English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News &
Editorials
For August 26/2026
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news
The Bulletin's Link on the lccc Site
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/aaaanewsfor2026/english.August
26.26.htm
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Bible Quotations For today
His master commended the dishonest manager
because he had acted shrewdly
Luke 16/01-08: "The Lord Jesus said to the disciples: ‘There was a rich
man who had a manager, and charges were brought to him that this man was
squandering his property. So he summoned him and said to him, "What is this that
I hear about you? Give me an account of your management, because you cannot be
my manager any longer." Then the manager said to himself, "What will I do, now
that my master is taking the position away from me? I am not strong enough to
dig, and I am ashamed to beg. I have decided what to do so that, when I am
dismissed as manager, people may welcome me into their homes."So, summoning his
master’s debtors one by one, he asked the first, "How much do you owe my
master?" He answered, "A hundred jugs of olive oil." He said to him, "Take your
bill, sit down quickly, and make it fifty."Then he asked another, "And how much
do you owe?" He replied, "A hundred containers of wheat." He said to him, "Take
your bill and make it eighty."And his master commended the dishonest manager
because he had acted shrewdly; for the children of this age are more shrewd in
dealing with their own generation than are the children of light."
Titles For The English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News &
Editorials published on August 25-26/2026
Tom Barrack: An American Envoy, or a History-Ignorant Dealmaker Lost in
the Quagmire of Politics?/ Elias Bejjani/August 25/2026
On the Anniversary of Bashir’s Election as President of the Republic/Elias
Bejjani/August 23, 2026
Ministry of Health: 4,350 Victims and 12,310 Wounded Since March 2
No Israeli Withdrawal from Zawtar al-Sharqiya Before the Ali al-Taher Issue and
Hezbollah's Weapons Are Resolved
Israel: The Battle with Hezbollah Is Not Over, and We Hope We Won't Have to
Operate Militaryly Deep Inside Lebanon
Bombing, Incursions, and Van Targeting... Explosions Continue in the South
From Ali al-Taher to Rihan: Israel Charts a New Course to Strike Hezbollah's
"Nerve"
Ali al-Taher Is Not the End… Hezbollah Prepares for the Next Battle
Lebanon to End Old Passports Under Pressure from International Warnings and
Requirements
Israel Restricts Movement in Three Christian Towns in Southern Lebanon
Lebanese Authorities Extend Residency of Iran’s Ambassador
Guarantees Demanded from Israel, Hezbollah over Proposed Int’l Force in South
Lebanon
Between a Model Lebanon and ‘Pilot Areas’/Sam Menassa/Asharq Al-Awsat/August
25/2026
Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News
published on August 25-26/2026
Trump: We are monitoring the Strait of Hormuz, have removed the mines,
and will not allow new ones to be laid.
Trumo: We are monitoring Pickaxe Mountain and the three other nuclear sites.
Qatar: Our Contacts Continue to Push for a Resumption of US-Iran Negotiations
Trump Says Strait of Hormuz Has Been Demined, Warns Iran Not to Plant More
Qatari Foreign Ministry Spokesperson: Economic Measures Taken During the Crisis
Were Precautionary
Bissent: America will continue to cut off every economic lifeline to Iran...
"Pressure is working"... The leadership admits that the people will not survive
if they suffer from hunger.
Omani Foreign Minister hopes for "announcement soon" of a temporary shipping
corridor in the Strait of Hormuz... Joint project to clear the strait of mines
Source to Al Arabiya: US Offered to Lift Blockade and Sanctions on Tehran in
Exchange for Opening the Strait of Hormuz and Halting Proxy Attacks
The Revolutionary Guard Brandishes the Nuclear Bomb: A Significant Stance with
Regional Repercussions
Hundreds of parliamentary and political figures from 11 Arab countries condemn
Tehran's policies and call for support for the Iranian resistance.
A Notable Meeting Between Mohammad Khatami and the Supreme Leader's Brother:
Adherence to Rationality and Diplomacy to Spare Iran from Dangers
Iran Negotiates with Oman on Hormuz and Sends its Conditions to Washington via
Pakistani Mediator
After the war ended, Washington is redeploying diplomats to the Middle East and
lowering its alert level.
Official: US Aircraft Carrier Abraham Lincoln to Dock in Thailand Next Week
Netanyahu Reveals Iran Attempted to Assassinate One of His Sons
Israeli Military Censorship Refuses to Allow Publication of Details to Protect
Sources and Expresses Surprise at How the Prime Minister Revealed the News
Israeli Chief of Staff Vows to Disarm Gaza Despite Ceasefire Following Sporadic
Israeli Strikes on the Palestinian Territory
Israel Reports of Foiling Turkish Deployment in Syria from Mount Hermon
Damascus Witnesses Intensive Meetings to Finalize SDF Integration into State
Institutions
Syria/Kurdish Language to be Adopted as an Elective Subject with Two Weekly
Classes at the Start of the 2026-2027 Academic Year
Al-Sharaa: Syria “Tears Out a Page of Its Painful Past” by Being Removed from
the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism… Thanks to the US President and Friendly
and Supporting Countries
Gulf States Welcome Washington's Removal of Syria from the List of State
Sponsors of Terrorism
Katz Visits His Troops in Syria and Vows to Keep Them "As Long as There Are
Threats" / Damascus Condemns the Israeli Defense Minister's "Illegal Entry" into
Its Territory
Syria condemns Israeli Defense Minister's entry into its territory; Katz: We
will not act
Canada imposes $20 billion in retaliatory tariffs on US goods in response to
Trump, effective from September 8
Quebec's French Language a Stumbling Block in US-Canadian Trade Negotiations
Titles For The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials
from miscellaneous sources published
on August 25-26/2026
The November Elections: Different Inputs, Different Outputs/Nabil
Amr/Asharq Al-Awsat/August 25/2026
'They Are Against the Principles of the Country They Live In': The Islamization
of Europe/Robert Williams/Gatestone Institute/August 25, 2026
Tom Barrack: “Strange” Statements/Dr. Ahmed Yousef Ahmed/Al-Ittihad/August 25,
2026
Does Democracy Prevent Wars or Incite Them?/Mohammed Al-Rumaihi/Al-Nahar/August
25, 2026
The Arab Leftists: From Lenin's Hammer to Khomeini's Turban/M. Abdullah Ouda
Al-Ghabin / Al-Arabiya.net /2026
Selected Face Book & X tweets on August 25/2026
Latest English LCCC Lebanese &
Lebanese Related News & Editorials published
on August 25-26/2026
Tom Barrack: An American Envoy, or a
History-Ignorant Dealmaker Lost in the Quagmire of Politics?
Elias Bejjani/August 25/2026
Ever since Tom Barrack entered the current U.S. administration as the United
States Ambassador to Turkey and its Special Envoy to Syria and Iraq, he has not
stopped raising questions and controversy regarding the true nature of his role,
and the extent to which his positions and statements align with the foreign
policy he is supposedly in the region to represent and execute. He is neither a
traditional professional diplomat, nor a historian specializing in the Middle
East, nor someone with a long career in American diplomatic institutions. The
man essentially hails from the world of finance, investment, and real estate; he
founded Colony Capital and was a prominent player in the realms of real estate
investment and international deals, with extensive relations, interests, and
business dealings in the Arabian Gulf region. He is also a longtime friend of
President Donald Trump, chaired his 2017 presidential inaugural committee, and
has remained close to Trump’s political and financial circles for years.
Tom Barrack’s Problem with Politics
The Middle East is not a distressed piece of real estate that Barrack can buy at
a low price and resell at a profit, nor is it a bankrupt company he can rescue
with a financial deal, nor a political bazaar where states and peoples are
managed through the logic of brokerage and barter. Politics in the Middle
East—especially in Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Turkey, and Iraq—requires a profound
knowledge of history, geography, demography, civilizational and sectarian
conflicts, and a precise understanding of the nature of competing regional
projects. Herein lies Barrack’s problem: the most dangerous thing that can
happen is for a senior American official to deal with this region through the
mindset of a businessman looking for a "deal" rather than a statesman defending
his country's strategy, interests, and values.
When the U.S. Ambassador Becomes More Enthusiastic for Turkey Than for
Washington
The biggest problem with Barrack's positions is not that he holds personal
views; any official has the right to have views. The problem is that some of
these views, when expressed in his capacity as ambassador and special envoy of
the U.S. President, appear to contradict or confuse the policy he is supposed to
represent. It is difficult, for example, to ignore the impression Barrack leaves
through his frequent positions on Turkey and its President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Erdogan is not merely an ordinary Turkish president. Erdogan's Turkey carries a
clear regional project, utilizing its political, military, economic, and
religious influence in an attempt to restore a dominant Turkish position in the
region. It is a state with close ties to political Islam movements, foremost
among them the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and Ankara has massively expanded
its military and political presence in Syria.
In this context, any American official who deals with Erdogan as if he were
simply a natural regional partner—without factoring Ankara’s expansionist
project and Turkish political Islam into the core of his calculations—is
committing a major strategic error. More dangerously, this is happening at a
moment when the confrontation between Turkish and Israeli interests in Syria is
escalating. Barrack criticized recent Israeli strikes on the Syrian Abu al-Zohour
airbase while Israel was moving to prevent the expansion of a Turkish military
presence inside Syria. These developments clearly revealed that Turkish and
Israeli interests in Syria are not congruent, but are rather heading toward an
increasing strategic clash. Is the United States expected to act as a mediator
to protect Turkish ambitions in Syria? And must Israel now accommodate Erdogan's
military interests inside Syria so as not to upset the U.S. ambassador in
Ankara? These are legitimate questions, especially when such remarks come from
an official representing the United States rather than a private political
analyst.
Barrack and the Golan: How Can the Ambassador Say Something That Contradicts
Trump’s Decision? Barrack's most controversial statement came in his recent
interview with activist and media figure Mario Nawfal. Barrack said that Israel
"still occupies the Syrian Golan Heights," referring to United Nations
resolutions and the international order—phrasing that appeared to directly
ignore President Donald Trump's 2019 decision recognizing Israeli sovereignty
over the Golan. Here, we are not talking about a minor difference in wording,
but rather an official policy announced by the U.S. President himself. The next
day, Barrack was forced to backtrack and clarify, stating that his words were a
description of the historical situation rather than an endorsement of the UN
position, and affirming that the U.S. policy outlined by Trump in 2019 "has not
changed."
Yet the question remains: if Trump's policy has not changed, why did Barrack say
what he said in the first place? Diplomacy is not a talk show where an official
can float an idea in the morning and say by evening that it was merely a
"personal point of view." When the U.S. ambassador and special envoy to the
region speaks, his words are read as the voice of Washington, and any statement
that contradicts the U.S. president's policy causes confusion and undermines the
credibility of the United States and its allies. The Golan is not a marginal
detail; Trump's 2019 decision was a historic turning point in American policy
toward the Golan. Therefore, reopening the issue, even verbally, is not a mere
slip of the tongue.
Have Hezbollah and Iran Become Parties to Lebanese-Israeli Negotiations?
Then came an even more dangerous issue regarding Lebanon. In the same interview,
Barrack spoke about the absence of Iran and Hezbollah from the equation
concerning Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, remarks that were understood as a push
to introduce them into discussions about the future of the situation between
Lebanon and Israel. Following a wave of criticism, Barrack walked back his
statements to say that he was not proposing the creation of a new negotiating
table that includes Iran and Hezbollah, that Hezbollah's weapons are funded and
supplied by Iran, and that his remarks addressed the complications posed by
Iranian support to the file.
Once again, the simple question arises: why does the American envoy need to
backtrack and explain himself after every major statement? Does Barrack truly
not know that his country classifies Hezbollah as an international terrorist
organization, and that it is not an ordinary Lebanese party that can be treated
as a normal political actor in a diplomatic dispute? It is an armed militia
organically linked to Iran, and its leaders have for years declared their
allegiance to the Wilayat al-Faqih project and the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC). Consequently, any attempt to normalize the existence of
Hezbollah's weapons as merely a "Lebanese problem" or to treat Iran as a normal
party in rearranging Lebanon practically means ignoring the root of the problem:
Lebanon cannot build a fully sovereign state as long as an armed organization
tied to a foreign regional power retains the decision of war and peace.
From Iran to Turkey: Is One Tutelage Being Replaced by Another?
Here we reach the core of the dilemma. Iran has retreated in Lebanon and the
region, Hezbollah's influence has suffered massive blows, and regional balances
of power have begun to shift. However, Iran's exit or the retreat of its
influence does not mean that the vacuum should be filled by Turkey... This is
precisely the danger that Washington must realize. Lebanon is not a prize for
Iran, nor for Turkey, nor a zone of influence for any regional power. If
Washington truly wants to end Iranian influence in the Levant, it must not
simultaneously permit the emergence of alternative Turkish influence based on an
Erdoganist project rooted in Muslim Brotherhood origins and neo-Ottoman
ambitions and illusions. Replacing Iranian tutelage with Turkish tutelage is not
the liberation of the region; it is merely a change in the guardian's name.
Erdogan's Turkey is not a 16th-century Ottoman Empire returned to life, no
matter how hard Erdogan tries to invoke the symbols of the Ottoman Empire and
rebrand Turkey as a central power in the Islamic world. The Ottoman Empire has
ended, and with it a long history of wars, invasions, and tyranny that cannot be
recycled under new slogans. It is a historical and strategic error for
Washington to treat Turkish ambitions as mere good-neighborly policy.
Ahmed al-Sharaa: From al-Golani to the President of Syria
Then there is Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Golani, the
leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Washington is not expected to ignore the new
political reality in Syria, but dealing with the man and his new regime requires
the utmost caution—not an emotional or political rush, as is the case with
Barrack, who is entirely ignorant of the region's history and the sensitivities
of dealing with its complexities. History cannot be erased by changing a name;
changing a suit and a title does not wipe away the past. The question that any
American official must ask is: What is the nature of the new Syrian state? What
are the limits of its independence from Turkey? What is the future of
minorities? What is the position of political Islam within it? And will Syria
transition from a zone of Iranian influence to a zone of Turkish influence?
These questions are far more important than the handshakes, smiles, and press
conferences staged by Barrack—a dealmaker before being a statesman—which is why
his personality cannot be understood without examining his career.
Barrack wealth and fame
Barrack built his wealth and fame primarily in the world of investment, real
estate, and international deals. He founded Colony Capital, dealt in projects,
hotels, real estate, and distressed assets around the world, and maintained
extensive investment relations with Gulf parties, including the UAE and Qatar,
alongside his long-standing ties in Saudi Arabia. Press reports indicate that
Emirati funds invested hundreds of millions of dollars in his companies during
the first Trump administration years. His name was also linked to major deals
with Gulf investment institutions, including partnerships and deals with
Qatar—such as the Miramax deal—in addition to transactions with Emirati and
Saudi investors. And here we must be fair: when U.S. authorities accused him in
2021 of acting secretly as an unregistered agent for the UAE, he stood trial,
and a jury acquitted him in 2022 of all nine counts. Therefore, from an American
legal standpoint, he is not "convicted" nor an "Emirati agent." Yet the case
itself reveals the profound sensitivity of the overlap between the financial
world, Gulf relations, and American politics throughout his career. This
precisely raises a legitimate question regarding his suitability for a
diplomatic post of such sensitivity and peril.
The Middle East Is Not a Real Estate Deal
The problem with the dealmaking mentality represented by Barrack is that it
constantly seeks quick settlements, whereas the Middle East is not governed by
deals alone. There are centuries-old history, occupations and wars, minorities
and peoples, borders, ideologies, imperial projects, political Islam, terrorism,
and great power interests. They cannot be approached and managed with such
logic: "You get this, I get that, Turkey takes this, Iran takes that, Israel
makes a concession here, and Lebanon makes a concession there." This is not
strategic diplomacy; this is political brokerage, and the United States is not a
real estate investment firm.
Required: A Clear American Policy, Not Personal Interpretations
If Tom Barrack represents President Trump, he must represent Trump's policy. If
he holds personal views that differ from the president's policy, they have no
place in press conferences and interviews perceived as expressions of the United
States' position. President Trump recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan
in 2019, and this policy—according to Barrack himself after his recent
backtrack—remains in place. The United States has repeatedly stated that
Hezbollah's weapons constitute a fundamental obstacle to the establishment of a
sovereign Lebanese state. It is unacceptable for the Lebanese, Israelis,
Syrians, Turks, and Iranians to simultaneously hear contradictory stances from a
single American official, as U.S. foreign policy requires a single voice, not
multiple contradictory ones.
Barrack Is Unsuited for the Position He Holds
President Trump has the right to choose those he trusts, and Tom Barrack has the
right to hold his views. However, the American people, U.S. allies, and the
peoples of the Middle East have the right to ask: Is the right man to manage the
files of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon a businessman, investor, and real
estate player with broad personal ties to the president, or a strategic diplomat
possessing deep knowledge of the region's history and entanglements? In my
personal view, the answer is clear.
Barrack is an appropriate statesman to manage the Middle East's most dangerous
files
Tom Barrack may be a successful businessman, a skilled negotiator in the world
of deals, and a loyal friend to President Trump, but that does not automatically
make him the appropriate statesman to manage the Middle East's most dangerous
files. More dangerously, his recent positions have begun to suggest that he is
not content with merely representing American policy, but is sometimes putting
forward his own vision for the region—a vision that in some aspects appears
closer to Erdogan's Turkey than to the interests of U.S. allies, opening the
door to serious questions regarding the Turkish role and the future of Syria and
Lebanon. Therefore, what is required is not more justifications after
statements, nor more claims that "this is my personal opinion"; what is required
is a clear American position. If Barrack is unable to separate his personal
views from the official policy of the United States, and if his presence in this
position causes more confusion for Washington's allies than it serves them,
President Trump possesses a simple and clear solution: dismissing him and
replacing him with a professional diplomat who knows the region's history,
understands the danger of political Islam, realizes that Turkey is not the
legitimate heir to the Ottoman Empire, that Iran is not an alternative to the
Lebanese state, that Hezbollah is not a "Lebanese resistance," that Israel is
not merely a negotiating chip, and that the Middle East is not a distressed
property that can be saved by a deal.
Conclusion
It remains that the Middle East needs an American strategy, not a deal broker.
Lebanon specifically needs a sovereign state, not a replacement of Iranian
tutelage with Turkish tutelage. This is the truth that Tom Barrack must
understand before giving lessons on the region's history or charting its future
from behind interview screens.
Link to detalied Tom Barrack biography from Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tom_Barrack
Summary of Tom Barrack's biography (GPT)
He is:
A Lebanese-American businessman
A lawyer by education
A former Reagan administration official
A major real-estate investor
Founder of Colony Capital
Former chairman of Colony NorthStar
An investor with extensive Gulf relationships
A longtime friend of Donald Trump
Former chairman of Trump's inaugural committee
A person prosecuted in a major UAE foreign-agent case and acquitted of every
charge
And now a senior American diplomat dealing with some of the most complicated
political conflicts in the Middle East.
His supporters can legitimately point to his decades of experience in the
region, his Arabic-language skills, his relationships with Arab leaders, and his
ability to communicate directly with powerful people.
His critics can legitimately ask whether the same business relationships and
transactional style that made him successful as an investor are appropriate for
the conduct of American foreign policy.
That is the real issue.
The question is not whether Tom Barrack is a successful businessman. He clearly
is.
The question is whether the Middle East should be approached primarily through
the mentality of a businessman searching for deals, or through the disciplined
strategy of a professional diplomat who understands history, sovereignty,
national interests, and the long-term consequences of American decisions.
For Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Iraq, and Turkey, this is not an academic
question.
It is a question of national survival and regional stability.
On the Anniversary of Bashir’s Election as
President of the Republic
Elias Bejjani/August 23, 2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/08/121512/
Today, as we proudly and resolutely commemorate the election of Sheikh Bashir
Gemayel as President of the Lebanese Republic on August 23, 1982, we reaffirm,
on the basis of a firm and steadfast faith, that Bashir’s dream is alive and
will not die. It remains powerfully embodied in the determination of Lebanon’s
sovereign and honorable youth, who have taken upon themselves the responsibility
of carrying the torch of freedom, dignity, liberation, sovereignty, and
independence through a peaceful and civilized approach that, God willing, will
culminate in saving the Cedar Nation from the claws of the Iranian occupation,
as well as from all Trojan horses, agents, traitors, and dhimmis, and in
restoring its independence and freedom.
On August 22, 1982, Bashir Gemayel was elected President of the Lebanese
Republic. President Reagan described him as “the young president who brought the
light of hope to Lebanon.” The president who was characterized as “a strategic
planner” and “a man whose positions crossed red lines” loved his country to such
an extent that Lebanese people of all backgrounds and affiliations dreamed of
and believed in his vision for the republic, in living with dignity and in
peace. He infused the people with courage, boldness, and strength of will to
demand and strive for the building of a “state of citizenship,” while preserving
Lebanon as a “space of freedom” and a homeland worthy of sacrifice.
On this day in 1982, Bashir’s love for his country ignited the spirit of
national belonging among all Lebanese and planted an eternal dream in the heart
of every free Lebanese, both in the homeland and across the corners of the
world. On the anniversary of Bashir’s election, every free and sovereign
Lebanese is reminded that Bashir—the cause, which is Lebanon’s cause—will never
die, for he whose supporter is God cannot be overcome.
It is true that the forces of evil and darkness succeeded in assassinating
Bashir the man, but they failed to kill Bashir the cause, who continues to live
in the hearts, conscience, and spirit of every free Lebanese. Bashir the cause,
Bashir the dream, Bashir of coexistence, Bashir of commitment to the state, the
law, the constitution, freedoms, democracy, and coexistence—this Bashir lives in
the minds and culture of every sovereign and free Lebanese. This Bashir will not
die.
Bashir, whose body was killed in 1982, remains alive through his memory and
through his example and model of patriotism and integrity, living in hearts,
conscience, culture, dreams, and hope. Meanwhile, the majority of today’s
leaders and politicians, though physically alive, are in practice and in terms
of respect and trust, dead in their faith, minds, greed, and Judas-like
betrayal. Their presence is an absence, and their absence is a relief and a
blessing.
Returning to the memory of the assassination on the Feast of the Holy Cross, on
September 13, 1982, the hand of hateful treachery reached out and killed Bashir
the man. Yet it failed to kill Bashir the cause, ambition, patriotism, vision,
thought, and the spirit of resistance.
Ministry of Health: 4,350 Victims and 12,310 Wounded Since
March 2
LCCC/August 25, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
According to a report by the Ministry of Public Health, headed by a minister
affiliated with the terrorist group Hezbollah, the cumulative total of the
party's senseless wars, from March 2 to August 25, has reached 4,350 victims and
12,310 wounded.
No Israeli Withdrawal from Zawtar al-Sharqiya Before the
Ali al-Taher Issue and Hezbollah's Weapons Are Resolved
Janoubia/August 25, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
Demolition and bulldozing operations continue in Zawtar al-Sharqiya, while
developments on the ground raise questions about the town's fate and the timing
of the Israeli withdrawal, amidst ongoing discussions about the phases of
withdrawal from areas north of the Litani River. An informed source told
Janoubia that there will be no Israeli withdrawal from Zawtar al-Sharqiya before
the issue of the Ali al-Taher facility in Kfar Tebnit is resolved. The source
pointed out that the town was the first village entered by the Israeli
occupation north of the Litani River, and therefore, the withdrawal from it will
be in the final stages. The source explained that Israel does not want to
withdraw from Zawtar al-Sharqiya and the area north of the Litani River before
addressing what it described as the "Hezbollah weapons dilemma," in addition to
resolving the Ali al-Taher issue. In this context, the source noted that
negotiations are now focused on the towns of Khiam and Bint Jbeil, without
addressing Zawtar al-Sharqiya. According to the source, the exclusion of Zawtar
al-Sharqiya from the discussions surrounding the withdrawal phases does not mean
it is being excluded from consideration. Rather, it reflects Israel's insistence
on maintaining its presence within areas it considers linked to unresolved
security and political issues.
Israel: The Battle with Hezbollah Is Not Over, and We Hope
We Won't Have to Operate Militaryly Deep Inside Lebanon
Al-Markazia/August 25, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
Al-Hadath TV quoted an Israeli military source as saying that the battle with
Hezbollah "is not over yet," noting that the party "has suffered significant
damage but remains an organization." The source added that Israel "prefers a
political path leading to the disarmament of Hezbollah," considering that "the
Lebanese state is the party responsible for addressing the issue of Hezbollah's
weapons," and indicating reliance on "American-mediated negotiations to reach an
agreement regarding the party's weapons." Regarding military operations, the
source said, "We hope we won't have to operate militarily deep inside Lebanon,"
adding that Israel's objective is "to prevent Hezbollah from regaining its
ability to threaten towns in northern Israel." The source indicated that Israeli
forces "have not yet reached all of Hezbollah's infrastructure in the Bint Jbeil
area," and that the search for additional Hezbollah infrastructure "is still
ongoing."He said that Israeli forces "uncovered Hezbollah infrastructure above
and below ground in and around Bint Jbeil."
Bombing, Incursions, and Van Targeting... Explosions
Continue in the South
Al-Markaziya/August 25, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
A reconnaissance aircraft was seen flying at very low altitude over villages
west of Baalbek, simultaneously circling over several towns in the area. Reports
indicate the aircraft circled the towns of Tariya, Shamshtar, Nabi Rashadi, and
Hadath Baalbek. The Israeli army also carried out a series of violent explosions
in the Al-Mansouri area, while the burning of vineyards and houses continued in
the town of Ainatha. Israeli attacks continue in the south. In this context, an
enemy drone launched a guided missile strike this afternoon, targeting a van on
the Doha-Kafr Rumman road. The missile struck the ground, and the van was
damaged by shrapnel, but no injuries were reported. The National News Agency
reported that the Israeli occupation escalated its attacks today on villages in
the western sector of the Tyre district. Enemy aircraft launched two raids on
the town of Mansouri and another targeting Wadi Hassan in the town of Tayr
Harfa, coinciding with widespread bombings in Mansouri and Majdal Zoun.
Meanwhile, enemy artillery shelled the towns of Ainata and Beit Leef in the Bint
Jbeil district with 155mm heavy artillery. Enemy military vehicles advanced from
the town of Haddatha into the town of Haris in the Bint Jbeil district, and
swept the outskirts of the town with machine guns.
Additionally, the Marjeyoun plain below the Hamams hill was subjected to
artillery shelling, causing a fire. This afternoon, an explosion of unexploded
ordnance in the town of Tayr Debba was reported, resulting in one injury.
Israeli forces continued their attacks, targeting the town of Beit Leef and Wadi
al-Ayoun near the town of Rashaf with heavy artillery, while simultaneously
conducting machine gun fire towards the town. Israeli warplanes also targeted
the town of Mansouri and the Wadi Hassan area on the outskirts of the town of
Tayr Harfa, southeast of Tyre. Israeli Apache helicopters are flying over the
eastern sector, simultaneously conducting a large-scale sweep with heavy
weapons. The town of Bani Hayyan is under artillery fire, coinciding with
movements of Israeli army vehicles within the town and rising smoke from
bulldozing and burning. An Israeli army vehicle was observed moving from Khallat
Haris towards the outskirts of the cemetery. The town of Ainatha, near the town
of Qounine in the Bint Jbeil district, was also subjected to heavy artillery
shelling targeting the western part of the town. Israeli warplanes carried out
two separate airstrikes targeting the area between the towns of Tayr Harfa and
Majdal Zoun, southeast of Tyre. An Israeli drone is flying at low altitude over
the city of Baalbek and neighboring villages. Around 9:00 AM this morning, the
Israeli army carried out a large explosion in the town of Zawtar al-Sharqiya,
the sound of which was strongly heard in most southern towns. Israeli forces
stationed in Kfarkela and Tell Nahas constructed an earthen berm at the Deir
Mimas-Burj al-Muluk-Kfarkela triangle, towards Tell Nahas, approximately 150
meters from inhabited houses in the town of Burj al-Muluk. They also constructed
another earthen berm at the Deir Mimas-Burj al-Muluk-Hawra triangle, towards the
Hawra area. The Israeli army carried out a bombing in the town of Mays al-Jabal.
Additionally, the town of Markaba in the Marjeyoun district was subjected to
Israeli artillery shelling, coinciding with the movement of Israeli vehicles
within the town. The town of Ainatha in the Bint Jbeil district was also
subjected to Israeli artillery shelling. Furthermore, shortly after midnight on
Monday-Tuesday, an Israeli armored force advanced towards Tell al-Sawwan in the
town of Mayfadoun, which lies within the Green Line, and took up positions in a
house in the area. At 4:00 AM, Israeli warplanes also launched an airstrike on
the Litani River, below the Mar Mimas Monastery in the town of Deir Mimas.
From Ali al-Taher to Rihan: Israel Charts a New Course to
Strike Hezbollah's "Nerve"
Eremm News/August 25, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
Hezbollah's concerns are no longer limited to the potential loss of its massive
military installation in the Ali al-Taher Heights. Lebanese military sources
indicate that the party is now grappling with a more dangerous scenario: Israel,
after securing victory there, will shift its focus to Mount Rihan, the Iqlim
al-Tuffah region, and the Western Bekaa Valley. This could involve an attempt to
circumvent Hezbollah's defenses via Mount Hermon, rather than advancing along
the more difficult route from the south. A Lebanese military source told Eram
News that Israeli activity in the Mount Hermon area has recently intensified,
including the construction of military roads and the linking of various
positions. This coincides with special forces exercises and movements, raising
concerns that Israel might use its presence there to establish a new axis,
allowing it to exert pressure on the Western Bekaa Valley and approach
Hezbollah's military heartland from an unexpected direction. Published
information supports some of these assessments. Recent reports indicate that
Israel has established approximately ten observation posts and positions on
Mount Hermon, equipped with cameras and thermal imaging systems, in addition to
constructing military roads on the mountain's slopes and connecting the new
sites. However, the source emphasizes that Hezbollah's primary concern is not
Israel's actions within Syria itself, but rather the potential military options
these new roads and positions offer on the Lebanese front.
According to the source, Hezbollah's military leadership is now considering the
possibility that the "Ali al-Taher" operation may not be the end of the Israeli
operation, but rather its beginning, especially since Israel has been focusing
for some time on three interconnected areas: the Iqlim al-Tuffah region, Mount
Rihan, and the Western Bekaa Valley. Recent Lebanese reports already suggest
that field assessments indicate the possibility that operations, following the
Ali al-Taher incident, will shift to the heights of the Iqlim al-Tuffah and
Rihan regions, reaching the southern entrances to the Western Bekaa Valley. The
Ali al-Taher hill derives its importance from its commanding position
overlooking Nabatieh, Kfar Tibnit, and axes leading towards the Iqlim al-Tuffah
and Rihan regions. Military assessments suggest that controlling it could grant
Israel greater ability to monitor movements deep within its territory and
establish a launching point for exerting pressure on Hezbollah positions further
north. Thus, according to this interpretation, destroying the facility located
below the Ali al-Taher heights would mean breaching the southern gate of a
deeper defensive belt, not merely eliminating an isolated installation.
The military source says that Israel believes Hezbollah has significant
installations in the Rihan and Iqlim al-Tuffah regions, a rugged mountainous
area with some sections reaching heights of approximately 1,200 meters. This
makes any ground operation there entirely different from those carried out by
Israeli forces along the border. Israel also believes that the Lebanese army
will be unable to advance towards these installations in the foreseeable future
and considers the conditions favorable for pursuing them and dismantling them
once and for all. However, the source notes that reaching them directly would be
extremely costly. Advancing from the direction of Khardali and the Nabatieh area
towards Iqlim al-Tuffah and Rihan would necessitate moving Israeli forces and
vehicles along axes that Hezbollah could monitor and target, in addition to the
mountainous terrain which gives artillery a significant advantage. This region
holds particular importance in the Israeli military's strategic thinking.
Estimates have long spoken of a military structure for the party north of
Nabatieh, while recent analyses have indicated that the Tuffah region represents
one of the party’s most prominent deep military strongholds, and that
controlling “Ali al-Taher” could open the way to putting pressure on it.
This is where the scenario that most worries Hezbollah emerges. Instead of
deploying large forces from the south towards Nabatieh and then advancing to the
high ground, the party fears, according to the source, that Israel might attempt
to open a flanking maneuver from Mount Hermon towards the Western Bekaa Valley,
taking advantage of the military roads it is developing and its ability to
monitor the area from the high ground. The idea of using Mount Hermon to exert
pressure on the Lebanese front is not entirely new. Last March, Israeli forces
launched an operation from the Syrian side of Mount Hermon towards the Shebaa
Farms, a military move that demonstrated the possibility of using the area to
open routes that bypass traditional front lines. Military assessments at the
time also spoke of an Israeli attempt to pressure the road linking the south to
the Western Bekaa Valley and complicate supply lines between them. The danger of
this scenario, according to the source, lies in the possibility that Israel
might maintain pressure on Ali al-Taher and the Iqlim al-Tuffah region while
attempting to surprise Hezbollah from the eastern flank, forcing it to disperse
its forces across a wide front stretching from Nabatieh and Rihan to the Western
Bekaa Valley. However, according to the source, executing an operation of this
scale would require American political cover, because advancing beyond Ali
al-Taher into the heart of the areas north of the Litani River would effectively
mean the collapse of the partial ceasefire and the onset of a confrontation
whose boundaries would be difficult to control.
Commenting on this scenario, military and strategic expert Mohammed Youssef
al-Nour believes its significance lies not in the number of roads Israel is
opening, but rather in the operational options it could provide in the future.
Al-Nour says, "Entering the Iqlim al-Tuffah and Rihan regions from the southern
axis exposes Israeli forces to difficult terrain and areas where Hezbollah can
monitor and prepare preemptive defenses. Therefore, opening a parallel axis from
the direction of Mount Hermon and the Western Bekaa, even if used for pressure
or diversion rather than a full-scale invasion, could alter the calculations of
the battle." He adds, "The danger for Hezbollah is being forced to defend on
multiple fronts simultaneously and losing the advantage of knowing the axis of
attack in advance." He considers that moving from Ali al-Taher to Rihan and
Iqlim al-Tuffah would mean that Israel is no longer targeting the border strip,
but has begun testing the possibility of dismantling Hezbollah's military depth
north of the Litani River. Then the battle of "Ali al-Taher" will be just the
first gateway to a much bigger battle.
Ali al-Taher Is Not the End… Hezbollah Prepares for the
Next Battle
Janoubia/August 25, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
Hezbollah’s concerns are no longer limited to the potential loss of its massive
military installation in the Ali al-Taher Heights. Lebanese military sources
indicate that the party is now considering a more dangerous scenario: Israel,
after securing the Heights, will advance towards Mount Rihan, the Iqlim
al-Tuffah region, and the Western Bekaa Valley. However, the most worrying
aspect, according to this analysis, is not simply the advance from the south,
but the possibility of Israel attempting to circumvent Hezbollah’s defenses via
the Mount Hermon axis, instead of taking the more difficult route through the
mountainous areas to the north. A Lebanese military source told Eram News that
Israeli activity in the Mount Hermon area has recently intensified, including
the construction of military roads and the linking of various positions,
coinciding with special forces exercises and movements. This, according to the
source, has raised concerns that Israel might use its presence in the area to
open a front that would allow it to exert pressure on the Western Bekaa Valley
and approach Hezbollah’s military heartland from an unexpected direction.
Published information supports some of this data, as recent reports indicate
that Israel has established approximately ten observation posts and positions on
Mount Hermon, equipped with cameras and thermal imaging systems, in addition to
constructing military roads on the mountain's slopes and connecting the new
sites. However, the source emphasizes that Hezbollah's primary concern is not
what Israel is doing inside Syria per se, but rather the military options these
roads and positions might offer that could be used later on the Lebanese front.
According to the source, Hezbollah's military leadership is now considering the
possibility that the "Ali al-Taher" operation will not be the end of the Israeli
operation, but rather its beginning. The source states that concerns are
concentrated in three interconnected areas: the Iqlim al-Tuffah region, Mount
Rihan, and the Western Bekaa Valley. Recent Lebanese reports indicate field
assessments suggesting that operations, after Ali al-Taher, may shift to the
highlands of Iqlim al-Tuffah and Rihan, reaching the southern entrances to the
Western Bekaa Valley. The Ali al-Taher hill is of particular importance due to
its commanding position overlooking Nabatieh, Kfar Tibnit, and axes extending
towards Iqlim al-Tuffah and Rihan. Military assessments suggest that controlling
this facility could grant Israel greater ability to monitor movements deep
within its territory and transform it into a launching pad for exerting pressure
on Hezbollah positions further north. Thus, according to this interpretation,
destroying the facility located beneath the Ali al-Taher heights could mean more
than just eliminating a single installation; it could constitute a breach in the
southern gateway of a deeper defensive belt.
The military source states that Israel believes there are significant Hezbollah
installations in the Rihan and Iqlim al-Tuffah regions, a rugged, mountainous
area with some sections reaching elevations of approximately 1,200 meters. This
makes any ground operation there entirely different from those conducted by
Israeli forces along the border. According to the source, Israel also believes
the Lebanese army will be unable to advance towards these installations in the
foreseeable future, which might compel it to attempt to reach and dismantle them
itself. However, direct access to the area would be extremely costly. Advancing
from the direction of Khardali and the Nabatieh area towards the Iqlim al-Tuffah
and Rihan regions means moving forces and vehicles along axes that Hezbollah can
monitor and target, in addition to the mountainous terrain which gives artillery
a significant advantage. The area is of particular importance in the Israeli
military assessment, as estimates speak of a deep Hezbollah military
infrastructure north of Nabatieh, while analyses indicate that Iqlim al-Tuffah
represents one of its most important military strongholds, and that controlling
Ali al-Taher could open the door to exerting greater pressure on it.
Herein lies the scenario that most worries the party. Instead of deploying large
forces from the south towards Nabatieh and then advancing to the heights, the
party fears, according to the source, that Israel might attempt to open a
flanking maneuver from Mount Hermon towards the Western Bekaa Valley, taking
advantage of the military roads it is developing and its ability to monitor the
area from the heights. The idea of using Mount Hermon to exert pressure on the
Lebanese front is not entirely new. Last March, Israeli forces launched an
operation from the Syrian side of Mount Hermon towards the Shebaa Farms, a move
that demonstrated the possibility of using the area to open routes that bypass
traditional front lines. Military assessments at the time also spoke of an
Israeli attempt to pressure the road linking the south to the Western Bekaa
Valley and complicate supply lines between the two regions. The danger of this
scenario, according to the source, lies in the possibility of Israel maintaining
pressure on Ali al-Taher and the Iqlim al-Tuffah region, while simultaneously
attempting to surprise the party from the eastern flank. This could force the
party to disperse its forces and capabilities across a broad front stretching
from Nabatieh and Rihan to the Western Bekaa Valley, instead of concentrating on
a single axis whose direction is predictable. However, according to the source,
carrying out an operation of this scale would require American political cover,
because Ali al-Taher's advance into the heart of the areas north of the Litani
River would effectively mean the collapse of the partial ceasefire and the onset
of a confrontation whose boundaries would be difficult to control.
In his analysis of this scenario, military and strategic expert Mohammed Youssef
al-Nour believes that the significance of the Israeli movements lies not in the
number of roads Israel is opening, but in the operational options it could
provide in the future. Al-Nour says that "entering the Iqlim al-Tuffah and
al-Rayhan regions from the southern axis exposes Israeli forces to difficult
terrain and areas that Hezbollah can monitor and prepare in advance." He adds
that opening a parallel axis from the direction of Mount Hermon and the Western
Bekaa, even if used for pressure or diversion rather than for a large-scale
invasion, "could change the calculations of the battle." Al-Nour believes that
the danger for Hezbollah lies in being forced to defend on multiple fronts
simultaneously and losing the advantage of knowing the axis of attack in
advance. Thus, the shift from Ali al-Taher to Rihan and the Iqlim al-Tuffah
region could mean, according to this interpretation, that Israel is no longer
focusing solely on the border strip, but has begun testing the possibility of
reaching Hezbollah's military depth north of the Litani River. In that case, the
battle of Ali al-Taher might be merely the first step towards a larger battle,
extending beyond the southern highlands to the Iqlim al-Tuffah and Rihan
regions, and perhaps even to the western Bekaa Valley.
Lebanon to End Old Passports Under Pressure from
International Warnings and Requirements
Janoubia/August 25, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The Lebanese General Directorate of General Security is preparing to permanently
end the use of non-biometric passports (2003 model), nearly eight years after
the introduction of the modern biometric passport. This move comes in response
to an official warning from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
regarding the need to discontinue the old systems due to their incompatibility
with internationally adopted security and electronic connectivity systems.
An-Nahar newspaper noted that the procedures have become more complicated with
the additional pressure exerted by Cyprus, which has stopped accepting the old
passports for visa applications starting September 1st. This has placed a heavy
burden on citizens a full month before the deadline set by General Security for
replacing the documents on October 1st. The technical significance of the
biometric passport lies in its inclusion of an electronic chip that encrypts the
personal and vital data of the document holder and transmits it directly to
international verification systems and Interpol via smart gateways. In contrast,
the old passport lacks this technology and relies solely on visual scanning and
manual verification, which weakens its security and increases the likelihood of
its misuse or data manipulation. An-Nahar, citing private sources in the General
Security Directorate, explained that many Lebanese find themselves obligated to
pay fees for issuing new biometric passports, despite possessing old passports
that remain valid for years (up to 10 years). These are passports that were
reissued during the previous financial crisis. To date, no decision has been
issued by the Cabinet to compensate these citizens or transfer the remaining
years of their canceled documents. While the final number of old passports in
circulation remains undetermined pending the completion of a comprehensive
inventory, the General Security Directorate is working to expand issuance
centers at embassies abroad to facilitate replacements, with plans to open new
centers in the United States next month. In addition to the technical standards,
General Security sources revealed to An-Nahar a security loophole: some wanted
individuals and drug traffickers are using forged administrative documents and
signatures issued by mukhtars (local officials) to obtain official passports
under assumed names. To close this gap, the General Security is currently
working on a project for direct electronic linking with the databases of the
Directorate of Personal Status to verify identities digitally without relying on
paper transactions, with the aim of preparing in the future to equip Rafik
Hariri International Airport with electronic gates that keep pace with the
global system.
Israel Restricts Movement in Three Christian Towns in
Southern Lebanon
Beirut: Asharq Al Awsat/25 August 2026
The Israeli military has restricted movement in and out of three beseigned
Christian towns in southern Lebanon, forcing residents to travel in prearranged
convoys along a single route through Naqoura. Residents must register their
vehicles and submit travelers’ details before entering or leaving Rmeish, Debel
and Ain Ebel in the Bint Jbeil district. People remain in the three towns
despite being encircled by Israeli forces occupying every neighboring community.
Relief and medical supplies arrive from elsewhere in Lebanon in convoys escorted
by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Local sources in Rmeish
told Asharq Al-Awsat that no vehicle may travel alone. At least one convoy of
several cars or buses leaves one of the three towns each day.
The Lebanese army and UNIFIL organize the convoys, which must take the
coastal road south of Tyre to Naqoura before heading to the Christian towns in
Bint Jbeil. The army escorts them as far as Qlayleh, about 15 km from the
Israeli border. UNIFIL vehicles then accompany them to their villages. Travelers
must register their vehicles and provide UNIFIL with their personal details in
advance. Their identities are checked and their vehicles searched as part of
coordination with Israeli forces to allow them to pass, the sources said. The
restrictions have prompted the Vatican, through its ambassador to Lebanon, to
ask the United States to intervene to prevent Israel from limiting the movement
of residents of the Christian villages, Asharq Al-Awsat learned.
Marjayoun villages spared restrictions
The measures apply only to Christian villages in Bint Jbeil district and do not
extend to those in Marjayoun district. Residents and visitors can travel freely
between Qlayaa, Jdeidet Marjayoun, Burj al-Mulouk and Deir Mimas and out of the
towns, local sources in Qlayaa told Asharq Al-Awsat. They use a route through
the Western Bekaa in eastern Lebanon toward Hasbaya and then take the Ibl
al-Saqi-Dibbin-Marjayoun road. Residents continue to visit the towns as usual,
but the communities are barred from hosting people displaced from nearby
villages and towns. Journalists visiting the area are also prohibited from
photographing the nearby town of Khiam, the sources said.
Israeli forces stationed in Kfar Kila and Tall al-Nahhas erected an earth
mound on Tuesday near the Deir Mimas-Burj al-Mulouk-Kfar Kila junction, toward
Tall al-Nahhas. It lies about 150 meters from inhabited homes in Burj al-Mulouk.
The forces built another earth mound near the Deir Mimas-Burj al-Mulouk-Houra
junction.
More than 5,000 properties destroyed in Mais al-Jabal
Meanwhile, the Israeli military has continued bulldozing towns inside the
“yellow line” and systematically destroying the homes still standing there. In
recent days, trucks carrying crates filled with explosives have traveled
alongside Israeli patrols, a senior security source told Asharq Al-Awsat. The
crates are unloaded, and the explosives are placed around homes in occupied
towns after they are looted, ahead of their demolition, the source said.
The same method was used in the border town of Mais al-Jabal, the largest
town in Marjayoun district, where Israeli forces have continued destroying
homes. “Only dozens of housing units remain in Mais al-Jabal after more than
5,000 homes and commercial properties were destroyed,” the source said. The
latest demolition targeted a school complex consisting of prefabricated
buildings that the Iraqi government had helped provide. The complex stood on the
town’s outskirts, near Doubiyeh Castle and the road linking the area to Shaqra.
Nearby homes were also destroyed. The Israeli military
also brought in specialized equipment to pulverize concrete into material
resembling soil, making it easier for groups brought in for that purpose to
remove reinforcing steel from destroyed buildings and transport it into Israel,
the source said. Before dawn on Tuesday, an Israeli
force advanced toward Tallat al-Sawwan in Mayfadoun, an area inside the yellow
line, and took up positions in a house. Israeli
military vehicles also moved from Hadatha into Haris in Bint Jbeil district and
fired machine guns toward the town’s outskirts. Lebanon’s state-run National
News Agency said Israeli forces had stepped up attacks on villages in the
western sector of Tyre district. Aircraft carried out
two strikes on Mansouri and another on Wadi Hassan in Tayr Harfa, as large-scale
demolitions took place in Mansouri and Majdal Zoun, the agency said.Israeli
artillery also shelled Ainata and Beit Lif in Bint Jbeil district. Warplanes
struck Mansouri and Wadi Hassan on the outskirts of Tayr Harfa, southeast of
Tyre.
Lebanese Authorities Extend Residency of Iran’s Ambassador
Beirut: Asharq Al Awsat/25 August 2026
Lebanese authorities extended on Monday the residency of former Iranian
Ambassador Mohammad Reza Sheibani, who defied the country’s expulsion order
earlier this year. Now viewed as regular civilian, not
a diplomat, the authorities extended his stay by six months.
A security source told Asharq Al-Awsat that General Security chief Hassan
Choucair, within his legal capacity, proposed granting him residency. He
informed the concerned political authorities, meaning the president, prime
minister and interior minister, before approving the residency.
Lebanese Foreign Ministry sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the ministry
was not informed of the intention to grant him residency.They stressed that
Foreign Minister Youssef Raggi’s position "is clear and not up for debate" that
Iran must respect the expulsion order. The ministry
had in March withdrawn its approval of the ambassador's accreditation, giving
him 72 hours to leave the country, drawing Hezbollah's condemnation.
The expulsion stemmed from what the Lebanese state described as Tehran's
violation of diplomatic norms and established practices between the two
countries.It is "a measure against the ambassador for violating diplomatic
protocol and his obligations as an appointed ambassador to Lebanon". The
ministry accused him of making statements "interfering in Lebanon's internal
politics and evaluating the decisions taken by the government". The government
has accused Hezbollah of dragging Lebanon to war after it fired rockets at
Israel on March 2 in wake of the killing of Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei
at the beginning of the US-Israel war on Iran. Hezbollah called the expulsion a
"sin" and demanded the authorities "immediately reverse" the move.
Guarantees Demanded from Israel, Hezbollah over Proposed
Int’l Force in South Lebanon
Beirut: Nazeer Rida/25 August 2026
Countries being considered for a possible international mission to replace the
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), or as members in a
verification mechanisms in proposed pilot zones in South Lebanon, are seeking
security guarantees from both Israel and Hezbollah, Lebanese sources familiar
with discussions with European countries told Asharq Al-Awsat.
Continued Israeli attacks and military violations in the South are
blocking progress on both tracks, the sources said. Lebanese President Joseph
Aoun discussed the post-UNIFIL phase with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni
during a visit to Rome on Friday, including Italy’s readiness to participate in
a verification mechanism in the pilot zones and provide military support to the
Lebanese Army. Lebanese Army Commander Gen. Rodolphe Haykal, who headed to Rome
on Sunday, is continuing those discussions, focusing on technical and military
details.
Security guarantees
Military sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Haykal’s agenda includes support for
the army, preparations for the expiration of UNIFIL’s mandate at the end of this
year, a proposed joint European force to replace it and a monitoring mechanism
for the pilot zones. The details are being discussed so they would be ready for
implementation if political progress is made and obstacles are removed. “Nothing
is final at this point amid the Israeli escalation,” the sources said, referring
to daily strikes and violations of the ceasefire agreement. Protecting
international personnel deployed in South Lebanon remains a key concern.
Lebanese sources following the talks noted that countries being considered for
any mission are demanding security guarantees for their personnel from both
Israel and Hezbollah. They are seeking Hezbollah’s prior approval for their
participation and assurances that the party will not oppose their deployment.
They also require Israel to halt attacks on Lebanese territory within their
areas of operation. “With the attacks continuing, there is no progress on any of
the proposed files,” the sources underlined, adding that UNIFIL itself is
struggling with the current military escalation in the South.
Italy seen as leading candidate
The proposed monitoring mechanism for the pilot zones also remains unresolved,
with Israel objecting to the participation of some countries. Italy appears the
most likely candidate to secure approval from the United States, Lebanon and
Israel, although no final decision has been made. Unlike France, Italy has not
faced an Israeli veto, the sources remarked. Military
sources accused Israel of obstructing proposals for a verification mechanism
because “it does not want anyone monitoring it,” citing human rights violations
and other actions in the South that could be documented and potentially used
against the Israeli military in the future. Italy is considered the leading
candidate to undertake the verification mission once political obstacles are
removed, given its active role in several missions in Lebanon. Rome is also
hosting US-sponsored Lebanese-Israeli negotiations. Italy contributes 738 troops
to UNIFIL, making it the mission’s largest European contingent. UNIFIL is also
currently commanded by Italian Maj. Gen. Diodato Abagnara. Italy also leads the
Military Technical Committee for Lebanon (MTC4L), an international body
coordinating multinational military assistance to the Lebanese Army. The Italian
Bilateral Military Mission in Lebanon (MIBIL) has also provided training to the
Lebanese Army since 2015.
Israeli operations continue
Meanwhile, the Israeli military continued to violate the ceasefire agreement in
the South, carrying out major explosions in Kfar Tebnit, Yohmor al-Shaqif,
Majdal Zoun and Khiam. Israeli forces also carried out
bulldozing and demolition work on the western outskirts of Mays al-Jabal,
destroying a temporary school complex built and opened by the municipality after
the latest war in cooperation with the Council for South Lebanon and the Jabal
Amel Union of Municipalities. Israeli troops also
brought in a truck carrying explosives and began rigging several homes for
demolition. Airstrikes targeted the outskirts of Majdal Zoun in the Tyre
district, Houla in the Bint Jbeil district, and areas around Deir
Seryan-al-Qusayr and Dawhet Kfar Rumman in Nabatieh.
An Israeli armored force advanced toward an area between Hadatha and Haris,
where bulldozers carried out operations. Israeli forces positioned between
Beaufort Castle and Kfar Tebnit, through the towns of Arnoun and Zawtar
al-Sharqiyeh, opened heavy- and medium-machine-gun fire as several explosions
were heard. Israeli artillery also struck the outskirts of Mayfadoun.
The escalation followed a night of airstrikes targeting Ali al-Taher
hill, Dawhet Kfar Rumman and Nabatieh al-Fawqa, accompanied by intermittent
artillery fire.
Between a Model Lebanon and ‘Pilot Areas’
Sam Menassa/Asharq Al-Awsat/August 25/2026
The 60-day window that the American-Iranian memorandum of understanding set
aside for negotiating a final agreement has now closed. Tension is rising, and
there is no visible path toward addressing the causes of the war. As the United
States and Israel move deeper into their election seasons, the odds of a major
political breakthrough in the near term keep falling and Lebanon remains
suspended between war and non-war. Israel has not withdrawn. No progress has
been made over Hezbollah's weapons. And negotiations keep stalling against
Israeli conditions that demand of the Lebanese state precisely what it has so
far been unable to deliver. The result is a closed
circle. Israel ties any withdrawal to Lebanese action on the weapons; Hezbollah
shows no willingness to address the weapons in any way that would let the state
shift Israel's position. The Iranian factor remains very much in play through
contacts with the party and its fighters that Iranian officials have made
increasingly little effort to conceal.
Between a direct Israeli occupation and a disguised Iranian one, the space for
sovereign Lebanese decision-making keeps narrowing, and the authorities find
themselves facing two occupying powers contending over their own soil. But does
a deadlock of this kind mean the state must simply wait for Israeli and Iranian
positions to change, and for the US-Iran confrontation to resolve itself? Or is
there something it can do in the meantime, without waiting for the grand
settlement? There is an alternative to waiting.
Certain steps would attract less attention than the questions of withdrawal and
weapons, but they do not matter any less. Why should the state not begin
exercising its authority in full, and asserting its sovereignty, wherever it is
actually able to do so? Months ago, the government
declared that Beirut must be a city free of weapons. Why not turn that into
something larger - a project covering the cities and regions where the state can
extend its authority without colliding with the party's parallel military
structure? Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, Zahle, Jounieh, Jbeil, and others besides:
most of them reject the party's weapons and its conduct and would welcome the
return of the state in full. Sovereignty is not merely
a military and security deployment. It is the state present in every dimension,
until official institutions become the citizen's only point of reference. What
is then at stake is not an artificial "pilot area," or an experiment confined to
a patch of the map, but a model Lebanon - one that begins in the regions the
state can genuinely govern and expands, step by step, toward those it cannot
govern today.
This approach does not solve the problem of Hezbollah's weapons directly and it
will not produce an Israeli withdrawal on its own. What it does is change where
the state stands in the equation. The difficulty is not simply that the state
cannot disarm the party. It is that the state has yet to demonstrate it can
confine weapons to its own hands and enforce the law even where the party has no
military structure to stop it. If it cannot impose its authority where that
obstacle does not exist, how is it to persuade the Lebanese, or anyone abroad,
that it can handle the harder problem?
The same logic applies to the negotiations. The government has taken
unprecedented steps, among them entering direct talks with Israel, and those
steps now need something on the ground to prove they were serious. A state's
credibility, regionally and internationally, is built by converting its declared
positions into actual measures. If it succeeds in establishing a sovereign model
across most of the country, its negotiating hand strengthens: state authority, a
single set of weapons, and a single law become the rule, and the armed exception
becomes both more conspicuous and harder to defend. A move of this kind would
also expose the nature of the two occupations contending for the country and
would allow the state to draw on friendly countries, the US above all, in the
effort to recover its territory.
This is why the shift from "pilot areas" to a model Lebanon matters. A pilot
area may prove that a limited experiment can work; it does not prove that a
state exists. But a government reclaiming its full functions wherever it can
reach, sets in motion something cumulative - redefining the citizen's
relationship to the state and holding every political force to a single
standard: where the state can govern, it must govern. The government cannot
carry this alone. It will take political, economic, and social forces pulling
together, and popular pressure that demands a state, rather than merely
demanding that the state solve every great problem at once.
The Israeli occupation may last a long while, as may Iranian influence
and the question of Hezbollah's weapons, all awaiting some shift in the regional
balance of power. But waiting for a comprehensive solution cannot become an
excuse for suspending the work of building a state. A government cannot always
start from the hardest point. It can start from wherever it has the capacity to
act. So rather than asking when all Lebanese territory will come under the
state's sovereignty, we should be asking why the state should not exercise full
sovereignty, starting now, over the areas it can already reach. Pilot areas do
not make a model Lebanon. It is Lebanon as a state that makes all its regions
models.
The Latest English LCCC
Miscellaneous Reports And News published
on August 25-26/2026
Trump: We are monitoring the Strait of Hormuz, have
removed the mines, and will not allow new ones to be laid.
Trumo: We are monitoring Pickaxe
Mountain and the three other nuclear sites.
Riyadh: Al Arabiya.net and agencies/August 25/2026 (Google
translation from Arabic)
US President Donald Trump said on Tuesday in a post on his Truth Social account
that the US Navy had just informed him that all mines in the international
waters of the Strait of Hormuz had been removed and/or detonated. He added in
his post: "Iran has been notified that any ship or boat laying new mines will be
immediately and systematically destroyed." The US president affirmed the
readiness of his country's forces, saying: "With our air power, we are
monitoring every inch of the Strait, just as we are monitoring Pickaxe Mountain
and the three other nuclear sites that were previously destroyed." Trump
reiterated that the "zero tolerance" policy regarding the laying of mines is in
effect and being strictly enforced. A third of the ships Iran threatened to
seize for violating arrangements to transit the Strait of Hormuz were attacked
during the Middle East war, according to an AFP data analysis. Since the
conflict erupted in late February, Tehran has sought to impose its own shipping
lane in an attempt to control maritime traffic through this vital strategic
waterway, which was once freely traversed by ships and is governed by
international maritime law. However, not all ships were using this
Iranian-controlled route in the northern part of the strait. On Sunday, the
Persian Gulf Waterway Management Authority, established by Iran in May to
oversee the strait, published a list on its X-platform account of 45 vessels
that will face future "restrictions" during their next transit, including "fines
or confiscation." The maritime authority stated that these measures were taken
"due to some vessels violating" Iranian arrangements. Of the 45 vessels on the
list, at least 14 were damaged in incidents within or around the strait, as
confirmed by the International Maritime Organization.The UK Maritime Trade
Operations (UKMTO) agency said all of these incidents were classified as
attacks, without identifying who was responsible. Most of these incidents
occurred off the coast of Oman, along a route supported by the United States but
not recognized by Iranian authorities.
Qatar: Our Contacts Continue to Push for a Resumption of US-Iran Negotiations
Trump Says Strait of Hormuz Has Been
Demined, Warns Iran Not to Plant More
Asharq Al Awsat/25 August 2026
US President Donald Trump said on Tuesday that all mines had been detonated or
removed from international waters of the Strait of Hormuz and that Iran has been
told that any ship or boat placing new mines will be destroyed. In a post on
Truth Social, Trump said the United States, through its Space Force, was
watching "every square inch" of the Strait, a key waterway in the global energy
supply chain. "There is a Zero Tolerance policy on mine placement in full force
and effect," Trump said. The US and Iran have not conducted air strikes on each
other's militaries for weeks, but attacks on vessels in the Strait of Hormuz
have continued as the two sides vie for control of the narrow maritime
passage.Oil transits through the strait were at 5 million barrels per day on
Monday, provisional data from shiptracker Vortexa showed, down from more than 20
million per day before the war or about one of every five barrels consumed
worldwide.
Qatari Foreign Ministry Spokesperson: Economic Measures
Taken During the Crisis Were Precautionary
Riyadh: Al-Arabiya.net/August 25/2026
(Google translation from Arabic)
Qatar reaffirmed its continued regional contacts with various parties to push
for a resumption of negotiations between the US and Iran, in addition to
continuing coordination with the Gulf states to address any potential threats or
developments related to the escalation.
The official spokesperson for the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Majid
Al-Ansari, explained that his country's priorities at present are focused on
restoring navigation in the Strait of Hormuz to its normal state. In contrast,
Al-Ansari emphasized, during the weekly media briefing, the necessity of
exerting pressure on Israel and expediting the implementation of the ceasefire
agreement in Gaza, which is linked to US President Donald Trump's plan. In a
different vein, the spokesperson stressed that his country's economy "remains
strong, with a continued focus on the well-being of citizens and residents and
the continuation of national development projects and plans." He pointed out
that "the figures mentioned in the Financial Times report regarding the
reduction of financial spending in the State of Qatar are inaccurate and many of
them were taken out of context." He said: "The economic measures taken during
the crisis are precautionary and temporary, limited to operational aspects, and
do not represent structural changes in the economy."
Bissent: America will continue to cut off every economic
lifeline to Iran... "Pressure is working"... The leadership admits that the
people will not survive if they suffer from hunger.
Riyadh - Al Arabiya/August 25, 2026
(Google translation from Arabic)
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bisent affirmed on Tuesday that the United States
will continue to cut off every economic lifeline supporting the Iranian regime
until it stands alone. Bisent stated that "the Iranian leadership acknowledges
that our pressure is working... Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Qalibaf
admitted that Iran will not survive if the people suffer from hunger, and
President Pezeshkian also acknowledged the economic crisis that Iran is
experiencing." Nearly six months after the outbreak of a conflict that the
United States is finding difficult to end, the Treasury Secretary revealed the
punitive measures on Monday, but stopped short of imposing what could be
described as the harshest sanctions. The US Treasury Department announced new
sanctions on 60 individuals, entities, and ships, but the list did not include
any of the Chinese financial institutions suspected of being The trade in
Iranian oil is becoming easier. China has been the largest buyer of Iranian oil
for many years, but the US embargo on Iranian ports has reduced Iranian oil
flows to China since Washington reimposed it in mid-July. US President Donald
Trump said he expects to host his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, next month,
as Washington seeks to avoid any restrictions on China's exports of critical
minerals.China affirmed today that its cooperation with Iran is conducted within
the framework of international law and should not be interfered with or
obstructed.
Omani Foreign Minister hopes for "announcement soon" of a temporary shipping
corridor in the Strait of Hormuz... Joint project to clear the strait of mines
Riyadh: Al Arabiya.net and agencies/August 25, 2026
(Google translation from Arabic)
In Tehran on Tuesday, Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi expressed his hope
that his country and Iran would "soon" announce the establishment of a temporary
shipping corridor in the Strait of Hormuz, following weeks of bilateral talks.
Al-Busaidi said in a statement in English, "I hope that we will soon announce a
temporary passage in the Strait of Hormuz and practical arrangements for
restoring safe navigation. This will be followed in due course by an agreement
on the future management of the Strait and finding a permanent solution." The
Omani minister had paid a working visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran on
Tuesday, during which he held constructive consultations with Iranian Foreign
Minister Abbas Araqchi. A joint statement issued by the Sultanate of Oman and
the Islamic Republic of Iran today, issued by the Omani News Agency, indicated
that the consultations focused on the importance both countries attach to
resuming safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz in a manner that preserves
their sovereignty and sovereign rights. The two ministers discussed a phased
framework that would provide a practical and implementable basis, given the
current situation in the Strait resulting from the recent war and its tragic
consequences. The proposed framework includes the establishment of a joint
temporary shipping lane through the Strait of Hormuz and an agreement to
implement a joint project to clear the Strait of mines. Technical negotiations
between the two sides will continue with the aim of reaching an agreement on a
permanent shipping lane and future arrangements for managing the Strait, as well
as establishing a mechanism for exchanging information, managing maritime
traffic, and providing related navigational and security services. In this
context, both sides emphasized the importance of holding joint discussions with
the countries bordering the Gulf region and stressed the need to adhere to the
provisions of international law and respect the sovereign rights of coastal
states.
Source to Al Arabiya: US Offered to Lift Blockade and
Sanctions on Tehran in Exchange for Opening the Strait of Hormuz and Halting
Proxy Attacks
Al Arabiya.net, Agencies/August 25, 2026 (Google translation
from Arabic)
Al Hadath exclusively revealed today, Tuesday, the American messages conveyed by
the Pakistani army chief to Iran.
A high-ranking source confirmed to both channels that the US offered to lift the
naval blockade imposed on Tehran and lift sanctions in exchange for opening the
Strait of Hormuz and halting proxy attacks. The source also explained that Field
Marshal Asim Munir carried an offer to Iran to end the blockade and lift
sanctions under the memorandum of understanding, noting that the Secretary of
Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Major General Mohsen Rezaei, informed
Munir that Tehran would continue its internal consultations and provide its
response soon. This comes as Mehdi Tabatabaei, the communications and media
advisor to the Iranian president, wrote on the X platform: “Contrary to some
inaccurate media speculation, the visit of Field Marshal Asim Munir, Chief of
Army Staff of friendly Pakistan, to Iran was highly fruitful and full of
valuable diplomatic achievements, the results of which will soon become clear.”
The visit aimed to advance efforts. Pakistani Army Chief Field Marshal Syed Asim
Munir and Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi concluded a one-day visit to Iran as
part of Pakistani diplomatic efforts to break the deadlock in the ongoing
conflict between the United States and Iran and explore ways to achieve lasting
peace and a permanent end to instability in the region, the Associated Press of
Pakistan reported on Tuesday. The Iranian news agency IRNA quoted a statement
issued early Tuesday by the Pakistani military's public relations department,
saying that Field Marshal Asim Munir held official meetings during the visit
with President Masoud Pezeshkian, Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council
Major General Mohsen Rezaei, Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, and Interior
Minister Eskandar. Momeni. The statement read: "The talks were comprehensive and
focused on the necessary measures to prevent further escalation of tensions,
reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and expedite the resolution of the conflict." The
two sides also exchanged views on regional peace and ways to resolve disputes
through dialogue. In conclusion, the Pakistani military announced that Iranian
officials expressed their appreciation for Islamabad's constructive role and its
sincere efforts to facilitate dialogue, de-escalate tensions, and reach a
peaceful resolution to the conflict. IRNA quoted President Pezeshkian as
emphasizing during his meeting with Field Marshal Munir the necessity for the US
to adhere to its commitments to Iran in accordance with international law and
standards. He stressed the need for the US to correct its tone and approach in
its dealings with Iran, as relying on bullying and arrogance will only
complicate implementation procedures. IRNA also quoted Qalibaf as saying during
his meeting with the Pakistani army chief: "We are monitoring the implementation
of the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding, and the United States must
abide by its commitments under the memorandum."
The Revolutionary Guard Brandishes the Nuclear Bomb: A
Significant Stance with Regional Repercussions
Laura Yamin/Al-Markazia/August 25, 2026
(Google translation from Arabic)
Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council,
hinted at the possibility of developing a nuclear bomb and threatened to keep
the Strait of Hormuz closed to countries that join the US economic pressure
campaign against Tehran. Rezaei's statements on Sunday came ahead of
Washington's announcement on Monday of details of a new round of sanctions. In
an interview with state television, he said, "If that's the case, why shouldn't
we pursue a nuclear bomb?" questioning the point of continuing to adhere to
international restrictions after Iran was attacked. He added that the US attack,
according to him, led some countries to believe that possessing nuclear weapons
could provide greater "deterrence," and said that "Trump's folly pushed the
world toward acquiring the nuclear bomb." He pointed out that Iran was attacked
despite its membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, its acceptance
of inspections, and its extensive cooperation with the International Atomic
Energy Agency. He added: “Therefore, neither the Non-Proliferation Treaty nor
membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency is effective,” considering
that this increases countries’ “desire” to possess the nuclear bomb. As a
reminder, diplomatic sources told Al-Markazia that Rezaei was appointed this
month as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council as part of changes
that included senior security and military positions, a move considered an
indication of a hardening of Tehran’s political and military stance. His
interview with state television was his most extensive appearance since his
appointment. According to the sources, his remarks above confirm the rigid,
radical orientation of the man and the new Iranian leadership that has been
formed and now controls decision-making in Iran. While Rezaei did not
definitively state that his country would build a nuclear bomb, his threat of it
is a significant position and a major shift in Iranian policy, which has always
denied any intention of possessing the bomb and stated that nuclear weapons are
religiously forbidden. This threatening rhetoric will not go unnoticed in either
Washington or Tel Aviv, and will have a strong impact in the coming period.
According to the sources, this will push the United States, Israel, and
countries in the region to reconsider their options, as they will likely focus,
away from the spotlight, on examining what must be done, whether economically,
politically, diplomatically, or militarily, to put an end to Iranian madness.
Hundreds of parliamentary and political figures from 11
Arab countries condemn Tehran's policies and call for support for the Iranian
resistance.
Janoubia/August 25, 2026
(Google translation from Arabic)
Arab calls for a reassessment of the approach to the Iranian issue are
escalating. More than 280 Arab figures, including former ministers,
parliamentarians, and intellectuals from 11 Arab countries, have declared their
dual rejection of Tehran's regional behavior and its use of repression against
the people. The signatories proposed a third option: supporting the Iranian
people and their national resistance in determining their own destiny and
building a democratic state that fosters good neighborly relations. In a
comprehensive political statement reflecting a cross-border parliamentary and
political stance, more than 280 Arab figures, including former ministers,
parliamentarians, academics, and politicians from 11 Arab countries, strongly
condemned what they described as the "brutality of the Iranian regime and its
wars" in the region. The signatories emphasized in the comprehensive statement
that the successive crises plaguing the Middle East will find no lasting
solution except through supporting the aspirations of the Iranian people and
their organized resistance to achieve change from within. The statement issued
by Arab figures—representing several countries including Jordan, Syria, Iraq,
Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco, and Yemen—emphasized that Tehran is
deliberately exporting its internal and political crises abroad by supporting
armed militias and expanding its missile and drone attacks. The signatories
explained that these regional practices have severely damaged the security and
stability of neighboring countries, asserting that attempts to protect the
regime in Tehran have come at the expense of Arab security and nationalism. The
statement indicated that the escalating waves of executions and arrests within
Iran do not reflect the regime's strength, but rather express a genuine fear of
widespread popular anger and an explosion of unrest. The Arab figures
highlighted the growing role of "resistance units" and organized opposition
groups (foremost among them the National Council of Resistance of Iran and the
People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran) in mobilizing the public and expanding
the field movement, despite the regime's tight security grip. The statement
called for breaking the traditional equation that has confined Iran for decades
to a choice between external military intervention or policies of appeasement
and containment, asserting that appeasement has proven ineffective in curbing
Tehran's regional behavior. The signatories concluded their statement by
affirming the Iranian people's right to self-determination and to build a
democratic, pluralistic republic that fosters peaceful coexistence and good
neighborliness with Arab states and the wider region.
A Notable Meeting Between Mohammad Khatami and the Supreme
Leader's Brother: Adherence to Rationality and Diplomacy to Spare Iran from
Dangers
Janoubia/August 25, 2026
(Google translation from Arabic)
Amidst accelerating political and diplomatic efforts to resolve the tensions
between Tehran and Washington, the Iranian domestic scene witnessed a notable
development: a meeting between two prominent figures from the reformist
movement. This coincided with regional mediation efforts led by Pakistan to end
the blockade and the maritime crisis. Iranian media reported on Tuesday that
Hadi Khamenei, brother of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, received former
Iranian President Mohammad Khatami. This meeting comes just days after Khatami
openly criticized the Iranian leadership's handling of negotiations with the
United States, warning that "squandering the memorandum of understanding with
America will cost Iran dearly." During the meeting, Khatami reiterated to the
Supreme Leader's brother the utmost necessity of "activating diplomacy and
rationality and achieving calm" to spare the country further repercussions. For
his part, Hadi Khamenei praised Khatami's positions, describing them as
"important and noteworthy" in shaping the country's political directions and
strategies during this sensitive period. Regarding foreign policy moves and
regional mediations, high-level sources revealed to Al-Arabiya/Al-Hadath that
the Pakistani Army Chief, General Asim Munir, conveyed to the Iranian leadership
an American offer stipulating the "lifting of the naval blockade and sanctions"
under the Memorandum of Understanding, in exchange for "opening the Strait of
Hormuz and halting attacks by groups linked to Tehran." During his meeting with
the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Mohsen Rezaei, Munir
emphasized that Pakistan adheres to neutrality and does not take sides, working
diligently to resolve the crisis and end the war permanently. The Pakistani Army
Chief called for the resumption of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding and
a halt to all attacks, holding Washington and Tehran jointly responsible for any
violations that obstruct the implementation of the understandings. For his part,
Rezaei assured Munir of Iran’s desire to reach a permanent and sustainable
solution to the crisis, noting that Tehran will continue its internal political
and security consultations and will provide its official response to the offer
in the near future.
On Monday, Baqai said that talks with Oman regarding the Strait of Hormuz were
"ongoing," and that the two sides were working to finalize a memorandum of
understanding and reach a final agreement. Tehran had announced on August 15
that the two countries had reached an agreement on a map for shipping routes and
were working on a joint statement regarding the arrangements reached. Earlier
last week, Araqchi described these talks as a separate technical track from the
discussions concerning ending the war with the United States, explaining that
experts from both countries, with the participation of the Iranian armed forces,
were working to define the new maritime routes. The proposed plan is to replace
the decades-old navigation system with arrangements that would grant Iran a
broader role in managing shipping traffic. During a transitional phase, ships
would enter the Persian Gulf via a northern corridor near the Iranian coast and
Larak Island, while departing via a southern corridor near the Omani coast.
Tehran stated that this phase could last between two and four months, or even
longer, before transitioning to a "middle corridor" through which Iran would
manage entry traffic, while exit would be subject to joint coordination between
Iran and Oman. Tehran also proposed establishing a joint Iranian-Omani center to
coordinate ship movements and exchange information related to tankers and
commercial vessels.
However, Iran is separating a technical agreement on maritime routes from the
full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials have conditioned the
return of normal navigation on the lifting of the US blockade on Iranian ports,
the cessation of military operations, and the resumption of Iranian oil exports.
The issue of fees remains a major sticking point in the negotiations. Iran had
previously proposed fees ranging from 5% to 7% of the value of transiting
shipments, while the Omani side discussed a formula of approximately 3% as part
of a broader settlement. On Sunday, the National Security and Foreign Policy
Committee of the Iranian Parliament approved an article allowing the collection
of fees from ships of countries permitted to transit the strait in exchange for
services including navigation, insurance, safety, environmental services, and
refueling under special circumstances. The parliamentary text does not specify a
percentage of the cargo value, nor does it impose a fee for mere transit, but it
stipulates that the fees can be collected in Iranian rials or any currency
chosen by Tehran. In contrast, Washington opposes granting Iran unilateral
control over navigation or imposing mandatory fees on ships, and insists on
freedom of passage through the Strait. US President Donald Trump had threatened
to oppose any arrangements in the Strait of Hormuz if they "stood in the way" of
the US plan, referring to the understandings negotiated by Oman with Iran. Thus,
Tehran is pursuing two parallel tracks: the first, a technical and political one
with Muscat to establish new navigation arrangements in the Strait; and the
second, indirect negotiations with Washington via Pakistan, attempting to link
the future of Hormuz to broader conditions concerning the embargo, ports, and
Iranian oil exports.
Iran Negotiates with Oman on Hormuz and Sends its
Conditions to Washington via Pakistani Mediator
Janoubia//August 25, 2026
(Google translation from Arabic)
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi and his Omani counterpart, Badr
al-Busaidi, began talks in Tehran on Tuesday regarding navigation arrangements
in the Strait of Hormuz. This coincided with an announcement from an Iranian
source that Tehran had conveyed its conditions and positions to Washington
through the Pakistani mediator. Araqchi received al-Busaidi upon his arrival at
the Iranian Foreign Ministry headquarters, before the two ministers began a
bilateral meeting, according to photos published by the Iranian Foreign
Ministry. The state-run ISNA news agency reported that the main focus of the
talks was understandings between Tehran and Muscat regarding the designation of
a waterway in the Strait of Hormuz for the safe passage of ships, and a review
of the latest arrangements reached by the two sides in this regard. Al-Busaidi
is scheduled to meet with a number of senior Iranian officials during his visit.
Concurrently with the Iranian-Omani talks, the Tasnim news agency quoted an
informed Iranian source as saying that Iran's positions and conditions regarding
the Strait of Hormuz had been conveyed "clearly and explicitly" to the Pakistani
mediator. A source close to the Iranian negotiating team stated that Pakistani
Army Chief Asim Munir, who visited Iran, did not carry a threatening message
from the United States, contrary to some media reports. Rather, he sought to
open a space for negotiations and convey Iran's positions and conditions to the
American side. The source added that Iranian officials clearly informed Munir of
Tehran's position during their meetings, noting that among Iran's conditions was
the United States' return to the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding and its
implementation, including Article 5 concerning Iranian arrangements for the
Strait of Hormuz. He explained that the Pakistani side is working to convey
these conditions to Washington. Al-Busaidi's visit comes weeks after technical
negotiations between Tehran and Muscat reached an advanced stage, according to
the Iranian side, but have not yet resulted in a final agreement on fully
reopening the strait, or on fees and the authority to manage shipping traffic.
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ismail Baghaei had announced that
Al-Busaidi's visit would address "ongoing political consultations between the
two sides, as two countries bordering the Strait of Hormuz, to help strengthen
peace and security in the region," in addition to bilateral relations and
regional issues. The meeting was preceded by a phone call between the two
ministers on Friday, during which they discussed ways to create the appropriate
conditions for resuming dialogue and negotiations, as well as developments
regarding navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. According to the Oman News Agency,
both sides emphasized the importance of continuing discussions to reach
practical understandings that support freedom of navigation and its smooth flow,
and enhance the region's security and stability.
After the war ended, Washington is redeploying diplomats
to the Middle East and lowering its alert level.
Janoubia/August 25, 2026 (Google translation from
Arabic)
The US State Department is preparing to redeploy diplomats to several of its
embassies in the Middle East, after evacuating them before and during the
Iran-Iraq War. This indicates that President Donald Trump's administration does
not anticipate a return to a full-scale confrontation with Tehran in the near
future, according to The New York Times. The newspaper quoted an internal State
Department document stating that the return of diplomatic staff and the
reduction of emergency measures at US missions in the region could begin this
week. Three US officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, confirmed details
of the plan. The embassies slated to see an increase in US diplomatic staff
include those in Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Oman, Iraq, and
Kuwait. The redeployment comes despite stalled talks between the US and Iran,
which prompted the Trump administration to launch a campaign of economic
isolation and impose new sanctions on Tehran. The State Department said in a
statement that it “continuously reviews the security situation at its diplomatic
missions around the world,” adding, “Based on our most recent assessments, we
are adjusting staffing levels at some of our missions in the Middle East to
ensure we can continue to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives while
protecting the safety and security of our personnel.” In late February, a day
before the U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, non-essential staff at the U.S.
Embassy in Jerusalem and their families were given the option to leave Israel at
the government’s expense. In the following weeks, the State Department ordered
the evacuation of personnel from U.S. missions across the Middle East after Iran
and its regional allies targeted U.S. diplomatic facilities in Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Iraq, and other countries with drones and missiles. Diplomats in some of
those countries worked from home instead of at embassies as a precaution.
Current and former State Department officials said the redeployment of staff
indicates a de-escalation of tensions, despite stalled U.S.-Iranian talks on
extending the ceasefire. Former US Ambassador to Israel and former US Defense
Department official for Middle East affairs, Dan Shapiro, said, “The return of
personnel to partially evacuated missions indicates that the administration
believes the war is drawing to a close.” A gradual return with continued
security restrictions is expected. According to the document, US embassy staff
in Lebanon will be the first to return, but the mission will not have its full
staff restored at this stage. Eventually, US embassies in Israel, Jordan, and
Oman are scheduled to return to full staffing levels. Missions in the UAE, Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, and Lebanon will initially be staffed at 85%, compared to 75% in
Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain. The document added that the State Department will
maintain restrictions on bringing family members to the six Gulf states and
Lebanon. Former Under Secretary of State for Management, John R. Bass, said,
“The restrictions on family members in the Gulf indicate that the government
still considers the risk level to be high.” He added that these restrictions
“mean the threat level is less high than it was 30, 60, or 90 days ago, but it
is still higher than it was before the war began.” Two U.S. officials said some
diplomats who left the region because of the war have been asking for more
clarity about their future postings, particularly those with children who need
to make school-related decisions before the start of the academic year. It was
unclear whether this influenced the decision to bring staff back. Former State
Department officials cautioned that the return of diplomats and some family
members to the region may reflect the Trump administration’s desire to avoid
renewed fighting, but it does not necessarily mean that peace will be lasting.
“Bringing embassy staff back doesn’t tie the administration’s hands if it
decides to take action against Iran in the future,” said Robert Danin, a former
deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs. “They did it once,
and they can do it again,” he added, referring to evacuations earlier this year.
Official: US Aircraft Carrier Abraham Lincoln to Dock in Thailand Next Week
Bangkok/Middle East/August 25, 2026
A Thai official revealed on Tuesday that the US aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln
will dock in Thailand next week, following a lengthy deployment to the Middle
East during the Iran-Iraq War and reports of concerns regarding the mental
health and deteriorating conditions on board, according to Reuters. The carrier
departed the Middle East on Saturday and has not docked at any port for more
than 200 days, setting a modern-day record for the longest continuous voyage
without a port call, according to Democratic lawmakers. Warship deployments
typically last between six and nine months, but can be extended during wartime.
The official, who requested anonymity, added that the carrier, carrying
approximately 5,000 sailors and Marines, would arrive in Thailand "for rest and
recuperation after its long deployment." A U.S. Navy fighter jet takes off from
the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln in the Indian Ocean
(Reuters). Spokespeople for the Thai Navy and the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok have
not yet responded to requests for comment. The Lincoln departed its home port of
San Diego on the U.S. West Coast last November and was subsequently deployed to
the Middle East to support U.S. military operations in the Iran-Iraq War. The
military newspapers Navy Times and Stars and Stripes reported suicide attempts
and declining morale among the carrier's crew. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete
Hegseth dismissed these reports as "completely misrepresenting" the situation on
board. Thailand is the only treaty partner of the United States on the Southeast
Asian mainland, and a defense treaty has existed between them since 1954. It has
also been a major non-NATO ally of the United States since 2003. The two
militaries have close ties.
Netanyahu Reveals Iran Attempted to Assassinate One of
His Sons
Israeli Military Censorship Refuses to Allow
Publication of Details to Protect Sources and Expresses Surprise at How the
Prime Minister Revealed the News
Tel Aviv: Nazir Majali / Asharq Al-Awsat / August 25, 2026
(Google translation from Arabic)
In a move that falls under the motto "anything goes to win the elections,"
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu revealed on Monday evening that Iran
had attempted to assassinate one of his sons. Netanyahu's aides and supporters
on the right-wing Channel 14 attacked their opponents who criticize his request
for lifelong security for his family, claiming they are heartless. According to
Netanyahu's supporters, the prime minister and all members of his family are
under threat of assassination from enemies within the country and from Iran. To
confirm this, Netanyahu himself was contacted by phone, and he acknowledged the
news, saying: "This is unbelievable. Iran targeted one of my sons and tried to
assassinate him." Netanyahu linked this to the security arrangements imposed on
his family members, saying, "This security is not a luxury; without it, they
would succeed." He added, "We must also exercise restraint during the election
period." However, this revelation was not accepted at face value, even within
Israel itself. While various media outlets widely reported on it, many Israelis
expressed skepticism, believing it to be a common campaign tactic where the
prime ministerial candidate portrays himself as a victim of persecution and
harassment. The more prominent and powerful the candidate, the more endangered
his life and the lives of his family members become. These suspicions were
further fueled by the fact that the military censor, which had prevented the
media from publishing the story for several months, continued its ban on Monday,
even after Netanyahu himself had revealed it, expressing surprise at his
decision to do so. On Monday evening, the Israeli military censor told Israeli
media outlets that details of the case remained confidential and prohibited them
from publishing further information regarding the identity of the son Netanyahu
claimed was the target, or the nature, timing, and circumstances of the
assassination attempt, arguing that publication could compromise intelligence
sources. It is well known that Netanyahu has three children: a religious
daughter who lives in a religious neighborhood in Jerusalem, away from the
public eye. She is from Netanyahu's first wife, with whom he has almost no
contact. He also has two sons: Yair, who has lived in Miami for three years, and
Avner, who lives in London. Both sons, like their parents Sara and Benjamin
Netanyahu, have constant security protection. In the middle of last month, the
Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) made a decision that sparked widespread
controversy in Israel due to its high cost: to grant Sara Netanyahu security
protection that will continue until her husband's death. The decision was issued
by the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs. It appears that the decision
was made at the urgent request of Sara Netanyahu, who fears for the lives of her
family members. She believes that the loss of security protection, should he
lose the elections scheduled for next October, would make it easier for
Palestinians or Iranians, whose leaders were assassinated by the Israeli army
during the last war, to assassinate them. To illustrate this, I cite what
happened in 2021, when the government halted personal security for Sara
Netanyahu and her two sons six months after he left office, and what happened in
2023 when Hezbollah launched a drone attack on Netanyahu's private residence in
Caesarea. It is well known that the Israeli prime minister enjoys extensive
security protection that continues for 20 years after his term ends. The cost of
protecting the Netanyahu family is estimated at over $1.5 million annually.
Despite objections to the duration of the decision, it was approved, based on a
recommendation from the head of the Israeli Security Agency (Shin Bet), David
Zinni, to extend the protection for the sons for five years and for the wife for
the prime minister's lifetime. In contrast, the Hebrew newspaper Yediot Aharonot
reported that the children of former prime ministers Ehud Olmert, Naftali
Bennett, and Yair Lapid currently do not receive security protection. Olmert's
sons were not even under protection during his four years as prime minister. She
said that those close to Netanyahu believe the war and the accompanying change
in the nature of threats necessitate a review of security arrangements. The
newspaper quoted an unnamed source as saying, "Netanyahu and Sara fear defeat in
the elections and want to ensure the family's continued security, but there is a
real threat to their lives." She added that, despite this, there is no
fundamental disagreement among the relevant parties regarding the need for
continued security for the Netanyahu family, given the threats they face,
particularly after the assassinations carried out by Israel inside Iran. She
continued that security assessments also take into account the assassination of
senior Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, indicating that the protection will likely
be extended, while the disagreement centers on the duration of the extension and
whether an automatic five-year period should be established.
Israeli Chief of Staff Vows to Disarm Gaza Despite
Ceasefire Following Sporadic Israeli Strikes on the Palestinian Territory
Riyadh: Al-Arabiya.net and Agencies (Google translation from
Arabic)
Israeli Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir pledged on Tuesday to continue working to
disarm Gaza and disarm Hamas, despite US efforts to move forward with the second
phase of its peace plan for the Strip.Zamir's remarks came during a visit to
Gaza, following sporadic Israeli strikes on the Palestinian territory in recent
days, which the army says targeted militants. "In Gaza, we are not abandoning
the ultimate goal of disarming the Strip and dismantling Hamas, by all necessary
means," Zamir said in a statement. The Israeli army has repeatedly affirmed that
it will continue to pursue those responsible for the Hamas attack on October 7,
2013. Zamir added, "We continue to work systematically to inflict ongoing damage
on Hamas and its leadership everywhere, including an ongoing campaign to prevent
it from rebuilding its strength." He added, "The hunt for the terrorists who
participated in the October 7th attack continues. Everyone involved in the
massacre will remain a fugitive until they are eliminated. This is a long-term
mission to which the leadership and the entire IDF are committed." Hamas and
Israel have been exchanging accusations of violating the ceasefire agreement
reached in October 2015 in the devastated Gaza Strip, two years after a war
erupted when the movement launched an unprecedented attack on Israel on October
7, 2013. In late July, the Palestinian movement agreed to a US roadmap aimed at
launching the second phase of the peace plan, which stipulates its disarmament
and a gradual Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, over which it controls
more than 60 percent of the territory. However, Israel has not accepted the
plan. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demands the complete disarmament
of Hamas before any withdrawal from the Strip. Israeli media reports indicate
that the Israeli army has scaled back its operations in the Gaza Strip in recent
days following US pressure, carrying out strikes only aimed at eliminating
"imminent" threats to its forces or targeting individuals it claims were
involved in the October 7, 2013, attack. The Hamas attack resulted in the deaths
of 1,221 people, according to an AFP tally based on official Israeli figures.
The perpetrators also took 251 hostages into the Gaza Strip. In contrast, the
Israeli war in Gaza has killed more than 73,000 people, according to the
Hamas-run Ministry of Health in Gaza, whose data is considered reliable by the
United Nations.
Israel Reports of Foiling Turkish Deployment in Syria
from Mount Hermon
Janoubia/August 25, 2026
(Google translation from Arabic)
Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz stated on Tuesday that Israel acted to
thwart what he described as a Turkish attempt to establish a military presence
in Syria, considering it a threat to Israeli security interests. During a visit
to the Mount Hermon site inside Syrian territory, Katz affirmed that the Israeli
army will continue its operations in the area as long as threats to Israel's
security and its towns persist. He added that the army conducts daily operations
to thwart threats and eliminate what he termed "the remnants of the former
Syrian regime," and to prevent organizations that Israel considers dangerous
from consolidating their presence. Katz said that Israel "made its position
clear" regarding the Turkish presence in Syria, emphasizing that it will
continue to act to prevent any military deployment that it deems a threat to its
security. Katz's statements come after an Israeli strike that, according to the
Israeli account, targeted Turkish forces preparing to deploy at an airbase in
northern Syria. In contrast, the Turkish Ministry of Defense denied the presence
of any Turkish military delegation at the base before or during the Israeli
strikes, and also denied Israeli accusations regarding the deployment of its
forces there. Ankara affirmed its continued support for the Syrian regime led by
Ahmed al-Sharaa, at a time when relations between Israel and Turkey are
increasingly strained due to Turkey's growing influence in Syria.
Damascus Witnesses Intensive Meetings to Finalize SDF
Integration into State Institutions
Syria/Kurdish Language to be Adopted as an Elective Subject
with Two Weekly Classes at the Start of the 2026-2027 Academic Year
Damascus: Suad Jarous/Al-Sharq Al-Awsat/August 25, 2026
(Google translation from Arabic)
For the second time in less than a month, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa met
on Tuesday with Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF),
in the presence of Ilham Ahmed, head of foreign relations for the Autonomous
Administration, in the Syrian capital, Damascus. This was followed by another
meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, who had previously met
with Abdi and Ahmed on Monday.
The Kurdish Hawar News Agency reported that a military and security delegation
accompanied Abdi and Ahmed to Damascus. The delegation held meetings with
security leaders in Hasakah Governorate and Syrian government officials as part
of the executive procedures to finalize the practical and implementation steps
for the integration. The Kurdish delegation included Nawroz Ahmed, a member of
the General Command of the Women's Protection Units (YPJ), and Samir Ousso, the
Deputy Minister of Defense for Eastern Region Affairs, along with security
leaders. The intensive meetings held in Damascus, under a media blackout,
discussed the appointment of Kurdish figures to key positions within the state.
Kurdish media outlets reported that "the implementation arrangements were
discussed, and some leaders were assigned to various roles in different areas of
Hasakah Governorate, in line with the process of unifying security operations
and institutions within the Syrian state." Regarding the education file, leaks
indicate that no agreement or understanding has been reached to resolve the
controversy on this matter, and with the start of the academic year approaching,
the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) issued a decision a short while ago to
introduce the Kurdish language as an official and organized part of the
curriculum in Syrian schools starting with the 2026-2027 academic year. In
implementation of Decree No. 13 of 2026 and the executive instructions issued by
the Ministry of Education, which adopted it as an optional subject with two
periods per week, "in a step aimed at preserving cultural and linguistic rights
and promoting diversity within the framework of a unified Syrian national
identity," according to the SANA news agency on Tuesday.
Abdi had previously stated to the Kurdish network Rudaw that they (the Kurdish
self-administration) "will not accept Kurdish as an optional language in
predominantly Kurdish areas, but they intend to maintain it as the primary
language of instruction," and that they are "open to teaching Arabic alongside
Kurdish in the region," as the government has suggested. The self-administration
has adopted Kurdish as the language of instruction in its areas since the
establishment of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria 15 years
ago, leading to a division in the curricula in those areas, as Arabs, Assyrians,
and other groups have refused to have their children educated in Kurdish,
insisting on adhering to the Syrian Ministry of Education's curriculum.
Discussions continue regarding the integration of the Women's Protection Units
(YPJ) and the specific implementation arrangements within this process. It
remains unclear whether the YPJ will be integrated into the Ministry of Interior
or remain within a structure under the Ministry of Defense, specifically in
Hasakah Governorate, given the Ministry of Defense's refusal to establish a
separate military body for women within the Syrian Army. Prior to his departure
for Damascus, Abdi announced the completion of the military, security, and
administrative integration, moving from the integration phase to implementing
the resulting arrangements on the ground. He denied the dissolution of the
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), stating that their structure would be
transformed into brigades affiliated with the Syrian Army, and that joint forces
would remain in Kurdish-majority areas to defend them. He also revealed his
readiness to launch a political party, free from a "nationalist character,"
which he would personally lead. The party, expected to be launched before the
end of 2026, will include Syrian figures from diverse ethnic and religious
backgrounds, similar to Kurdish parties in Turkey. However, the absence of a
Syrian law regulating political parties is expected to be one of the challenges
facing the project, and Abdi is likely to raise this issue in his discussions
with Damascus. Meanwhile, inspection committees from the Syrian Central
Authority for Control and Inspection arrived in Hasakah Governorate as part of
extensive field visits to areas in eastern and northern Syria. These visits aim
to monitor administrative and financial operations in government facilities and
institutions, evaluate performance, and combat corruption and abuses within the
governorate. This follows a tour conducted by the committees at the al-Omar oil
field in the Deir ez-Zor countryside, during which a number of employees were
detained on corruption charges.
Al-Sharaa: Syria “Tears Out a Page of Its Painful Past” by
Being Removed from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism… Thanks to the US
President and Friendly and Supporting Countries
Damascus/Middle East/August 25, 2026
(Google translation from Arabic)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa welcomed the United States’ announcement of
removing his country from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, saying:
“Today, Syria is shaking off a dark burden and tearing out a page of its painful
past, to embark on a path of development, reconstruction, and rebuilding.” In a
televised address to the Syrian people, carried by the official Syrian news
agency SANA, al-Sharaa added: “Great people of Syria, you have done it again.
The sanctions have been lifted and the restrictions removed, and I ask God to
help us serve you.” The Syrian president expressed his deep gratitude to his
American counterpart, Donald Trump, and to all the friendly and supporting
countries that stood by Syria.
Gulf States Welcome Washington's Removal of Syria from the
List of State Sponsors of Terrorism
Riyadh/Asharq Al-Awsat/August 25, 2026 (Google
translation from Arabic)
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) welcomed on Tuesday
the United States' announcement of its decision to remove Syria from the list of
state sponsors of terrorism, considering the move a positive development that
will support stability in Syria and the region. The Saudi Ministry of Foreign
Affairs expressed the Kingdom's welcome of the American announcement,
congratulating the Syrian government and people on this step and wishing Syria
continued security, stability, and prosperity, and the continuation of its
reconstruction and development efforts to fulfill the aspirations of its people.
In a statement, the Ministry affirmed that the Kingdom reiterates its support
for the positive steps taken by the Syrian government that enhance Syria's
security and stability, contribute to building state institutions, and meet the
aspirations of the Syrian people for a more stable and prosperous future. Qatar
welcomed the United States' decision to remove Syria from its list of state
sponsors of terrorism. The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the
move represents a positive development that contributes to supporting efforts
aimed at achieving stability in Syria and the region, and strengthening the
political settlement process, in accordance with international resolutions and
in a way that fulfills the aspirations of the Syrian people. The Ministry
reiterated Doha's support for Syria's unity, sovereignty, and independence,
affirming its solidarity with the Syrian people in achieving their security,
stability, and prosperity. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) also welcomed the
United States' announcement of its ratification of the decision to remove Syria
from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. GCC Secretary-General Jassem
Al-Budaiwi affirmed that this step represents a positive development that will
support efforts to enhance Syria's security and stability, and create the
appropriate conditions for advancing recovery and development, thus fulfilling
the aspirations of the brotherly Syrian people for a future of security,
stability, and prosperity. The Secretary-General reiterated the GCC's firm and
unwavering support for the Syrian Arab Republic, its sovereignty, independence,
and territorial integrity, and stressed the importance of the international
community continuing its efforts and steps in support of the Syrian leadership
and its people. The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) issued an official update to its sanctions regulations on Monday,
announcing the removal of Syria from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.
This followed the completion of the legal procedures related to congressional
review without any objections. The U.S. State Department also removed Hayat
Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) from its list of designated global terrorist organizations.
HTS emerged from Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, before severing
ties with it in 2016. The Treasury Department, in a statement released Monday,
also announced the removal of HTS from its sanctions list targeting a number of
individuals and entities.
Katz Visits His Troops in Syria and Vows to Keep Them "As
Long as There Are Threats" / Damascus Condemns the Israeli Defense Minister's
"Illegal Entry" into Its Territory
Middle East / August 25, 2026 (Google translation from
Arabic)
Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz made a rare visit to his troops in
southern Syria on Tuesday, reiterating his pledge to keep them in the region as
long as there are "threats" to his country's security, according to Agence
France-Presse. The visit comes a week after Israel bombed the out-of-service Abu
al-Duhur airbase in northwestern Syria, claiming it wanted to prevent the
deployment of Turkish forces at the facility. Ankara denied sending any
delegation to the base. Israeli forces have been stationed in southern Syria in
a "security zone" since the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024.
The Israeli forces are deployed in the buffer zone, patrolled by the United
Nations, which has separated Israeli and Syrian forces in the Israeli-occupied
Golan Heights since 1974. Katz said, “There is daily activity here to thwart
threats, eliminate remnants of the old regime, and prevent the dangerous
entrenchment of the new one,” according to a video statement released by his
office. He added, “The message is also clear to the Syrian president: When you
wake up in the morning in your palace in Damascus, look towards Mount Hermon
(Mount Sheikh), and see the IDF, you know that we are here to protect our towns
and our borders.” Katz continued, “As long as there are threats, the IDF will
remain here to ensure our security. This is what we have done, and this is what
we intend to continue doing in the future.” Israel has launched hundreds of
strikes in Syria since the fall of Assad and has repeatedly incursions into
Syrian territory. Israeli officials have also repeatedly pledged to maintain
forces in the “security zone,” where Israel seeks to establish a wider
demilitarized area. The IDF Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir,
visited troops in the area last week, emphasizing that the army will not allow
threats to “entrench” on the border. During his visit on Tuesday, Katz addressed
the strike targeting the Abu al-Duhur airbase, stating that Israel "acted
against an attempt by Turkey to entrench itself in Syria, which threatens
Israeli security interests." Syria condemned Katz's "illegal entry" into its
territory today, following a rare visit he made to his troops stationed in the
south of the country. The Syrian Foreign Ministry, in a statement, denounced
Katz's "illegal entry and his crossing of the international borders of the
Syrian Arab Republic, in flagrant violation of the country's sovereignty and
territorial integrity." It called on the international community to take "the
necessary measures to compel the occupying authorities to cease their repeated
violations."
Syria condemns Israeli Defense Minister's entry into its territory; Katz: We
will not act
Al-Markazia/August 25, 2026 (Google translation from Arabic)
The Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates condemned the entry of
Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz into Syrian territory, considering the
move a new violation of Syria's sovereignty. The ministry said in a statement
that Katz's entry into Syrian territory constitutes "a blatant violation of the
country's sovereignty and territorial integrity," emphasizing Damascus's
rejection of Israeli actions within Syrian territory. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Expatriates stressed that these actions, according to the statement,
constitute "a clear provocation and a violation of international law and the UN
Charter," as well as a breach of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement. The ministry
emphasized the necessity of respecting the ceasefire lines and not crossing
them, given the continued tension on the border and Israeli actions within
Syrian territory. The Syrian stance comes as Damascus repeatedly demands a halt
to Israeli incursions and respect for the country's sovereignty, citing the 1974
Disengagement Agreement that has governed the situation between the two sides
since then. The Syrian Foreign Ministry called on the international community to
"assume its legal and political responsibilities," demanding that it take the
necessary measures to compel Israel to cease what it described as "repeated
violations." It also demanded "the immediate and complete withdrawal from the
Syrian territories into which the occupation forces have penetrated, and a
return to the disengagement line," while emphasizing respect for the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic. The 1974 Disengagement
Agreement serves as the fundamental framework for the existing arrangements in
the buffer zone between Syria and Israel. It was reached following the October
1973 war and stipulated the separation of forces and ceasefire monitoring
arrangements. The statement reiterated Damascus's commitment to its sovereignty
over all its territory and its rejection of any Israeli presence or movement
within Syrian borders, calling on the international community to exert pressure
to stop these practices. The Syrian Foreign Ministry views the Israeli Defense
Minister's visit as part of a series of actions that Damascus considers
violations of its sovereignty. It reiterated its demand for withdrawal from the
areas occupied by Israeli forces and a return to the arrangements stipulated in
the 1974 agreement. Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz reaffirmed that the
Israeli army will not withdraw from the buffer zone in southern Syria during a
visit to the area today. Katz stated, "We will not move from Mount Hermon and
the security zone as long as there are jihadist threats to the State of Israel,"
addressing Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa directly: "When you wake up in the
morning in the palace in Damascus and look at Mount Hermon and see the Israeli
army, you will know that we are here to defend our towns and our borders." He
added that Israel "acted against a Turkish attempt to establish a presence in
Syria, which would jeopardize Israeli security interests," referring to the
Israeli airstrike last week that targeted a Syrian airbase. Katz continued, "We
have made this clear, and we will maintain this position in the future as well."
Canada imposes $20 billion in retaliatory tariffs on US
goods in response to Trump, effective from September 8
Riyadh - Al Arabiya/August 25/2026 (Google
translation from Arabic)
Canada announced Tuesday the imposition of retaliatory tariffs on American goods
ranging from 15% to 50%, amid an escalating trade war between the two
historically close neighbors. The tariffs imposed by Ottawa will take effect on
September 8, a date set by Prime Minister Mark Carney after the 50% US tariffs
on Canadian products went into effect on Saturday. Canadian officials stated
Tuesday that the new tariffs will match the levels of the US tariffs, coinciding
with the announcement of a $5.4 billion aid package for affected businesses and
workers.
The Canadian retaliatory tariffs target more than 700 American goods, including
steel and electrical appliances, as the trade war between the two countries
intensifies.
Quebec's French Language a Stumbling Block in
US-Canadian Trade Negotiations
Montreal, Canada/Middle East/August 25, 2026 (Google
translation from Arabic)
The defense of Quebec's culture and French language has become a major sticking
point in trade negotiations between Ottawa and Washington, according to Canadian
Prime Minister Mark Carney, who confirmed that he refused to make any
concessions to US demands. The Canadian Prime Minister explained that "there is
a very large gap between Canadian and American perspectives" on culture. Carney
denounced the demands made by the American side "in the final hours," which he
described as addressing "fundamental rights," most notably a review of subsidies
allocated to Francophone culture, the role of Francophone media online, and the
requirement for bilingual labeling on products sold in Canada, according to
Agence France-Presse. Geneviève Talley, a professor of political science at the
University of Ottawa, explained that "the issue of Quebec's cultural
specialization has always been a source of irritation for the Americans," adding
that other factors also contributed to the failure of the talks, including
additional tariffs on the automotive sector. US Trade Representative Jamison
Greer told CNBC television yesterday (Monday) that "Canada is forcing American
technology companies to take a percentage of their profits to return to Canadian
competitors." Last July, Carney announced the cancellation of a planned 5% tax
on US online streaming platforms. However, the French-speaking US negotiator,
Greer, expressed his understanding of "why Quebecers want content" in French. In
Quebec, there was widespread support for Carney's decision to break off
negotiations on Friday and defend the province's cultural rights, where French
is the predominant language for more than 75% of its 9 million residents. A poll
published Sunday by the Angus Reid Institute showed that 85% of Quebecers
believe it was "the right decision." “Marc Carneille has been heavily criticized
for his lack of empathy with the Francophone reality,” said Geneviève Talley,
noting that the center-left Liberal prime minister had never taken such a stance
since taking office in March 2025. Quebec Premier Christine Fréchette, speaking
alongside Carneille on Monday, remarked that “Quebec faces enormous challenges,”
but “will not be intimidated.” In a post on her X account on Sunday, Fréchette,
who is leading in the polls for the October 5 legislative elections, wrote: “Our
identity is not up for negotiation.” The prominence that Quebec culture and the
French language have acquired in the trade war with the United States has even
drawn reactions in Europe. Jean-Luc Mélenchon, leader of the radical left-wing
party La France Insoumise, said on Sunday: “Trump is threatening Quebec. It
would be bad for him if he went any further. The French are tied to Quebec.”
Let's be prepared to act to save Canada and Quebec.
The Latest LCCC analysis & editorials from
miscellaneous sources published
on August 25-26/2026
The November Elections: Different Inputs, Different Outputs
Nabil Amr/Asharq Al-Awsat/August 25/2026
Since President Mahmoud Abbas issued his decrees calling legislative elections
for November of this year, a noisy argument has broken out among Palestinians,
beginning with the question of whether the elections will actually be held- or
whether the decrees are merely a maneuver to release the pressure of internal
tension. And before any conclusive answer to that question had taken shape, an
active process of preparing for the elections began, through consultations and
understandings over the formation of electoral lists, as though the vote were
certain to be held, and soon.
Between the last elections, held in 2006, and the November scheduled elections,
developments occurred that produced deep and far-reaching changes in the
Palestinian situation.
The largest and gravest split in Palestinian history took place; Gaza fell under
Hamas rule and entered a state of war with Israel, its military rounds pausing
only for a time while the strangling siege imposed on it never lifted- this in
the smallest and most densely populated place there is.
Matters reached the point of a war of extermination, and of Gaza's submission to
the trusteeship of the Board of Peace, without Israel's leaving three-quarters
of its territory.
Hamas came to a decline in standing and influence it could not have anticipated:
it is negotiating with the new trustee, Mladenov, over its own fate, having
relinquished the government of Gaza and given up the use of weapons. In a war
that ran more than two and a half years, Hamas lost every fighting, economic,
and administrative capacity it possessed- quite apart from the leaders, cadres,
and members it lost. After President Abbas issued his decrees fixing the date of
the legislative elections, Hamas officially announced its acceptance and
readiness to contest the vote directly and under its own name, rather than under
assumed names, as had been reported.
Hamas found in the legislative elections a suitable shelter from what threatens
its political existence, now that the Gaza file- or its first phase- has been
closed. It therefore decided to go to the polls, but this time through an
expanded list including other factions not registered in Hamas's name. This will
be the most important variable in the inputs of the November elections, and will
bear on their outputs in the number of seats won and the capacity to shape
decisions.
In discussing the legislative elections and Hamas's position in them, one ought
also to take stock of the changes that have come over Fatah in the period
between the second legislative elections, which were undone, and the coming
November vote.
On both previous occasions, whatever differences and struggles for influence
beset it, Fatah contested the elections as a single central bloc. And though it
lacked the qualification to form a government, it was powerfully present in
shaping political life, through its control of the West Bank and its hold on the
legitimacy recognized regionally and internationally.
The second elections produced a short-lived Hamas government, and an attempt was
made to repair matters by forming a coalition government, but the experiment
failed. The split then developed by way of a military coup Hamas carried out
against the coalition government, reaching the point of a separation between the
West Bank and Gaza that every attempt to end has failed.
For the first time in their history, Palestinians living under occupation came
to have two political systems and two legitimacies: One legal, the other a
legitimacy of fait accompli. The scene appeared to be a split between fighters
and negotiators- until, in our own days, the fighter has been stripped of his
weapons and of the legitimacy of fait accompli, and the negotiator stripped of
the negotiations, so that the two meet in a single place. It was not the
homeland and its needs that united them, but the impasse, and the necessity of
taking part in managing it and tending to their interests within it.
Hamas and Fatah are going into the elections at their weakest. Hamas has been
weakened by the war of extermination and by the absence of allies; Fatah, by its
internal struggles and by the absence of the political prospect that used to
justify its steps, whatever direction it took.
The two will meet in the corridor leading to the next Legislative Council, with
no guarantee for either that it can form a government. That is what will produce
different outputs for a parliament whose inputs are different.
The expected image of the third Palestinian parliament is that it will hold
formations limited in size, given the number and variety of the lists being
prepared- clan lists, regional lists, sectoral lists, and alliances of
individuals with no ties to the organizations, whose influence has receded to
the point where they are searching for clan, regional, or sectoral levers to
secure themselves a presence in the new parliament. If no surprise occurs to
furnish a logical pretext for postponing the elections, and they are held on
schedule, Palestinians will obtain a pluralist parliament- one that will make
coalitions necessary to form a legitimate government and an effective opposition
to it.
This will happen for the first time since the first and second elections of the
Authority era, because the party loyalty that once imposed itself on the
factions' parliamentarians, and the factions' dominance, will not be there this
time. Perhaps we will find a parliament that changes a Palestinian political
life long lived inside the closed box of the factions- with everything that has
meant, for good and ill.
'They Are Against the Principles of the
Country They Live In': The Islamization of Europe
Robert Williams/Gatestone Institute/August 25, 2026
"Europe should wake up. If they remain silent it will be destroyed from within.
It is almost already destroyed. If Europe does not wake up and prosecute these
people... these people are not only Hamas. These people are against freedom,
against democracy, against secularism, they are against the basic principles of
the country they live in." – A Gazan living in Belgium, Channel 12 News, July
2026. After the report was issued, Belgian federal MP Sam van Rooy... requested
a city council emergency session, but could not find enough votes to get one. No
meeting was held; no other party found it necessary. This indifference to the
security of the local Christian and Jewish communities, the city and country at
large, is particularly jarring after documentation exposed that Hamas was
planning an October 7-style mass attack against Jewish and Israeli targets in
Europe, scheduled to coincide with the second anniversary of the October 7, 2023
atrocities.
Perhaps one might argue that the Belgian government, which has shown itself to
be extremely anti-Israel, does not care that Hamas raises funds in the country:
the victims are "only" Israelis and Jews. So far. "Germany and other European
countries are now increasingly being viewed as operational areas for possible
attacks." —German Federal Prosecutor General Jens Rommel, Jerusalem Post, June
16, 2026ز In 2024, Belgium received half of all Palestinian asylum applications
submitted in the entire EU. In that year alone, 3,281 Palestinians were granted
formal refugee status by Belgium.
"This is not a Jewish problem, but a European problem." – Ralph Pais, vice-chair
of the Jewish Information and Documentation Center, Antwerp, Belgium, September
11, 2025.At the heart of the European Union, Belgium exemplifies better than
perhaps any other Western European country the extent to which political elites
seem to almost relish the degree to which Europe is being Islamized. In July
2026, Israel's Channel 12 News aired a report warning that Hamas terrorists,
including high-ranking members of the organization's Al-Qassam Brigades, now
live in Antwerp -- some of whom, according to local Gazans opposed to Hamas, are
receiving Belgian citizenship."Little Gaza," as the neighborhood in northern
Antwerp is called in the report, has a large population of Gazans from Khan
Younis, a major Hamas stronghold. Hamas-linked residents there traffic in
illegal narcotics, run shops and restaurants, and send the proceeds to Hamas in
Gaza, according to the interviewed Gazans, who only dared speak anonymously out
of fear of revenge from local Hamas supporters."You feel as if you are visiting
Palestine", one Arab said. The local baker, who sells only Gazan specialties,
agreed that walking on that street was like "walking in Khan Younis."
According to the Channel 12 report:
"In little Gaza in the heart of Antwerp you get the scent of the Strip,
literally. From restaurants... to shops and supermarkets, most business owners
come from Khan Younis. The names of the stores also reflect the character of the
immigrants here: From 'Haifa market' on the way to 'Rafah Market', and, of
course, 'Al Quds....'"Some people here in the street support Hamas, they are
also from Gaza. Others say it's a terrorist organization. But no one dares to
say that out loud, because they know that this terrorist organization can get
anybody through their people, who are also here...voices against Hamas are only
a whisper in Gaza because of fear from the threats of the terrorist
organization. But the strange thing is that they are also afraid here in
Antwerp, in Belgium, in Europe..."The journalist, an Israeli, asked a Gazan
whether he personally knew anyone from Hamas living in Antwerp. The man
responded:
"The man who investigated me when I was in Israel is in Antwerp...and now has a
Belgian citizenship. He was even a leader in Hamas in the regiment of Din
Al-Qassam... he collects money.... all these businesses they [Hamas] opened
here. Donations are collected through banks. They have businesses here, they
have drugs.""They send money to Hamas and support them," said another local
Gazan. He mentioned fundraisers for the children of Gaza as one way to drive
donations. "Europe should wake up. If they remain silent it will be destroyed
from within. It is almost already destroyed. If Europe does not wake up and
prosecute these people... these people are not only Hamas. These people are
against freedom, against democracy, against secularism, they are against the
basic principles of the country they live in."
Belgian politicians, however, do not appear particularly bothered by this
increasing political, cultural and demographic threat. After the report was
issued, Belgian federal MP Sam van Rooy, who also serves as a representative in
the Antwerp City Council for the Vlaams Belang party, requested a city council
emergency session, but could not find enough votes to get one.
According to Van Rooy:
"This particularly worrying report shows that Hamas members and terrorists not
only live in Antwerp and operate shops and restaurants, but also sponsor Hamas
in Gaza and threaten opponents of Hamas," They have no place in our city and
must be tracked down, detained, and deported."No meeting was held; no other
party found it necessary. This indifference to the security of the local
Christian and Jewish communities, the city and country at large, is particularly
jarring after documentation exposed that Hamas was planning an October 7-style
mass attack against Jewish and Israeli targets in Europe, scheduled to coincide
with the second anniversary of the October 7, 2023 atrocities. Already in
February 2024, Belgium's Minister of Justice Paul Van Tigchelt confirmed that
Belgian authorities are fully cognizant of Hamas' activities in the country. He
implicitly made it quite clear that no one could care less. "So far, we know
that Hamas is active in Belgium through various companies. The activities (...)
focus on lobbying and fundraising," he remarked at the time.
Hamas, in fact, has much more than shops and restaurants in Belgium. It has
front companies operating next to the European Commission and the EU Council.
Perhaps one might argue that the Belgian government, which has shown itself to
be extremely anti-Israel, does not care that Hamas raises funds in the country:
the victims are "only" Israelis and Jews. So far. Europe's status, however, has
changed. German Federal Prosecutor General Jens Rommel – whose office has been
arranging the arrests of nine of the Hamas suspects behind the European October
7 terrorist plot – warned in June that Europe no longer mainly serves as a place
where terrorist organizations generate funds to finance their terrorism.
"Rather, Germany and other European countries are now increasingly being viewed
as operational areas for possible attacks. This becomes particularly evident in
the case of Hamas. To prepare attacks in Europe, their foreign operatives,
sympathizers, or individuals connected to organized crime acquire and smuggle
weapons. They often hold European citizenship, or residence permits within the
Schengen Area, allowing them to move freely. They are highly mobile and
extensively networked, and some possess significant financial resources."In
Belgium, however, such concerns seem to play no role whatsoever. In 2024, the
country received half of all Palestinian asylum applications submitted in the
entire EU. In that year alone, 3,281 Palestinians were granted formal refugee
status by Belgium. A Hamas terrorist from Khan Yunis, Mohannad al-Khatib, who
participated in the October 7, 2023 massacre but calls himself as a freelance
journalist, was able freely to enter Belgium to claim asylum there. Belgian
authorities were only alerted to his terrorist background because the
Antwerp-based Jewish Information and Documentation Center (JID) compiled
information about him appearing in footage inside or near Israeli territory
during the Hamas invasion.
Ralph Pais, vice-chair of JID, said:
"It is incomprehensible that volunteers and citizens could identify this man
through open sources, while our security services apparently never noticed him.
The material clearly shows that he filmed the violence, applauded it, and openly
expresses support for Hamas, rocket attacks, and martyrdom. "Anyone in Europe
who wants to protect synagogues, schools, churches, metros, or events has every
interest in ensuring that terrorists do not enter unnoticed. This is not a
Jewish problem, but a European problem. We demand full transparency about how
such individuals gained access to Europe, and immediate security checks by the
competent authorities."Although Al-Khatib's application was ultimately rejected
by Belgium, he remained in the country -- where he apparently continues to live
-- and is free to travel throughout the EU. Nobody cares.Twice already, Hamas
has thanked Belgium for its support. Perhaps Belgium and other countries that
align with and harbor terrorist groups should be viewed as security threats to
Europe?
** Robert Williams is based in the United States.
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/22787/islamization-of-europe-belgium
© 2026 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute.
Tom Barrack: “Strange” Statements
Dr. Ahmed Yousef Ahmed/Al-Ittihad/August 25, 2026
Last Friday, Tom Barrack, the US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to the
Levant, made statements about the Syrian Golan Heights that can only be
described as bizarre. In an interview regarding Israel’s presence in the Golan,
he said, “They are still occupying the Golan Heights in defiance of UN
resolutions and against the entire international order, which recognizes the
Golan as Syrian territory.”
The strangeness of the statement does not stem from its inaccuracy. Israel has
occupied the Golan Heights since 1967 and formally annexed it in 1981. Rather,
the strangeness lies in the fact that US President Donald Trump, for whom Tom
Barrack, as ambassador, is supposed to be implementing foreign policy,
recognized full Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights on March 25, 2019,
during his first term. He justified his decision by citing the Golan Heights’
importance to Israel’s security, especially in light of the activities of Iran
and Hezbollah in southern Syria.
Given the clear contradiction between official US policy and these statements,
they sparked widespread reactions, ranging from strong condemnation from Israeli
and right-wing American circles to questions about whether the statements were a
trial balloon for a potential shift or modification in US policy. This is
especially relevant considering some indications of minor contradictions between
Trump's actions on regional issues and Israeli interests, as well as the
apparent rapprochement between Trump and the new Syrian leadership. These
questions were clearly reflected in some Israeli media outlets, which expressed
concern that the statements might signal a change or shift in the Trump
administration's approach to shaping security relations in Syria and the region.
Given these concerns, Netanyahu was keen to release a video showcasing Israel's
unwavering control over the Golan Heights, emphasizing that this control is
permanent and praising Trump's historic decision to recognize Israeli
sovereignty over the Golan in 2019.
Meanwhile, the Israeli Defense Minister directly attacked Tom Barak, accusing
his statements of being riddled with inaccuracies and misleading positions. He
also pointed out the contradiction between Barak's statements and his
president's policies. The criticism extended to the American arena, particularly
from right-wing figures close to Trump, who called for Barak's resignation. This
attack and criticism prompted Tom Barak to issue an official clarification less
than 24 hours later, retracting his statements and explaining that they were a
reference to the historical situation in the region and did not imply any change
in American policy—a clarification his initial remarks could not possibly
support.
Generally, this was not the first time Tom Barrack had made "ill-considered"
statements. On July 11, 2025, he stated that "if Lebanon does not act to address
the issue of Hezbollah's arsenal, it will face an existential threat and will
once again become part of the Levant." Given the predictable reactions to the
statement, Barrack quickly clarified that his words did not contain any kind of
threat to Lebanon, and that the aim of the statement was to praise the
tremendous progress being made in Syria! And to try to urge Lebanese leaders to
seize regional opportunities! This is the second time that clarifications have
explicitly contradicted the wording of the statement. Here, the issue shifts
from questioning whether the statements of a senior American diplomat indicate a
possible shift in policy to questioning the competence and focus of a senior
official in the agency responsible for implementing this policy.
Does Democracy Prevent Wars or Incite Them?
Mohammed Al-Rumaihi/Al-Nahar/August 25, 2026 (Google translation
from Arabic)
When looking at the bigger picture of what is happening around us, a question
arises that may seem provocative: Does democracy actually prevent wars, or does
it, under certain circumstances, pave the way for them?
The question cannot be answered with a simplistic, academic statement such as
"democracies are peaceful, and dictatorships are aggressive." History is more
complex, and politics, when it involves ballot boxes or the lust for power,
becomes even more so. I acknowledge that the concept is inherently ambiguous,
and what is meant here is the rise of leadership through free elections!
Let's take Israel; it is approaching elections that many observers
describe as pivotal. In any electoral system, the candidate seeks to capture the
mood of the majority, to meet its needs, and sometimes even its fears. The
problem begins when fear becomes the most sought-after political commodity. A
large segment of Israeli society lives with an obsession for security and fear
of its neighbors. Here, the most hardline politician can present himself as the
most capable of providing protection. Benjamin Netanyahu knows this equation
well, which is why he uses categorical language like: "Neither Hamas-stan nor
Fatah-stan as long as I am prime minister." This statement isn't just a security
stance; it's also an electoral message to a public that wants to hear that the
threat is contained and that a strong leader is in place. And the posturing
doesn't stay within the country; he even described Britain as the "United
Islamic Kingdom" simply because it politically opposed his government!
Here, democracy doesn't necessarily create war, but it can turn fear into
electoral fuel. Then, extremism becomes a path to the ballot box, and
politicians may find it advantageous to amplify the crisis rather than address
its root causes.
Let's look at the United States, the oldest and most influential of modern
democracies. There, too, we see widespread political investment in fear: fear of
immigrants, of the different other, of job loss, and of newcomers taking what
citizens believe is rightfully theirs. Donald Trump didn't invent these fears,
but he knew how to amass them and transform them into electoral power. Thus, if
a culture of rational politics weakens, democracy can reward those who raise the
level of anxiety rather than those who lower it. But is the alternative
dictatorship? Certainly not. Vladimir Putin didn't need to convince free voters
before launching his war in Ukraine. The initial assessment was that the
military operation would be short and that Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, would
fall quickly. More than four years have passed, the war continues, and the human
and economic losses are enormous. In a closed system, a leader can commit a
historic blunder and then prevent society from holding him
accountable.Dictatorships are not monolithic. They can be secular, as in Russia,
or religious, as in Iran. What they have in common is the narrowing of the space
for accountability. When money is squandered, or people's living standards
decline, and repression becomes widespread, the circle of foreign adventures
widens. There is no real mechanism through which citizens can say "enough." Even
a faint voice can come at a heavy price.
A third model remains worthy of consideration, which is what some literature
calls meritocracy or competence-based governance. China offers the clearest
example. Leaders there don't typically rise to power through a sudden populist
surge, but rather ascend within a political establishment through years of work,
testing, and advancement. This system has its well-known flaws, foremost among
them weak political participation and limited freedoms, but it has thus far
produced a leadership more cautious about direct involvement in major wars,
because it calculates the costs with a long-term perspective.
This does not mean that China is immune to risk-taking, nor that its system is
the ideal model. It simply means that the method of selecting leadership
influences how war and peace are calculated.
Today, we face a world of extreme danger and complexity, with the Middle East at
the heart of the peril. Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, Sudan, and other regions teeter on
the brink of renewed conflict. The paradox is that almost every side claims to
be defending the homeland, while it is the citizens themselves who pay the
price: death, destruction, poverty, displacement, and generations who will bear
the scars of war for many years to come.
Herein lies a paradox; In a democracy, the voter can remove the ruler, but the
ruler can influence them through fear, convincing them that the battle is not
between programs, but between survival and annihilation. Questions about
education, health, and the economy then recede, while security takes precedence.
The higher the level of fear, the more popular the politician who promises
protection. Therefore, the ballot box alone is not enough to make a decision for
war rational.In contrast, a dictator does not need a majority, but he needs a
narrative. He claims the nation is besieged, that a vast conspiracy exists, and
that dissent is treason. The media then becomes a tool to reinforce this
narrative. The result may be the same: the democrat exploits public fear to
maintain his power, and the dictator imposes fear on the public to maintain his.
Therefore, the more pertinent question is: Which system places barriers before a
leader sends the people to war? A free parliament is a barrier, a free press is
a barrier, an independent judiciary is a barrier, accurate information is a
barrier, and so is an elite capable of saying "no" when the public is driven by
emotion. Thus, democracy alone is not a guarantee of peace, nor is dictatorship
a guarantee of stability, nor is governance based on competence a magic formula.
The most important issue is the existence of institutions that can curb the
decision when fear turns into policy, and personal ambition into a state
project, and this will only happen through a societal culture that establishes
the values of accountability. Some societies have not been born with those
values! War often begins when a society loses its ability to hold accountable
those who call it to war.
The Arab Leftists: From Lenin's Hammer to Khomeini's Turban
M. Abdullah Ouda Al-Ghabin / Al-Arabiya.net /2026 (Google translation from
Arabic)
In February 1979, as the Shah’s throne fell and Khomeini entered Tehran
returning from exile, many Arab leftists and nationalists stood contemplating a
strange spectacle: a popular revolution that had toppled a Western-backed
monarchy, placed Palestine as its slogan, defied Washington, and spoke in the
name of the "dispossessed." The scene possessed all the elements of the
revolutionary theater they knew, except that the actors this time wore turbans
rather than party caps or red scarves.
That moment must be understood not as an ideological conversion from Marxism and
leftism to Khomeinist Shiism, but rather as a transition from revolution to
revolution, from one protest banner to another. The central question is: How was
a religious-sectarian project based on Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the
Islamic Jurist) and the "export of the revolution" able to attract Arab elites
who originally hailed from leftist, nationalist, and secular backgrounds—some of
whom were entirely distant from religion to begin with? The hypothesis proposed
in this text is that the hammer dropped from the hand, but the psychological
need for the hammer did not drop with it.
It is essential from the outset to define precisely whom we are talking about.
This article is not about the mercenaries—those whom Tehran bought with money,
positions, or influence, for they are not an intellectual subject to begin with;
someone who changes their stance in exchange for political gain does not require
an analysis of their psychological structure, because they have become a tool
studied in the context of influence rather than intellectual transformation. Nor
are we talking about "the Arab" in absolute terms, but rather a specific
intellectual elite: that leftist or nationalist who embraced the Khomeinist
project out of political conviction, was psychologically drawn to it, or saw in
it a new extension of a revolution they had been searching for after the
collapse of their old projects. The question, therefore, does not concern those
whom Iran paid, but rather how Iran convinced those it did not need to pay.
To understand this elite, one must return to the generation of defeats that
forged them. The Arab world lived for centuries under Ottoman rule, followed by
the Great Arab Revolt as a promise of independence that quickly collided with
European colonialism, the partitioning of the region, and the establishment of
mandates. Then came the Palestinian cause to add a massive political and
psychological wound. An entire Arab generation grew up within a successive
series of disappointments: colonialism, fragmentation, Palestine, the weakness
of the national state, and the wide gap between dream and reality. On the other
side of the world, the Bolshevik Revolution had opened up a completely different
horizon; the Soviet Union and its global revolutionary discourse rose, and for
this shattered generation, the left became much more than an economic theory—it
became a promise of salvation.
Gamal Abdel Nasser arrived at an Arab moment psychologically primed for the
emergence of a leader speaking the language of independence, dignity, unity, and
confronting colonialism and Israel. Nasserist nationalism thus emerged as a
broad current promising the Arab person salvation from multiple forms of
hegemony. Parallel to it—not as a substitute—arrived the Arab Marxist left with
its own parties and organizations. The two currents were not identical; they
sometimes intersected in their liberation lexicon and anti-colonialism, and at
other times clashed bloodily, as occurred in stages of the history of Syria,
Egypt, and Iraq. However, what concerns us here is
that both, despite their rivalry, bequeathed to a segment of Arab intellectuals
a political culture that viewed politics not merely as the management of
interests, but as a permanent revolution. When the Naksa of 1967 struck,
followed by the retreat of the nationalist project and later the collapse of the
Soviet Union, this revolutionary psyche found itself facing an inescapable
question: Where does the revolution go after the death of its old projects?
Ideology does not merely grant humanity an interpretation of the world; it
grants them a community to belong to. The leftist used to define themselves
through a complete vocabulary: imperialism, reaction, colonialism, liberation,
the masses, revolution, resistance. When the grand referents collapsed, the
psychological need that those referents satisfied did not necessarily disappear.
Here came the Iranian Revolution with a vocabulary that appeared
religious on the surface, but carried political terms very familiar to the
revolutionary ear: the dispossessed and the arrogant, revolution, America,
Israel, resistance, martyrdom, liberation, confronting hegemony. This leads to
one of the central hypotheses: Did some Arab leftists truly embrace Khomeiniism,
or did they find in it a new language for their old left? There is a political
mind that cannot imagine itself outside the state of revolution; if one
revolution ends, it seeks another, and if a leader falls, it seeks another
leader. One of the practical bridges between this mind and Khomeiniism was the
stance toward Arab monarchies; the historical left viewed them as part of the
system it wished to change, while the Iranian Revolution arrived after
overthrowing a royal throne and raised a cross-border revolutionary discourse
from its very first day. Here an idea emerges that deserves pause: ideological
alliance sometimes does not require agreement about the future; it is enough for
the two parties to agree on whom to oppose in the present.
The same applies to the shared hostility toward the West and the United States
specifically, even though this point carries its own paradox: How can some
reject the liberal state as a political model, yet choose that very state as a
model for life, security, education, and work? This contradiction does not need
named individuals to be scandalous; it is enough to pose it as a question with
which the reader confronts themselves.
If the psychological need for revolution prepared the ground, Palestine was the
practical bridge over which Iran crossed into the Arab conscience. Tehran could
not address the Arab street with its sectarian disputes, but it could address it
with the sole cause capable of transcending borders and sects combined:
Jerusalem.From the early days of the revolution, Palestine became a central part
of the new republic's discourse, and the symbolism of resistance and confronting
Israel was used to build legitimacy extending beyond Iran’s own borders. Suffice
it to recall Yasser Arafat’s early reception of the revolution and his
relationship with Tehran in its beginning stages, and compare it to what the
PLO’s relationship with Iran later became, to pose the question: Was Palestine
the ultimate goal of the Iranian project, or was it also one of the most
important tools for building its Arab influence?
Through this door, Iran entered its relationship with Hamas, and the symbolism
reached its peak when Ismail Haniyeh described Qasem Soleimani as the "Martyr of
Jerusalem." What matters here is not the emotional reaction to the phrase, but
observing how Tehran managed to make an Iranian military symbol part of the
Palestinian lexicon among its Arab allies.
Here we reach the most intellectually provocative paradox in this analysis: How
does an intellectual who once viewed religion as a private matter, or was
influenced by an explicit Marxist critique of the religious establishment,
transition to defending a system that grants the jurist vast political and
religious authority?
The answer begins with a necessary distinction: the point is not the adoption of
Twelver Shiism, but the adoption of the Khomeinist political project—a project
specifically tied to the theory of Velayat-e Faqih and the concept of exporting
the revolution, rather than sectarian affiliation in itself. At its core, it is
a purely political project, not a religious one.
The question worth digging into is: Did these leftists study the doctrinal and
political foundation of the system they defend, or were revolutionary slogans
sufficient to bypass the contradiction? A person might be far from religious to
begin with, yet passionately defend a religious state because they do not see it
as a jurisprudential project, but as a project of confrontation. This explains
one of the strangest phenomena of the Iranian project: its ability to build an
alliance of adversaries—gathering vastly different currents, from Islamists,
nationalists, leftists, armed organizations, and parties whose referents have
nothing to do with Twelver Shiism—under a single umbrella. Tehran was not always
looking for believers in its doctrine, but rather forces that could be
integrated into its network of rivalries and alliances.
Thus, the question becomes less about sect and more about the mechanism of
building influence: How does a highly specific ideological project forge an
alliance of groups that do not agree with it doctrinally, and may not even agree
among themselves?
This alliance cannot be fully understood except by testing it on the ground, and
four Arab cases reveal different facets of this influence:
Yemen: A movement with local Zaydii roots transformed—via an intellectual path
beginning with Badr al-Din al-Houthi toward Jarudism, and then Twelver Shiism
and Khomeiniism—into a political and military project tightly linked to Tehran.
Here, the local project's need for power, funding, and weapons met Iran's need
for an ally on the ground. Iraq: The picture appears
more complex and cautionary at once. The Shiite Hawza is not a single bloc, and
the theory of Velayat-e Faqih in its Iranian formula is not universally agreed
upon by the Shiite religious authorities themselves. This reminds us that
critiquing the Khomeinist project is a critique of a political theory and its
method of use in building regional influence, not a critique of Shiites as a
sect. Syria: Represents the harshest test of the
"dispossessed" discourse. When the Syrian revolution broke out, Iran stood by
Bashar al-Assad's regime, and Hezbollah intervened militarily to support it,
raising an inescapable question: What happens to the slogan of supporting the
dispossessed when the dispossessed themselves are facing Tehran's ally?
Lebanon: Hezbollah's experience provides a model for how this influence
transitions from an intellectual and political relationship into building
complete military and political power inside an Arab state.
Four completely different cases in their roots and paths, yet they all meet at
the exact same point: the capacity of the Iranian project to transform divergent
local demands into tributaries for a single regional project.
Here, the threads of this analysis can be gathered. The old leftist viewed
themselves as part of a global cause transcending state borders—the cause of
workers, global revolution, and liberation from imperialism. Then the "Axis of
Resistance" discourse appeared to offer a similar framework transcending the
national state, extending from Tehran to Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Sana'a, and
Palestine.
The names changed and the referent changed, but the psychological structure
remained strikingly similar: a global axis, a global enemy, a grand cause, a
permanent revolution, and the feeling that one stands on the right side of
history. Perhaps some of these individuals did not transition from the far-left
to Khomeiniism as it superficially appears; rather, they retained the exact same
set of psychological elements: the need for a grand cause, the need for
belonging, the search for permanent revolution, antagonism toward monarchies,
hostility to Western hegemony, and attraction to lofty, confrontational
rhetoric.
What changed was merely the ideological vessel: the vessel was red, then it
became religious; the image was of Marx, Lenin, or a nationalist leader, then it
became the image of the leader of the Iranian Revolution; and the slogan was
"Revolution" and remained "Revolution."
Therefore, the question that should remain with the reader is not why some
leftists became Khomeinists, but rather: Why did a segment of this elite, after
the collapse of its old projects, need the Iranian revolution in order to remain
leftist?
Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that a person can change their ideas faster
than they can change their psychological structure. When the hammer collapsed,
the hand kept searching for something to grasp. And so, it found the turban.
And then the most crucial question: Where will the remaining remnants of Arab
leftists resort to after the impending collapse of the Khomeinist turban?
Would you like to explore how these psychological patterns manifest in any
specific regional case mentioned in the article?
Selected Face Book & X tweets
on August 25/2026
Nadim Koteich to
Robert Malley
X Platform/August 25/2026
Your four questions are serious, but you answer them with a selective reading of
both history and the nature of the Iranian regime. It is funny that you treat
sanctions as uniquely reckless when applied after military degradation, while
overlooking that the same instrument helped produce the JCPOA.
You overlook, as well, that accommodation, multilateralism, and “respect” did
not moderate Tehran. IRGC promptly translated that limited nuclear bargain into
expanded proxy operations across Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
So let me answer your questions.
1. Do we know what comes next?
Yes. The campaign is sequenced precisely because instantaneous, universal
secondary sanctions would risk broader disruption. Prior kinetic operations have
already degraded air defenses, missile and nuclear infrastructure, and the proxy
network. Economic pressure through sectoral measures, designations, and
diplomatic timelines now raises the cost of reconstitution while managing
systemic risk. Third-party compliance is never automatic, yet American financial
leverage remains potent when paired with demonstrated resolve. Refusing to
pressure the very channels Iran has long constructed simply restores the earlier
equilibrium.
2. Can the plan work?
Yes, It can, provided success is defined as altering the regime’s calculation so
that retaining its preferred tools becomes costlier than accepting durable
limits. Let’s not forget that sanctions previously helped produce the JCPOA. So
unless one claims that they are legitimate only under one administration, you
can’t ignore their workability. Actually they’d work better now than before. The
2015 deal constrained enrichment and extended breakout time in exchange for
relief, yet left missiles and proxies untouched. Iran treated the resulting
revenue as license to intensify support for Hezbollah and Hamas, deepen its role
in Syria, expand Iraqi militias, and strengthen the Houthis.
However, after force has already disrupted the Axis, including the fall of
Assad, economic isolation are now leverage over the regime’s survival
itself.
3. What if the plan “works”?
Retaliation remains possible; the regime’s culture favors externalizing costs.
That risk is inherent, not created by sanctions. Force has already raised its
price by removing key leaders, eroding proxy cohesion, and damaging Iranian
capacity. Post-2015 experience shows that limited nuclear diplomacy did not
prevent escalation through proxies. Economic pressure after degradation further
constrains the material base for such action.
4. Can the sanctions be justified?
They impose real hardship on ordinary Iranians. That cost must be acknowledged.
Yet the regime itself has consistently prioritized the IRGC and its proxies over
its population, and the present campaign follows years of attacks conducted
through those networks. After military degradation, broad economic denial is a
proportionate instrument, and more realistic than hopes that respect alone will
transform priorities. Selective skepticism that praises earlier sanctions while
condemning current ones forgets both their prior coercive effect and Iran’s
actual post-JCPOA conduct. Iran is weakened today by force applied against it
and its proxies, not by diplomacy.
Robert Malley
X Platform/August 25/2026
Four questions about the so-called D-day sanctions, and an overriding point:
devastating a country is a far cry from accomplishing a defined policy
objective:
1. Do we (or the administration) know what comes next? Not really. The
announcement was as belligerent as it was vague. Bessent’s most revealing
admission was that immediately imposing the sanctions in full would blow up the
global financial system. If the Trump administration is unwilling to do that
now, why would it be willing to do it at any point? And if not, what will they
do when third parties refuse to cooperate?
2. Can the plan work? Putting aside the small matter that the administration has
not specified what it intends to achieve, whether it can succeed depends on what
“work” means. Can more pressure devastate Iran’s economy and inflict enormous
suffering on its people? Absolutely. Expect the administration to regularly trot
out statistics documenting economic contraction and currency collapse.
But can more pressure force Iran’s leadership to surrender positions they
consider essential? Almost certainly not. In fact, the more convinced they are
that Washington seeks their overthrow, the less willing they will be to give in.
Of course, they know and openly admit the depth of the economic crisis. If
offered a broadly acceptable deal, many among them would have every incentive to
take it. But that deal would probably have to be akin to the earlier MOU, only
with greater clarity about Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz. In other
words, roughly the deal they might have accepted before and without D-Day…
3. What happens if the plan “works”? If the sanctions work in the sense of truly
cratering Iran’s economy, Tehran is more likely to retaliate than capitulate, to
ensure the US, the region, and the wider world also pay a heavy price for this
economic warfare. That in turn would lead to the very military escalation the
D-day sanctions are supposed to avert.
4. Finally, regardless of the outcome, can such draconian sanctions be
justified? No doubt, elements of the Iranian leadership will pay a price. But,
as @yarbatman
points out, the principal victims will be ordinary Iranians whose suffering has
become the chief measure of the policy’s success, targets of an unconscionable,
indiscriminate, and almost certainly unlawful sanctions regime.
What happened with Mohammad Reza Sheibani is not a
six-month residency story. It is a snapshot of a state rotting from within.
Jowelle Michel Howayeck/ جوال ميشال الحويك/X Platform/August
25/2026
Lebanon is running out of precious time, yet we are governed by a bunch of
losers, liars and political cowards who preach sovereignty in public and
undermine it behind closed doors.The regime that armed, financed and empowered
Hezbollah, creating an armed state within our state, continues to find doors
open and accommodations made for its people in Lebanon.
And when Foreign Minister Youssef Raggi, perhaps the only genuinely
sovereign minister in this administration, takes a clear position, what happens?
They bypass him. A former Iranian diplomat applies for residency, and suddenly
the machinery of this dysfunctional state becomes remarkably efficient. A legal
formula is found, a different capacity is invoked, and six months are granted.
How convenient.This is exactly how a corrupted and spineless state operates.
Nobody takes responsibility. Everybody hides behind procedures. Sovereignty
becomes a slogan for television while the system quietly finds loopholes to
accommodate those who spent years undermining it.Meanwhile, Lebanon is losing
the one thing it simply does not have anymore: TIME.We do not have another six
months for your games.We do not have another year for your compromises.We do not
have another generation to sacrifice while you pretend to be rebuilding a state.
You cannot speak of sovereignty while finding bureaucratic back doors for
representatives of the regime that armed Hezbollah and helped build a state
within our state.Either there is one Lebanese state, one army, one authority and
one sovereign decision, or everything you have been telling us is another lie.
Enough excuses. Enough cowardice. Enough wasting Lebanon’s time.You have failed.
You are useless. Lebanon cannot afford you anymore.GO HOME.
Shiri_Sabra
A Message from israel.
Senior Israeli researcher David M. Weinberg warned Erdogan in a column he wrote
for The Jerusalem Post saying: The lessons Israel learnt from Judea and Samaria,
Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran apply to Turkey as well. “From Idlib to Istanbul,
Israel will strike if necessary, not defend.”
To me, Israel is always on the defensive and offensive if any Islamic nation
messes up where Israel is. The Jewish State of Israel takes no sh!t from any
terror nation trying to destroy Israel.
I love Israel and I stand with Israel
John Gatti
Ignore Carney's rambling corporate BS answers and focus on one indisputable
truth......
Canada is worse off today than it was when he took office and that's after
Trudeau.
RC
BREAKING: The Epstein Class Globalist Mark Carney and his partner have big
plans. They are enriching themselves through Brookfield’s Transition Fund 1.
These corrupt individuals are desperate to become part of the billionaires club
and they will succeed using Canadians.
@Canada
ISGAP
Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP) today released
Assault on Democratic Values and Principles: How Islamist Entryism Weakens Civil
Society and Higher Education in Canada, a 200-page study finding that Muslim
Brotherhood-aligned networks in Canada should be understood not as isolated
organizations or unrelated episodes but as part of a structured transnational
strategy of ideological entrenchment, institutional embedding, narrative
control, and political and legal protection.
Read the report on our website - linked below!
#isgap #muslimbrotherhood #canada
ISGAP
Billions in Undocumented Funds From Qatar to Universities Undermining Western
Education
Watch Dr. Charles Asher Small from @ISGAP speak on @visegrad24
about the infiltration of the Muslim Brotherhood into the west.
https://x.com/ISGAP/status/2090071276564193493/video/1
#isgap #muslimbrotherhood #charlesashersmall #qatar
Michail Ignatiou
Serious reports indicate that the White House and the State Department have
summoned the Turkish ambassador "for consultations" in Washington: Is Tom Barak
being recalled from Ankara?
@HellasJournal
https://hellasjournal.com/2026/08/sovares-plirofories-anaferoun-oti-o-lefkos-oikos-kai-to-steit-ntipartment-kalesan-ton-atzenti-tis-tourkias-gia-diavoulefseis-stin-ouasigkton-anakaleitai-o-tom-barak-apo-tin-agkyra/
Barry Tigay
Ambassador Tom Barrack should be removed immediately. He acts, speaks and
chooses friends like a Muslim Brotherhood asset. He has run rogue for too long.
He is doing real harm to our foreign relations. Enough is enough.
C14 News | EN
Greece is putting Turkey on notice, and highlighting its strategic partnership
with Israel.
Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis warned Ankara that Athens is “fully
prepared for any scenario” and will defend its sovereign rights “by all means”
as tensions flare in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean. His message was
blunt: “The Greece of passivity… is gone forever.”
Ambassador Tom Barrack
Another historic milestone in @POTUS’s bold vision to give Syria a chance.
Today, @SecRubio
formally rescinded Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism — another
decisive step in Syria’s remarkable journey from isolation to partnership, and
from a source of terrorism to a committed partner in the global fight against
it.For too long, this designation was another wall separating the Syrian people
from the investment, enterprise, and opportunity necessary to rebuild their
nation. Today, another wall comes down. Capital can replace conflict, enterprise
can replace isolation, and commerce can continue to triumph over chaos.This is
not simply the removal of a designation. It is another foundation stone in a new
U.S.–Syria relationship built on shared interests, mutual security, and shared
prosperity — and another example of @POTUS ’s “security first, prosperity next”
vision becoming reality.
Promises made. Promises kept. Syria has been given a chance — now the work is to
turn that chance into enduring peace and prosperity.
The New Yorker
The Iranian government is hiring criminals—Russian mobsters, Hells Angels
bikers, and even Swedish teen-agers—to attack its detractors and intimidate
Iranians in exile. Phillip Smyth, a researcher who tracks Iran’s proxies, said
that the regime has grown dependent on disposable assassins because they’re
cheaper than sending Iranian agents overseas. “Criminals can obtain false
documents, cross borders, rent safe houses, arrange cars, move money, and
disappear,” Smyth told me. The use of local criminals, who don’t have any
affiliation with Iran, forces European governments to “invest more in domestic
security,” and demonstrates that “any crook can wreak havoc” in diaspora
communities. The tactic also makes it difficult for investigators to link the
plots to the Iranian regime. Read Cora Engelbrecht’s full report: https://newyorkermag.visitlink.me/v1DrC-
Vivid.
https://x.com/VividProwess/status/2091797662794387646/video/1
Benjamin Netanyahu: “You know what the women in Gaza are? They are property,
they are nothing. They have no rights. They are completely subjugated.”He’s 100%
correct, and the crazy thing is that the women’s rights organizations don’t care
because they can’t blame Israel for it.
Uzay Bulut
It is true that the Ottoman Empire, Turkey’s predecessor, is where Boris
Johnson’s paternal great-grandfather, Ali Kemal, was born. It is also where he
was brutally murdered by Turkish nationalists in 1922 for wanting to bring to
account the perpetrators of the 1915 Armenian genocide, and for criticizing the
nationalist movement that would establish the Turkish Republic in 1923.
Ali Kemal was a leading Ottoman journalist, editor, poet, novelist, and
politician who served for some three months as the Minister of Education and
then as the Minister of the Interior of the Ottoman Empire in 1919. I wrote
about the persecution and lynching of Kemal here:
https://algemeiner.com/2020/04/29/why-was-boris-johnsons-ottoman-great-grandfather-murdered/
איוב קרא ايوب قرا ayoob kara
https://x.com/ayoobkara/status/2092198362762080525/video/1
I call on the Israeli government not to wait for an agreement with Syria and to
recognize Suwayda as an independent confederation, including opening the
crossing as was agreed upon in the Paris meetings and even before that. The
Druze citizens of Suwayda have the right to decide where and how they will live,
and certainly after the massacre they went through a year ago. If America wants
an agreement between Syria and Israel, not at the expense of the Druze people's
lives.
CanadianExMuslim
https://x.com/RealBababanaras/status/2074126955000287297/video/1
This is how Muslim terrorists treat Christians in Syria. They kill the men, rape
the women, and kidnap their children 🇸🇾 Where is the mainstream media?
Maya Khadra (PdV)
The Lebanese "Deep state" renews the residence permit of Iran's ambassador to
Lebanon, Mohammad Reza Chibani. Despite the decision by Lebanese Foreign
Minister Youssef Raggi to declare him persona non grata, the Lebanese
establishment finds a subterfuge to avoid confrontation with Tehran. A
"courtesy" stay of 6 months without diplomatic functions.
This state incapable of expelling an ambassador—would it be capable of
dismantling Hezbollah?
Alas, the presidency of Joseph Aoun, which began full of hope for renewal, is
showing some anomalies, especially in terms of political firmness and the
imposition of a strong and sovereign state.
Ted Bird
Tough bounce for the haters, as Montreal City Council passes a watered-down and
toothless motion that does more to affirm the Jewish community’s legitimacy than
it does to isolate them or put them in harm’s way. A win for decency and common
sense.
Anastasia
Tonight, Montréal City Council voted on Projet Montréal’s motion concerning
Israel and the Palestinians. What passed is not the motion that was originally
proposed. It is the amended motion above. The original motion sought to have
Montréal itself denounce Israeli “apartheid” and “genocide” and, most seriously,
immediately cut the City’s institutional ties with Israel, Israeli institutions
and Israeli municipalities.
Those provisions were removed.
The final motion that passed:
• does not itself declare that Israel is committing genocide, but explicitly
supports the international judicial bodies examining those allegations,
including the ongoing ICJ proceedings under the Genocide Convention
• does not declare that Israel is imposing apartheid
• does not cut Montréal’s institutional ties with Israel or Israeli
municipalities
• does not ban Israeli representatives from City Hall
Instead, the final text explicitly states that Hamas is recognized by Canada as
a terrorist organization and that Montréal unequivocally condemns terrorism,
hostage-taking and violence against civilians.
It also explicitly recognizes Israeli Montrealers as one of the communities
affected by the conflict, reaffirms that Jews and Israelis cannot be held
responsible for the actions of Israel’s government, recognizes the alarming rise
in antisemitism, and adds support for security and dignity for both Israelis and
Palestinians and a negotiated two-state solution.
Do I agree with everything this motion? Absolutely not. There are statements
about Israel in this motion that I very strongly reject. I don’t even think that
Montreal should touch foreign affairs matters. It’s not in their jurisdiction.
The most consequential and discriminatory part of the original proposal, cutting
Montréal’s institutional relationship with Israel, was completely removed.
There is still a lot of work to do, and I will continue opposing attempts to
isolate Israelis and Montreal’s Jewish community through municipal institutions.
But the final vote matters, and people deserve to know exactly what was changed
rather than simply reading the title of the motion and assuming the original
proposal passed unchanged.