English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For November 21/2026
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
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Bible Quotations For today
A woman in the crowd raised her voice and said to him, ‘Blessed is the womb that bore you and the breasts that nursed you!’But he said, ‘Blessed rather are those who hear the word of God and obey it!
Saint Luke 11/27-32: “A woman in the crowd raised her voice and said to him, ‘Blessed is the womb that bore you and the breasts that nursed you!’But he said, ‘Blessed rather are those who hear the word of God and obey it!’When the crowds were increasing, he began to say, ‘This generation is an evil generation; it asks for a sign, but no sign will be given to it except the sign of Jonah. For just as Jonah became a sign to the people of Nineveh, so the Son of Man will be to this generation. The queen of the South will rise at the judgement with the people of this generation and condemn them, because she came from the ends of the earth to listen to the wisdom of Solomon, and see, something greater than Solomon is here! The people of Nineveh will rise up at the judgement with this generation and condemn it, because they repented at the proclamation of Jonah, and see, something greater than Jonah is here!”

Titles For The English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on November 20-21/2026
Saint Edmund the Martyr- King of England Who Chose Martyrdom Rather Than Denying Christ/Elias Bejjani/November 20/2026
Condemnation and Denunciation of the Jihadist and Criminal Attack on Metropolitan Abdo Arbash Inside His Church in Homs And a Warning Against the al-Sharaa Regime’s Measures to Islamize Syria/Elias Bejjani/18 November 2026
Our Shepherds Prey on Us, Our Rulers Sell Us, and Our People Are a Flock Led to the Slaughterhouses Without Even Bleating/Elias Bejjani/November 16, 2026
Friday Mass – Week of the Annunciation to Zechariah
Abu Arz: Lebanon… A Word from History (15)
From Zahle, the U.S. Ambassador Elevates the Urgency of the "Tripartite Framework": A Once-in-a-Lifetime Opportunity
Israel Ignites Fires... and Drops Explosives on Homes!
Arnault: Lebanese Concerns Over a Potential Security Vacuum Following the Expiration of UNIFIL’s Mandate
Hezbollah Cell in the Bsharri Highlands: Documents Reveal Plans for Ambushes and IEDs, Links to Beirut, and Summons of Key Operatives
A Fourth Name Emerges in the Bsharri Case: A Hezbollah Official Close to Tony Frangieh?
Trump to Aoun: "Seize the Opportunity"—and the "Jaroud Cell" Case Sets the Stage for a Confrontation Between the State and Hezbollah
The Judiciary Wages a Battle for Independence and Pursues Leaders of the "Northern Cell"
Syria Seizes Weapons Shipment Bound for Lebanon
The South: Between Field Escalation and International Maneuvers—Concerns Over the Post-UNIFIL Phase and the Case of the Detainees
Washington Pushes for a Force to Monitor Disarmament Across Lebanon—What Is the Stance of Beirut and the "Duo"?
Jurf al-Sakhr under the control of the Iraqi state... The repercussions of the confrontation with Iran reach Lebanon'
Independence Amidst Challenges: Trump Tells Lebanon to Seize the Opportunity
US Commends Government Decisions; Aoun to Deliver Comprehensive Address Tomorrow Evening
Al-Juroud Cell: Sufficient Evidence for Prosecution; Second Summons Issued; Hezbollah Issues a Warning
Lebanon’s Explosives Case Highlights the Judicial Obstacles to Disarming Hezbollah/Hanin Ghaddar/The Washington Institute/November 20, 2026

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on November 20-21/2026
Trump praises Al-Zaidi: “He is able to do what he wants.”
Iraqi Forces Enter Jurf al-Sakhr After 12 Years of Control by "Kata'ib Hezbollah"—Al-Zaidi: No Arms Outside State Authority
Jurf al-Sakhr Opens the Gateway to Restoring Iraqi Sovereignty
Trump: Iran wants an agreement... and I will strike it again if necessary
Trump Conditions End of War on a "Real, Not Fake" Deal with Iran
Eisenkot Maneuvers to Form a Government… A Knesset Vote, Even Without a Majority?
Israeli Military Targets Hamas Meeting in Gaza: What Do We Know About the Operation?
Witkoff and Kushner Discuss Ways to Contain Escalation with Iran with Doha
Araghchi: The "Two-Day Plan" Remains on the Table; Trump Must Signal Willingness to Negotiate
A new explosion on Qeshm Island... and an attack on a tanker in the Strait of Hormuz
France Moves to Punish Iran Over Cyberattacks; Paris Accuses the Revolutionary Guard of Targeting 700 Stores and Seeks European Sanctions
Amid UN condemnation of human rights violations: 19 prisoners executed by hanging in Iran over five days, including two women.
Tehran raises the ceiling of deterrence after the “Schengen” summit.. The Revolutionary Guard announces “a review of nuclear doctrine” and Washington mobilizes aircraft carriers
Pezeshkian Sparks Outrage in Iran with Remarks About Sleeping in a "Coat" and Turning Off Heating; Citizens Respond: "We Sold Our Coats to Buy Bread"
Araghchi Rules Out War Tonight… Amid Israeli Warnings of Renewed Strikes on Iran
From Tehran to Kyiv: Trump’s Messages Following the Summit with Putin and Xi
Berlin and Doha Channels in Motion: Efforts to Cool U.S.-Iran Confrontation
Economic Pariah: Washington Expands Siege on Iran, Targeting Its Networks in Asia
Dispatching a Ship and Invoking History: Iran Seeks to Break the U.S. Naval Blockade
Putin Meets Trump’s Diplomacy with Fire and Steel
Riyadh Confronts Houthi Terrorism with a Targeted Operation
Yazidi Survivor Claims to Have Seen Al-Sharaa in the House Where She Was Held During ISIS Rule

Titles For The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on November 20-21/2026
The Gulf Is America’s Next AI Security Test/Elizabeth Dent/The Washington Institute/November 20, 2026
Who’s in Charge in Iran?/Patrick Clawson/The Washington Institute/November 20, 2026
The Gulf Is America’s Next AI Security Test/Elizabeth Dent/The Washington Institute/November 20, 2026
Question: What does the Bible say about plagiarism?/GotQuestions/November 20/2026
Washington, Tehran, and the Limits of Maneuvering/Hassan Fahs / Independent Arabia / November 20, 2026
Selected Face Book & X tweets on November 20/2026

Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on November 20-21/2026 (Some of the News reports below are translated from Arabic by AI)
Saint Edmund the Martyr- King of England Who Chose Martyrdom Rather Than Denying Christ
Elias Bejjani/November 20/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/11/159476/
Introduction
On November 20, the Church commemorates Saint Edmund, King of East Anglia, who was martyred in 869 AD for defending his Christian faith. He is one of the prominent figures in the history of English Christianity and has become a symbol of courage, steadfastness, and unwavering loyalty to Christ.
His Birth and Origins
According to traditional accounts, Edmund was born around 841 AD. However, his birthplace and family origins remain historically uncertain. Later accounts claim that he was born in Nuremberg, Germany, and was the son of a Saxon king named Alcmund. Nevertheless, historians do not regard these details as firmly established. It is more likely that he was of Anglo-Saxon origin and connected to East Anglia.
His Accession to the Throne
Edmund ascended the throne of East Anglia on December 25, 855, when he was approximately fourteen years old. His traditional biography portrays him as a just ruler, devoted to prayer, concerned for his people, and free from arrogance, malicious intrigue, and the abuse of power.
According to religious tradition, he memorized the entire Book of Psalms. This detail belongs to the traditional accounts of his life, although no contemporary evidence has been found to establish it.
When and Why Did He Embrace Christianity?
We do not know the exact date of Edmund’s baptism or the year in which he embraced Christianity. Nor do the earliest historical sources provide a documented account of his conversion. It is likely that he was raised in a Christian environment and was already a Christian before becoming king.
What his ecclesiastical tradition emphasizes, however, is the depth of his devotion to Christ. His faith was not merely a social or inherited tradition; it was a fundamental principle that he refused to compromise, even when faced with death.
His Era and the Viking Invasions
The ninth century witnessed widespread Scandinavian invasions of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms. The force known as the Great Heathen Army arrived in England in 865 and returned to East Anglia in 869.
Edmund found himself confronting an invasion that threatened his kingdom, his people, and their independence.
His Martyrdom on November 20/869 AD
Early historical sources report that Edmund fought against the Danes, who defeated him, killed him, and seized his kingdom.
However, the ecclesiastical account written by the monk Abbo of Fleury around 985–987 AD relates that Edmund was captured and refused to abandon Christ or submit to the demands of the pagan invaders.
According to this account, his captors tied him to a tree and shot him with arrows before beheading him.
Thus, he became remembered in Christian tradition as a martyr king—not simply because he died in battle, but because, according to the Church’s account, he refused to deny Christ in order to save his life.
His Miracles and the Traditions Associated with Him
One of the best-known traditions associated with Saint Edmund concerns his head and a she-wolf.
According to the legend, after the invaders beheaded him, they threw his head into a forest among the thorns. When his followers began searching for it, they heard a voice calling out: “Hic, hic, hic,” meaning “Here, here, here.”
The story relates that they eventually found his head guarded by a large she-wolf. They then reunited it with his body, and, according to the miraculous account, it became joined to the body once again.
His shrine at Bury St Edmunds also became associated with numerous accounts of healing, protection, and answered prayers. It developed into an important center of Christian pilgrimage.
These accounts form part of the religious tradition surrounding the saint, although not all of them are
Historically verifiable events.
His Achievements and Historical Influence
Saint Edmund became an example of a Christian ruler who placed justice and responsibility above personal interests.
His legacy includes:
Becoming a symbol of unwavering faith and refusing to deny Christ.
Gaining widespread veneration in the late ninth century, as demonstrated by commemorative coins bearing his name.
Having his relics transferred to Bury St Edmunds around the beginning of the tenth century.
Becoming associated with the development of a major Benedictine abbey, which turned the location into an important pilgrimage center.
Earning the respect of English kings and becoming one of England’s most important patron saints during the Middle Ages.
When Was He Canonized?
There is no known exact date for Saint Edmund’s formal canonization, nor is there a record of a pope issuing an official decree declaring him a saint.
This is because he lived before the establishment of the centralized papal canonization system familiar today.
Nevertheless, devotion to him began relatively soon after his martyrdom, and his recognition as a saint became firmly established in the English Church during the tenth and eleventh centuries.
He served as one of England’s principal patron saints before Saint George gradually assumed that position in the mid-fourteenth century.
Spiritual Lessons
The life of Saint Edmund offers us several important spiritual lessons:
Faith in Christ is not negotiable. Our loyalty to God must remain stronger than our fear of suffering or death.
Authority is a responsibility to serve the people, not a personal privilege. Leadership must be guided by justice, integrity, and concern for others.
True courage means standing firm for what is right despite fear and suffering.
One must never sacrifice conscience and dignity merely to secure personal survival.
Witnessing to Christ means bearing witness to truth, love, and freedom.
Edmund lost his crown and his earthly life, but he remains in Christian memory an enduring example of faithfulness to God.
A Prayer for Lebanon’s Deliverance Through the Intercession of Saint Edmund the Martyr
O Lord, our God, through the intercession of Saint Edmund the Martyr, we humbly implore You to have mercy on Lebanon, the Land of the Cedars, a land of faith and holiness, and to deliver it from injustice, corruption, occupation, subservience, and illegal weapons.
O Lord, liberate Lebanon from all those who undermine its sovereignty and threaten its peace and national identity. Establish within it a free, independent, and just state, governed by the rule of law and protected by its legitimate national army.
Grant its people patience and hope. Protect its sons and daughters, its churches, and its Christian heritage. Shield its youth from emigration and despair, and restore security, peace, and dignity to its homes.
O Saint Edmund the Martyr, you who chose faithfulness to Christ over your own life, intercede for Lebanon and ask God to grant it the blessings of deliverance, freedom, sovereignty, and peace.
O Lord, have mercy on Lebanon, bless it, and deliver it. Amen.
O Lord, through the intercession of Saint Edmund, save Lebanon, bless it, protect it, and restore its sovereignty, independence, and peace.
We offer You this prayer in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, one God. Amen.
Saint Edmund the Martyr, pray for us.
O Lord, save Lebanon. Amen.
Note: The information contained in this study is compiled from numerous documented ecclesiastical, theological, academic, and media sources.
Historical References:
Vatican City State – Saint Edmund, King and Martyr, 20 November 2026.
Abbey of St Edmund Heritage Partnership – Who Was Saint Edmund?
Cambridge University Press – St Edmund’s Medieval Lives.
Catholic Encyclopedia – St Edmund the Martyr.

Condemnation and Denunciation of the Jihadist and Criminal Attack on Metropolitan Abdo Arbash Inside His Church in Homs And a Warning Against the al-Sharaa Regime’s Measures to Islamize Syria
Elias Bejjani/18 November 2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/11/159378/

What the minorities in Syria, and especially the Christian community, are enduring under the regime of Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly al-Jolani) is reprehensible and unacceptable. It must not be met with silence—neither Arab, regional, international, human-rights-related, nor ecclesiastical.
In this context, moral, faith-based, and human-rights duty demands the strongest possible condemnation of the cowardly and brazen attack that targeted the Shepherd of the Melkite Greek Catholic Archdiocese of Homs, Hama, and Yabroud, Metropolitan Yohanna Abdo Arbash, last Saturday inside the Church of Our Lady of Peace in the al-Hamidieh neighborhood of Homs.
Unknown armed men stormed the church in broad daylight, tied up the Metropolitan, blindfolded him, and gagged him. They then seized the safe and a number of the Archdiocese’s belongings. Not content with that, they tore the holy cross from around the Metropolitan’s neck before fleeing to an unknown destination.
This criminal act is not merely a robbery. It is a flagrant violation of the sanctity of the House of God, a direct assault on the dignity of a Christian clergyman and his Church, and a clear message that Christians in Syria have become easy targets amid the prevailing security chaos and official silence.
This attack comes within a worrying series of assaults and kidnappings that have targeted Christians in Syria over recent weeks and months, as documented in the statement issued by the Patriarchs and heads of the Churches (Patriarch Yohanna X, Patriarch Ignatius Joseph III Younan, and Patriarch Youssef Absi). They denounced “odious and recurring attacks” and “systematic aggressions,” as well as kidnappings for exorbitant ransoms, affirming that these are not isolated incidents. Clergy and places of worship have themselves become targets due to the authorities’ inability or failure to provide even minimal protection.
It is necessary here to highlight the deep Christian fear—regional and international—regarding the crude and sectarian steps being taken by the regime of Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly al-Jolani) in multiple domains, foremost among them school curricula that are advancing steadily toward the Islamization of Syrian society. These policies reveal a clear intention to alter the country’s identity and impose a rigid, one-sided vision, despite the promises the new authorities made to protect minorities upon assuming power.
What provokes both anger and astonishment is that the West, after lifting sanctions on Syria and granting political legitimacy and cover to a man who until recently was classified as a terrorist and jihadist, now stands as a mere spectator while the existence of Christians, Alawites, and Druze is threatened. This glaring contradiction between the Western discourse on “values” and “human rights” and the reality on the ground deepens the sense of abandonment among Syrian and Eastern Christians in general.
It must also be strongly emphasized that the growing Turkish control over the levers of power in Syria constitutes an additional strategic danger to the future of the minorities and to the demographic and religious balance in the country.
What is required of the Vatican, the Churches of the world, human-rights organizations, and the free nations of the world is to break free from the circle of indifference, silence, and timid condemnations, and to exert serious pressure on the Syrian authorities to guarantee the protection of Christians, their properties, and their places of worship; to hold the perpetrators immediately accountable; and to halt any path aimed at the Islamization of the state and society.
We must also recall that the persecution of Christians is not an isolated Syrian phenomenon. It is a painful reality that recurs in Egypt and in the majority of Arab and Islamic countries, where rights are violated and historically rooted indigenous communities are targeted under various pretexts, often amid suspicious international silence.
The Christian presence in Syria remains an authentic part of the fabric of the Levant. It is neither foreign nor alien. Any attempt to erase this presence, marginalize it, or turn it into a weak and vulnerable minority is a crime against history, civilization, and humanity.
The free world and the free people within it are called upon to raise their voices forcefully and continuously, demanding real protection rather than empty promises, justice rather than silence, and an end to the sectarian path that threatens the future of everyone in Syria.
Enough of the violation of Christians.Enough of the silence.
*The author, Elias Bejjani, is a Lebanese expatriate activist
Author’s Email: Phoenicia@hotmail.com
Author’s Website: https://eliasbejjaninews.com

Our Shepherds Prey on Us, Our Rulers Sell Us, and Our People Are a Flock Led to the Slaughterhouses Without Even Bleating
Elias Bejjani/November 16, 2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/11/159309/
Our condition is a disgrace, unprecedented, neither near nor far. Not in its blasphemy, nor in its rulers, nor in its shepherds, nor in its ingratitude and Trojanism.
Total humiliation. Submission, wandering astray, and the murder of conscience, of feeling, and of the Word.
Those who represent us in the state, from the greatest of them to the smallest, are filthy, cowardly merchants. They sold us to the Iranian, and to the Syrian, and before them to the Palestinian, for thirty pieces of silver.
As for our shepherd, the same one, “who sleeps on his ear for 7-8 hours, whose appetite for food is fancy-schmancy, and who does not read,” just as he himself told us — there is much to be said.
A shepherd who does not shepherd, but preys… who insults the Word which is God, who has mastered hypocrisy, and who has bet on Iscariot.
A shepherd surrounded by bishops — may they not be in anyone’s house, except in the house of affliction… A shepherd who preys on the flock, and keeps going, walking on, and continuing…
And as for our political parties’ companies, they are all disasters. Their evil owners are corrupt, mere idols, with no dignity, no conscience, and no shame.
Meanwhile, we must not forget our political and media crews, who are a gang of greedy, satanic Trojans.
And let no one be fooled and imagine that our “forgiving” people, in their majority, are in a better state. For “we are ruled by those who are a million times worse than us.”
Our people, in their majority, have turned — out of stupidity and lack of shame, and on the basis of lack of faith, ingratitude, and narcissism — into a flock, nay, into flocks.
Flocks being led to the slaughterhouses without even bleating.
It remains forbidden to despair and to surrender. For nothing will get us out of this hell except a miracle from Heaven… And it must surely come, because Lebanon is holy, a land of holiness and of saints.

Friday Mass – Week of the Annunciation to Zechariah
The Divine Liturgy for Friday (November 20), during the Week of the Annunciation to Zechariah, is celebrated by Father Hani Shalala (Lebanese Missionary) at the Church of Saint John the Beloved in Jounieh.
Become a partner in love and contribute to the mission of evangelization with "Sawt al-Mahabba" (Voice of Love):
https://www.facebook.com/charityradiotv/videos/1494625439399280

Abu Arz: Lebanon… A Word from History (15)
November 20, 2026
In his book *The Name of Lebanon Through the Ages*, historian Antoine Khoury Harb recounts the story of a Phoenician inscription—reportedly discovered in 1872 in Paraíba, Brazil—which suggests that the Phoenicians reached the shores of the Americas approximately two thousand years before Christopher Columbus. American researcher Cyrus H. Gordon defended the authenticity of this inscription in a study published in 1968.
The text attributed to the inscription reads:
"We are Canaanites from Sidon… We set sail on ten ships during the reign of our King Hiram and circumnavigated the land of Ham for two years. Then, the hand of Baal scattered us, and twelve men and three women arrived here… May the gods grant us their aid and protection."
Conclusion:
Our ancestors traversed the seas, reaching the farthest corners of the earth, while our current rulers have drowned in a sea of ​​corruption and betrayal—leading us to the very depths of degradation. #AtYourServiceLebanon
References:
— Antoine Khoury Harb, "The Name of Lebanon Through the Ages."
— Cyrus H. Gordon, *Orientalia*, Vol. 37 (1968), pp. 75–80

From Zahle, the U.S. Ambassador Elevates the Urgency of the "Tripartite Framework": A Once-in-a-Lifetime Opportunity
Janoubia / November 20, 2026
During a visit with significant political and economic implications, the U.S. Ambassador in Beirut, Michel Issa, reaffirmed the priority of implementing the "Tripartite Framework" and enacting financial reforms in Lebanon. He emphasized that attracting American investment and expanding trade are contingent upon restoring confidence and establishing a foundation for peace and security. These remarks were made during a visit to Zahle, which included meetings with local officials and economic figures to explore opportunities for bilateral cooperation. In a statement, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut announced that Ambassador Issa visited Zahle on November 19, where he discussed political and economic developments—as well as investment prospects for American companies—with local officials and prominent figures. The Ambassador stressed that attracting U.S. investment and growing trade between Lebanon and the United States require comprehensive financial reforms that align with international standards, alongside the establishment of a foundation for peace and security capable of restoring confidence in Lebanon. He further reiterated the call to implement the "Tripartite Framework," describing it as an "opportunity that may not come again" for Lebanon. Regarding economic and development matters, Ambassador Issa met with the Governor of the Bekaa, Kamal Abu Jaoudeh, and the Mayor of Zahle, Salim Ghazaleh, to discuss the region’s priorities and ways to strengthen cooperation between the U.S. Embassy and the governorate. He also discussed the state of electricity supply and the company’s operational mechanisms with Asaad Nakad, Chairman and General Manager of Électricité de Zahlé, as well as potential Lebanese-American cooperation in the energy sector. In another economic engagement, the Ambassador met with the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture of Zahlé and the Bekaa, where they addressed challenges facing the business sector and ways to boost trade between Lebanon and the United States.
The visit concluded with a luncheon hosted by MP George Okeis in honor of Issa, attended by various political, religious, and economic figures from the region. In its concluding statement, the U.S. Embassy reaffirmed Washington’s ongoing commitment to supporting Lebanon in implementing the "tripartite framework" and pursuing necessary reforms, with the aim of fostering economic recovery and attracting investment.

Israel Ignites Fires... and Drops Explosives on Homes!
Al-Markaziya / November 21, 2026
Southern Lebanon witnessed an escalation on the ground this evening, marked by a massive Israeli-caused explosion in the town of Zawtar al-Sharqiya, coinciding with Israeli artillery shelling targeting the town of Kfar Tebnit. The Israeli army is currently uprooting olive trees on Al-Shariqa Hill in the town of Khiam; reports indicate the sound of military vehicles moving in the vicinity. Several areas in southern Lebanon saw field developments, as the Israeli army conducted an extensive sweep using machine-gun fire toward the town of Khiam, coinciding with an explosion heard in the area a short while ago. In a related context, artillery shelling struck the area between the towns of Zawtar al-Sharqiya and Mifdoun, as well as the vicinity of the Ali al-Taher ridge. This afternoon, Israeli army artillery also targeted the towns of Sarbine and Bani Hayyan in southern Lebanon, as part of the ongoing assaults on the southern regions. The Israeli army ignited fires within the "Scout City" (al-Madina al-Kashfiya) complex on the eastern outskirts of Zawtar al-Sharqiya; plumes of smoke were seen rising from the area, while the outskirts of the town of Kfar Tebnit were subjected to intermittent artillery fire. Furthermore, an Israeli drone has been intermittently dropping explosive materials toward homes on the outskirts of the town of Hadatha, in the Bint Jbeil District, causing damage and fires. During the afternoon, Israeli artillery shelling hit the Ali al-Taher ridge in Nabatieh and the outskirts of Hadatha. Heavy drone activity was also recorded over the Tyre area. Earlier in the morning, Israeli artillery targeted Al-Mansouri, Majdal Zoun, Wadi al-Hujair, and the outskirts of the town of Al-Ghandouriya in the south. Israeli forces also conducted a sweep using machine-gun fire toward Wadi Baraachit. Additionally, Israeli warplanes carried out a two-wave airstrike targeting the "crossing" (al-Ma'bar) area in the town of Kfar Tebnit.

Arnault: Lebanese Concerns Over a Potential Security Vacuum Following the Expiration of UNIFIL’s Mandate

Al-Markaziya / November 21, 2026
Yesterday, Jean Arnault, Acting Head of the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon, together with Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix, briefed the UN Security Council on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006). Mr. Arnault highlighted the grave humanitarian, economic, and security challenges in southern Lebanon as military operations by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continue. He also underscored the Lebanese government’s commitment to extending state authority, noting the importance of achieving a complete cessation of hostilities and maintaining stability to advance these efforts. With the expiration of UNIFIL’s mandate approaching, Mr. Arnault pointed to a consensus in Lebanon regarding the importance of extending the mission’s presence, and emphasized that Security Council Resolution 1701 must remain the legal foundation for any future international arrangements in southern Lebanon. Furthermore, he conveyed to the Security Council the concerns expressed by Lebanese leaders regarding the potential for a security vacuum. Among these concerns, he highlighted the importance of maintaining the Blue Line; ensuring the continuation of liaison and coordination mechanisms between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the IDF; securing international support for humanitarian and civilian access; and sustaining monitoring and reporting activities in southern Lebanon. Mr. Arnault also stressed that the restoration of state authority is not limited to security measures alone; it also requires effective public institutions capable of meeting the needs of the population, particularly in communities affected by the conflict. In conclusion, Mr. Arnaud reaffirmed the United Nations' commitment to supporting Lebanon’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and stability, and called on the Security Council to adopt a comprehensive response to the challenges facing Lebanon.

Hezbollah Cell in the Bsharri Highlands: Documents Reveal Plans for Ambushes and IEDs, Links to Beirut, and Summons of Key Operatives
Janoubia / November 20, 2026
Investigations into the five Hezbollah members arrested in the highlands of Bsharri and Koura are expanding, following the emergence of information regarding security plots, ambushes, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Documents seized from the group point to the existence of other cells in Beirut, prompting the summoning of several Hezbollah officials. Reports also suggest that Western intelligence agencies had been monitoring the group prior to their arrest. On Friday, sources from the MTV channel revealed that documents found in the detainees' possession contained references to preparations for ambushes and the use of IEDs across various Lebanese regions. The documents also point to a network whose operations extend beyond the north to include the capital, Beirut. This information aligns with reports from the Al-Hadath channel, which—citing Lebanese security sources—noted the discovery of another cell in Beirut. The seized materials reportedly include codenames and military identification numbers for Hezbollah operatives, as well as evidence that the group relied on manual courier methods for internal organizational communications. Further details indicate that the documents contained references to specific locations in Hazmieh and the Southern Suburb (Dahiyeh), along with lists of codenames, encrypted numerical codes, and mentions of weaponry and field missions. In a significant development, MTV sources suggested that foreign intelligence agencies may have provided Lebanese authorities with information regarding Hezbollah’s security-related activities in the north and other parts of the country. It was revealed that a Western entity had issued a warning regarding preparations by a Hezbollah operative—identified by the initials "M.R."—to carry out a security-related operation. He was subsequently arrested as part of a five-member cell, in an encounter that sources described as having occurred by chance. Sources speaking to *Al-Hadath* also noted contradictions in the statements provided by the detainees, which prompted an expansion of the investigation to identify those responsible for tasking the group and coordinating its movements. The name of Bilal al-Asaad—a Hezbollah member from the town of Banhran in the Koura district—surfaced after it was discovered that the vehicle used by the detainees was registered in his name. *Al-Hadath* reported, citing its sources, that one of the detainees—identified by the initials "Q.A."—admitted that the five individuals had left their mobile phones at al-Asaad’s residence before setting out. The channel’s sources describe al-Asaad as the leader of the group, alleging that he oversaw military activities and recruited young men to participate in the Syrian war—a claim that contradicts his own account, in which he asserted that he was merely handling the issue of displaced persons. In a related development, according to *MTV*, the Government Commissioner to the Military Court, Judge Claude Ghanem, has summoned three Hezbollah officials, including the party’s Northern Sector chief, Sheikh Reda Ahmed. *Al-Hadath* also mentioned another Hezbollah official from the Bekaa region—identified by the initials "Th.H."—who is said to be the direct organizational superior of Bilal al-Asaad. Furthermore, *Al-Hadath* reported that documents seized during the investigation contained the name of an individual identified by the initials "A.H.," who had previously been arrested at Rafic Hariri International Airport in possession of $2.5 million in cash. Citing its own sources, the channel reported that an Iranian individual had handed the sum of money to one of the detainees prior to his arrest; however, the connection between this incident and the mission the detained group was carrying out in the north remains unclear. From a judicial standpoint, Judge Claude Ghanem has brought charges against the five detainees for offenses including the formation of armed factions without state authorization, equipping such groups with weapons and ammunition, and undermining the state’s internal security. Sources from "MTV" indicate that pressure was exerted to secure the release of the detainees, but this did not lead to any change in the detention orders. The sources further conveyed a position attributed to "Hezbollah" that no additional individuals would be permitted to appear before investigators. Meanwhile, there is talk of potentially expanding the charges and issuing arrest warrants for other individuals, should the necessary judicial grounds arise. Conversely, during the preliminary interrogations, the detainees denied planning any security-related operations against predominantly Christian villages. They claimed that their activities were intended to protect Shia villages, counter any potential Israeli landing operations, and prepare for the arrival of displaced persons from the south and the Bekaa region.

A Fourth Name Emerges in the Bsharri Case: A Hezbollah Official Close to Tony Frangieh?

Janoubia / November 20, 2026
Developments continue to unfold in the case of the five individuals detained in the highlands of Bsharri, northern Lebanon. Reports suggest that another Hezbollah figure may be summoned for questioning—a move that could broaden the scope of the investigation and open new avenues for inquiry. According to sources cited by "Al-Hadath," there is a possibility that Wael Tamer—described as the official in charge of armored units for Hezbollah in northern Lebanon—could be summoned to provide testimony regarding the so-called "Bsharri cell," though no formal judicial summons has been confirmed as of yet. Sources indicate that Tamer serves as the right-hand man to Sheikh Reda Ahmed, a Hezbollah official who is himself wanted for questioning by the Lebanese Military Court in connection with the same case. Furthermore, the sources noted a personal friendship between Wael Tamer and Member of Parliament Tony Frangieh, though no information was provided to suggest any involvement by the MP in the case or any connection to the ongoing investigation. These developments coincide with an expansion of the probe into the five detainees held in the highlands of Bsharri and Batroun, with additional Hezbollah officials—including Sheikh Reda Ahmed—being identified for potential questioning. Amid the names currently circulating and the possibility of new summonses, attention remains focused on the steps that the relevant judicial authorities might take to determine the nature of the connection between these individuals and the case—and whether the information being discussed will evolve into formal summonses as part of the investigative process. For now, the potential summoning of Wael Tamer—as suggested by media sources—remains speculative, pending an official confirmation from the Lebanese judiciary regarding any action to be taken against him.

Trump to Aoun: "Seize the Opportunity"—and the "Jaroud Cell" Case Sets the Stage for a Confrontation Between the State and Hezbollah

Janoubia / November 20, 2026
Lebanon enters its 83rd Independence Day amidst a highly complex political and security landscape, where international pressures intersect with internal divisions. The state now faces a genuine test of its ability to reclaim its sovereign decision-making power and assert its authority across its entire territory. This year, independence is constrained not only by the repercussions of the war with Israel and negotiations—now deferred until after the end of the year—but also by an unfolding internal battle over the state’s exclusive control of security and military affairs. This follows the transition of the "Jaroud Cell" case from the investigative phase to formal judicial prosecution, a development accompanied by political and media escalation from Hezbollah. As attention turns to the address by President Joseph Aoun tomorrow evening, Saturday, a message from U.S. President Donald Trump has emerged, carrying implications that go beyond a standard Independence Day greeting. Trump praised what he termed the "courageous decisions" taken by the Lebanese government, urging them to seize the current opportunity to launch a new national revival, while strengthening sovereignty, stability, and peace with neighboring states. The message signals clear support for the path currently being pursued by the Lebanese authorities, while simultaneously placing upon them the responsibility to translate these decisions into concrete, practical steps. Trump Raises the Bar for Support: An Opportunity for Lebanon
On the eve of the anniversary, the President of the Republic received congratulatory messages from several world leaders—most notably from U.S. President Donald Trump, who expressed his desire for the continued partnership between Lebanon and the United States. President Trump noted that "Lebanon has an opportunity to launch a new renaissance under your leadership, as it moves along a path toward greater sovereignty, stability, and peace with its neighbors." In his message, he wrote: "I commend the courageous decisions taken by your government, and I urge you to seize this opportunity." “I look forward to the continued partnership between our two countries as you work to chart a brighter future for generations to come.” The significance of this message lies in the link it draws between Lebanon’s national revival and the pillars of sovereignty, stability, and peace with its neighbors—implying that international support is inseparable from the state’s ability to assert the independence of its decision-making and to end the duality of authority and arms. The challenge, however, remains the government’s capacity to translate this positive climate into tangible achievements, especially as issues concerning the south, ongoing negotiations, and reconstruction remain entangled in regional and international complexities.
Aoun’s Address: Independence, Domestic Affairs, Negotiations, and the Economy
At 6:00 PM tomorrow, Saturday, President Aoun will deliver a message to the Lebanese people on the occasion of the 83rd anniversary of independence, during a ceremony to raise the Lebanese flag outside the Nahr el-Kalb tunnel. The address is expected to cover key issues of the current phase—ranging from the domestic situation and political dossiers to the trajectory of negotiations with Israel and the state of the economy. The message comes at a highly sensitive juncture; negotiations linked to the “framework agreement” have entered a period of stagnation, with a likely postponement until after the end of the year, pending greater clarity regarding the political landscape in Israel. Furthermore, discussions remain ongoing regarding the future of the international presence in the south following the conclusion of UNIFIL’s mandate, and what framework might replace it to ensure stability and the continued implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. In this context, Defense Minister Michel Mansi, during a meeting with U.S. Ambassador Michel Issa, emphasized the necessity of implementing the terms of the framework agreement—beginning with an end to daily Israeli aggressions, followed by a withdrawal. ...from Lebanese territory, thereby enabling the army to complete its deployment and extend the authority of the state. The meeting also addressed the future of UNIFIL and the requirements of the military establishment, in light of mounting security challenges.
The Jurud Cell: The judiciary moves to the indictment phase.
However, the most sensitive test for independence and sovereignty arises within the judicial sphere. Regarding the "Juroud cell" case, an official source confirmed that the data and documents gathered during the investigations provided sufficient evidence to suspect the five young men of engaging in suspicious activities, which justified the charges brought against them. The source dismissed accounts suggesting that Hezbollah had been informed in advance about the content of the communications or the judicial decision, noting that what has been circulated in certain media outlets aligned with the "Axis of Resistance" presents a distorted version of the facts. The situation has further evolved with reports that Bilal Asaad—a Hezbollah affiliate—has been summoned again by the Government Commissioner to the Military Court, Judge Claude Ghanem, to appear for a second time, following an initial release pending further investigation. Consequently, the case is no longer merely about the arrest of a group of young men in the North; it has become a litmus test for the ability of security and judicial agencies to pursue investigations free from political pressure, demonstrating that the application of the law is not contingent upon the identities or partisan affiliations of the suspects.
Hezbollah Escalates: Accusing the Judiciary and Threatening to Expand the Confrontation
In response, Hezbollah has opted for political escalation. MP Hussein Hajj Hassan dismissed the charges as baseless and lacking any legal foundation. He accused certain security and judicial entities of leaking details from the investigations and propagating fabricated narratives, warning that this case would ultimately hold certain agencies accountable. However, this discourse reveals the high level of sensitivity surrounding the shift of this matter into the judicial sphere. The party is not merely defending those who have been detained; rather, it frames the investigations as part of a political confrontation with the authorities, alleging that the "resistance" community is being targeted and pointing to the influence of external actors. Conversely, MP Fadi Karam has called for an expansion of security-related prosecutions, arguing that the arrest of this particular group does not preclude the existence of other security cells linked to Hezbollah in different regions—cells that could potentially carry out security operations, assassinations, or incite unrest. Thus, Independence Day arrives amidst a clash between two competing visions of the state: one that seeks to consolidate the authority of the judiciary and legitimate security apparatuses—ensuring a state monopoly on security decisions—and a party that rejects what it perceives as an assault on its own community and standing, preemptively leveling political accusations against state institutions. With the anticipated impact of a message from Trump, an upcoming address by Aoun, and the "Jaroud cell" case—which continues to expand both judicially and politically—Independence Day has become a test that transcends mere celebrations and ceremonies. Can the state transform its sovereignty into an effective, lived reality, or will independence remain nothing more than an annual commemoration, while actual decision-making power remains fragmented among state institutions and forces that operate outside the state’s authority?

The Judiciary Wages a Battle for Independence and Pursues Leaders of the "Northern Cell"

Nidaa Al-Watan / November 21, 2026
From one battle for independence to the next, Lebanon continues its journey through a history in which the chapters of its sovereignty remain incomplete. No sooner does it close the book on one form of tutelage than it finds itself confronting a disguised, internal occupation. Yet, regional shifts—which have dealt a crushing blow to the Iranian-led axis and are subsequently reshaping the regional balance of power—offer Lebanon a golden opportunity to break the vicious cycle of incomplete independence. In this, it mirrors Iraq’s own path toward restoring sovereignty, where the government’s deployment in Jurf al-Sakhar marked a step toward breaking the grip of Tehran-aligned factions.
Trump: Lebanon Faces a Historic Opportunity
A congratulatory telegram sent by U.S. President Donald Trump to President of the Republic Joseph Aoun, on the occasion of the 83rd anniversary of independence, reflects this trend. Trump suggested that Lebanon now stands before a horizon for a new renaissance under Aoun’s leadership—a path toward greater sovereignty, stability, and peace with its neighbors. Praising the "courageous decisions" taken by the Lebanese government, Trump urged the nation to seize this historic moment, affirming his commitment to the ongoing partnership between Washington and Beirut as they work to forge a brighter future for generations to come. A Pivotal Message from Aoun at Nahr el-Kalb
Amid the intersection of external shifts and domestic sovereign imperatives, all eyes are on the message that President Aoun is set to deliver to the Lebanese people today at 6:00 PM. The address will take place during a flag-raising ceremony on the exterior of the Nahr el-Kalb tunnel—an event organized by the municipalities of Dbayeh, Zouk el-Kharab, Aoukar, and Haret el-Ballaneh to mark Flag Day. *Nidaa Al-Watan* has learned that the President’s speech will be significant in both form and content, articulating clear stances on internal concerns—particularly in light of regional conflicts, ongoing wars, and various proposed solutions. Sources indicate that Aoun will reaffirm his steadfast position that the state should hold a monopoly on the use of arms, while also emphasizing the importance of the established framework for negotiations. Furthermore, he is expected to outline a series of approaches aimed at helping the country emerge from its spiral of crises and restoring the foundations of its sovereignty and stability.
Investigations into the "Hezbollah" Cell Expand
As the state maintains its insistence on the exclusive right of the authorities to bear arms, judicial investigations into the "Hezbollah" cell discovered in the highlands of Bsharri are progressing—putting the objective of restoring national sovereignty to a practical test. According to information obtained by *Nidaa Al-Watan*, the Government Commissioner to the Military Court has summoned four additional Hezbollah commanders for questioning. This coincides with the referral of the case—along with five individuals already in custody—to Military Investigative Judge Ghada Abu Alwan. The detainees face charges related to the formation of armed factions without state authorization, the recruitment of personnel, and the provision of individual and medium-caliber weaponry, all with the intent of undermining the authority of the state. The investigative judge is scheduled to begin questioning the detainees early next week, with the possibility that formal arrest warrants will be issued against them.
Separately, *Al-Hadath* channel, citing its own sources, identified Wael Tamer—described as the head of Hezbollah’s armored units in Northern Lebanon and the right-hand man to Sheikh Reda Ahmed (who is also wanted for questioning by the Military Court). The sources noted that Tamer maintains a personal friendship with Member of Parliament Tony Frangieh, raising the possibility that he, too, could be summoned for questioning.
Hezbollah’s Tactics of Misinformation
In response to the judiciary’s boldness and courage, Hezbollah has resorted to its customary tactics—attempting to distort the facts and cast doubt on the integrity of the investigation. The group has a long-standing record of employing misinformation, as well as political and security-related violence, in connection with various assassination cases, crimes, and the subsequent investigations into them. In this context, MP Hussein Hajj Hassan stated that the arrest of the group would not break the will of the "resistance constituency." He described the accusations as "baseless" and the arrests as "arbitrary," further accusing certain security and judicial entities of leaking information and promoting fabricated narratives under the influence of external pressures. He hinted that more facts would be revealed over time—a stance reflecting the party’s determination to shift the focus of the confrontation from the substance of the accusations to questioning the credibility of those conducting the investigation.
The State as the Sole Authority on War and Peace
Parallel to these judicial proceedings, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam defined the parameters of true independence, asserting that it cannot be fully realized without the recovery of all Lebanese territory, the end of the Israeli occupation, and the safe and dignified return of displaced persons to their towns and villages. He emphasized that safeguarding sovereignty and the freedom of national decision-making requires the state to be the sole authority—without partners or challengers—regarding war and peace. He further stressed that the state must extend its control over its entire territory through its own forces, ensuring that no arms remain outside its authority.
The "Framework" and the Future of International Deployment
As part of efforts to bolster the state and its military institutions, U.S. Ambassador Michel Issa met with Defense Minister Michel Mansi in Yarzeh. The discussions covered security developments, the progress of negotiations concerning the "framework agreement," post-UNIFIL arrangements, and the requirements of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Mansa emphasized the necessity of halting Israeli attacks and withdrawing from occupied territories, which would enable the army to complete its deployment and extend the authority of the state. Meanwhile, Issa reaffirmed continued American support for the military institution. In a symbolic gesture reflecting the significance of independence and the sacrifices made to defend it, Army Commander General Rudolph Haykal laid a wreath at the monument to fallen soldiers at the Ministry of National Defense—in the presence of the General Staff and several officers—to honor their memory and acknowledge their sacrifices for the sake of Lebanon’s unity, sovereignty, and independence.

Syria Seizes Weapons Shipment Bound for Lebanon

Riyadh – AlArabiya.net / November 20, 2026
Syrian authorities announced on Friday the seizure of a weapons shipment intended for smuggling into Lebanese territory—the latest such operation along the border between the two countries. A source within the General Intelligence Directorate revealed that the agency had intercepted the shipment, as reported by the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA). The source did not provide details regarding the type or quantity of the seized weapons, nor did they disclose the location of the seizure or the intended recipients. These developments occur as Syrian authorities continue security measures to tighten control over the border with Lebanon; in recent months, they have reported thwarting several attempts to smuggle weapons and narcotics across the frontier, noting that some of these operations were aimed at transporting arms into Lebanon. In August, the Internal Security Forces in the western province of Tartus, in coordination with the General Intelligence Directorate, thwarted an attempt to smuggle a shipment of weapons and ammunition into Lebanon. Prior to that, in July, Syrian customs officials seized 226 grenades hidden inside a vehicle heading to Lebanon via the Jdeidat Yabous border crossing in the Damascus countryside. Additionally, on Monday, the Syrian Ministry of Interior intercepted a large shipment of narcotics arriving from Lebanon that was intended to be smuggled through Syrian territory. This week in Damascus, Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab received his Lebanese counterpart, Ahmad al-Hajjar. The meeting—the first official encounter between the two—focused on strengthening security cooperation and coordination, as well as establishing mechanisms for communication between relevant agencies to bolster the security and stability of both nations. Damascus and Beirut are seeking to turn a new page in their bilateral relations following years of tension linked to the repercussions of the Syrian war—most notably the involvement of the Lebanese group Hezbollah in the fighting alongside the regime of Bashar al-Assad, a period marked by heightened friction and cross-border smuggling.

The South: Between Field Escalation and International Maneuvers—Concerns Over the Post-UNIFIL Phase and the Case of the Detainees
Janoubia / November 20, 2026
Political, security, and judicial developments in Lebanon are accelerating. International efforts are underway to devise a new UN framework for the period following the conclusion of the UNIFIL mission, with various international actors emphasizing the necessity of consolidating all arms under the authority of the state. This comes against the backdrop of ongoing Israeli escalation in the south and the unfolding case of the five young men currently in detention. On the diplomatic front, sources informed the television channel *Al-Jadeed* that the United States is working on a new UN resolution that would maintain a civilian presence in the south after the UNIFIL mission ends, without the continued deployment of international troops on the ground. According to the channel, the absence of an effective international force has sparked concerns in Lebanon that an Israeli presence in the south could become entrenched, eventually hardening into a *fait accompli*. In this context, information obtained by "Al-Jadeed" indicates that Walz—along with France’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Jérôme Bonnafont—is holding meetings to prepare for a UN resolution that would lay the groundwork for a gradual withdrawal of UNIFIL forces from southern Lebanon, pending the development of an alternative framework and agreement on the mechanisms for its implementation. Parallel to these efforts, a diplomatic source told "Al-Jadeed" that Lebanon has received a firm, non-negotiable international message: arms must be consolidated exclusively under the authority of the Lebanese state, and Hezbollah must transition into a purely political entity. The source warned that failure to achieve this would make an escalation inevitable. Meanwhile, "Al-Jadeed" reports that Hezbollah is closely monitoring upcoming judicial developments regarding the five individuals in custody, in order to determine its own stance on the matter. On the legal front, the defense counsel for the five detainees denied reports that they were questioned about weapons caches or armed groups, asserting that no such topics have appeared in the investigations or official interrogation records. He clarified that the men were not arrested by security forces; rather, they arrived voluntarily at the gendarmerie station in their own vehicle. Conversely, a judicial source cited by the channel noted contradictions in the detainees' statements, pointing out that they initially admitted that mobile phones had been hidden at the home of Bilal Asaad, only to later claim that they did not possess any mobile phones at all. On the ground, the south witnessed a fresh Israeli escalation as two Israeli airstrikes targeted the outskirts of the town of Hadatha, in the Bint Jbeil District; reports indicated that one of the missiles failed to detonate. Additionally, the towns of Sarbine and Bani Hayyan were subjected to Israeli artillery shelling, coinciding with low-altitude flights by warplanes over the southern region. Footage has circulated documenting several consecutive explosions in the town of Hadatha, occurring as new airstrikes hit the area.

Washington Pushes for a Force to Monitor Disarmament Across Lebanon—What Is the Stance of Beirut and the "Duo"?

Lara Yazbek / Al-Markazia / November 20, 2026
Al-Markazia – As discussions begin next week at the UN Security Council regarding the force that will replace UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, no clear scenario has yet emerged concerning its structure or mandate. Instead, a multitude of press reports offer various scenarios—only for them to gain brief traction before vanishing. For instance, the idea of ​​replicating the Sinai model—which had gained some momentum just days ago—has been set aside in favor of a proposal for a force of 1,000 to 3,000 personnel, drawn from countries primarily approved by the United States. This force would include both military personnel and civilian experts; notably, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, speaking from Paris following a meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron, alluded to a "civilian force." With reports suggesting that the United States itself might participate—a first for the southern region—through the inclusion of experts, supervisors, technicians, and military personnel, it appears likely that this force will be established via a UN Security Council resolution. While rooted in Resolution 1701, the mandate would also encompass the "Framework Agreement." According to well-informed political sources speaking to Al-Markazia, the force’s mandate is the most critical aspect. While Washington accommodated Beirut’s insistence on maintaining Resolution 1701, it will not compromise on the monitoring of the Framework Agreement’s implementation. Washington intends for this force to play a robust role in overseeing the proper execution of the agreement’s provisions—specifically, the removal of Hezbollah’s armed presence from villages in the south, which stands as its primary objective in Lebanon. According to sources, the United States is pushing for the mandate of this force to extend beyond the south—and specifically beyond the area south of the Litani River—to encompass all of Lebanon. The objective is to closely monitor the disarmament process, which is intended to be carried out by the Lebanese Armed Forces. It is worth noting that Washington is currently coordinating with Saudi Arabia and France at the UN Security Council; it specifically seeks Paris’s support for its vision, in exchange for France’s inclusion in the prospective UN force. But what if a stringent resolution is adopted that covers the entirety of Lebanon? How would the official Lebanese state—and, more importantly, the "Shiite duo" (Hezbollah and the Amal Movement), who reject even the inclusion of this framework within the scope of UN Resolution 1701—respond? Furthermore, could such a resolution be met with a Russian or Chinese veto, given that U.S. relations with both nations currently appear stable and robust?

Jurf al-Sakhr under the control of the Iraqi state... The repercussions of the confrontation with Iran reach Lebanon

Najwa Abi Haidar / Al-Markaziya / November 20, 2026
Al-Markaziya – The Iraqi government is moving to translate its policy of consolidating arms under state control into concrete, on-the-ground measures targeting areas held by pro-Iranian armed factions. This is occurring alongside tighter border controls with Tehran, driven by mounting U.S. pressure to halt smuggling and regulate the flow of funds and weaponry. Developments in Jurf al-Sakhr are particularly significant, as the area serves as a security stronghold for *Kata'ib Hezbollah*. Bringing it under the authority of the central government could have regional implications, extending as far as Lebanon. Iraqi authorities have announced the opening of a command headquarters in Jurf al-Sakhr, located in Babil Governorate—acting on orders from the Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces—and have confirmed that the facility has begun its operations. The headquarters will oversee the deployment of security and military forces and coordinate with the leaderships of the Babil, Karbala, and Anbar governorates. The Ministry of Interior also announced the reopening of bridges and roads in the area that had previously been closed, in order to facilitate movement. This move follows an emergency security meeting—during which a report on the smuggling of oil and petroleum products was presented—and the issuance of an ultimatum for the Kata'ib Hezbollah brigades to withdraw from the area before the entry of Iraqi forces. These measures are part of Baghdad’s broader efforts to secure its 1,458-kilometer border with Iran; the government has closed several border crossings, leaving only two operational, one of which is located in the Kurdistan Region. This comes amid pressure exerted by U.S. President Donald Trump on Al-Zaydi during his visit to New York, with Trump demanding tighter border control and the prevention of smuggling. The move has sparked tension with Tehran—despite a subsequent visit there by Al-Zaydi—amid U.S. allegations that gaps in border security are allowing funds and weapons to transit through Iraqi territory. Diplomatic sources told "Al-Markaziyah" that these developments carry significance extending beyond just Iraq-Iran relations, given suspicions that the Iraq-Syria border is being used as a conduit for transferring Iranian funds and supplies to its allies, most notably Hezbollah in Lebanon. Consequently, tightening oversight in this area is not limited to its implications for Iraq and Iran; it also affects Iran’s regional network of supply and influence. In this context, sources point to broader shifts in the region—including a reconfiguration of demographics, influence, and deployment across Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—and raise questions regarding reports of the relocation of Shiites from Lebanon to Iraq, a move aimed at keeping communication lines with Iran open. Meanwhile, sources suggest that the postponement of Al-Zaidi’s visit to Beirut—originally expected two days ago—was driven by tensions between Iraq and Iran. It is also suggested that Baghdad might act as a mediator between Beirut and Tehran, at a time when issues concerning arms, borders, and the future of Iranian influence have become deeply intertwined. According to the sources, this initiative by Al-Zaidi enjoys international support, as it aligns with efforts to consolidate control over arms within the state. However, the true test lies in the government’s ability to translate security decisions into a sustainable reality, without sliding into an internal confrontation with armed factions. The battle for Jurf al-Sakhr, much like the battle over the borders, transcends mere transient security measures; it touches upon the future of the Iraqi state and the extent of militia influence in the region.

Independence Amidst Challenges: Trump Tells Lebanon to Seize the Opportunity
US Commends Government Decisions; Aoun to Deliver Comprehensive Address Tomorrow Evening
Al-Juroud Cell: Sufficient Evidence for Prosecution; Second Summons Issued; Hezbollah Issues a Warning

Al-Markaziya / November 20, 2026
Lebanon enters the holiday period for its 83rd Independence Day burdened by political and security challenges that transcend the symbolic nature of the occasion. Negotiations with Israel remain suspended until the end of the year, pending clarity on the composition of the government in Tel Aviv, while international consultations continue regarding the framework for the period following the conclusion of UNIFIL’s mission in the south. As attention turns toward the address to be delivered by the President of the Republic on the eve of the holiday, a message from US President Donald Trump carried notable political signals—praising the "courageous decisions" taken by the Lebanese government and urging the nation to seize the available opportunity to launch a new revival, strengthen sovereignty and stability, and foster peace with its neighbors.
Independence Day Address: At 6:00 PM tomorrow, Saturday, the President of the Republic will deliver a message to the Lebanese people on the 83rd anniversary of independence. The address will take place during a flag-raising ceremony on the exterior of the Nahr el-Kalb tunnel—an event organized by the municipalities of Dbayeh, Zouq el-Kharab, Aoukar, and Haret el-Ballaneh to mark Flag Day. Sources familiar with the matter indicated to "Al-Markaziya" that the speech—currently in preparation—will cover key contemporary issues, ranging from the domestic situation and its various challenges to the status of negotiations and the state of the economy. Trump’s Telegram: On the eve of the anniversary, the President of the Republic received congratulatory telegrams from several world leaders, most notably from U.S. President Donald Trump. President Trump expressed his desire for the continued partnership between Lebanon and the United States, noting that "Lebanon has an opportunity to launch a new renaissance under your leadership, as it moves along a path toward greater sovereignty, stability, and peace with its neighbors." In his telegram, he wrote: "I commend the courageous decisions taken by your government, and I urge you to seize this opportunity." "I look forward to the continued partnership between our two countries, as you work to chart a brighter future for generations to come."
Wreaths for the Martyrs: For his part, the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, General Joseph Aoun, laid a wreath at the monument to the army’s martyrs at the Ministry of National Defense. The ceremony was attended by members of the General Staff and several officers, in honor of the martyrs' pure souls and in recognition of their immense sacrifices to preserve Lebanon’s unity, sovereignty, and independence.
Issa Visits Mansi: In a visit to mark Independence Day, the Minister of National Defense, Maurice Sleiman Mansi, received the United States Ambassador to Lebanon, Michel Issa, at his office in Yarze. The discussion covered political and security developments in Lebanon and the region, the progress of the tripartite meetings and negotiations related to the "framework agreement," and the future of UNIFIL following the expiration of its current mandate, including proposed arrangements for the next phase. The visit of the U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Mike Waltz, to Lebanon—and the topics addressed during that visit—were also discussed. Mansi emphasized "the necessity of implementing the terms of the framework agreement, starting with an end to daily Israeli aggressions, followed by a withdrawal from Lebanese territory, which would enable the Lebanese Armed Forces to complete their deployment and extend the state’s authority over its entire territory." He underscored "the importance of making the necessary efforts to stabilize the situation and avoid further escalation, in a manner that preserves Lebanon’s rights and safeguards its sovereignty." According to a statement from Mansi’s office, the two sides also addressed "the tasks currently being carried out by the Lebanese Armed Forces, their role at this critical juncture, and the requirements needed to enable them to continue fulfilling their responsibilities." ...in light of the current security developments." Mansi expressed his "appreciation for the American aid provided to Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces," emphasizing "the importance of continued support for the military institution, given the challenges it faces."
Sufficient evidence and a distorted account: On the judicial front, an official source confirmed to "Al-Markaziya" that the narrative promoted by certain media outlets aligned with the "Axis of Resistance"—regarding the circumstances surrounding the arrest of a cell in the Jurud (border highlands) and the filing of charges against five young men affiliated with Hezbollah—presents a completely distorted version of the facts. The source explained that security and judicial officials informed the President of the Republic and General Joseph Aoun that, upon consolidating the available information—particularly after analyzing documents seized from the five suspects—sufficient evidence emerged to warrant the charges. The content of these documents provided clear grounds to proceed with formal accusations, prompting security and judicial officials to take the necessary legal steps and inform President Aoun that the case file contained enough evidence to justify this action. The source stressed that reports claiming Hezbollah had been briefed on the nature of the communications and the subsequent decision are entirely untrue.
A second summons: In a related development, information indicates that the Government Commissioner to the Military Court, Judge Claude Ghanem, has re-summoned Bilal Asaad—an individual affiliated with Hezbollah—in connection with the case of the five arrested men. Asaad is now required to appear before the judge for a second time, having previously been released pending further investigation.
Yielding to Pressure: In this context, MP Hussein Hajj Hassan, a member of the "Loyalty to the Resistance" bloc, stated that "betting on the disintegration of the Resistance’s support base or the weakening of its popular presence is a delusional gamble." He asserted that "the arrest of a group of young men will not break the will of the Resistance’s community," adding that these individuals are being subjected to "arbitrary detention, injustice, and baseless allegations." He emphasized that "further facts regarding this case will be revealed in due course." In a statement, he declared that the charges brought against them by the Government Commissioner to the Military Court are "false and lack any legal basis," constituting "a clear assault on the rights and dignity of citizens." He added: "This unacceptable and condemned indictment—following arbitrary arrests and the deliberate leaking of investigative details to the media—along with the promotion of fabricated, misleading narratives, false news, and concocted events by certain high-ranking security and judicial officials, reflects a reckless and irresponsible approach to a highly sensitive matter. This sets a dangerous precedent that demands accountability from the authorities and specific security and judicial bodies regarding the motives behind these actions, and the extent to which they have succumbed to external pressures and interference—at the expense of the national interest, judicial independence, national sovereignty, and the rights of citizens."
Expanding Prosecutions: Conversely, MP Fadi Karam, a member of the "Strong Republic" bloc, remarked in a radio interview that "security cells affiliated with Hezbollah remain present across various Lebanese regions, standing ready to carry out security operations, assassinations, or incite unrest whenever..." ...the issuance of a decision to that effect," noting that "this state of readiness has existed for years." He explained that "the arrest of the group—comprising five young men—in the Batroun, Bsharri, and Koura districts does not signify the end of the party’s security and military project," pointing to "the possibility that other such groups exist in various regions, including Beirut." He stressed "the need for the state to expand its pursuit of these groups and dismantle Hezbollah’s security and military infrastructure across all Lebanese territory," warning that "any leniency regarding this matter threatens internal stability."
Fires and Shelling: On the ground, the Israeli army ignited fires within the "Scout City" (a scout camp/facility) on the eastern outskirts of the town of Zoutar al-Sharqiya; plumes of smoke were seen rising from the area. Meanwhile, the outskirts of the town of Kfar Tebnit were subjected to intermittent artillery fire. Furthermore, an Israeli drone has been intermittently dropping explosive materials toward homes on the outskirts of the town of Hadatha, in the Bint Jbeil District, causing damage and fires. Later in the afternoon, Israeli artillery targeted the outskirts of Hadatha. Heavy drone activity was also reported over the Tyre (Sour) region.
Finger on the Trigger: In regional news, Brigadier General Ali Balali, an advisor to the commander of the Aerospace Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), affirmed that the Iranian armed forces are in a state of full alert and readiness, stating that "their fingers are on the trigger." Balali added that the contradictory reports being circulated by what he termed "the enemy" are intended to keep the Iranian public in a state of uncertainty. He noted that the Iranian government has taken appropriate measures, particularly regarding... ...relates to maintaining the general standard of living.
Attack and opposition: Meanwhile, the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz* reported that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to push for the possibility of launching an attack on Iran—either in cooperation with the United States or, at the very least, with its tacit approval. The newspaper added that the Chief of the General Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces, Eyal Zamir, opposes an attack on Iran, arguing that while the threat posed by the country is real, it is not imminent.

Lebanon’s Explosives Case Highlights the Judicial Obstacles to Disarming Hezbollah
Hanin Ghaddar/The Washington Institute/November 20, 2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/11/159480/
Unless Washington makes judicial reform and credible enforcement part of its engagement with Beirut, government decisions to disarm and dismantle Hezbollah will remain vulnerable to obstruction and coercion.
The seizure of around 500 kilograms of explosives from a vehicle in Dahr al-Baidar last month has rekindled the perennial question of who controls weapons in Lebanon: Hezbollah or the state. The Internal Security Forces (ISF) intercepted the cargo, but the challenge became apparent when the case reached the Permanent Military Court, a body with a long track record of shielding Hezbollah from accountability (see below). Justice Minister Adel Nassar called for referring the case to the Judicial Council—the country’s highest court for national security crimes—but the cabinet postponed the decision amid political pressure and threats from Hezbollah.
At stake are several of Lebanon’s most serious legal and security issues. Hezbollah is looking to protect the institutional influence and freedom of movement it needs to continue rebuilding its depleted military arsenal and domestic legitimacy. For the government, the case is testing its willingness to assert sovereignty, enforce its decisions, fulfill its commitments under the U.S.-brokered Trilateral Framework agreement with Israel, and, not least, protect the populace—a concern that should not be overlooked given that Hezbollah has used similar C-4 explosives in the past to assassinate Lebanese politicians and journalists.
Hezbollah Doubles Down
So far, the group’s direct challenge to state authority seems to be working. On November 5, a senior Hezbollah delegation visited Beirut’s Palace of Justice to convey a pointed message to Judge Ahmad Rami al-Hajj, the prosecutor-general of the Court of Cassation. Declaring that the seized explosives belonged to their group and were intended for operations against Israel, they argued that any conviction in the case would amount to “cutting off the hand of the resistance,” echoing previous statements by one of Hezbollah’s members of parliament. It was bad enough that the country’s highest-ranking prosecutor even received a delegation linked to a crime, but Judge Hajj compounded the transgression by telling a reporter on November 9 that lack of evidence was the reason why terrorism charges had not been filed against the suspects—despite receiving clear evidence straight from the terrorist’s mouth, so to speak.
The same day that Hajj was hosting Hezbollah members in his chambers, the United States released a joint statement with Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom calling for an independent investigation into the explosives seizure. (France was reportedly invited to join but declined.) This followed the Military Court’s October 30 decision to charge thirteen individuals with offenses related to state security and unauthorized weapons transportation. Yet only two of the suspects—Haitham Amhaz and Ali al-Kurdi—were detained, even though all thirteen were involved in transporting a massive cargo of deadly materials from the Beqa Valley to the southern suburbs of the capital. Two weeks later, Military Court investigators have yet to publicly announce who authorized the delivery or controlled the network that supplied it, despite Hezbollah’s very public claims of ownership.
Indeed, the group’s statements alone give investigators plausible reason not only to move the case forward and detain the suspects who remain free, but also to hold Hezbollah’s leadership responsible. This will only be possible if the case is referred to the Judicial Council, as the joint statement implied in calling for a clear path toward accountability. Such a referral requires a cabinet decree placing the alleged offenses within the jurisdiction of this special national security court. On October 22, however, the cabinet postponed the referral decision, prompting ministers from the Lebanese Forces party to walk out of the meeting. And because cabinet officials have not announced a date for their next meeting on the case, it could remain under the biased Military Court indefinitely.
Charging thirteen Hezbollah members with serious crimes was a welcome step, but filing charges is not enough—true accountability requires establishing who organized the explosives delivery and enforcing legal consequences. The need for urgent action intensified when the ISF arrested five more Hezbollah members on November 10. According to the ISF’s Information Branch, these suspects were found with documents that mentioned sniper weapons and listed locations across the country’s Christian-populated northern districts, pointing to further internal security threats.
Why the Judicial Council Is a Better Option
The Military Court’s inability to properly handle these types of cases can be traced back to the post-civil war period, when the subordination of Lebanese institutions to Syria’s Assad regime greatly weakened judicial credibility and independence. The Military Court in particular became an instrument for repressing journalists, political activists, and other civilians while shielding Assad’s local allies from accountability.
Hezbollah inherited this instrument when Syria withdrew from Lebanon in 2005. Since then, not a single member of the group has been held accountable for acts of terrorism, assassinations, street violence, bombings, or other threats against national security, including the devastating Beirut port explosion in 2020.
This judicial malpractice has been no less evident in 2026. On March 9, one week after the government declared Hezbollah’s military and security activities illegal, the Military Court released three of the group’s members. All three had been convicted of illegally possessing and transporting weapons, and all three cited their Hezbollah membership when asked to explain why they were transporting the weapons. Yet each received a paltry fine of 900,000 Lebanese pounds—approximately $10.
On March 16, four additional Hezbollah members faced charges after being arrested at army checkpoints. Two were transporting 122-millimeter rockets, while the others possessed rifles and pistols. All four were released in April.
The thirteen suspects in the Dahr al-Baidar investigation face even more serious allegations, and Hezbollah has openly acknowledged ownership of the seized explosives. Yet the case will go nowhere if it remains within the same military judicial system that has repeatedly imposed laughable penalties—or no penalties at all—on the group’s members.
Unlike the Military Court, the Judicial Council consists of senior civilian judges and was specifically created to prosecute serious national security cases. Although a cabinet referral to the council would not guarantee independence or accountability, it would at least place the case outside the deeply compromised military tribunal system.
Policy Recommendations
The Dahr al-Baidar case demonstrates that Lebanese authorities have the capacity and authority to intercept weapons linked to Hezbollah and initiate criminal proceedings. The state must now prove that it can bring those responsible before a competent court, convict them of serious crimes, and enforce these judgments. Disarmament must be measured not just by weapons seizures, but by what happens to those who deliver, receive, and claim ownership of those weapons. Even if the government and armed forces start dismantling Hezbollah’s infrastructure and arsenal in earnest, such gains will not mean much in the long term if the group can keep evading meaningful legal consequences by influencing or coercing judges and prosecutors. More immediately, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and the cabinet risk reinforcing Hezbollah’s pattern of political pressure and eroding the government’s credibility at home and abroad if they keep delaying referral of the explosives case to the Judicial Council. Judicial reform must therefore be regarded as a vital part of the disarmament effort.
Toward that end, Washington should pair its support for Lebanon’s government, military, and security institutions with greater attention to the judiciary, particularly the Military Court. This includes the following steps:
Press Beirut to refer the Dahr al-Baidar case to the Judicial Council. The November 5 joint statement was a good start, but it needs to be followed up with clear communications from Washington and its partners about the consequences of imposing minimal or no penalties on those involved in the explosives delivery. Toward that end, they should push for an independent process before civilian judges, with accountability based on evidence.
Use U.S. government assistance as leverage to push for judicial reform and end military trials of civilians. Washington should incorporate measurable judicial reform benchmarks into its assistance framework for Lebanon, including restrictions on the Military Court’s jurisdiction over civilians, stronger safeguards against political interference, and greater transparency in judicial appointments and sentencing. The military court is a beneficiary of U.S. assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces, so officials can leverage that funding to advance accountability.
Use targeted sanctions against Lebanese officials who obstruct justice. The U.S. Treasury and State Departments should review any judges or other individuals suspected of serious corruption or interference in criminal proceedings, especially in cases involving the seizure of illegal weapons.
Coordinate diplomatic and financial support to promote judicial independence. Washington should work with European partners and international judicial reform organizations to support transparent appointments, independent procedures, and stronger civilian criminal courts in Lebanon. Relatedly, by establishing a public framework for weapons-related cases, Beirut could make the data on such prosecutions more transparent and help authorities in Lebanon and abroad assess whether the law is being applied consistently across all cases.
Increase assistance to the ISF, mainly its Information Branch. So far, most of the arrests of Hezbollah members and illegal weapons seizures have been conducted by the ISF, which is showing more commitment to disarmament than any other security institution in Lebanon. Additional assistance and vocal support to ISF officers could further their mission and help protect them against intimidation by Hezbollah.
**Hanin Ghaddar is the Friedmann Senior Fellow in The Washington Institute’s Rubin Program on Arab Politics.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on November 20-21/2026 (Some of the News reports below are translated from Arabic by AI)
Trump praises Al-Zaidi: “He is able to do what he wants.”
Riyadh - Al Arabiya.net/November 20, 2026
As tensions escalated between the Iraqi government and the Hezbollah Brigades in the Jurf al-Sakhar region, US President Donald Trump considered Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi “strong and capable of implementing what he wants.” In response to a question about Al-Zaidi’s ability to subject the militias to state control, during a press conference on Friday, Trump said that the Iraqi Prime Minister is a “strong man,” adding: “He is my friend... I believe that when he wants to do something, he is able to implement it.” He also indicated that he had previously supported Al-Zaidi during the elections, considering that he "achieved a major surprise victory after supporting him." Trump did not directly address the future of the armed factions or how to deal with their weapons, nor did he clarify whether he expected the Iraqi government to take specific steps to subject them to state authority. Trump's statements came at a time when the Zaidi government is facing a difficult test regarding the issue of armed factions, in light of its efforts to confine weapons to the state, amid fears that the confrontation with pro-Iranian groups will lead to security and political unrest inside the country. On Friday, the Jurf al-Sakhar area, also known as “Jurf al-Nasr,” witnessed the start of the deployment of Iraqi security forces as part of arrangements to re-establish state authority over the region, which had been under the influence of the Hezbollah Brigades for more than 12 years.
The "control headquarters", composed of several units from the army, federal police, and oil police, whose formation was announced yesterday, Thursday, entered the area that witnessed high tension during the recent period between Al-Zaydi and the Hezbollah Brigades, and the security forces began to spread in all locations, with the centers being taken over from Hezbollah. Al-Zaidi stressed, during a speech addressed to the forces deployed in the region, that Jurf al-Sakhar represents a starting point for imposing state authority over all Iraqi territory and unifying the armed forces under one command, stressing that the current stage is based on “containment, not exclusion.” He said: “We are not fighting a battle... I advise you to exercise self-restraint and wisdom, as all those there are your brothers,” stressing that the decision to limit weapons to the state is “fixed, and there are no weapons outside the authority of the state.” These developments came after the Zaidi government gave Kataib Hezbollah until today to leave Jurf al-Sakhar, following the dismissal of 9 administrative officials and security leaders on the grounds of involvement with this armed faction in smuggling oil from the region. It is noteworthy that Al-Zaidi, who is considered a novice in the world of politics, had taken a decision that was considered “bold” since he assumed the presidency of the government to restrict weapons to the state, in a country that was accustomed to seeing several armed factions.
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Iraqi Forces Enter Jurf al-Sakhr After 12 Years of Control by "Kata'ib Hezbollah"—Al-Zaidi: No Arms Outside State Authority
Janoubiya / November 20, 2026
On Friday, the Jurf al-Sakhr area, south of Baghdad, witnessed a significant security and political development as joint Iraqi forces entered the territory—long considered a primary stronghold of the Iranian-backed "Kata'ib Hezbollah." The entry followed a settlement that averted an armed confrontation between the two sides. Prime Minister Ali Falih al-Zaidi declared that this move marks the beginning of asserting state authority across all Iraqi territory. In an address to the security forces deployed in Jurf al-Sakhr, Al-Zaidi stated, "From Jurf al-Nasr [Victory Bank—a name sometimes used for the area], we begin the process of imposing state authority over the entirety of Iraqi land," reaffirming his government’s firm stance against the presence of any weaponry outside the control of the state. He urged the forces to exercise restraint and wisdom, telling them, "I advise you to show restraint and wisdom, as we are not engaged in a battle." Al-Zaidi’s remarks followed the entry of joint forces into the area on Friday morning—an unprecedented development since Jurf al-Sakhr was recaptured from the "Islamic State" (ISIS) in 2014. In the years that followed, the area had become a closed zone under the influence of "Kata'ib Hezbollah," with a large number of its original inhabitants still barred from returning. The operation commenced at 6:00 AM with the establishment of a unified security command headquarters under the leadership of Lieutenant General Ahmed Hatem Hamid, involving units from the Iraqi Army, the Federal Police, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and the Energy Police. The forces tasked with the deployment include an army brigade, a Federal Police brigade, two Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) brigades, and an Energy Police regiment assigned to protect oil pipelines. The Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army, General Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah, arrived in the area to oversee the redeployment. Sabah al-Numan, spokesperson for the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, stated that the rotation of units is proceeding smoothly. Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Saad Maan confirmed that the Energy Police have begun taking over the protection of the oil pipeline, describing the redeployment as a "genuine step toward the full realization of sovereignty." The measures also include reopening the main road between al-Fadhiliya and Karbala to civilian vehicles—excluding transport trucks—starting at 6:00 AM on Saturday. Iraqi media outlets even reported that the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) was taken aback by what they discovered in the orchards of Jurf al-Sakhar following an airborne operation (see video below the article)—though a security source told Al Arabiya that "CTS forces did not conduct any airborne operations inside the Jurf al-Sakhar area," following the circulation of footage that sparked tension on social media. However, this new deployment does not mean that the "Kata'ib Hezbollah" faction has completely withdrawn from the area. The website "Ultra Iraq," citing political sources, reported that the withdrawal of the faction's members will be gradual—potentially spanning several months—and that the current operation is being carried out in coordination with the group as part of a rotation of the units stationed on the ground. The entry of these forces follows days of escalating tension between the Al-Kadhimi government and "Kata'ib Hezbollah," prompted by investigations into suspected oil smuggling from Jurf al-Sakhar. The government had given the faction a deadline to evacuate the area and hand over responsibility for its security, while officials from the factions warned against any attempt to enter by force.
On November 17, the faction’s military spokesperson, Abu Talib al-Saidi, declared that government forces would only enter the area "over our dead bodies." However, political communications intensified over the following days—involving leaders from the "Coordination Framework" and the Popular Mobilization Forces—eventually leading to a settlement that provided for the replacement of the forces currently in the area and the deployment of joint units.
Reuters, citing three Iraqi security officials, reported that the agreement aims to diminish the influence of "Kata'ib Hezbollah" without engaging in a military confrontation. The Iranian role in this settlement became apparent with the arrival of Esmail Qaani, commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, in Baghdad last Monday. Iraqi political sources told Reuters that Qaani participated in efforts to contain the crisis, holding talks with Kata'ib Hezbollah Secretary-General Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi and various Shiite political leaders, including Hadi al-Amiri. On November 19, Kata'ib Hezbollah announced that the meeting between al-Hamidawi and Qaani yielded "positive" results, which paved the way for de-escalation measures and the deployment of government forces. The current escalation was triggered by government investigations into suspected tampering with oil pipelines and the existence of illegal facilities in the Jurf al-Sakhar area. Iraqi officials accused Kata'ib Hezbollah of being linked to a network involved in smuggling state-owned oil—an operation that security sources, speaking to Reuters, estimated to be worth hundreds of millions of dollars. The investigations led to the removal of nine security and oil sector officials from their posts, while Al-Zaidi decided to refer the case concerning the illegal interference with oil pipelines to the judiciary. In response, Kata'ib Hezbollah denied any involvement in oil smuggling, accusing the government of using the issue to exert pressure and disarm the group—describing the situation as the "greatest act of political and security-related extortion" they have faced. As a field measure linked to the investigation, the Energy Police began securing a section of the oil pipeline that runs through Jurf al-Sakhar on Friday. The Director of the Energy Police, Lieutenant General Hamid al-Husseini, revealed that the plan involves securing approximately five kilometers of the pipeline, deploying security personnel at close intervals, and implementing the use of thermal cameras to prevent unauthorized access or tampering. The significance of Jurf al-Sakhar extends beyond issues of weaponry and oil; it also concerns the local population, many of whom were displaced during the 2014 battles against ISIS and have been unable to return. Estimates suggest that the number of displaced persons from the area and its surroundings reaches approximately 200,000. Situated in a strategic location that connects the governorates of Babil, Anbar, and Karbala with the outskirts of Baghdad, the sub-district has remained under strict security restrictions—amidst accusations that the factions controlling the area are preventing residents from reclaiming their homes and lands. The commander of the new security headquarters announced that life would gradually return to Jurf al-Sakhar, while military spokesperson Sabah al-Nuaman confirmed that the next phase will involve developing plans to restore services and infrastructure, paving the way for the residents' return.
However, the authorities have yet to announce a binding timeline for the return of the displaced or a clear mechanism for them to recover their property.
Politically, the crisis extends beyond the borders of Babil Governorate; it is part of Prime Minister [Mustafa] al-Kadhimi’s efforts to consolidate arms under state control and strengthen the authority of official institutions over areas currently under the influence of various factions. The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump is pressuring Baghdad to disarm groups linked to Iran—particularly following attacks by Iraqi factions on U.S. interests and forces in the region since the onset of tensions with Iran last February. Meanwhile, Tehran maintains close ties with several Iraqi factions, most notably Kata'ib Hezbollah, meaning any direct confrontation with them would carry repercussions extending well beyond Iraq’s borders.
The recent settlement points to an attempt to avoid a clash by introducing government forces and rotating the units in control of the territory, rather than mandating an immediate and total withdrawal of all faction members. In doing so, Baghdad has succeeded in establishing a security presence in an area that had remained outside direct government control for over a decade. However, the real test begins now that the deployment has taken place: will military command, oil resources, infrastructure, and the return of the local population truly fall under the authority of state institutions—or will the settlement amount to little more than a reshuffling of forces, with the factions’ de facto influence remaining intact? The answer depends on the implementation phases of the agreement, the withdrawal of the previous units, the findings of investigations into oil smuggling, and the government’s ability to consolidate these measures without triggering a return to military tension.

Jurf al-Sakhr Opens the Gateway to Restoring Iraqi Sovereignty

Nidaa al-Watan / November 21, 2026
From Jurf al-Sakhr—the most prominent stronghold of the Iraqi "Kata'ib Hezbollah" for over a decade—Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has chosen to address one of the most sensitive political and security issues in Iraq: restoring state authority over areas under the influence of Iran-aligned militias and ending the duality of military decision-making. The deployment of government forces in the area yesterday marks a pivotal moment in the battle to reclaim Iraqi sovereignty. It puts to the test the state’s ability to wrest control over its own security and military affairs from the grip of militias linked to Iran—in a country exhausted by conflicting loyalties, where a multiplicity of power centers has drained the state’s authority and prestige. In his address to the deployed forces, al-Zaidi encapsulated the essence of this approach, asserting: "There shall be no arms outside the authority of the state; there shall be no weapons other than Iraq’s own; there shall be no decisions other than Iraq’s own; and no flag shall fly higher than the flag of Iraq." Mindful of the risks of sliding into internal conflict, he tempered his firm stance with a call for "restraint and wisdom," emphasizing that the objective is containment rather than exclusion, with all parties brought under a single military command and the rule of law. In doing so, he established a framework aimed at ending the military autonomy of these militias, without triggering a confrontation that could jeopardize internal stability. Units from the Army, the Federal Police, and the Energy Police—with the participation of elements from the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—have begun assuming security responsibilities under the oversight of a "command headquarters" in Jurf al-Sakhr, which will be managed by the Federal Police. The entry of government forces coincided with the expiration—yesterday—of the deadline Al-Zaidi had given to the "Hezbollah Brigades" (Kata'ib Hezbollah) to withdraw from the area. The measures include replacing military units according to a set timeline, reopening roads, and securing oil pipelines—steps taken following government investigations that uncovered large-scale oil smuggling operations in which the "Hezbollah Brigades" were implicated. However, the consolidation of state authority on the ground remains contingent upon adherence to these understandings and the government's ability to translate its military deployment into effective security control. While the newspaper *Asharq Al-Awsat*—citing Iraqi security and political sources—reported a gradual, month-long withdrawal of the "Brigades'" personnel, a source within the militia told Agence France-Presse (AFP) that they would not be leaving the area. This discrepancy raises a fundamental question regarding the nature of the settlement: will it lead to the transfer of full security authority to legitimate state institutions, or will it merely result in the reorganization of the armed presence under an official veneer, while preserving the existing balance of power?
In this context, the role played by Esmail Qaani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force, in mediating between the Iraqi government and the "Hezbollah Brigades" to avert a clash—as reported by AFP and Reuters, citing Iraqi sources—is significant. Tehran’s intervention to contain the tension underscores its continued influence over the militias and its capacity to shape their decisions. It also suggests that Tehran opted to accommodate Al-Zaidi’s assertive move rather than engage in a confrontation with his government, all while seeking to safeguard its own interests within the new security arrangements. Here lies the most striking paradox: the process of restoring Iraqi sovereignty—at its very first critical juncture—hinges on an understanding with the very external power to which the militias (which the state seeks to bring under its authority) are linked. Does this mediation pave the way for a decline in Iranian influence, or does it merely grant Tehran an opportunity to reorganize that influence with minimal losses, pending greater clarity regarding the regional balance of power? This equation becomes more complicated under the weight of mounting American and Gulf pressure on Baghdad, after attacks were launched from Iraqi territory targeting American interests and facilities in the Gulf states during the recent war, revealing the ability of the militias to involve the country in conflicts that exceed the will of its constitutional institutions. Iraq does not have the luxury of opposing Washington and the Gulf capitals at this sensitive time, and it is one of the economies most affected by the war, after the disruption of its oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz caused huge losses and a sharp decline in revenues. Thus, arms control has also become linked to Baghdad's ability to protect its economic interests and regain the confidence of its regional and international partners. The challenge remains whether the Jurf al-Sakhar experience can be generalized to other regions where the militias enjoy broad military and economic influence, especially as June 2027 approaches, the date set by Al-Zaidi to confine weapons to the state. The Prime Minister had pledged to achieve this goal by the end of the aforementioned month, so that all armed formations would be subject to the authority of the official military and security institutions, and the presence of any weapons outside their framework throughout Iraqi territory would end. Its success will be measured by its ability to transform the Jurf al-Sakhar settlement into a comprehensive national approach that does not exclude any faction or region. Iran's position will remain a decisive factor in determining the course of these efforts, between accepting the decline of its military influence and using its connections to militias to slow down implementation.

Trump: Iran wants an agreement... and I will strike it again if necessary

Riyadh - Al Arabiya.net/November 20, 2026
US President Donald Trump said, during a press conference at the White House on Friday, that Iran wants to reach an agreement with the United States, but he stressed that the conditions proposed by Tehran are still unacceptable to him, while he threatened to strike Tehran again if necessary. Trump added in his press conference at the White House: “We want a real agreement, not a fake one, with Iran,” stressing that the Iranian side seeks to conclude an agreement, without revealing details of the terms in question or indicating specific progress in the negotiations. He also added that the United States is ready to repeat military strikes against Iran if necessary, stressing that Tehran cannot be allowed to possess a nuclear weapon. In addition, Trump commented on reports that Iran might seek to carry out an attack using a “dirty bomb” in the United States, saying that Washington would reveal the matter if there was such a threat, adding: “We will not allow that.” For his part, US Vice President J.D. Vance stressed that the decision to deal with the war with Iran is up to Trump, stressing that his mission is to support the president and support him in his decisions. Vance said that the primary goal that should be achieved is to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Regarding the Ukrainian file, US President Donald Trump confirmed that his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, informed him of his desire to end the war with Ukraine, indicating that he continues to work to reach a settlement that ends the conflict. Trump said that Putin is not opposed to resorting to diplomatic means to resolve the conflict, but he pointed out that the sharp personal differences between the Russian and Ukrainian presidents represent an obstacle to reaching an agreement. He also added that "the hatred between Putin and Zelensky is very great," considering that this intense hostility makes the task of reaching a political settlement more difficult. Meanwhile, the US President did not reveal details of new proposals to end the war or a possible date for the resumption of direct negotiations between Moscow and Kiev. In a context related to European security, Trump stressed the need to ensure the security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and protect marine cables, which represent an essential part of the international communications infrastructure. He said that Washington wants to ensure the security of the alliance and protect these cables, without clarifying in the statements transmitted from him the nature of the new measures that the United States or its allies may take in this field. These statements come at a time when the Ukrainian war and the security of vital infrastructure are at the forefront of discussion between the United States and its European allies. Regarding the results of his Asian tour, Trump confirmed that the United States had concluded “great trade agreements,” while the White House announced that the tour resulted in deals worth more than $17 billion, in addition to trade understandings with a number of Asian countries. The US President pointed to the continued decline in oil prices, but in return he criticized the rise in interest rates, considering that raising them despite what he described as good economic numbers was unfortunate. He said the United States should have the lowest interest rates in the world. He also threatened to impose heavy taxes on American companies that build data centers outside the country, as part of his efforts to keep investments related to artificial intelligence within the United States.

Trump Conditions End of War on a "Real, Not Fake" Deal with Iran
Reuters / November 21, 2026
U.S. President Donald Trump stated on Friday that Iran wishes to reach an agreement to end the war, but emphasized that Washington seeks a "real deal, not a fake one." During a press conference, Trump remarked, "They want to make a deal, but they don’t want to make a deal that would be acceptable to me." The U.S. President linked fuel prices to how matters with Iran are resolved, noting that oil prices are currently seeing a significant decline and will continue to fall. On Thursday, Trump indicated that he had not yet reached a decision regarding Iran, asserting that he is "in no rush" to finalize his position, amid reports of Israeli pressure to resume military action against Tehran. In a statement to Israel’s Channel 12—made from his plane while returning from China—Trump added, "I am in no rush to make any decisions regarding Iran. We will see what happens after the start of the new year." According to the channel, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to press Trump to launch a new military operation soon. Two informed sources indicated that the U.S. President has reconsidered the possibility of carrying out strikes, after having described such an action as "highly unlikely" just last week. Trump also mentioned a "rumor" that Iran is working on developing a "dirty bomb," affirming that if they are indeed doing so, the United States will discover it and take steps to prevent it. CNN previously reported that U.S. intelligence indicated a potential effort by Iran to develop a "dirty bomb" and detonate it in Washington. Regarding trade, Trump announced that ten additional trade agreements would be concluded "very soon," following his tour of Asia. He also criticized the Federal Reserve, arguing that interest rates are too high due to what he described as the "politicized" nature of the U.S. central bank, asserting that the United States should have "the lowest interest rates in the world." On the subject of the Russia-Ukraine war, Trump noted that "Russian President Vladimir Putin has expressed a desire to end the war with Ukraine through diplomatic means." Furthermore, Trump stated that the United States "remains at the forefront of artificial intelligence and is maintaining this lead," adding that he had reached an agreement with Chinese President Xi Jinping to establish joint regulations in this field.

Eisenkot Maneuvers to Form a Government… A Knesset Vote, Even Without a Majority?
Janoubia / November 20, 2026
Gadi Eisenkot, leader of the "Yashar" party and a member of the Israeli Knesset, is preparing to bring a new government to a Knesset vote before his mandate to form one expires on December 6—even without securing a parliamentary majority. He has placed on the table the option of a minority government, which would either be supported by Arab parties or rely on them to abstain from the vote. According to Israeli media reports, this move could allow Eisenkot to avoid returning the mandate to form a government to Israeli President Isaac Herzog once the deadline expires—though the chances of success remain uncertain. The *Times of Israel* reported that Eisenkot is considering bringing his proposed government before the Knesset for a vote, even without a clear majority. Meanwhile, *Haaretz* noted that President Herzog has the authority to extend the deadline by an additional two weeks before either transferring the mandate to another figure or calling for new elections. However, Eisenkot’s party is not counting on such an extension, leaving it in a race against time to reach political understandings before December 6. Eisenkot was tasked with forming a government on November 8, with the support of his allies, the United Arab List, and the Joint List. These maneuvers are taking place against a parliamentary backdrop where neither camp holds a decisive majority. In the elections held on October 27, Eisenkot’s camp secured 48 out of 120 seats, compared to 53 seats for the ruling coalition led by Benjamin Netanyahu, while Arab parties won 19 seats. In an effort to broaden his base of support, Eisenkot’s party is engaged in talks with the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) parties—which have traditionally supported Netanyahu—despite the commitment by Eisenkot’s camp to end the military service exemptions currently granted to the Haredi community. The discussions also extend to the Likud party itself, despite Eisenkot’s pledge to remove Netanyahu from the premiership. According to reports from *Haaretz* and the *Ynet* website, should negotiations falter, the option of forming a minority government emerges; such a government could secure a vote of confidence in the Knesset with a simple majority of the votes cast, rather than requiring an absolute majority of 61 lawmakers. *Haaretz* notes that Eisenkot anticipates support from the left-leaning "The Democrats" party and the United Arab List, while the Joint List—an Arab alliance that maintains a more hardline stance in its opposition to Zionism—might choose to abstain. However, this option faces resistance within Eisenkot’s own camp, as several of his allies have rejected the idea of ​​a minority government that relies on the support of Arab parties (with the exception of "The Democrats"). In this context, Avigdor Liberman, leader of the Yisrael Beiteinu party—which holds seven seats—has announced that he would vote against any such government. Instead, he has called for the formation of a coalition that includes the two ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) parties, United Torah Judaism and Shas, which together hold 13 seats. Consequently, Eisenkot faces a range of possibilities: courting the ultra-Orthodox parties, reaching understandings with other political forces, or pursuing a vote for a minority government—all while the deadline for his mandate approaches without a clear resolution on the shape of the next coalition.

Israeli Military Targets Hamas Meeting in Gaza: What Do We Know About the Operation?

Janoubia / November 20, 2026
In a new field development in the central Gaza Strip, the Israeli military announced an airstrike targeting a meeting of several members of Hamas’s military wing. The military stated that these individuals were planning operations against Israeli forces and citizens—an escalation occurring amid Israeli accusations that the movement is rebuilding its military capabilities and continuing its activities, despite the ceasefire agreement. Providing further details, an Israeli military spokesperson announced on the platform "X" that the Air Force had carried out a strike targeting members of Hamas’s military wing as they met in the central part of the Strip. The spokesperson noted that the meeting was intended to devise plans for attacks against Israeli forces and civilians. She added that those targeted included members of the movement’s elite forces, as well as individuals alleged to have participated in the October 7, 2023, attack. According to the Israeli account, the targeted individuals had continued to plan operations against Israeli forces and civilians throughout the war—particularly in the recent period—and were involved in efforts to restore Hamas’s military capabilities. The spokesperson characterized these activities as a violation of the ceasefire agreement, asserting that the strike was carried out to eliminate what she described as the threat posed by these individuals. Regarding the circumstances of the attack, the spokesperson stated that the military took precautionary measures—including the use of precision-guided munitions and aerial surveillance—to minimize the risk of civilian casualties. The spokesperson has not yet disclosed the toll of the strike or the fate of the targeted individuals, noting that the military will provide further updates on the operation's outcome at a later time. The strike occurs amid ongoing Israeli accusations that Hamas is attempting to restore its military capabilities and reorganize its ranks, while developments on the ground continue to pose fresh challenges to the ceasefire agreement. With the Israeli account citing the targeting of military plans, and in the absence of a definitive casualty count, the results of the attack and its implications on the ground remain a subject of close attention—amid concerns that such an escalation could destabilize the truce in the Gaza Strip.

Witkoff and Kushner Discuss Ways to Contain Escalation with Iran with Doha
Riyadh - AlArabiya.net / November 20, 2026
As U.S. President Donald Trump hints at the possibility of resuming military operations against Tehran should the need arise, his envoys, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, held a meeting in Berlin on Thursday with high-ranking Qatari officials. According to two sources familiar with the matter who spoke to *Axios*, the discussions focused on mediation efforts between the United States and Iran. The sources indicated that the meeting in Berlin was attended by Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, accompanied by his envoy, Ali Al-Thawadi. This follows remarks made by Trump during a press conference on Friday, in which he stated that while Iran desires an agreement, it does not seek one that would be acceptable to him. "We want a real deal, not a fake one like the ones they’ve made for 51 years," he said, describing the Iranian leadership as a "very evil group." He further asserted that the United States is prepared to carry out additional military strikes against Iran if necessary, emphasizing that Tehran cannot be permitted to possess a nuclear weapon.
These developments come in the wake of a visit to Washington last week by the Prime Minister of Qatar, who met with Trump and Vice President-elect J.D. Vance to discuss the Iran dossier. Following the meeting, Trump remarked that a new military campaign against Iran had become "highly unlikely" and did not appear "necessary." However, Trump is facing mounting pressure from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to push Washington toward launching a new military operation against Iran. In a phone interview with the news outlet *Axios* on Thursday, Trump stated that he would not make a decision regarding the next steps in the conflict before the new year, adding, "I’m in no rush to make any decision on Iran; we’ll see what happens after the start of the year." As part of ongoing diplomatic efforts, the Qatari Prime Minister met with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Turkey a week ago to brief him on the outcome of his discussions with Trump and Vance. According to a diplomat familiar with the meeting, the two sides also explored ways to break the current deadlock in negotiations. The source noted that an Iranian technical delegation visited Doha earlier this week to continue these talks. Araghchi also paid visits to Pakistan and the Sultanate of Oman to discuss efforts aimed at reaching a diplomatic solution, and met in Muscat with the Qatari envoy, Ali Al-Thawadi. Despite an intensification of diplomatic meetings and contacts in recent times, these moves have yet to yield any tangible progress in the negotiation process, according to informed sources.

Araghchi: The "Two-Day Plan" Remains on the Table; Trump Must Signal Willingness to Negotiate

Riyadh – AlArabiya.net / November 20, 2026
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed on Friday that his country’s proposal, known as the "Two-Day Plan," remains on the table. He noted that Tehran has yet to receive any response from the U.S. regarding the initiative, which he described as comprehensive, practical, and capable of addressing the demands of both sides. In an interview with the newspaper *Iran*—shared via his Telegram account—Araghchi stated that the plan proposes initiating negotiations with the United States immediately, rather than adhering to a 60-day timeframe. He explained that the proposal aims to accelerate agreements on outstanding issues and create the conditions necessary for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Araghchi added that Iran is prepared to reopen the Strait the day after the United States fulfills its commitments, emphasizing that the plan remains valid despite the lack of a response from the American side. Regarding the nuclear dossier, Araghchi stressed that the removal of enriched nuclear materials from Iran is a "red line" for Tehran, while simultaneously affirming that a fair solution concerning these materials is still achievable.
He further clarified that the plan is based on U.S. commitments outlined in the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, alongside new demands put forward by Tehran—including the lifting of U.S. sanctions imposed in the recent period. Araghchi revealed that the Iranian proposal began as a seven-day plan to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Under this plan, the United States would fulfill its commitments within the first five or six days, in exchange for Iran reopening the Strait on the sixth day, with negotiations between the two sides commencing on the seventh day. He explained that Tehran presented this plan to Washington via a Qatari intermediary during a visit to New York; discussions continued for about two months, during which both sides exchanged proposals. He added that the mediators suggested shortening the timeframe to expedite the initiative’s implementation. Tehran agreed to reduce it to two days: Washington would fulfill its pledges on the first day, and Iran would reopen the Strait of Hormuz on the second day, coinciding with the start of negotiations. Araghchi noted that the previous memorandum of understanding with Washington no longer holds practical significance; however, he emphasized that the American commitments contained therein still provide a foundation upon which a final agreement could be built. The official affirmed that his country remains committed to a diplomatic path toward an agreement with the United States, stressing that Tehran’s primary objective is to reach an understanding that ensures the conflict between the two sides does not reignite. He clarified that Iran’s initial requirement is for U.S. President Donald Trump to publicly declare his desire to reach an agreement, noting that a clear American position is an essential step toward creating the conditions for the resumption of negotiations. He further added that the exchange of messages through mediators is ongoing, and emphasized that Tehran sees no need to replace the current intermediaries. Furthermore, Araghchi pointed out that his country believes it is necessary to end the state of "neither war nor peace" in its relations with the United States. He emphasized that Iran’s nuclear doctrine remains unchanged and that Tehran is prepared to reach an equitable solution regarding nuclear materials—one based on its national interests. He noted that Iran has held discussions with intermediaries concerning confidence-building measures with Washington, as part of efforts to create the conditions for resuming a diplomatic path and reaching understandings between the two sides. In a related context, the Iranian Foreign Minister denied reports suggesting that Tehran intends to attack the U.S. capital, Washington, using chemical weapons, dismissing such claims as entirely baseless. This follows a statement by U.S. President Donald Trump on Thursday, in which he acknowledged that the United States possesses information indicating that Iran is considering the use of chemical or biological weapons. Trump’s remarks came in response to a question about a CNN report citing new U.S. intelligence, which suggests that Iran is developing potential plans to use a "dirty bomb" in Washington, targeting officials within the U.S. administration. Araghchi’s comments come amid ongoing diplomatic efforts to contain tensions between Washington and Tehran—tensions fueled by disputes over Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions, and the future of arrangements concerning the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, the prospects for resuming negotiations remain contingent upon the positions of both parties and their willingness to make mutual concessions.

A new explosion on Qeshm Island... and an attack on a tanker in the Strait of Hormuz
Riyadh - Al Arabiya.net/November 20, 2026
In conjunction with indications of the possible return of the military confrontation between Washington and Tehran, an explosion occurred on the Iranian island of Qeshm overlooking the Strait of Hormuz, on Friday. While there were reports of a missile landing in an area located on the outskirts of the city of Qeshm, at 18:50 local time, and Tasnim Agency reported that the missile was launched by the American army, an Iranian official denied this account, stressing that the sound of the explosion resulted from the process of destroying unexploded ordnance remaining from previous attacks. The Deputy Governor of Hormozgan, Ahmad Nafisi, said that the sounds of explosions and smoke columns seen on Qeshm Island were due to “an operation to dismantle and destroy unexploded ordnance left over from American attacks,” explaining that “the operation was carried out under the supervision of the competent and responsible authorities,” according to the official Iranian news agency, “IRNA.” So far, there has been no comment or clarification from the American side regarding the Qeshm Island explosion. In addition, the British Maritime Trade Operations Authority (UKMTO) announced that an oil tanker was attacked with a projectile while leaving the Strait of Hormuz, about 8 nautical miles from the Omani coast of Khasab. The authority explained, in a statement on Friday, that an oil tanker that was on its way to leave the Strait of Hormuz was hit by an unknown projectile in its bow from the port side (left side), which led to a fire breaking out on board, without recording human injuries or environmental effects. The authority did not reveal the identity of the tanker or the party responsible for the attack, while the nature of the damage it sustained has not yet become clear. As for the Iranian version of what happened, the Revolutionary Guard Navy said that an oil tanker, which it described as “in violation,” exploded and caught fire after colliding with sea mines at the entrance to Khasab Port. It also claimed that the accident occurred while it was trying to cross the Strait of Hormuz “via an unauthorized route, with the support of the American army,” according to what was reported by Tasnim Agency. These developments came days after several sites on Qeshm Island were subjected to American strikes last Tuesday, according to what was announced by the Deputy Governor of Hormozgan, Ahmed Nafisi, who confirmed that the attack did not result in damage to residential and commercial areas or infrastructure. Qeshm Island gains strategic importance due to its location in the Strait of Hormuz, off the southern coast of Iran and near the city of Bandar Abbas, as it is located adjacent to one of the most important sea lanes for transporting oil and gas globally, making it a point of military and economic importance in light of the regional escalation. Meanwhile, field developments coincide with reports of American and Israeli preparations for the possible resumption of military operations against Iran during the coming period. Informed sources revealed to CBS News that the United States and Israel are considering launching a new attack on Iran in the near term, perhaps before next January. According to the sources, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is concerned about the speed with which Tehran is rebuilding its capabilities to manufacture ballistic missiles, as well as the pace of fortifying its military and nuclear infrastructure against attacks, by moving more facilities to underground sites. This comes in light of the continuing tension between the United States and Iran, since the outbreak of war on February 28, when Washington and Israel began military strikes against Iran, which responded with attacks on Israel and American military installations in a number of countries in the region. On June 18, Washington and Tehran, with Pakistani and Qatari mediation, reached a memorandum of understanding, but its implementation faltered due to disagreements regarding ensuring freedom of navigation and security in the Strait of Hormuz, before renewed confrontations between the two sides last July, coinciding with the continuation of diplomatic efforts to end the conflict.

France Moves to Punish Iran Over Cyberattacks; Paris Accuses the Revolutionary Guard of Targeting 700 Stores and Seeks European Sanctions

Riyadh – AlArabiya.net / November 20, 2026
The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs has revealed moves to take action against Iran following cyberattacks that Paris attributes to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The ministry confirmed that it has shared the evidence in its possession with its European partners in preparation for discussions on imposing sanctions. Pascal Confavreux, spokesperson for the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, told "Al Arabiya English" that France holds the IRGC responsible for a cyberattack that targeted 700 supermarkets last October. He explained that Paris has presented evidence regarding the attack to its European Union partners and is pushing for punitive measures against those responsible. The spokesperson did not specify the nature of the potential sanctions or when a decision might be reached; meanwhile, the published statements did not provide details regarding the French evidence or Tehran’s response to the accusations. Regarding the war in Ukraine, Confavreux emphasized that the security of the European continent cannot be determined without the participation of the European nations themselves. Commenting on a summit that brought together U.S. President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, the French spokesperson remarked that it was "not a new Yalta"—a reference to the historic conference where major powers discussed post-World War II arrangements. He asserted that the summit did not lead to a reorganization of the global order, reiterating the necessity of including Europeans in any arrangements that affect their security. He also cast doubt on Moscow’s willingness to negotiate regarding Ukraine, citing the continued Russian attacks on energy infrastructure. He added that, in his assessment, Russia is losing territory rather than making gains on the battlefield.
Regarding regional security, the French spokesperson affirmed his country’s readiness to assist in protecting energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, including facilities in Yanbu. He also condemned Houthi attacks, reiterating Paris’s support for the security of the Kingdom and its vital facilities. On the subject of Gaza, he emphasized the necessity of ensuring full humanitarian aid access to the territory. As for Lebanon, he noted that France supports a three-pronged plan to prevent a security vacuum as the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) nears its expiration on December 31. These positions reflect Paris’s efforts to coordinate its security and diplomatic actions with its European and regional partners, amidst ongoing tensions with Iran, the war in Ukraine, and various security challenges in the Middle East.

Amid UN condemnation of human rights violations: 19 prisoners executed by hanging in Iran over five days, including two women.
November 20, 2026
Coinciding with the adoption by the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly of a resolution condemning grave and systematic human rights violations in Iran, the clerical regime—driven by fear of an explosion of public anger—executed at least 13 prisoners by hanging between Tuesday, November 17, and Wednesday, November 18. On Wednesday, November 18, seven prisoners were sent to the gallows: Hamid Reza Karouni (24) in Shiraz, Javad Kardgar (24) in Behshahr, Amir Hossein Shah-Pasandi (27) in Saveh, Morteza Naghdi (30) and Saeed Iravani (33) in Ghezel Hesar, Esmail Sarasti in Babol, and Ebrahim Mohammadi Maboud in Tonekabon. On Tuesday, November 17, six prisoners were executed by hanging: Yaghoub Heidarpour in Marand, Esmail Pour-Amashl in Ferdows, Hamid Khoda-Bakhsh in Damavand, Hossein Manouchehri in Arsanjan, Siavash Hosseini in Abadan, and Hamzeh Maraei Khales (Narouyi) (23)—a member of the Baluch people—in Zahedan. On Monday, November 16, Mehdi Aini was executed in Qorveh. On Sunday, November 15, four prisoners were executed by hanging, including two women: Masoumeh Sayyadi (39) and Fatemeh Farhadi, along with Hamid Hosseinzadeh in Shiraz and Mohammad Amin Atashgar (25) in Zabol. On Saturday, November 14, Hossein Mirzaei (27) was executed in Malayer. Following the adoption of the resolution by the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly last night, Mrs. Maryam Rajavi stated that the dossier of the mullahs’ regime—a regime that cannot survive without resorting to torture and executions—must be referred to the UN Security Council, and its leaders must be brought to justice for crimes against humanity and genocide. She once again called upon the United Nations, its member states, and all human rights advocacy organizations to take urgent action to halt the executions and save the lives of prisoners on death row in Iran.

Tehran raises the ceiling of deterrence after the “Schengen” summit.. The Revolutionary Guard announces “a review of nuclear doctrine” and Washington mobilizes aircraft carriers

Southern/November 20, 2026
The indirect political and military clash between Washington and Tehran is escalating due to the faltering diplomatic efforts and the escalation of maritime tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, in conjunction with the American mobilization of three aircraft carrier battle groups in the Middle East, and the strong return of debate within Iran about the possibility of reviewing its defense and nuclear doctrine in light of the threat of broad responses “without geographical restrictions.” The discussion about the possibility of changing the “Iranian nuclear doctrine” has returned to the forefront of the scene, after an official in the “Revolutionary Guard” hinted at the possibility of reviewing the country’s defense doctrine, amid escalating calls within political, religious and military institutions towards possessing nuclear weapons. In response to a question about increasing the range of Iranian missiles and the possibility of responding to adversaries “without restrictions,” the official stressed that Tehran makes its decisions according to its own needs and doctrine, adding that “the enemy’s actions” may push it to review that doctrine, after a series of positions witnessed by Iran during October and November that went beyond developing missiles to calling for a reconsideration of the policy of refraining from producing nuclear weapons. On November 12, Iran's Leadership Council of Experts called for a review of defense doctrine and a reconsideration of the country's membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to enhance deterrence. On November 7, Revolutionary Guard spokesman Hussein Mohebi announced the Guard’s readiness to make the necessary arrangements if the leadership decided to move toward producing nuclear weapons. On October 31, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Mohsen Rezaei, confirmed that changing the nuclear doctrine is up for discussion if the war resumes, stressing at the same time that no official decision has been issued yet. The controversy extended to the fatwa issued by former guide Ali Khamenei prohibiting nuclear weapons. Representatives Ahmed Naderi and Mahmoud Nabawyan called for the production of an atomic bomb, while cleric Ahmed Alam al-Huda considered that possessing nuclear weapons might become a “religious duty” if required by deterrence requirements. As the circle of claimants expands, the final decision remains dependent on the position of the leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, and whether he will maintain his father’s approach or allow it to be reviewed, in a step that would - if it happens - spark a regional arms race and double international pressures and sanctions. On the diplomatic level, the hard-line Iranian positions came the day after US President Donald Trump left China after an hour-and-a-half meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, at the tripartite Shenzhen summit, which avoided delving into core issues including Iran, Ukraine, and Taiwan, contenting itself with a joint statement called a “peace declaration” that stressed securing energy corridors and preventing confrontations or nuclear wars. Mohammad Mokhber, advisor to Iranian leader Mojtaba Khamenei, said in a post on the “X” platform today, Friday, that the “Schengen” summit sent a clear message that the United States “no longer has sufficient influence to mobilize support against Iran,” adding that Trump “left China empty-handed after issuing a statement that was not in his favor.” An informant reiterated that the “Strait of Hormuz” represents a red line for Iran, and that ensuring its operation remains linked to achieving its seven basic conditions, with Tehran stressing that any attack targeting it will be met with an immediate response and without geographical restrictions. On the other hand, while all options remain on the American table, President Donald Trump announced that he is “in no hurry” to make a decision regarding Iran, preferring to give the economic sanctions and the naval blockade more time, noting the possibility of renewing the war early next year, and pointing out the existence of a common interest with China to ensure the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz and prevent Tehran from possessing a nuclear weapon. Tehran had presented a revised proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz - which has been almost closed since the outbreak of the war in Last February 28 - in exchange for seven demands that include stopping the conflict on all fronts, lifting Western sanctions, stopping the US naval blockade of Iranian ports, and releasing Iranian funds frozen abroad. However, the American response did not meet Iranian hopes, which kept the negotiations faltering despite the continued Qatari and Pakistani mediation efforts to bring views closer, at a time when Washington continues to strengthen its military presence by deploying three aircraft carrier battle groups in the region.

Pezeshkian Sparks Outrage in Iran with Remarks About Sleeping in a "Coat" and Turning Off Heating; Citizens Respond: "We Sold Our Coats to Buy Bread"
Janoubia / November 20, 2026
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian sparked an angry backlash from citizens on Thursday, November 19, during the "Pioneers of Liberation" conference at the University of Tehran, when he mentioned that he sleeps at home wearing a coat and does not turn on any lights or heating. Pointing to Iran’s vast gas reserves—contrasted against the energy supply crisis, freezing temperatures in schools, and severe economic hardships—followers of "Iran International" criticized the government’s failure to manage the nation’s resources, noting that it instead places the burden of these crises on the shoulders of the people. During the conference, Pezeshkian remarked, "I do not live the way you live," and added that he would be willing to show his home to others. Many of the responses focused on the stark gap between Pezeshkian’s statements and the actual living conditions of the Iranian people.
One individual from Mashhad wrote, addressing Pezeshkian: "We sold our coats just so we could put bread on the table for our wives and children for a single night." Another citizen, from Tehran, commented: "You sleep in a coat—so, at the very least, you *have* a coat. Do you realize how many of our dear fellow citizens cannot even afford to buy one? If only you possessed some honor." Another follower asked: “Do you even know how much a child’s coat costs? And do you know what it takes to keep a household refrigerator stocked so that people can go to sleep with a full stomach?” Another user questioned: “Are we supposed to sleep in our coats, forgo heating, and stop using our cars—all so that you can buy us a few extra days [of energy supply]? What a delusion!” In response to Pezeshkian’s remarks that the Iranian people deserve a better life, one citizen wrote: “Yes, we do deserve better, but our lives have now been reduced to installment plans and a rationing system.” Addressing Pezeshkian, another user pointed to the bread and flour crisis in Iran, noting: “Even basic bread is no longer accessible; you’ve imposed rationing on that, too.” The stark contrast between Iran’s vast energy resources and the government’s recurring warnings—about electricity shortages in the summer and gas shortages in the winter—drew further criticism. A resident of Karaj wrote: “Shame on a government official like you. In a vast country like Iran, which possesses such immense potential and latent resources, you end up telling people to rely on coats and blankets—all because of your own incompetence and failure.” Another follower remarked: “Pezeshkian—who is clearly ill-informed—mentions that we hold the world’s second-largest gas reserves, yet we still face these problems. This proves, quite precisely, that the root of the issue lies in a system incapable of managing things properly.” A citizen from Isfahan, criticizing the solutions proposed by Pezeshkian, wrote: “In a century where nations around the world boast of their scientific and research achievements, Pezeshkian, the President of Iran, suggests wearing coats and eating less food.” Another person addressed Pezeshkian, saying: “Mr. Pezeshkian, you are speaking from a warm place. For those who have nothing to eat, a coat will not keep them warm, nor will they even have the energy to walk.” One observer asked: “Mr. Pezeshkian, are the heating systems in the schools attended by your own grandchildren and the children of other officials also turned off in this cold weather? Or are your children and grandchildren an exception?” This question arises at a time when several provinces have been hit by cold spells and rain; parents and students have reported that school heating systems are switched off, leaving students shivering in their classrooms. Messages received by *Iran International* indicate that students are arriving at school carrying blankets, while school officials have suggested that they warm the classrooms with their own breath. Masoud Pezeshkian also touched upon the costs of weddings during his own youth, joking about offering students “500 tomans or 500,000 tomans” as financial aid—a remark that sparked outrage and sharp reactions from the public, given the current, difficult living conditions and the exorbitant costs of getting married. One follower wrote: “Mr. Pezeshkian, it seems you don’t live in this country. A wedding ring costs at least 100 million tomans. How do you expect to help a young person with 500,000 tomans?” He added: “With that amount, a young person could at most take a Snapp [ride-hailing] taxi, go look at a jewelry store window, and lament their situation.” In other reactions, the criticism went beyond Pezeshkian’s remarks to challenge the performance of the Iranian regime and its role in the current crises facing the country. Mocking the fact that Pezeshkian sleeps while wearing a coat, one follower wrote: “You’re on such high alert that the moment you get the word, you can jump up quickly and head straight for the tunnels, bunkers, and hideouts.” Another citizen remarked: “Mr. Pezeshkian, you sleep in your coat because you fear the outbreak of war and want to escape in a hurry; you don’t turn on the lights in your home because you’re afraid your hiding spot will be discovered; and you don’t travel anywhere by car because you fear assassination.” Yet another citizen commented: “Take the regime by the hand and leave this country—that way, the electricity and water problems will be solved, and 80 million people will finally feel some warmth.”

Araghchi Rules Out War Tonight… Amid Israeli Warnings of Renewed Strikes on Iran
Janoubia / November 20, 2026
Amid mounting anticipation regarding a potential resurgence of military confrontation between Iran and Israel—and following reports of Israeli efforts in Washington to push for a resumption of strikes against Tehran—Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has made a notable statement, ruling out the outbreak of war tonight. This comes as U.S. President Donald Trump continues to weigh his options for dealing with Iran. Speaking on Friday while visiting the 23rd International Exhibition for Metals, Steel, Mining, and Mineral Industries in Tehran, Araghchi indicated that he does not expect a military confrontation to erupt tonight. In response to a journalist’s question about the possibility of such a confrontation, the Iranian minister replied curtly: "There will be no war tonight." Video footage shows Araghchi delivering this response with a smile, to which the journalist retorted sarcastically, "So, the probability is high!"—a moment that drew significant attention given the heightened tensions surrounding the Iranian issue. Meanwhile, Araghchi’s remarks take on added significance in light of a report by *The Wall Street Journal*, which revealed that the head of the Israeli Mossad, Roman Gofman, had requested that officials in the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump resume joint U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran. According to the report, citing informed sources, the request was made during a visit by Gofman to Washington last week—part of an Israeli push to resume military operations against Tehran. The report notes that Trump is still weighing a range of options for dealing with the Islamic Republic of Iran, with no final decision yet reached on the path Washington will ultimately take. Between Iranian official Araghchi’s dismissal of the prospect of an imminent war and reports of Israeli efforts to resume joint strikes, the region remains in a state of anxious anticipation, awaiting the American decision regarding the next phase of the confrontation with Iran.

From Tehran to Kyiv: Trump’s Messages Following the Summit with Putin and Xi

Janoubia / November 20, 2026
During a press conference at the White House on Friday—held following a trilateral summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping—U.S. President Donald Trump addressed a number of international and economic issues, ranging from negotiations with Iran and the war in Ukraine to NATO security and artificial intelligence. Regarding Iran, Trump stated that Tehran wishes to reach an agreement with the United States, but emphasized that the terms they are proposing remain unacceptable to him. He stressed that Washington seeks a genuine agreement rather than merely superficial understandings, though he did not disclose the specific points of contention or indicate that any tangible progress has been made in the negotiations. The U.S. President commented on reports suggesting that Iran might seek to carry out an attack within the United States using a so-called "dirty bomb," stating that Washington would detect any such threat and emphasizing that his country would not allow it to happen. Regarding artificial intelligence, Trump announced that an understanding had been reached with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, on establishing joint controls for this technology. He asserted that the United States remains at the forefront of advanced nations in this field and that his administration is committed to maintaining its technological superiority. As for the war in Ukraine, Trump stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin had expressed a desire to end the conflict, and he affirmed that efforts would continue toward reaching a settlement to conclude the war. He noted that while Putin is not opposed to diplomatic solutions, the intense personal animosity between the Russian leader and his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, poses an obstacle to an agreement, adding that "the hatred between Putin and Zelenskyy is immense." Trump did not disclose details regarding any new proposals to end the war, nor did he specify a potential timeline for the resumption of direct negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv. In the context of European security, the U.S. President underscored the importance of ensuring the security of NATO and protecting undersea cables, which form a critical part of international telecommunications infrastructure. He reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to strengthening the alliance’s security and safeguarding these cables, though he did not reveal any specific measures or new steps that the United States and its allies might take in this regard. Economically, Trump touted the results of his Asian tour, stating that the United States had secured what he described as "great" trade agreements. The White House announced that the tour yielded deals worth over $17 billion, alongside various trade understandings with several Asian nations. Trump also noted the continued decline in oil prices, while criticizing the rise in interest rates; he deemed it unfortunate that rates were being hiked despite what he characterized as strong economic figures, asserting that the United States should have the lowest interest rates in the world. Furthermore, he hinted at imposing high taxes on American companies that establish data centers abroad—a move he claimed was intended to keep investments related to artificial intelligence within the United States. Regarding domestic affairs, Trump alleged that Americans were dissatisfied with the outcome of the congressional midterm elections, though he provided no further details to explain this assessment.

Berlin and Doha Channels in Motion: Efforts to Cool U.S.-Iran Confrontation
Janoubia / November 20, 2026
As U.S. policy options waver between a diplomatic path and a return to military confrontation with Tehran, regional efforts and communications have intensified to contain the escalation. Doha has stepped into a mediation role, with Qatari officials meeting with envoys of U.S. President Donald Trump—Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner—in Berlin, Germany. According to *Axios*, citing two informed sources, the meeting, held on Thursday, addressed mediation efforts between Washington and Tehran, as well as ways to advance a diplomatic track to avoid a renewed confrontation. Participants included Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, alongside Qatari envoy Ali Al-Thawadi. These contacts coincide with hardline statements from Trump regarding Iran; while he acknowledged that Tehran seeks an agreement, he emphasized that the terms currently on the table do not meet his demands, stating that Washington wants a "real deal, not a fake one." The U.S. President also reiterated his warning against allowing Iran to possess a nuclear weapon, affirming his country’s readiness to conduct further military strikes if necessary—a stance that keeps the military option on the table, even as diplomatic efforts unfold. The Berlin talks are part of an ongoing Qatari initiative, which follows a meeting last week in Washington between the Qatari Prime Minister, President Trump, and Vice President-elect J.D. Vance to discuss the Iranian dossier and prospects for containing the tension. Following that meeting, Trump indicated that launching a new military campaign against Iran is highly unlikely and does not appear necessary at this stage. He noted that he is in no rush to decide on the next move, emphasizing that he will wait to see how developments unfold after the start of the new year. Meanwhile, Trump faces mounting pressure from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to push Washington toward a new military operation against Iran—a situation that leaves the U.S. administration navigating a complex set of calculations, balancing Israeli demands against efforts to contain escalation through diplomatic channels. In a phone interview with the news outlet *Axios* on Thursday, Trump stated that he would not make any decisions regarding the next steps until the new year, reiterating that he is in no hurry to reach a conclusion concerning Iran. On the regional front, the Prime Minister of Qatar met with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Turkey a week ago, briefing him on the outcomes of his discussions with Trump and Vance. According to a diplomat familiar with the meeting, the two sides also explored ways to break the current stalemate in negotiations. The source noted that an Iranian technical delegation visited Doha earlier this week to continue these talks, while Araghchi also traveled to Pakistan and the Sultanate of Oman to discuss the prospects for a diplomatic settlement—meeting in Muscat with the Qatari envoy, Ali Al-Thawadi. Despite numerous meetings and communications between Washington, Tehran, and various regional capitals, these efforts have yet to yield any tangible progress in the negotiation process, according to informed sources. Consequently, Qatari mediation faces a difficult challenge: preventing the region from sliding once again into an open military confrontation.

Economic Pariah: Washington Expands Siege on Iran, Targeting Its Networks in Asia
Janoubia / November 20, 2026
While Washington’s decision regarding the resumption of military operations against Tehran remains a subject of anticipation, the United States continues to intensify its economic pressure on Iran. This involves expanding the scope of sanctions and pursuing commercial and financial networks suspected of helping to circumvent the restrictions imposed on the country. In its latest move, U.S. Treasury Department officials held meetings with their counterparts in Singapore and Malaysia—including regulators and national security officials—to warn against the risks of engaging with Iranian networks that may be subject to U.S. sanctions, as reported by Reuters. Washington urged both nations, along with banks and law firms operating within them, to tighten oversight of companies suspected of serving as commercial fronts to conceal Iranian activities, with a particular focus on the shipping, aviation, and supply chain sectors. A U.S. Treasury official stated that the U.S. is calling for greater scrutiny of high-risk sectors to ensure they are not exploited as cover for Iran-linked activities, affirming that Washington intends to target supply networks that facilitate the evasion of sanctions. The official added that U.S. pressure has begun to impact Iran’s revenue streams, citing economic data that reportedly shows a sharp decline in economic performance and a significant surge in inflation rates. The maritime transport sector stands out as an area closely monitored by Washington. For years, the waters surrounding Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia have been the site of ship-to-ship oil transfers—a mechanism that can be used to obscure the origin of shipments and facilitate their entry into markets. Malaysian authorities have announced plans to tighten the enforcement of regulations governing these operations; in February, they seized two tankers along with their cargoes, a move reflecting an increased focus on tracking oil shipments. These actions coincide with broader U.S. measures targeting shipping linked to Iran, as well as stricter controls on transport and trade routes across land borders and the Caspian Sea, according to reports. Since the U.S. and Israeli military strikes on Iran last February, Washington has intensified efforts to squeeze Tehran’s commercial interests abroad, pursuing entities suspected of helping the country sustain its economic activities and circumvent sanctions. Last August, the U.S. administration launched an operation dubbed "Economic Pariah," accompanied by a package of sanctions targeting various parties, including cryptocurrency platforms in Canada and a major Russian banking group. Recent U.S. actions in Southeast Asia signal an expansion of the economic confrontation with Tehran; it is no longer limited to imposing sanctions on specific companies and individuals, but now extends to pressuring countries, financial institutions, and commercial entities whose territories or services might be used to facilitate the movement of Iranian funds, oil, and goods.

Dispatching a Ship and Invoking History: Iran Seeks to Break the U.S. Naval Blockade

Janoubia / November 20, 2026
As economic options dwindle, calls are mounting within hardline circles to practically challenge the blockade by dispatching a convoy of oil tankers to foreign markets—a move that could trigger a new confrontation in the waters of the Gulf and expose regional energy infrastructure to further risks. Iran is facing intensifying pressure as the United States tightens its naval blockade of Iranian ports and waters, pushing oil exports toward a complete halt. Meanwhile, Mohammad Mokhber, an advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, asserted that the United States is no longer capable of rallying support against Tehran, while reiterating his country’s seven conditions for keeping the Strait of Hormuz open. In a post on his X account on Friday, Mokhber stated that "the Shanghai summit in China sent a clear message to the region: the United States no longer possesses sufficient influence to mobilize support against Iran." In a related development, the idea of ​​deploying a "convoy of oil tankers" has emerged in Iranian discourse over the past few days, amid growing projections that Tehran’s revenue from crude oil and condensate exports could drop to zero by mid-December—a first in the country’s history, according to estimates by Kpler, a firm specializing in energy market intelligence. The Fars News Agency, affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), spearheaded the campaign calling for an end to the blockade. On November 19, it published an article advocating for the dispatch of oil tankers through the blockaded zone, warning that any U.S. attempt to intervene could result in strikes against oil facilities in Gulf states. Such calls were not limited to media outlets close to the IRGC; a more direct statement came from Hossein Mohebbi, an IRGC spokesperson, who declared during a gathering in Tehran on November 19: "We will not allow the continuation of the naval, land, and air blockade imposed on our country." In its article, Fars invoked a tale from the *Shahnameh*—the Iranian national epic—featuring the legendary hero Fereydun, who, upon being denied passage by a river guard, forced his way across with his horse and men. According to Radio Free Europe, the agency concluded that Tehran would not wait for American permission; instead, it would seek to open the route, raising the cost of maintaining the blockade to a level that makes its continuation increasingly difficult. This proposal quickly resonated among hardline figures. Ebrahim Azizi, chairman of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, wrote on the platform X that Iran cannot be subjected to a blockade, while various commentators discussed a potential decision to load crude oil onto a tanker and dispatch it to China—the largest buyer of Iranian oil. Meanwhile, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced that a "two-day" plan remains on the table; it entails the opening of the Strait of Hormuz on the second day, provided that the United States fulfills its obligations during the first day. Araghchi stated that the plan could create the conditions for reaching an agreement—provided Washington is serious about pursuing this path—while emphasizing the necessity of fulfilling Iran’s seven conditions for opening the strait. He added that Tehran is prepared to engage in dialogue with the American side, should they present proposals regarding the mechanism for implementing these conditions. Regarding the nuclear dossier, Araghchi expressed his belief that a fair resolution concerning nuclear materials is achievable—one that is rooted in Iran’s national interests and secures the country’s needs.
A military maneuver, or a test of Washington’s response?
Meanwhile, the idea of ​​dispatching a convoy remains, for now, merely a subject of speculation and calls; there is no definitive evidence that an official decision has been made to carry it out. Analysts warn that translating this into a practical step could force both sides into a direct test of will, with consequences that extend far beyond the mere interception or passage of a tanker. Some suggest that if reports regarding the deployment of an oil tanker are accurate, Iran may be attempting to actively challenge the blockade. The successful passage of any such vessel would undermine the credibility of the blockade, whereas its interception or targeting would provide Tehran with a pretext for retaliation. Through this maneuver, Iran might also be seeking to regain the military initiative, while placing the onus for any subsequent escalation on Washington. This perspective reflects an Iranian effort to alter the equation of the confrontation, ensuring that Tehran is no longer the sole party bearing the brunt of maritime and economic pressure. However, threats to target Gulf oil facilities heighten the level of risk; should they be carried out, the confrontation could expand to include the region’s energy infrastructure, further disrupting shipping and supplies along a corridor that serves as one of the most vital arteries for the global oil trade.
Eroding exports and stranded inventories
These developments come at a time when shipping data indicates a sharp decline in Iran’s ability to deliver its oil to buyers. According to data from Kpler, the volume of Iranian oil held at sea—outside the scope of the sanctions—peaked at 88.8 million barrels on July 14 (the date sanctions were reimposed) before falling to zero by mid-October, as the final shipments were offloaded in China. Meanwhile, approximately 43 million barrels of Iranian oil remain stranded within the sanctioned zone, limiting Tehran’s capacity to deliver new cargoes and bringing its exports to a critical juncture as mid-December approaches. Nevertheless, Homayoun Falakshahi, a senior commodities analyst at Kpler, cautions against interpreting recent Iranian rhetoric as evidence of a structured plan to circumvent the sanctions. He told Radio Farda—part of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty—that it is still too early to conclude that Iran has taken any serious steps in that direction.
Maritime incidents heighten tensions
These threats have coincided with security incidents in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz, further fueling concerns regarding the safety of navigation. On Friday, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that a fire had broken out aboard a tanker after it was struck by an unidentified projectile while exiting the Strait, approximately 8 nautical miles north of the Omani city of Khasab. The agency confirmed that there were no casualties or environmental damage. Later, Iranian state media reported that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stated a fire had broken out on a tanker after it struck a naval mine while attempting to transit the strait near Khasab—though the circumstances of the incident and the nature of the object struck have not been independently verified. In a separate incident, the Iranian news agency Tasnim quoted an official on Friday as saying that an explosion and rising smoke on Qeshm Island—located in the south of the country, near the Strait of Hormuz—were the result of the disposal of unexploded ordnance. In an earlier report, the agency had mentioned a missile attack in the area, before subsequently relaying the official account. These incidents take on added significance given the strategic location of the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately one-fifth of the world’s crude oil supply passed prior to the outbreak of conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran on February 28. Maritime traffic through the strait has been disrupted since Iran closed it following the onset of the conflict. As economic options for Tehran continue to narrow, calls to dispatch oil tankers appear to be an attempt to test the limits of the U.S.-led blockade—and perhaps to redefine the rules of engagement in the Gulf. However, a critical distinction remains between merely threatening to break the blockade and actually doing so: a successful attempt could weaken U.S. pressure, whereas an interception could trigger a naval confrontation with consequences for regional energy security and maritime navigation that would be difficult to contain.

Putin Meets Trump’s Diplomacy with Fire and Steel

Nidaa Al-Watan / November 21, 2026
Russian President Vladimir Putin responded to American efforts to end the war in Ukraine with a barrage of over 500 missiles and drones—just one day after a trilateral summit in Shenzhen involving himself, U.S. President Donald Trump, and Chinese President Xi Jinping. On Thursday night into Friday, Moscow launched one of its most intense attacks on Ukraine, an escalation that underscored the Kremlin’s determination to impose its will through military force whenever it fails to secure concessions diplomatically. Despite this, Trump remained optimistic about the possibility of a settlement; following the strikes, he asserted that Putin had expressed a desire to end the war through diplomacy—a claim that highlighted the stark gap between the American interpretation of Putin’s intentions and his actual conduct on the ground.
According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Russia unleashed more than 400 drones and 110 missiles—including 27 ballistic missiles—upon his country. The strikes targeted energy infrastructure, bridges, and railways, resulting in casualties and plunging vast areas into darkness. This bombardment served to carry out Putin’s earlier threat to retaliate for the Ukrainian attack on the Crimean Bridge. It confirms that Moscow is banking on escalating the destruction and increasing the human toll to improve its political standing, effectively leveraging its superior firepower as a bargaining chip in negotiations. The repercussions of this aggressive approach have extended to Poland, following reports that Russian projectiles—including a Kh-101 missile—landed on its territory. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk described the incident as a deliberate provocation, noting that it coincided with military exercises conducted by a European "coalition of the willing." The event serves as a stark reminder that the war threatens not only Ukrainian sovereignty but the security of the entire continent—particularly NATO’s eastern flank—amid fears that any agreement rewarding Russian aggression could embolden further military adventurism.
These developments place Trump’s diplomatic push to a delicate test, especially following reports in the *Financial Times* that his administration aims to secure an agreement by early January, before control of Congress shifts to the Democrats. However, Washington’s haste—contrasted with the rigidity of Russia’s demands—has fueled concerns in Kyiv and among its allies that any potential settlement might be judged by the speed of its conclusion rather than its capacity to establish a sustainable peace. Consequently, European nations are insisting on full participation in the negotiations, maintaining that Ukraine’s security is inextricably linked to their own. Following Putin’s invitation for European leaders to visit Moscow, Paris has signaled a willingness to engage in dialogue, provided that a substantive European role—alongside Washington and Kyiv—is recognized. This includes ensuring coordination among all three parties, particularly given the volatility of American policy and the fear that new understandings could redraw the continent’s security balance without European involvement. At the heart of these calculations lies a proposal to grant Ukraine security guarantees akin to Article 5 of the NATO Charter, which is based on the principle of collective defense. According to his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, Trump has shown openness to this option; meanwhile, the French presidency has suggested that guarantees of such magnitude would effectively be tantamount to Kyiv joining the alliance—a prospect Moscow rejects. A more sensitive issue, however, concerns the potential for linking such guarantees to Ukraine’s agreement to relinquish territories currently occupied by Russia—a scenario that, according to Paris, would be contingent upon the Ukrainians receiving robust guarantees to prevent any future recurrence of aggression. Herein lies the dilemma: how can a painful territorial concession be transformed into a secure peace, rather than serving as a reward for Moscow that encourages it to impose further demands through force? Parallel to these challenges, the agreement reached yesterday in Brussels between the United Kingdom and the European Union—covering trade, the mobility of young people, and the linking of carbon emissions markets—carries implications that extend well beyond the economic sphere. This rapprochement between London and the EU, a decade after the Brexit referendum, reflects an acknowledgment that confronting Russian threats and navigating strategic shifts requires repairing partnerships and closing ranks—especially given the uncertainties surrounding the steadfastness of American commitments.

Riyadh Confronts Houthi Terrorism with a Targeted Operation

Nidaa Al-Watan / November 21, 2026
The U.S.-Iran confrontation is shifting toward a more dangerous dynamic, in which Tehran—struggling to withstand mounting economic pressures—seeks to compensate by expanding the scope of its regional threats. While Washington bets that a naval blockade and sanctions will compel the Iranian regime to make substantive concessions, Tehran aims to ensure that continuing these policies remains costly for its adversaries. It leverages its capacity to threaten maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, alongside the terrorist escalations carried out by the Houthis against Saudi Arabia. However, the Saudi response yesterday posed a serious challenge to this strategy; the Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen, led by the Kingdom, announced a targeted military operation whose implications extend well beyond its immediate tactical objectives. Following an intensification of Houthi attacks on Saudi territory—culminating in an assault on the King Abdullah Financial District in Riyadh on Thursday—the Coalition struck the militia’s military capabilities in the port of Hodeidah, as well as in Sana’a, Saada, and Taiz. These strikes targeted weapons-smuggling facilities, workshops for manufacturing missile launchers and drones, and supply depots. The operation conveyed a clear message: Riyadh will not merely intercept incoming attacks; it will actively neutralize their sources to prevent the imposition of a long-term war of attrition. Ultimately, it is the nature of the targets—rather than the frequency of the attacks—that reveals the true intent behind the Iranian-Houthi strategy. Targeting financial centers, oil facilities, and airports—along with threats to strike ports and power plants, and endangering Saudi airspace—reflects the militia’s efforts, backed and directed by Tehran, to inflict damage on the Saudi economy and disrupt its vital infrastructure. This approach threatens the safety of civilians and the flow of commerce, while the Kingdom seeks to safeguard its stability and prevent its infrastructure from being exploited as leverage for regional blackmail. The danger of this escalation is compounded by the Houthis’ advance toward Aden, which strengthens their military influence near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and grants them a greater capacity to threaten navigation in the Red Sea. Consequently, Saudi strikes take on a preemptive dimension, aimed at undermining the terrorist militia’s capabilities and preventing it from leveraging its battlefield gains into further pressure tactics. The repercussions of this confrontation extend beyond the Yemeni theater; Houthi threats in the Red Sea intersect with ongoing disruptions to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz—driven by Iranian threats—placing two of the world’s most critical maritime corridors for trade and energy under severe security risks.
This escalation is closely linked to the deepening economic crisis in Iran, which has intensified following Washington’s tightening of restrictions on Tehran’s maritime trade and financial networks, as well as its expanded pursuit of entities that assist Iran in circumventing sanctions. As revenues decline and inflation rises, the social and economic burdens on the Iranian population continue to mount. Tehran’s use of the Houthis in its confrontation with the United States appears to be an attempt to improve its negotiating position by demonstrating that the continued strangulation of the Iranian economy could be met with broader instability in energy security and regional and international trade. However, U.S. President Donald Trump does not seem prepared to trade pressure for quick concessions; he has asserted that Iran seeks an agreement that fails to meet U.S. conditions, while reiterating his refusal to allow the country to possess a nuclear weapon. Meanwhile, the news outlet *Axios* revealed that U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner met with Qatari officials in Berlin on Thursday, as part of efforts to revive a ceasefire and nuclear negotiations. It was also reported that Trump does not intend to decide on his next move until the beginning of the new year, despite Israeli pressure to resume military operations. This cautious approach suggests that Washington remains committed to the strategy of economically exhausting Tehran to secure an agreement on its own terms, while Tehran, in turn, attempts to compensate for its weak negotiating hand by expanding the scope of its threats. Yet, the Saudi response presents Iran with an additional dilemma: rather than increasing pressure on Riyadh, the Houthi attacks may end up undermining the militia’s own military capabilities and raising the cost of relying on them. Consequently, the question is no longer just whether Tehran can export its crisis, but rather what price it might pay if the tools of pressure it employs turn into new sources of depletion for both the regime itself and its terrorist proxies.

Yazidi Survivor Claims to Have Seen Al-Sharaa in the House Where She Was Held During ISIS Rule
Monte Carlo International / November 20, 2026
The "Syrian Democratic Observatory" released a video featuring the testimony of a Yazidi survivor, delivered on Monday before a "Truth Commission" in Berlin investigating the genocide of the Yazidi people. The survivor stated that Ahmad al-Sharaa visited the house where she was being held captive during the period of ISIS control. She confirmed having seen him personally, though she clarified that she was not subjected to any sexual assault by him. The survivor recounted that, during the visit, she was tasked with serving tea to al-Sharaa. She insisted that she saw him with her own eyes, while reiterating that he did not engage in any sexual acts with her, nor did he assault her. The questioning involved some confusion due to translation issues, prompting a member of the commission to emphasize the need to distinguish between what the witness personally observed and any conclusions she might have drawn. Seeking to clarify this point, a commission member asked again whether she had personally seen Ahmad al-Sharaa inside the house; she replied, "I saw him with my own eyes—one hundred percent." She reaffirmed that she was in the room and served tea during the visit, and that al-Sharaa had seen her as well.
The Truth Commission
Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported on the commencement of the commission’s proceedings, noting that it is the first of its kind, coming 12 years after the atrocities committed against the Yazidi minority in Iraq and Syria by the Islamic State (ISIS). The hearings spanned three days, during which 30 victims provided their testimonies. This initiative, led by civil society and funded by the British government, aims to produce a report for the UK authorities. A seven-member panel will examine testimonies concerning acts of murder, torture, rape, and enslavement. The panel includes figures such as Navi Pillay—a recipient of the 2026 Nobel Peace Prize—as well as parliamentarians from Germany and the United Kingdom. During the opening session, Helena Kennedy, chair of the truth-seeking commission on the genocide against the Yazidis, noted that "there has been no real accountability for the atrocities committed over the past twelve years." Described by the organizers as a "truth commission initiated by the Yazidi community," the proceedings led Kennedy to remark that "the rape and enslavement of Yazidi women and girls stand as one of the greatest stains of the last two decades." In 2014, members of the "Islamic State" (IS) seized vast territories across northern Syria and neighboring Iraq, including the historic Yazidi homeland in the Sinjar Mountains. The group deemed the Yazidis—and their pre-Islamic monotheistic faith—to be "heretics." IS militants carried out massacres against this Kurdish-speaking minority, killing thousands and taking women and children captive. More than a decade after these atrocities—during which approximately 5,000 Yazidis were killed and some 6,400 were enslaved—many survivors are still waiting for the opportunity to share their experiences.

The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on November 20-21/2026/ (Some of the News reports below are translated from Arabic by AI)
The Gulf Is America’s Next AI Security Test
Elizabeth Dent/The Washington Institute/November 20, 2026
In the wake of Jensen Huang’s stunning resignation as CEO of Nvidia over his alleged affair with a Chinese spy, the U.S. Commerce Department this week announced new export controls on artificial intelligence and semiconductors. These rules mark the most serious effort to close the loopholes that have allowed Chinese companies to obtain access to U.S. chips and computing power. The new interim rules target three vulnerabilities: Chinese rerouting of U.S.-made AI chips through third countries, rented access to AI computing power, and Chinese chip designers’ ability to manufacture advanced chips at non-Chinese facilities.
The Nvidia scandal—including the alleged rerouting of Nvidia’s most advanced chips to China and the Trump administration’s apparent quiescence—underscores the scope of the Chinese threat to U.S. artificial intelligence technology. The new rules close important gaps, but they do not resolve the threat. The next area where the United States is especially exposed is the Gulf, where the most advanced U.S. chips are now arriving, to be utilized in data centers operated by partners that maintain extensive ties with China.
The Gulf magnifies the Nvidia problem. Both the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are trying to shift their economies away from oil, and they’re placing AI at the center of their strategies. In May 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that both countries would be able to purchase advanced U.S. chips to help facilitate these efforts. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh are financing massive AI buildouts, where Nvidia chips will be installed, operated, and even rented to customers or cloud tenants. The two monarchies are taking advantage of their desert land areas, access to lower-cost energy, and deep coffers, offering Nvidia an appealing market and affording Washington an opportunity to keep U.S. technology at the center of the AI buildout.
Both the Saudis and the Emiratis, however, also maintain deep relations with China. Washington fears that Beijing could gain access, intentional or not, through its contractors or cloud customers—or via hardware or software that may be connected to U.S. systems or chips. Chinese infiltration could occur through a trusted partner, with or without their knowledge, without directly acquiring the restricted chips.
That’s why companies such as the UAE’s Group 42 have caught the eye of China watchers and technology hawks. The group’s past links to China and its tech sector, even though the company publicly renounced them after the Biden administration declared it a security risk, raise questions that diplomatic assurances cannot resolve. The issue is not what the company says but whether its operations, ownership, partnerships, and access to sensitive technology can be independently verified and insulated from possible Chinese exploitation.
Saudi Arabia presents a similar challenge. The kingdom is pursuing AI autonomy by seeking control over every layer of the technology stack. But Washington will want evidence that Saudi officials can protect their data centers and cloud services from unauthorized access. And that case is increasingly difficult to make as Saudi Arabia continues to partner with both U.S. and Chinese technology companies.
The new rules make the Gulf an important litmus test for whether Washington can enforce its new approach in third-country data centers. Gulf-based facilities will need to prevent restricted users from accessing compute power enabled by U.S. chips, including indirectly through the cloud or other intermediaries. It’s not just about whether a Chinese company or user can rent compute power through a Gulf partner, but also whether the safeguards are in place for partners who maintain U.S. compute power to verify ownership and the affiliations of users.
U.S. export controls were designed for trade in tangible goods, but the Commerce Department has now acknowledged that simply controlling the physical movement of chips is not enough. The new rules extend export controls to some forms of remote access and computing power—intended, for example, to prevent a Chinese company from renting access to a processor through a data center or cloud provider. The new rule is a major step forward but not a complete solution. Safeguarding U.S. chips will require more than protecting the physical product or regulating direct access. It will require oversight of the people and systems that can use the computing power that those chips provide. That means guarding not just the chips’ physical location but also their ownership, network architecture, and consumer access.
Instead of determining which country or firm is purchasing a chip, an export policy will need to ask who will own and operate the facility, who can administer the compute power, which customers can rent its processors, what the networking and software infrastructure is made of, the nationality of users, and even whether the systems can be accessed outside of where they are housed. A processor being utilized in a Gulf data center, for example, may be used to provide computing power to a restricted Chinese company or state institution through the cloud—so controls must follow the user, not just the export.
Nvidia sells the most advanced chips in the business. Its former CEO, who made himself the face of the company’s strategy and government relations, was close with Trump and has decried more stringent export controls on AI chips, arguing that such restrictions will merely move more consumers toward Chinese suppliers like Huawei. His influence may have helped persuade Trump to sell limited amounts of the H200 chip to China. But the concern extends beyond Huang’s influence. Questions about the administration’s handling of the policy—including conflicts of interest involving U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, Trump’s own financial interests in Nvidia, and other relationships between U.S. officials and companies that may have benefited from certain sales, like Jared Kushner’s—warrant a review of these decisions. Regulators should begin by reexamining the decision to allow the sale of Nvidia’s most advanced chips to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
A new oversight policy would not entail a crackdown on Nvidia or a blanket ban on selling further advanced chips to Gulf states. Instead, Washington would expand access only when Gulf states meet specific conditions and establish guidelines for continuously evaluating who can access the technology. The new framework should become the baseline for future Gulf licenses that can identify approved facilities and consumers; limit chip quantities and aggregate compute power; prohibit restricted access and rentals; and require oversight of inventories, access logs, and control standards. Washington should also retain the right to suspend a license at any time. China has already sought to lease capacity through data centers in Europe and accessed U.S. chips to train its models through systems in Thailand.
When the Democrats take control of the U.S. Congress in January, they will likely press for tougher oversight of foreign chip deals—as they should. Democrats and Republicans have a considerable opportunity to work together on this issue. Even though this week’s new rules help address some of the areas of concern, they are an executive branch policy and thus subject to change at any moment. Congress can focus on passing the Remote Access Security Act, which will require export policy to include remote access controls, and the AI Overwatch Act, which will give Congress more oversight over foreign chip sales.
For the UAE and Saudi Arabia, access to the most advanced chips is still possible but now comes with stronger U.S. demands—and any failure to adhere to those conditions should mean that access is immediately cut off. Fair or not, the Nvidia scandal raises the cost of assuming that trust is enough protection.
However, tighter U.S. restrictions also carry some risk. If U.S. requirements become too stringent, intrusive, costly, or unpredictable, Gulf governments may turn back toward Chinese tech or tilt toward other suppliers with fewer restrictions. Greater reliance on Chinese tech would not replace the U.S. technological edge overnight but over the long term, it could well reduce U.S. influence.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia are seeking slightly different things. The UAE is leading the space in dealmaking and pushing the next generation of AI models, while Saudi Arabia is seeking to build out local compute capacity. For both, ongoing relationships with Chinese tech companies will remain an issue, and Washington will need stringent controls and verifications on who can access and use the systems.
China’s challenge to U.S. AI is a serious threat, and the United States must strengthen its technological defenses in the Gulf and elsewhere. The Commerce Department’s new rules are a meaningful step in closing the regulatory gap in U.S. export policy on chips. The Saudis’ and Emiratis’ AI ambitions make them key tests of whether the United States can enforce this approach. That requires systematic and continuous scrutiny of many more layers of the AI value chain than current U.S. export controls offer, including ownership, users, infrastructure, and remote access. The Saudis and Emiratis will, of course, say that they can be trusted. But in the post-Huang AI space, it is simply too risky to rely on assurances alone.
**Elizabeth Dent is the Wagner Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and former director for the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula at the Pentagon. This article was originally published on the Foreign Policy website.

Who’s in Charge in Iran?
Patrick Clawson/The Washington Institute/November 20, 2026
Unusual public statements on nuclear issues and ceasefire terms may signal that the Islamic Republic’s clerical establishment plans to play a more active political role post-Khamenei.
U.S. officials have been puzzling over who is making decisions in Tehran, and a November 12 statement from the Assembly of Experts raises further questions about who is really in charge. Is the clerical establishment asserting a greater role?
Breaking the Silence
During the reign of the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, there was no doubt that he was Iran’s top decisionmaker, even when he was careful to frame certain policies (e.g., accepting the 2015 nuclear deal) as being advocated by other officials despite his misgivings. Since his killing, his son and successor Mojtaba has yet to be seen or heard. In recent weeks, written statements attributed to the new Supreme Leader have become more frequent and substantial, and several senior officials claim to have held long meetings with him. Yet it remains entirely unclear how much authority he actually wields.
U.S. officials were therefore encouraged when the Iranian delegation sent to negotiate the June memorandum of understanding was headed by Speaker of Parliament Muhammad Baqer Qalibaf, a former general whom many thought was the real center of power. But the MOU quickly fell apart, with various reports suggesting it was deliberately sabotaged by radical critics. Washington then began to wonder whether real power was in the hands of Mohsen Rezaei, the former head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and now chief of the Supreme National Security Council. Hence, when Vice President JD Vance sent a letter to Iran on October 25 proposing a new framework for negotiations, it was addressed to Rezaei.
Yet a November 12 statement issued by the Assembly of Experts raises the possibility that the country’s clerical establishment intends to play a more active role in decisionmaking. According to Iranian news agencies, the statement included the following declaration: “The repeated threats by the hostile enemy, particularly those directed at the country’s nuclear program, demonstrate that no hope should be placed in the relevant international bodies. Therefore, withdrawal from the [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty], a revision of the country’s defense doctrine, and the development of stronger deterrent capabilities have become a national demand.”
An elected body of eighty-four clerics, the assembly is formally charged with choosing the next Supreme Leader during times of succession—though only two such moments have come up in five decades, and the assembly’s actual role in the choice is debatable. As such, the body is mostly known for infrequent formal sessions and ritual expressions of support for the leadership. All of its members are elderly (the Iranian joke is that their average age is “dead”), and few are politically active, so there is little precedent for them to weigh in on public policy issues. Indeed, observers have long concluded that the Islamic Republic is not really a theocracy, since major decisions are made by revolutionary power centers—chiefly those tied to the IRGC—rather than clerics.
The assembly also stirred controversy on June 27, when more than sixty members published an unusual statement on the MOU. Despite thanking the negotiators, the signatories were quite critical of the agreement with Washington and warned that violating Mojtaba’s red lines was “not permissible under any circumstances.” Specifically, they argued that the decision to reopen the Strait of Hormuz before a ceasefire was reached in Lebanon was a “strategic error,” and that Tehran should refuse further negotiations on the nuclear program. Days later, the assembly’s secretariat criticized the signatories for issuing a statement outside normal procedures, calling it “unprecedented.” At the time, the episode was seen as an anomaly, but the November 12 statement suggests otherwise.
Alternatively, the assembly may be acting as a cutout for criticism by other hardline elements—though unlike parliament, the clerical body has not previously been used in this manner as a message-signaling device. If that is the case, then the assembly’s recent behavior would be yet another indication that hardliners are gaining more influence throughout the regime.
No Religious Brake on Nuclear Activities
Notably, the substance of the November 12 statement drives a nail in the coffin of any lingering hope that religious objections might keep Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. As previous Washington Institute publications have detailed, various clerical loopholes meant that such hopes were always in vain. For example: clerics frequently change their opinions about such rulings; clerics have been known to give binding oral instructions that contradict their written statements on controversial issues; and a cleric’s rulings become religiously null and void as soon as that individual dies. Hence, even the late Supreme Leader’s past fatwa banning nuclear weapons was no barrier to actually developing them.
Tellingly, more Iranian officials are now saying that the country will (or should) reexamine its supposedly peaceful nuclear program and consider building a bomb. It can be easy to dismiss such statements when they come from radical clerics and other firebrands, but some of the latest comments have been made by more sober and authoritative sources, including Rezaei.
Policy Implications
Given the current uncertainty about who the regime’s key policymakers are, it would be a triumph of hope over experience to expect that any one individual has the authority to make commitments to which Tehran will stick. This is a sharp contrast to the prewar era, when decisions made by the Supreme Leader generally stuck. Hence, any new agreements should be based on clear understandings of the consequences Iran would face if it fails to fulfill obligations approved by its negotiators. Any U.S. concessions should also be tied to Iranian actions and be easily reversible if circumstances require.
Finally, no U.S. policy decision should be based on the hope that Iran will refrain from developing nuclear weapons. Each time Tehran has offered assurances about the peaceful nature of its program, they have ultimately rung hollow, and the situation is no different today. Only concrete, verifiable limitations on the regime’s nuclear activities will achieve the paramount goal of the past six U.S. presidents: to prevent Iran from getting the bomb.
*Patrick Clawson is the Morningstar Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and director of its Viterbi Program on Iran and U.S. Policy.

The Gulf Is America’s Next AI Security Test
Elizabeth Dent/The Washington Institute/November 20, 2026
Even after the Nvidia scandal ushered in new U.S. government rules to counter Chinese tech risks, significant loopholes remain open in the Gulf states.
In the wake of Jensen Huang’s stunning resignation as CEO of Nvidia over his alleged affair with a Chinese spy, the U.S. Commerce Department this week announced new export controls on artificial intelligence and semiconductors. These rules mark the most serious effort to close the loopholes that have allowed Chinese companies to obtain access to U.S. chips and computing power. The new interim rules target three vulnerabilities: Chinese rerouting of U.S.-made AI chips through third countries, rented access to AI computing power, and Chinese chip designers’ ability to manufacture advanced chips at non-Chinese facilities.
The Nvidia scandal—including the alleged rerouting of Nvidia’s most advanced chips to China and the Trump administration’s apparent quiescence—underscores the scope of the Chinese threat to U.S. artificial intelligence technology. The new rules close important gaps, but they do not resolve the threat. The next area where the United States is especially exposed is the Gulf, where the most advanced U.S. chips are now arriving, to be utilized in data centers operated by partners that maintain extensive ties with China.
The Gulf magnifies the Nvidia problem. Both the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are trying to shift their economies away from oil, and they’re placing AI at the center of their strategies. In May 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that both countries would be able to purchase advanced U.S. chips to help facilitate these efforts. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh are financing massive AI buildouts, where Nvidia chips will be installed, operated, and even rented to customers or cloud tenants. The two monarchies are taking advantage of their desert land areas, access to lower-cost energy, and deep coffers, offering Nvidia an appealing market and affording Washington an opportunity to keep U.S. technology at the center of the AI buildout.
Both the Saudis and the Emiratis, however, also maintain deep relations with China. Washington fears that Beijing could gain access, intentional or not, through its contractors or cloud customers—or via hardware or software that may be connected to U.S. systems or chips. Chinese infiltration could occur through a trusted partner, with or without their knowledge, without directly acquiring the restricted chips.
That’s why companies such as the UAE’s Group 42 have caught the eye of China watchers and technology hawks. The group’s past links to China and its tech sector, even though the company publicly renounced them after the Biden administration declared it a security risk, raise questions that diplomatic assurances cannot resolve. The issue is not what the company says but whether its operations, ownership, partnerships, and access to sensitive technology can be independently verified and insulated from possible Chinese exploitation.
Saudi Arabia presents a similar challenge. The kingdom is pursuing AI autonomy by seeking control over every layer of the technology stack. But Washington will want evidence that Saudi officials can protect their data centers and cloud services from unauthorized access. And that case is increasingly difficult to make as Saudi Arabia continues to partner with both U.S. and Chinese technology companies.
The new rules make the Gulf an important litmus test for whether Washington can enforce its new approach in third-country data centers. Gulf-based facilities will need to prevent restricted users from accessing compute power enabled by U.S. chips, including indirectly through the cloud or other intermediaries. It’s not just about whether a Chinese company or user can rent compute power through a Gulf partner, but also whether the safeguards are in place for partners who maintain U.S. compute power to verify ownership and the affiliations of users.
U.S. export controls were designed for trade in tangible goods, but the Commerce Department has now acknowledged that simply controlling the physical movement of chips is not enough. The new rules extend export controls to some forms of remote access and computing power—intended, for example, to prevent a Chinese company from renting access to a processor through a data center or cloud provider. The new rule is a major step forward but not a complete solution. Safeguarding U.S. chips will require more than protecting the physical product or regulating direct access. It will require oversight of the people and systems that can use the computing power that those chips provide. That means guarding not just the chips’ physical location but also their ownership, network architecture, and consumer access.
Instead of determining which country or firm is purchasing a chip, an export policy will need to ask who will own and operate the facility, who can administer the compute power, which customers can rent its processors, what the networking and software infrastructure is made of, the nationality of users, and even whether the systems can be accessed outside of where they are housed. A processor being utilized in a Gulf data center, for example, may be used to provide computing power to a restricted Chinese company or state institution through the cloud—so controls must follow the user, not just the export.
Nvidia sells the most advanced chips in the business. Its former CEO, who made himself the face of the company’s strategy and government relations, was close with Trump and has decried more stringent export controls on AI chips, arguing that such restrictions will merely move more consumers toward Chinese suppliers like Huawei. His influence may have helped persuade Trump to sell limited amounts of the H200 chip to China. But the concern extends beyond Huang’s influence. Questions about the administration’s handling of the policy—including conflicts of interest involving U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, Trump’s own financial interests in Nvidia, and other relationships between U.S. officials and companies that may have benefited from certain sales, like Jared Kushner’s—warrant a review of these decisions. Regulators should begin by reexamining the decision to allow the sale of Nvidia’s most advanced chips to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
A new oversight policy would not entail a crackdown on Nvidia or a blanket ban on selling further advanced chips to Gulf states. Instead, Washington would expand access only when Gulf states meet specific conditions and establish guidelines for continuously evaluating who can access the technology. The new framework should become the baseline for future Gulf licenses that can identify approved facilities and consumers; limit chip quantities and aggregate compute power; prohibit restricted access and rentals; and require oversight of inventories, access logs, and control standards. Washington should also retain the right to suspend a license at any time. China has already sought to lease capacity through data centers in Europe and accessed U.S. chips to train its models through systems in Thailand.
When the Democrats take control of the U.S. Congress in January, they will likely press for tougher oversight of foreign chip deals—as they should. Democrats and Republicans have a considerable opportunity to work together on this issue. Even though this week’s new rules help address some of the areas of concern, they are an executive branch policy and thus subject to change at any moment. Congress can focus on passing the Remote Access Security Act, which will require export policy to include remote access controls, and the AI Overwatch Act, which will give Congress more oversight over foreign chip sales.
For the UAE and Saudi Arabia, access to the most advanced chips is still possible but now comes with stronger U.S. demands—and any failure to adhere to those conditions should mean that access is immediately cut off. Fair or not, the Nvidia scandal raises the cost of assuming that trust is enough protection.
However, tighter U.S. restrictions also carry some risk. If U.S. requirements become too stringent, intrusive, costly, or unpredictable, Gulf governments may turn back toward Chinese tech or tilt toward other suppliers with fewer restrictions. Greater reliance on Chinese tech would not replace the U.S. technological edge overnight but over the long term, it could well reduce U.S. influence.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia are seeking slightly different things. The UAE is leading the space in dealmaking and pushing the next generation of AI models, while Saudi Arabia is seeking to build out local compute capacity. For both, ongoing relationships with Chinese tech companies will remain an issue, and Washington will need stringent controls and verifications on who can access and use the systems.
China’s challenge to U.S. AI is a serious threat, and the United States must strengthen its technological defenses in the Gulf and elsewhere. The Commerce Department’s new rules are a meaningful step in closing the regulatory gap in U.S. export policy on chips. The Saudis’ and Emiratis’ AI ambitions make them key tests of whether the United States can enforce this approach. That requires systematic and continuous scrutiny of many more layers of the AI value chain than current U.S. export controls offer, including ownership, users, infrastructure, and remote access. The Saudis and Emiratis will, of course, say that they can be trusted. But in the post-Huang AI space, it is simply too risky to rely on assurances alone.
**Elizabeth Dent is the Wagner Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and former director for the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula at the Pentagon. This article was originally published on the Foreign Policy website.

Question: What does the Bible say about plagiarism?
GotQuestions/November 20/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/11/159492/
Answer: Plagiarism is the act of taking someone else’s work or ideas and presenting them as your own. Plagiarism is most commonly associated with written work, such as research papers or books, but it can also occur with artistic expressions or in spoken work, such as a speech. While it is true that imitation is the highest form of flattery, such imitation is only flattering when proper credit is given to the original. When proper credit or permission is not given, imitation becomes plagiarism.
Plagiarism is dishonest because it advances a falsehood, passing off as one’s own the work of another, and the Bible has much to say about lying (e.g., Exodus 20:16; Proverbs 6:17). Plagiarism is also self-seeking, since the plagiarizer attempts to promote himself through the stolen work, and the Bible condemns self-seeking (see Romans 2:8; Philippians 2:3; 2 Timothy 3:2). Plagiarism is also stealing, and the Bible has much to say about the evils of stealing (e.g., Exodus 20:15). To steal is to take something that belongs to another, without permission, and make it one’s own.
It is easy to see how taking someone’s physical property is wrong. But taking someone’s intellectual property is just as wrong. Ideas, creative work, and written expressions belong to the person who created them. Plagiarism takes from the creator what was produced from his or her own mind and heart. Plagiarism robs authors, artists, musicians, and other creators of their right to profit from their own original work. It also robs them of the right to build a reputation based upon their work.
Stealing is a sin that was part of our old lives, not to be continued after we meet Jesus (2 Corinthians 5:17). Ephesians 4:28 says that stealing must be replaced with something good: “Anyone who has been stealing must steal no longer, but must work, doing something useful with their own hands, that they may have something to share with those in need.” This principle applies to the theft of intellectual property as well. If plagiarism has been a part of someone’s old life, it must be renounced and confessed to the Lord as sin (see 1 John 1:9). In order to live in honesty and integrity, we must give proper credit to people whose work we admire, and we should request permission before using the work of others as part of our own creations. Plagiarism has no part in the life of a follower of Christ (1 Peter 4:15).

Washington, Tehran, and the Limits of Maneuvering
Hassan Fahs / Independent Arabia / November 20, 2026  (translated from Arabic by AI)
In an article published on the *Persuasion* platform (via Substack) regarding the repercussions of the U.S. midterm elections, political thinker Francis Fukuyama argues that it is unlikely U.S. President Donald Trump will—during the final two years of his term—align himself with the preferences of the electorate or alter the positions that have already exacted a political price. Early indicators suggest that, rather than adjusting his approach, he is leaning toward even greater hardline stances. This assessment—which applies to Trump and his administration, particularly following the exclusion of Vice President J.D. Vance from the negotiation process—is equally relevant to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, and the team he has tasked with handling negotiations. Consequently, the situation between Washington and Tehran offers little promise of de-escalation. This is especially true given that most experts in the United States are largely convinced that the losses suffered by the Republican Party and Trump in the midterm elections will drive the President to focus more heavily on foreign policy, granting him greater room to maneuver—far removed from the intricacies of his domestic struggle with the Democrats over internal issues. Conversely, the Iranian leadership—as articulated by Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council—believes that through its resilience and ability to absorb the shocks and losses of the conflict, it has achieved a major victory and inflicted a strategic defeat upon the United States. They argue that the war has exposed the limitations of U.S. military capabilities in achieving its objectives, suggesting that the conflict will inevitably lead to a new regional order in West Asia. Furthermore, they anticipate that the coming period may facilitate a U.S. withdrawal from the region, prompting the question: who will inherit this role and influence—China, Russia, or the regional powers themselves? Could Israel perhaps serve as a proxy, stepping in to replace Washington?
Given this, it may be overly optimistic to pin high hopes on the outcomes of a potential trilateral summit in Shenzhen, China—involving Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and U.S. President Donald Trump—as a pathway toward a practical resolution to the ongoing war, confrontation, and escalation between Washington and Tehran. This is particularly true given that the U.S. President would arrive at such a summit with the "Iran file" in hand, yet would be unable to offer any substantive—or even tactical—concessions regarding Iran’s nuclear program or its enriched uranium. Meanwhile, despite its deep, strategic alliances with both Russia and China, Tehran is equally unlikely to make such concessions, having already endured the severe consequences and heavy costs of maintaining its stance—costs that have impacted its leadership, economy, military, and financial sectors, alongside an unprecedented economic blockade by land and sea. The interplay between the two sides is no longer confined to fine-tuning the nuances of terms and demands, or shifting the order of specific points; rather, it has come to resemble an exchange of blows—a war of attrition that could drag on, pending the moment one side signals its readiness to accept the terms of a settlement.
This conflict—its persistence, the political stalemate, and the military deadlock between the two sides—is a manifestation of a "psychology of obstinacy," embodied by the U.S. President on one hand and the Supreme Leader on the other. Both parties view this "personal stubbornness" as a calculated negotiating strategy, driven by considerations of survival, prestige, and mutual deterrence.
The outcomes of the confrontation between Washington and Tehran contributed—for Trump, his team, and the Republican Party—to their electoral defeat and an erosion of their grassroots support, stemming first from economic repercussions and second from a decline in American credibility among allies. Conversely, for the Supreme Leader and the Iranian leadership, these outcomes fostered a sense of victory—a victory that paves the way for Iran to emerge as a key player, not only in regional dynamics but on the international stage as well. Neither side feels able to retreat or make concessions; instead, both are driven toward greater rigidity, shaped by both psychological and strategic factors. The Iranian regime, having faced a barrage of "maximum pressure" and persistent military threats, sees no alternative but to exhibit psychological resistance. It remains steadfast in rejecting any external dictates from the United States—a stance it views as a strategic necessity to assert and cement its independence and autonomy. This serves to demonstrate its resolve to its own domestic audience and allies, as well as to the international community and its geopolitical neighborhood, while simultaneously acting as a lever to advance its ambitions to play a pivotal role—if not a controlling one—in future regional and global equations. For Washington, the situation is no different than it is for Tehran. It finds it extremely difficult to offer substantive concessions after decades of sanctions—under which Tehran has lived—alongside the massing of military forces and the development of a regional power presence in Iran’s periphery. Tehran has long perceived this as a military encirclement, waiting for a moment of Washington’s choosing to escalate into full-scale war or military aggression—a scenario that indeed materialized in June 2025 and February 2026. Consequently, any retreat would amount to an admission that the human, economic, military, and moral losses incurred over these decades were entirely in vain.
For Washington, any concession is viewed as a move that undermines its doctrine of "global hegemony and deterrence." For Tehran, it would strike at the very core of the regime’s existence—a regime founded on the principles of "resistance and non-submission," in line with its historic slogan, "Neither East nor West." Such a concession would also shatter the image of independence that the regime has sought to project to both its adversaries and its allies. The Iranian regime has set forth a list of seven conditions that it demands the U.S. administration meet before entering into any permanent settlement. Most notably, it insists that the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is contingent upon ending the war on all fronts—including in Lebanon—lifting the naval blockade, and unfreezing Iranian assets. The furthest Tehran has gone is to suggest a potential adjustment to the timeline for addressing these conditions versus discussing the nuclear issue; yet, it continues to refuse to abandon these demands, reflecting a deep-seated psychological obstinacy that has evolved into a formal strategy. The U.S. administration has likewise planted its own "tree"—with branches representing the dismantling or restriction of Iran’s nuclear, missile, and drone programs, as well as the termination of its regional influence. Washington refuses to back down from these demands, driven by the same psychological and emotional factors that shape the Iranian position. Furthermore, maintaining these conditions serves to raise the threshold for potential final gains; it transforms the situation into a high-stakes test of endurance—a "war of nerves"—designed to push Tehran toward a forced settlement. Consequently, pinning hopes on a resolution emerging from the trilateral summit in Shenzhen, China, may be premature. This does not, however, rule out the possibility of an interim or partial agreement with Tehran—one that neither precludes a future return to conflict nor grants Tehran its ultimate goal of closing the chapter on this hostility with Washington. Such an arrangement would keep the door open for the United States to pursue a "long-game" strategy, should it choose not to opt for a return to war aimed at fundamentally altering the regional balance.

Selected Face Book & X tweets on November 20/2026
makram rabah
Menassa and Haykal owe the Lebanese a credible account of implementation, with identifiable obstacles and measurable progress. President Joseph Aoun must insist on that accountability. If the minister and commander cannot execute the government’s lawful decisions, they should make way for those who can. Lebanon has paid enough for officials who demand the privileges of authority while treating its obligations as optional
Lebanon’s army leadership must answer to the constitution
https://ara.tv/wq9xr


Jonathan Serero @sererojonathan

https://x.com/sererojonathan/status/2123739419270054207/video/1
ISRAEL/ELECTIONS 2026: Prime Minister Benjamin @netanyahu : "We are at a decisive crossroads in the history of the State of Israel.""A few words before Shabbat.
Over the past few days, I have briefed Avigdor Lieberman, chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, Naftali Bennett and Gadi Eisenkot on the difficult security situation we are facing.
We are at a decisive crossroads in history. There is no manipulation or exaggeration here. The facts are being presented to them, and what is needed now is responsibility. And that responsibility means unity. But what is incredible is that I hear there is an intention to form a narrow government as early as the beginning of the week, relying on the votes of supporters of terrorism who advocate the destruction of the Jewish state. This is unacceptable. I say this as clearly as possible: this must be stopped immediately. Responsibility means unity. This is what must be done now, and every hour we wait is an hour lost. Israel's fate is at stake."

Israel War Room@IsraelWarRoom

Hezbollah critic Charles Jabbour wears a Star of David kippah on live Lebanese television and declares: “It does not bother me at all.”TV host Marcel Ghanem placed the kippah, bearing the name of the Israeli series Fauda, on Jabbour’s head. Jabbour has previously expressed his willingness to become Lebanon’s first ambassador to Israel if peace is established.

Prof. Dr. Susanne Schröter@susannschroeter
Islamism is the antithesis of democracy and civil liberties. This becomes unmistakably clear when we look at countries in the Islamic world. One of them is Iran, which for much of the 20th century was seen as an example of a move toward modernity, in which women’s rights were gradually secured and the power of reactionary religious elites was curbed. All that came to an end when the Shiite cleric Ayatollah Khomeini seized power in 1979 and proclaimed an Islamic Republic, initially supported by left-wing forces. Women were forced to wear the chador, a tent-like black garment, were pushed out of universities and many professions, and were subjected to their husbands’ total control. The regime, which now relies on the military strength of the Revolutionary Guards and other Islamist militias, ruthlessly persecutes the opposition and slaughters thousands of young people who dare to demonstrate in the streets for human rights. The clergy and their henchmen are obsessed with the idea that women are so alluring to men that they will destroy Islamic society unless they are veiled, locked away, and subjected to rigid Islamic control. They would rather murder them than grant them freedom. This paranoid, patriarchal delusion, however, is not confined to Iran; it also shapes many other countries in the Islamic world. It is the reason for veiling, gender segregation, and the so-called “culture of honor,” which repeatedly leads to family-sanctioned murders of female family members who refuse to submit. There is resistance to this barbarity. There are women such as Nawal al-Saadawi in Egypt, Fatima Mernissi in Morocco, Nargess Mohammed in Iran, and Malala Yousafzai in Pakistan who have risen up against it. Some women now live in Western countries and tirelessly raise awareness of the dangers of Islamism. Among them is Masih Alinejad, who visited Frankfurt on November 17 at the invitation of the “Institute for Democracy and Islam.” Photographic impressions of the event, along with background articles on current events concerning everything related to Islam, can be found on our website http://indemis.org.

Faith Under Pressure

Soraya Manutchehri, a 35-year-old Iranian mother of four, was falsely accused of adultery by her husband, who wanted to marry a younger woman. According to her story, her husband manipulated witnesses to secure her conviction. Soraya was buried in the ground and stoned to death.
Her own father reportedly joined the execution, while her children were pressured to throw stones at their mother. An innocent woman, condemned by lies and killed in the name of religious justice. Muhammad was a curse to humanity.