English LCCC Newsbulletin For Le

English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For February 27/2026
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
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Bible Quotations For today
The Parable of the Unmerciful Servant: You wicked servant,’ he said, ‘I canceled all that debt of yours because you begged me to. Shouldn’t you have had mercy on your fellow servant just as I had on you
Matthew 18/23-35/ Then Peter came to Jesus and asked, “Lord, how many times shall I forgive my brother or sister who sins against me? Up to seven times?”Jesus answered, “I tell you, not seven times, but seventy-seven times. “Therefore, the kingdom of heaven is like a king who wanted to settle accounts with his servants. As he began the settlement, a man who owed him ten thousand bags of gold[h] was brought to him. Since he was not able to pay, the master ordered that he and his wife and his children and all that he had be sold to repay the debt. “At this the servant fell on his knees before him. ‘Be patient with me,’ he begged, ‘and I will pay back everything.’ The servant’s master took pity on him, canceled the debt and let him go.“But when that servant went out, he found one of his fellow servants who owed him a hundred silver coins. He grabbed him and began to choke him. ‘Pay back what you owe me!’ he demanded.“His fellow servant fell to his knees and begged him, ‘Be patient with me, and I will pay it back.’“But he refused. Instead, he went off and had the man thrown into prison until he could pay the debt. When the other servants saw what had happened, they were outraged and went and told their master everything that had happened. “Then the master called the servant in. ‘You wicked servant,’ he said, ‘I canceled all that debt of yours because you begged me to. Shouldn’t you have had mercy on your fellow servant just as I had on you?’ In anger his master handed him over to the jailers to be tortured, until he should pay back all he owed. “This is how my heavenly Father will treat each of you unless you forgive your brother or sister from your heart.”

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on February 26-27/2026
The Commons (Communal Lands) of Historic Mount Lebanon Belong to the Villages’ Residents Since Ottoman Times… The Iranian-Backed and Terrorist Shiite Duo Is Attempting to Seize Them/Elias Bejjani/February 26/2026
Israel says struck 8 Hezbollah compounds in Baalbek district
Lebanon reports teenager killed as Israeli army says struck Hezbollah compounds
Israeli military says it struck Hezbollah Radwan Force infrastructure in Baalbek
Hezbollah official says will not intervene in event of 'limited' US strikes on Iran
Israeli drone strikes Nabatieh's Ali Taher
Israel boycotts Mechanism meeting
Reports: Hezbollah reassures state, Presidency threatens Hezbollah
PM Salam marks one year in office: Lebanese government laid foundation for rebuilding the state
Salam says army can finish N. Litani plan in 4 months
Aoun, Salam sign decree for extraordinary legislative session
Hajjar says timely elections 'more likely than not' but sources suggest otherwise
Gasoline tax approved, but questions remain over funding public wage increases
Good news for Lebanon’s diaspora: Passport fees cut, consular charges scrapped
Lebanon eyes role in IMEC: Can Beirut and Tripoli ports become key hubs for the new trade route?
Hezbollah Puts the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in Its Sights/David Daoud/FDD-Policy Brief/February 26/2026

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on February 26-27/2026
Iran, US talks ended after 'significant progress': Oman FM
White House envoys disappointed after morning talks with Iranians, Axios reports
US and Iran make significant progress in talks, will meet again soon, mediator says
Iran FM says 'good progress' in talks with US
US and Iran hold third round of talks in Geneva
Iran would be outgunned in any war with the US but could still inflict considerable pain
Pentagon’s first kamikaze drone unit ready for Iran strikes
Israeli fire kills six people in Gaza as truce deal staggers
Syria govt swap dozens of detainees with Druze factions
IMF releases $2.3 billion to Egypt after reforms help to stabilize economy
US, Ukraine hold talks in Geneva as Russia says 'no deadlines' to end war
Zelensky says 'more readiness' for next Russia meeting after Geneva talks

Titles For The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on February 26-27/2026
On War with Iran, a U.S.-Israeli Division of Labor?/Michael Herzog/The Washington Institute/February 26/2026
From SNAFU to FUBAR in Northeast Syria/
Devorah Margolin, Joana Cook/The Washington Institute/February 26/2026
Trump’s Best Options on Iran: Limited Strikes and Continued Military, Economic, and Diplomatic Pressure/Michael Singh/The Washington Institute/February 26, 2026
Saving the European-American marriage ... President Trump’s Secretary of State shows how
Clifford D. May/ The Washington Times/February 26, 2026
Iran FAQ: What You Should Know/Behnam Ben Taleblu and Janatan Sayeh/February 26/2026
What will the Middle East look like after 30 years?/Zaid AlKami/Al Arabiya English/27 February/2026
X Platform Selected twittes for 26/2026

on February 26-27/2026
The Commons (Communal Lands) of Historic Mount Lebanon Belong to the Villages’ Residents Since Ottoman Times… The Iranian-Backed and Terrorist Shiite Duo Is Attempting to Seize Them
Elias Bejjani/February 26/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/02/152475/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ns_SMzpIKBQ
In the context of a long series of theft, usurpation, corruption, moral decay, and blatant disregard that has, for years, been associated with Nabih Berri and Hezbollah—terroists groups aligned with Iran and acting in hostility to all that is Lebanese, constitutional, and rooted in respect and coexistence— Yesterday, Finance Minister Yassine Jaber, a member of the Amal Movement led by Nabih Berri and his circle, issued a circular that complements a previous one released in 2015 by then–Finance Minister Ali Hassan Khalil. That earlier circular sought to seize the commons (Communal Lands) of Mount Lebanon and register them as state property. It must be emphasized that the commons of historic Mount Lebanon, stretching from Bsharri in the north to Jezzine in the south, have belonged to the residents of the villages and towns since Ottoman rule, and subsequently during the French Mandate and throughout the First and Second Lebanese Republics. They were therefore preserved and never confiscated, seized, or placed under state control—unlike commons in other Lebanese regions that are owned by the state outside historic Mount Lebanon.In 2015, backed by the force of the Iranian jihadist-terrorist Hezbollah’s weapons and political dominance, Berri attempted to seize these commons. At that time, Ali Hassan Khalil issued a circular aimed at confiscating the commons and transferring their ownership to the state. The circular was not implemented due to widespread opposition, most of it from Christian communities. Today, Berri is attempting once again to pursue the same objective through a new circular issued under the tenure of Minister Yassine Jaber.
The Vatican, first and foremost, the Maronite Church in particular, and all genuine sovereignty advocates are called upon to reject this circular publicly and to demand the prosecution of former Minister Ali Hassan Khalil, current Minister Yassine Jaber, and their political master Nabih Berri on charges of abuse of office and unlawful infringement upon Christian-owned lands.
The Commons of Mount Lebanon: A Historic Ownership Confronting an Administrative Circular
Amid the controversy stirred by the circular issued by Finance Minister Yassine Jaber on February 25, 2026, concerning the registration of un-surveyed properties and commons, the issue of the historic commons of Mount Lebanon has resurfaced. The matter carries historical, legal, and existential dimensions that strike at the heart of collective ownership by the residents of villages and towns extending from Bsharri in the north to Jezzine in the south.
First: Historical Background of the Commons’ Ownership
The commons of Mount Lebanon are not abandoned or ownerless lands; they are collective properties belonging to village communities since the era of the Mutasarrifate of Mount Lebanon under the Ottoman Empire. During that period, local customs and land regulations recognized the distinct nature of communal ownership in mountain villages. Under the French Mandate over Lebanon, these commons were not confiscated. Instead, they continued to be recognized within the framework of land demarcation and registration systems. This recognition persisted after Lebanon’s independence in 1943, without transferring ownership to the state—unlike practices applied in other Lebanese regions outside historic Mount Lebanon.
For centuries, these commons have formed an economic and social backbone for village residents, used for grazing, agriculture, and public benefit. They have traditionally been administered in the name of the local community rather than the central state.
Second: The 2026 Circular and the Revival of the 2015 Attempt
The new circular issued by Minister Jaber requires that un-surveyed properties and commons be registered first in the name of the state, with the possibility of later transfer to municipalities if legal documentation is provided. This measure is justified as compliance with Decision No. 26/186 concerning land demarcation and registration, as well as Articles 236 and 256 of the Property Law. However, this step recalls the 2015 circular issued by then–Finance Minister Ali Hassan Khalil, which adopted a similar approach and triggered broad political and popular opposition, preventing its effective implementation in many areas.
Current concerns revolve around two key points:
Registering initial ownership in the name of the state may open the door to altering the historic legal status of these lands. Granting the Ministry of Finance—acting as custodian of state property—the final authority over such properties effectively places collective ownership under direct central control.
Third: Between Law and Historic Rights
While the Property Law prohibits acquiring ownership of abandoned attached properties and commons through prescription, the historical specificity of Mount Lebanon lies in the fact that these commons were never state property to begin with. They are historically established communal properties administered in the name of local communities.
The distinction is fundamental between:
Public state property, and
Commons historically belonging to village residents.
Any legal approach that disregards this distinction risks triggering a constitutional dispute affecting the principle of protecting private and collective property as enshrined in the Lebanese Constitution.
Fourth: Rejection and Calls for Action
Political, ecclesiastical, and popular voices have rejected the circular, considering it an infringement on established historical rights. They have called for:
Freezing the circular and subjecting it to transparent public legal debate.
Legislative action by Mount Lebanon MPs to clarify and explicitly safeguard the historic status of the commons.
A clear stance from religious authorities, particularly the Maronite Church, in defense of the communities’ historic land ownership.
Recourse to the State Council (Shura Council) to challenge the circular should it prove inconsistent with existing laws or constitutional property protections.
Conclusion
The issue of Mount Lebanon’s commons is not a minor administrative matter. It is intrinsically linked to history, identity, and a distinct land system that emerged in the mountains during the nineteenth century. What is required today is a calm, lawful, and well-documented approach grounded in archival and cadastral records—free from arbitrariness or political manipulation. For the people of the mountain, land is not merely real estate; it is an element of existence and continuity. Any alteration of its legal status necessitates a transparent national debate balancing state authority with the historic rights of local communities.
Text of the Circular Under Discussion
A New Financial Circular Restricting Land Registration Powers
Agencies/February 26/2026 (Translated from Arabic)
Finance Minister Yassine Jaber issued a new circular stressing the strict obligation to adhere to legal procedures in the registration and transfer of ownership of un-surveyed properties, abandoned attached properties, and commons, amid increasing violations involving the registration of such properties contrary to applicable laws.
In the circular addressed to real estate judges, surveyors, mukhtars, and land registry officials, the minister required refraining from directly registering un-surveyed properties and commons in the names of municipalities or individuals during demarcation and registration processes. These properties must first be registered in the name of the state, and may later be transferred to the relevant municipalities if proper legal ownership documentation is available, in accordance with Decision No. 26/186 on land demarcation and registration.
The circular further instructed mukhtars to limit themselves strictly to their identificatory functions and not to exceed into ownership powers, pursuant to the Law of Mukhtars and Local Councils dated November 27, 1947. It also warned against issuing “knowledge and acknowledgment” certificates for abandoned attached properties and commons, as such properties cannot be acquired through prescription, seizure, or occupation under Articles 236 and 256 of the Property Law.
The circular clarified that determining “possession over time” falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the real estate judge, not the mukhtar. It also required land registry officials not to transfer ownership of abandoned attached properties and commons into the private ownership of municipalities before submitting the file to the General Directorate of Real Estate Affairs for a final decision by the Minister of Finance, given that the Ministry acts as custodian of state properties.
The circular follows a rise in the registration and transfer of un-surveyed or abandoned attached properties and commons to municipalities or individuals contrary to legal procedures, as well as confirmed cases of mukhtars issuing improper certificates. It also forms part of a series of previous circulars issued by the Ministries of Finance and Interior and Municipalities regulating conditions for issuing such certificates and governing the transfer of ownership of commons.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on February 26-27/2026
Iran, US talks ended after 'significant progress': Oman FM
LBCI/AFP/February 26/2026
Oman's foreign minister said Thursday that the third round of talks between Iran and the United States were over and that technical discussions will be held next week in Vienna.
"We have finished the day after significant progress in the negotiation between the United States and Iran," Badr Albusaidi said in a post on X, adding that "discussions on a technical level will take place next week in Vienna."

White House envoys disappointed after morning talks with Iranians, Axios reports
Reuters/February 26/2026
hite House envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff were disappointed by what they heard from Iranians in morning negotiations Thursday in Geneva, Axios reported.

US and Iran make significant progress in talks, will meet again soon, mediator says
Al Arabiya English/27 February/2026
The United States and Iran made significant progress in talks on Thursday aimed at resolving a longstanding nuclear dispute and averting new US strikes, mediator Oman said, amid Washington’s large-scale military buildup in the Middle East. The two sides plan to resume negotiations soon after consultations in their countries’ capitals, with technical-level discussions scheduled to take place next week in Vienna, Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi said in a post on X after the day’s talks ended in Switzerland any substantial move toward an elusive agreement between longtime foes Washington and Tehran could reduce the imminent prospects for US President Donald Trump to carry out a threatened attack on Iran that many fear could escalate into a wider war. The Omani minister’s upbeat assessment followed indirect talks between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner in Geneva, with one session in the morning and the second in the afternoon. “We have finished the day after significant progress in the negotiation between the United States and Iran,” al-Busaidi said. Describing the talks as some of the most serious that Iran has had with the US, Araghchi told Iranian state television: “We reached agreement on some issues, and there are differences regarding some other issues.” “It was decided that the next round of negotiations will take place soon, in less than a week,” he said, adding the Iranians had clearly expressed their demand for sanctions relief. There was no immediate comment from US negotiating team on the outcome of the talks. The discussions about the decades-long dispute over Iran’s nuclear work come as fears grow of a Middle East conflagration. Trump has repeatedly threatened action if there is no deal and the US military has amassed its forces in waters near the Islamic Republic.
‘Intense and serious’ talks
A senior Iranian official told Reuters earlier on Thursday that the US and Iran could reach a framework for a deal if Washington separated “nuclear and non-nuclear issues.”The Trump administration has insisted that Iran’s missile program and other issues must be part of the negotiations. After the morning session, al-Busaidi said the two sides had exchanged “creative and positive ideas.”But a senior Iranian official said at the time that some gaps still had to be narrowed. Washington, which believes Tehran seeks the ability to build a nuclear bomb, wants Iran to give up all uranium enrichment, a process that makes fuel for atomic power plants but that can also yield material for a warhead. Iran has long denied wanting a bomb and said earlier on Thursday it would show flexibility at the talks. Reuters reported on Sunday that Tehran was offering undefined new concessions in return for removal of sanctions and recognition of its right to enrich uranium. However, the United States also wants to expand talks to other issues including Iran’s arsenal of ballistic missiles and its support for armed groups in the region. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on Wednesday that Iran’s refusal to discuss its ballistic missile program was a “big problem” which would have to be addressed eventually. The missiles were “designed solely to strike America” and pose a threat to regional stability, he said. Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei told Press TV on Thursday that the negotiations would focus solely on nuclear topics and the lifting of sanctions, and said Tehran was going into them with “seriousness and flexibility.”

Iran FM says 'good progress' in talks with US
Agence France Presse/February 26/2026
Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Thursday that the latest round of talks with the United States dealt with the nuclear program and the lifting of sanctions, adding that negotiators made "good progress". "We made very good progress and entered into the elements of an agreement very seriously, both in the nuclear field and in the sanctions field," Araghchi told state TV after the talks in Geneva ended.

US and Iran hold third round of talks in Geneva
Associated Press/February 26/2026
Iran and the United States were holding another round of indirect talks in Geneva on Thursday to try to reach a deal on Tehran's nuclear program and potentially avert another war as the U.S. gathers a massive fleet of aircraft and warships in the Middle East.
U.S. President Donald Trump wants a deal to constrain Iran's nuclear program, and he sees an opportunity while the country is struggling at home with growing dissent following nationwide protests. Iran also hopes to avert war, but maintains it has the right to enrich uranium and does not want to discuss other issues, like its long-range missile program or support for armed groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.If America attacks, Iran has said U.S. military bases in the region would be considered legitimate targets, putting at risk tens of thousands of American service members. Iran has also threatened to attack Israel, meaning a regional war again could erupt across the Middle East. "There would be no victory for anybody — it would be a devastating war," Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told India Today in an interview filmed Wednesday just before he flew to Geneva. "Since the Americans' bases are scattered through different places in the region, then unfortunately perhaps the whole region would be engaged and be involved, so it is a very terrible scenario."
Geneva talks are the third meeting since June war
The two sides held multiple rounds of talks last year that collapsed when Israel launched a 12-day war against Iran in June and the U.S. carried out heavy strikes on its nuclear sites, leaving much of Iran's nuclear program in ruins even as the full extent of the damage remains unclear. Araghchi is representing Iran at the talks. Steve Witkoff, a billionaire real estate developer and friend of Trump who serves as a special Mideast envoy, is heading up the U.S. delegation with Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner. The talks are again being mediated by Oman, an Arab Gulf country that's long served as an interlocutor between Iran and the West. Araghchi met Oman's Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi after arriving in Geneva on Wednesday night. The men "reviewed the views and proposals that the Iranian side will present to reach an agreement," a report from the state-run Oman News Agency said. Al-Busaidi will pass along Iran's offer to the U.S. on Thursday, it added. Al-Busaidi also met with the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations' nuclear watchdog. The Omani diplomat flashed a thumbs-up to a question about whether he was hopeful for the talks. Oman later published images of Witkoff and Kushner meeting with the mediator. The two sides adjourned after around three hours of talks and planned to resume the discussions later on Thursday. "We've been exchanging creative and positive ideas in Geneva today," the Omani envoy said. "We hope to make more progress." Trump wants Iran to completely halt its enrichment of uranium and roll back both its long-range missile program and its support for regional armed groups. Iran says it will only discuss nuclear issues, and maintains its atomic program is for entirely peaceful purposes. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio told reporters Wednesday that Iran is "always trying to rebuild elements" of its nuclear program. He said that Tehran is not enriching uranium right now, "but they're trying to get to the point where they ultimately can."Iran has said it hasn't enriched since June, but it has blocked IAEA inspectors from visiting the sites America bombed. Satellite photos analyzed by The Associated Press have shown activity at two of those sites, suggesting Iran is trying to assess and potentially recover material there.The West and the IAEA say Iran had a nuclear weapons program until 2003. After Trump scrapped the 2015 nuclear agreement, Iran ramped up its enrichment of uranium to 60% purity — a short, technical step away from weapons-grade levels of 90%. U.S. intelligence agencies assess that Iran has yet to restart a weapons program, but has "undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so." While insisting its program is peaceful, Iranian officials have threatened to pursue the bomb in recent years.
Threat of military action sparks war fears
If the talks fail, uncertainty hangs over the timing of any possible U.S. attack.If the aim of potential military action is to pressure Iran to make concessions in nuclear negotiations, it's not clear whether limited strikes would work. If the goal is to remove Iran's leaders, that will likely commit the U.S. to a larger, longer military campaign. There has been no public sign of planning for what would come next, including the potential for chaos in Iran. There is also uncertainty about what any military action could mean for the wider region. Tehran could retaliate against the American-allied nations of the Persian Gulf or Israel. Oil prices have risen in recent days in part due to those concerns, with benchmark Brent crude now around $70 a barrel. Iran in the last round of talks said it briefly halted traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow mouth of the Persian Gulf through which a fifth of all traded oil passes. Satellite photos shot Tuesday and Wednesday by Planet Labs PBC and analyzed by the AP appeared to show that American vessels typically docked in Bahrain, the home of the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet, were all out at sea. The 5th Fleet referred questions to the U.S. military's Central Command, which declined to comment. Before Iran's attack on a U.S. base in Qatar during the closing days of the war last June, the 5th Fleet similarly scattered its ships at sea to protect against a potential attack.

Iran would be outgunned in any war with the US but could still inflict considerable pain
Associated Press/February 26/2026
As U.S. forces mass in the Middle East, Iran faces the threat of major strikes by the world's most powerful military, potentially targeting its leaders, military, nuclear sites and critical infrastructure. Iran has nowhere near the same capabilities, and is even more vulnerable after last year's war launched by Israel and recent anti-government protests. But it could still inflict pain on American forces and allies, and may feel it has to if the Islamic Republic's survival is at stake. While Iran suffered major losses last June, it still has hundreds of missiles capable of hitting Israel, according to Israel's estimates. Iran boasts a much larger arsenal of shorter-range missiles capable of hitting U.S. bases in Gulf countries and offshore American forces, soon to be joined by a second aircraft carrier. Iran has previously threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, a vital waterway for the global oil trade, and claimed to have done so partially during military drills last week. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned that Iran could sink American warships, and top officials have said a U.S. attack would spark regional war. Iran's U.N. ambassador Amir Saeid Iravani said "all bases, facilities and assets of the hostile force in the region" would be legitimate targets.
Lingering capabilities
Israel carried out heavy strikes on Iran's longer range missile arsenals — as well as its military leadership and nuclear program — during the 12-day war in June. The U.S. struck Iran's main nuclear sites, and President Donald Trump said at the time that they had been "obliterated."But the extent of the damage — and how much has been rebuilt — is still unknown. Iran continued to strike Israel with missiles and drones until the fighting stopped, increasingly eluding its vaunted air defenses. Iran's shorter-range missile arsenal was largely untouched, said Danny Citrinowicz, an Iran expert at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies. That could make Iran more inclined to retaliate against tens of thousands of U.S. forces based in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and elsewhere."Iran may be weak. But it still has ways to inflict real pain on the United States — and much more incentive to try than it did before," Nate Swanson, head of the Atlantic Council's Iran Strategy Project, wrote in Foreign Affairs. "Iranian officials feel they need to give Trump a bloody nose or they will perpetually be at risk." Iran launched missiles at a U.S. base in Iraq after the killing of its top general in 2020 and targeted a U.S. base in Qatar near the end of last year's war. Those strikes, which appeared to have been telegraphed in advance, caused damage but no fatalities, as early warning systems and missile defenses swung into action. Iran could also carry out attacks farther afield. The country has been accused of using criminal gangs and armed groups to plan or carry out attacks around the world, including on dissidents, Israelis and Jewish targets.
Learning curve
Last year's Israeli strikes killed several top generals and nuclear scientists, revealing major vulnerabilities. At one point, Trump said the U.S. knew where Khamenei was hiding, calling him an " easy target." Fresh off the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, Trump may consider decapitation strikes aimed at bringing down Iran's decades-old Shiite theocracy, which he recently said "would be the best thing that could happen."The Iranians have had eight months to learn from their mistakes and firm up internal security. Citrinowicz said there are likely contingency plans if Khamenei were to be killed. Rather than naming a single successor, power would probably shift to a small committee until hostilities subsided.Experts say the death of the 86-year-old Khamenei, who has ruled Iran for over three decades, would not in itself spell the end of the Islamic Republic. Power might eventually pass to a member of his inner circle, as it did in Venezuela, or to Iran's Revolutionary Guard.
US allies could be targets
American allies are clearly concerned about a regional war. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has warned of a heavy response to any Iranian attack on Israel. Arab Gulf states have long viewed Iran with concern and leaned on the U.S. for defense, but do not want to be drawn into war. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which host thousands of American troops, have said they would not allow their airspace to be used. An Arab Gulf diplomat said regional leaders were talking to Iran and the United States to avert war, warning that it could have severe consequences, including a spike in oil prices. The diplomat spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive, closed-door talks. Iran has its own allies, including Houthi rebels in Yemen, armed groups in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. But its self-described Axis of Resistance suffered major losses in the fighting that rippled across the region after Hamas' October 2023 attack from Gaza.
A global pressure point
Another close-in target could allow Iran to inflict wider pain. Around one-fifth of all traded oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz, just off Iran's shore. The U.S. Navy is committed to keeping it open, but Iranian attacks could disrupt trade, as the far-weaker Houthis managed to do in the Red Sea for much of the past two years. Iranian officials have not explicitly threatened to target the strait in the current standoff, but Iranian forces partially closed it last week during military drills, signaling it could be vulnerable if war breaks out. Other critical oil assets would also be within range. In 2019, strikes on oil infrastructure temporarily halved Saudi Arabia's production. Yemen's Houthis claimed responsibility, but U.S. officials later blamed Iran.
The nuclear question
After initially threatening military action over Iran's killing of protesters, Trump shifted attention to its nuclear program, warning that "bad things" would happen if Iran doesn't agree to a deal. The two sides are set to hold another round of indirect talks in Geneva on Thursday. Iran has always said its nuclear program is peaceful, while the U.S. and others have long suspected that Tehran intends to eventually develop weapons. After Trump scrapped a 2015 nuclear agreement, Iran ramped up its enrichment of uranium, building up a stockpile of near-weapons grade material. Iran's biggest sites were hit by U.S. and Israeli strikes, causing significant damage above ground. But it's unclear whether enriched uranium was spirited away before they were hit or buried underground. Iran says it has been unable to enrich since then, but it has also barred inspections. Iran is still believed to be a long ways from developing a usable nuclear weapon, but radioactive material could pose a risk in the event of widespread strikes.

Pentagon’s first kamikaze drone unit ready for Iran strikes
Bloomberg/27 February/2026
The Pentagon’s first kamikaze drone unit is ready to participate if President Donald Trump decides to launch strikes on Iran, according to US officials and analysts. The drone unit is known as Task Force Scorpion and evolved from an experimental US military drone unit. It’s now ready for operations, US Central Command spokesman Capt. Tim Hawkins said in an emailed statement.“We established the squadron last year to rapidly equip our warfighters with new combat drone capabilities that continue to evolve,” he said. The one-way attack drone unit is now part of the largest regional US military buildup since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was ordered by Trump to pressure Iran into negotiations about its nuclear program. US-Iran talks continued Thursday in Geneva, with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi saying the two sides made good progress and a new round of talks could happen “very soon,” possibly in “about a week.”One of the unit’s drones successfully test launched in the Gulf in mid-December, off the flight deck of the USS Santa Barbara, one of littoral combat ships in the region today as part of the US armada. The unit’s deployment marks “a pivot away from US military reliance on multi-million-dollar platforms like the MQ-9 Reaper, which are increasingly difficult to justify in high-attrition, swarm-based conflicts,” said Forecast International defense analyst Anna Miskelley. CENTCOM estimated the Low-Cost Unmanned Combat Attack System drones cost about $35,000 each. The lightweight LUCAS drones are produced by Arizona-based SpektreWorks and can be launched for one-way attacks, reconnaissance missions and maritime strikes, among other tasks. The drones have “an extensive range and are designed to operate autonomously,” according to a separate CENTCOM statement.
While the drone unit is just one small part of the broader deployment, its involvement in any upcoming military action would be a first for the brand-new unit. It could also validate Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s mandate to accelerate the US military’s use of unmanned aerial vehicles. At the same time, the fact that the unit’s one-way attack drones were reverse-engineered from Iran’s Shahed-136 shows the US is still playing catch-up after years of Russia and Iran using kamikaze drones to hit targets, including in Ukraine. With a 40-pound payload, the LUCAS drones couldn’t be used against hardened Iranian targets. But “this force would be an effective way to attack softer, distributed targets in Iran like missile production facilities, road networks and missile launch sites,” according to Bryan Clark, a Hudson Institute think-tank analyst and former strategic planner at the US Navy. “Destroying these kinds of targets require a lot of dispersed attacks that inexpensive drones are well suited to deliver,” he said. “Iran doesn’t have much of an air defense network anymore, so they may not be able to shoot down many.”

Israeli fire kills six people in Gaza as truce deal staggers
Reuters/February 26/2026
CAIRO, Feb 26 (Reuters) - Israeli attacks killed five people in Gaza on Thursday, the territory's health officials said, and the Israeli military ‌said it killed a militant who posed a threat to its ‌forces in the south of the enclave. Medics said an Israeli airstrike against a group of Palestinians in Gaza City's Tuffah neighbourhood in northern Gaza killed two people and wounded several others. Three people were killed and several injured, some critically, in an Israeli drone attack on a police checkpoint in southern Gaza's Khan Younis later in ‌the day, medics said. ⁠The Israeli military did not immediately comment on the reports.Separately, the Israeli military said forces operating in the southern Gaza ⁠Strip killed a militant who posed an imminent threat to them after he crossed into an area still occupied by Israel inside the enclave. It described the incident as a violation of the U.S.-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Hamas that began last ‌October. Gaza has been reduced to rubble in the war that was triggered by an attack by the Palestinian militant group Hamas on southern Israel on October 7, 2023 in which 1,200 people were killed, according to Israeli tallies.The Gaza health ministry says more than 72,000 people, mostly civilians, have been ‌killed by Israeli fire since then. It also says that at least 600 people have been killed by Israeli fire since a ceasefire agreement came into effect last October.Israel has ‌said four soldiers have been killed by militants in Gaza since the ceasefire began. Both sides have traded blame for violations of the truce.In January, the Gaza deal moved into a second phase in which Israel is ‌expected to withdraw troops further from Gaza, and Hamas is due to yield control of the territory's administration.

Syria govt swap dozens of detainees with Druze factions
Associated Press/February 26/2026
Syrian government forces and Druze militiamen who control areas in the southern Sweida province on Thursday exchanged prisoners taken in clashes last summer, a rare step toward a possible political resolution of simmering tensions in the country. The exchange was the first major sign of progress in attempts by the United States and Jordan to broker a political settlement between the two sides. The Syrian government side handed over 25 prisoners while local authorities in the Druze-run parts of Sweida released 61 at a checkpoint in the al-Matuna area in northern Sweida. The exchange was facilitated by the International Committee of the Red Cross.Syrian Interior Ministry spokesperson Noureddine al-Baba told journalists that the exchange deal was reached "through the combined efforts of international and local parties, and it reflects the Syrian state's commitment to all its citizens, from all backgrounds and affiliations and across all provinces."Stephan Sakalian, head of the ICRC delegation in Syria, expressed "hopes that this operation will pave the way toward possible further releases and dialogue between all parties on other humanitarian concerns," including the fate of people who went missing during the violence. In mid-July, armed groups affiliated with Druze leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri clashed with local Bedouin clans, spurring intervention by government forces, which effectively sided with the Bedouins. Hundreds of civilians, mostly Druze, were killed, many by government fighters. Tens of thousands of people, both Druze and Bedouins, were displaced in the fighting. Since then, a large group of the militias banded together under al-Hijri, creating a de facto anonymous area in large swaths of the province, backed by neighboring Israel. Since former Syrian President Bashar Assad was ousted in an offensive by Islamist-led insurgents in December 2024, the new authorities in Damascus have struggled to unify the country and consolidate control over the territory. A deal reached last month with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces that have controlled much of the country's northeast was a significant step toward consolidation — and also left Sweida as the main area left outside government control. The Druze religious sect began as a 10th-century offshoot of Ismailism, a branch of Shiite Islam. Over half of the roughly 1 million Druze worldwide live in Syria. Most other Druze live in Lebanon and Israel, including in the Golan Heights, which Israel seized from Syria in 1967 and later annexed.

IMF releases $2.3 billion to Egypt after reforms help to stabilize economy
Associated Press/February 26/2026
The International Monetary Fund says it is allowing Egypt to draw on about $2.3 billion from an earlier approved loan, noting that the country has made progress in restoring economic stability and reducing inflation as part of a reform program. The IMF said in a statement Wednesday that the decision to release the funding followed reviews of the government reforms, which it credited with bringing about "a broad-based economic recovery" in the world's most populous Arab country. It noted that the gross domestic product grew at a rate of 4.4% from 2024 to 2025. A $3 billion bailout loan for Egypt approved in 2022 was increased to $8 billion in 2024 — an effort to shore up an economy hit by a staggering shortage of foreign currency and soaring inflation that peaked at 38% in September 2023. Inflation fell to 11.9% in January, the Washington-based Fund said in its statement. Measures that Egypt took to tackle inflation included the flotation of the Egyptian pound and interest rate hikes. However, the IMF noted that progress "has been uneven." It said that too much of the economy remains in the hands of the state, and that "decisive efforts to reduce the state's footprint in the economy will be essential." Egypt's economy has been hit hard by the coronavirus pandemic, the fallout from Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. Additionally, attacks by Houthi rebels in Yemen on shipping routes in the Red Sea have slashed Suez Canal revenues, which is a major source for foreign currency. The attacks forced traffic away from the canal and around the tip of Africa. Around 30% of the people in the nation of more than 108 million lives in below poverty line, according to the latest government figures.

US, Ukraine hold talks in Geneva as Russia says 'no deadlines' to end war
Naharnet/February 26/2026
U.S. and Ukrainian officials were meeting in Geneva on Thursday to discuss advancing efforts to end Russia's four-year invasion of Ukraine, just as Moscow signaled it was in no hurry to sign a deal. U.S. leader Donald Trump is pushing for an end to Europe's deadliest conflict since World War II, but has so far failed to broker any deal between Moscow and Kyiv. Previous rounds of U.S.-led negotiations between Russian and Ukrainian officials in Geneva and Abu Dhabi have failed to yield a compromise, including on the key sticking point of territory. Russia, which has signaled it will not budge on its demands for full control of Ukraine's eastern Donetsk region, said Thursday it was too early to make forecasts about when a deal would take place. "Have you heard anything from us about deadlines? We have no deadlines, we have tasks. We are getting them done," Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told state media. Kyiv says the only way of breaking the deadlock is a leaders' meeting between Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky, and that it aims to lay the ground for such a summit during talks on Thursday.
"Today in Geneva we continue our work within the framework of the negotiation process. A bilateral meeting with the American delegation has begun -- with Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner," Ukraine's lead negotiator Rustem Umerov said.
Ukraine aims to "synchronize positions" with the United States ahead of fresh trilateral talks in March, he added. Russian negotiator Kirill Dmitriev plans to be in Geneva on Thursday, though there is no indication he plans to meet the Ukrainian side, according to Russian state media. "Dmitriev plans to arrive in Geneva on Thursday to pursue negotiations with the Americans on economic issues," Russia's TASS news agency cited an unnamed source as saying.
Drone and missile attacks -
Hours before the meeting, Russian forces launched some 420 drones and 39 missiles at Ukraine, wounding more than two dozen people in at least six different regions, according to authorities.AFP journalists heard several explosions in central Kyiv shortly after authorities warned Russia had launched its attack. The strikes hit an electricity substation in the southern Odesa region, as well as a school building in the southern Zaporizhzhia region, according to officials. "Destruction has been recorded in eight regions, with many private homes and apartment buildings damaged," Zelensky said. Also ahead of the meeting, Russia announced that it had returned the bodies of 1,000 killed Ukrainian soldiers to Ukraine, while Moscow received 35 Russian bodies in exchange. The two sides regularly exchange the remains of killed serviceman, one of the few areas of cooperation between the warring countries. Zelensky spoke with U.S. President Donald Trump on Wednesday ahead of the talks, with US envoys Witkoff and Kushner part of the 30-minute call. "We expect this meeting (in Geneva) to create an opportunity to move talks to the leaders' level. President Trump supports this sequence of steps," Zelensky said. After first refusing to negotiate with Russia, Zelensky has repeatedly said that the only way of resolving difficult issues, including territory, is through a meeting with Putin. Talks between Moscow and Kyiv remain deadlocked over the fate of the Donbas -- the industrial region in eastern Ukraine that has been the epicenter of the fighting. Russia is pushing for full control of Ukraine's eastern Donetsk region, and has threatened to take it by force if Kyiv does not cave at the negotiating table. But Ukraine has rejected the demand and signaled it would not sign a deal without security guarantees that deter Russia from invading again.

Zelensky says 'more readiness' for next Russia meeting after Geneva talks
LBCI/February 26/2026
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Thursday there was "more readiness" for the next round of talks with Russia to end the war, after Kyiv and Washington concluded their latest talks in Geneva. "As a result of today's meetings, there is already more readiness for the next trilateral format. Most likely, the next meeting will be in the Emirates, specifically in Abu Dhabi. We expect the format to be in early March," Zelensky said in a regular evening address. AFP

The Latest LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on February 26-27/2026
On War with Iran, a U.S.-Israeli Division of Labor?
Michael Herzog/The Washington Institute/February 25/2026
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/war-iran-us-israeli-division-labor
U.S. President Trump walks with Israeli President Herzog and Prime Minister Netanyahu
Believing that conflict is more likely than a diplomatic deal and that Israel will be involved in the fighting, Jerusalem has been intimately coordinating its military planning with Washington despite certain differences in their policy priorities.
With the United States and Iran poised between diplomacy and war, Israel is preparing for hostilities that would likely include a sizable role of its own. Iran has been weakened considerably of late, but Israel still regards the Islamic Republic as its most dangerous enemy and therefore considers itself a major stakeholder in the current standoff.
Not long after the twelve-day war with Iran last June, Jerusalem came to realize that it would have to take additional military action sooner or later given the regime’s efforts to rebuild strategic capabilities that pose a major threat to Israel. This view—which was repeatedly relayed to Washington—drew on the main lesson that Israel learned from the war that began on October 7, 2023: namely, that it could no longer allow the emergence of strategic threats in its neighborhood in the hope of containing them, but must instead nip them in the bud.
The situation shifted dramatically when the United States took the lead against Iran following the eruption of major protests in December. Whereas Israel led the way last June while Washington joined the war effort afterward, this time Jerusalem will have to adjust to whatever option the Trump administration chooses—though Israeli officials are trying to shape that choice. From their perspective, the current situation in Iran presents not only a threat but also a unique opportunity. The regime is at a historic low—the result of a failing economy, collapsing infrastructure, irreparable divides with most of the population, degraded strategic capabilities, and a shattered regional axis. Indeed, the June war exposed Tehran as a paper tiger and may have contributed to the re-eruption of internal dissent soon after. Israel’s conclusion is that the regime is extremely vulnerable, and that further pressure at this point could deny it important assets, further weaken it, and possibly hasten its demise.
As for the possibility that the United States and Iran might reach a viable diplomatic settlement to avoid war, Jerusalem is skeptical. For one thing, there is little chance that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will accept current U.S. demands, which in his view are both humiliating and likely to invite more pressure that aims at toppling the regime. For another, Israel’s decisionmaking circle largely believes that President Trump is loath to give up the ample leverage Washington has amassed against an enfeebled Iran just for the sake of a “weak deal”—meaning an agreement that lifts sanctions and throws a lifeline to a wounded regime without effectively addressing the long-term strategic threats posed by its nuclear and missile programs and its destabilizing regional activities. Even so, Israeli officials are on the alert lest Washington winds up accepting a deal focused solely on the nuclear dimension—a scenario that would leave out the missile program (a major concern for Jerusalem, as discussed below), limit Israel’s freedom of action, and strike a blow to the hopes of the Iranian people at a critical moment.
For now, Jerusalem is operating under the assumption that President Trump will ultimately opt for military action, and that Iran will retaliate by attacking Israel, among other targets. Israel is poised to hit back very strongly in this scenario and has fully coordinated its potential response options with the U.S. defense establishment. As Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu stated last week, “If the Ayatollahs make the mistake of attacking us, they will experience a response they cannot even imagine.” This reflects the thinking that Israel’s retaliatory operations—not to mention U.S. operations—should be so devastating that they shelve the strategic threats posed by Iran for years, not just a few months. During the June war, Israel focused on strategic and military targets; it barely touched regime targets and avoided economic targets completely. This time, all target types are on the table (though hitting critical economic infrastructure is a very sensitive decision and would require close consultations with Washington).
Even if Iran does not strike Israel during a military showdown with the United States, Jerusalem could very well decide to join the American war effort in earnest. While Israel remains intent on neutralizing the regime’s strategic capabilities, seeing an opportunity to complete what was not achieved during last year’s war, it is not leaving out the internal Iranian scene. Israeli planners are fully cognizant that an air campaign by itself cannot bring about regime change, but they believe military operations could play a valuable role in degrading the regime and emboldening further mass protests.
Israeli planners have also given thought to the most immediate military imperatives of a U.S. operation, whether it takes the form of a major, sustained campaign or limited strikes designed to boost U.S. diplomatic terms. Namely, any opening U.S. strike should include suppression of Iranian retaliatory capabilities (e.g., missiles that threaten Israeli, American, and allied targets) and naval capabilities (to reduce any maritime threats in the Strait of Hormuz).
Addressing the Ballistic Missile Threat
According to Israeli intelligence sources, Iran has prioritized efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile capabilities over the past few months, seeing them as a critical tool of deterrence and response given the regime’s weakened air defenses and shattered regional axis. The June war convinced Tehran that Israeli defenses are vulnerable to its missiles. Consequently, the regime hastened its efforts to produce large quantities of liquid-fueled ballistic missiles, aspiring to overwhelm those defenses with larger salvos. Its arsenal is now approaching 2,000 ballistic missiles, and its current production rate is estimated at around 100 per month and growing. It is also producing mobile launchers, which became a bottleneck for the program following the war. In Israel’s view, the prospect of Iran fielding thousands of ballistic missiles within the next few years is a major strategic threat that must be prevented or preempted. In recent consultations with Washington, including at the top leadership level, Israel asked that any U.S. deal with Iran include limitations on the quantity and range of these missiles. At minimum, Israel sought to guarantee its freedom of action against this threat should the United States decide not to address it diplomatically or militarily. Israel’s first request was seemingly not heeded—in recent public comments about negotiations with Iran, senior U.S. officials have referred solely to the nuclear dimension (though President Trump’s latest State of the Union address did mention Iran’s quest to develop a missile capable of reaching the United States). In private, however, Israeli government sources claim that their request for freedom of action was guaranteed.
In this regard, Israel’s best defense is a good offense—if war erupts beyond a surgical strike and triggers an Iranian attack on Israel, Jerusalem would likely seek to play a major role in the conflict by ordering operations to take out Iran’s missile program. This means not only hunting missiles and launchers but also destroying development and production infrastructure. The idea would be to buy several years’ respite from the Iranian ballistic missile threat—time that Israel could use to upgrade its air defenses with laser systems and other capabilities (and, hopefully, witness regime change in Tehran).
The Nuclear Threat
The June war dealt a severe blow to Iran’s nuclear program, and the regime has been cautious about its activities on that front ever since for fear of triggering additional strikes. Even so, Israeli intelligence indicates that Tehran has embarked on a slow but deliberate process of preparing the ground for the program’s eventual reconstruction. Rather than attempting to jump right back into enriching uranium (which is difficult anyway given the level of damage at major enrichment and storage sites), the regime has focused on digging deep underground facilities that it believes will be immune to U.S. and Israeli airstrikes. Consequently, Israel has asked Washington to ensure that any new deal not only prohibits future enrichment activities on Iranian soil, but also denies the physical infrastructure required for any such efforts (underground or otherwise) and mandates intrusive inspections to enforce compliance.
The Proxy Threat
Israel is also following Tehran’s efforts to secure the involvement of its regional proxies in a potential war, including significant engagement with Hezbollah by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Although the Lebanese group refrained from firing a single bullet during the June war and has been weakened by conflict with Israel, it still possesses dangerous military capabilities and has exerted substantial efforts to restore its prewar footing. Alarmed by these efforts and frustrated with Lebanon’s apparently insufficient will and capacity to disarm Hezbollah, Israel has carried out an intensifying stream of pinpoint strikes against the group’s military targets and rearmament efforts. If Hezbollah attacks Israel during the next war with Iran, one should expect a major Israeli military push against the organization inside Lebanon.
Toward a Joint Strategy
While U.S.-Israeli dialogue on Iran has been very intimate at all levels, some natural differences remain in their policy priorities. If the United States decides to advance a diplomatic deal, those differences will come to the fore. Alternatively, if it decides to strike Iran—a more probable outcome at this point—then the two allies will likely agree on a military division of labor that suits them both.
In formulating what such operations might look like, both Washington and Jerusalem seem intent on incorporating two main goals in their plans: denying Iran dangerous strategic capabilities (nuclear and missiles) and degrading the regime. Yet despite wanting to see a different regime in Tehran, neither ally seems to have a viable plan for getting there. Whatever President Trump decides in the near term, the United States and Israel need to jointly develop a comprehensive, long-term strategy for advancing that second shared goal. Among other things, this strategy should include ways of providing significant support to protesters inside Iran, deepening the divide between the regime and the people, opening cracks within the regime’s repressive network, and identifying and empowering Iranians who could effectively lead efforts to challenge the regime. Military strikes could play an important role by decapitating the regime’s leadership, degrading the repressive network’s centers of gravity, and potentially emboldening the oppressed populace. Yet kinetic action may prove insufficient without a wider strategy for eroding the regime.
**Brig. Gen. Michael Herzog, IDF (Ret.), is The Washington Institute’s Tisch Distinguished Fellow and former Israeli ambassador to the United States.

From SNAFU to FUBAR in Northeast Syria
Devorah Margolin, Joana Cook/The Washington Institute/February 26/2026
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/snafu-fubar-northeast-syria
Some 20,000 Islamic State-affiliated individuals are now unaccounted for, and no one has a plan for what to do about this mix of committed radicals, at-risk victims, and other escapees.
Syria has just witnessed a great escape. Just weeks after a breakout from an Islamic State detention facility in the country’s northeast, more than 20,000 people from al-Hol detention camp, which is known for holding Islamic State-affiliated families, are now unaccounted for. The delayed responses of the Global Coalition Against Daesh, the Syrian government, and the United Nations—all of which helped operate al-Hol—have done little to quell mounting security and humanitarian concerns. The absence of transparency about this fiasco threatens not only regional stability but also the lives and futures of those whose whereabouts remain unknown.
The threat posed by these 20,000 escapees varies. Many were victims of the Islamic State, women and children who were swept up in its rapid rise. Some are committed radicals, eager to resurrect the caliphate. Others fall somewhere in between. Now, all of these people are either abandoned or at large.
The Syrian government, which is now nominally responsible for their fate, has not provided any sort of documentation or offered clear repatriation or reintegration plans. Among other things, this means that thousands of foreign citizens who may be subject to criminal charges in their home countries will likely quietly make their way back home in the coming months—or simply disappear. If international actors don’t take action, and there is every reason to fear that they won’t, the result will be a humanitarian disaster for many civilians and a growing terrorist threat from a smaller number of radicalized individuals.
How did we get here? In 2014, the Islamic State declared its self-styled caliphate in Iraq and Syria. Across the region, thousands of people either willingly joined the group or were forced into taking some role within its so-called state. More than 40,000 foreigners traveled to join the group from across the world or were born there after a parent’s arrival. Then, following the caliphate’s collapse in 2019, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—backed by the Global Coalition Against Daesh—implemented a series of emergency detention measures. Some 10,000 men and some teenage boys were moved into detention facilities funded by the U.S. Defense Department. Separately, tens of thousands of mostly children and women were moved into detention camps. Most ended up at al-Hol camp, which swelled to 70,000, with a small number later being transferred to Roj camp.
For the past seven years, these detention sites operated under what the U.S. military bluntly calls SNAFU: Situation Normal: All F*cked Up. The detention facilities and camps existed in a prolonged state of legal and political limbo, managed by the SDF, a nonstate actor with neither the legal authority to deport foreign nationals nor the capacity to conduct credible trials. Many governments around the world were slow—or unwilling—to repatriate their citizens, leaving tens of thousands in indefinite detention without charge or trial, and children suffering for the sins of their parents.
As conditions steadily deteriorated across detention sites, including al-Hol, both the security risks and the humanitarian suffering deepened. Throughout it all, the Global Coalition Against Daesh continued to fund and support the system without articulating a clear or lawful endgame.
The collapse of the Assad regime at the end of 2024 presented the incoming Trump administration with an opening to advance a long-signaled objective: withdrawing from Syria. After cutting funding to counter-Islamic State activities, President Donald Trump’s team encouraged the U.N. to assume administrative control of al-Hol and Roj camps while pressing for reconciliation between the SDF and the new government in Damascus. Simultaneously, Washington urged the Syrian government not only to formally join the Global Coalition Against Daesh—which it ultimately did—but also to assume responsibility for Islamic State detention facilities and camps, despite the new regime having expressed neither the capacity nor the willingness to do so.
Even under ideal circumstances, a handover from the SDF to Damascus of detention facilities holding thousands of men accused of Islamic State affiliation, as well as al-Hol and Roj detention camps, would have been extraordinarily complex. What actually happened was close to a worst-case scenario. After weeks of fighting, there was a prison break at al-Shaddadi prison on Jan. 19. Roughly 200 militants escaped, though a majority were later recaptured.
Separately, Syrian army forces moved on al-Hol on Jan. 20, prompting the SDF to abandon its positions under fear of escalating violence. That created a vacuum between the SDF’s withdrawal and Damascus’s consolidation of its own control. Misinformation swirled around this hours-long gap. In exclusive statements given to one of the authors, a U.S. Central Command spokesperson—Navy Capt. Tim Hawkins—said, “The U.S. military closely monitored the situation at al-Hol and observed no displaced persons or detainees departing the camp prior to Syrian government forces arriving.” Yet other sources suggested that hundreds may have escaped in this transition.
Confronted with the risk of further breakouts, the U.S.-led coalition moved 5,700 male detainees from SDF-run facilities to Iraq rather than risking losing them altogether. This population included Syrians, Iraqis, and foreign nationals, creating a host of legal complications. Meanwhile, the coalition failed to articulate a strategy for the approximately 25,000 individuals who remained in al-Hol and Roj. After taking control of al-Hol, the Syrian government announced plans to close it, leaving the status of its inhabitants dangerously undefined.
As a result, the situation on the ground has gone from SNAFU to FUBAR, or F*cked Up Beyond All Recognition. Reports in recent days indicate that al-Hol is empty. Not in a systematically organized way, but through chaos. Videos circulating online have shown vehicles arriving at al-Hol and leaving with families of suspected militants, with no guards in sight. Reports have circulated describing documents of residents being destroyed. Fighting broke out in the camp on Feb. 11 between remaining residents, forcing the U.N. and other nongovernmental organizations to suspend operations.
By Feb. 15, Gonzalo Vargas Llosa, the U.N. refugee agency representative in Syria, belatedly stated, “UNHCR has observed a significant decrease in the number of residents in Al-Hol camp in recent weeks.” This is an understatement, as it is now estimated that up to 20,000 people previously held in al-Hol are gone.For years, the SDF, U.N., and U.S. government have called on countries to address indefinite detention in northeast Syria—and warned of the consequences of neglecting this issue. The chaos of the past few weeks was both predictable and preventable. Occurring on the watch of the Syrian government, it raises serious questions about whether this release was the result of intent or ineptitude. Both scenarios are worrisome.
While not everyone in al-Hol was a committed Islamic State extremist, many were. Still more have been exposed to a harsh, heavily radicalized environment for seven years, and these civilians will likely require some support transitioning back to their homes.
Two divergent regional approaches have emerged in this regard. Syria has seemingly focused on thrusting its citizens back into society in a haphazard manner. Many Syrians previously held in al-Hol have already reportedly returned to their families without proper documentation or support. Iraq has emphasized a formalized rehabilitation and reintegration program for its citizens. Some Iraqis also remained in al-Hol camp. The Iraqi government—which has been in the process of bringing back more than 22,000 of its citizens since 2021—repatriated 191 nationals who wanted to go home last week. Which national approach will be more effective in the long term is yet to be seen, but Iraq’s undoubtedly looks more promising at this stage, even if imperfect.
For the few hundred residents—Syrians and Iraqis—that did not leave the camps, the Syrian government implemented a plan this week to send them to a repurposed camp for internally displaced people called Akhtarin in Aleppo province. The UNHCR is supporting this effort, which ultimately aims to reintegrate this population. But it is not clear what will happen to those at Akhtarin who do not voluntarily return to their homes. Already 1,200 Iraqis have reportedly said they do not want to go to Iraq due to outstanding warrants.
As for the approximately 20,000 people who disappeared from al-Hol, they have simply been forgotten. These include citizens from 40 countries, many of whom have reportedly moved around Idlib and Aleppo. Some foreigners are trying to return home. Others who might be facing criminal charges in their home countries are unlikely to return. Finally, those who are still committed to the Islamic State may try to rejoin local jihadi groups or even move internationally to other hotbeds of jihadi activity. There is a long history of foreign fighters (and in some cases, their families) moving from conflict to conflict. Unfortunately, there is no shortage of jihadi hot spots in the world today to consider.
The smaller Roj camp—which is still under the control of the SDF—also holds around 2,000 foreigners, including many Westerners. Questions remain over the future of these populations, but some are taking their fate into their own hands.
A group of 11 Australian families in Roj camp attempted to return home with assistance from their relatives, but they were returned back to the camp due to what news reports described as a “coordination problem” with Damascus. Australia said it would not help in their repatriation but would likely have to act if its citizens arrived at an embassy, or indeed back in Australia. One Belgian woman who recently arrived in her home country unexpectedly was immediately arrested. Amid the chaos, the government of Albania repatriated one woman taken to Syria as a child. While many countries are still reluctant to repatriate their citizens, they may still have to address these cases if individuals return home of their own volition.
Finally, there are the oft forgotten children of al-Hol. These Syrians, Iraqis, and foreigners have known little but conflict and have grown up amid the violence of first the Islamic State and later the detention camp. Tens of thousands are now unaccounted for. They remain at particular risk of trafficking, exploitation, or recruitment if they are not returned to their home countries and provided with targeted support. Programming needs to address their myriad of developmental needs and their unique status as both victims and risks. These children urgently need intervention and support, not more neglect.
Iraq, for its part, is struggling to face its own new security and legal hurdles. The Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council announced that it will hold trials for the more than 5,700 Islamic State-affiliated men recently transferred into the country’s custody. Baghdad continues to call on foreign governments to accept their own citizens. But until this happens, Iraq will have to deal with severely overcrowded prisons holding incredibly dangerous detainees. Here, the country’s history of mistreating prisoners and subjecting them to overly hasty trials continues to raise human rights concerns.
At this stage, the Syrian government, the Trump administration, the Global Coalition Against Daesh, and other key stakeholders would ideally coordinate on next steps. But the proliferation of urgent geopolitical crises in the world, and the neglect of this population historically, suggest that there will be few resources and little attention directed their way.
The security consequences are already emerging. Al-Hol staff have reported receiving threats from former residents and now live in fear of reprisal attacks. Recently, the head of Iraqi intelligence warned of a resurgence of Islamic State cells in Iraq, citing an increase from 2,000 to 10,000 fighters over the past year. Syria already faces an uphill battle meeting the needs of its citizens in a postwar environment with few resources, raising concerns about how it would handle more radical challenges to the regime of Ahmed al-Sharaa. As the Islamic State waits in the shadows to reconstitute itself, international inaction may provide it the *opportunity that it needs.
Devorah Margolin is the Blumenstein-Rosenbloom Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and Pepperdine University. Joana Cook is an assistant professor of terrorism and political violence at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University, and an adjunct lecturer at Johns Hopkins University. This article was originally published on the Foreign Policy website.

Trump’s Best Options on Iran: Limited Strikes and Continued Military, Economic, and Diplomatic Pressure
Michael Singh/The Washington Institute/February 26, 2026
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/trumps-best-options-iran-limited-strikes-and-continued-military-economic-and
Rather than choose between a narrow nuclear deal and open-ended war, the United States should conduct limited military strikes against Iran’s missile program and security services and double down on a pressure strategy that was working.
Following U.S. and Israeli strikes in June 2025, the Trump administration appeared to demote Iran significantly in its foreign policy priorities. President Trump frequently asserted that the strikes had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program, and analysts close to the administration argued that the campaign had set Iran’s efforts to produce a nuclear weapon back by years.
These conclusions were debatable. While the sites the United States and Israel targeted were significantly damaged and key nuclear personnel eliminated, Iran still possesses large amounts of high-enriched uranium (HEU) and likely has the wherewithal to turn it into at least a crude nuclear weapon in only a few months. Much of the assessment of Iran’s residual nuclear capabilities rested on unknowns, such as how much of its HEU was accessible, the expertise of surviving nuclear scientists, and how quickly Tehran could reconstitute a weaponization capability.
Nevertheless, few close observers have argued that Iran’s nuclear program still poses an urgent threat after the strikes, even if it remains a serious one. This makes it all the more surprising that in the current negotiations, which began with Trump’s threat to intervene on behalf of Iranian protesters, the focus is once again almost exclusively on the nuclear issue.
Issues on the Table
Amid the U.S. military buildup after the January massacres in Iran, the Trump administration articulated four issues it wished to address: nuclear weapons, missile capabilities, treatment of protesters, and the regime’s support for proxy forces such as Hezbollah. The conundrum posed by this agenda, however, is that no single strategy is likely to address all four concerns. Addressing Iran’s residual nuclear capabilities would likely require removing its HEU from facilities and tunnels buried under rubble from June’s bombing, and bombing them again would avail little. Likewise, verifying that other nuclear activities have ceased would require readmitting inspectors to Iran, which is achievable only through diplomacy.
Yet Iran is unlikely to make negotiated concessions on other U.S. concerns. For at least the last twenty years, the regime has shown no inclination to negotiate seriously about any issue other than the nuclear program. It likely views significant concessions on missiles, proxies, and domestic matters as fatally compromising its entire approach to security and tantamount to surrender in the face of U.S. coercion and domestic unrest. Given such stakes, the regime may believe that war would be less damaging to its prospects for survival.
As a result, Washington’s nonnuclear concerns likely require it to resort to tools other than direct diplomacy. Iran’s missile capabilities can be set back in the short term through military strikes; in the long term, Iran may agree to a regional framework limiting missile arsenals and proliferation but is likely to seek to retain the ability to strike Israel even at significant cost. Blunting Iran’s support for proxies requires an even broader set of tools, including efforts to weaken those proxies directly and punitive actions against Iran to disincentivize support for them. Perhaps most important, these tools include support for friendly governments in states where these proxies prosper—like Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq—to fill the governance and security vacuums in which Iran’s partners thrive.
The Way Forward
In the current crisis, President Trump appears to be weighing two options: a nuclear deal negotiated directly with Iran, or military strikes whose possible scope and objectives remain uncertain. On the first option, there is little to suggest that Iran would entertain a deal that fully or even significantly addresses U.S. concerns. Iranian negotiators have reportedly prepared a proposal that insists on Tehran’s “right” to enrich, asking Washington to accept a limited Iranian enrichment capability that they claim would be strictly for medical research. Tehran has reportedly packaged this request with concessions such as not accumulating enriched uranium and readmitting international nuclear inspectors.
Such a deal would represent a major climbdown for the United States, however. Not only does it fail to address the root cause of the current crisis—Iran’s treatment of protesters—it also asks Washington to stand by as Tehran rebuilds enrichment activities eliminated in June. Nor are Iran’s reported concessions as valuable as they may at first glance seem: allowing even a token level of enrichment likely implies permitting Iran to possess the entire nuclear supply chain, from uranium mining and conversion to centrifuge production, in addition to gaining experience in the enrichment process itself. Even if international monitors verify that Iran is not accumulating enriched uranium through export or downblending, this could easily be reversed.
A lengthy and ambitious war, however, is not desirable, nor is it the only alternative to whatever deal Iranian negotiators offer. Such a war would have many downsides: drawing U.S. resources from the administration’s priority theaters in the Indo-Pacific and Western Hemisphere, further drawing down already-depleted munitions stockpiles, and risking damage and loss of life to U.S. forces and other American and allied targets.
Some have touted such a war as a means of toppling Iran’s regime. However, it is uncertain whether war would achieve this outcome short of a much more significant military effort, for which the United States does not have the necessary forces in the region. It is also unclear if such a war would be positive for the region or for the Iranians whom President Trump set out to help. Past regime change operations have a poor record even when the United States was prepared to provide stabilization forces and significant economic investment, neither of which appears to be in the offing now. This should give policymakers pause. The administration may be emboldened by its apparent success in Venezuela, but it is unclear whether the removal of President Nicolas Maduro represents regime change, and it will be some time before the policy can be judged a success or failure.
Instead of launching a regime change war, the administration should remember that the January protests that precipitated the current crisis were at least partly the result of a successful U.S. policy of multifaceted pressure. President Trump’s best way forward is not to alter that strategy but to double down on it by doing the following:
Launch limited military strikes. The United States, together with Israel if practical, should engage in limited strikes against Iran’s missile arsenal and security service targets. This would address the near-term threat of Iran’s missiles (which will likely prompt Israeli strikes this year anyway) and allow President Trump to say he followed through on his warnings regarding the regime’s treatment of protesters. Tehran may retaliate for such strikes, but Washington and Jerusalem have demonstrated in the past their capacity to limit the effectiveness of Iranian retaliation. Washington should also make clear that it is willing to strike again in the future, and that it will support additional Israeli strikes as needed.
Redouble economic pressure. The January protests were sparked by a dramatic decline in the value of Iran’s currency. The Trump administration should seek to increase economic pressure on the regime by placing the issue high on the agenda for President Trump’s summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in April. While China’s oil imports from Iran have apparently declined in recent months, a further, longer-lasting reduction would leave Iran with few alternative export destinations. Beijing could contribute even more to this pressure if it refrains from helping Tehran rebuild its missile and nuclear programs. Meanwhile, the Trump administration can make clear what economic benefits would be available for a post-Islamic Republic Iran.
Support the Iranian people. The ultimate U.S. objective in Iran, shared by multiple administrations, is positive change that originates from within the country. Yet too frequently, Washington gives serious consideration to supporting the Iranian people only when protests break out. The Trump administration should instead formulate a strategy for long-term support of Iranian dissidents. This could include providing technology (e.g., VPN access, Starlink terminals, direct-to-cell access on Starlink), funding human rights documentation and related activities, conveying information on social media, and resuming U.S. government broadcasting. It could also include other forms of support, such as increased visa access for Iranian activists and, if necessary, sanctions modifications to allow those outside Iran to provide financial assistance to activists inside the country.
Increase engagement in the Middle East. Washington should begin to address Iran’s support for proxies with more robust engagement in the areas where they thrive. The administration has devoted significant time and attention to Gaza, yet Hamas has arguably been strengthened politically, if not militarily, by the events of the past two-plus years. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is weakened militarily but still has no rivals for political power within the Shia Muslim community; in Yemen, the Houthis’ political power is at the root of their ability to project force. In each place, the United States should be looking to transform military victories into longer-lasting political—and thus strategic—gains.
While these steps do not address Iran’s residual nuclear program, neither do they foreclose future bilateral or international negotiations on those capabilities. In addition, Iran so far appears to have been deterred from significantly rebuilding or advancing its nuclear capabilities, and it will likely remain so as long as the United States appears willing to employ force as needed.Iran faces a strategic conundrum: its longstanding strategy of threatening adversaries with its missile arsenal, proxy network, and latent nuclear capabilities has failed, and the regime appears to lack ideas for a new strategy or the flexibility to pursue one. In contrast, U.S. strategy toward Iran appears to have produced unprecedented pressure on the regime. The Trump administration’s best bet, and its best way to support the Iranian people in their aspirations for a better future, is to patiently continue a strategy of military, economic, and diplomatic pressure.
**Michael Singh is the managing director and Lane-Swig Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute.

Saving the European-American marriage ... President Trump’s Secretary of State shows how
Clifford D. May/ The Washington Times/February 26, 2026
One of the most popular magazines in the years following World War II was the Ladies’ Home Journal. One of its most popular features was “Can this marriage be saved?”
Why am I dredging up this tidbit of journalistic trivia? Because of Marco Rubio’s address at the Munich Security Conference – on Valentine’s Day, no less.
A year ago, it was Vice President J.D. Vance who spoke in Munich. Ever since, major media platforms – including Foreign Policy, the Wall Street Journal, Politico, NPR, and the BBC – have been suggesting that the U.S. and Europe may be heading for a “divorce.”
President Trump’s Secretary of State has now shifted the discussion to the possibility of a reconciliation. To be fair, Mr. Rubio’s message was not significantly different from Mr. Vance’s. Both were based on Mr. Trump’s Weltanschauung – his general perception of the world. The difference between the two speeches was largely one of tone and tenor, but Mr. Vance’s did seem to imply that Europe’s attorneys might soon be hearing from America’s.
Mr. Rubio, by contrast, conveyed the idea that marriage vows are lifelong and unconditional, in good times and in bad, in sickness and in health. “We are bound to one another,” he told the Europeans. That said, marriages evolve. Europe and America tied the knot with the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949. Lord Ismay, NATO’s first secretary general, quipped that the purpose of the union was to keep “the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” So, it was in America’s interest for our European allies – wrecked by World War II – to get themselves back into shape economically and politically. America’s Marshall Plan contributing $13.3 billion for Europe’s recovery was strategic – stable, prosperous democracies mean trading partners, not aid dependents. And we were more than willing to do the heavy lifting militarily.
That was then, this is now: Four years ago this week, Vladimir Putin deployed Russian troops and tanks on a war of aggression and conquest which he has attempted to spin as a “special military operation.”
Should he prevail against Ukraine, his free and democratic neighbor, do you really think he will not deploy additional SMOs against other nations in the future?
Just days prior to his invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Putin forged a “no-limits” partnership with Xi Jinping, China’s ruler. Around their axis, the rulers of Iran and North Korea now revolve as well. As both Messrs. Vance and Rubio made clear, Washington in this new era needs a strong and capable partner, not a nervous nellie taking to the couch while America bears the burden of standing up to the world’s multiple bullies.
Here, we must acknowledge that America’s marriage is polygamous. Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania count as solid allies, doing everything they can to defend themselves and contribute to the collective security of the West.
The same cannot be said of Spain, currently governed by a coalition led by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party. And Britain, under the leadership of Prime Minister Keir Starmer last week denied the U.S. the use of the military base on Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, to use against the theocratic tyrants in Tehran. Canada, led by Prime Minister Mark Carney, also is problematic, as is France, in recent years forcibly driven out of a string of African nations thereby opening doors for Russia and China to expand their influence across that continent.
Mr. Rubio concluded his remarks by telling Europe that America’s “destiny is and always will be intertwined with yours” and that the two continents should be “proud of what we achieved together in the last century, but now we must confront and embrace the opportunities of a new one – because yesterday is over, the future is inevitable, and our destiny together awaits.”
He received a standing ovation.
I’m going to resist the temptation to end this column on that optimistic note. Why? Because Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, a leader of the ascendant Jeremy Corbyn wing of the Democratic Party, also attended the Munich conference.
As soon as she opened her mouth, it became obvious that she lacks the basic knowledge of world affairs that should be expected of a pottery major at a community college.
Asked whether the U.S. should defend Taiwan, she babbled: “Um, you know, I think that, uh, this is such a, you know, I think that this is a, um, this is of course a very long-standing, um, policy of the United States. Uh and I think what we are hoping for is that we want to make sure that we never get to that point and we want to make sure that we are moving in all of our economic research and our global positions to avoid any such confrontation and for that question to even arise.”If, a few years hence, she or someone of her ilk is in the White House and the Europeans have not risen to the challenges articulated by Messrs. Vance and Rubio, if they are still obsessing over carbon dioxide, flagellating themselves over the alleged past sins of Western civilization, leaving their doors open to unvetted immigrants from radically different cultures, and fielding too many JV militaries, they will find themselves in a forced marriage with the Communists in Beijing, the imperial revanchists in Moscow, the Islamists in Tehran, and the personality cultists in Pyongyang – abusive spouses all.
And they’ll remain in that wedlock till death do them part.
**Clifford D. May is founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a columnist for the Washington Times, and host of the “Foreign Podicy” podcast.
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/feb/24/secretary-state-rubio-saving-european-american-marriage/
Read in The Washington Times

Iran FAQ: What You Should Know
Behnam Ben Taleblu and Janatan Sayeh/February 26/2026
https://www.fdd.org/in_the_news/faq/2026/02/25/iran-faq-what-you-should-know/
Heir to a 2,500-year-old civilization, Iran today stands at a historic crossroads. The very survival of the Islamic Republic that has brutalized the country since the Islamic Revolution overthrew a pro-Western, secular monarchy in 1979 is at stake.
Iran simultaneously faces economic meltdown, weakened regional influence, nationwide protests prompting President Donald Trump to pledge support for regime opponents, a crippled nuclear program, and military threats on its still formidable arsenal of ballistic missiles and other long-range strike systems.
The present confrontation between the United States and Iran, rooted in the Islamic Republic’s hatred of America as a decadent, imperial power, is the culmination of nearly half a century of enmity that has killed hundreds of Americans. Trump now holds significant leverage to shape the outcome.
The confrontation is not with the Iranian nation but rather with its rulers. Iran is the home of the region’s most anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-Israeli regime and its most pro-American, pro-Western, and pro-Israeli population.
With up to 80 percent of Iranian citizens wanting an end to the regime, the big question now is whether, combined with protests, targeted U.S. military action can push Iran’s current rulers over the edge.
Q: What are the basic facts about Iran?
The Islamic Republic of Iran is an authoritarian and Islamist regime that was established in 1979 by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a formerly exiled cleric. Khomeini was at the helm of a revolutionary movement that replaced a pro-Western and modernizing monarchy with a rigid theocracy that continues to promote anti-Americanism, antisemitism, and gender apartheid at home and abroad.
Iran’s landmass covers 1.65 million square miles at the crossroads of the Middle East and Central Asia, with a population of 92 million and its capital in Tehran.
The Islamic Republic is the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism and has spawned or supported a variety of terrorist groups across the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shiite militia groups in Iraq, al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and Hamas in Gaza.
Iran forms one leg of an emerging “Axis of Aggressors” alongside Russia, China, and North Korea. The four authoritarian regimes coordinate to challenge U.S. power through arms transfers, sanctions evasion, military exercises, and joint efforts to reshape the global order. Iran sells oil to China and has been a critical weapons supplier to Russia throughout the Ukraine war, providing both finished drones and the technology for mass production. Iran has also received material support for its military programs from these countries and is in talks to procure more.
The official/state faith of Iran is Islam (of the Twelver Shiite sect), but the country’s population is highly secular and nationalist, with polls indicating less than 40 percent of Iranians identify as Muslim. The official language is Persian, but Iran is only 51-64 percent Persian and ethnically and linguistically diverse.
Iran’s primary export is oil, alongside petrochemicals and base metals, and the United States has banned these from international markets. Despite these sanctions, Iran exported an average of 1.5-1.66 million barrels per day in 2025, peaking at roughly 2.15 million barrels per day in October 2025.
Q: Did the January 2026 protests stem from a single trigger?
Iran’s protest waves over the years have had different triggers, but the accumulation of overlapping grievances has defined each movement. The ongoing wave, as well as the 2017 and 2019 protests, had economic triggers, the 2022 unrest centered on women’s rights, while earlier waves in 1999 and 2009 were driven by political demands. In each case, the unrest did not remain confined to the initial spark; broader grievances converged and evolved into calls for regime change rather than narrow policy reform.
Iran faced sharp economic contraction, inflation of nearly 50 percent, and food prices rising 60 to 70 percent in late 2025. Within one year, the rial fell from about 807,000 to 1.43 million per dollar on the free market.
In the final six months of 2025 alone, at least 60 environmental crises were documented, including drought, dust storms, wildfires, air pollution, desertification, land subsidence, and depleted reservoirs.
In summer 2025, rolling blackouts became routine, with scheduled two-hour cuts twice daily in some neighborhoods three days a week, often striking without warning and disrupting homes, shops, and factories.
Following the 12-Day War, regime authorities arrested 21,000 people simply for social media posts. By the end of the year, the regime carried out roughly 1,500 executions, nearly double the 975 recorded in 2024.
Q: Why do Iranians oppose the Islamic Republic?
The Islamic Republic was founded on Islamist principles and has acted at home and abroad in a manner deemed by large swaths of the Iranian population as not reflective of Iranian national interests. Specifically, it has prioritized funding terrorism and advancing its nuclear and missile programs over the welfare of its own people. Most Iranians view the regime not as their government but rather as an occupying Islamist force seeking to eradicate Iranian identity.
The Islamic Republic has brutally repressed Iranians. The regime ranks second in executions carried out annually and is the world’s highest executioner per capita. It also deploys Iraqi, Lebanese, and Afghan proxy forces to suppress protests at home, with these groups reportedly helping enable the killing of an estimated 36,000 to 43,000 unarmed protesters in January. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has ruled Iran since 1989, making him the modern Middle East’s longest-serving dictator. As “supreme leader,” a position created to enshrine clerical control, he commands the military and oversees key vetting bodies that control who can run for office, ensuring elections are neither free nor fair. Internal dissent is crushed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and a host of other domestic security forces like the Basij — an all-volunteer paramilitary. The IRGC is Khamenei’s primary security apparatus for suppressing opposition and projecting force across the Middle East. The IRGC is a designated terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, Canada, and Australia.
The theocratic regime treats Iran’s religious minorities as second-class citizens and is designated by the United States as a Country of Particular Concern regarding religious freedom. Authorities exploit and oppress Iran’s Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Bahai communities as scapegoats.
Q: Why are the U.S. and its allies opposed to Iran’s nuclear program?
Regime officials have routinely threatened nuclear weaponization, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reporting in 2025 that it is no longer able to verify whether Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful.
Iran is one of six countries in the world that can domestically enrich uranium — the fissile material needed for a nuclear weapon. From April 2021 to June 2025, it was the only country in the world enriching uranium to 60 percent purity. Prior to Operation Midnight Hammer, Iran’s breakout capacity could produce enough fissile material for 10 weapons in one month and 17 weapons in four months.
Deals have not prevented Tehran from enriching uranium in secret sites. Following the 2015 JCPOA, the IAEA found undeclared uranium traces at Turquzabad and Varamin and investigated past explosives-related activity at Marivan. None of these sites was declared under the 2015 agreement.
Intelligence estimates underpin these fears; recent satellite images show Iran undertaking extensive reconstruction work at its Taleghan 2 facility, where nuclear weapons research has been carried out, after it was badly damaged in the combined airstrikes on its nuclear and military sites in June 2025.
Following the June 2025 airstrikes by Israel and the United States, Iran is believed to have approximately 440 kg of uranium at 60 percent purity entombed in its facilities.
Iran insists it will never surrender its claimed “right to enrich” — the framework that provides a pathway for domestic weapons production. No such right exists under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Q: How dangerous is Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal?
Iran possesses the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East — an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 missiles capable of reaching U.S. military bases throughout the region, as well as allies like Israel and Arab states.
Iran is the only country without nuclear weapons to have first produced a 2,000-km-range ballistic missile. It has also targeted nuclear-armed states with ballistic missiles, having done so four times without first having produced nuclear weapons itself — against Pakistan in January 2024 and against Israel in April 2024, October 2024, and June 2025.
Despite adhering to a self-imposed range cap of 2,000 km, Iran has a space program that allows it a pathway toward developing intermediate-range systems capable of targeting the European continent and puts it on the pathway to developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability to target the U.S. homeland. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency assesses that Iran will possess more ICBMs than North Korea by 2035.
Iran refuses to include its ballistic missile capability as a subject for current negotiations with the United States.
Q: How extensive is Iran’s support for terrorist groups?
Iran has long been identified by the United States and other countries as the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism. Iran provides the majority of arms, training, funding, and guidance to its terrorist proxies, in violation of binding UN Security Council resolutions, and has avoided ratifying in full international counterterrorism finance regulations.
Through the IRGC’s Quds Force, Tehran has sought to export the 1979 Islamic Revolution by creating groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shiite militias in Iraq while coopting others, including Hamas and the Houthis, providing arms, training, funding, and guidance to what it terms the “Axis of Resistance.” Although al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban are not technically under this umbrella, Tehran has financed, armed, and trained both throughout the years. These groups receive Iranian funding and direction and are united with Tehran in countering U.S. and Israeli influence through coordinated attacks and arms transfers. Iran has plotted bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations in the United States, Europe, Latin America, and Asia — including foiled plots targeting President Trump.
Since the brutal Iran-backed October 7, 2023, terrorist attack by Hamas against Israel, both the United States and Israel have degraded Iran’s proxies’ military force. However, these proxies retain offensive and disruptive military capabilities and are poised to rebuild should outside pressure subside.
Behnam Ben Taleblu is senior director of the Iran Program and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Janatan Sayeh is a research analyst. For more analysis from the authors and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow Behnam and Janatan on X @therealBehnamBT and @JanatanSayeh. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_Iran. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

What will the Middle East look like after 30 years?
Zaid AlKami/Al Arabiya English/27 February/2026
The region today stands on the edge of a new phase. Established and effective powers are working to consolidate their positions, rising powers are testing their ability to ascend, and others imagine that a passing moment means the road to dominance is now open. Here, a question arises: what will the Middle East look like after 30 years? At its core, this is a question about who possesses a viable project, not who has the loudest rhetoric, nor who bets on others to bring about change.
Years ago, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi Crown Prince, pointed out that the Middle East could become the “new Europe.” The reference from the Saudi Crown Prince was not a geographical or civilizational comparison as much as it was a description of a political development path and a transition from the logic of chronic conflict to the logic of economic integration. Europe is a living example because, after bitter years of repeated wars that drained everyone, it realized it had no choice but to pursue development. And development can only happen through active partnership built on stability. That is why European countries decided to build a common market and lay the foundations for long term peace based on shared interests, not on balances of deterrence.
Despite the simplicity and depth of the idea used in Europe, which may well determine the shape of our region after three decades, some countries read the scene differently. They see in the ongoing transformations, and in the preoccupation of major powers with other global issues, a historic opportunity to leap into a leadership position. But regional leadership is not a vacuum filled with slogans. It is a responsibility built on solid pillars, most importantly a productive economy, stable institutions, internal legitimacy, and regional and international acceptance. Without these foundations, ambition turns into a burden, and attempts at dominance become closer to a costly gamble.
More dangerous still is that some ambitions go no further than seeking to be an “agent” for a major power, whether regional or global, relying on its political or military umbrella to enhance their standing. This type of rise is inherently fragile because it is tied to an external will. It advances when that power advances and retreats when it recalculates. After thirty years, only the states that have built independent decision making will remain on the scene, not those content with acting as intermediaries or tools in the conflicts of others.
Let us look at Israel today. It is a significant military and technological power, with a global presence in innovation fields. Yet it faces an existential question about the nature of its political project. When Thomas Friedman in The New York Times criticized the policies of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, he was warning that seeking to impose permanent realities without a political horizon could turn military superiority into a strategic burden. Hard power provides deterrence, but it does not grant regional acceptance nor does it settle the battle over legitimacy.
The same equation applies to regional states that rely on armed proxies or on extended influence across multiple arenas through the support of militias. Such influence is not anchored in cohesive internal development or an economy capable of resilience. Over time, it becomes a drain. Peoples do not measure their countries’ greatness by the number of open fronts, but by job opportunities, quality of education, level of services, and their sense of security.
After thirty years, the Middle East will either be a space for cross border economic integration or a permanent chessboard for proxy wars. In the first scenario, chronic conflict files are closed through courageous settlements, foremost among them the Palestinian issue, and a regional order is built on shared interests in energy, technology, and supply chains. In the second scenario, the cycle continues. Crises renew themselves, alliances shift, and opportunities are lost.
In the end, the future will not be kind to illusions. The states that build a cohesive national project, balance their security and development, and understand that regional legitimacy is earned, not imposed, are the ones that will sit at the decision-making table after three decades. As for those who believe that money or a fleeting moment of turmoil, through interference in other countries’ affairs and support for various militias within them, is enough to impose dominance without foundations, they will discover that history does not grant leading roles to those who have not prepared well for them. The region is being shaped now, and the question is not who dreams of leadership, but who deserves it and can pay its price.

X Platform Selected twittes for 26/2026
Blitz
Father Boulos Naaman on Bachir Gemayel:
Sometimes an entire people, an entire nation with all its talents and ambitions, is embodied in a single individual, one person.
Sometimes nations, peoples, and civilizations are unable to produce someone of the caliber of Bachir Gemayel.

Brother Rachid الأخ رشيد
The Jewish Bride captured by Muhammad
Safiyya bint Huyayy was the daughter of a Jewish tribal leader, respected, noble, and newly married. Her family had already been expelled once when Muhammad drove Banu Nadir from their land. They relocated to Khaybar, trying to rebuild their lives. But Khaybar was attacked as well.
During the raid on Khaybar, her father was killed. Her husband was killed. Her brother was killed. Many of her tribe were killed. Safiyya, a young bride, was taken captive along with hundreds of other Jewish women. They were treated as spoils of war — divided among the victors to be kept, used for sex, or sold.One of Muhammad’s companions, Dihya al-Kalbi, chose Safiyya for himself. Then Muhammad was told that Dihya had taken an exceptionally beautiful captive. He summoned Dihya and exchanged her for other women (two according to some reports, seven according to others). She became his share of the war booty. On the journey back from Khaybar — about 180 kilometers away — the army made several stops. During one of those nights, Muhammad instructed that Safiyya be prepared for him for sex. She had just lost her father, husband, and brother. She was grieving and devastated. Nevertheless, that night he slept with her in his tent.Islamic sources themselves record that one of his companions stood guard outside the tent the entire night — afraid she might attempt revenge. Other narrations attributed to Safiyya state that Muhammad was the most hated person in her life because he had killed her father, husband, and brother. Later versions of the story attempt to soften it. We are told he apologized repeatedly until she became pleased. We are told she had a dream about him before the battle. We are told that freeing her and declaring her his wife erased the brutality of the circumstances. We are told she “chose” Islam.
But none of these additions change the core facts: her family was killed, she was taken as war booty, transferred between men, and sexually raped within days of her capture.
This episode is not a minor footnote. It forces uncomfortable questions about power, conquest, consent, and the moral character of Muhammad. No amount of later embellishment removes the brutality of what happened to Safiyya.

Geert Wilders
https://x.com/i/status/2026734586093240560
Today I spoke about #islam and the prophet #Muhammad in the Dutch parliament
Listen carefully, for every word is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
#stopislam #Wilders

Narendra Modi
Fully agree with you, President Herzog. It was a delight to meet you and discuss diverse aspects of the India-Israel friendship. There is immense scope in futuristic areas such as technology, innovation, StartUps and more. My gratitude to you for supporting the ‘Ek Ped Maa Ke Naam’ (A tree for Mother) initiative. @Isaac_Herzog
Quote

Behnam Ben Taleblu بهنام بن طالب لو
@therealBehnamBT
Pay attn to this! Iran’s ballistic arsenal is the largest in the region & its primary tool of coercion, deterrence & punishment. Iranian efforts to develop its space program are a cover to develop longer-range strike capabilities that could threaten Europe & the US.