English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For November 09/2026
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news

The Bulletin's Link on the lccc Site
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/aaaanewsfor2026/english.november09.26.htm

News Bulletin Achieves Since 2006
Click Here to enter the LCCC Arabic/English news bulletins Achieves since 2006 

Click On The Below Link To Join Elias Bejjaninews whatsapp group
https://chat.whatsapp.com/FPF0N7lE5S484LNaSm0MjW
اضغط على الرابط في أعلى للإنضمام لكروب Eliasbejjaninews whatsapp group

Elias Bejjani/Click on the below link to subscribe to my youtube channel
الياس بجاني/اضغط على الرابط في أسفل للإشتراك في موقعي ع اليوتيوب
https://www.youtube.com/@eliasbejjani8036

Bible Quotations For today
Who does not enter the sheepfold by the gate but climbs in by another way is a thief and a bandit.
John 10/01-06: "‘Very truly, I tell you, anyone who does not enter the sheepfold by the gate but climbs in by another way is a thief and a bandit. The one who enters by the gate is the shepherd of the sheep. The gatekeeper opens the gate for him, and the sheep hear his voice. He calls his own sheep by name and leads them out. When he has brought out all his own, he goes ahead of them, and the sheep follow him because they know his voice. They will not follow a stranger, but they will run from him because they do not know the voice of strangers.’Jesus used this figure of speech with them, but they did not understand what he was saying to them."

Titles For The English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on November 08-09/2026
Ballot Jihad: How Political Islam Uses Elections in Europe and America as a Weapon to Infiltrate the West and Achieve Empowerment and Islamization/Elias Bejjani/November 04/2026
Lebanon races against the end of UNIFIL’s mandate to prevent a vacuum in the south… Its concerns are border-related, documentary, and about the isolation of Christian villages… and bilateral coordination with Israel
Weapons Found Near UNIFIL Positions in Southern Lebanon; Airstrikes, Sweeping Operations, Shelling, and Detentions Reported
Lebanese Consul’s Passport Revoked in the U.S.; Farewell Gatherings Prohibited
A New French Proposal for the Post-UNIFIL Phase
Will the Israeli Army Withdraw from Southern Lebanon if Eizenkot Forms a Government?
A Million Dollars to Bring Public Institutions Out of the Dark...
Washington Douses the Spark of the "Resistance Axis," While Beirut Awaits Developments from Tel Aviv
Eisenkot and the Region... The Rhetoric Shifts, but the Swords Remain Drawn
Lebanon Fears New War as Hezbollah Retains Say Over Conflict
US State Department 'Expels' Lebanon’s Consul in Detroit
Lest We Forget ...​November 11 – Remembrance Day/Edmond El-Chidiac/Face Book//November 08/2026
Turks openly joining the circus, “Ya Hala”!/Elissa El Hachem/Now Lebanon/November 08/2026

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on November 08-09/2026
Trump Says Elections Were ‘Giant Step Back in History' for US
Israel’s president gives Eisenkot the first chance to form the next government
Israel Defense Minister Says ‘Mission Not Complete’ on Iran
Tens of Thousands March in Amsterdam, Pressing the Dutch Govt on Gaza and Israel
Israel Deports 14 Activists on Palestinian Solidarity Mission
Palestinian Authority Arrests Brokers Over Alleged Sale of Jericho Homes to Settlers
Iran-Linked Ships Hover Over Subsea Cables in Gulf of Oman
Iran Says Two Tankers Caught Fire in Hormuz after Hitting Mines
Iran Executes Three Men over Armed Unrest during January Protests
Thick Smoke at Tehran Refinery Caused by Safety Flaring, No Fire Reported
US Launches Task Force to Disrupt Land Transit Routes into Iran
Iran Suggests Blasts Are Not US Attacks as Both Sides Report Ships Hit
Train Collision in Egypt’s Giza Province Kills 4 and Injures 88, Health Ministry
SaysAl-Zaidi Intensifies Confrontation with Armed Factions
Al-Zaidi Intensifies Confrontation with Armed Factions

Titles For The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on November 08-09/2026
Makkah Alliance and Iran: From Deterrence to Establishing Stability/Dr. Ibrahim Al-Othaimin/Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
Elections and Scenarios on the Lebanese-Israeli Front/Dr. Nassif Hitti/Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
The US Midterms… Fallen Certainties and Emerging Paradoxes/Eyad Abu Shakra/Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
The US Congressional Elections and Our Region/Abdulah bin Bijad Al Otaibi/Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
Is the Houthis’ strength real or illusory?/Mishari Al-Dhaidi / Asharq Al-Awsat / 8 November 2026
Rubbing the Americans’ noses in the mud/Mamdouh Al-Muhaini / Asharq Al-Awsat / 8 November 2026
Selected Face Book & X tweets on November 08/2026

Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on November 08-09/2026 (Some of the News reports below are translated from Arabic by AI)
Ballot Jihad: How Political Islam Uses Elections in Europe and America as a Weapon to Infiltrate the West and Achieve Empowerment and Islamization
Elias Bejjani/November 04/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/11/158819/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1gZ7S6KAn0o
Introduction: America Votes, and Political Islam Seeks an Opportunity for Empowerment
The US elections held yesterday, Tuesday November 03, 2026, were not just a normal election or a traditional democratic transfer of power. The results, which led to the Democratic Party taking control of both houses of Congress after Republicans lost many seats, raise a very dangerous question about the future of the West, and about the ability of Western democracies to protect themselves from ideological movements that use the freedoms available to reach power and expand influence.
What deserves attention is not only the victory of Democrats and the defeat of Republicans, but the nature of the electoral alliances formed inside American society, and how different political forces used population, religious, and cultural blocs, including organized Muslim voting blocs, to reach decision-making centers. Americans and Westerners in general must understand that political Islam, both Sunni and Shia, especially Muslim Brotherhood currents, does not look at elections the way liberal democracies do. All these movements treat elections as a means to reach power, build institutions and influence, and achieve their ideological, political, and religious projects.
Ballot Jihad.
After armed jihad, coups, assassinations, and terrorism, the ballot box has become in the calculations of all jihadist Islamic movements a very important political and organizational weapon. The goal is not just to win a parliamentary or local seat, but to use the win to build power and influence that opponents will find hard to confront later.
US Election Results and Their Political Message
Yesterday's results showed a big shift in the American balance of power, as Democrats (left, gay groups, political Islam) regained the majority in the House and Senate, and won in states considered Republican strongholds. One notable event was the win of Dr. Abdul Salam Al-Sayed for a Senate seat in Michigan, known for his ideological affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood groups and his family, becoming the first Muslim elected to this chamber in US history. This event has political, demographic, and electoral importance, but by itself it does not mean political Islam has taken over American institutions, nor does it prove that all Muslim voters vote according to one organizational directive.
The problem we discuss is much deeper.
Organized voting blocs, whatever their identity, can become influential in close races, and turn into a bargaining force that imposes conditions on major parties. When ideological organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood invest in this fact, it becomes necessary to monitor their programs, connections, and political goals. American democracy allows a Muslim citizen and a non-Muslim citizen to vote, run for office, and reach the highest positions, and this is a constitutional right that must not be touched. But it does not give any Islamic or non-Islamic organization the right to use these freedoms to cancel the freedoms of others or to impose an ideological rule on them.
Ballot Jihad... The New Weapon of Political Islam
We must be clear about the plans, tricks, and taqiyya of political Islam, which does not always need a rifle, a suicide bombing, or an armed militia to achieve its goals. It can use elections, party alliances, associations, educational institutions, media, municipalities, and unions as multiple fronts for one political battle, and this is the essence of what we call ballot jihad. In democratic societies, political Islamic movements have wide space for freedom, organization, and expression, and can benefit from laws that protect religious and political pluralism. But the danger begins when these freedoms turn into tools to build a jihadist and religious authoritarian project that does not really believe in the right of others to exercise the same freedoms.
The electoral empowerment strategy of these jihadist and terrorist Islamic organizations is based on:
Mobilizing voters on the basis of religious, ideological, and organizational loyalty.
Using demographic weight in close electoral districts.
Pressuring major parties to get political concessions.
Building temporary electoral alliances with forces that differ ideologically.
Organizational control or wide influence over civil society institutions.
Placing their cadres in municipal councils, legislative institutions, and centers of influence.
Turning electoral gains into long-term political, legislative, and media influence.
Thus the ballot box becomes, in the calculations of these movements, a front of political jihad... It is a battle not necessarily fought with weapons and all kinds of terrorist operations, but with votes, organization, money, alliances, and exploiting legal and political loopholes. The question the West must ask is: Do these organizations accept democracy as a permanent principle, or do they accept it only when it is a path to power?
The Muslim Brotherhood and the Empowerment Project
It is impossible to understand a basic aspect of contemporary political Islam, both Sunni and Shia, without studying the concepts, doctrines, plans, and projects of the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928. The Brotherhood is not just a charity or traditional religious movement, but an ideological movement with a transnational political and organizational project, based on making Islam the reference for governance, society, and the state. Over decades, the group's methods and branches evolved, some entered elections and parliaments, formed political alliances, and some reached power. But electoral participation does not automatically mean abandoning the jihadist ideological project or accepting all foundations of a civil state and liberal democracy. The concept of empowerment (tamkeen) in the literature of all jihadist Islamic currents refers to moving from the stage of building the organization and social base to the stage of expanding influence and reaching centers of power. Here lies the importance of monitoring what these movements announce in their electoral programs, what they say in their internal literature, and what they do when they hold power. Therefore the West should not be satisfied with hearing democratic slogans, but should ask about the real position on freedom of belief, women's rights, rights of Christians and Jews, freedom of expression, independence of judiciary, and peaceful transfer of power.
Taqiyya, Gradualism, Abrogation... The Problem of Temporary Discourse
One of the issues to stop at when studying the political religious discourse of Muslim Brotherhood groups in all their organizations and branches is the issue of gradualism in action, the gap between public discourse and political practice, and how religious texts are used to serve ideological goals. These movements present themselves in Western societies as moderate, defending freedoms, pluralism, and minority rights, while in their other literature or positions they adopt different views about state, society, and source of legislation. We should not consider every moderate discourse as deception, or attribute taqiyya to every Muslim, but we have the right, indeed the duty, to ask about the extent to which public discourse matches the actual political program. Here the importance of studying the concepts of taqiyya, gradualism, and empowerment in their jurisprudential and organizational contexts appears, and not allowing them to be used to justify hiding political goals or evading accountability. As for dividing Quranic verses into peaceful verses in the phase of weakness and fighting verses in the phase of strength, it is a complex interpretive and jurisprudential subject, and it should not be reduced to one equation that applies to all Muslims. But what the West must understand is that religious and electoral slogans are not enough to judge any movement. The criterion is its real program and its behavior when it has power.
The Opportunistic Alliance Between the Left, Political Islam, and Gays
One of the paradoxes worthy of criticism and study in Western politics is the emergence of electoral and interest-based alliances between currents of the radical left and groups of political Islam and gay groups. This alliance is not based on unity of doctrine or values, but on intersection of immediate electoral and political interests. The left needs Muslim voters' votes in some districts, political Islam needs doors to institutions where the left has influence, and alliances that help it expand its political presence... and gays need forces that support their demands... Here a stark paradox appears. Political Islamic groups adopt very conservative positions, reject homosexuality, and oppose basic aspects of individual freedoms defended by leftist groups. Yet, we find electoral and political intersections between the three parties when their interests meet against a common opponent. The left raises slogans of diversity and pluralism, while Islamic movements allied with it adopt religious and political views that do not accept pluralism in the liberal sense... The same opportunistic equation applies to the alliance of gays with those who stay silent or support their life and rights demands.. What kind of alliance is this? And what intellectual harmony is there between projects, aspirations, concepts, values, and lifestyles that are contradictory? It is an alliance of interests and votes, not an alliance of principles. And the danger is that some Western parties may discover too late that the votes they invested in do not necessarily adopt the social and cultural project they defend.
Example of Hamas and Gaza... What Does Political Islam Do After Winning?
The experience of Palestinian Hamas provides a model that must not be ignored when discussing political Islam's relationship with elections. In January 2006, jihadist and terrorist Hamas won the majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, in elections in which Fatah and other political forces participated. But in June 2007, after bloody armed confrontations with Fatah, Hamas took control of Gaza by force, expelled the Palestinian Authority from it, and established a unilateral rule under which no new general elections were held. These facts are not just historical details, but raise a fundamental question about the difference between electoral victory and respect for democracy. Elections give the winner the right to govern within the constitution and law, and do not give him the right to abolish opposition or use weapons against opponents or monopolize power indefinitely. Here the difference appears between democracy as a fixed political value, and democracy as a tactical means to reach power.
Hitler and the Historical Lesson That Must Not Be Forgotten
European history itself provides a stark example of the danger of totalitarian movements reaching power through political and constitutional paths. Adolf Hitler reached the position of Chancellor on January 30, 1933 by presidential appointment, after the Nazi party became a large electoral force and benefited from alliances and political maneuvers.
After reaching power, he used state institutions and exceptional laws to dismantle democracy, ban opposition parties, and establish a dictatorial regime. Here the historical lesson is clear: Reaching power through elections or constitutional procedures alone does not prove that the movement is committed to democracy. Peoples have the right to know in advance whether whoever reaches power will preserve the rights of his opponents, or will use his authority to eliminate their political existence.
Role of Qatar, Turkey, and Iran... Money, Organization, and Weapons
Sunni and Shia political Islam based on the ideological concepts of terrorist Muslim Brotherhood groups cannot be studied apart from the regional and international influence network that supports it and invests in its expansion, and here three countries with different roles stand out:
Qatar: Has wide financial, media, and diplomatic tools, and has a history of relations with movements and figures linked to political Islam, in addition to influential international media influence.
Turkey: Under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, it became a political ally of a number of Islamic currents, and uses its political, media, and economic tools to enhance its regional influence.
Iran: Leads a Shiite political and military Islamic project under the authority of Wilayat al-Faqih, and uses its affiliated armed organizations in the region to expand its influence at the expense of state sovereignty.
Sunni and Shia political Islam are not one organization, but they intersect in many cases in putting ideological and organizational reference above the concept of an independent nation-state. The Sunni side includes multiple currents and organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram, with big differences in structure, goals, and means among them.
As for the Shia side, arms of the Iranian regime stand out, foremost Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and armed Iraqi factions linked to Tehran. These organizations are not all identical in their goals or methods, but their existence forces Western countries to deal with external financing, cross-border organizations, and political and military interventions seriously and transparently.
The Eastern Message to the West
We in the Middle East do not read these issues from books alone. We have lived long experiences with religious and political regimes, with armed organizations, and with countries where pluralism collapsed before the authority of doctrine and weapons. In Lebanon, we know well what it means for an armed organization to have the decision of war and peace outside state institutions, and for loyalty to an external reference to come before loyalty to the constitution and homeland, and we also know how religious slogans, resistance, and jihad can turn into tools to justify monopolizing power and decision. Therefore the warning we direct to the West is not a warning against Muslims, but against political Islam that wants to turn religion into political authority above constitution and law. A Muslim who lives in America or Canada or Europe, respects the constitution, believes in equality, and accepts the right of others to exercise their freedoms, is a citizen with full rights and duties. As for the organization that wants to exploit democracy to establish a system that does not recognize the rights of those who are not its followers, it is an opponent of democratic principles, regardless of the religion it uses as a cover for its project.
Conclusion: From Jihad by Sword to Jihad by Ballot
The recent American elections should be an occasion for a deeper reading of the future of Western democracy, and to notice that political conflict in modern societies does not always happen with weapons, but may happen through ballot boxes, party alliances, institutions, money, and media. Ballot jihad is the political expression of using elections as a means for empowerment, when the goal of democratic participation becomes reaching power, not respecting its rules, values, and principles, and political Islam, both Sunni and Shia, deserves serious critical study that does not flatter or compromise, and does not confuse it with Islam as a religion or Muslims as citizens. Hence the West must not deal naively with organizations that raise slogans of democracy in opposition, then reject pluralism when they reach power. Also the left must not ignore ideological and political contradictions with its electoral allies just to get extra votes... In the same context, gays should not ally with those who criminalize, prohibit, and betray their social lifestyle... And most importantly, Western institutions must not overlook any external financing or organizational connection or attempt to impose religious authority on civil society. The ballot box is not a weapon against democracy, but it can be turned into a political weapon against it when used by movements that do not accept peaceful transfer of power nor equality among citizens. Jihad by sword destroyed countries and societies, and ballot jihad may turn into another path to empowerment if accountability, transparency, and protection of institutions are absent. Beware that the ballot box turns into a Trojan horse through which enemies of pluralism and groups of terrorism and barbarism enter democratic institutions!
Democracy does not protect itself just by opening ballot boxes, but by protecting the constitution, law, freedoms, and the right of every citizen to live free, whatever his religion, origin, or belief. The West is not required to abandon its democracy, but is required to understand that everyone has the right to participate in elections, and no party has the right to use this participation to abolish democracy itself.
Finally, it is very important that the world, with all its countries and systems, understands the reality of the contradictions in the Muslim Brotherhood's discourse:
In the phase of weakness in the West and in any country in the world (Dar al-Harb / House of War), the Muslim Brotherhood raises the Meccan verses - the verses of patience and peacefulness:
"O you who have believed, persevere and endure and remain stationed" [Al-Imran: 200]
"And be patient, and your patience is not but through Allah" [An-Nahl: 127]
"Indeed, Allah is with the patient" [Al-Baqarah: 153]
"And if they incline to peace, then incline to it and rely upon Allah" [Al-Anfal: 61]
"There shall be no compulsion in religion, the right path has become clear from the wrong" [Al-Baqarah: 256]
"For you is your religion, and for me is my religion" [Al-Kafirun: 6]
With these verses they address the West: We are moderate, democratic, we believe in coexistence.
And at the time of empowerment and strength (Dar al-Islam/House of Islam) in any country, the Muslim Brotherhood applies the Medinan verses - the verses of the sword and empowerment which abrogate what came before them:
"And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush" [At-Tawbah: 5]
"Fight those who do not believe in Allah nor in the Last Day" [At-Tawbah: 29]
"And fight them until there is no fitnah and the religion, all of it, is for Allah" [Al-Anfal: 39]
"And He brought down those who supported them among the People of the Scripture from their fortresses
*The author, Elias Bejjani, is a Lebanese expatriate activist
Author’s Email: Phoenicia@hotmail.com
Author’s Website: https://eliasbejjaninews.com

Lebanon races against the end of UNIFIL’s mandate to prevent a vacuum in the south… Its concerns are border-related, documentary, and about the isolation of Christian villages… and bilateral coordination with Israel
Beirut: Nazir Rida / Asharq Al-Awsat / 8 November 2026
Lebanon is racing against the expiry of the mandate of the international forces operating in southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) at the end of this year, through diplomatic efforts to avoid a security vacuum that threatens Lebanon’s internationally recognized southern borders, deprives Lebanon of an international mechanism for documenting Israeli aggressions, and isolates the residents remaining in the Christian villages of Bint Jbeil district, forcing them to submit directly to Israeli measures. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) said in a statement on Friday: “In accordance with Security Council resolution 2790 (2025), UNIFIL’s mandate in Lebanon ends on 31 December 2026, after which the mission will begin the process of reducing its numbers and withdrawing.”Diplomatic sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the full withdrawal arrangements will stretch over several months, as the sectors will not be vacated all at once; the withdrawal will follow a timetable and be carried out gradually to prevent a vacuum in the three sectors (western, central, and eastern). Lebanon fears a “vacuum” in the south amid the Israeli occupation, after the Lebanese army withdrew from the occupied areas during the Israeli incursion deep into southern Lebanon between March and June 2026. The army was forced to withdraw gradually from dozens of positions it had held in the area south of the Litani, and redeployed and repositioned itself in the non-occupied areas north of the Yellow Line—areas that fall within the sector south of the Litani, which is UNIFIL’s area of operations.
International borders and documenting violations
Security sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the fears of a “vacuum” in the south after UNIFIL’s departure are not limited to the security file. They explained that the immediate danger “lies in the disappearance of the border points that UNIFIL worked to fix with the Lebanese army since 2000 (demarcating the Blue Line) in the border area with Israel.” They noted that “the absence of an international witness will push Israel to escalate its violations of the international borders” that Israel accepted in the 1949 Armistice Agreement. The sources added: “The only witness today in the occupied area is the United Nations forces, given the absence of official Lebanese agencies (the army and security forces) and amid the displacement of residents and the destruction of villages.” They stressed that the international forces “have long been the reliable witness before the international community and a supporter of Lebanon.”The sources said the reliable international testimony “includes documenting Israeli practices and aggressions and recording the history of the conflict at the United Nations—a role Lebanon will lose with the absence of UNIFIL.” They affirmed that “in the face of Israeli claims, the international narrative and documentation cannot be cast into doubt.”The sources emphasized that since 2006 the UNIFIL mission has helped the Lebanese army deploy south of the Litani, supported Lebanon’s legitimate institutions, and fulfilled its commitments under its mandate as set out in Resolution 1701, with 45 countries shouldering those responsibilities over 20 years.
Isolation of the Christian villages
The sources said that UNIFIL’s departure without replacement by a UN force or any force representing the international community “will leave Lebanon as prey to the Israeli hyena and leave it alone facing Tel Aviv.” They noted that the repercussions of the vacuum “will affect hundreds of families that are still holding out in the occupied area,” referring to the three Christian villages in Bint Jbeil district (Rmeish, Debel, and Ain Ebel). Their residents travel deeper into Lebanon escorted by UNIFIL in the occupied areas, then escorted by the army and UNIFIL to the area north of the Litani.
If UNIFIL leaves, these people will be forced to submit alone to Israeli security measures. On this issue, the sources revealed that Israel rejected a Lebanese proposal to open a safe corridor for them with Lebanese security escort so they could move freely to and from their towns, which lie within an occupied perimeter in Bint Jbeil district. The proposal provided for passage via the Tebnine road toward Beit Yahoun and Ain Ebel, but Israel rejected it. Lebanon fears being left alone after a path that cost it the international umbrella, following the cancellation of the tripartite negotiations (Lebanon and Israel under UN auspices) in Naqoura, and then the cancellation of the five-party negotiation framework (France and the United States were added to the tripartite framework, which was chaired by an American general and held at the UN center in Naqoura). The concerns reach the level of fear that the American guarantor will announce the end of its mission, leaving Lebanon in direct contact with Israel—something Beirut rejects. UNIFIL occupies around 36 fixed military positions south of the Litani, some of which the Israeli army could occupy or destroy. It also conducts hundreds of patrols daily; the number of patrols reached 410 per day in its area of operations before the 2024 war. UNIFIL said in its statement: “Peacekeepers from 45 countries continue to carry out their daily tasks as usual throughout southern Lebanon until the end of the mission’s mandate, including monitoring and reporting developments, communicating with the parties, supporting the Lebanese army, and facilitating humanitarian tasks.”
Ongoing efforts
Until the end of UNIFIL’s mandate, diplomatic efforts to find a replacement have not stopped. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun repeatedly warns of a vacuum in the south and welcomes any international force that undertakes the task of maintaining stability in the south.
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri reiterated on Friday to the European Union Ambassador to Lebanon, Sandra de Waele, that “UN Resolution 1701 is the legal guarantor of Lebanon’s right to fully recover its land up to the internationally recognized borders, and that the international emergency forces represent an operational framework for implementing all the provisions of this resolution.”Lebanon proposed expanding the tasks of some UN observers, but Israel rejected the proposal. According to UNIFIL, “the Security Council is considering the options available for the phase following the end of UNIFIL’s mandate, including monitoring and reporting activities along the Blue Line in the coming period. Decisions on any future arrangements rest with the Security Council.”

Weapons Found Near UNIFIL Positions in Southern Lebanon; Airstrikes, Sweeping Operations, Shelling, and Detentions Reported
Al-Markaziya / November 8, 2026
In a statement, the Israeli military announced the discovery of two caches of weapons and combat equipment in the town of Mays al-Jabal, as well as an apartment in the town of Tiri—both located near United Nations positions in southern Lebanon—which the military claimed were being used for operational purposes. According to the statement, the caches in Mays al-Jabal were found inside a civilian home and a warehouse—situated approximately 200 meters and 100 meters, respectively, from a UN site—and contained Kalashnikov rifles, shells, RPG launchers, a machine gun, hand grenades, an explosive device, ammunition, and communication and reconnaissance equipment. Also discovered at the site were boxes of humanitarian aid, alongside symbols associated with the Amal Movement and Hezbollah. Furthermore, the military reported finding reconnaissance gear, combat equipment, supplies for long-term stays, and Hezbollah-related symbols inside the apartment in Tiri, which is located about 250 meters from a UN position. The Israeli military accused UNIFIL of failing to fulfill its mandate, asserting that these findings substantiate its claims. Meanwhile, the Marjeyoun Plain in southern Lebanon was struck by three Israeli artillery shells, coinciding with an airstrike by Israeli warplanes targeting Wadi al-Salouqi, near the town of Shaqra. Additionally, Israeli aircraft carried out two airstrikes targeting the towns of Al-Mansouri and Hadatha in southern Lebanon, as part of the ongoing escalation in the region. Southern Lebanon also witnessed an escalation on the ground, with the outskirts of the town of Zawtar al-Sharqiya subjected to intermittent artillery fire, coinciding with shelling directed at the wooded area near the town of Ayta al-Sha’b. In a related development, Israeli aircraft carried out a strike targeting the Al-Mansouri area in southern Lebanon, amid an atmosphere of heightened tension and escalation in the region. A new security breach was recorded in the central sector of southern Lebanon, as Israeli warplanes conducted intensive, low-altitude flights over various villages and towns in the south.
This aerial activity coincided with an Israeli military operation involving the use of medium and heavy machine-gun fire directed toward the town of Al-Qantara, located in the Marjeyoun District. Around 1:00 AM, the Israeli army released a citizen named Nakad Bishara—a resident of the town of Deir Mimas—returning him to the town’s junction following a two-day detention and interrogation. Regarding further developments on the ground, Israeli artillery shelled the outskirts of the town of Majdal Silm and Wadi al-Salouqi this morning, while also opening machine-gun fire toward Wadi al-Hujair and the outskirts of Qabrikha. Additionally, the area between the towns of Mifdoun and Zawtar al-Sharqiya, as well as the area between Nabatieh al-Fawqa and Zawtar al-Sharqiya, were subjected to intermittent artillery fire this morning. During the night, Israeli artillery had also shelled Wadi al-Hujair and the outskirts of the towns of Baraachit and Hadatha. Overnight, the Israeli army carried out a large-scale detonation between the towns of Zoutar al-Sharqiya and Zoutar al-Gharbiya. It also conducted a detonation in the town of al-Qantara.

Lebanese Consul’s Passport Revoked in the U.S.; Farewell Gatherings Prohibited
Al-Markaziya / November 8, 2026
After the U.S. State Department declared Consul Ibrahim Sharara *persona non grata* and ordered his expulsion, several "Islamic" clubs and centers refused to host a modest farewell gathering for him—despite his dedicated service to them, his responsiveness to their invitations, and his active participation in their events. In response, Father Halim Choucair, pastor of the Mother of the Savior Church in Dearborn, opened the church doors to host the farewell. However, the church was also barred from hosting the event or any other gathering to bid him farewell. The Consul was instructed to head directly to the airport and depart the United States; he is expected to leave the country at 8:00 PM today. Furthermore, the diplomatic passport of the Lebanese Consul General in Detroit, Ibrahim Sharara, has been revoked following the U.S. State Department’s decision to declare him *persona non grata* and demand his departure from U.S. territory—a move prompted by posts he made on the platform "X" regarding Hezbollah. On Sunday, the U.S. State Department disclosed the reasons behind the decision to declare the Lebanese Consul in Detroit, Michigan, *persona non grata* and mandate his departure—a development that has raised questions regarding the background and timing of the decision. The U.S. Department of State has informed the Lebanese side of its decision to declare the Consul General in Detroit *persona non grata*, requiring him to depart U.S. territory no later than Sunday, November 8. A spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State, in comments to *Sky News Arabia*, stated that the Department continuously reviews information regarding members of foreign missions accredited to the United States—including any concerns related to national security—and takes appropriate action in accordance with U.S. law and international obligations. The spokesperson explained that "the Lebanese Consul in Detroit has been declared *persona non grata*," adding that "a visa is a privilege, not a right; there is no place in our country for anyone on U.S. soil who celebrates or justifies terrorist attacks." The U.S. official further remarked, "Terrorists killed Americans—including our own colleagues—in the bombings of U.S. diplomatic facilities in Beirut in 1983 and 1984. We will never forget them."
An Old Post Behind the Crisis
According to U.S. media reports, the decision stems from an old post by Sharara on the platform "X" (formerly Twitter), in which he praised the 1983 attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. The matter came to light following a report by the *Washington Free Beacon*, which noted that in October 2021—on the anniversary of the event—Sharara had praised the attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut. The bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut on October 23, 1983, resulted in the deaths of 241 U.S. Marines, 58 French soldiers, and 6 civilians, following a suicide attack on a military facility in the Lebanese capital. The United States accused Hezbollah of being behind the attack, which stands as one of the deadliest assaults on U.S. forces abroad.

A New French Proposal for the Post-UNIFIL Phase
Al-Markaziya / November 8, 2026
MTV sources have indicated that a new French proposal—to be discussed discreetly at the United Nations—addresses the post-UNIFIL phase and includes the possibility of strengthening the role of the Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). The sources noted that Israel might be open to discussing this new French proposal should Gadi Eizenkot succeed in forming a government.

Will the Israeli Army Withdraw from Southern Lebanon if Eizenkot Forms a Government?
Al-Markaziya / November 8, 2026
All eyes are on Tel Aviv following the tasking of Gadi Eizenkot to form an Israeli government, with Lebanon closely monitoring security developments along the northern border and the reality of the Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon. In this context, a report by the Israeli radio station "Kol Hai" stated that "Eizenkot plans to withdraw from Lebanon—even before successfully forming a government—having already begun negotiations and arrangements for what is being termed 'the day after' on the northern front." The report further noted that Eizenkot is engaged in negotiations with foreign parties regarding an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. The radio’s political correspondent stated: "Even before forming a government, Eisenkot is already planning what will follow. This may well be the reason why Arab parties are supporting him from the outside—they are fully aware of what Eisenkot intends to offer them across the board. A withdrawal from Lebanon, for instance, would merely be a prelude to what comes next: withdrawals from Gaza and Syria, and the systematic, deliberate dismantling of outposts in the West Bank."

A Million Dollars to Bring Public Institutions Out of the Dark...
Al-Markaziya / November 8, 2026
Tomorrow, the Finance and Budget Committee will examine an urgent draft law—submitted by the government via Decree No. 4210—proposing an additional appropriation of 8.95 trillion Lebanese pounds (equivalent to $100 million) within the 2026 general budget’s reserve fund. This allocation is intended to settle a portion of the outstanding dues owed to Électricité du Liban (EDL). The move comes in response to the complications that arose when electricity was cut off to various public institutions and government departments due to accumulated unpaid bills—a situation that has negatively impacted citizens. This legislative effort is part of a legal approach to resolve the issue, based on the principle—as stated by Kanaan a few days ago—that citizens should not bear the consequences of these accumulated debts, nor should they be "punished twice" (by having paid their bills only to be subsequently deprived of the service). Once approved by the Finance and Budget Committee, this additional appropriation is expected to be added to the agenda for the legislative session scheduled for next week.

Washington Douses the Spark of the "Resistance Axis," While Beirut Awaits Developments from Tel Aviv
Nidaa Al-Watan / November 8, 2026
Caught between the arduous process of forming an Israeli government and the repercussions of the U.S. midterm elections, Lebanon finds itself walking a tightrope—poised between the possibility of negotiations and the risk of escalation. As the country remains besieged by crises from every direction, its international image and reputation have been further tarnished by the fingerprints of the "Resistance Axis" (al-mumana'a). There is hardly a sector they have touched—from security and politics to diplomacy—that they have not left in a state of ruin. The expulsion of Consul Ibrahim Sharara from the United States has brought the issue of the "deep mini-state" back to the forefront. A U.S. State Department spokesperson confirmed to *Nidaa Al-Watan* that the United States has declared Sharara *persona non grata*, emphasizing that "a visa is a privilege, not a right; there is no place in our country for anyone who celebrates or justifies terrorist attacks." The spokesperson added that the Department "constantly reviews information regarding members of foreign missions accredited to the United States, including any concerns related to national security," noting that appropriate measures are taken in accordance with U.S. law and international obligations. He continued: "Terrorists killed Americans—our own colleagues—in the bombings of U.S. embassy compounds in Beirut in 1983 and 1984. We will never forget them."*Nidaa Al-Watan* has learned that Sharara departed the United States for good yesterday, returning to Beirut, where he is expected to be embraced by the "Axis of Resistance." However, the repercussions of this affair necessitate that the Lebanese Foreign Ministry investigate the positions attributed to him—positions that have dragged Lebanon’s long-standing diplomatic reputation, cultivated since the founding of the United Nations, to an all-time low. This raises the question: Will Washington accept another diplomat from the Shia community as a replacement for Sharara?
Rajji addresses the repercussions
As a measure to address the repercussions of the situation, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants Youssef Rajeh announced in an interview with MTV that he has appointed a diplomatic chargé d'affaires. The appointee is expected to arrive in Detroit within the next two days to oversee the affairs and administrative matters of Lebanese citizens, pending the appointment of a new, permanent Consul General. Regarding his visit to Canada, Rajeh achieved notable success on both official and public levels; he held high-level political and official meetings and received exceptional attention from the Lebanese diaspora. The Lebanese Embassy in Ottawa played a pivotal role in the visit's success through professional organization and the mobilization of all available resources. There was a significant turnout of Lebanese people from diverse regions, religious sects, and political affiliations. In Montreal, the response was so overwhelming that organizers had to change the venue at the last minute to accommodate the large number of attendees. Rajeh’s statements reflected the state’s current political direction—a push to reclaim its sovereign decision-making power and the independence of its diplomacy. He emphasized that Lebanon has entered a new phase from which "there is no turning back," asserting that "henceforth, no arms other than those of the Lebanese Army will be permitted," and declaring that Lebanese diplomacy has "returned to being one hundred percent Lebanese." Positive Neutrality: A National Necessity
Raji’s positions align with a political assessment of upcoming developments, as articulated to *Nidaa Al-Watan* by a high-ranking political source. The source emphasized that "Lebanon stands at a fateful juncture that necessitates restoring the concept of an independent state—rejecting any form of partnership or tutelage over its national decision-making—especially since past experience has shown that compromising sovereignty has only plunged the country into wars and crises." The source further asserted that "adopting a policy of 'positive neutrality' has become an urgent national necessity, rather than a political option that can be deferred." Meanwhile, Beirut is awaiting the formation of a new government in Tel Aviv. Commenting on a statement by Israeli President Isaac Herzog—who called for progress in negotiations with Lebanon—an official source told *Nidaa Al-Watan* that "the significance lies not in what the Israeli President says, but rather in what Gadi Eizenkot—or Benjamin Netanyahu, should Eizenkot fail to form a government—might say." The source stressed that "there are no indications of any progress or shift in the Israeli approach toward Lebanon; any differences are merely a matter of style."
Electricity and World Bank Loans
On the domestic front, and as part of efforts to address the electricity crisis, a Qatari technical delegation is expected to arrive in Beirut today. The visit aims to conclude the fifth round of Lebanese-Qatari talks regarding a proposal from Doha to develop the sector. In this context, attention is also turning toward the Parliament, in anticipation of a legislative session scheduled for next Thursday. "Nidaa Al-Watan" has learned that the Parliament is hosting a series of meetings today, most notably that of the Finance and Budget Committee. Its agenda includes a draft proposal to open an additional credit line of $100 million to settle a portion of the outstanding arrears owed to Électricité du Liban (EDL) by various public institutions and government departments—a step intended to pave the way for its inclusion on the agenda of an upcoming legislative session. Furthermore, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri has called for a meeting of the joint parliamentary committees to discuss projects linked to World Bank loans; there is concern that if these are not approved during the legislative session, the World Bank might withdraw its support for them.
King of Belgium to Visit Beirut
Regarding foreign relations, the King of Belgium, Philippe Léopold, is set to visit Lebanon on December 4. The visit will focus on Lebanese-Belgian relations and prospects for cooperation with Europe, as well as discussions on the political, economic, and security situation in Lebanon—all against the backdrop of the persistent "drums of war" sounding across the region.

Eisenkot and the Region... The Rhetoric Shifts, but the Swords Remain Drawn
Nidaa Al-Watan / November 8, 2026
Former Israeli Chief of Staff and leader of the "Yashar" party, Gadi Eisenkot, has entered the mandate phase with a promise to restructure the relationship between the state and society. In his address to Israeli President Isaac Herzog, he framed the fragility of democracy as a danger necessitating an emergency government, linking a change in leadership to ending the sense of exclusion felt by many Israelis. Eisenkot—who hails from a working-class family of Moroccan-Jewish immigrants—seeks to redefine "emergency" beyond the narrow scope of war, expanding it to encompass the integrity of institutions and internal social cohesion. This is a battle to establish a political legitimacy that transcends the mere accumulation of parliamentary seats, placing the restoration of trust at the very core of the concept of security. His call for the Likud party and the "Religious Zionism" bloc to support a government under his leadership is a calculated maneuver; it puts his opponents—who often champion "unity"—on the spot, testing their genuine willingness to facilitate a transfer of power. Furthermore, his warning directed at those who might obstruct the formation of a government for personal reasons serves to preemptively assign them the blame for any potential failure. Yet, this rhetoric of inclusion will face its true test when the "extended hand" must translate into the distribution of ministerial portfolios and the forging of binding commitments. The very principles that lend coherence to his project may, in fact, narrow the scope for compromise—most notably at the contentious intersection of mandatory military conscription and the demands of the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) parties. A complex and thorny political divide separates the 67 recommendations for Eisenkot’s mandate from the 48 seats held by his own political camp. External support from Arab parties could potentially enable the formation of a minority government, but such a move faces opposition from Avigdor Liberman, leader of the "Yisrael Beiteinu" party. Mathematically, the two ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) parties could bring the bloc to 61 seats—provided the coalition remains cohesive and a costly compromise is reached regarding the issue of military conscription; notably, the Shas party has denied agreeing to join a government led by Gadi Eisenkot. As for a unity government with Likud, it would require either a breakthrough in the party’s relationship with its leader, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, or a reversal by Eisenkot’s camp on its pledge to oust "Bibi." Consequently, the possibility of forming a government remains, but it is contingent upon breaking certain political taboos—while a narrow majority would leave any such government beholden to the demands of its coalition partners.
Netanyahu possesses effective tools to obstruct the process, including securing the loyalty of the Haredi parties, deepening divisions over the role of Arab-Israeli votes, enticing lawmakers from the opposing camp, and keeping the option of a unity government under his own leadership on the table as a potential way out. Furthermore, his position as head of a caretaker government grants him a daily role in security-related decision-making. Any regional escalation could increase pressure on his rivals to join him—though it is necessary to distinguish between his potential political exploitation of such an event and the possibility that he might deliberately orchestrate it for that very purpose. In the initial phase, it suffices for him that his rival fails to translate political recommendations into a functioning government. Should Eisenkot succeed, a shift in the architecture of decision-making would likely emerge: the establishment of clear, specific objectives, alongside an attempt to link military achievements to sustainable political arrangements.
This perspective underpins his stated criticism regarding the gap between operational successes and the ultimate outcomes of war. However, he will likely encounter a multi-centered government, where the imperative to keep the coalition intact could constrain his available options. Furthermore, his pledge to rely on institutional processes will be put to the test whenever a security recommendation clashes with the demands of a coalition partner capable of toppling the government.
Regarding relations with Washington, Eisenkot advocates for regaining support among both Republicans and Democrats, and for convincing both sides that Israel serves as a strategic asset to the United States. A potential shift here would involve moving toward more structured understandings concerning objectives, costs, and the limits of the use of force. While maintaining a strong connection with U.S. President Donald Trump remains essential, Israel must also work to restore its standing within American institutions and the broader political landscape—a process that requires far more time than simply changing a prime minister or refining diplomatic rhetoric. Eisenkot has previously warned of a widening gap between American and Israeli interests. In light of this, he is likely to seek a partnership with Washington that combines deterrence with diplomatic settlements, aiming to translate military gains into sustainable political arrangements. However, this approach will not eliminate the divergence in their respective calculations; Washington seeks to balance regional stability against the costs of its commitments, while Israel insists on maintaining a broad margin for military action. Consequently, the ultimate test for Eisenkot may be his ability to manage this divergence and forge understandings that limit friction, ensuring that disagreements do not escalate into open confrontation.
Regarding Iran, the stance remains firm, with the military option kept on the table. Eisenkot has previously linked the justification for a new campaign to Tehran’s push toward acquiring nuclear weapons—thereby establishing a clearer threshold for initiating war, as well as defining its timing and scale. One can anticipate an approach that subjects any decision to strike to precise calculations—weighing the level of the threat, the military’s capacity to neutralize it, and the costs associated with igniting a new conflict. A change in leadership could recalibrate the management of the conflict with Iran, from the conditions under which force is used to the timing and objectives of such action. Rigor remains a constant, with a likely emphasis on strengthening the link between military operations and the political goals they are intended to serve. His approach can be understood as an effort to decouple the decision to wage war—and the terms for ending it—from an open-ended gamble on toppling the regime of the Ayatollahs in Tehran, anchoring it instead to measurable and verifiable objectives. However, managing the scope of the war does not resolve the dilemma of "the day after": how can military strikes be translated into lasting gains if the regime remains capable of restoring its strength and regenerating sources of threat?
As for Lebanon, the potential rise of Gadi Eisenkot to the premiership would confront Beirut with a politician who possesses a military background and a hardline stance toward Hezbollah. He evaluates any settlement based on its ability to diminish the group’s power and prevent the resurgence of its threat to northern Israel. Eisenkot has advocated for the freedom to conduct military operations against Hezbollah—including in the southern suburbs of Beirut—and has criticized the practice of limiting operations solely to the south. Such positions undermine the assumption that a withdrawal might occur automatically or that pressure would ease following the departure of Benjamin Netanyahu. Instead, it is more likely that any withdrawal would remain contingent upon strict conditions regarding Hezbollah’s arsenal, its territorial deployment, and its capacity to rebuild its strength. Differences may also emerge in how the confrontation is managed and how diplomacy is utilized. Eisenkot’s inclination to restore an influential French role—alongside the Americans—could broaden the scope for mediation and provide fresh momentum to negotiations, while Washington would retain the primary role in supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces and assessing the implementation of security arrangements. In this context, he might combine field pressure with an openness to interim understandings, linking withdrawal steps to the deployment of the Lebanese Army and the dismantling of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure. Consequently, opportunities for negotiation could expand—within a framework of stringent security constraints—with diplomacy serving as a tool to consolidate military gains and transform them into long-term guarantees. Regarding Syria, Eisenkot proposes negotiating from a position of strength to update the 1974 Disengagement Agreement. This would involve American guarantees and stringent security arrangements, with the withdrawal of Turkish and Russian forces as a fundamental condition, while keeping the status of Mount Hermon on the negotiating table. It is an approach aimed at translating military superiority into durable political and security gains. As for the Palestinians, his vision for Gaza centers on ending Hamas’s rule, dismantling its military capabilities, and establishing an alternative authority—all while Israel retains ultimate security control. In the West Bank, he balances a rejection of wholesale annexation—to safeguard the Jewish majority—with support for settlements, aligned with Israel’s strategic interests and legal framework. These positions suggest that the proposed shift focuses on curbing settler violence, restoring authority to security institutions, and empowering a Palestinian administration, without committing to a fully sovereign Palestinian state. Eisenkot’s approach offers the prospect of a more disciplined application of force, alongside the potential to leverage diplomacy to consolidate its outcomes. The ultimate challenge will be his ability to translate the promise of domestic recovery into policy decisions that account for the costs of external settlements. As a general, he understands how control on the ground is measured; as a head of government, he will be expected to demonstrate that Israel’s military superiority can be converted into lasting stability, rather than being squandered on successive rounds of conflict that repeatedly raise the same fundamental questions.

Lebanon Fears New War as Hezbollah Retains Say Over Conflict
Beirut: Caroline Akoum/November 08/2026
Lebanon faces mounting political and security uncertainty amid fears it could be drawn into a new regional war pitting the United States and Israel against Iran, with the government unable to guarantee that Hezbollah would stay out of the fighting. The prospect has alarmed Lebanese citizens, who fear renewed destruction and displacement, as well as officials who have limited control over how events might unfold. President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have repeatedly warned of the dangers posed by the absence of clear assurances about Hezbollah’s intentions.
Lebanese State Faces Dilemma Over Lack of Guarantees
Although the Lebanese government has taken unprecedented decisions aimed at placing authority over war and peace exclusively in its hands, with broad support from Western and Arab countries, a major source of uncertainty remains in its inability to guarantee that Hezbollah will comply with any state decision to keep Lebanon out of a regional confrontation. Despite officials’ insistence that such decisions must rest solely with legitimate state institutions, Hezbollah’s continued control over its own military decisions and the close connection between its strategic calculations and developments in Iran leave the state facing a complex situation. A ministerial source said domestic contacts have continued among the various parties but have yet to produce tangible results, apart from statements suggesting that Hezbollah would not enter any future conflict. The source cautioned, however, that these assurances have not been accompanied by substantive evidence to justify confidence, making vigilance essential at this stage. The source stressed that the Lebanese state is not weak and that its position remains firm, having adopted clear decisions in this regard. The problem, however, is that the party directly involved in decisions on war is neither cooperating with the state nor responding to its policies, acting instead according to calculations and priorities that differ from those of official institutions.
“The state does not want war or destruction, but the calculations of the other side — Hezbollah — are different,” the source said. Amid regional uncertainty following the Israeli and US elections, the source said the core problem also lies in the nature of Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran.
Tehran, the source explained, does not treat the Lebanese state as the official authority on this issue. Instead, it communicates with the group it supports, without offering clear guarantees that Hezbollah will stay out of any future confrontation. The source also pointed to recent remarks attributed to Mojtaba Khamenei concerning the “unity of fronts,” describing them as a signal that cannot be ignored when assessing the possibilities ahead.
Israeli Threats, US Warnings Heighten Concerns
Developments on the ground have done little to ease fears, with Israeli attacks continuing in southern Lebanon alongside repeated threats. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz has threatened to expand military operations and target additional areas of Lebanon if Hezbollah joins any confrontation involving Iran, while Israeli media have discussed possible military scenarios extending beyond the area south of the Litani River. Israel’s Maariv newspaper published information about possible plans involving an advance toward Tyre, Sidon and Nabatieh, as well as a naval blockade of the ports of Beirut and Tripoli should the conflict widen. These remain scenarios reported in the media, with no official confirmation that they will be implemented. The warnings are not limited to Israel.
The ministerial source reiterated that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio had conveyed clear warnings to President Joseph Aoun that Hezbollah’s involvement in any future war would invalidate previous guarantees, potentially exposing Lebanon to far-reaching consequences that could prove impossible to contain. Regarding the suspension of Lebanese-Israeli talks, the source expressed hope that negotiations would resume and produce results. The source added, however, that the suspension was not unexpected, as it had been clear for some time that the talks would not take place during the US and Israeli election periods.
Lebanon Faces a Serious Predicament
Dr. Rodrigue Abi Khalil, head of the Political Science Department at the Lebanese University, said the uncertainty confronting the Lebanese state stems fundamentally from its lack of the means to implement its commitments, despite the unprecedented decisions taken by the government to assert its authority and extend state sovereignty. Abi Khalil told Asharq Al-Awsat that, despite their significance, these decisions run up against the reality that Hezbollah’s decisions remain tied to Iran, preventing the state from controlling the course of a confrontation or keeping Lebanon from being drawn into one. “Government decisions, however important, are not sufficient for the international community unless they are translated into practical measures on the ground, particularly since Hezbollah will not relinquish this advantage without a political price,” he said.
Abi Khalil argued that Lebanon’s domestic political situation is closely linked to regional developments, leaving the country in a serious predicament as the region approaches a pivotal phase that could see war resume with greater intensity amid US and Israeli efforts to bring about strategic changes in the region. He said this reality explains the Lebanese state’s uncertainty and apprehension, as a significant part of the decision affecting Lebanon’s fate depends on the outcome of the potential confrontation. “This connection has been clearly reflected in the course of Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, which have yet to produce decisive results,” he added. Abi Khalil concluded that “Lebanon is approaching the prospect of another confrontation without having adequately prepared for it, while the state waits to see what outside powers decide rather than controlling the course of events itself.”

US State Department 'Expels' Lebanon’s Consul in Detroit
Asharq Al Awsat/November 08/2026
Lebanese Foreign Ministry sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Lebanese Embassy in Washington had been formally notified by the US State Department that Lebanon’s consul in Detroit, Ibrahim Charara, had been declared persona non grata and must leave the United States within 48 hours.
The decision reportedly followed controversy sparked by US media reports that resurfaced old social media posts attributed to Charara about the 1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut, which he had described as “heroic resistance.”
Political Views
In a report published on November 2, the US news website The Washington Free Beacon said Charara had written in a 2021 social media post marking the anniversary of the Marine barracks bombing that “heroic resistance” had ended the “American military occupation of Beirut with a single strike.”The website also cited another post attributed to Charara that read: “From the Marine barracks in Beirut to the Al-Tanf base ... we will reject the occupier and defeat him,” an apparent reference to the US military presence in Syria. The report also highlighted other positions attributed to Charara, including his praise for the escape of six Palestinian prisoners from Israel’s Gilboa Prison in 2021. It also pointed to his X account’s cover image, which shows an Israeli flag burning, and a quotation by Palestinian writer and political figure Ghassan Kanafani in his profile bio. The controversy resurfaced on the eve of the midterm elections, with the Free Beacon highlighting Charara’s attendance at an Arab American political action committee event in Dearborn, attended by Senate candidate Abdulrahman Alsayed (who later won the seat) and other Democratic hopefuls. The report was published a day before the November 3 vote, fueling speculation about an attempt to influence Michigan voters, though no link between the event and the US decision has been established. Article 23 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations allows a host country to declare a consular officer persona non grata, requiring the sending state to recall the officer or end their duties. If the sending state does not comply within a reasonable time, the host country may stop recognizing the officer’s consular status. This measure does not itself constitute a criminal conviction. The decision is expected to require Beirut to make arrangements for the consulate’s management and ensure the continued delivery of services to the Lebanese community, while containing the diplomatic fallout. The move against the consul does not in itself mean a rupture in relations or the closure of the mission, but the scope of the fallout will depend on Washington’s explanations and Beirut’s response.

 Lest We Forget ...​November 11 – Remembrance Day
Edmond El-Chidiac/Face Book//November 08/2026
​Every freedom has a story, and behind Canada's freedom stand generations of brave men and women who were willing to give everything for it. They went to war, leaving behind the people they loved, the homes they cherished, and futures they would never get to see. Many never returned. Their lives were cut short, but their courage helped secure a future for millions they would never know.
​On this day, we remember not only their ultimate sacrifice, but the human lives behind it: the sons, daughters, husbands, wives, fathers, and mothers whose absence echoed in countless homes, and whose bravery became woven into the fabric of Canada's history.
​As a first-generation Canadian, I am deeply grateful for the freedom my family and I enjoy today—knowing it was secured by the courage, sacrifice, and blood of those who gave their lives defending this great country. Their sacrifice is a debt of gratitude I will carry forever, and one I would never hesitate to repay, if ever necessary, in defense of Canada and its freedom.
​The red poppy is a small symbol, yet its meaning is immense. It reminds us that freedom must never be taken for granted, and that those who gave their lives deserve to be remembered by every single generation.​To our fallen heroes: your sacrifice lives on in the freedom we enjoy, the country we cherish, and the generations who will always remember you.
​God Bless Canada. God Bless Freedom. Lest We Forget.

Turks openly joining the circus, “Ya Hala”!
Elissa El Hachem/Now Lebanon/November 08/2026
Israel is stuck in coalition limbo, with no bloc near 61 seats. America has voted, and in some states the count is still under way. Someone has won and someone has lost. For Lebanon, it changes nothing. Neither Netanyahu nor Eisenkot, neither Republicans nor Democrats, can fix a country that insists on staying in caretaker mode.
First came the Syrian occupation, then the Iranian one. One would think the lesson had been learned. It has not. Dependency is a form of submission, and submission has become a habit.
Lebanon marks Independence Day on 22 November, its 83rd. A country that cannot mature keeps looking for a chaperone. First came the Syrian occupation, then the Iranian one. One would think the lesson had been learned. It has not. Dependency is a form of submission, and submission has become a habit.
Bilal Erdogan, the Turkish president’s son, is reportedly expected in mid-November to meet the three presidencies and visit Tripoli, with talk of restoring Ottoman-era landmarks. The Ottomans return and the doors swing open. Call it charity if you like. It looks more like a footprint.
Every patron arrives with a parish. Tehran has its own. Riyadh and Paris, who never stopped treating Lebanon as an unfinished mandate, have theirs. And now the Turks are back. Bilal Erdogan, the Turkish president’s son, is reportedly expected in mid-November to meet the three presidencies and visit Tripoli, with talk of restoring Ottoman-era landmarks. The Ottomans return and the doors swing open. Call it charity if you like. It looks more like a footprint.
Meanwhile Lebanon is discussed in its absence. Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Pakistan’s army chief Asim Munir and Turkey’s intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin sat with President Pezeshkian and Mohsen Rezaei in Tehran. Iran’s foreign ministry listed Lebanon among the topics. The Lebanese state was not in the room. Then Araghchi set out Iran’s conditions, including an end to the war on all fronts, “including Lebanon.” Nobody should mistake this for an offer to help. It is a claim of ownership, tying Hezbollah’s weapons to Iran’s dispute with Washington instead of to decisions taken by the Lebanese Cabinet.
The pressure is gathering. Days ago, Maariv reported that Israel is preparing, should war resume, to blockade the ports of Beirut and Tripoli, much like the American blockade on Iran’s ports, with heavy strikes and plans to hold Tyre, Sidon and Nabatieh. Washington sanctioned nine officials in May, MPs and a security officer among them, and warned that more designations are in the pipeline. By the time you read this, the war may well have resumed. The scale of the crisis is clear. What is missing is Beirut’s answer.
The question of who decides for Lebanon has already been answered on paper. The framework signed in Washington on 26 June ties Israeli withdrawal to the Lebanese state extending its authority and holding a monopoly on weapons. The Tampa military round ended on 22 October without agreement on how that is verified. Lebanon has a channel, and it is being ignored while its leaders listen to everyone else.
Saudi de-escalation can lower the risk of a regional war reaching Lebanon, but it cannot decide who holds weapons in the south. Turkish warmth cannot replace a state. Iran’s “regional settlement” is the old guardianship under a new name. The Cabinet should execute its own decisions: Lebanon’s weapons and borders are decided by the Lebanese state, through the Washington framework, not in a room where Iran is a party.
Whoever wins in Israel and in Washington will deal with whoever is willing to decide. If Beirut will not, someone else will decide for it and call it a chaperone.
Independence is not a flag on a balcony. It is the decision to stop needing a guardian. Lebanon turns 83 this month. It is time to act its age.
*Elissa E Hachem is a journalist and political writer specializing in regional affairs and governance. Former Regional Media Advisor at the U.S. State Department’s Arabic Regional Media Hub, with broad experience in strategic communication across government and private sectors.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on November 08-09/2026 (Some of the News reports below are translated from Arabic by AI)
Trump Says Elections Were ‘Giant Step Back in History' for US
Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
President Donald Trump vowed Sunday to bounce back stronger from a massive midterm elections loss that he called a "giant step back in history" for the United States. Democrats captured both chambers of Congress in last Tuesday's midterms that dealt historic losses for Trump's Republican Party in states they had dominated for decades. "America took a giant step back in History with the results of the last Election," Trump said in a post on Truth Social, saying that the stock market that had grown during his tenure took a loss after the vote. "But have no fear, we will be back, BIGGER AND STRONGER THAN EVER BEFORE!" While Republican lawmakers have been licking their wounds over the setback, Trump has sounded defiant and on Friday appointed hardline advisor Stephen Miller as his new chief of staff, signaling a bare-knuckle fightback. Democrats have pledged to hold the Trump administration to account and fight "every step of the way" against Miller, architect of Trump's tough immigration policy.

Israel’s president gives Eisenkot the first chance to form the next government
Associated Press/MELANIE LIDMAN and GIOVANNA DELL'ORTO/November 08/2026
JERUSALEM, Israel (AP) — Israeli President Isaac Herzog gave opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot the first chance to form the next government on Sunday evening. After the formal announcement, Eisenkot, who ran as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's main rival, now has to launch complicated negotiations with potential coalition partners. He has six weeks to form a government. At the ceremony in Jerusalem, Eisenkot said he wanted a leadership that people can trust, that will act in the interests of the public and that represents all parts of society. The Oct. 27 election gave neither Netanyahu's bloc nor Eisenkot a clear majority in parliament. Among the kingmakers — and most politically fraught potential allies — are the Arab-led parties. They made historic gains in the election and have been a target of Netanyahu and his allies. Eisenkot said Sunday that the conditions for parties joining his governing coalition are support for Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, for its declaration of independence, for military or national service, and recognizing the Hamas militant group as a terrorist organization. While the announcement doesn't guarantee that Eisenkot will be the next prime minister, Herzog's decision is another blow to Netanyahu, who lost his parliamentary majority in the election.Here's a closer look at what lies ahead:
There was no clear winner
In Israel, people vote for parties, which form alliances. A coalition needs to have a majority of at least 61 seats in the 120-member assembly, known as the Knesset, to form a government. Neither Netanyahu nor Eisenkot secured a majority in the election. Netanyahu's coalition plunged from a peak of 68 seats to just 53. The opposition bloc, led by Eisenkot, won 48 seats, and Arab-led parties secured the other 19. Eisenkot faces significant challenges on the road to becoming prime minister. Eisenkot has three options: a power-sharing agreement with Netanyahu, support from Arab-led parties — something several members of his bloc do not support — or an agreement with the ultra-Orthodox parties, which demand military exemptions for their community. Eisenkot, a former army chief, and his partners made equal military service a central part of their campaign. Specifically, they are seeking an end to the long-standing draft exemptions enjoyed by the ultra-Orthodox. After Herzog announced Saturday that he would tap Eisenkot, the candidate vowed to form a government as quickly as possible. But doing so will almost certainly require compromises or broken promises. Netanyahu presses unsubstantiated claims against Arab voters. Netanyahu has repeatedly claimed the election was "stolen" by Arab parties, which rallied their supporters to vote in large numbers. But he has offered little evidence to support the claims.
Netanyahu is expected to continue his pressure tactics against Eisenkot, saying any alliance with the Arab parties would be an act of betrayal. Israel's Shin Bet security agency has launched an investigation into possible foreign interference in the vote, but the country's Central Elections Commission — and Herzog — say the vote was valid and even if wrongdoing is found, it did not have a significant impact on the result. Netanyahu called for a "national unity" government with Eisenkot on Saturday night. But it remains unclear whether the two rivals could agree on a power-sharing agreement, and these coalitions are fragile and often collapse.
Support from Arab-led parties faces opposition within Eisenkot's bloc
Eisenkot has the option of forming a coalition with the support of the two Arab-led parties, which won an unprecedented 19 seats in the highest Arab election turnout. Only one Arab party, Ra'am, has ever joined a governing coalition, in 2021. Ra'am has said it will support Eisenkot, but the party does not have enough seats on its own to push Eisenkot into the majority. Breaking with decades of precedent, the second Arab-led party, the Joint List, said it will support Eisenkot from outside the coalition to end Netanyahu's grip on power. That cooperation is fraught for both sides. For the Joint List, it would mean backing a government unlikely to end Israel's wars or curb settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank. For Eisenkot and other opposition parties, it would mean aligning with parties that not only criticize Israel's policies but reject its identity as a Jewish state. One of Eisenkot's partners, the more conservative Yisrael Beytenu party, already has said it will not join a coalition with Arab-led parties. Cooperation with ultra-Orthodox falters at anger over military exemptions. Eisenkot also says that any party that joins him must support mandatory military service or civil service. It remains unclear whether the ultra-Orthodox religious parties are prepared to compromise. These religious parties, which were part of Netanyahu's outgoing coalition, want to preserve their military exemptions, which they say are needed to preserve their devout lifestyle. But the exemptions have grown especially controversial among the broader public during the past three years of war. Anticipating its position as a swing vote, the ultra-Orthodox party United Torah Judaism has left the door open to cooperating with Eisenkot.
What's expected this week in Israel
Eisenkot has 28 days to form a coalition, with a possible two-week extension from the president. If he is unable to form a government, Netanyahu could then be given a chance put together a coalition. If Netanyahu is also unable to do so, the country will return to elections early next spring. Israel's new members of Knesset will be sworn in on Tuesday evening. Netanyahu and his Cabinet will remain in office in a caretaker capacity, with limited powers, until a coalition is formed.
*Lidman reported from Tel Aviv, Israel.

Israel Defense Minister Says ‘Mission Not Complete’ on Iran
Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
Israel is not finished with Iran, its defense minister said Sunday, as he renewed charges that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons, which the country has long denied. "With regard to Iran, the mission is still not complete. Iran is trying to renew its efforts to obtain nuclear weapons -- alongside other grave efforts that place the State of Israel in real danger," Defense Minister Israel Katz said at a ceremony.

Tens of Thousands March in Amsterdam, Pressing the Dutch Govt on Gaza and Israel
Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
Tens of thousands of people, many of them dressed in red, marched through Amsterdam on Sunday in a mass demonstration aimed at pressing the Dutch government to take more decisive action against Israel over Gaza. The organizers of “Red Line” demonstrations in the Netherlands called for measures including stricter trade sanctions on Israel, officially declaring that Israel’s actions in Gaza amount to genocide and halting all arms sales to Israel. The Dutch branch of Amnesty International, one of the organizers, said in an online post that more than 200,000 people joined the march.
“What is happening there is inhumane,” Mike van Dongen said as he walked in the huge throng of people. He was critical of the Dutch government’s actions. “As far as I’m concerned, they are doing nothing,” he said. “They don’t dare take any serious steps.”As the protesters marched along a normally busy Amsterdam street that was closed to traffic on Sunday, a man stood on a bus stop with a loudspeaker shouting, “Free, free Palestine!” Many of the marchers echoed his cry as they passed. Israel strongly rejects suggestions it is committing genocide in Gaza in its military campaign that followed the attacks by Hamas-led fighters in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. Gunmen killed around 1,200 people and took 251 hostages. Israel’s retaliatory offensive has killed tens of thousands of Palestinians and destroyed much of Gaza. More than 1,550 Palestinians in Gaza have been killed by the Israeli military since a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas began in October 2025, according to the territory’s Health Ministry. The ministry, part of the Hamas-run government, doesn’t distinguish between civilians and combatants, though it says women and children make up roughly half of the dead. The campaign in Gaza has strained relations between the Netherlands and Israel. The Dutch foreign minister resigned last year after failing to secure new sanctions against Israel. Since then, a new minority coalition government has taken power and introduced an import ban on products from Israeli settlements, which the Dutch government and most of the international community consider illegal - a move that provoked a diplomatic spat with Israel. Prime Minister Rob Jetten, who took part in a march last year but was not present on Sunday, defended his government’s actions at his weekly press conference on Friday.
“Every single day and every single week, we do what we can to alleviate the terrible situation there,” he said. He added that his administration is “exerting greater political and diplomatic pressure" on Israel to abide by its agreements on Gaza. Simultaneously, he said, his government is applying more pressure on Hamas and other organizations that continue to carry out "various operations that endanger the safety of ordinary Israelis.”

Israel Deports 14 Activists on Palestinian Solidarity Mission
Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
Israel said on Sunday it had deported 14 Western activists who had gone to the occupied West Bank on solidarity missions with Palestinians facing violence from Israeli settlers. Israeli authorities arrested them on Friday near Ramallah after an altercation between the activists and settlers, according to the Human Rights Defenders Fund, a group that provides legal support to activists who visit to support Palestinians. The activists had gone with hopes of protecting Palestinians during their annual olive harvest, which has been hit by a surge of attacks by Israeli settlers who have beaten and stolen from the farmers, AFP said. "Fourteen foreigners who were staying in Israel on tourist visas were deported after being detained by security forces," Israel's Population and Immigration Authority said in a statement. They were deported for "having violated legal provisions" of their visas and "disrupting public order", it said. The activists came from the United States, Canada, Italy and Germany, it added. A spokeswoman for the agency said that the last of the activists was deported Sunday morning. Israeli police said that three Palestinians were also arrested. A police statement accused the foreign activists of "provocative activities" aiming to trigger clashes and of backing "anti-Israeli media campaigns".But Sharona Weiss, the head of international advocacy at the Human Rights Defenders Fund, told AFP that the foreigners had been accompanying Palestinian farmers on their land "when settlers arrived and began attacking them". A journalist and a 77-year-old activist were among those expelled, she said. The group said another 15 foreigners including a journalist had been expelled the week before. The deportations come amid growing international criticism of violence by Israeli settlers in the West Bank, which Israel has occupied since 1967. The Israeli rights group Yesh Din said it has documented more than 850 acts of violence committed by settlers during the five-week olive harvest. Settlers have also attacked journalists covering the olive harvest, including photojournalists for AFP and The Washington Post, and beat up a visiting French mayor. Israel has voiced anger over international criticism and ordered the closure of the British consulate after London imposed sanctions on products from Israeli settlements.

Palestinian Authority Arrests Brokers Over Alleged Sale of Jericho Homes to Settlers
Ramallah: Kifah Zboun/Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
The Palestinian Authority has arrested several property and land brokers suspected of facilitating the transfer of homes in Jericho to Israeli settlers, amid fears the move could mark the beginning of what has been described as a “Jewish invasion” of one of the world’s oldest continuously inhabited cities.
Palestinian security forces spokesman Maj. Gen. Anwar Rajab said several suspects had been detained in connection with homes seized by settlers in Al-Duyuk al-Tahta, west of Jericho. Security sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the brokers were suspected of facilitating the transfer of the properties as part of a plan to enable settlers to take control of an entire neighborhood. The suspects were remanded in custody for 15 days pending investigation. The case emerged Wednesday when 20 Jewish families entered eight homes they claimed to have legally purchased through the Nachala settlement movement, with the involvement of the Binyamin Regional Council, in an operation described as secret. The houses are located in Area C of the occupied West Bank, near the archaeological site known as the Hasmonean Palaces. Israel’s Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper reported that the purchases had been arranged in secrecy, with only a small number of people involved. Even some participants’ wives were reportedly surprised by the move. Settlers who arrived at the site said they were reestablishing Jewish settlement in Jericho, which Jews regard as their gateway into Palestine. The takeover sparked an uproar in the Palestinian territories, raising questions about how the properties had been transferred, whether the transactions were illegal, particularly as some of the homes stand on government-owned land, and where the Palestinian Authority had been during the process. The site lies in Al-Duyuk al-Tahta, within Area C, but very close to Area A, which is under Palestinian administration. Establishing a settlement outpost there would therefore carry serious geographical and political implications. The Palestinian Authority responded immediately by forming a crisis committee and launching an arrest campaign.
Palestinian Security Forces Investigate Property Transfers
In a statement, Palestinian security forces said investigations into the settlers’ seizure of homes in the Al-Duyuk area of Jericho governorate were ongoing, under close supervision by the relevant authorities and the Public Prosecution. They said legal measures would be taken against anyone found to be involved, in accordance with established procedures. The security forces warned citizens against dealing with documents, papers or information circulated on social media about the case or similar incidents, saying such material could be intended to sow confusion and disrupt investigations.
They urged residents and media outlets to rely exclusively on official sources and avoid rumors or unreliable information, some of which was intended to incite discord and disputes within Palestinian society. The statement reaffirmed the security services’ commitment to protecting citizens and their property and maintaining security and public order. It said any official developments would be announced through authorized channels. The security forces stressed that they would not allow the case to become a source of rumors or tolerate attempts to undermine public security, threaten property, mislead public opinion or exploit the investigation to spread disorder. The statement followed the widespread circulation of forged documents seeking to implicate a Palestinian Authority figure, triggering heated debate on social media. Before the security forces issued their statement, the Palestinian Land Authority rejected claims that preliminary sale transactions, official documents or powers of attorney existed in connection with the properties. It said such practices formed part of Israeli occupation policies aimed at seizing more land and forcibly displacing residents. The authority stressed that any action taken by a third party concerning state property constituted a violation of state ownership. It said no allocation, lease or other transaction had been authorized for Plot 14. According to land records predating 1967, one of the two plots on which the buildings stand belongs to the state, while the other belongs to its historical owners.
The Land Authority maintained that the occupation could not confer property rights and that any measures taken under its authority were null and void, carrying no legal effect.
Israeli Commander Accused of Prior Knowledge
As Palestinian authorities continued their arrests and investigations, a separate controversy erupted in Israel. Although the Israeli military initially said the operation had not been coordinated with it, Israeli security sources familiar with the matter told Haaretz that Maj. Gen. Avi Bluth, head of the military’s Central Command, had known in advance about plans by settlers and the Nachala movement to take over Palestinian homes west of Jericho. According to the sources, Bluth met the settlers a day before they entered the properties and asked them to keep the operation secret and not inform field officers until the takeover was complete. The sources said he had spoken with senior settler leaders involved in the operation, asked them not to disclose his prior knowledge and “wished them success.” The allegations gained further attention following remarks by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who also accused Bluth of assisting settlers involved in attacks against Palestinians in the West Bank. The Israeli military dismissed the accusations as “offensive and baseless.”Since the settlers entered the homes, the army has had to divert three combat platoons to protect them after the settlers attacked Bedouin residents in a nearby area and forced them to leave. Israel’s Walla news website reported Saturday that the entry of Israelis into homes near Jericho had prompted two families from the local Bedouin community to abandon their temporary shelters. The report said the army had contacted the families and offered assistance to prevent their departure, but both decided to leave. The Israeli military said it had tried unsuccessfully to persuade the families to stay and would therefore work to prevent Jewish settlers from taking over the two vacated homes.
Senior Israeli military officials warned of the risk of further escalation.

Iran-Linked Ships Hover Over Subsea Cables in Gulf of Oman
Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
Ships linked to Iran have been hovering over subsea telecoms cables in the Middle East after Tehran threatened to attack cables and data centers if the US and Israel launch a fresh bombing campaign, reported the Financial Times on Friday. At least four vessels tracked by the maritime analytics company Windward have been observed taking unusual routes and loitering over subsea cables traversing the Gulf of Oman in the days after Iran warned of disruption to digital infrastructure if the US escalated the conflict. Three were tankers subject to US sanctions, while the fourth was a small Iranian fishing craft that loitered over the Europe India Gateway and Transworld cables between October 21 and 26, according to Windward data. According to data from TeleGeography, six cables run through the Strait of Hormuz, while three more — Fiber in Gulf, Sea-Me-We 6 and 2Africa — are under construction. 2Africa is the closest to completion. Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar are wholly dependent on cables running under the strait for their internet connectivity. Tehran has been vocal in its threats against cables and data centers running through the Strait of Hormuz over the past month, in response to suggestions from US President Donald Trump and other senior US figures in the run-up to this week’s midterm elections that they would launch further attacks on Iran. Hossein Mohebbi, spokesperson for Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, said on October 19: “Seven major undersea internet cables run through the Strait of Hormuz, carrying all commercial and internet data. We just want [the US] to realize that new targets and new weapons shall be unveiled.”That echoed comments by Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, a week earlier threatening that “data centers and artificial intelligence facilities will be destroyed”.
Yadollah Javani, deputy commander of the IRGC for political affairs, said later in October that assets “including internet cables” would be damaged in retaliation for attacks on Iran’s own infrastructure. Masha Kotkin, a former US state department official and fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think-tank, said AI, cloud computing, data centers and other digital activities in the Gulf depended on subsea fiberoptic cables. Any damage would result in “slower internet [and] financial transactions” and would “disrupt communications networks, ecommerce and cloud computing”, Kotkin said. Connectivity is also a significant part of the Gulf countries’ efforts to diversify away from hydrocarbons and become a hub for digital businesses, Kotkin noted. The US has continued to move military assets into the region. An aircraft carrier, the USS Theodore Roosevelt, was seen on satellite images in the South China Sea travelling towards Singapore early on Wednesday, potentially adding to two carriers already in the Middle East region.

Iran Says Two Tankers Caught Fire in Hormuz after Hitting Mines
Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
Two oil tankers caught fire in the Strait of Hormuz after hitting mines, Iran's Revolutionary Guards said on Sunday, according to state news agency IRNA. Since the outbreak of the Iran war in late February, Tehran has severely restricted traffic through the strategic waterway, insisting vessels use routes authorized by the Iranian republic. The United States has in response imposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports and helped tankers travel the strait, which normally carries about one-fifth of global oil consumption. "Two oil tankers violating regulations -- one in the eastern part of the Strait of Hormuz and the other within the strait -- caught fire and are currently engulfed in intense flames after striking naval mines while attempting to cross through unauthorized routes," the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the ideological arm of Iran's military, said in a statement. "The two tankers had reportedly committed multiple violations, including switching off their navigation and positioning systems, as they attempted to transit through an unauthorized route," the statement added. The Guards did not specify the name or nationality of the tankers. Tehran has made multiple announcements in recent weeks saying that ships have caught fire in the Hormuz strait. US Central Command has recently said that all mines have been cleared from the waterway. The IRNA separately reported late on Saturday that sounds of explosions were heard in parts of the country. "Sounds resembling explosions were heard in Qeshm, Sirik, Jask, and Bandar Abbas. The cause of the sounds remains unknown," the news agency wrote on Telegram. Officials confirmed an "impact" in the port city of Jask, the IRNA said. US President Donald Trump previously talked up the possibility of resuming heavy strikes on Iran but has since walked back from the idea. Nevertheless, the US military has conducted occasional limited strikes.

Iran Executes Three Men over Armed Unrest during January Protests
Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
Iran executed three men on Sunday after they were convicted of carrying out operations for Israel and the US and taking part in armed unrest during anti-government protests in January, state media reported. The executions are the latest in a ‌series Iran has ‌carried out in recent ‌months ⁠over the January ⁠protests, including of people accused of links to Israel and the US, Reuters reported. Hassan Dioband, Hamid Kazemi and Reza Zanganeh were accused of using firearms, grenades and Molotov ⁠cocktails, setting fire to public facilities ‌and ‌damaging an electricity substation in the city of ‌Karaj, causing power outages ‌in some areas, according to the judiciary. The judiciary said Dioband was arrested on January 11 after investigations identified him ‌as a suspect in attacks on public property and incitement ⁠to ⁠violence. Ten others accused of participating in the unrest under his supervision were subsequently arrested. The three were sentenced to death and ordered to have their assets confiscated. Their executions were carried out after the Supreme Court upheld their sentences, while the other defendants received prison terms of 5 to 10 years.

Thick Smoke at Tehran Refinery Caused by Safety Flaring, No Fire Reported
Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
Thick smoke and flames seen rising from Tehran's oil refinery on Sunday were caused by activation of its flare systems ‌after electrical ‌and technical problems, ‌the ⁠refinery's public relations ⁠office was reported as saying by the oil ministry's news outlet, Shana. The ⁠refinery said the ‌systems ‌had been activated ‌to release excess ‌gases in accordance with industrial safety procedures. It said no ‌fire had broken out in its ⁠processing ⁠units, the situation was under control and teams were working to restore normal operations. Fuel production and supply continued without interruption, it added.

US Launches Task Force to Disrupt Land Transit Routes into Iran
Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
The US military has announced it will create a 20-member task force to find ways to disrupt land routes into Iran that it says are used for shipments of weapons and illicit materials. The restrictions would expand on a US naval blockade of Iranian ports during the two countries' eight-month war, in which Tehran has also restricted passage through the critical Strait of Hormuz trade route, choking global energy supplies, AFP said. The task force's work "will further constrain Iran's ability to finance terrorism, rebuild weapons factories, and replenish their military," US Central Command chief Brad Cooper said in a statement posted on X on Saturday. The team of both civilian and military personnel based in Florida would coordinate with US government agencies on "preventing the movement of advanced weapons systems, dual-use technologies, sanctioned materials, and illegal revenue streams across Iran's land borders and the Caspian Sea," the statement added. The United States imposed a blockade on Iranian ports early in the war in response to Tehran seeking to limit traffic through the strategic Strait of Hormuz, where around a fifth of global oil trade normally passes.
That blockade has halted around $25 billion in crude oil exports from Iran, according to the US Central Command.

Iran Suggests Blasts Are Not US Attacks as Both Sides Report Ships Hit
Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
Iranian media suggested explosions in southern Iran on Saturday evening were related to Iranian military activities rather than US strikes while both sides reported that shipping had been hit in or near the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's state television said officials had not confirmed any missile strikes on Iranian territory following blasts heard in several areas, including on Qeshm Island in the strait. President Donald Trump had hinted at renewing major attacks on Iran after last week's US midterm elections but there has been no sign of a large-scale US military operation, which Iran has said it would respond to by striking US and Israeli targets. Both sides have continued strikes on vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, however, restricting exports of energy and other commodities vital to the world economy. Iran's state television said the evening explosions might be related to Iranian military ‌activity in the ‌waterway, where Iran said two vessels had hit mines and a third had caught ‌fire.The ⁠US said its ⁠air force had disabled a vessel in the Gulf of Oman beyond the strait. Tasnim news agency said two missiles had struck Qeshm Island, with no official information on possible damage. Neither Iran nor the US has commented on that report.
Washington said on November 2 that it had struck the island in a limited defensive measure against Iranians using surface-to-air missiles against US assets. Since the US and Israel began attacks on Iran in February, Tehran has sought the upper hand by hitting vessels in the Strait of Hormuz to block Gulf energy exports, while US forces began blockading movements to and from ⁠Iranian ports in April. The US military said on Saturday evening that its air ‌force had fired at the stern of a commercial vessel in the Gulf ‌of Oman, disabling it as it tried to get through the blockade. Iran's Revolutionary Guards Navy said two oil tankers had caught fire ‌after hitting mines while attempting to pass through an "unauthorized route" in the Strait of Hormuz. A third tanker had also ‌suffered an explosion and caught fire, the semi-official Fars news agency reported later. Reuters was not able to confirm any of the reported strikes. Monitors from the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) said a bulk carrier and military forces were involved in an incident in the Gulf of Oman, approximately 18 nautical miles east of the United Arab Emirates' city of Khor Fakkan, with damage unknown. It was unclear ‌if it was related to the reported US attack.Qatar, which has been mediating in talks to try to end the conflict that has shaken the world economy, on Saturday denied reports that the US and Iran had failed to reach a deal. The Qatari prime minister had affirmed that both sides were continuing to work toward an agreement, it said. Iran has submitted a nuclear proposal to Washington through Qatar, a senior Iranian official told Reuters on Thursday, saying the US was reviewing it but discussions would depend on Washington first meeting Tehran's seven demands. These include sanctions relief, access to frozen assets and war reparations, while Washington insists nuclear issues must feature in initial talks. On Saturday, the US military said it was launching a task force to crack down on the movement of advanced weapons and other sanctioned material to Iran via its land borders and the Caspian Sea – part of economic measures to try to pressure Tehran. Iran's Revolutionary Guards dismissed the plan as "wordplay", saying it would not work because Tehran had made preparations and communicated closely with its neighbors.

Train Collision in Egypt’s Giza Province Kills 4 and Injures 88, Health Ministry Says
/Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
Two passenger trains collided some 76 km (47 miles) south of Cairo on Sunday, killing at least four people and injuring 88, Egypt’s health ministry ‌said. The state ‌railway authority ‌said ⁠a train traveling ⁠from Giza to Fayoum hit the back of another heading from Cairo to Aswan, derailing ⁠several carriages. President Abdel ‌Fattah ‌al-Sisi ordered a ‌swift investigation and said ‌anyone found negligent should be held accountable, according to a separate ‌statement. Emergency crews were clearing the wreckage ⁠to ⁠restore services on the Cairo-Upper Egypt line, the railway authority said, without giving any indication of how long this would take.

Al-Zaidi Intensifies Confrontation with Armed Factions
Baghdad: Hamza Mustafa/Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
The Iraqi Kataib Hezbollah, one of the armed factions that still refuses to disarm, responded to Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi's announcement regarding its possession of investments worth billions of dinars and millions of dollars. The premier has launched what political observers in Baghdad view as an "open battle" against the armed factions, vowing that he "will not let them remain." Over recent days, Al-Zaidi canceled multi-million dollar contracts across various locations, ranging from Baghdad Airport and the Ministry of Transport to Mosul Airport. Websites close to the government circulated the names of the armed factions that had control of those contracts. Al-Zaidi dismissed statements issued against him and his associates, including his own brother, by Kataib Hezbollah, choosing Sadr City in eastern Baghdad to assert his firm stance.
Visiting the popular district late Saturday night, he met directly with citizens at a local restaurant and delivered a clear message to armed factions, signaling the start of an open and uncompromising confrontation. In his most critical message directed at the factions, he declared: "I will absolutely not let weapon holders remain," adding, "If others allowed them to remain, it was because they were benefiting from them." Al-Zaidi's response to the armed factions came a day after accusations were leveled against his brother by Kataib Hezbollah, which said in a statement: "We address our remarks directly and explicitly to Hassan Al-Zaidi, the media and security official in the Prime Minister's office. All your allegations regarding investments, companies, and the like - whether accurate or completely fabricated slanders - we consider entirely, along with all their dependencies, a 'gift' to you from the Brigades, to be added to your assets."On Saturday, Al-Zaidi directed the cancellation of contracts for three companies at Mosul Airport due to their links to armed groups, ordering their referral to international firms. It has become clear that the initiative to restrict weapons to state control is facing growing setbacks, following announcements by armed factions such as Kataib Hezbollah, Al-Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada of their refusal to surrender their arms. This contrasts with other factions, most notably Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali, which complied and secured ministries, agencies, and embassies in exchange for their stance. The current truce remains tied to the potential military confrontation between the US and Iran, amid leaks that the Americans delivered a warning to Al-Zaidi regarding potential strikes on those factions should they move against neighboring countries or US bases in the region. Meanwhile, political forces, particularly certain factions represented by the Coordination Framework, have kicked off efforts to prevent the confrontation between the government and the factions from widening because it has started to impact upon "one of the most critical areas that everyone was keen to avoid over the past years: economic committees and investments," said a well-informed Iraqi politician and lawmaker close to both sides. Speaking on condition of anonymity to Asharq Al-Awsat, the Iraqi lawmaker and politician noted that "certain forces within the Coordination Framework, during talks between some of its factions and the armed groups, have begun leaning toward the factions' refusal to disarm under Al-Zaidi's vision.”“This shift follows Al-Zaidi's understandings with the US and President Donald Trump, whom he met twice - first during a visit to Washington last July, and second in New York during the UN General Assembly meetings last September - as it became clear to some Framework leaders that the Al-Zaidi-Trump agreement might not stop at the weapon, but could extend to other factions within the Shiite political structure,” he added.

The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on November 08-09/2026 /(Some of the News reports below are translated from Arabic by AI)
Makkah Alliance and Iran: From Deterrence to Establishing Stability
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Othaimin/Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
Amid intense diplomatic efforts, spearheaded by Qatari mediation and Turkish-Pakistani moves to resume US-Iran talks and avert conflict after the US midterms, and reported Pentagon plans for potential military strikes on Tehran, global attention is fixed on the region's trajectory. Entering one of its most critical and complex phases, the fallout from this standoff threatens to ripple far beyond regional borders, jeopardizing global energy security, maritime navigation, and international economic stability. In support of Qatari and Pakistani mediation efforts, the meeting between the leadership in Tehran and representatives of the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement nations—Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan—served as an extension of these initiatives aimed at de-escalation and promoting diplomatic solutions. However, the significance of this meeting may transcend merely containing the current crisis, potentially opening new horizons for broader regional security arrangements in which Saudi Arabia highlights its leadership role in fostering a balance of power and supporting dialogue.
This raises the critical question: Can the Makkah Agreement provide a solid foundation for building a more stable regional security system, one in which Iran becomes a stakeholder in the regional security equation rather than a perpetual source of threat to it?
The importance of the Makkah Agreement is not limited to strengthening defense cooperation among its parties, but extends to its potential contribution toward reinforcing the regional balance of power and opening avenues for dialogue and stability. Deterrence does not necessarily imply that the three nations are ready for war or confrontation; on the contrary, it can serve to prevent it when each party recognizes the limits of power and the cost of its deployment.
History demonstrates that stability is not achieved merely by possessing power, but rather through the existence of a balance that prevents any single party from imposing its will on others. This is the very concept Henry Kissinger addressed in his famous book “Diplomacy”, in which he reviewed the experience of the European order established after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, where the principle of the balance of power, alongside political understandings among major powers, contributed to laying the foundation for a long period of relative stability.
Consequently, the Makkah Agreement could serve as an opportunity to reinforce the regional balance, making deterrence a supporter of diplomacy rather than a substitute for it, and paving the way for building more stable and comprehensive security arrangements.
Furthermore, the Makkah Agreement will by no means serve as a substitute for existing security alliances and partnerships, but rather as an addition that reinforces and integrates with the regional security framework. The agreement does not conflict with the strategic partnership between Saudi Arabia and the United States, the Gulf defense cooperation system, Türkiye's membership in NATO, or Pakistan's defense partnerships. Instead, it opens broader avenues for cooperation among the three nations, thereby boosting their shared capabilities and helping in anchoring the balance of power and stability in the region.
Iran remains an important regional power by virtue of its geographical location and its political and military weight, which cannot be ignored in any future regional security arrangements. Gradually involving it in broader security frameworks could be an option that serves long-term regional stability, provided that Iran is willing to change its behavior by respecting state sovereignty, halting its interventions through armed groups, and committing to maritime security and common security rules, thereby paving the way for its transition from a source of tension to a partner in regional stability.
The European experience proved that the gradual reintegration of France and Germany into the European order after the continent's wars helped in transforming them from sources of conflict into partners in stability by tying their interests to shared rules.
When Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister, declared during the 2018 Future Investment Initiative conference that the Middle East would become the "new Europe" and that the region's renaissance was his "personal war," he was not speaking about the future of Saudi Arabia alone. Rather, he was referring to a region that possesses the youth potential, economic resources, and strategic foundations qualifying it to become a global hub for growth and prosperity. This is the vision that Saudi Arabia embodies today through Vision 2030 and its economic and developmental transformations.
Iran is not far from these opportunities, given its vast natural resources and significant human and economic capabilities; however, decades of conflicts, tensions, and isolation have contributed to draining its potential and deepening its economic and social crises. Perhaps the opportunity is available today for Tehran to reconsider its priorities and engage in a regional path that makes development and cooperation an alternative to conflict, and shared prosperity an interest that takes precedence over calculations of influence and confrontation.
The future of this region should not remain hostage to conflicts and tensions, but must instead be built on shared interests and opportunities for development and prosperity. No one wants to see Iran become another Iraq, another Libya, or another Sudan, given the humanitarian suffering, divisions, and instability that these experiences entail. What is required is not a change of the Iranian regime as much as a change in its behavior, so that it becomes part of the region's stability rather than a source of threat to it. This is a responsibility that lies first and foremost with the Iranian leadership, which must realize that the strength of nations is not measured by their ability to threaten their neighbors, but by the security, dignity, and opportunities for a better future that they provide to their peoples.

Elections and Scenarios on the Lebanese-Israeli Front
Dr. Nassif Hitti/Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
Undoubtedly, the economic and financial fallout from the US war on Iran contributed to the Democratic Party's victory in securing control of both chambers of the US Congress - the Senate and House of Representatives. Nevertheless, foreign policy and the ultimate decision to go to war remain vested in the president, even as Congress retains the power to leverage certain policies by obstructing the execution of specific decisions, particularly in "financial or operational" domains. The question raised today is whether the election results will prompt US President Donald Trump to reconsider certain policies, priorities, and approaches - chief among them in the Middle East being the Lebanese file, specifically the negotiating track managed by Washington under the banner of the "Framework Agreement" it drafted. Notably, this negotiating path has seen no actual progress due to the lack of US pressure on Israel to halt its ongoing war, a prerequisite that remains vital for effective negotiations. The Israeli elections have concluded, opening up various scenarios for the mandate and formation of a new government among far-right political factions. These components share a unified outlook on the war and its intended objectives, even as their primary figures, namely Netanyahu and Eisenkot, diverge on specific tactical aspects of the Israeli approach rather than its strategic goals, particularly regarding the "day after" on the Lebanese front.
Faced with these shifts in shifting priorities, the necessary approach, the execution of strategic goals, and the lessons learned for the "day after" while awaiting a new Israeli government - with a return to the polls remaining a possibility if a coalition fails to form, as seen in past precedents - the question remains as to what tomorrow holds for the Lebanese-Israeli track. This is unfolding in a Middle East gripped by interconnected and overlapping wars, disputes, and conflicts, even if their root causes were not originally linked. In this context, from a Lebanese perspective, four potential scenarios can be examined under the so-called "waiting period," resulting from the halt in negotiations until a new Israeli government is formed:
The first scenario involves the continuation of the Israeli war, which is useful to Netanyahu and serves as one of his primary cards to form a new government under his leadership. There is no deterrent, particularly from the US, to halt this conflict, which carries transformative objectives on the ground from the perspective of Israeli security, as reiterated by the Israeli political leadership across all its factions. It remains a self-restrained war, fluctuating in escalation and de-escalation in terms of both firepower and combat geography, and is considered a pivotal asset for future negotiations, as well as a tool to effectively stall them from Israel's perspective. The second scenario points toward a shift toward an expanded, open-ended Israeli war across a wider geography by expanding the occupation as Israel threatens, in order to impose a new reality on the ground that would form the baseline for any future negotiations. Until then, it aims to establish a new status quo in the "Lebanese combat theater" - a situation that generates further complexities and variables for the "day after" whenever that day arrives, not only for the Lebanese front, but particularly at the Levantine level and across the Middle East in general.
The third scenario involves Washington accepting the US-Iranian understanding signed "remotely" between the two parties through Pakistani mediation last June, which begins with a ceasefire across all fronts, including Lebanon.
In practice, if Washington pressures Israel to accept this as a "transitional solution" - a move some might justify even as the Israeli occupation of the border strip persists and the status quo remains unchanged - it would yield an arrangement reminiscent of the written 1996 April Understanding, which regulated the combat theater during the Israeli occupation. This would effectively mark a return to the pre-Gaza support war status quo, defined by the establishment of an Israeli security strip and temporary guarantees tied to the evolving conflict objectives of the parties involved: an open-ended truce heavily contingent on the broader regional landscape. Such a status quo would remain fragile, liable to collapse at the first turn. While this scenario would incorporate adjustments to the ground and negotiations, the core situation regarding war, peace, and strategic decisions would remain fundamentally unchanged.
The fourth scenario entails returning to negotiations from where they stood when suspended, or building upon the third scenario if a ceasefire is achieved. Such a truce cannot serve as the end of the road for the Lebanese authority, nor can it be locked in as a permanent fait accompli; instead, it must act as a catalyst to revive talks through this new ceasefire variable, while accounting for the unavoidable new parameters created by this situation.Lebanon must also draw lessons from the recent past to clearly and firmly assert what I term the "negotiating references" it must uphold. Chief among these is the 1949 General Armistice Agreement, which remains legally valid irrespective of subsequent conflicts in their various forms, serving as the foundational international legal framework governing relations between two parties in a state of war.
The same principle applies to relevant United Nations resolutions, most notably Resolution 1701, alongside the necessity of mapping out a negotiating roadmap with a flexible yet finite timeline. Adhering to these points, which are anchored in international legitimacy, its resolutions, rulings, principles, and customs, is absolutely vital for an effective return to the negotiating table.

The US Midterms… Fallen Certainties and Emerging Paradoxes
Eyad Abu Shakra/Asharq Al-Awsat/November 08/2026
Nothing lasts forever. A few days ago the United States held highly consequential midterm elections- a round of the cycle held every two years by which all members of the House of Representatives, a third of the Senate, and a number of state governors are elected.
Important as it is, the election remains an ordinary exercise of democracy, and experience has taught us that every election has its circumstances and its heroes, just as it has its issues and its casualties. In my estimation, President Donald Trump had not been expecting these results. Indeed, I would almost swear that many Democrats, politicians and supporters alike, did not dare take such an optimistic view of what their candidates actually achieved across the length and breadth of the country. The Democrats were not content with changing the balance of power in Congress by seizing the majority in both the House and the Senate; they also won striking victories among state governors, including surprising political and cultural "breakthroughs." In the House, as of yesterday evening London time, the Democrats had won a landslide: 252 of 435 seats, against 162 for the Republicans.
There had been signs before polling day that they would take the House, but the margin exceeded expectations. So did the Senate result, where they secured 54 of 100 seats against 44 for the Republicans, with the official results from Mississippi and Alaska still to come.
The shift in Congress was mirrored in the governors' races, where the surprise was arguably bigger, and more painful for the Republicans. They lost the governorship of Texas, their greatest stronghold of all and the apple of the right-wing trillionaire Elon Musk's eye.
In Texas, a state with a long history of hostility toward its "neighbor" Mexico, the right-wing Republican governor Greg Abbott- one of the "heroes" of Trump's campaign and of the MAGA movement against illegal immigration from Latin America- lost to his Democratic challenger, the Latina progressive Gina Hinojosa. Texas, the second most populous state after California, also gave another young "Latino" candidate a national platform: the new senator James Talarico, who won one of its two Senate seats.
To appreciate what Hinojosa and Talarico achieved, consider that Musk had come to see Texas as a "safe haven" for tech oligarchs' investments fleeing "California taxes," and that the last time a Democrat won a Texas Senate seat was in 1970. That year Lloyd Bentsen, the future senator and cabinet minister, defeated George Bush senior, who nonetheless went on to win the presidency, as did his son George W. Bush, a former governor of the state. Trump's plan for a "separation wall" along the Mexican border has also suffered a painful setback: the Democrats now control all four border states, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. As for the broader picture, which may or may not shape the 2028 presidential race, women made a large and influential showing. Among the winners was the physician Annie Andrews in South Carolina, who took the seat of the late Republican senator Lindsey Graham, while two Native American Democrats won a Senate seat in Minnesota and the governorship of New Mexico. The Democrats now hold 28 governorships to the Republicans' 20, including most of the largest states- Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Georgia, alongside Texas- as well as their "impregnable strongholds" of California, New York, and Illinois.A clear majority of "Latino/Hispanic" voters also turned against the Republicans this time, reversing the pattern of the presidential election two years ago. And a cohort of young Democratic leaders has emerged, some of them radical "progressives" from ethnic and religious "minorities," led by Georgia's new governor, Keisha Lance Bottoms, the first African-American woman to govern the state. Overall, the Democrats won the popular vote by nearly 13 points, the largest margin for either party since 1976. Yet some argue that their real test begins now.
In politics, where there are no certainties but plenty of paradoxes, the Democrats will soon face two real problems, both rooted in the divide between their young radicals and the "old guard" led by Chuck Schumer in the Senate and Hakeem Jeffries in the House.
The first is that Schumer and Jeffries are men of "compromise" and of "lobbies," the "Israel lobby" foremost among them, which will make it easier for the Republicans to exploit their differences with a generation of radicals among the young, women, minorities, and LGBT people.
The second is that President Trump has chosen to stand up to the "Democratic hurricane" rather than bow before it, appointing Stephen Miller, the closest of his hardline advisers, as White House chief of staff. The days ahead will bring a great deal, in peace or in war.

The U.S. congressional elections and our region
Abdullah bin Bijad Al-Otaibi / Asharq Al-Awsat / 8 November 2026
The U.S. congressional elections, for both the Senate and the House of Representatives, witnessed important changes worthy of attention. What always happens occurred: the midterm elections for Congress in any American president’s second term tend to go to the party opposing the president. Presidents who wage wars—regardless of whether they win or lose—consistently and repeatedly lose both houses of Congress. But what the logic of history, its events, and its fluctuations tells us is that states do not triumph through the opinions of the majority or the interests of the masses, who are innately inclined toward individual selfishness; rather, they triumph through the awareness of wise leadership and the judgment of the wise, the rational, and the specialists in every field. The street remains the street.
The Vietnam War brought down President Lyndon Johnson, and George H. W. Bush fell after his resounding victory in the Second Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and victory in the Cold War—to the benefit of a young man named Bill Clinton whose slogan at the time was “It’s the economy, stupid.” But George W. Bush waged large and wide-ranging wars after the events of 11 September and lasted for two terms. The resounding loss of the Republican Party in both houses today expresses the ordinary American citizen’s individual rejection of wars; it also expresses the ability of the American “liberal left” to close ranks, mobilize the masses, and rally the rabble behind it in order to reach the seat of decision-making in America in whatever form it takes.
It is good to understand that the world is divided between right and left, between conservatives and liberals, between monarchies and republics, between support for stability and support for chaos. This division has clear political manifestations, clearer republican ones, representations expressed by parties, groups, and organizations, and biases expressed by writers, intellectuals, and researchers.
The elected American political figures chosen by American citizens are first and foremost American citizens who express their voters, their parties, and their political and intellectual orientations. Their positions on what is happening in the Middle East or in Arab and Islamic countries stem from this logic first, and then from the orientations they inherited from their countries of origin. Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib are two women elected on the Democratic ticket, and they are always and forever biased toward most of what is against Arab states and their interests. And if Mr. Abdul Rahman Al-Sayed has joined them in these elections, the Arab recipient should understand that these people and their like in America do not represent Arab and Islamic states—neither in religion, nor peoples, nor states and political interests. Indeed, some of them belong, explicitly or semi-explicitly, to everything that is hostile to our states, our stability, our values, and our culture.
It is very striking to any observer, monitor, and researcher that there is a class of Arab mercenary intellectuals who combine ignorance and boldness, becoming a glaring example of those the Arabs used to call “the base at the tables of the noble.” They spend their entire lives feeding on the magnanimity and values of the Gulf rulers, then at every turn and every crisis they promptly take positions that are completely hostile to the Arab Gulf states, their leaderships, and their policies. They write mockingly about the culture and values of the Arabs as embodied in the peoples of the Arabian Gulf, belittling them and aligning with others—positions that make any honorable person, whatever their origin, blush with shame.
The great, wide, and intertwined intellectual, ideological, and political interconnection between the Western “left” and the groups of political Islam—in the “foundations,” the “principles,” the “discourse,” the “groups,” the “organizations,” and the “movements,” and in the nearly unified positions toward major and minor events in our region—points to a broad and strategic alliance that could greatly harm the region, both states and peoples.
Say the same exactly about the supporters of political Islam in its Shiite version in America, where the “mullahs’ regime” in Iran has succeeded on two important levels: the first is supporting and creating Sunni terrorist “groups” and “organizations,” taking charge of their training, building their strategies, appointing their leaders, and directing their missions toward serving its regional expansion project; and likewise through building the organizations and militias of the “savage minorities,” which have expressed with ugliness the “extremism” of Shiite political Islam—whether in Lebanese Hezbollah, or in the Shiite terrorist organizations in Iraq, or in the “Houthi militia” in Yemen.
As for the fifth column affiliated with the groups of political Islam, “Shiite” and “Sunni,” and aligned with the “Western left”—there is no need to elaborate. Some of these people appear to reject affiliation with these groups, yet they leave no cause that serves them, no event that benefits them, and no story that harms the Gulf states, their leaderships, and their peoples without joining it and outbidding in it—whether in the east of the earth or its west, its north or its south. And how many of these there are.
Finally, what happened in the current American elections is historically well known and predictable, and it is important because it affects every country in the world.

Is the Houthis’ strength real or illusory?
Mishari Al-Dhaidi / Asharq Al-Awsat / 8 November 2026
Journalist and Yemeni researcher Saleh Al-Baidani asked in his article in the Saudi newspaper Okaz: Are the Houthis an invincible militia? I see this question as central to a better approach to understanding the Yemeni crisis with the Houthis, inside and outside Yemen.
Al-Baidani summarizes the Houthis’ long-standing approach as follows: “Since the six Saada wars until today, the Houthis have relied on a nearly fixed military and political pattern: launching sudden, violent attacks in which they expend a large portion of their capabilities and sacrifice large numbers of their fighters, then seeking a truce during which they catch their breath, rearrange their ranks, compensate for their losses, and consolidate their field gains before resuming the attack once again.”
He believes that the Houthis’ field expansions may carry the seeds of their near-term crisis; they have “expanded militarily in a poorly calculated manner, driven by Iran’s interests across wide areas of Taiz and western Yemen, and pushed into regions where the group lacks social and political support.” Going far into Yemeni geography that does not support them, and far from their base on the northern plateau, also makes matters more difficult for them militarily because of the length of supply lines and the ease of targeting their elements from the air and on the ground. The major war with Iran and America’s severe blockade of it will also damage the military supply convoys from Iran to the Houthis.
This is a striking reading, but it is important to deal with the Houthi threat as if it will continue for a long time—even if that scenario does not materialize. Resolve requires dealing with it according to the worst assumptions. A wise saying is attributed to the founding King Abdulaziz about dealing with dangers, in the Najdi dialect: “I gird myself for the fox with a lion’s belt.” The meaning in classical Arabic is: “I deal with the danger of a fox as if it were a fierce lion.” This is what resolve, determination, and decisiveness require—especially since the Houthi threat is real and expanding, not illusory and shrinking.
Among the manifestations of dealing firmly with it is understanding its internal operating mechanisms, the lines of its entanglement with Yemeni society, and understanding the “reality” of its external support networks—not imagining these networks and casually throwing accusations at this party or that according to “social-media nonsense.” This means designing a deep, practical, and lasting approach to confronting this threat—not only to Yemen and Saudi Arabia, but to the entire world, for the Houthis pirate the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea.
Among the tools of this approach is discussing striking readings by experts, such as Saleh Al-Baidani’s, who concluded his article with this summary: “The Houthis are in the greatest need of quickly shedding their rough skin in order to raise the banner of victimhood, while in reality they are not seeking peace so much as seeking time.”

Rubbing the Americans’ noses in the mud
Mamdouh Al-Muhaini / Asharq Al-Awsat / 8 November 2026
After the Americans left Afghanistan, following twenty years and a cost of two trillion dollars, one commentator said that the Taliban had won and rubbed America’s nose in the mud! Even if we agreed with him—then what? Afghanistan remains a poor, miserable country, just as it was before the Americans arrived and after they left. The Americans at least left with a victory of sorts: weakening al-Qaeda and killing bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and the rest of their enemies. Their departure from Afghanistan has become something of the past for them; they will learn the lessons from it so as not to repeat the experience. But the condition of the Afghans has not changed. What do they do with this victory? Practically nothing, except slogans and celebrations.
We see the same celebratory mood now after Trump’s defeat in the midterm elections. The leaders of the regime in Tehran regard it as a victory for themselves and a defeat for Trump. Let us agree with them in their conclusion: you have rubbed Trump’s nose in the mud, and you were the reason for his defeat. And then what? Trump will leave in two years, and after a few years the world will forget him, but the United States will remain militarily and economically strong and will lead the world in the artificial-intelligence revolution. But what about the condition of the Iranian people at home? Poverty and unemployment rates are high, and the economy is in its worst state. How does Trump’s defeat benefit the Iranians when they are hungry?
One commentator wrote that the “Flood” was behind Trump’s loss in the elections, and that the Israeli lobby lost millions of dollars! Even if we agreed with what he claimed, what do the people of Gaza gain from it? Does he not look at their condition today? At the very time he was saying this, the residents of Gaza were drowning in rainwater without shelter! We can hold psychological self-healing celebrations that rejoice in the defeat of the Americans, the Israelis, the British, and the French, and call them invaders, usurpers, occupiers, and colonialists—but that will not feed a single hungry child! When will we stop shooting ourselves in the head in this collective ritualistic state in which we are drowning, imagining that we are aiming the pistol at the heads of our enemies?

Selected Face Book & X tweets on November 08/2026
Alberto Miguel Fernandez
Blatant abuse by the Egyptian regime. State sponsored repression and violence is a key part of persecuting converts to Christianity in countries like Egypt and Iran.
Quote
Ihab Hassan
@IhabHassane
URGENT: Egyptian prosecutors are seeking the death penalty or a 25-year prison sentence for Said Mansour Rezk Abdelrazek, a former Muslim who converted to Christianity.

Ryan Fournier
Gadi Eisenkot just laid down the LAW for joining his government:
1. Jewish & democratic state
2. Honor Declaration of Independence
3. EVERYONE serves (expand the IDF)
4. TOTAL destruction of Hamas terrorists
No games. No compromises. You’re either all in for Israel, or you’re OUT!  https://x.com/clashreport/status/2119454936484184275/video/1

Jonathan Gregory
ABDUL EL SAYED FAILS BACKGROUND CHECK FOR CLASSIFIED SENATE BRIEFINGS
By Jonathan Gregory
Washington, DC - November 8, 2026
Abdul El Sayed has failed the background check required for classified Senate briefings. The denial blocks him from any session that involves sensitive national security information. Officials who conduct the clearances reported that the review did not meet the standards necessary for access to restricted materials. The failure leaves open the question of what specific issues prevented approval. Senators who receive classified briefings must clear the same process before they can attend. El Sayed’s rejection means he cannot participate in those meetings. The decision places him outside the normal flow of information that other members receive. Americans who expect every senator to qualify for the same briefings now see one individual excluded by the clearance system. The denial raises direct concerns about what the background check uncovered. Officials have not released the precise reasons but the result itself is public. Voters who supported El Sayed must now consider whether a senator barred from classified sessions can fulfill the full duties of the office. The clearance failure stands as the official record until any appeal produces a different outcome. The standard remains the same for every member of the chamber.