by 80 per cent — a rate that makes it virtually impossible for European countries that depend on Russian gas to fill their underground storage tanks for winter. The Kremlin, which controls Gazprom, has been playing with the gas supply to Europe in an effort to weaken sanctions imposed on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. Russia has argued that technical issues caused by sanctions were impeding normal deliveries.
The turbine dispute
At the centre of those arguments are half-a-dozen Siemens gas turbines that compress and propel gas through the undersea pipeline. Those turbines normally are removed from service on a regular, rotating schedule and refurbished in the Montreal workshops of Siemens Energy Canada. But when Canada sanctioned Russia's oil and gas sector, Siemens Energy was blocked from returning one of the turbines to Russia through Germany. Russia warned that it would reduce the flow unless it got its turbine back. The government of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz asked Canada to make an exception to its sanctions regime to permit the turbine's return. "We were certainly under a lot of pressure from Germany and the European Union, and on the other side we were under pressure from the Ukrainian government," Natural Resources Minister Jonathan Wilkinson told CBC News on July 11, one day after his government granted a "temporary" and "revocable" sanctions waiver to allow the turbine's return. The Trudeau government's decision was criticized harshly by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and by Ukrainian diaspora organizations in Canada.
Canada not signalling any change to waiver
Ukrainian officials told CBC News today that the cuts to supply proved that the sanctions waiver should not have been granted in the first place.
"This decision of waiving sanctions actually did not have any practical impact on helping the European countries, first of all Germany, to secure their gas supply," said Yulia Kovaliv, Ukraine's ambassador to Canada. "Instead we see the next steps of Gazprom blackmailing their European consumers." Kovaliv pointed out that the sanctions waiver was presented as "revocable.""Gazprom, we believe, took all the steps to provide the evidence that this permission needs to be removed," she told CBC News. Natural Resources Canada, which granted the waiver, was heavily critical of the latest move by Gazprom. "The Russian regime and its propaganda arms are clearly creating additional false pretexts to further and deliberately cause energy instability across Europe in an attempt to sow division amongst allies, as it continues to wage its unjustifiable war against Ukraine," department spokesperson Keean Nembhard told CBC News. "We see through their lies. The only thing that would prevent gas from flowing to Europe is (Russian President Vladimir) Putin." But neither Natural Resources Canada not Global Affairs Canada responded directly when asked whether the Trudeau government was considering revoking the waiver in response.
Calling the Kremlin's bluff
No one can claim the reductions in flow came as a surprise to the governments of Germany or Canada — both of which have insisted they're not naive about Russia's intentions. Wilkinson told CBC News after granting the waiver that his government was well aware that Russia was using the turbine as a pretext and might not restore the full flow. Putin "was saying very publicly that unless the turbines were brought back, it would be our fault that Germany was losing access to Russian gas," the minister said. "That's not to say that Putin may not shut it down on his own. But it's quite a different circumstance from him being able to say that it was because of Canada's unwillingness to assist our friends in Germany."German leaders said that their country was determined to call Putin's bluff over the turbine, knowing full well that he could still manipulate the flow based on political calculations. "We're delivering now in order to keep Russia from having the excuse that we are basically inflicting harm to ourselves," Sabine Sparwasser, Germany's ambassador to Canada, told CBC News. "In many experts' opinions, it's a pretext, but we take away that pretext. We're delivering the turbine and then we will see whether there is a weaponization of energy by stopping the delivery or not."
Waiver called into question
As currently framed, the waiver would run for two years and allow numerous turbines to be cycled through Canada. The exact location of the turbine already returned under the sanctions waiver is unclear. Russian media reported on July 18 that it was on its way from Germany to the Russian Portovaya compressor station. On Tuesday, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that it had still not reached Russia. "We hope that it will happen... sooner rather than later," he said. "The situation is critically complicated by the restrictions and sanctions, which had been imposed against our country." But Siemens Energy told CBC News that the only obstacle to the turbine entering Russia was the Russian government's own failure to provide an import permit. "The German authorities provided Siemens Energy with all the necessary documents for the export of the turbine to Russia at the beginning of last week. Gazprom is aware of this," a Siemens spokesperson said. "What is missing, however, are the customs documents for import to Russia. Gazprom, as the customer, is required to provide those."
Germany's nuclear option
Germany has faced heavy criticism since the Ukraine war began for allowing itself to become dependent on Russian energy (against the warnings of allies) and for deepening its energy problems by choosing to close its nuclear power plants — a long-standing goal of governing coalition member the Green Party. That decision required Germany to replace low-carbon nuclear with lignite, the dirtiest and most carbon-intensive form of coal. It also deepened its dependence on Russian energy. Wilkinson defended Germany's right to shut down functioning capacity even as it asked Canada for a sanctions waiver because of feared shortages. But today, Germany's energy inspector told the Bild newspaper that Germany is looking at cancelling the proposed closure of three nuclear plants this December and may also reopen plants that were already closed.
Ukrainian officials told CBC News they have made a new offer to Germany to supply it with electricity. The power would come from Ukraine's own nuclear, hydro and renewable generating capacity — in spite of the difficult wartime conditions Ukraine faces that include the occupation by Russian troops of its Zaporizhia nuclear plant, Europe's largest. The electricity on offer, Ukraine said, would be equivalent to five billion cubic metres of natural gas and would help Germany and its western European neighbours reduce their dependency on Russia. Olga Bielkova speaks for Ukraine's state gas company. She said the overnight reductions in Nord Stream are "not a surprise at all." "I would want to say I told you so, but I was trained not to say so." Bielkova said that reporting on western and central European energy woes often overlooks the catastrophic energy situation that Ukraine itself faces. Before the war, Ukraine was one of Europe's largest producers of natural gas, pumping out 20 billion cubic metres per year. But it has seen pipelines damaged, its facilities attacked, a large part of its territory occupied and much of its industrial base destroyed. Bielkova said it is time for European nations to face a reality that Ukraine has already accepted. "It is very probable that at some point they will put us all in a very difficult situation by stopping this supply, regardless of which routes, be it Nord Stream One, the Ukrainian route, or TurkStream. And Europe as the largest consumer of Russian gas should exercise some power as a customer."

Pro-Sadr protesters breach Iraq's fortified Green Zone
Agence France Presse/27 July/2022
Supporters of powerful Iraqi cleric Moqtada Sadr on Wednesday penetrated the capital's high-security Green Zone, home to government buildings and diplomatic missions, an AFP reporter said. The protesters, opposed to a rival bloc's nomination for prime minister, tried to march towards parliament but were stopped by police firing a barrage of tear gas, a security source told AFP. An AFP correspondent saw protesters carrying one colleague who had been hurt.

Biden tests negative for Covid after completing treatment
Agence France Presse/27 July/2022
U.S. President Joe Biden has had two negative Covid-19 tests and no longer needs to isolate after recovering from infection, his White House doctor said Wednesday. "Yesterday evening and then again this morning, he tested NEGATIVE for the SARS-CoV-2 virus by antigen testing," presidential physician Kevin O'Connor wrote in a memorandum, adding that Biden had already completed a course of the Paxlovid therapeutic."Given these reassuring factors, the President will discontinue his strict isolation." The US leader had been isolated in his White House residence since testing positive for the coronavirus last Thursday. He has been carrying out his full duties, but observed a lighter schedule during his recovery. While now out of isolation, the president will wear a mask for 10 days when around others and continue to test regularly for the virus in case of a "rebound," O'Connor said. Biden has no fever, the doctor added, noting "his symptoms have been steadily improving, and are almost completely resolved." Biden, 79, is the oldest person ever in the U.S. presidency but his physician says he is generally in good health. He has been fully vaccinated and received two booster shots against the coronavirus.

Pro-Sadr protesters breach Iraq's fortified Green Zone
Agence France Presse/27 July/2022
Supporters of powerful Iraqi cleric Moqtada Sadr on Wednesday penetrated the capital's high-security Green Zone, home to government buildings and diplomatic missions, an AFP reporter said. The protesters, opposed to a rival bloc's nomination for prime minister, tried to march towards parliament but were stopped by police firing a barrage of tear gas, a security source told AFP. An AFP correspondent saw protesters carrying one colleague who had been hurt.

Iran says arrested Israel-linked agents were Kurdish rebels
Agence France Presse/27 July/2022
Iran's intelligence ministry said Wednesday that agents linked to Israel's Mossad who were arrested last week were also members of an outlawed Kurdish rebel group who planned to target a "sensitive defense center."The ministry had announced on Saturday that it arrested "members of a terrorist organization who work for the Zionist spy agency Mossad and were sent to (Iran) to carry out (a) terrorist operation."It did not say how many suspects were arrested, nor did it identify the targets of the purported plots against "sensitive sites", but alleged that they entered from neighboring Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan region.
On Wednesday, the intelligence ministry said in a new statement that "the elements of the operating team are members of the Komalah terrorist and mercenary group." Komalah is a Marxist group which seeks autonomy for Kurdish-populated regions of northern Iran and has been outlawed since the Islamic revolution of 1979. The group has periodically clashed with security forces in northwest Iran, which has a sizeable Kurdish population. Iranian intelligence forces in April said they arrested a number of Komalah members in the northwestern province of Kurdistan who were seeking to "cause security problems." The ministry on Wednesday published pictures of equipment and weapons allegedly confiscated from those detained. They showed square-shaped pieces of furniture with 'bombs' hidden inside, pistols with silencers and bullets, SD cards hidden in the cap of perfume bottles, oxygen tanks, in addition to laptops, mobile phones and cash. The arrested individuals were aiming to "blow up a sensitive defence industry centre in the country," the statement published on Wednesday said, without identifying the target. Iran and Israel have been engaged in a years-long shadow war, with the Islamic republic accusing its arch-foe of carrying out sabotage attacks against its nuclear sites and assassinations of key figures, including scientists. Tensions have ratcheted up following a string of high-profile incidents that Tehran has blamed on Israel. The Islamic republic has blamed Israel for the killing of Revolutionary Guards Colonel Sayyad Khodai at his Tehran home on May 22. Two other Guard members have also died -- one in a reported accident and the other while on a mission -- earlier this year. In April, Iran said it arrested three people linked to Mossad and a month earlier claimed it had foiled an attack on a nuclear plant also planned by suspects linked to Israel.

17 fighters killed in south Syria clashes
Agence France Presse/27 July/2022
Seventeen gunmen were killed in two days of clashes in southern Syria's Sweida province between groups loyal to the Damascus regime and others opposing it, a war monitor said Wednesday. Ten loyalists and seven opposition fighters died in fighting on Tuesday and Wednesday in two villages in the Druze-majority province, the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said, raising the toll from 10 a day earlier. The monitor said more than 40 were wounded, including civilians. The Druze, who made up less than three percent of Syria's pre-war population, have largely kept out of the country's civil war since it started in 2011. Tensions had risen since Monday, after the abduction of two people close to the local armed opposition. The clashes ended when opposition fighters surrounded the village headquarters of the pro-Damascus faction blamed for the kidnappings. The pair were released, the Observatory said. Hundreds of Sweida residents gathered Wednesday in a square to celebrate, footage broadcast by the local Suwayda24 news outlet showed. Opposition fighters found "machines and presses for the manufacture of captagon pills" in one of the loyalist leader's bases, the Observatory and Suwayda24 said, referring to an amphetamine-type stimulant mainly produced in Syria. Kidnappings and assassinations, carried out mostly by local gangs, are common in Sweida, where drug smuggling is rife, especially across the border with Jordan. Government institutions and security forces are present in the province, while Syrian troops are deployed not far from its borders. Sweida has been spared most of the civil war fighting, though local forces had to repel limited rebel attacks in 2013 and 2015. A jihadist rampage in the area in 2018 killed more than 250 people.

UAE, Iran discuss boosting ties ahead of possible ambassador return
Agence France Presse/27 July/2022
The Emirati and Iranian foreign ministers have held a telephone conversation and discussed boosting ties, UAE state media reported Wednesday, as the Gulf Arab country considers sending an ambassador back to Tehran. Emirati Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan and his Iranian counterpart Hossein Amir-Abdollahian discussed ways of "boosting bilateral relations and areas of cooperation for the benefit of both countries", the UAE's state news agency WAM reported. Sheikh Abdullah "highlighted the UAE's keenness... to enhance the security and stability of the region", WAM added.
Iran's foreign ministry said Amir-Abdollahian "welcomed the enhancement of the level of ties between the two countries" as "an important step in the process of developing bilateral relations", in a statement late Tuesday. It said the Iranian minister also spoke separately with his Omani and Kuwaiti counterparts on Tuesday night. The United Arab Emirates scaled back its ties with the Islamic republic in 2016 after Iranian protesters attacked Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran following Riyadh's execution of Shiite Muslim cleric Nimr al-Nimr. Earlier this month, UAE presidential adviser Anwar Gargash said his country was considering sending an ambassador back to Iran and called for regional economic cooperation to help ease political tensions. "The next decade cannot be like the last decade. It's a decade where 'de-escalation' should be the key word," he had said.
His comments came after Israel and the United States signed a new security pact reinforcing their common front against Iran, during a visit to the Jewish state by US President Joe Biden. The UAE's talk of strengthening Iran ties comes alongside Iraqi efforts to mediate between Emirati ally Riyadh, and Tehran. Saudi Arabia and Iran have had no diplomatic ties since the 2016 attacks on the kingdom's diplomatic missions in the Islamic republic, while Kuwait also downgraded relations with Tehran. An Iranian diplomat told a Kuwaiti newspaper earlier this week that a Kuwaiti ambassador would arrive in Tehran "in the next few days", but authorities in the Gulf emirate have yet to announce such a move. The oil-rich UAE has previously said that Arab Gulf states should take part in "collective diplomacy" to reach an agreement with Iran, whose talks with Western powers over a faltering 2015 nuclear agreement have been stalled since March. In 2020, the UAE established diplomatic relations with Israel, a move which Tehran condemned. Amir-Abdollahian on Tuesday described Israel's presence in the region as a cause of "instability and insecurity", Iran's foreign ministry said.

Rocket fire targets Turkish consulate in Iraq's Mosul
Agence France Presse/27 July/2022
Rockets hit the vicinity of the Turkish consulate in Iraq's main northern city of Mosul causing damage but no casualties, Iraqi and Turkish sources said Wednesday. The overnight fire came after deadly shelling blamed on the Turkish army killed nine civilians last week, prompting anti-Turkish protests in cities across Iraq. Four rockets hit, causing damage to cars parked in the street near the consulate, provincial lawmaker Shirwan Dobardani told AFP. There was no immediate claim of responsibility. Turkey, which denied its forces were behind last week's artillery bombardment and instead blamed the rebel Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), condemned the overnight rocket fire."We condemn this attack, in which no casualties were reported, in the strongest terms," the Turkish foreign ministry said in a statement. "We firmly request from the Iraqi authorities to fulfil their responsibilities in protecting diplomatic and consular missions."The ministry said it was a "grave and noteworthy development that this attack was carried out during the UN Security Council meeting, which was held upon the call of the Iraqi authorities."Following last week's shelling, Baghdad called on the Security Council to pass a resolution demanding that Ankara withdraw its troops from northern Iraq, where it maintains a network of bases as part of its long-running campaign against the PKK.

At UN, Iraq and Turkey escalate dispute over deadly attack
Associated Press/27 July/2022
A dispute between Iraq and Turkey over a recent deadly attack in Iraq's northern Kurdish region has escalated at an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council. Iraq's foreign minister demandedthe withdrawal of all Turkish troops from his country, while Turkey's deputy ambassador said his government will keep pursing fighters it considers terrorists who take refuge in Iraq. The Iraqi government sought the meeting after the July 20 artillery attack that killed nine Iraqi tourists and injured 33 other people. Its foreign minister, Fuad Hussein, said the government has "proofs" that Turkish armed forces were responsible. Turkey has denied it was behind the attack and blamed fighters from the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, which is considered a terrorist organization by Ankara and the West . It has for decades waged an insurgency against the government in Ankara and maintains hideouts in Iraq's mountainous north. At the start of the Security Council meeting, the U.N. special envoy for Iraq had said Turkey and Iraq were ready for a joint investigation into the artillery shelling at the Parkha resort in the Zakho district of the semi-autonomous Kurdish region. Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert said Iraq's caretaker prime minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, emphasized in a conversation Monday "the importance of a transparent and thorough investigation: independent or jointly." She quoted him as saying it is vital "to put a stop to speculations, denials, misunderstandings and rising tensions."
The U.N. envoy said she understood "that Turkey is also ready to address the issue jointly, with Iraq, in order to determine exactly what happened."
Iraq's Hussein called on the Security Council to set up "an international independent team of inquiry" to look into what he called the Turkish army's "flagrant aggression."
The foreign minister told journalists later that Iraq is also ready to have a joint investigation with Turkey, but he said "they didn't approach us" and "never sent us an official letter about having an investigation." Turkey's deputy U.N. ambassador, Öncü Keçeli, countered that "we made it clear that Turkey is ready to take all the steps to unveil the truth," stressing to the council that "our officials at many different levels have given the same message."He said some Iraqi authorities were on the same page as Turkey and "wanted to find out the truth." But other Iraqi officials, he said, "chose escalation instead of diplomacy and cooperation," and started a media "smear campaign" aimed at driving a wedge between the Turkish and Iraqi people. Hussein said the Iraqi government is "sure" the Turkish military was responsible for the attack. He pointed to the findings of its investigation that Turkey's army has bases in the area near the resort, PKK fighters have not been in the area for the last month and the Turkish army uses 155 mm artillery projectiles whose fragments were found at the scene. Hussein added that many people in the area "gave us enough information about the activity of Turkish soldiers there." He called on the Security Council to urgently adopt a resolution demanding that Turkey withdraw what he said were about 4,000 combat soldiers from Iraq, and halt incursions into Iraqi airspace. Turkey's Keçeli countered that "the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq are breached by terrorist organizations, not by Turkey," which he said has always supported Iraq's sovereignty. "As we speak, the flags of the PKK terrorist organization are raised in certain parts of northern Iraq, not the flags of the federal government" or the Kurdish regional government, he said, Turkey estimates the PKK controls an area of "at least 10,000 square kilometers in Iraq," he said. "Nearly 800 villages have been forcefully evacuated by the PKK and all these spots have become a safe haven for the terrorists." In the first six months of this year the PKK carried out 339 attacks against Turkey, he said. "Iraq has so far proven to be either unable or unwilling to fight the terrorists," and therefore it cannot blame Turkey for exercising its right to self-defense, Keçeli said. Hussein said Iraq's government is ready to work alongside the United Nations and concerned countries "to ensure that elements of the PKK leave Iraq because this destabilizes Iraq" and undermines security in the country.
The Security Council issued a statement Monday condemning the attack on the resort "in the strongest terms," expressing support for Iraqi authorities "in their investigations" and urging all countries to cooperate with the Iraqi government "and all other relevant authorities in support of these investigations." The council did not mention Turkey. Diplomats said chances of the council approving a resolution demanding the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Iraq are slim, especially given the key role Turkey is playing in the recently announced deal to export desperately needed grain from Ukraine and grain and fertilizer from Russia to countries facing food shortages, rising prices and widespread hunger.

Blinken meets kin of slain Palestinian-American journalist
Associated Press/27 July/2022
Secretary of State Antony Blinken has met with the family of Palestinian-American reporter Shireen Abu Akleh killed while covering an Israeli raid in the occupied West Bank. The State Department said Blinken met with relatives of Al Jazeera reporter and vowed that the U.S. would demand "accountability" for her death. "The secretary is deeply appreciative of the opportunity to meet with Shireen's family," State Department spokesman Ned Price told reporters. "Not only was she an American citizen, she was a reporter whose fearless pursuit of the truth earned her the profound respect of audiences around the world." Price said Blinken would use the meeting "to underscore for Shireen's family our deepest condolences on her tragic death and to reiterate the priority we attach to accountability, something we continue to discuss with our Israeli and Palestinian partners as well." He could not say, however, what that accountability might mean. After reviewing investigations by Israeli and Palestinian authorities, the U.S. concluded on July 4 that Abu Akleh was likely killed by Israeli fire, although not intentionally. But it has not conclusively blamed Israel for her death and has left the question of accountability to the Israelis, prompting anger from the Palestinians and her family. Relatives — including her brother Tony Abu Akleh, her niece Lina Abu Akleh and her nephew Victor Abu Akleh — have been seeking a meeting with President Joe Biden to make the case for pressing Israel to account for her death. Blinken invited them to visit Washington after Biden was unable to see them while on a visit to Israel and the Palestinian territories earlier this month. "We are in Washington, D.C., to insist on a thorough, credible, independent, and transparent U.S. investigation into the Israeli military's killing of our dear Shireen," the family said in a statement. It called the July 4 U.S. conclusion "an affront to justice" that "enabled Israel to avoid accountability for Shireen's murder.""This is totally unacceptable to us," they said. "If we allow Shireen's killing to be swept under the rug, we send a message that the lives of U.S. citizens abroad don't matter, that the lives of Palestinians living under Israeli occupation don't matter, and that the most courageous journalists in the world, those who cover the human impact of armed conflict and violence, are expendable."A reconstruction by The Associated Press lent support to Palestinian eyewitnesses who said she was shot by Israeli forces without making a final determination. Investigations by CNN, The New York Times and The Washington Post, as well as monitoring by the U.N. human rights office, reached similar conclusions. Abu Akleh, who was 51, had spent a quarter-century reporting on the harsh realities of life under Israeli military rule. Palestinians view her as a martyr to journalism as well as their national cause.

Saudi crown prince: First EU visit since Khashoggi killing
Associated Press/27 July/2022
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has arrived in Greece on his first trip to a European Union country since the killing in 2018 of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi that triggered widespread international condemnation. Bin Salman, who is traveling with a large government and business delegation, met with Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and will attend the signing of a series of bilateral investment and defense agreements. Khashoggi, a U.S.-based journalist, was killed at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul and his body was dismembered with a bone saw, according to Turkish officials. A U.S. intelligence report, made public last year, said the crown prince likely approved the killing but he has denied any involvement. Greece has forged close ties with Saudi Arabia in recent years as it seeks allies in the wider region to address long-standing tension with neighbor Turkey, mostly over sea boundaries and drilling rights. Last year, Greece and Saudi Arabia held joint military exercises out of the Greek island of Crete, and Athens lent the kingdom a missile battery from its Patriot air defense system. "I promise you that when I come to Greece, I'm not coming empty-handed. We have many issues that will be game-changers for both our countries and for the whole region," Bin Salman was quoted as saying in a transcript of his remarks distributed to reporters by the government. He said the two countries were working on a project that would make "Greece a hub for Europe in terms of hydrogen (fuel)," but gave no further details. Journalists were not invited to attend the meetings and were given no opportunity to ask the visiting Saudi royal questions. The two countries are also planning a data cable link worth a reported 800 million euros that would run under the Mediterranean Sea and be completed in 2025.
The Saudi Prince's trip to Greece follows his meeting earlier with month in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, with President Joe Biden. Mitsotakis visited Saudi Arabia last October and met the crown prince who also later received visits from French President Emmanuel Macron and the outgoing British Prime Minister Boris Johnson.

The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on July 27-28/2022
Will Assad attend the next Astana talks?
Ibrahim Aljabin/The Arab Weekly/July 27/2022
The presence of the Syrian leader or his absence does not change anything.
The photos showing Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Iranian leader Ibrahim Raisi and Russian President Vladimir Putin together during the Astana summit talks held in Tehran last week, did not reflect the real differences between them.
The conflicting interests and visions between the three nations have sparked the Russian bombing of civilians in northwestern Syria and the Turkish strikes that targeted Syrian government forces.
The head of the Syrian regime, Bashar al-Assad, was, as usual, the proverbial elephant in the room. He was present and yet absent. However, in his absence, things were different this time. His biggest supporter, Putin, is no longer the Russian leader he used to be. He is more vulnerable politically and economically although he is militarily more aggressive and more wedded to Russia's vision of how its interests are to be served in Europe, Asia, and of course in Syria and the rest of the world. Putin is also today more than ever needs to keep hold of his allies.
The outlines of the Iranian project are clear and there is no dispute about them. But Erdogan's problems, however, lie with Putin, who has offered to host the next Astana summit talks in Russia. These problems have to do with Assad.
When Putin said that the three leaders want to see “concrete measures” on Syria, he was in fact throwing the ball into Erdogan’s court as he expected the Turkish president to pressure the Syrian opposition.
Although the Russians suspended the meetings of the Constitutional Committee in Geneva, Putin has hinted at the possibility of helping that committee resume its work without further interruption.
The Russian president was clear about the issues discussed at the Tehran summit. It seems that Syria was not at the top of the agenda. Trade between Moscow and Tehran (in national currencies instead of the dollar) and the development of Russian-Turkish economic relations “despite of everything,” as Putin put it, was much more important than discussion on the stalled Syria talks.
The “despite of everything” expression that Putin used, shows exactly the predicament that the Turkish president faces in Tehran. His Russian and Iranian allies want him to close the chapter of the dispute with the Syrian regime. They want him to deal realistically with Damascus, as they say. They believe the regime is there to stay and must be included in the talks whether now or tomorrow.
For the Damascus regime, the Astana summit is an opportunity to stop the Turkish operation against the SDF militias, which are dominated by another ally of Assad, the Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in northern Syria.
Of course, Assad does not want a military confrontation with Turkey. As for his wish to prevent Turkey from targeting the SDF, it falls within his efforts to re-establish his control over the entire Syrian territory and weaken all his rivals.
In Tehran, the three presidents agreed, according to the final summit statement to reject any plans to divide Syria, to commit to the country’s sovereignty and to prevent attempts to create a new reality on the ground. This included what are known as self-rule initiatives, as well as the looting of oil revenues east of the Euphrates.
As much as these positions reassure the Syrians because they reject the separatist project in the north and northeast of Syria, they also assuage the Turks. They implicitly send a message that Assad will not allow the Kurds in the end to cross the red lines.
Through this message, the Russians wanted to nudge the Turks towards normalising their relations with Assad. However, the Turks view Assad and the entire situation in Syria only as a national security concern. They see it as part of their overall vision of the fight against terrorist threats, whether posed by the Kurdistan Workers Party or by ISIS. The security track has allowed for coordination between the Turkish and Syrian sides. So Ankara does not feel the need to add political coordination to that track.
The most serious problem is between the Russians and the Iranians. Although they agree to condemn the Israeli attacks on Syrian territory, the Russians do control the entire Syrian airspace. Coordination between them and the Israelis is an ongoing reality, whether before and after Israel launches its strikes against Iranian militias. Tehran and Moscow have also differences over oil market policies and the nuclear deal.
The differences between the Iranians, the Russians and the Turks at that summit, over wheat, drones, oil and security, were greater than the Syrian issue and greater than the Syrian regime itself. The decision taken by the three leaders to put some order in their differences of views “despite of everything” is enough to save the Astana understandings. This makes Assad a guest whose presence or absence does not change anything.

The shadowy economics of ISIS resurgence in Syria
Haid Haid/The Arab Weekly/July 27/2022
Despite ISIS’s territorial defeat in Syria more than two years ago, the group has continued to terrorise people, particularly in the northeast. In June, ISIS sleeper cells were linked to 18 attacks and 16 deaths, on par with ISIS-linked violence in May, when 14 died in 26 attacks. The group’s survival is due, in part, to its ability to extort business owners to finance their operations and regrow their networks.
For months, ISIS has been using the threat of violence to operate extensive protection rackets in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor governorates. The inability of local authorities to provide sufficient protection from ISIS has left many people with no choice but to pay.
More importantly, fear of retaliation from both ISIS and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has allowed these extortion activities to go largely undetected, making it more difficult to counter. Unless the conditions that enable the group to finance itself are addressed, the group’s survival will almost certainly be guaranteed.ISIS is reliant on its extensive knowledge of local communities to identify targets and determine the amount of tribute. The group typically flags professionals (such as doctors and pharmacists) and business owners (including prominent farmers, shepherds, shop owners, traders and investors) who are considered well off. In a series of interviews that I conducted in recent months, those affected told me that ISIS uses a well-informed human intelligence network to track targets and estimate their income.
The scale and frequency of these forced payments varies. Some of the group’s victims said they pay between $700 and $1,500 annually, while investors overseeing oil fields in eastern Deir Ezzor reportedly pay more than $5,000 per well per month (or between ten percent and 20 percent of the well’s monthly profits).Once targets are selected, ISIS uses various methods to communicate demands. Victims told me that the group relies primarily on messaging applications, particularly WhatsApp, which uses end-to-end encryption and provides ISIS affiliates with anonymity. But ISIS also delivers written notices stamped with the group’s logo to the homes of its targets, an intimidation tactic that is arguably more effective.
Regardless of how people are coerced, ransom demands typically include the name of the target, the required amount in US dollar denominations and where the payment should be dropped. The messages also contain clear and explicit warnings to deliver the money quickly and discreetly to avoid punishment. Failure to comply has resulted in ISIS attacks on businesses, kidnappings and targeted killings. In January, ISIS reportedly destroyed several oil wells when those in charge refused to pay.
Nonetheless, there seems to be wide latitude in how ISIS enacts its retribution for non-compliance and is dependent on the personality of the ISIS commander and the profile of the targeted individual.
For example, not all ISIS targets are able to pay and victims told me that the group leaves room for negotiation. A doctor in the rural Deir Ezzor governate said he received a WhatsApp message from a foreign number demanding payment of $1,200. Attached to the message was a photo of an invoice stamped with the ISIS logo with details on where to send the cash. But when the doctor replied that he was internally displaced and treats patients who cannot afford medical care, the ISIS operative agreed to reduce the fee to $800.
Once details are agreed, ISIS members typically meet their targets in person. Cash drops do not always occur in remote areas, suggesting that ISIS members feel unthreatened by local authorities. ISIS even provides receipts to their prey, which not only makes the transaction more formal, but offers proof of payment if other ISIS members try to collect.
ISIS’s ability to deliver on its threats, which have been amplified by the general lack of security in the northeast, particularly in Deir Ezzor, makes people I spoke with reluctant to ignore the payment demands.
Estimating ISIS’s earnings from illicit shakedowns is difficult, but media reports suggest the group is generating several million dollars a year this way. While far less than the $80 million a month the group was generating in 2015, it is more than enough to make the group dangerous. ISIS’s territorial defeat in 2019 reduced its state-like financial responsibilities, and its current cash flow is more than sufficient to finance its hit-and-run operations and ensure its survival.
Preventing ISIS from extorting from local populations will require Syrian and regional officials to beef up security and crack down on the pay-for-protection schemes. It will not be easy. But unless ISIS’s ability to fund its deadly operations is disrupted, its resurgence is all but assured. ISIS was once known as the world’s “richest” terrorist organisation. Syria cannot afford to let it reclaim that title.

Why Europe’s fate matters to the Middle East and North Africa
Afshin Molavi/Arab News/July 27/2022
The EU is facing a rough winter. Overdependence on Russia for its energy needs has left many countries across the continent vulnerable to cuts in natural gas flows and price spikes in fossil fuels. There is talk of energy rationing at a time of sluggish growth and rising inflation. The dreaded “s” word — stagflation — is on many lips, and the ensuing political turbulence will rattle several governments.
The fate of Europe matters a great deal to the Middle East and North Africa region. After all, the EU’s $18 trillion economy makes it a key piece of the triumvirate of key nodes that are critical to the global economy — the other two being the US and China. It also matters a great deal to North Africa given the robust trade ties across the Mediterranean, the 5.5 million North Africans living in Europe, the supply chain links to European industry, and the flow of remittances from Europe headed mainly to Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria.
The recently concluded Jeddah Security and Development Summit declared a “joint vision toward a peaceful and prosperous region,” as noted by the assembled leaders from the Gulf Cooperation Council and the US, as well as Iraq, Jordan and Egypt. As always, prosperity begins with sound policies at home, but can also be rocked and buffeted by rough winds from abroad.
There are numerous rough external winds facing many Middle East and North Africa states today: Rising food and energy prices, a slowdown in China (a major energy buyer), global sluggishness, rising debt loads across emerging markets, supply chain disruptions and geopolitical uncertainty. Among these, however, a key factor will be the fate of Europe.
That is why the recent announcement by the European Central Bank that it will raise rates by half a percentage point as part of its inflation battle is not just a story for the financial pages, but will have real consequences for the MENA region as well.
The ECB, like the US Federal Reserve, is aiming to cool inflation without tanking the economy. Given the rising debt load in several countries — notably Italy’s 150 percent public debt to gross domestic product — the danger of successive rate rises would be a rapid rise in borrowing costs. So, the ECB laid down a marker, with the formidable Christine Lagarde, its president, pushing through a proposal that will allow the central bank to buy bonds and even private securities of EU countries in danger. This was a powerful warning to speculators: Do not take large positions against European markets; you will lose in a battle with the central bank.
The ECB move could help stabilize many European economies, though the region still faces many headwinds. Russia’s war in Ukraine will continue to cast a shadow over the region, and inflation will sap the consumer.
When it comes to energy, North African gas producers can help make up for some of the shortfall of Russian gas. Algeria is already a major natural gas supplier to Europe — the third largest after Russia and Norway. Algerian state energy firm Sonatrach has been doubling down on new exploration spending. The future looks bright for Algerian gas to Europe.
Meanwhile, in a remarkable deal that reflects the new temper of our times, Egypt is set to export Israeli liquefied natural gas to Europe via two Egyptian LNG plants. The memorandum of understanding was signed this month at the East Mediterranean Gas Forum in Cairo. Another major new development took place this week during the visit of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to Greece. Both sides signed an agreement to develop green hydrogen and clean energy initiatives jointly. The crown prince noted that Saudi Arabia would like to help "turn Greece as a hub for hydrogen to Europe," describing it as "a game changer for both of us."
Qatar, one of the world’s largest liquefied natural gas exporters, is also well positioned to boost its European market share. Right now, the bulk of Qatari LNG heads to Asia. But with billions in new investments and an ambitious production expansion schedule, more can be expected to flow to Europe over the next decade. As for oil, Saudi Arabia and Iraq are reportedly diverting more of their oil flows to European refiners to help make up for the shortfalls from Russia.
Europe will need a more diversified and stable energy supply to maintain its status as a key pole of the global economy. Key poles, such as Europe, are both supply and demand engines for the world, creating multiplier effects among their main partners. North Africa’s trade profile is heavily European, and its tourist flows are the same. A sluggish Europe will add to the challenges already faced across North Africa, most notably food price inflation and slowing growth. As for the Levant and the GCC states, they also have deep commercial and political ties across Europe and benefit when the continent thrives.
Europe will need a more diversified and stable energy supply to maintain its status as a key pole of the global economy.
Further, as economies deteriorate, societies fray and become more susceptible to populist nationalist movements. In Europe, those movements tend to be skeptical of migrants and, more broadly, of Muslim migrants. The rise of a new wave of populist nationalists could pose new challenges for MENA governments more accustomed to dealing with centrist parties.
It should come as no surprise in our globalized economy that the fate of Europe matters to the fate of the world. For its neighbors across the Mediterranean in North Africa or the Levant that are highly correlated to European markets, or its allies in the GCC states, the fate of Europe will help determine their own fate in a precarious moment. Ramping up energy supplies to Europe will have a virtuous cycle effect: It will boost Europe at a critical time, supporting a continent that is vital to the economic future of the region.
*Afshin Molavi is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and the founder and editor of the Emerging World newsletter. Twitter: @AfshinMolavi

Lapid’s chance to break with the past
Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib/Arab News/July 27/2022
Yair Lapid, the caretaker Israeli prime minister, needs to score a win if he is to remain in the post after the November elections. Lapid, who represents the center left, has a certain vision of a two-state solution and might push for it if he retains power.
Unlike Naftali Bennett, who adopts a dogmatic philosophy and believes the land of historic Palestine is for the Jews and for the Jews only, Lapid has a more pragmatic worldview, and believes that Israelis and Palestinians should live side by side in peace in two neighboring states.
Lapid has a three-month window in which he can call the shots before the elections. If he scores an important win in foreign policy or domestically and wins the premiership, it will be an advancement for peace in the region. His victory would be a relative win for Arab states whose interests lie in peace and in the two-state solution.
Today, the hot topic when it comes to Israel’s foreign policy is the demarcation with Lebanon. While Hezbollah is raising the stakes and threatening to hit Israel, claiming all of the country is within range of its missiles, in its dispute over access to disputed natural gas fields, the Israel Defense Forces Joint Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi is acting more like a politician than a military figure and saying that Lebanon will face “unprecedented bombing” if a war breaks out.
Tensions have reached their height and it is time for a deal or a strike. Both parties would prefer an agreement, and this is an occasion not only to clinch a deal with Lebanon but also to set the pace for a new track in Israeli foreign policy.
The former Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu, whose foreign and domestic policy relied on hatred and fear, had a well-known line. He said that if Arabs laid down their arms, there would be no war, but if Israel laid down its arms, there would be no Israel. This line is now obsolete, as no Israeli in their right mind believes that.
Despite the fact that Israeli society is moving to the right, there is a window to capitalize on this changing perception to push for peace. There is an opportunity to showcase to the Israeli public that by making the right decisions at the right time to the right people, Israel can provide security to its people. There is a window through the Lebanon deal for Lapid to show that through negotiations and not through military action, Israel can guarantee its security. It is also an opportunity for Israel to show that it can be generous if the other party understands and fulfills its security concerns.
It is time for Lapid to make a generous proposition that will set the pace for Israel’s foreign and domestic policy should he become prime minister.
Regardless of the threats by its chief Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah does not want a confrontation. The group knows that, unlike in 2006, this time if Israel destroys the south, money will not flow from the Gulf for reconstruction and Iran, still technically under maximum pressure, is unlikely to be able to foot the bill. Hence Hezbollah will tacitly accept a deal that will stabilize the borders and prevent a strike on Lebanon. It is time for Lapid to make a generous proposition that will set the pace for Israel’s foreign and domestic policy should he become prime minister.
Israel and Lebanon have been quarreling over the line from which to start negotiations. While the technical team, which is under the jurisdiction of the Lebanese armed forces, wants to start from Line 29, Israelis are insisting on Line 23, which was set by the previous incompetent government of Najib Mikati in 2011.
However, thinking logically, Israel is a rich country and a few hundred kilometers of gas field will not really make a difference. Lebanon on the other hand is in a destitute position and the gas can lift the country out of its misery, provided that the funds generated are directed toward development and do not end up in the pockets of corrupt politicians.
Here, instead of being petty and negotiating on a few hundred kilometers more or less, on Line 29 or Line 23, Israel should have a broader horizon. It should think that it is in its own interest to have a stable and prosperous Lebanon because problems with its neighbors are bound to affect it.
Hence Lapid should make the proposition that Israel is ready to show generosity if two conditions are met. The first is signing a non-aggression agreement with the Lebanese state. The agreement falls short of full normalization as there are many complex issues at stake between Lebanon and Israel, and Lebanon is committed to the Arab Peace Initiative that bases normalization on the two-state solution and with the pre-1967 borders. However, the agreement will provide stability for both countries waiting for a more final and comprehensive deal.
The other condition is to make sure that the funds Lebanon gets will not feed corruption further, creating more instability. Even if simply an announcement is made in this regard, it will show goodwill and allow Lapid to garner international praise and support.
On the other hand, Arab countries should welcome such a proposition and endorse it, even if they do not have formal diplomatic relations with Israel. Though Lapid has a narrow window of three months, it is his chance to break with the past and set a new pace for Israeli politics that will lay the foundation for a comprehensive and sustainable peace.
• Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib is a specialist in US-Arab relations with a focus on lobbying. She is co-founder of the Research Center for Cooperation and Peace Building, a Lebanese NGO focused on Track II.