English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For  February 05/2026
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
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Bible Quotations For today
when you are offering your gift at the altar, if you remember that your brother or sister has something against you, leave your gift there before the altar and go; first be reconciled to your brother or sister, and then come and offer your gift
Matthew 05/21-26/:"‘You have heard that it was said to those of ancient times, "You shall not murder"; and "whoever murders shall be liable to judgement.  But I say to you that if you are angry with a brother or sister, you will be liable to judgement; and if you insult a brother or sister, you will be liable to the council; and if you say, "You fool", you will be liable to the hell of fire. So when you are offering your gift at the altar, if you remember that your brother or sister has something against you, leave your gift there before the altar and go; first be reconciled to your brother or sister, and then come and offer your gift. Come to terms quickly with your accuser while you are on the way to court with him, or your accuser may hand you over to the judge, and the judge to the guard, and you will be thrown into prison. Truly I tell you, you will never get out until you have paid the last penny."

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on February 04-05/2026
Inside Every Human Being There Is a Beast ...The true struggle within every human being is between the image of God within them and the distortion of that image/Elias Bejjani/February 02/2026
U.S. Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Sanction Election Interference in Lebanon
Aoun Orders Inquiry Into Israel’s Spraying of Unknown Substance in South Lebanon
Video link to a US Congressional hearing on Lebanon, titled: US Policy Towards Lebanon… “Obstacles to Dismantling Hezbollah’s Grip on Power,” featuring Dana Stroul, David Schenker, and Hanin Ghaddar
Targeting Hezbollah’s Broader Ecosystem of Power/Hanin Ghaddar/The Washington Institute/February/03/2026
Congressional Testimony/In Lebanon, Pushing the Ball Forward Before the May Election/David Schenker/The Washington Institute/Feb 3, 2026
Congressional Testimony/U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon: Obstacles to Dismantling Hezbollah’s Grip on Power/Dana Stroul/Washington Institute/Feb 3, 2026
Israeli operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah: January 26–February 1, 2026 /David Daoud/FDD's Long War Journal/February 3, 2026 |

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on February 04-05/2026
Trump says Iran’s supreme leader ‘should be very worried’
Iran says nuclear talks with US to be held in Muscat on Friday
Rubio says US ready to meet Iran but must discuss missiles, proxies
US rejects Iran’s request to change location, format of talks: Report
Common foe, different agenda: US and Israel diverge on Iran
MBS welcomes Germany’s chancellor during official visit to Saudi Arabia
Red Cross ‘outraged’ as on-duty paramedic killed in Gaza
Trump, Xi discuss Taiwan and soybeans in call aimed at easing China-US relations
Kremlin vows to act ‘responsibly’ after nuclear pact with US expires
Iran Formally Allows Women to Ride Motorcycles
Syria signs landmark offshore oil field deal with Cheron and a Qatari investor
Libya opens investigation into killing of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi
AMCD Endorses the Save the Kurds Act
AMCD Opposes Closure of the General Assembly Building in Aden by the Saudi-backed Giants Forces

Titles For The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on February 04-05/2026
What If the United States Doesn’t Strike Iran?/Patrick Clawson/The Washington Institute/Februay 03/2026
EU Takes Aim at Tehran: IRGC Terror Listing Opens New Front in Europe’s Iran Policy/Michael Jacobson/The Washington Institute/Februay 03/2026
Go Straight to Paradise: Women's Equality, Pakistan Style/Uzay Bulut/Gatestone Institute/February 4, 2026
Pope Leo XIV Is Set to Visit Equatorial Guinea — Here’s What He’ll Find/Alberto M. Fernandez/NationalCatholic Register/Februaru 04/2026
Why Iran must not expand its conflict beyond/Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Al Arabiya English/04 February/2026
The 2026 Brink: Trump Tests His Venezuela Doctrine on Iran/Pierre A. Maroun/Beirut Times/February 04/2026
Selected X tweets for February 04/2026

The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on February 04-05/2026
Inside Every Human Being There Is a Beast ...The true struggle within every human being is between the image of God within them and the distortion of that image
Elias Bejjani/February 02/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/02/151757/
Christian faith teaches us a fundamental truth: the human being was created in the image and likeness of God (Genesis 1:26) and was called to live in communion with Him, in love and holiness. Yet, because of the Fall, every person carries within himself a wounded nature. In this wounded nature lies what can be described, in spiritual terms, as an inner “beast”—a force of uncontrolled instincts and desires that emerges when the human person separates himself from God’s grace.
This beast is not an independent power. It is not stronger than the human person by nature. It remains dormant as long as the person lives in humility, generosity, and love, and remains faithful to the gifts and responsibilities entrusted to him by his Heavenly Father.
The beast sleeps when the human being lives according to love, because love is not merely a moral value; love is God Himself:
“God is love, and whoever abides in love abides in God, and God abides in him” (1 John 4:16).
As long as a person is conscious of his holiness, of his identity as a child of God by grace, and remains faithful to God’s commandments, the inner beast remains restrained. The awareness of standing one day before God’s judgment is essential to Christian life, for Scripture tells us:
“For we shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ” (Romans 14:10).
On the last day, when God reclaims from the human being the gift of life, the soul will stand alone before Him. At that moment, wealth, power, and earthly achievements lose all value. They remain behind, because:
“For we brought nothing into this world, and it is certain we can carry nothing out” (1 Timothy 6:7).
The only thing a person carries with him is his spiritual provision—his faith expressed through works of love. As Christ says:
“Behold, I am coming quickly, and My reward is with Me, to give to every one according to his work” (Revelation 22:12).
According to what this spiritual provision contains, the Lord will either say:
“Well done, good and faithful servant… enter into the joy of your Lord” (Matthew 25:21),
or the soul will face separation from God if it is empty of love, mercy, and good works, and filled only with greed, pride, and unrepented sin, where:
“Their worm does not die and the fire is not quenched” (Mark 9:48).
The inner beast awakens when faith weakens, hope fades, and the human being falls into temptation. At that point, the person returns to the “old self” and abandons the new life given through baptism by water and the Holy Spirit, forgetting the words of Scripture:
“Put off the old man… and put on the new man, which was created according to God” (Ephesians 4:22–24).
When a person distances himself from God, disobeys His commandments, and lives as if God does not exist, the beast within rises and dominates. Sin then becomes not an isolated act, but a way of life, because:
“The wages of sin is death” (Romans 6:23).
In this light, Jesus presents to us the parable of the rich fool (Luke 12:16–21). This man was not condemned for being rich, but for believing that his life depended on his possessions. He spoke only to himself and not to God. He trusted his barns, not his Creator. Therefore God said to him:
“Fool! This night your soul will be required of you.”
This parable reveals a deep spiritual truth: the true beast within the human person is the illusion of self-sufficiency and independence from God. When God is removed from the center of life, the human being becomes a slave to money, power, and pleasure. As Jesus teaches:
“For where your treasure is, there your heart will be also” (Matthew 6:21).
This truth applies not only to individuals, but also to societies and political systems. The crisis of our world—and of Lebanon in particular—is not only political or economic, but spiritual. It is the crisis of humanity that has forgotten God. Therefore Christ’s warning remains timeless:
“What will it profit a man if he gains the whole world, and loses his own soul?” (Mark 8:36).
In conclusion, the true struggle within every human being is between the image of God and its distortion. Salvation does not come by suppressing the beast through human effort alone, but by returning to God through repentance, grace, and a life rooted in faith and love. For in God alone there is true life:
“But now having been set free from sin… you have your fruit to holiness, and the end, everlasting life” (Romans 6:22).

U.S. Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Sanction Election Interference in Lebanon
This is Beirut/February/04/2026
U.S. lawmakers introduced legislation on February 2 that would authorize President Trump to impose sanctions on foreign individuals or entities accused of interfering in Lebanon’s electoral process, including efforts to obstruct voting by Lebanese citizens living abroad. The legislation would allow the president, in consultation with senior national security and financial officials, to impose sanctions on foreign persons found to have hindered, obstructed, or delayed Lebanon’s parliamentary elections or restricted diaspora voting rights. Authorized penalties include asset freezes under U.S. sanctions law, visa bans, and other measures available under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The bill’s findings state that free, fair, and timely elections are essential to Lebanon’s sovereignty and political stability and note that Lebanese law provides for participation by citizens residing abroad. It also cites past interference in Lebanon’s political process by armed groups, corrupt political actors, and foreign entities.Under the legislation, the administration would be required to submit an initial report to Congress within 60 days of enactment identifying individuals involved in election interference and assessing foreign involvement in Lebanon’s parliamentary elections scheduled for May 2026. Subsequent reports would be required every 180 days. The bill defines election interference to include actions such as voter intimidation, manipulation of electoral administration, obstruction of overseas voter registration or ballot handling, and material support for such activities. If enacted, the authority to impose sanctions under the measure would expire five years after the date of enactment. The bill, H.R. 7311, titled the Lebanon Election Integrity and Diaspora Voting Protection Act of 2026, was introduced in the House of Representatives by Rep. Darrell Issa, with Rep. Darin LaHood as a co-sponsor. It was referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and, additionally, to the Judiciary Committee.
The Diaspora Vote and Upcoming Parliamentary Elections
Lebanon is tentatively scheduled to hold parliamentary elections in May 2026. Voting by Lebanese citizens living abroad has been a recurring point of contention since it was first introduced under Lebanon’s electoral law.
Some political factions have pushed to limit or delay diaspora voting, arguing that it presents administrative difficulties or raises legal concerns, while others have accused domestic actors of seeking to restrict the overseas vote for political advantage. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who heads the Amal Movement, has blocked in the legislature the proposed amendment to the electoral law to allow Lebanese expatriates to vote abroad in their districts of origin. Berri and Hezbollah have pushed for the diaspora vote to be limited to six seats specifically created for expatriates voting abroad, as called for by the 2017 electoral law, but never implemented. Amal and Hezbollah believe that allowing Lebanese votes from abroad in all 128 parliamentary seats could disadvantage their electoral chances. The parliamentary deadlock on diaspora voting could lead legislators to push back the date of the parliamentary elections, as they did in 2013, with the voting delayed by four years.

Aoun Orders Inquiry Into Israel’s Spraying of Unknown Substance in South Lebanon
This is Beirut/February/04/2026
President Joseph Aoun instructed the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Wednesday to investigate Israel’s spraying of an unknown substance on southern Lebanese land to document the violations for international bodies. He declared that “these dangerous practices…require the international community and relevant United Nations organizations to assume their responsibility to end these aggressions and protect Lebanon’s sovereignty.”On Sunday, Israeli aircraft flying over southern Lebanon sprayed an unidentified substance near villages in the Bint Jbeil region. Aoun condemned the release of chemicals as a violation of Lebanese sovereignty and possible breach of international law. Since 2023, the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has seen environmental ramifications resulting from Israeli operations with chemicals and munitions affecting the viability of agricultural land and negatively impacting ecosystems and biodiversity. Over this time period, a total of $700 million in damage to agriculture is estimated to have been carried out by Israel, according to a U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization report. The investigation will coordinate across the health, environment, and agricultural ministries to assess the toxicity of the substance and its effects on public health, agricultural land, and water resources in tandem with residents and local authorities. The inquiry aims to prepare for the use of available legal and diplomatic means to issue a formal complaint to the U.N. Security Council

Video link to a US Congressional hearing on Lebanon, titled: US Policy Towards Lebanon… “Obstacles to Dismantling Hezbollah’s Grip on Power,” featuring Dana Stroul, David Schenker, and Hanin Ghaddar
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/02/151784/
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
Chair Michael Lawler
Witnesses:
The Honorable David Schenker
Taube Senior Fellow
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Ms. Hanin Ghaddar
Friedmann Senior Fellow
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Ms. Dana Stroul
Director of Research
Shelly and Michael Kassen Senior Fellow
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
—
The House Foreign Affairs Committee is responsible for oversight and legislation relating to:
Foreign assistance – including development assistance, Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Millennium Challenge Account, HIV/AIDS in foreign countries, security assistance, and Public Law 480 programs abroad
National security developments affecting foreign policy
Strategic planning and agreements
War powers, treaties, executive agreements, and the deployment and use of United States Armed Forces
Peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and enforcement of United Nations or other international sanctions
Arms control and disarmament issues
The International Development Finance Corporation, the United States Agency for International Development
Activities and policies of the State, Commerce, and Defense Departments and other agencies related to the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign assistance Act, including export and licensing policy for munitions items and technology and dual-use equipment and technology
International law
Promotion of democracy
International law enforcement issues, including narcotics control programs and activities
International cyber issues
U.S. Agency for Global Media
Embassy security; international broadcasting
Public diplomacy, including international communication and information policy, and international education and exchange programs; and all other matters not specifically assigned to a subcommittee.
The Export Administration Act, including the export and licensing of dual-use equipment and technology and other matters related to international economic policy and trade not otherwise assigned to a subcommittee, and with respect to the United Nations, its affiliated agencies, and other international organizations, including assessed and voluntary contributions to such organizations.

Targeting Hezbollah’s Broader Ecosystem of Power
Hanin Ghaddar/The Washington Institute/February/03/2026
The ongoing disarmament process is crucial, but completing it will be impossible without more attention to Hezbollah’s cash economy, judicial interference, political intimidation, and other elements of domestic power.
The following is an excerpt from testimony submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa. To read the full testimony, download the PDF on this page.
While much of the current international focus is on Hezbollah’s possession of weapons, these assets are just one part of a wider ecosystem that enables the group to maintain power within state institutions, ensure a continued cash flow into its coffers, and rebuild its broken military infrastructure. This ecosystem is what keeps Hezbollah alive today—if the group loses its cash flow and influence within the state, it will not be able to sustain its arsenal. Hence, even as all eyes are on the disarmament process carried out by the Lebanese Armed Forces, Hezbollah has been quietly focused on other tools. Despite domestic and regional challenges, it has managed to maintain the financial and political foundation needed for its survival. Hezbollah’s plan thus far has been threefold...
*Hanin Ghaddar is the Friedmann Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute's Rubin Family Arab Politics Program, where she focuses on Shia politics throughout the Levant.

Targeting Hezbollah’s Broader Ecosystem of Power
Hanin Ghaddar/February 03/ 2026
TESTIMONY OF HANIN GHADDAR
Friedmann Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa Hearing: “U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon: Obstacles to Dismantling Hezbollah’s Grip on Power” February 3, 2026
Introduction
Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Schneider, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
Lebanon is at a historic crossroads. The current ceasefire and the dramatic shifts in regional power dynamics—most notably the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria—have left Hezbollah in its weakest state since its inception. However, there is a dangerous misconception that military setbacks alone will lead to Hezbollah’s disappearance.
While much of the current international focus is on Hezbollah’s possession of weapons, these assets are just one part of a wider ecosystem that enables the group to maintain power within state institutions, ensure a continued cash flow into its coffers, and rebuild its broken military infrastructure. This ecosystem is what keeps Hezbollah alive today. If the group loses its cash flow and influence within the state, it will not be able to sustain its arsenal.
I. The Parallel Cash Economy
Hezbollah has spent years "de-risking" from the formal Lebanese banking sector to avoid international sanctions. Today, it operates almost entirely through a parallel cash economy.
Al-Qard al-Hassan (AQAH): This institution acts as Hezbollah’s unregulated bank. It is the primary vehicle for paying salaries and providing loans to its base, entirely outside the reach of the Central Bank of Lebanon.
The Shadow Budget: Through illicit trade, drug trafficking (Captagon), and control of the Port of Beirut, Hezbollah generates "black" revenue that bypasses state oversight.
Crypto and Digital Assets: We have seen an increasing shift toward the use of cryptocurrency to move Iranian funds into Lebanon, bypassing traditional financial monitoring systems.
II. State Capture and Institutional Control
Hezbollah’s grip on power is cemented through the infiltration of state institutions. Even if its fighters retreat from the border, its officials remain in the ministries.
Judicial Interference: Hezbollah has effectively paralyzed the Lebanese judiciary to ensure that no investigation—including the probe into the 2020 Beirut Port explosion—reaches its leadership.
Security Infiltration: While the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are our primary partner, Hezbollah maintains "coordination units" that often influence operational decisions in certain sectors of the country.
III. The Syrian Factor
The fall of Bashar al-Assad has severed Hezbollah’s primary land bridge to Iran. For the first time, the "Resistance Axis" is geographically broken. Hezbollah is currently struggling to find new supply routes. This is the moment to ensure that the Lebanese-Syrian border is not just monitored, but sealed against military smuggling.
IV. Policy Recommendations
To truly dismantle Hezbollah’s grip, U.S. policy must move beyond the "security-first" approach and target the ecosystem:
Sanction the Facilitators: The U.S. Treasury should expand sanctions to include the non-military facilitators—the businessmen, lawyers, and accountants who manage Hezbollah’s cash economy and the AQAH branches.
Condition Aid on Judicial Independence: Future economic support to the Lebanese government should be conditioned on the protection of judges and the resumption of major investigations into corruption and port security.
Empower Shia Alternatives: Hezbollah maintains its base through a monopoly on Shia representation. The U.S. should support civil society initiatives that empower independent Shia voices, journalists, and political movements that are currently silenced by intimidation.
Border Enforcement: Use the current transition in Syria to demand a permanent international or technical monitoring presence on the Lebanon-Syria border to prevent the re-establishment of Iranian supply lines.
Conclusion
Hezbollah is currently wounded, but it is not dead. It is waiting for the international community to lose interest so it can begin the process of "tashjir" (re-planting) its infrastructure. We must not give them that time. By targeting the group’s financial and political ecosystem now, we can ensure that Lebanon finally emerges from Hezbollah’s shadow.

Congressional Testimony/In Lebanon, Pushing the Ball Forward Before the May Election
David Schenker/The Washington Institute/Feb 3, 2026
Without electoral law modifications, sanctions against pro-Hezbollah elites, prosecutions for long-delayed cases like the port explosion, and other urgent measures, the group and its allies could wind up regaining their grip in Lebanon during the next round of nationwide voting.
The following is an excerpt from testimony submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa. To read the full testimony, download the PDF on this page.
Last year, Lebanon’s new president and government articulated an ambitious and positive program, which was largely welcomed inside the country and overwhelmingly applauded by the international community. Improbably, at the beginning of 2025—with Hezbollah defanged and a competent, nationalist government in place—it seemed possible that a perennially hapless and dysfunctional Lebanon might finally be turning the corner. Alas, the exuberance was premature. While diminished, Hezbollah remains dangerous. At the same time, the progress of the Lebanese Armed Forces has been insufficient, government efforts to legislate significant economic reform have largely fallen short, the judiciary remains anemic, and electoral reform—a key initiative required to meaningfully enfranchise Lebanon’s enormous expatriate electorate—languishes in purgatory on the desk of the eighty-seven-year-old parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri...
*David Schenker is the Taube Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and director of the Linda and Tony Rubin Program on Arab Politics. He is the former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.

In Lebanon, Pushing the Ball Forward Before the May Election
David Schenker/The Washington Institute/February 3, 2026
Israel’s degradation of Hezbollah in late 2024 along with the subsequent election in early 2025 of a new Lebanese president and the naming of a new government constituted a rare moment of opportunity for Beirut and the region. For decades, Iran-backed Hezbollah utilized the country as a hub for Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operations, murdering opponents, dictating domestic policy, and deciding matters of war and peace for the state. The terrorist militia’s military setback and loss of its longstanding leadership weakened the organization’s grip over Lebanese politics, allowing a window to stabilize a failing state that has long been a global outpost for crime and terrorism. On taking office, President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam articulated a novel agenda for a Lebanon no longer subjugated by Hezbollah and its masters in Tehran: state sovereignty. For the new government in Beirut, sovereignty implied not only the disarmament of Hezbollah, but the implementation of rule of law. To emerge from the crippling financial crisis, rebuild Lebanon after the war, and have a successful state, Lebanon would require significant economic and judicial reforms to ensure transparency, accountability, and curb the endemic corruption that had facilitated Hezbollah’s operations. The November 27, 2024, ceasefire agreement that ended Hezbollah’s war with Israel provided a framework for Hezbollah disarmament. In that accord—signed prior to Aoun and Salam’s mandates—Lebanon committed to implementing UN Security Council Resolutions 1701 and 1559, disarming Hezbollah both south and north of the Litani River (i.e., throughout the entirety of Lebanon). During his inaugural speech, President Aoun affirmed his support for this objective. He noted that as supreme commander of the armed forces, he would carry out his duty by “working to ensure the state’s right to hold a monopoly on weapons.” Consistent with the ceasefire agreement, Aoun also pledged to secure Lebanon’s borders. Beyond decommissioning Hezbollah weapons, President Aoun pledged to pursue a broader agenda to improve Lebanese governance. He promised to push for an independent judiciary, to prioritize “competence over patronage” in administrative appointments, prevent monopolies in the private sector, and advance transparency. The prime minister has been equally adamant in pressing for Hezbollah disarmament and transforming an “all-too-prevalent culture of impunity and corruption.”
The new president and government articulated an ambitious and positive program, which was largely welcomed in Lebanon and overwhelmingly applauded by the international community. Improbably, at the beginning of 2025—with Hezbollah defanged and a new competent, nationalist government in place—it seemed possible that a perennially hapless and dysfunctional Lebanon might finally be turning the corner. Alas, the exuberance was premature. While diminished, Hezbollah remains dangerous. At the same time, entrenched elites and patronage networks disinclined to reform persist, constituting a significant obstacle to systemic change.
Perhaps expectations were too high. Regardless, the first year of the Joseph Aoun era has been disappointing. Despite the new government’s rhetorical embrace of its ceasefire obligations, Beirut vacillated for months before it took the decision in the cabinet to disarm Hezbollah in the south. Since then, the progress of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has been insufficient. Meanwhile, government efforts to legislate significant economic reform have largely fallen short, the judiciary remains anemic, and electoral reform—a key initiative required to meaningfully enfranchise Lebanon’s enormous expatriate electorate, which opposes Iranian occupation—languishes in purgatory on the desk of the eighty-seven-year-old perpetual parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri. During a December 23 Policy Forum at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Lebanon’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, H.E. Youssef Raggi, concisely summed up the dynamic, noting there is some disappointment in Washington that Beirut is not doing enough or moving quickly enough to disarm Hezbollah and exert full sovereignty throughout the country. In his view,
those who hold such views might be right.1
Protracted Disarmament
The new Lebanese government was seated in early February 2025, more than a month after the ceasefire was signed. It wasn’t until August, however, that the cabinet approved the LAF plan for disarming Hezbollah south of the Litani. Concerns over Hezbollah violence—the group’s repeated threats of “civil war”—paralyzed the government. Rather than moving forward, President Aoun announced that Beirut would not forcibly disarm the militia. Instead, he said he would try to convince Hezbollah to dispense with its arms through dialogue and negotiations—a strategy that has repeatedly failed over the last two decades. He even floated the controversial idea—reminiscent of the Hashd Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, which are replete with U.S.-designated terrorist organizations—that the militia’s troops could be integrated into the LAF.
Hezbollah didn’t bite. Indeed, it doubled down on its threats against the government—especially in regard to disarmament north of the Litani. Meanwhile, Israel continued to occupy five hilltop locations in Lebanese territory and, starting on day one of the ceasefire, itself undertook Lebanon’s ceasefire obligations to disarm Hezbollah. On an almost daily basis since then, Israel has been striking Hezbollah arms caches, positions, and key personnel, both south and north of the Litani. 1 “Lebanon’s Outlook on Sovereignty, Disarmament, and Peace: A Discussion with Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Raggi,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 23, 2025, ttps://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/lebanons-outlook-sovereignty-disarmament-and-peace-discussion-foreign minister Lately, as Hezbollah has reportedly focused on rearming, Israel has been focused on targeting personnel involved in arms smuggling. Since the LAF began operating earnestly in the south, it has made some modest progress. The “Mechanism” established in the U.S. ceasefire agreement provides intelligence information to the LAF to operationalize. (The LAF itself does not appear to be generating its own intelligence as to the whereabouts of Hezbollah weapons.) For the most part, this arrangement appears to be working relatively well. To be sure, the LAF is understaffed and under-resourced and is not particularly proactive in its mission. Like the government, the LAF is also averse to confrontation with Hezbollah, in part because the militia has no compunction about attacking the army. To wit, just days after the cabinet vote to disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani, six LAF soldiers were killed near Tyre while removing militia ordnance, an explosion believed to have been a booby trap. Despite the risks, however, the LAF has been mostly responsive to tasking.
Unfortunately, notwithstanding its relatively good performance to date, incidences of LAF collusion, collaboration, and deconfliction with Hezbollah persist. In December 2025, Israel targeted alleged Hezbollah member Ali Abdullah along with two terrorist colleagues in a drone strike near Sidon. The LAF protested the killing of Abdullah, who concurrently served as a warrant officer in the army, but did not apparently dispute the Hezbollah affiliation of his dead colleagues. During another incident in January 2026, acting on Israeli intelligence provided by the Mechanism, the LAF entered the southern town of Yanouh to seize a Hezbollah arms cache. Prior to the operation, the LAF engaged with a Hezbollah liaison officer, who assembled a crowd that obstructed the military from searching and seizing the weapons. The LAF returned the following day, but only after Hezbollah had removed the arms.2 Just days ago, it was reported that Lebanese security forces interdicted two shipments of weaponssmuggled by Hezbollah from Syria being brought to the southern subur bsof Beirut. When the trucks were stopped, Hezbollah arrested a LAF soldier, who was subsequently released after LAF negotiations with Hezbollah. The shipments were allowed to proceed to their destination.3 While some Lebanese complain about continuous Israeli airstrikes targeting the group, what has emerged is a productive division of labor. Both Washington and Jerusalem believe that Beirut’s progress has to date been insufficient. In the absence of a more comprehensive and aggressive Lebanese effort, Israel is filling an important gap, preventing Hezbollah from rearming and targeting militia locations and personnel the LAF deems too sensitive to engage. In mid-January, Foreign Minister Raggi told Sky News Arabia publicly what many Lebanese, civilians and defense officials alike, say privately: “So long as Hezbollah is not completely disarmed, Israel has the right to continue its attacks.”Given Hezbollah’s long track record of murdering its Lebanese opponents, Beirut’s reticence to take on Hezbollah is understandable. More than a year after Israel decapitated the group’s leadership and severely degraded its capabilities, however, the continued deference afforded to Hezbollah is stunning. To date, no discernible effort has been made to hold Hezbollah accountable for the dozens of assassinations it perpetrated, nor for the deadly August 2020 port explosion, in which the 2Ido Bar-Nes, “Hezbollah’s ‘Rabet’ exposed for the first time. And this is how the IDF is working to thwart it,”Israel Defense Forces website, January 26, 2026, https://www.idf.il/329003
3 “Hezbollah yufawad aldawla fil thunknat al Tayouna,” YouTube, January 27, 2026,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhHGtyQosh8
4 Tsvi Jasper, “‘Israel has a right to continue its attacks,’ Lebanese Foreign Minister,” Jerusalem Post, January 15, 2026, https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-883433 group was implicated. Yet this past September, a minister in Salam’s government announced it
would provide official disability cards and full benefits to thousands of Hezbollah members injured in Israel’s September 2024 pager operation. Adding insult to injury, the minister justified this Lebanese version of a “pay for slay” social safety net for terrorists by comparing wounded Hezbollah fighters to the civilian victims of the massive 2020 port explosion. Lebanon clearly has a long way to go in terms of Hezbollah. This past fall, the United States approved a $230 million aid package for Lebanese security services, including $190 million for the
LAF. The assistance was a down payment—or an advance—to assist the LAF with its disarmament mission. Future U.S. largesse greatly depends on how the LAF performs in both the south and the north. It will also determine how much support the LAF receives in March, when a conference to support the army convenes in Paris with the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt in attendance.
Ultimately, though, Hezbollah disarmament is not dependent solely on LAF capabilities, but on Beirut’s continued will—and perhaps risk tolerance. Recently, President Aoun has been criticizing Hezbollah with unusually harsh language. It’s unclear whether this change of tone will be accompanied by a more robust approach on the ground. The Trump administration’s advocacy at the United Nations in August 2025 to end the forever mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon was a positive step to force action in the south. UNIFIL will end in December 2026, compelling Beirut and the LAF to establish a permanent presence and exert sovereignty in the south. But sovereignty and the process of rebuilding what was destroyed during Hezbollah’s war on Israel will be delayed indefinitely absent the disarmament of Hezbollah throughout the entire state.
Stalled and Anemic Reforms The heady rhetoric articulated by the new president and government fueled high expectations that significant reforms would be forthcoming in Beirut. As with the Hezbollah disarmament process, however, the pace of economic and judicial reforms has been glacial. While a comprehensive reform process has been launched—replete with committees and an ambitious “restructuring and renewal plan”—few concrete accomplishments have been realized during the government’s first year. The persistence of entrenched elites and a fractious legislature—led by Speaker Nabih Berri, the
Hezbollah-adjacent Amal Party leader—are at least partly to blame for the lack of progress. One of the few government reform successes to date has been the passage of legislation in April 2025 lifting banking secrecy. Based on the new law, government institutions, including the Central Bank and the Banking Control Commission, will now have access to banking records and account details up to a decade prior. The legislation is a significant step toward transparency and, perhaps, accountability. Upon request, Lebanese commercial banks will be required to provide the government with personal account information, enabling authorities to deter, prevent, and/or prosecute illicit financial transactions, money laundering, and ubiquitous tax evasion. Theoretically, this law will also enable Beirut for the first time to target corruption and actions that contributed to or exacerbated the current financial crisis. The other ratified reform legislation advanced by the government was the Bank Resolution Law. Passed in April, this law focuses on assessing the financial health of banks and providing a framework for the restructuring or liquidation of insolvent financial institutions. The process is overseen by the purportedly independent Higher Banking Commission, but critics of the legislation note that the commission is “heavily influenced by banking interests,” lacking the impartiality necessary to oversee and restructure the banking sector.5 Banking secrecy legislation is a notable but relatively isolated government accomplishment toward economic reform. It was also a prerequisite for additional legislation. Yet several of these other priority initiatives have since stalled in parliament or en route. The Financial Stability Law, better known as the “Gap Law”—intended to address the roughly $80 billion shortfall in the banking sector and compensate depositors for their losses—is an especially controversial government effort that has encountered difficulties. Per the draft law, account holders with deposits up to $100,000 (roughly $20 billion total) would be repaid over four years in cash and government bonds. Higher deposit holders would also be compensated but forced to take a significant haircut. Banks would also bear some of the burden, losing their equity. The state would underwrite an estimated $10 billion of the cost. The draft law is stuck because no one likes it. The International Monetary Fund says the legislation is insufficiently specific in stipulating a hierarchy of claims. Influential financial elites believe banks—who were compelled to loan money to the Central Bank and generated enormous returnsfrom this business for decades—will disproportionately lose out. Depositors feel they will bear the brunt of the losses and fear that the bankers and other depositors who managed to spirit their funds out of Lebanon during the financial crisis will avert accountability. To be fair, this is a heavy lift for the government, but it will be necessary to push forward, even if imperfect, to extricate Lebanon
from the crisis.
Of course, the success of economic reform in Lebanon depends on the completion of a comprehensive audit of the Central Bank and the commercial banking sector. An audit is essential not only to ascertain the causes of the 2019 financial crisis, but also to assign accountability and track the illegal transfer of funds abroad by elites when public access to deposits was severely limited. Six years into Lebanon’s man-made economic meltdown, no such audit has been concluded. Absent a thorough systemic and public inspection, impunity will persist, and it will be difficult to reestablish confidence in the banking sector. A normal functioning banking sector is critical. Lacking traditional banking, over the past six years, Lebanon has largely devolved to a cash economy. Today, there are reportedly 57 operating banks and 531 other varieties of financial institutions operating in the state. These institutions include cash transfer service companies, e-wallets, exchange houses, et cetera, which have filled the gap left by banks, along with Hezbollah’s own al-Qard al-Hassan financial services firm. While some punitive and kinetic actions have been taken against al-Qard al-Hassan, the organization still functions, and other entities—many of which are licensed—are less closely monitored and are believed to facilitate money laundering and illicit activities. In an effort to close loopholes, the Central Bank
has limited transfers to $1,000 at a time and has required “know your customer” and currency transaction paperwork to be filed On a positive note, the government has appointed a financial prosecutor, who appears to be reaching out to banks seeking information, trying to obtain evidence of financial crimes. Whether theprosecutor will have the political backing to actually prosecute cases targeting the state’s financial and/or political elites remains unclear. The same goes for newly staffed government committees 5 Fouad Deebs, “Lebanon’s Bank Resolution Law: A Missed Opportunity for Accountability and Reform,” Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, December 23, 2025, ttps://timep.org/2025/12/23/lebanons-bank-resolutionlaw-a-missed-opportunity-for-accountability-and-reform overseeing the state’s long inefficient and corrupt electricity and telecommunications sectors. Lebanon’s Banking Control Commission appears to be competent and focused on its supervisory role,
and eager to claw back depositor funds that were immorally if not illegally disappeared. Concerns persist about the government’s willingness and ability to end impunity and impose accountability. Consider that last month, the government appointed Gracia Azzi as director-general of customs—a department long associated with corruption in Lebanon. Azzi was a subject of investigation in the 2020 port explosion, as well as in another corruption case in 2018. At the time of the 2020 blast, she served on the Higher Customs Council, responsible for oversight of customs operations at the port. To be sure, one is innocent until proven guilty, but Azzi’s nomination provoked outrage among the families of the more than 200 Lebanese killed in the explosion. Nearly six years after that event, not a single person has been held accountable. Despite government promises of reform, for many Lebanese the Azzi appointment suggests business as usual. While the reform and Hezbollah disarmament process has been halting, improbably, there are some modest signs of increased confidence and a rebound of economic life in the state. Since 2019,
Lebanon’s economy has contracted by 40 percent or more. In 2026, though, according to World Bank predictions, the state’s GDP will grow by an impressive 4.7 percent. The market price for Lebanon’s Eurobonds, which it defaulted on in March 2020, has gone up as well. In recent months, the
cost has shot up from 23 cents to 29-30 cents on the dollar, suggesting the market’s increased confidence in financial recovery.
U.S. Policy Implications
In May 2026, Lebanon is slated to return to the polls to elect a new parliament and government. For a host of reasons, this election may not happen. Absent a change in the electoral law—which seems unlikely—Hezbollah and its allies could obtain even more seats in the next parliament, undermining Salam’s chances for a return to the premiership and impeding hopes for progress on Hezbollah’s disarmament and implementation of deep economic reform. Accordingly, there should be more of a sense of urgency for Washington and Beirut. Indeed, in July 2021, I testified before this committee in a hearing called “Lebanon: Assessing Political Paralysis, Economic Crisis, and Challenges for U.S. Policy.” Today’s panel could have had the same title. It’s critical to start capitalizing on the unprecedented opportunities so the next time the committee convenes to discuss Lebanon, the discussion will be focused on how Washington can build relations with a sovereign Lebanese partner. The Trump administration should take several steps to disrupt the inertia and push the ball forward: Encourage electoral law modifications. The Lebanese parliament should reflect the new realities on the ground. As it currently stands, Lebanon’s vast expatriate community—a population greater than Lebanon’s itself—can vote for just six of 128 parliamentary seats. The reality is that many of these citizens emigrated in search of safety, stability, and opportunity far away from Hezbollah’s dominant culture of death. Washington has seemingly not engaged on this important but largely domestic political matter. But elections will determine Lebanon’s future, and the next balloting is critical to maintain momentum on reform. As things currently stand, Speaker Berri alone will decide whether changes in the law are even debated, much less voted. Yet even a small change—such as allowing Shia displaced from the south to vote not in their destroyed villages but in “mega-centers” in or around Beirut, free from Hezbollah intimidation—could make a difference Target Hezbollah’s influence within Lebanese security institutions. Existing U.S. sanctions have largely focused on Hezbollah’s own finances. To break the organization’s grip on Lebanon’s security institutions, however, the Trump administration should consider targeting the key officials within these institutions who collude with Hezbollah. The United States and the international community provide the entirety of the LAF’s procurement budget and support recurrent salary outlays, providing the leverage to demand the dismissal (or early retirement) of officers and enlisted soldiers in key positions within the military hierarchy who are affiliated with or sympathetic toward
Hezbollah. The LAF should not undergo a “de-Baathification” process, but continued incidents of collusion and collaboration undermine the disarmament mission and should not be tolerated. Washington should also press for the LAF and Internal Security Forces (ISF) to finally end their coordination with Hezbollah. While these contacts might help the LAF avoid confrontation with the militia, they also help Hezbollah evade disarmament. Time to sanction Lebanese again. Washington should resume its practice of sanctioning Lebanese political elites, regardless of sect, who obstruct reform and perpetuate the system of endemic corruption that continues to plague the state. It would be helpful if the Trump administration could also encourage European states to likewise designate deserving Lebanese elites. In many ways,
Lebanese elites have closer financial, familial, and recreational relations with Europe than the United States, making European (and particularly French) designations more impactful. Until now, sanctions have been too few and far between to encourage meaningful and sustained changes in behavior.
Broaden the coalition against Hezbollah. U.S. Special Envoy Tom Barrack was wrong when he described Hezbollah in July 2025 as a “political party...[that] also has a militant aspect to it.” Hezbollah is a terrorist militia established by Iran in the early 1980s to kill Americans and fight Israel. Barrack’s understanding of Hezbollah reflects a more traditional European view, albeit one that is changing over time. Hezbollah has demonstrated little interest in becoming a normal Lebanese political party. Indeed, it has progressively become more “Iranian.” If this wasn’t evident in 2008
when Hezbollah attacked the Lebanese state, killing hundreds in a bid for more political power, it became clear when Hezbollah deployed its forces to Bashar al-Assad’s Syria on behalf of Iran. Lebanon’s new government would benefit from broader international support in its effort to disarm Hezbollah and roll back the group’s political dominance of the state. To help Beirut succeed and
hold the organization accountable for its murders, Washington should press states like France to designate the entirety of Hezbollah. The urgency of accountability. To convince Lebanese that the new government is committed to accountability and the end of impunity, heads must roll. In the year since the Salam government took power, the Lebanese judiciary has only prosecuted, indicted, or convicted a small handful of nationals for financial crimes and/or corruption. Not a single individual has been held to account
for the 2020 port explosion, nor has the government indicted a Hezbollah member for any one of the dozens of political murders the group allegedly perpetrated. The lack of justice is having an impact on the government’s credibility. Washington should be encouraging Beirut to finish investigating and initiate long-delayed prosecution of some politically sensitive, high-profile cases. If not now, when? The port blast is an obvious place to start. Both Lebanon and Washington also have an interest in the pursuit of justice for Lokman Slim, a longtime critic of Hezbollah and a recipient of U.S. development assistance who was murdered—almost certainly by the militia—in February 2021. No reconstruction until Hezbollah is disarmed. Beirut has a lengthy history of deferring or avoiding difficult decisions. This government has taken the courageous and decisive step toward dis-armament and should be commended. Seeing this process through is going to be difficult, especially north of the Litani, which Hezbollah has threatened to resist. President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam appear committed, but experience suggests that Washington should maintain the pressure to avoid backsliding, unproductive compromise, and conflict between the LAF and Hezbollah. Accordingly, Washington should continue to oppose the rebuilding of Hezbollah’s heartland in south Lebanon until the organization disarms or is disarmed. Qatar’s recently reported offer of $450 million toward the reconstruction of Lebanon should serve as motivation for disarmament. It is premature to rebuild what surely will again be destroyed given the continued presence of Hezbollah arms in the region. Moreover, Hezbollah will exploit reconstruction to embed its military assets in civilian centers as it did after the 2006 war, when the group was allowed to play a significant role in the reconstruction process.
Engage Lebanon’s Shia community. Hezbollah claims to speak for the entire Shia community, while Berri claims to be the representative of Hezbollah. Notwithstanding some sporadic engagement with other Shia stakeholders, U.S. and international engagement with the community has been quite limited. At the end of the day, to end Hezbollah’s grip on Lebanon, Shia will require credible alternatives. Once the group finds itself without weapons, extensive Iranian funding, and narco-money, other Shia voices may emerge. In the meantime, Washington should be talking to a wider range of Lebanese Shia. Representation of the community can no longer be reduced to Hezbollah communiques via Amal intermediaries. Don’t perpetuate corruption during reconstruction. In June 2025, the World Bank gave the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) $250 million to begin the rebuilding of south Lebanon, a region in which Hezbollah has still not been disarmed, despite ceasefire obligations. CDR is widely recognized as a corrupt organization that has been implicated in several scandals involving financial mismanagement, political patronage contracts, and failed implementation of large projects. The organization, along with the so-called Council for South Lebanon, is controlled by Berri and his family. The Trump administration should oppose channeling U.S. and international aid in Lebanon for this problematic organization. Back the LAF based on performance. The LAF is imperfect, but it is also a capable national organization that serves a key role at present. Since 2005 and the Cedar Revolution, the United States has played a central role in backing the LAF, and largely only expected the force to take on Sunni counterterrorism missions. Now the LAF has been tasked with a Shia CT mission, and it is doing the job. It can do more and can do better. Washington should continue to provide support for the LAF, but it should be conditioned on performance. Ultimately, the LAF may have to confront Hezbollah north or south of the Litani. Its willingness to take on that challenge, root out collaboration with the militia, and work toward state sovereignty should determine whether and to what degree Washington continues to invest in this force The division of labor is working. As Lebanon’s foreign minister recently told Sky News Arabia, “As long as the weapons are not totally monopolized by the state, Israel will unfortunately retain the right to continue its attacks in accordance with this agreement.” While Israeli strikes on Lebanon are jarring and not politically helpful for the government, the division of labor—Israel hitting targets too sensitive for the LAF—is by and large supported (quietly) by the Lebanese defense establishment. Unless and until the LAF is prepared to do the work, Israel will remain a partner in fulfilling Lebanon’s ceasefire obligations to disarm Hezbollah.

Congressional Testimony/U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon: Obstacles to Dismantling Hezbollah’s Grip on Power
Dana Stroul/Washington Institute/Feb 3, 2026
Meeting the moment requires greater investment and attention from Washington, including additional targeted security assistance, robust diplomatic efforts, expansion of the U.S. team tasked with handling the Lebanon file, and more.
The following testimony was submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa.
Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on this important topic. Lebanon today presents a historic and time‑limited opportunity for U.S. and regional engagement. Multiple shifts have converged that should energize an expanded U.S. policy.
First, Lebanese Hezbollah’s profound military setbacks offer a narrow window to reorient the country. Hezbollah’s capabilities, weapons arsenal, and ability to threaten Israel are significantly degraded since the Hamas terrorist attack of October 7, 2023, and Hezbollah’s decision to drag Lebanon into war by opening a second front against Israel. Moreover, the other means by which the terrorist group undermined Lebanon’s sovereignty and stability are at risk, including its political stranglehold on the Lebanese government. The November 2024 ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah confirmed this state of affairs: the agreement’s terms are favorable to Israel, with a separate side letter that allows Israel to respond to immediate threats. Since the ceasefire came into effect, Hezbollah has repeatedly challenged it. Targeted Israeli strikes against Hezbollah operators and reconstituting efforts continue, underscoring that the group will continue to seek ways to rebuild. Although Hezbollah is under significant pressure, the United States should do more to make clear that this Iran-backed terrorist group’s continued unwillingness to give up its arms is what has been holding Lebanon back from stabilization and recovery.
Second, the Iranian regime is unprecedentedly weak at home and abroad, and the regional ecosystem in which Iran-backed terrorist groups thrived is changed. Tehran is currently mired in its own brutal repression against Iranian citizens at home while its traditional means of projecting influence across the region are compromised. Iran’s strategy to cultivate nonstate groups like Hezbollah and expand its missile arsenal to threaten the region failed. Sanctions against Iran’s support for terrorism are depriving Hezbollah of cash in Lebanon. Tehran also lost its partnership in Syria with the December 2024 ouster of Bashar al‑Assad, depriving the regime of a state partner in funneling cash, weapons, and advisors to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The ecosystem of strategic and operational support around Hezbollah is fundamentally changed, but other illicit networks and relationships persist. Without more effort to capitalize on their historic weakness, illicit actors will find workarounds. It is now possible for the United States and its partners to imagine a Middle East with new leaders who are focused on responsiveness and accountability to their own people and free of Iran’s menace.
Third, new leaders in Beirut are empowered after more than a decade of political paralysis. Under the leadership of President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, the government formed in early 2025 charged the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with bringing all weapons south of the Litani River under state control by the end of last year. Although this mandate was not completely achieved, important steps should be acknowledged, and the trajectory is promising. Beirut is also taking early economic reform measures, including banking sector restructuring—important initial steps that require sustained follow‑through. The new government is sincere regarding relations with Israel, recently appointing a senior Lebanese civilian to join the ceasefire military mechanism with a mandate to expand dialogue with Israel on security arrangements and beyond. These developments constitute a narrow window for Lebanon to claim state authority and advance long‑overdue reforms.
However, current U.S. attention and investment are not aligned with this historic opportunity. U.S. policy is largely focused on Hezbollah and its disarmament. To keep focus on this objective, the Trump administration is maintaining pressure and attention through the military mechanism that coordinates the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, and supporting the LAF with non-advanced equipment. These critical elements of U.S. policy should continue, but on their own they form only a partial strategy. To consolidate the gains from Hezbollah’s weakness, the United States must broaden its engagement beyond security. A more developed U.S. policy approach should proactively encourage continued reform, articulate the conditions under which it would provide non-security assistance to the long-suffering Lebanese people across different communities, and engage other governments inclined to meddle in Lebanon’s messy politics ahead of the upcoming parliamentary election. It is also important to channel complementary efforts by regional leaders, Europeans, and others into a comprehensive strategy that lends additional credibility to the current government. In short, more investment and attention from Washington are needed in order to meet the opportunity of the moment.
Security Assistance
Akey element of U.S. policy in Lebanon has been training, equipping, and supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces as the most credible national institution with broad public support for the past twenty years. Over the course of the partnership, the United States has provided roughly $3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and additional assistance to bolster the LAF’s capabilities. This policy has long been contentious, with skeptics questioning whether the LAF could or would confront Hezbollah and seize its illegal weapons. Nevertheless, recent progress merits acknowledgement.
The LAF has taken important steps, asserting authority over Beirut’s airport, removing weapons from Palestinian refugee camps, increasing deployed forces in southern Lebanon, and conducting searches of some private homes. The LAF’s announcement that it has achieved “operational control” over Lebanese territory south of the Litani River is an important milestone, but it does not mean every private home and business has been cleared of Hezbollah assets. More work is needed, and the LAF should be encouraged to move quickly north of the Litani while maintaining operational control in the south and completing the clearing out of Hezbollah fighters and weapons. This work must move faster: reports indicate that Hezbollah is moving quickly to rebuild and increasing its indigenous production of weapons north of the Litani.
If the LAF is to consolidate and expand these gains, targeted support is essential while holding the LAF accountable for effective operations. The LAF will need more vehicles, continued training, and sustainment to patrol and project presence. Recent U.S. announcements about transferring key equipment are important. The Trump administration approved four military support packages last year, including a presidential drawdown of $14.2 million in September and a $240 million package in October. Sustained funding will be required to increase force size so the LAF can hold southern gains while extending operations northward. Salary support programs (including U.S.-backed efforts begun in 2022) remain critical to morale and retention. Finally, the LAF must be empowered and resourced to enter private businesses and homes where Hezbollah stores weapons and conceals activities if Lebanon is to reunify the monopoly of force under the state.
U.S. officials should seize two near‑term opportunities to signal focus on completing Hezbollah’s disarmament while supporting the LAF: the French‑hosted conference in early March, and the LAF commander’s visit to Washington this week. The objective should be to make clear that U.S. support comes with expectations for performance and transparency: the United States has invested in the LAF for two decades in preparation for this moment, and the LAF needs to live up to that investment. Beirut’s civilian leaders and LAF commanders should understand that continued support will be tied to the effectiveness of the disarmament process. These expectations must go beyond numbers of houses cleared and announcements of Hezbollah weapons decommissioned—Beirut must also transparently explain what it is doing with the seized weapons and the actions it is taking to shut down the illicit rearming process if it is to earn the confidence of the international community.
Beyond Security Assistance
While Trump administration officials have warned about the negative consequences of postponing Lebanon’s May election, there is little indication of U.S. focus on supporting a free, fair, and credible vote that reflects the will of Lebanese voters, including those in the diaspora. The worst‑case outcome would be a parliamentary makeup that mirrors the pre‑October 7 one, leaving Hezbollah‑affiliated politicians with influence. In the absence of visible U.S. leadership, regional actors—Qatar, Turkey, and others—are stepping into the political void, increasing external meddling to favor politicians beholden to outside priorities rather than focused on the needs of Lebanese citizens. The United States should make clear it will be difficult to work productively with a government that does not commit to meaningful economic reform, tackle corruption, and respond to the needs of all Lebanese. Importantly, any new parliament must empower and back the mandate of Lebanon’s president and prime minister to bring all weapons under state control.
U.S. policy must also articulate a reconstruction and assistance strategy—especially for southern Lebanon—tied to disarmament incentives. The World Bank 2025 Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA) estimates that postwar reconstruction and recovery in Lebanon will cost approximately $11 billion. Many in Lebanon’s Shia community may choose not to rely on Hezbollah as their defender within the country, but acute humanitarian and rebuilding needs risk driving them back to the group if Beirut cannot deliver. Washington should pair concrete steps on Hezbollah’s disarmament with support for reconstruction, quick‑impact projects, and longer‑term livelihood programs to ensure an inclusive post‑Hezbollah future. This approach should build on multilateral efforts—including the World Bank’s recent loan to the Council for South Lebanon—and coordinate donor financing to make disarmament politically and materially sustainable.
Assistance, as well as advocacy with international financial institutions and other donors, should be part of a U.S. conditional package to Lebanon. Historically, the United States has provided Lebanon with billions of dollars in economic and humanitarian assistance, supporting governance, development, refugee relief, and emergency response after crises such as the 2020 Beirut port explosion. The Trump administration’s suspension of most U.S. foreign assistance and termination of some programs impacted all U.S.-funded non-security activities in Lebanon. Restoring and refocusing that assistance can reinforce U.S. focus on supporting both reform and reconstruction.
Without something tangible on the table, the United States is ceding much of its influence to others and risks re-empowering ministries and local government entities that are still under Hezbollah’s influence. Consider the Qatari government’s recent announcement of $480 million to rebuild three communities in southern Lebanon, and then another $400 million for Lebanon’s electricity sector. Absent any performance benchmarks or expectations for continued Hezbollah disarmament, this generous assistance does not reinforce U.S. priorities for Lebanon. The United States should work with the international community—and donors like Turkey and Qatar—to ensure that funding does not benefit Hezbollah-linked entities.
There are many steps the Trump administration can take to seize this narrow window in Lebanon. First, it should expand the U.S. policy team in Lebanon beyond Ambassador Michel Issa. Employing additional diplomatic and technical experts will sustain engagement across security, governance, and reconstruction portfolios. A larger team would improve coordination with partners, better monitor on‑the‑ground progress, and signal sustained U.S. attention.
Second, President Trump should offer President Aoun a White House visit at the appropriate time this year to acknowledge progress and encourage further reforms, preferably before the May parliamentary election. A carefully timed visit would publicly reward concrete steps while reinforcing U.S. expectations for continued action and transparency on disarmament, anti‑corruption, and inclusive governance.
Third, to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to Lebanon beyond Hezbollah’s disarmament, the administration could publicly articulate the requirements for expanding U.S. support for Lebanon’s recovery and present a plan for assistance beyond the security sector. Specifically, phased economic and reconstruction aid should be conditioned on defining a timeline for implementation of the remaining phases of the ceasefire agreement with Israel, affirming expectations for a transparent, credible election cycle, and seating a government like the current one—that is, technocratic, not shackled by persistent corruption, and committed to prioritizing the needs of the Lebanese people.
Finally, the United States must continue its critical role in facilitating direct dialogue between Lebanon and Israel toward eventual normalization. U.S. certification of Lebanese and Israeli confidence‑building measures is critical. For its part, Beirut must implement all phases of the ceasefire and continue demonstrating commitment to Hezbollah’s disarmament. Israel must be prepared to do its part, including withdrawing from its outposts in Lebanon after Hezbollah’s complete disarmament is validated by a credible third party. Security agreements to end hostilities, demarcate remaining border areas, and related measures would be a watershed for Lebanon, Israel, and the region.
**Dana Stroul is Director of Research and Shelly and Michael Kassen Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Israeli operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah: January 26–February 1, 2026
David Daoud/FDD's Long War Journal/February 3, 2026 |
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/02/03/israeli-operations-in-lebanon-against-hezbollah-january-26-february-1-2026/
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted numerous operations throughout Lebanon against Hezbollah between January 26 and February 1, 2026. Israeli operations last week maintained an intensified tempo, concentrating on targeting Hezbollah assets and personnel involved in the group’s regeneration efforts in south Lebanon, both north and south of the Litani River. These strikes continued despite the claim by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to have taken operational control of the South Litani Area earlier this month.
The IDF conducted operations in Lebanese locales, some more than once. These activities included:
Airstrikes: Eight (+)
Artillery missions: Four
Detonations: Four
Drone strikes: Seven
Ground activities: Four
Leaflet drops: One
Mortar missions: One
Quadcopter activities: 11
Tank fire: One
Map instructions: Click the top-left icon or an icon on the map to open the Map Key and adjust the map’s zoom as desired. Click the top-right icon to open a larger version of the map.
Nabatieh Governorate
Bint Jbeil District: Aitaroun, Ayta Ash Shaab, Bint Jbeil, Ramia, Rmeish, and Yaroun
Marjayoun District: Adaisseh-Markaba, Blida, Houla, Khiam, and Rabb al Thalatheen
Nabatieh District: Azza-Kafrawa, Duweir, and Numeiriyeh-Zefta
South Lebanon Governorate
Jezzine District: Aqmata-Luwayza
Sidon District: Dawudiyeh, Msayleh-Najjariyeh-Tuffahta, Qennarit, and the Zahrani region
Tyre District: Barish-Maaroub, Batoulay, Dhayra, Kfar Reman-Kfar Tebnit, Naqoura, Siddiqine, and Tyre
Casualties
Between January 26 and February 1, Israeli operations in Lebanon killed seven people, at least five of them Hezbollah operatives, and wounded 18 people.
January 26, 2026: One Hezbollah operative was killed, two possible Hezbollah operatives were killed, and two unidentified individuals were wounded.
January 27, 2026: One Hezbollah operative was killed.
January 28, 2026: No casualties were reported.
January 29, 2026: No casualties were reported.
January 30, 2026: One Hezbollah operative was killed, and two unidentified individuals were wounded.
January 31, 2026: One dead Hezbollah operative was identified, one Hezbollah operative was killed, and one unidentified individual was wounded.
February 1, 2026: One Hezbollah operative was killed, and 13 people were wounded.
Chronology of Israeli operations against Hezbollah, January 26–February 1, 2026
January 26
NNA Lebanon reported that at 3:00 am, Israeli airstrikes targeted the heights of Aqmata-Luwayza in the South Lebanon Governorate’s Jezzine District.
At 6:49 am, NNA Lebanon reported that Israeli forces positioned in the IDF’s Tel Aoueidah post directed gunfire toward the outskirts of Blida in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Marjayoun District.
At 1:53 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that Israeli forces directed gunfire toward a group of young men allegedly engaged in reclamation of agricultural land east of Yaroun in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Bint Jbeil District, damaging a piece of equipment.
At 3:14 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli drone targeted a vehicle in the suburbs of Tyre in the South Lebanon Governorate’s Tyre District. The strike killed one person and wounded two unidentified individuals. The IDF released a statement claiming it had “targeted a Hezbollah operative near Tyre in south Lebanon.” Hezbollah-affiliated social media later announced the death of Hezbollah operative Sheikh Ali Abdelhassan Noureddine, whose nom de guerre was Sheikh Amine, from Jwaya. The IDF claimed Noureddine commanded a Hezbollah artillery team in the village of Al Horsh in south Lebanon, and since November 27, 2024, was involved in “advancing terror initiatives against the State of Israel and IDF troops, and most recently was involved in restoring Hezbollah’s artillery capabilities in south Lebanon … in violation of the understandings between Israel and Lebanon.” According to Hezbollah, Noureddine also served as a journalist in its Al Manar Television station. Hezbollah gave Noureddine a military funeral in Tyre.
Death announcement for Ali Abdelhassan Noureddine. (Balagh Media on Telegram)
At 3:52 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli quadcopter dropped a stun explosive on an alleged marble factory on the Adaisseh-Markaba road in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Marjayoun District.
At 4:54 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that Israeli forces fired several mortars at the area of Al Hariqa on the outskirts of Aitaroun in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Bint Jbeil District.
At 5:46 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli tank fired two shells at a home in Al Selm on the outskirts of Aitaroun.
At 10:07 pm, NNA Lebanon reported an Israeli drone targeted a vehicle near Kfar Tebnit-Kfar Reman in the South Lebanon Governorate’s Tyre District. The strike killed two people. NNA Lebanon reported the two fatalities as Samir Alaa Hoteit, a 22-year-old from Duweir, and Ahmad Abdelnabi Ramadan, a 22-year-old Egyptian national born and residing in Duweir. The IDF released a statement claiming it had targeted two Hezbollah operatives near Nabatieh, and later claimed the two were targeted and killed while they were operating inside an underground Hezbollah installation in south Lebanon to restore the structure “in violation of the understandings between Israel and Lebanon.”
January 27
NNA Lebanon reported that overnight, two Israeli quadcopters dropped fragmentation explosives on a house in Yaroun in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Bint Jbeil District.
At 9:41 am, NNA Lebanon reported that Israeli artillery intermittently targeted the forested area of Yaroun.
At 11:05 am, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli quadcopter dropped a stun explosive in Dhayra in the South Lebanon Governorate’s Tyre District.
At 11:31 am, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli drone targeted a motorbike in Batoulay in the South Lebanon Governorate’s Tyre District. The strike killed one person. Hezbollah later announced the death of Hezbollah operative Hussain Ahmad al Mardineh, whose nom de guerre was Thaer, from Shaatiyeh. The IDF released a statement saying it had targeted and killed a “Hezbollah operative involved in attempts to restore Hezbollah’s military installations near Deir Qanoun in south Lebanon … in violation of the understandings between Israel and Lebanon.” Hezbollah gave Mardineh a military funeral in his hometown.
Death announcement for Hussain Ahmad al Mardineh. (Balagh Media on Telegram)
At 11:59 am, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli quadcopter dropped a stun explosive near alleged shepherds on the outskirts of Rmeish in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Bint Jbeil District.
At 12:22 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli quadcopter dropped a stun explosive in the Kasayer neighborhood of Meiss al Jabal in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Marjayoun District.
At 6:30 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli quadcopter dropped a stun explosive in Ayta Ash Shaab in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Bint Jbeil District.
January 28
NNA Lebanon reported that at 12:01 am, two Israeli quadcopters dropped several fragmentation explosives toward Yaroun in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Bint Jbeil District.
NNA Lebanon reported that, in the morning, Israeli forces conducted a detonation in the Sabih neighborhood east of Houla in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Marjayoun District.
At 3:38 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that Israeli artillery fired two shells that fell into the sea opposite Naqoura in the South Lebanon Governorate’s Tyre District.
January 29
At 12:44 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that Israeli artillery fired several shells at the Salhani area on the outskirts of Ramia in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Bint Jbeil District.
At 8:37 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that Israeli forces directed machine-gun fire toward the outskirts of Aitaroun in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Bint Jbeil District.
At 10:45 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that a mechanized IDF infantry patrol comprised of a Merkava tank and two military vehicles headed toward the eastern section of Yaroun in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Bint Jbeil District and positioned itself near an inhabited house. The house’s owners reportedly fled before the arrival of the Israeli force, which then rigged the house for detonation after intermittent artillery had targeted the area between Bint Jbeil and Yaroun.
January 30
At 8:09 am, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli quadcopter dropped a stun explosive in the “Chalets” area of Khiam in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Marjayoun District.
At 8:40 am, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli quadcopter dropped a stun explosive on the outskirts of Ayta Ash Shaab in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Bint Jbeil District.
At 10:36 am, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli quadcopter dropped two stun explosives in the “Chalets” area of Khiam in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Marjayoun District.
At 12:07 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli quadcopter dropped a stun explosive between Markaba and Adaisseh in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Marjayoun District.
At 2:20 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli drone targeted a vehicle on the outskirts of Siddiqin in the South Lebanon Governorate’s Tyre District. The strike killed one person. The IDF released a statement saying it had “targeted a Hezbollah operative operating near Siddiqine in south Lebanon.” Hezbollah-affiliated media announced the death of Hezbollah operative Mohammad Ahmad Yusef, whose nom de guerre was Fatras, from Riyaq in the Beqaa. The IDF released a subsequent statement claiming Fatras was “involved in attempts to restore Hezbollah’s military infrastructure near Siddiqine … in violation of the understandings between Israel and Lebanon.” Hezbollah gave Yusef a military funeral, burying him in its Zahraa Cemetery in the Kafaat area of Dahiyeh.
Death announcement for Mohammad Ahmad Yusef. (Lebanon Debate)
At 7:27 pm, the IDF released a statement saying that it was targeting Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon.
At 7:31 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that several Israeli airstrikes targeted the outskirts of locales in the Zahrani region in the South Lebanon Governorate’s Sidon District.
At 7:37 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that several Israeli airstrikes targeted the wadi between Msayleh, Najjariyeh, and Tuffahta in the South Lebanon Governorate’s Sidon District. The strikes caused local power outages.
7:37 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli airstrike targeted a bulldozer and excavator parking lot in Dawudiyeh in the South Lebanon Governorate’s Sidon District. The lot belonged to Abbas Diab, whose brother Jaafar’s machinery lot in Msayleh was also targeted by Israeli airstrikes on October 7, 2025. The latest strikes lightly wounded two people. The IDF released a statement saying it had targeted engineering equipment belonging to Hezbollah that the organization had been using to restore its infrastructure near Dawudiyeh “in violation of the understandings between Israel and Lebanon.”
At 7:46 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that several Israeli airstrikes targeted the wadi between Numeiriyeh and Zefta in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Nabatieh District.
At 7:46 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that several Israeli airstrikes targeted the wadis between Azza and Kafrawa in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Nabatieh District.
January 31
NNA Lebanon reported that at 3:00 am, Israeli forces detonated a chalet in Khiam in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Marjayoun District.
At 1:30 pm, Hezbollah-affiliated social media announced that the group had located and identified the remains of Hezbollah operative Hassan Abdallah Awada, whose nom de guerre was Abbas, from Khiam. Awada was killed at an unspecified time in late 2024 during the war with Israel.
At 2:25 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli drone strike targeted a vehicle on the outskirts of Rabb al Thalatheen in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Marjayoun District. The strike killed one person. The IDF released a statement saying it had “targeted a Hezbollah operative near Markaba in south Lebanon.” Hezbollah-affiliated social media later announced the death of Hezbollah operative Ahmad Hassan Faqih, whose nom de guerre was Sadeq, from Rabb al Thalatheen. The IDF released a subsequent statement claiming Faqih was “involved in restoring Hezbollah’s military infrastructure near Markaba … in violation of the understandings between Israel and Lebanon.”
Death announcements for Hassan Adballah Awada (Left) and Ahmad Hassan Faqih. (Balagh Media on Telegram)
At 11:36 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli airstrike targeted a vehicle between Barish and Maaroub in the South Lebanon Governorate’s Tyre District. The strike wounded one person.
February 1
At 9:42 am, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli patrol entered Rabb al Thalatheen in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Marjayoun District and detonated two homes, damaging neighboring residences.
At 10:18 am, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli quadcopter dropped a stun explosive on an excavator that had been previously targeted in Ayta Ash Shaab in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Bint Jbeil.
At 12:10 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli drone targeted an excavator with five missiles in Qennarit in the South Lebanon Governorate’s Sidon District. The excavator was reportedly clearing debris from Israel’s January 21 airstrikes in the town. The strike wounded one person. The IDF released a statement saying it targeted engineering equipment being “used by Hezbollah to restore its terror infrastructure in the area … in violation of the understandings between Israel and Lebanon.”
At 12:57 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that Israeli forces dropped “inciteful and threatening leaflets” in Bint Jbeil in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Bint Jbeil District. The leaflets were addressed to “the locals and residents of Bint Jbeil,” warning them that a “hospital is being used by the terrorist members of Hezbollah, steer clear of them!” Then the leaflet addressed “Hezbollah’s operatives – we are monitoring you. Stop your efforts to restore terrorist infrastructure.” Another leaflet mimicked Hezbollah’s death announcements, with “You” in the usual place of the fatality’s name and stating, “If you are involved in illegal activities in the south’s villages.”
Leaflets dropped by Israel in Bint Jbeil. (NNA Lebanon)
NNA Lebanon reported that at 2:20 pm, an Israeli airstrike targeted a vehicle with two missiles at the southern entrance of Duweir in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Nabatieh District. The strike killed one person and wounded sixpeople, including a nine-year-old boy identified as “Ali M.F.” who was in a vehicle with his parents that happened to pass by the area as the airstrike occurred, a four-year-old girl identified as “Mila A.H.” who was playing in her house’s courtyard near the road, an unidentified six-year-old girl, and an unidentified 16-year-old boy. The strike also significantly damaged nearby homes and a nearby Mercedes belonging to an individual identified as “Ali H.” The IDF released a statement saying it had targeted a Hezbollah operative near Duweir. Pro-Hezbollah social media later announced the death of Hezbollah operative Ali Dawoud Amees, whose nom de guerre was Mohammad Ali, from Aba. Hezbollah gave Amees a military funeral in his hometown. The IDF released a statement saying it had targeted and killed Amees, whom it described as the “head of the branch in Hezbollah’s engineering division” and claimed was “involved in attempts to restore Hezbollah’s military infrastructure near Duweir … in violation of the understandings between Israel and Lebanon.”
Death announcement for Ali Dawoud Amees. (Jibchit on Facebook)
At 7:38 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that an Israeli drone targeted a vehicle in Harouf in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Nabatieh District. The strike wounded six people. The IDF released a statement saying it had targeted a Hezbollah operative near Harouf.
11:29 pm, NNA Lebanon reported that Israeli forces directed machine-gun fire toward the outskirts of Aitaroun in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Bint Jbeil District.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on February 04-05/2026
Trump says Iran’s supreme leader ‘should be very worried’
Al Arabiya English/04 February/2026
US President Donald Trump said Wednesday that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei should be “very worried,” as Washington builds up its military forces in the region.“I would say he should be very worried, yeah, he should be,” Trump said in an interview with US broadcaster NBC News. “As you know, they are negotiating with us.”Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Wednesday that nuclear talks with the US are set to be held in the Omani capital Muscat at around 10 a.m. on Friday. A US official confirmed that US-Iran talks would take place in Oman on Friday. Trump has sent a US aircraft carrier to the region and has not ruled out new military action to follow the US attacks on Iranian nuclear sites during Israel’s June war against the Islamic Republic. Trump also said that Iran had eyed a new nuclear site after US strikes. “They were thinking about starting a new site in a different part of the country,” Trump told NBC. “We found out about it, I said, you do that, we’re going to do very bad things to you.”With AFP

Iran says nuclear talks with US to be held in Muscat on Friday
Al Arabiya English/05 February/2026
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Wednesday that nuclear talks with the United States are set to be held in the Omani capital Muscat at around 10 a.m. on Friday.A US official confirmed that talks between the two countries will take place on Friday in Oman. US President Donald Trump said Wednesday that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei should be “very worried,” as Washington builds up its military forces in the region. “I would say he should be very worried, yeah, he should be,” Trump said in an interview with US broadcaster NBC News. “As you know, they are negotiating with us.”US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said earlier on Wednesday that the United States was ready to meet Iran this week but discussions must cover its missile and nuclear programs as well as its support for regional militias. “In order for talks to actually lead to something meaningful, they will have to include certain things, and that includes the range of their ballistic missiles, that includes their sponsorship of terrorist organizations across the region, that includes their nuclear program and that includes the treatment of their own people,” Rubio said. Iran has repeatedly stressed that any negotiations must remain limited to its nuclear program, rejecting talks on its missile program or its support for regional proxies. Friday’s talks come amid heightened tensions between Tehran and Washington, with the United States in recent days deploying an aircraft carrier group to the Middle East following a deadly crackdown on anti-government protests in Iran.Tehran has acknowledged more than 3,000 deaths during the unrest. The US-based HRANA rights groups says it has confirmed 6,872 deaths, most of them protesters killed by security forces, while other rights groups warn the true toll is likely far higher. With agencies

Rubio says US ready to meet Iran but must discuss missiles, proxies
Al Arabiya English/04 February/2026
The United States is ready to meet Iran this week but discussions must cover its missile and nuclear programs as well as its support for regional militias, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Wednesday. Rubio did not confirm a meeting on Friday with Iran’s clerical state, which has violently put down some of the most serious protests against its rule since the 1979 Islamic revolution.“If the Iranians want to meet, we’re ready,” Rubio told reporters. “They’ve expressed an interest in meeting and talking. If they change their mind, we’re fine with that too,” he said, after President Donald Trump ordered a sharp military buildup near Iran’s coast and threatened to strike. “In order for talks to actually lead to something meaningful, they will have to include certain things, and that includes the range of their ballistic missiles, that includes their sponsorship of terrorist organizations across the region, that includes their nuclear program and that includes the treatment of their own people,” Rubio said. Iran in previous talks on its disputed nuclear program has ruled out discussions on its missiles, casting the weapons that can hit Israel as a tool of self-defense to which every country has a right. But Iran has been under growing pressure from the protests and after an Israeli bombing campaign last year. Iran has also lost key regional allies with Israel’s severe degrading of Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the fall of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. Iranian state media said Wednesday that talks with the United States would take place Friday in Oman, after diplomats earlier said the meeting would happen on Friday in Turkey. Rubio said that US envoy Steve Witkoff had been ready to meet with Iran in Turkey but then received “conflicting reports” on whether Tehran had agreed. “That’s still being worked out,” he said of the location for the talks. With AFP

US rejects Iran’s request to change location, format of talks: Report
Al Arabiya English/04 February/2026
The United States has told Iran that it will not accept its demands to change the location and format of talks scheduled for later this week, again heightening the risk for renewed US military action, according to a report on Wednesday. Washington and Tehran had agreed to hold talks on Friday in Istanbul, with other Middle Eastern countries participating as observers. However, Iranian officials said they wanted to move the talks to Oman and shift to a bilateral format in order to keep discussions focused solely on Iran’s nuclear program and exclude topics such as missiles, which are priorities for the United States and regional countries. US officials considered the request but decided on Wednesday to reject it, Axios reported. “We told them it is this or nothing, and they said, ‘Ok, then nothing,’” Axios quoted a senior US official as saying. The official added that if Iran does not return to the original format, “people will look at other options,” an apparent reference to US President Donald Trump’s repeated threats of military action. “We tried to reach an accommodation but the Iranians refused. There is a good chance the talks won't happen now at all this week,” Axios quoted a second US official as saying. Earlier on Wednesday, Iran’s state-linked Tasnim news agency said Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US envoy Steve Witkoff would hold indirect talks in the Omani capital Muscat on Friday. Tasnim said the discussions would focus exclusively on Iran’s nuclear program and the lifting of sanctions on Tehran. Later in the day, Reuters cited a regional official as saying plans were being finalized for direct talks between Iran and the United States in Oman on Friday, and that talks in Turkey were no longer under consideration. Early media reports had said the talks would be held in Istanbul, but Iran appears to favor Oman as the venue. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on Wednesday the United States was ready to meet Iran this week, but any discussions must address both its missile and nuclear programs as well as its support for regional militias. “In order for talks to actually lead to something meaningful, they will have to include certain things, and that includes the range of their ballistic missiles, that includes their sponsorship of terrorist organizations across the region, that includes their nuclear program and that includes the treatment of their own people,” Rubio said. Iran has repeatedly stressed that any negotiations must remain limited to its nuclear program, rejecting talks on its missile program or its support for regional proxies. Rubio said Witkoff had been prepared to meet Iran in Turkey but received “conflicting reports” on whether Tehran had agreed. “That’s still being worked out,” he added, referring to the location of the talks. This comes amid heightened tensions between Tehran and Washington, with the United States in recent days deploying an aircraft carrier group to the Middle East following a deadly crackdown on anti-government protests in Iran. Tehran has acknowledged more than 3,000 deaths during the unrest. The US-based HRANA rights groups says it has confirmed 6,872 deaths, most of them protesters killed by security forces, while other rights groups warn the true toll is likely far higher.

Common foe, different agenda: US and Israel diverge on Iran
AFP/04 February/2026
The US and Israel may be close allies but they are pursuing divergent goals in confronting shared adversary Iran, experts said, as Tehran and Washington square off in the Middle East. After threatening to strike Iran over its deadly crackdown on a protest movement that erupted in December, US President Donald Trump now appears to be seeking negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear program.Talks between the two countries are expected to take place on Friday in Oman. Israel, however, is pursuing an uncompromising stance toward the Islamic Republic, and would like to see its clerical leadership toppled, according to experts. “Israel and Trump share a common enemy, but not exactly the same agenda on Iran,” geopolitical analyst Michael Horowitz told AFP. Were the US to strike Iran, Israel -- located around 2,000 kilometers (more than 1,200 miles) away -- would be on the front line of any Iranian retaliation. Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly said Israel would not hesitate to respond were Iran to attack. “If Iran makes the grave mistake of attacking Israel, we will respond with a force that Iran has never seen,” Netanyahu told reporters last month. On Tuesday, Netanyahu told visiting US envoy Steve Witkoff that the Islamic republic “cannot be trusted.”Horowitz believes that “Israel is pushing for a lasting weakening, or even the fall of the Iranian regime, with the option of additional strikes if necessary.”
“For Netanyahu, the maximalist objective is clear: regime change or at the very least the complete dismantling of nuclear and missile capabilities,” he said.
Trump, for his part, does not want to “take the risk of a long-lasting war.”
These tactical differences between Israel and the US administration, Horowitz said, “nevertheless create tensions and a certain uncertainty in Israel,” where public opinion appears divided over a potential Israeli strike against Iran.
According to an opinion poll published Tuesday by the Israel Democracy Institute, 50 percent of Israelis would support an attack by Israel against Iran only in retaliation, and 44 percent say they favor military action in coordination with the United States. Mairav Zonszein, an expert with the International Crisis Group, highlighted the different political incentives at home for Netanyahu and Trump. She said that Trump has little “to gain domestically from going into a long war with Iran,” whereas “Netanyahu has built his career on the threat of the Iranian nuclear program and in general the threat that Iran poses.”
Sworn enemies
Arch-foes since the proclamation in 1979 of the Islamic Republic, which does not recognize Israel’s right to exist, the two countries fought a 12-day war last year. The conflict was triggered by an unprecedented Israeli attack against Iranian military and nuclear facilities as well as residential areas.The US joined the offensive by striking three Iranian nuclear sites, before a ceasefire initiated by Trump came into force. In Israel, the war killed 30 people and caused considerable damage, notably to a hospital and public institutions, including some army bases. In April 2024, on the sidelines of the Israel-Hamas war in the Gaza Strip, Iran launched an unprecedented drone and missile attack against Israel. It was in retaliation for a deadly attack on Iran’s Damascus consulate that occurred days before and was blamed on Israel. Months later on October 1, Iran fired a barrage of 200 missiles at Israel in response to the assassinations of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders.
Fault lines
For Israeli reserve general Eitan Ben Eliahou, potential negotiations between the United States and Iran could lead to an agreement, but only under several conditions: an end to Iran’s military nuclear program and the production of ballistic missiles, as well as “Iranian recognition of Israel’s right to exist.”“Iran would issue a public statement announcing the abandonment of its intention to destroy Israel and a declaration that Iran will not attack Israel, and in return... the United States and Israel will not attack it,” the former air force commander of Iranian origin told Israeli news website Ynet on Tuesday. For Zonszein, these conditions are “not realistic.”“The official position is that Israel would have been happy with a very good deal, but we all know that Israel was against the JCPOA,” she said, referring to a nuclear deal signed under former US President Barack Obama. “The main divide is that Israel has always favored military and kinetic action to deal with Iran, and the Trump administration prefers diplomacy.”

MBS welcomes Germany’s chancellor during official visit to Saudi Arabia
Al Arabiya English/05 February/2026
Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman received German Chancellor Friedrich Merz at al-Yamamah Palace in Riyadh late Wednesday, where the two leaders held an official meeting.

Red Cross ‘outraged’ as on-duty paramedic killed in Gaza
AFP/04 February/2026
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies said it was “outraged” by the killing of an on-duty colleague on Wednesday in Gaza, where Israel is battling Hamas. The IFRC said Hussein Hassan Hussein Al-Samiri, “a dedicated paramedic” with the Palestine Red Crescent Society, “was killed while performing life-saving humanitarian duties in Khan Younis during an attack in the Al-Mawasi area” of the southern Gaza Strip. “The IFRC sends its deepest condolences to his family, friends and colleagues and expresses its full solidarity with PRCS.”
Despite a US-brokered truce entering its second phase last month, violence in the Palestinian territory has continued, with Israel and Hamas accusing each other of violating the agreement. The IFRC said the death brings the number of PRCS staff and volunteers killed in Gaza in the line of duty to 30 since the conflict began in October 2023. The federation said humanitarian workers and medical staff needed to be respected and protected at all times. “The Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems are symbols of protection, humanity, neutrality, and hope. Yet too often, our volunteers and staff are killed while performing life-saving work,” it said. “The loss of Hussein is a tragic reminder of the dangers faced by those who dedicate their lives to helping others.”The Geneva-based IFRC is the world’s largest humanitarian network, with more than 17 million volunteers in more than 191 countries. Gazan health officials said Israeli air strikes on Wednesday killed 23 people, with Israel’s military saying it struck after one of its officers was wounded by enemy gunfire.

Trump, Xi discuss Taiwan and soybeans in call aimed at easing China-US relations
Reuters/04 February/2026
China agreed to buy more US-farmed soybeans in what President Donald Trump called a “very positive” call with President Xi Jinping on Wednesday, even as Beijing warned Washington about arms sales to Taiwan. In a goodwill gesture two months before Trump’s expected visit to Beijing, Xi agreed to hike soybean purchases from the US to 20 million tons in the current season, up from 12 million tons previously, Trump said. Soybean futures rallied sharply. Hours after Xi’s virtual meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Xi and Trump discussed Taiwan and a wide range of trade and security issues that remain a source of tension between the world’s biggest economies. Both leaders publicly affirmed their personal stake in strong relations after the call, their first since late November. “All very positive,” Trump said in a post on his Truth Social platform. “The relationship with China, and my personal relationship with President Xi, is an extremely good one, and we both realize how important it is to keep it that way.”“I attach great importance to Sino-US relations,” Xi Jinping said, according to an official government account. “Both sides are signalling that they want to preserve stability in the US-China relationship,” said Bonnie Glaser, head of the Indo-Pacific program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, a think tank. Though Trump has tagged China as the reason for several hawkish policy steps from Canada to Greenland and Venezuela, he’s eased policy towards Beijing in the last several months in key areas from tariffs to advanced computer chips and drones.
Areas of tension and goodwill gestures
One key exception is on Taiwan policy. The US announced its largest-ever arms sales deal with Taiwan in December, including $11.1 billion in weapons that could ostensibly be used to defend itself against an attack by Beijing. Taipei expects more such sales. China views Taiwan as its own territory, a position Taipei rejects. Washington has formal diplomatic ties with Beijing, but maintains unofficial ties with Taiwan and is the island’s most important arms supplier. The US is bound by law to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself. “The United States must carefully handle arms sales to Taiwan,” Beijing said in an official summary of the meeting. The dismissal or investigation into several senior military leaders in China has stirred concern about the implications for Beijing’s foreign policy. But Trump downplayed the investigation into Central Military Commission vice-chairman Zhang Youxia, saying over the weekend that “as far as I’m concerned, there’s one boss in China,” and “that’s President Xi.”The last nuclear treaty between Russia and the United States is soon to expire, raising the risk of a new arms race in which China will also play a key role with its own growing nuclear stockpile. Trump has said that he wants China to be part of arms control. The Kremlin said it was a topic between Xi and Putin.
Soybeans, airplanes and oil
Economic issues continue to be a flashpoint between the world’s biggest consumer and its biggest factory. Trump has made tariffs on imports a pillar of his strategy to revive domestic manufacturing jobs. US Vice President JD Vance on Wednesday unveiled plans for a preferential trade bloc of allies for critical minerals, part of an effort to eliminate one key area of leverage that Beijing has over Washington given its control of key metals. But the two sides are working to find areas of accord heading into an expected April state visit by Trump to Beijing. Soybeans are a key issue because struggling farmers are a major domestic political constituency for Trump and China is the top consumer. Overseas sales of US soybeans this year slumped to the lowest in 14 years due to trade tensions with China. Benchmark Chicago Board of Trade soybean futures surged more than 3% to a two-month high after Trump’s post. China’s commerce ministry did not immediately respond to a Reuters request for comment on the soybean purchases Trump announced. In addition to soybeans, the leaders discussed Iran, Russia’s war in Ukraine, airplane engines and oil and gas, Trump said. China has been Venezuela’s top oil buyer for years, and the sales helped Caracas repay massive loans to Beijing in debt-for-oil deals. The Trump administration removed President Nicolas Maduro last month, and it has suggested that China will have to buy Venezuelan oil on the US’s terms.

Kremlin vows to act ‘responsibly’ after nuclear pact with US expires
AFP/04 February2026
Russian President Vladimir Putin intends to act “responsibly” should the last nuclear pact with the US be allowed to expire on February 5, the Kremlin vowed Wednesday. The New START agreement is set to expire on Thursday, formally releasing both Moscow and Washington from a raft of restrictions on their nuclear arsenals. Campaigners have warned allowing the treaty to lapse could unleash a new nuclear arms race. In a call with China’s President Xi Jinping, Putin said that Russia “will act in a measured manner and responsibly,” after the treaty expires, Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov said. Putin offered a one-year extension of the pact in September. US President Donald Trump said at the time it “sounds like a good idea,” but the Kremlin says it has not received an answer. Moscow remains “open to finding ways for dialogue and ensuring strategic stability,” Usahkov added in a briefing to journalists, including from AFP. The treaty, which included a monitoring mechanism, was signed in 2010 by then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his US counterpart Barack Obama. It limited each side’s nuclear arsenal to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 800 missile launchers. In 2023, Russia froze its participation in New START, but it has continued to voluntarily adhere to the limits.Moscow last year tested its latest nuclear weapon carriers without atomic warheads, prompting Trump to announce he was moving two nuclear submarines closer to Russia.The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) called on Russia and the United States to commit to honor the New START limits while a new agreement was negotiated.“Without New START, there is a real danger the new arms race will accelerate between the US and Russia -- more warheads, more delivery systems, more exercises -- and other nuclear-armed states will feel pressure to keep up,” ICAN Executive Director Melissa Parke said Wednesday in a statement.

Iran Formally Allows Women to Ride Motorcycles
This is Beirut/04 February/2026
Women in Iran can now formally obtain a license to ride a motorcycle, local media reported Wednesday, ending years of legal ambiguity surrounding two-wheelers.The law previously did not explicitly prohibit women from riding motorbikes and scooters, but in practice authorities refused to issue licenses.Due to the legal grey area, women have been held legally responsible for accidents even when they are victims.Iran's First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref signed a resolution on Tuesday aimed at clarifying the traffic code, which was approved by Iran's cabinet in late January, the country's Ilna news agency reported. The resolution obliges traffic police to "provide practical training to female applicants, organize an exam under the direct supervision of the police, and issue motorcycle driver's licenses to women," Ilna said.
The change follows a wave of protests across Iran that were initially sparked by economic grievances but which grew last month into nationwide anti-government demonstrations. Tehran has acknowledged that more than 3,000 deaths occurred during the unrest, insisting that most were members of the security forces and bystanders.Since Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution, women have faced a number of societal restrictions, with dress codes posing a challenge for those riding motorcycles. Women must cover their hair with a headscarf in public and wear modest, loose-fitting clothing, but in recent years many have defied those rules, with the number of women on motorbikes rising sharply in recent months. This trend accelerated after the 2022 death in custody of Mahsa Amini, a young Iranian woman arrested for allegedly violating the dress code.
Her death sparked protests across Iran by women demanding greater freedoms. AFP

Syria signs landmark offshore oil field deal with Cheron and a Qatari investor
The Associated Press/04 February/2026
Syria’s state-owned petroleum company signed a memorandum of understanding with the US and Qatar on Wednesday for the development of the country’s first offshore oil and gas field. Syrian Petroleum Company’s deal with US energy giant Chevron and the Qatar-based Power International Holding was signed in Damascus in the presence of the US’s special envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack. Syria’s state news agency, SANA, said that the agreement aims to strengthen strategic partnerships in the energy sector and will cover cooperation in offshore exploration and the development of oil and gas resources in Syria’s territorial waters, as well as broader efforts to support investment and energy-sector development. The deal marks Syria’s first formal step toward offshore energy exploration as the government seeks to expand hydrocarbon production and attract foreign partners. Syria’s oil and gas sectors were adversely impacted by the country’s nearly 15-year conflict that killed half a million people and caused wide destruction. Before the conflict began with an uprising against then President Bashar al-Assad’s government in March 2011, the oil sector was a pillar of Syria’s economy, with the country producing about 380,000 barrels a day and exports — mostly to Europe — bringing in more than $3 billion in 2010. Oil revenues provided around a quarter of the funds for the government budget at the time. Syrian government forces captured wide parts of northeast and oil-rich eastern Syria last month from Kurdish-led fighters in what could pave the way for exploration on some of the country’s largest oil fields. Syria’s new authorities who came to power after removing Assad in December 2024, are trying to revive the country’s economy.

Libya opens investigation into killing of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi
Al Arabiya English/04 February/2026
Libyan prosecutors said Wednesday they were investigating the killing of Seif al-Islam Gaddafi, son of slain ruler Muammar Gaddafi, in the city of Zintan.
The public prosecutor’s office said forensic experts had been dispatched to Zintan in northwest Libya, where he was shot dead, adding that efforts were underway to identify suspects. “The victim died from wounds by gunfire,” the office said in a statement, adding that investigators were looking to “speak to witnesses and anyone who may be able to shed light on the incident.”The Libyan Presidential Council called on the various political sides to await the results of the investigations, according to Libyan media. The council, headed by Mohammad al- Menfi, also offered its condolences to Ghaddafi’s family. A source close to the family told Al Arabiya on Wednesday that he will be burried in the Libyan city of Sirte. A lawyer of Seif al-Islam, Marcel Ceccaldi, told AFP he was killed by an unidentified “four-man commando” who stormed his house in Zintan on Tuesday. Libya has struggled to recover from the chaos that erupted after a NATO-backed uprising in 2011 overthrew Muammar Gaddafi. Libya remains divided between a UN-backed government based in Tripoli and an eastern administration backed by Khalifa Haftar. Moussa al-Kouni, vice-president of the Presidential Council representing the Fezzan region said on X: “No to political assassinations, no to achieving demands by force, and no to violence as a language or a means of expression.”With AFP

AMCD Endorses the Save the Kurds Act
February 4, 2026
The American Mideast Coalition for Democracy strongly endorses the bipartisan “Save the Kurds Act” (Senate Bill S.3740), introduced by Senator Lindsay Graham (R-South Carolina) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Connecticut) on January 29th. Senator Graham has been deeply involved in US foreign policy for decades, and our long-suffering American allies, the Kurds, have no better friend in Congress. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have been a loyal US ally in the region and were especially effective in the fight against ISIS in Syria and Iraq. In recent weeks, the Kurds have come under attack by Syrian government forces under the leadership of President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Under Sharaa, first the Alawite community, then the Druze, and now the Kurds and Christians have been subject to severe oppression and direct attack by government forces. In addition, there are approximately one-thousand U.S. military personnel in the Kurdish area of northeast Syria who are being directly threatened. It is also being reported that these attacks are being assisted by the Turks, who have oppressed the ever-resilient Kurds for centuries, and are apparently being allowed to slaughter Kurds on Syrian soil by the Sharaa government. “I believe that there is strong bipartisan support for the idea of protecting the Kurds in Syria and beyond because they have been such a reliable ally to the United States,” began Senator Graham. “The SDF – with a large Kurdish element – took the brunt of the fight to defeat ISIS in President Trump’s first term. I realize Syria is complicated culturally, ethnically and politically. However, attacking the Kurds greatly diminishes the United States’ standing and will hinder Syria’s ability to grow as a country. To those countries or groups who believe it is open season on the Kurds in Syria without consequence, you will be sadly mistaken.” “I believe we need to protect the Kurds in Syria and take action to ensure they are protected from any retribution or revenge by the Syrian government,” added Senator Blumenthal.
The Save the Kurds Act:
Imposes sanctions on Syrian government officials and financial institutions, and any foreign individual who engages in any transaction, including military or financial support, with the Syrian government.
Recognizes the Kurdish-led SDF for their contributions in working with the U.S. to eliminate ISIS
Redesignates Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)
Requires congressional review for the removal of Syria’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism
Gives the president the authority to suspend sanctions upon certifying to Congress that the Syrian government has ceased all attacks on the Kurdish-led SDF and their partners
Contains a snapback measure, requiring the president to immediately reimpose all sanctions if the Syrian government restarts all attacks on the Kurdish-led SDF or their partners
AMCD has long supported the idea of Kurdish independence, and we will continue to support the brave Kurdish people in their fight against oppression and attack by the Syrian government and their Turkish allies. We applaud Senators Graham and Blumenthal and urge full congressional support for the “Save the Kurds Act.”

AMCD Opposes Closure of the General Assembly Building in Aden by the Saudi-backed Giants Forces
February 4, 2026
The American Mideast Coalition for Democracy opposes this action to close the General Assembly of the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen and call on Saudi Arabia to order its re-opening immediately.
The Southern Transitional Council’s General Assembly, which includes the National Assembly and the Consultative Council, represents the comprehensive political framework that expresses the will of the people of South Yemen, which includes the vital port city of Aden. The General Assembly is the only vehicle the southern people have for political expression and its closing constitutes suppression of their legitimate rights.In a statement the STC, “affirms its unwavering commitment to ensuring that political and human rights activities in the capital, Aden, and all southern governorates are conducted in a safe environment, with full guarantees of freedoms, and rejects any militarization of civilian institutions or political intimidation by force.”AMCD is concerned that this action will only spark further tension and unrest. We call on all relevant parties to de-escalate the rhetoric and work together to re-open the General Assembly so that peaceful, democratic processes will prevail over tyrannical oppression. Let the people of South Yemen speak! UPDATE: The Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) National Assembly headquarters in Tawahi district of the capital, Aden, was reopened Sunday (February 1), two days after it was closed by a military force that prevented staff and Assembly members from entering. The reopening came following widespread protests and a mass street rally that moved through the Maalla and Tawahi districts.

The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on February 04-05/2026
What If the United States Doesn’t Strike Iran?
Patrick Clawson/The Washington Institute/Februay 03/2026
No matter what President Trump may say about potentially securing “a good deal” from Iran, refraining from military action after weeks of dire U.S. warnings would likely convince Tehran that it can strike fear in other governments.
Alongside important analyses of strike options and potential consequences if the United States attacks Iran again, it is also worth pondering what implications would arise if there is no U.S. strike. This is all the more relevant amid sundry reports that the multilateral talks now set for Istanbul on February 6 may focus solely on nuclear matters rather than the wide variety of other issues that are central to U.S. policy on Iran—from the human rights concerns that spurred President Trump’s military threats, to America’s longstanding security concerns about missile proliferation and regional destabilization.
Whatever happens, Trump’s past practice strongly suggests that he will claim success tied directly to his threats of using force. Yet the administration will face major challenges portraying whatever modest steps emerge from the new round of talks as a U.S. victory. The Iranian people, the regime’s leaders, and observers around the Middle East are likely to measure such claims against the perception that America’s true goal is the fall of the Islamic Republic, which is very unlikely to happen soon. U.S. officials should therefore expect widespread skepticism about whether Tehran—or, for that matter, Washington—will follow through on whatever nuclear agreement-in-principle is reached in the coming days.
Fear of Iran’s Capabilities
Tehran has good reason to believe it can strike fear in other governments. Over the past month, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has stated that his country will not attack Iran at this time, and many other governments in the region—including Egypt, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—have echoed Jerusalem in urging the United States not to strike now. Riyadh and the United Arab Emirates publicly ruled out the use of their airspace or territory for any offensive military action against Iran, unlike their public silence before last summer’s twelve-day war. (Washington did not use facilities in either country for that campaign, reportedly at their request.) The New York Times was spot on when it wrote that “Israeli and Arab officials fear Iran could retaliate by striking their countries.” In other words, if the United States opts not to attack, Tehran will be justified in concluding that its own military capabilities (especially its missiles) were an important factor in that decision.
Indeed, allied warnings about the dangers of another strike have fallen on receptive ears in Tehran. Contrary to U.S. perceptions, Iranian officials at all levels have proclaimed loudly and often that their retaliatory measures inflicted substantial damage during the twelve-day war. Although many of these proclamations are somewhat exaggerated, one of their central arguments is difficult to deny: namely, that Iran never asked for last year’s fighting to stop, and that halting the war was a decision made by the other side. Furthermore, they are correct in noting that Israel has never revealed the full extent of damage from Iranian missile strikes, in part to keep these details from Tehran. What Jerusalem has acknowledged is that two of those strikes alone—on the Weizmann Institute of Science and the Haifa refinery—cost hundreds of millions of dollars or more to remedy. In addition, Israeli homeowners reportedly filed claims of $1.5 billion in damages from the June war.
Iran also appears to believe that its missile inventory is holding up better than U.S. and Israeli stocks of antimissile systems, though it has acknowledged extensive damage to its missile launchers. According to various privately disclosed Israeli analyses, Iran was estimated to have lost as much as 80 percent of its air defense systems at the time of last summer’s ceasefire and more than two-thirds of its launchers; these assessments also note that Israeli strikes knocked out significantly more missiles than Iran was able to fire. Crucially, however, the regime retained perhaps half of its stock of ballistic missiles capable of reaching Israel. Overall, many of its remaining missile stocks are short-range systems that are not suitable for hitting Israel, but they can reach targets in neighboring countries, including installations used by the United States. Iran is estimated to have made considerable progress on restoring production of long-range missiles, though its claims that production is higher than before the war are improbable.
On the other side of the ledger, the United States and its allies fired roughly 100-150 Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile interceptors during the war—a substantial figure given that the total global inventory of these munitions is 500-600 and annual production is generally quite slow (e.g., only 11 THAADs were produced in 2023). The Pentagon has also repeatedly warned that U.S. stocks of Patriot missiles are much lower than needed for defensive purposes in the current global threat environment. And although Israel has not released information about its antimissile inventory, estimates from reliable sources are that it is significantly smaller than before the war.
More broadly, allied warnings about Iran’s retaliatory capabilities—including from Israel—say much about how the region regards the current balance of power. Although Washington is rightly impressed by the manner in which Israel won the opening battle last June (e.g., killing many top Iranian military and nuclear officials; operating largely unimpeded over Iranian airspace), that is not the whole story. The region’s pleas to Washington show clear worries about what Iran could do in future rounds of fighting.
Disappointment Among the Iranian People
Even after high-profile regime slaughters against protesters on January 8-9, President Trump urged Iranians to continue marching. On January 13, he posted, “Iranian patriots, keep on protesting—Take over your institutions. Help is on its way.” He also warned that those behind “the senseless killing...will pay a big price,” claiming, “The day of reckoning & retribution is coming.”
In light of such statements, it is hardly surprising that many Iranians who detest the regime—especially after the recent slaughters—not only hope but indeed expect the United States to attack. Nerves are on edge inside the Islamic Republic, as seen by the widespread rumors that a foreign attack was behind recent accidental explosions in various locations (now a common occurrence given the country’s mismanagement and deteriorating infrastructure). Speculation that the United States intends to kill Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is rampant as well, with regime sources shrilly warning about the dire consequences of any such attempt and popular voices expressing hope that this will happen.
If the United States takes no action after all these warnings, promises, and rumors, many in Iran will be deeply disgruntled. Some Western commentators may draw comparisons to 1991 (when Washington was perceived as encouraging Iraqis to overthrow Saddam Hussein) or 1956 (when U.S. officials indirectly urged Hungarians to resist the Soviet occupation), but the more vivid comparison for many Iranians would be 2009, when the United States did relatively little to encourage the mass protest movement sparked by the regime’s rigged presidential election. Even those civilians who are not much aware of the historical precedents will likely be disappointed and resentful that Trump’s words did not lead to action, while the regime will no doubt portray a U.S. stand-down as “proof” that Washington accepts the Islamic Republic’s deep roots.
How Much Does This Matter?
U.S. discussions about what to do next should be informed by a realistic understanding of how decisionmakers in Iran and the rest of the Middle East view the results of America’s previous use of force. While Washington may read the twelve-day war as a complete disaster for Iran, the messaging from Israel and other governments suggests that they remain respectful of what Iran can do militarily.
Of course, this perceptual factor is only one of several elements that should inform a U.S. decision on military action—and not necessarily the most important element. For instance, if U.S. advisors do not believe a strike would accomplish much at this time, then it would be better to absorb the reputational costs of not attacking rather than suffer the potentially worse consequences of launching strikes that have little or no impact. If President Trump decides not to attack, his administration could limit the damage to U.S. military credibility by highlighting specific aspects of Iran’s continued vulnerability. It could also address the disappointment of the Iranian people by taking visible steps to support protesters, such as stronger measures to help them communicate amid regime blackouts and crackdowns.
In many ways, the problems that could arise from not acting are the product of the Trump administration’s loud proclamations about whether and why it would act. The usual advice about such strikes is to keep quiet in advance while warning one’s adversary behind the scenes that an attack is imminent unless certain conditions are met. Yet that approach does not always appeal to U.S. politicians. When Trump wrote that, “Time is running out...The next attack will be far worse,” he was only the latest in a line of U.S. presidents who have issued bold public ultimatums to adversaries—most recently President Obama, who insisted in 2013 that Bashar al-Assad “must go” and warned in 2015 that Assad’s use of chemical weapons would “cross a red line.” Much as advisors and analysts may counsel against such an approach, U.S. politicians often ignore these precautions. The challenge now is to shape potential reactions to U.S. military inaction by explaining that Washington retains the upper hand while Iran is the party that remains vulnerable.
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-if-united-states-doesnt-strike-iran
**Patrick Clawson is the Morningstar Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and director of its Viterbi Program on Iran and U.S. Policy.

EU Takes Aim at Tehran: IRGC Terror Listing Opens New Front in Europe’s Iran Policy
Michael Jacobson/The Washington Institute/Februay 03/2026
Besides the welcome symbolic value of taking action amid bloody regime crackdowns inside Iran, the designation gives multilateral law enforcement agencies and individual member states a powerful new tool set for limiting terrorist plots and criminal activity on their soil.
On January 29, Europe found its voice against Iran’s apparatus of terror. The European Union (EU) announced that it is adding Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to its list of designated terrorist entities. The EU spent years mulling this step and taking half measures. Now, the EU and its member states must use this new, much-needed tool broadly and effectively. The EU’s designation should mark the start of Europe’s campaign against the IRGC, not its end.
Formally listing the IRGC will give Europe important new authorities to limit Iranian attacks and plotting on their soil. The EU’s move also has major symbolic value, particularly at a time when the Iranian regime is under pressure at home and abroad.
The EU previously sanctioned some of the IRGC’s branches, leaders, and operatives. But EU member states resisted taking action against the IRGC in its entirety for several reasons, including European fears of Tehran’s reaction. Iran has long been vocal in its opposition to an IRGC designation, warning in recent days that an EU label would have “destructive consequences.” The U.S. unwillingness to lift its own Foreign Terrorist Organization listing of the IRGC was reportedly a key reason why U.S.-Iran negotiations fell apart during the Biden administration.
The EU designation comes on the heels of the Iranian regime’s bloody crackdown against its own outraged people. The EU’s decision—reached by consensus among its 27 member states—lends Europe’s united voice to the Iranian protestors’ indignation against their oppressors.
The EU action also sends a powerful message to Tehran that it should refrain from conducting attacks on European soil against its perceived enemies, particularly Iranian dissidents and Israeli and Jewish targets. European security officials express great concern about that risk now. Both the IRGC’s deadly Quds Force and Iran’s notorious Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) have conducted numerous terrorist plots in recent years in Europe, including in Sweden, Germany, Cyprus, and Belgium. Individual European governments have disrupted and prosecuted these networks and issued statements condemning Iranian behavior, but this is the most unified and strongest European stance to date.
With the EU designation, any IRGC assets in Europe are now subject to an asset freeze. It is now illegal to provide the group with funds or resources. The designation also requires EU member states to increase police and judicial cooperation on IRGC-related criminal matters. And the EU will impose a travel ban on IRGC members hoping to visit Europe.
The Europeans should now aim to use these tools vigorously. The IRGC has historically had near global reach, not only with its terrorist cells but with its procurement and financial networks. Uncovering and disrupting the IRGC’s networks and freezing their assets would weaken the corps’ capabilities to rearm, profit, and funnel materiel and finances to its proxies.
Europe can and should do much more to maximize the impact of the designation and impose real costs on the IRGC and its overlords. The EU’s 2013 designation of Hezbollah’s so-called “military wing” offers a good model for how an EU designation can empower both the EU and its member states.
First, the EU should ensure that Europol—the EU’s umbrella police agency—gets a key role in coordinating and supporting IRGC-related investigations across Europe, as Europol has done with Hezbollah. Before the EU’s designation, Europol’s ability to police the IRGC’s operatives in Europe was greatly limited. The IRGC’s many European plots often have a consistent modus operandi, including using criminal actors not associated with Iran to carry out attacks and thus offer Tehran a fig leaf of deniability. Europol is uniquely positioned to see the whole picture and share relevant information with all EU member states.
For one model, look to Europol’s involvement in the complex multi-jurisdictional investigation of the Hezbollah financier Mohamad Nourredine, which involved multiple European governments as well as several U.S. law enforcement agencies. In 2018, he was convicted in a French court on multiple charges and sentenced to seven years in prison as part of a multi-country investigation codenamed “Operation Cedar.” Europol could provide similar support in international investigations against IRGC operatives.
Since 2014, Europol has also played an integral role, along with the United States, in the Law Enforcement Coordination Group, the sole international body dedicated to countering Hezbollah’s terrorist and illicit activity. The EU should empower Europol to do likewise for the U.S.-led Countering Transnational Terrorism Forum, which focuses on Iran-linked terrorism.
Second, European governments must follow up on the EU’s actions and impose their own national bans and designations. Many European countries did just this against Hezbollah, including Germany, Slovenia, Austria, the United Kingdom, and the Baltics.
Take Germany, which shows how national-level actions can strengthen law enforcement and build on Brussels’s actions. In May 2020, Germany formally banned Hezbollah and conducted near simultaneous raids on several Hezbollah-linked organizations in the country. Germany is now prosecuting a Lebanese national allegedly tied to Hezbollah for procuring drone components for the terrorist group—a scheme that also took place in the U.K. and Spain.
The EU’s IRGC designation won’t tip the balance of power within Iran in favor of the protestors, but it can still help reduce Iran’s ability to stage vicious attacks abroad. The EU and its member states must robustly implement these new authorities for them to have the desperately needed effect.
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/eu-takes-aim-tehran-irgc-terror-listing-opens-new-front-europes-iran-policy
*Michael Jacobson, a senior fellow in The Washington Institute’s Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, formerly served as director of strategy, plans, and initiatives in the State Department’s Counterterrorism Bureau. This article was originally published on the Cipher Brief website.

Go Straight to Paradise: Women's Equality, Pakistan Style
Uzay Bulut/Gatestone Institute/February 4, 2026
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/22234/women-equality-pakistan
The Army of Mohammed (Jaish-e-Mohammed — JeM), one of Pakistan's too-many-to-count jihadist terrorist groups, recently launched its first-ever women's wing. JeM chief Azhar claims that since its launch, the women's wing [which runs indoctrination courses that include specialized training for combat and suicide missions] has recruited 5,000 members. According to journalists who analyzed his audio message, Azhar explains how these women are now recruited, trained, and integrated into his long-term "global jihad" mission, mirroring the structure of JeM's long-running male training program. Azhar promised that any woman who joins the group "will go straight to paradise from her grave after death."
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, since its founding in 1947, is home to numerous Islamic terror organizations. JeM is also a member of the United Jihad Council (UJC), sponsored by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
Pakistan apparently intends to continue using terrorism to advance its agenda of exporting Islam to the rest of the world. The launch of JeM's women's wing is a further attempt to recruit more women terrorists. Given that the goal of these jihadist groups is global jihad and domination, they pose a serious security threat not just to South Asia, but also beyond. Pakistan has been invited by the Trump administration to join his "Board of Peace" for the purported stabilization of Gaza, and Pakistan accepted the offer.
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), one of Pakistan's too-many-to-count jihadist terrorist groups, recently launched its first-ever women's wing, which has held meetings, launched in-person and online radicalization events, recruitment fairs, and indoctrination courses for women and girls that include specialized training for combat and suicide missions. JeM claims the women's wing has recruited 5,000 members.
The Army of Mohammed (Jaish-e-Mohammed — JeM), one of Pakistan's too-many-to-count jihadist terrorist groups, recently launched its first-ever women's wing. The "Congregation of the Believing Women" (Jamaat-ul-Mominaat) was launched on October 9, 2025, and hosted by JeM's training facility, "Center of Usman and Ali," (Markaz Usman-o-Ali) in Bahawalpur, a city in the southeast of Pakistan's Punjab Province. The JeM's women's wing has since held meetings, launched in-person and online radicalization events, recruitment fairs, and indoctrination courses for women and girls that include specialized training for combat and suicide missions
On October 19, JeM organized another event for the "Daughters of Islam" ("Dukhtaran-e-Islam") to attract women into the terror group. "Daughters of Islam," a radical Islamist women's organization, emerged in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in the late 1980s. Since October, many more training sessions have taken place: for instance, in Rawalpindi on October 26; in Lahore on October 27; in Karachi on November 7, and in Sindh on November 9.
The women's wing of JEM is particularly active through online classes on jihad and other Islamic issues. One of those classes, called "One Thousand Units of Jihad in the Path of Allah" (Alfiya Al-Jihad Fi Sabil Allah) is a new training program by Sadia Azhar, sister of Masood Azhar, JeM's chief. It has taken place five days a week since August 15. The goal of another online jihad course, "Gift to Believing Women," (Tuhfat-ul-Mominaat), which began on November 8, appears to be recruitment, indoctrination and fundraising. For this course, 40-minute daily lectures are given by women family members of JeM leaders. They teach Islamic duties and jihad. Each woman enrolled is required to make a donation of PKR 500, just under $2.
JeM chief Azhar claims that since its launch, the women's wing has recruited 5,000 members. JeM was founded by Masood Azhar in early 2000 and has since been designated as a terrorist organization by the UN, India, the US, the UK, Russia, Canada, the UAE, and Australia. According to the US National Counterterrorism Center, JeM has openly declared war against the United States. According to a report by the Australian parliament, "JeM may be facilitating the activities of international jihadists intending to conduct terrorist operations outside Kashmir or greater India, including the United Kingdom and US."In 2019, Azhar was added by the UN to its "ISIS and Al-Qaida Sanctions List" for "being associated with Al-Qaida":
"Mohammed Masood Azhar Alvi founded Jaish-i-Mohammed (JEM) upon his release from prison in India in 1999. Azhar was released from prison in exchange for 155 hostages held on an Indian Airlines flight that had been hijacked to Kandahar, Afghanistan. Azhar has also financially supported JEM since its founding.
"The UN Security Council listed JEM on October 17, 2001, as being associated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban for "participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of", "supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to" or "otherwise supporting acts or activities of" Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban.
"Azhar is also a former leader of the terrorist group Harakat ul-Mujahidin / HUM, aka Harakat ul-Ansar; most of these groups' members subsequently joined JEM under Azhar's leadership. In 2008, JEM recruitment posters contained a call from Azhar for volunteers to join the fight in Afghanistan against Western forces."
In October 2025, Azhar released a 21-minute audio message from the group's Bahawalpur headquarters, outlining a detailed plan for training, indoctrinating, and deploying women under the new unit, the Times of India reported.
According to journalists who analyzed his audio message, Azhar explains how these women are now recruited, trained, and integrated into his long-term "global jihad" mission, mirroring the structure of JeM's long-running male training program. In his speech, Azhar promised that any woman who joins the group "will go straight to paradise from her grave after death."
"The enemies of Jaish have put Hindu women into the army and set up female journalists against us," Azhar claimed, declaring that he is "mobilising his women to compete and fight against them."
Women joining Jamaat-ul-Mominaat are trained through an induction course named "Daura-e-Taskiya" ("Course of Purification") conducted at Markaz Usman-o-Ali in Bahawalpur, Times of India reported, citing local media. The course is expected to provide similar ideological training as the primary indoctrination course for male recruits. Women who successfully complete the first course will advance to a second stage, which teaches how Islamic texts "instruct women to conduct jihad" and "spread Islam across the world."
According to Azhar:
"Women joining the brigade must not speak to any unrelated men through phone or messenger, except their husbands or immediate family members."
Azhar added that the women's wing branches will be opened in every district, each headed by a coordinator responsible for recruiting local women. The women's wing is led by Sadiya Azhar, Azhar's widowed sister.
Azhar revealed that Jamaat-ul-Mominaat includes "4–5 women whose male relatives were killed in encounters with the Indian Army," who will inspire new recruits under a campaign called Shoba-e-Dawat. Notably, 14 members of Azhar's family were killed in India's Operation Sindoor, which decimated terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
JeM, despite the 2002 ban on its activities, continues to operate openly in parts of Pakistan. The group has conducted many lethal terrorist attacks, including a suicide bombing of the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly building in the Indian-administered Kashmir capital of Srinagar in October 2001 -- killing more than 30 people – followed by an attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi on December 13, 2001.
In July 2004, Pakistani authorities arrested a JeM member who was wanted in connection with the 2002 abduction and murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl. In 2006, JeM claimed responsibility for a number of attacks, including the killing of several Indian police officials in Srinagar. JeM members were also involved in the 2007 Red Mosque uprising in Islamabad.
According to the 2019 dossier submitted to the UNSC 1267 Sanctions Committee by India, Azhar has worked with Al Qaeda and the Taliban:
"Azhar established JeM with the support of Al Qaeda (AQ) and Mullah Omar (Taliban). He has actively supported and has closely worked with the AQ, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and other affiliates of AQ."....
"JeM has undertaken a recruitment drive through its students and charity fronts... [and] regularly organizes events... to urge people to wage jihad.
"JeM, under Azhar, also .... gathers together in the name of killed terrorists in order to collect funds and radicalize and motivate youth.
Azhar made another threat on January 12, 2026. In the audio recording, he claimed that suicide bombers are waiting in numbers so large that the world would be shocked if revealed. The launch of the women's wing of JeM in Pakistan was done with the apparent approval of the country's government. This underscores the alliance between JeM and Pakistan's military establishment. JeM has committed real atrocities over the past decades, threatens India's security and aims to spread Islam across the world.
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, since its founding in 1947, is home to numerous Islamic terror organizations. JeM is also a member of the United Jihad Council (UJC), sponsored by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
Pakistan apparently intends to continue using terrorism to advance its agenda of exporting Islam to the rest of the world. The launch of JeM's women's wing is a further attempt to recruit more women terrorists. Given that the goal of these jihadist groups is global jihad and domination, they pose a serious security threat not just to South Asia, but also beyond. Pakistan has been invited by the Trump administration to join his "Board of Peace" for the purported stabilization of Gaza, and Pakistan accepted the offer.
*Uzay Bulut, a Turkish journalist, is a Distinguished Senior Fellow at Gatestone Institute.
© 2026 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute.

Pope Leo XIV Is Set to Visit Equatorial Guinea — Here’s What He’ll Find
Alberto M. Fernandez/NationalCatholic Register/Februaru 04/2026
The Holy Father’s upcoming trip to Africa’s only Spanish-speaking nation will bring him to a Catholic country shaped by oil wealth, inequality and decades of authoritarian rule.The announcement of Pope Leo XIV’s second apostolic journey, scheduled for May, included a surprise stop. In addition to visiting Angola, the Holy Father will visit Equatorial Guinea, one of Africa’s smallest and most obscure countries but also one of the most Catholic, in terms of the percentage of the population (87%) faithful to the Church. The Maryland-size country of fewer than 2 million people consists of one large island, several smaller islands and a continental section on the African mainland. In many ways, tiny Equatorial Guinea, like giant Angola, faces many of the major development and resource challenges common to other African countries. It is one of Africa’s oil-exporting states, with all the blessings and curses that oil wealth provides. The country has invested heavily in infrastructure, apparent in paved highways, electric lights, modern airports and sleek government buildings.
Chinese companies contracted by the government are building a new capital, Oyala (or Ciudad de la Paz), carved out of virgin rainforest. The energy boom, led by American oil companies, drew populations away from much of the country to the two main cities — Bata, on the African coast, and the former capital of Malabo, on the island of Bioko — in search of services and employment opportunities unavailable elsewhere. Oyala is an expensive attempt to reverse that trend. But with infrastructure spending came massive corruption. Before oil was discovered in the late 1990s, Equatorial Guinea was one of the poorest countries in Africa, dependent on foreign assistance and a small cocoa crop. Now luxury items — and even many staples — are imported by air from Europe. With oil wealth has come conspicuous consumption by elites and extreme inequality between rich and poor (on paper, the country is the fourth richest in Africa). Equatorial Guinea is not unique in this. It is not the most corrupt country in the world, but it is very close to the bottom. Many Equatoguineans aspire to secure a government or oil-company job. The service industry — waiters, barbers, laborers — is often staffed by foreigners, from elsewhere in Africa or beyond. An Equatoguinean farmer I knew hired some locals to help with his crop; they quit after a couple of days, and he hired Chinese laborers to finish the job. Like other African countries with relative wealth, Equatorial Guinea faces the problem of illegal migration from poorer countries, with migrants often resented by the native population. When Pope St. John Paul II visited Equatorial Guinea on Feb. 18, 1982, he was blessing a country that had until recently endured ferocious religious persecution. Spain had hurriedly divested itself of its African colony in 1968 and, as a result of a democratic election, a literal madman was elected president. For 11 years, Macías Nguema — a literal psychopath and self-proclaimed “Hitlerian Marxist” — ruled with an iron hand. He executed one-sixth of the population, expelled missionaries, and shuttered all the churches. Some have called Nguema an “African Pol Pot.” He was credibly accused of practicing both witchcraft and cannibalism. Equatorial Guinea was called the “Auschwitz of Africa.”
VATICAN-EQUATORIAL GUINEA-AUDIENCE-POPE
Teodoro Obiang Nguema, a young army officer — and a relative of the fearsome dictator — overthrew Macías on Aug. 3, 1979, in “the coup of liberty,” which saw church doors reopened. Macías was tried by a summary military tribunal and executed.
In 1982, Pope John Paul II was welcomed to the country by 39-year-old President Teodoro Obiang. In May 2026, Pope Leo XIV is expected to be met by Obiang, now 83, who is not only the longest-ruling leader in Africa but the longest ruling leader in the world. Most Equatoguineans — median age 20 — have not known any other president. While Obiang is no Macías — very few are — he has been an authoritarian figure, both adulated and despised. A June 2023 trial sentenced opposition political figures to long jail terms.
For all his many faults and multiple political transgressions, Obiang sees himself very much as a loyal son of the Catholic Church. While opposition figures deride him for supposedly having several wives and as many as 30 children, Obiang ordered the construction in 2006 of the largest church in the country — and one of the largest churches in Africa. The Italian-built Basilica of the Immaculate Conception in Obiang’s native town of Mongomo was inaugurated in 2011 by Cardinal Francis Arinze. When the historic Cathedral of Santa Isabel in Malabo (built in 1897) was severely damaged by fire in 2020, Obiang ordered its restoration paid for out of government coffers. As the Pope’s trip approaches, many media outlets will decry the regime in Equatorial Guinea as somehow uniquely evil or uniquely corrupt. It is neither. The fraught reality is difficult enough. What the regime actually represents is a survival of a late African political model — the authoritarian “Big Man” neopatrimonial state.  Angola, under the late José Eduardo dos Santos, used to be one of these countries. Both of Equatorial Guinea’s neighbors, Cameroon and Gabon, have similar strongman regimes.
In contrast to Obiang’s carefully groomed, and likely sincere, public persona as an assiduously Catholic head of state, his expected successor is his erratic 57-year-old son and First Vice President, “Teodorin” Obiang, infamous for past excesses and not known for religious devotion. The country could well face a volatile and traumatic transition sooner rather than later.Pope Leo’s challenge to Equatorial Guinea will not only be spiritual — his main focus on this and any other trip — but also social. Without being overtly partisan, how can he best encourage human flourishing, social peace, and more just and humane societies in regimes known for authoritarianism and corruption? In our changing world, these no longer seem to be particularly African challenges — they never were — but global ones.
*Alberto Fernandez served as U.S. ambassador to Equatorial Guinea during the George W. Bush administration.

Why Iran must not expand its conflict beyond
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Al Arabiya English/04 February/2026
Tensions between Iran and the United States have once again intensified. In recent periods of heightened tension, some Iranian rhetoric has gone beyond the US-Iran binary, referencing the Strait of Hormuz or hinting at consequences for other regional actors. Such language may be intended as deterrence or leverage, but it carries serious risks. Expanding the conflict – whether rhetorically or materially – would invite escalation and expose the region to instability that would be difficult to control or reverse. For this reason, Iran should exercise restraint and ensure that its confrontation remains contained, avoiding actions or threats that could internationalize the conflict or draw in neighboring states. Maintaining this implicit boundary is crucial. Once a conflict extends beyond its original actors, the ability to manage outcomes diminishes sharply. Miscalculations multiply, alliances are triggered, and local disputes turn into regional crises. Iran should not expand its conflict and tensions.
The Strait of Hormuz: Strategic importance and global consequences
The Strait of Hormuz is not merely a regional waterway; it is one of the most critical chokepoints in the global economic system. A significant portion of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas passes through this narrow passage every day, supplying energy to Asia, Europe, and beyond. Even minor disruptions – real or perceived – can cause immediate shocks to global energy markets, triggering price spikes, inflationary pressures, and economic instability far beyond the Middle East. Because of its importance, the strait is not just an Iranian concern. It is a shared global interest. Any threat to the free flow of maritime traffic through Hormuz instantly becomes an international issue, drawing in actors who otherwise have no direct involvement in Iran tensions. This is precisely why escalating rhetoric or military signaling around the strait is so dangerous: it transforms a bilateral confrontation into a multilateral crisis.
Iran is acutely aware of the strait’s leverage value, but leverage should not automatically translate into advantage. Using the Strait of Hormuz as a pressure point would almost certainly provoke a response far beyond Washington, involving European navies, Asian energy consumers, and multinational security coalitions. Such actions would unify a broad range of actors against it.
Beyond global consequences, any serious disruption to the Strait of Hormuz would directly harm Iran’s own economic and strategic interests. Iran relies on maritime routes for its own exports, imports, and economic connectivity. This would further strain an economy already under pressure, deepen isolation, and complicate relations with countries that otherwise maintain pragmatic or neutral stances toward Tehran. Moreover, escalation in such a sensitive area increases the risk of rapid military confrontation. Naval incidents, misinterpretations, or accidental clashes could spiral quickly. Once military dynamics take over, political control weakens, and outcomes become unpredictable. There ought to be a recognition that some thresholds, once crossed, cannot be easily undone. Iran would incur serious risks by turning the Strait of Hormuz into either a battlefield or a bargaining chip.
The dangers of extending conflict to other regional states
Equally important is the need that the Iranian government avoids expanding tensions to other countries in the region. The Middle East is already burdened by overlapping conflicts, fragile political systems in some countries, and economic vulnerabilities. Introducing additional points of confrontation would only compound existing instability. Many regional states maintain security partnerships with the United States, while also engaging diplomatically and economically with Iran. These countries often seek balance rather than confrontation. If Iran were to threaten or target them – directly or indirectly – it would force them into defensive alignments, harden regional divisions, and eliminate space for mediation or neutrality. Regional escalation would also increase the likelihood of coalition-based responses, drawing multiple states into a conflict that initially involved only two. Once that happens, the conflict becomes structurally entrenched.
Regional stability as a strategic asset
Stability in the region is not merely an abstract ideal; it is a strategic asset. Stable nations mean predictable borders, secure trade routes, investment opportunities, and diplomatic flexibility. Instability, by contrast, invites foreign intervention, economic decline, and long-term insecurity.
For Iran, expanding its conflict and escalation undermines this balance. Turning the region into an arena of expanded conflict would also deepen humanitarian suffering, increase displacement, and prolong cycles of violence that ultimately benefit no one. These outcomes weaken states, fracture societies, and create long-term challenges that persist long after immediate confrontations fade.
Iran must avoid regional escalation
In conclusion, Iran should not expand this conflict – neither to the Strait of Hormuz nor to other countries in the region. Doing so would escalate tensions, internationalize the dispute, and create economic, military, and humanitarian consequences that far outweigh any perceived short-term gains. The Iranian government should avoid actions that would transform its conflict and tension into a regional crisis.

The 2026 Brink: Trump Tests His Venezuela Doctrine on Iran
Pierre A. Maroun/Beirut Times/February 04/2026
The Middle East is again entering a moment of dangerous clarity. After years of calibrated pressure, quiet diplomacy, and strategic ambiguity, Washington has shifted toward something far more explicit: compellence. In late January 2026, the Trump administration abandoned incrementalism in favor of visible force, heavier sanctions, and unmistakable ultimatums. The deployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group to the North Arabian Sea was not symbolic theater. It was a signal: negotiate a new nuclear agreement on American terms—or prepare for escalation.
Where ambiguity once buffered tensions between the United States and Iran, that buffer has largely disappeared.
The new posture follows the aftershocks of Operation Midnight Hammer, the June 2025 U.S.–Israeli air campaign that struck Iran’s fortified nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. The strikes were judged tactically successful, degrading enrichment capacity and damaging critical infrastructure. Yet intelligence later indicated rapid reconstruction deep underground. In Washington, that recovery was interpreted less as resilience than as defiance. Limited blows, many officials concluded, had failed to alter Tehran’s strategic calculus. Partial measures invited resistance; only sustained and overwhelming pressure could force change.From this logic emerged what some policymakers privately describe as a “Venezuela Doctrine”—the belief that political outcomes can be shaped not by occupying territory but by targeting leadership vulnerabilities. The January 2026 capture of Nicolás Maduro reinforced confidence in what planners called “decapitation without occupation.” The episode suggested that brittle regimes often hinge on narrow points of failure: isolate the leadership and the system weakens on its own. Increasingly, Washington views Tehran through that same lens. The regime—not the state—is the pressure point. The timing is deliberate. Inside Iran, domestic strains have intensified. Hyperinflation, currency collapse, shortages, and years of mismanagement have fueled nationwide protests, posing one of the most serious internal challenges to the Islamic Republic in years. Authorities responded with internet blackouts, mass arrests, and lethal repression. Human rights groups report hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries at the height of the crackdown before unrest subsided. The White House has warned that large‑scale executions would trigger a “forceful” response—an implicit red line intended to deter further violence while signaling readiness to act if repression escalates. Internal fragility and external pressure are now converging.
Those pressures are not only political or military—they are increasingly financial. Energy markets have begun pricing in geopolitical risk premiums amid concerns over potential disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Prices fluctuate with each diplomatic rumor or military movement, underscoring how quickly regional tension can ripple through the global economy. For Tehran, the problem is structural: sanctions constrain exports, foreign reserves remain limited, and the government’s fiscal breakeven oil price sits well above current revenues. The European Union’s recent decision to place the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on its terrorist list has further restricted access to capital and trade, signaling that even Europe—long a moderating force—now sees the regime as a destabilizing actor beyond rehabilitation. The regime faces a narrowing set of choices: negotiate, escalate, or slowly suffocate under isolation. Regional partners are wary of being drawn directly into confrontation. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have made clear they will not permit their territory or airspace to be used for strikes against Iran, fearing retaliation against energy infrastructure. Both prefer managed de‑escalation to either regime collapse or open war. Their caution increases Washington’s reliance on naval and offshore assets, allowing sustained pressure without politically sensitive basing rights. The strategy is forceful yet geographically distant—persistent rather than invasive.
No assessment of escalation is complete without accounting for Hezbollah, Iran’s most capable proxy and a cornerstone of its deterrence architecture. Weakened by the 2023–2024 conflict with Israel and constrained by Lebanon’s economic collapse, the group has largely avoided renewed confrontation while rebuilding. It retains significant missile stockpiles and experienced fighters, but reduced funding, domestic pressure, and organizational fatigue limit its appetite for war. For now, deterrent posture appears preferable to escalation. Direct intervention would likely occur only if Tehran’s regime survival were clearly at stake. Taken together, these dynamics point to a rapidly narrowing decision window. The administration’s strategy—tightened sanctions, forward deployments, and explicit warnings—aims to convince Tehran that delay is costlier than compromise. Diplomatic channels remain open, with intermediaries probing for talks, but Washington is no longer relying on gradualism. It is betting that unmistakable pressure can achieve what years of calibrated measures did not.
Coercion, however, carries its own risks. Steps intended to clarify choices can just as easily eliminate off‑ramps. If Tehran interprets American deployments as preparation for regime removal rather than negotiation, deterrence could erode on both sides. Miscalculation becomes more likely. A strategy designed to prevent war can, paradoxically, accelerate it. Yet even if escalation is avoided, the broader trajectory is becoming difficult to reverse. An intensifying de facto blockade, sustained sanctions, domestic unrest, and structural economic decay are converging on the regime’s weakest point: its political durability. Iran has historically absorbed pressure rather than capitulated, but the current convergence of internal exhaustion and external isolation is unusually severe. Time, once Tehran’s ally, is now working against it.
A prolonged American pressure campaign is unlikely to produce rapid capitulation—but it may achieve something more consequential. By steadily eroding the regime’s finances, cohesion, and legitimacy, it threatens the system’s capacity to endure. Whether through confrontation or negotiation, war or no war, the underlying trajectory now points in one direction: the Islamic Republic is entering a phase where its long‑term viability is no longer assured. The question is not whether the system weakens, but how—and how soon—it ultimately unravels.
*Strategic Analyst
SOUL for Lebanon

Selected X tweets for February 04/2026
Reza Pahlavi Communications
https://x.com/i/status/2018711603252707566
See Prince Reza Pahlavi’s vision for Iran’s transition that begins the moment the regime collapses: A transitional government that prevents chaos and guides Iran to a referendum, a new constitution, free elections, and a democratic transfer of power.

This is Beirut
https://x.com/i/status/2018801451397439953
RECAP U.S. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa convened a hearing today titled “U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon: Obstacles to Dismantling Hezbollah’s Grip on Power” to assess the political, security, and institutional challenges confronting U.S. policy in Lebanon.

Stephen Harper
I sincerely hope that mine is just one of many portraits of Prime Ministers from both parties that will continue to be hung in the Parliament of Canada for decades and centuries to come […] but that will require that in these perilous times both parties whatever their differences, come together to preserve the independence and unity of this blessed land.

Amine Bar-Julius Iskandar
Arabism has only affected and destabilized countries where the Arab ethnic group is a minority (dark green). Arab countries (in gray) have not been affected by this destructive ideology.

Open Source Intel
Lebanon’s prime minister sends a clear warning to Hezbollah leader Qassem that he better not pull Lebanon into another confrontation if the U.S. strikes Iran.
“No one is allowed to drag Lebanon into a new adventure. We have had enough of adventures. We entered an adventure called ‘the war to support Gaza,’ and the price Lebanon paid for it was very, very, very heavy, and no one is willing to drag the country into adventures of this kind.”

Carlos Abadi
One day, there will be peace between Lebanon 🇱🇧 and Israel 🇮🇱, but not because a Palestinian state with Al-Quds as its capital was created or five million savages were admitted into Israel. It will come when the Lebanese finally realize that falling behind decade after decade from supporting those savages in war was too high a price to pay.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain
1930 – Baalbek, Lebanon: My maternal grandfather, a Sharia judge, is among the seated men. The others are Shia middle-class skilled laborers: judges, lawyers, educators, civil servants. Notice their elegant Western suits and ties. Unlike Sunnis, who viewed the creation of Lebanon (and Palestine) as an imperial conspiracy to divide the Sunni Muslim Umma, the Shia minority celebrated the recognition they received in predominantly Christian, independent, Lebanon and the end of Ottoman Sunni oppression of their beliefs.
Muslim Brotherhood thought, mixed with Marxism, produced the ideology of the Iranian Islamic government. The Islamist Iranian regime came to Lebanon, revised its Shia history, and told the Shia they had been shoe shiners—and that Hezbollah would bring them dignity. Today, when Shia support Hezbollah, it is vis-à-vis other Lebanese sects, certainly not against Israel. After all, there is not a single Palestinian Shia, nor a single holy Shia site in the whole of Mandate Palestine. But the Hezbollah narrative about the Shia history is a lie. Like all other Lebanese, the Shia had all sorts of classes, and they were certainly not all impoverished and desperate.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain
Just finished 4 hours of back-to-back TV interviews (I24 English, France 24 Arabic, Almashhad, Asas Media) and need a break. So lemme tell you about running I escaped the snowstorm to London and squeezed in as much mileage in the Fog City as I could. Since coming back, I’ve been waiting for snow and ice to melt because there is no trail. Finally, I dug out today and ran in the street, between the houses. First pic, London trail, second pic, Washington.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain
The majority of French people hate America—out of jealousy, believing the American "bully empire" stole France's thunder and historical glory. The majority of Arabs hate America for similar reasons, feeling the U.S. stole Arab/Muslim thunder and glory. Among French Arabs, an absolute majority hate America like the plague. I found myself today in a conversation with two North African Frenchmen. The guy in the red tie kept hammering on the "children of Gaza" as proof that America doesn't respect human rights. He even equated Gaza's children with Americans of color, claiming they too have no rights. I ignored his remarks for a while, but eventually decided to respond. I said this: First, Gaza's children are not the only victims on the planet. You've said nothing about Sudanese children or Iranian children, who have died in far greater numbers than Gazans. Don't you want America to protect these children too?
Second, here in the U.S., the rights of American citizens are still protected. The reason I said citizens is because we have a social contract under "we the people." This constitution protects our rights as Americans. The presence of non-Americans in America, however, is not protected by the constitution but at the discretion of our executive power. But rights for citizens are still protected. Pro-Palestinian American demonstrators burned the American flag in the middle of Washington, DC, draped a statue of America's founder, George Washington, with a keffiyeh and Palestinian flag, and faced zero consequences. They weren't slapped, chased, harassed, or arrested—they went home safe, sound, and still enjoying America's freedom of speech. The other guy then asked an even more nonsense question: "So you want Trump to go after them too?"It's hard to win an argument when logic dies and there's no common point of reference.