English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For August 18/2026
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news

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Bible Quotations For today
Jesus is the atoning sacrifice for our sins, and not for ours only but also for the sins of the whole world.
First Letter of John 02/01-11: “My little children, I am writing these things to you so that you may not sin. But if anyone does sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and he is the atoning sacrifice for our sins, and not for ours only but also for the sins of the whole world. Now by this we may be sure that we know him, if we obey his commandments. Whoever says, ‘I have come to know him’, but does not obey his commandments, is a liar, and in such a person the truth does not exist; but whoever obeys his word, truly in this person the love of God has reached perfection. By this we may be sure that we are in him: whoever says, ‘I abide in him’, ought to walk just as he walked. Beloved, I am writing you no new commandment, but an old commandment that you have had from the beginning; the old commandment is the word that you have heard. Yet I am writing you a new commandment that is true in him and in you, because the darkness is passing away and the true light is already shining. Whoever says, ‘I am in the light’, while hating a brother or sister, is still in the darkness. Whoever loves a brother or sister lives in the light, and in such a person there is no cause for stumbling. But whoever hates another believer is in the darkness, walks in the darkness, and does not know the way to go, because the darkness has brought on blindness.”

Titles For Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on August 17-18/2026
A Political Class Hatched by the Incubators of Occupations/Elias Bejjani/August 18/2026
The rulers & state of occupied Lebanon are mere marketing megaphones for the occupation of the Party of Satan and their foolish mullahs/Elias Bejjani/August 15, 2026
Elias Bejjani/Text, Video, Arabic and English/The Dhimmi and Sin of the Amnesty Law as it relates to the heroic South Lebanon Army and those forcibly displaced since 2000
With a reading of the article by director and writer Youssef Y. Khoury, which exposes and condemns the monstrous law: When Marika pardons Saint Rita/Elias Bejjani/August 14/2026
Video Link & Text of an Important & Extremely Informative Strategic Interview with Dr. David Wormser from Israel365 News YouTube Platform
Link to an important video report in English by Israeli Rabbi Pesach Wolicki,
The Use by President of the Republic Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, State Institutions, and the Media of the Terms “Massacre” and “Civilians” Is a Grave Mistake/Nadim Koteich/X Platform/16 August 2026
Video Link & Interview with Director Youssef Y. El-Khoury
Report: Israel, Hezbollah agree to de-escalate after latest flare-up
Report: Israel preparing for possible days of combat in Lebanon
Strikes and shelling target al-Mansouri, Aitaroun and Bani Hayyan
Aoun: Our first choice is to extend UNIFIL's mandate
Aoun calls for 'state-to-state' relations with Iran, full implementation of framework deal
UNIFIL reports surge in military activity in South Lebanon
PM Salam: Lebanon insists on maintaining UN force in South Lebanon
MP Melhem Khalaf urges extending UNIFIL mandate to prevent vacuum in southern Lebanon
Fears of renewed fighting force southern Lebanon residents to leave homes again
Between war and the harvest: South Lebanon’s tobacco farmers hold on

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on August 17-18/2026
Iran-US Memorandum of Understanding expires: What happens now?
Trump says Iran should surrender
Trump says Iran won’t make deal he thinks is needed, threatens to bomb Oman
Trump threatens to 'bomb' Oman, says Iran must 'put up white flag'
UK PM exchanged messages with Trump aide imposter: Reports
Top US Democrat slams Trump's 'inane' move to shrink South Korea military drill
Iran threatens to go on offensive in Strait of Hormuz if diplomacy with US fails
Iran condemns ‘suspicious’ drone attack on Iraqi Kurdistan PM’s office
Yemen's Houthis say targeted Saudi military vessel in Red Sea
Netanyahu’s re-election hopes ride on divided party’s primaries
Netanyahu presses role for US general in Hamas disarmament
Trump envoy predicts Hamas disarmament progress in about 30 days
Israeli official says Netanyahu, Kushner agree US general to supervise Hamas disarming
Kushner says Iran, US conversations are robust but no understanding yet
Kushner meets Netanyahu after talks with Hamas on Gaza plan
Seven migrants dead, 50 rescued off Libya: Charity
Saudi Arabia, Sudan establish coordination council to deepen bilateral ties

Titles For The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on August 17-18/2026
Tehran’s reshuffle leaves no pragmatic opening/Saeed Ghasseminejad & Janatan Sayeh/Iran International/August 17/2026
Jared Kushner's Gaza Strategy Could Reshape the Middle East/Ahmed Charai/Gatestone Institute/August 17, 2026
European Leaders: In Urgent Need of Deradicalization/Robert Williams/Gatestone Institute/August 17, 2026
The Mecca Agreement: A Threat to Regional Security?/Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/August 17/2026
The Islamic Republic’s Revolutionary DNA/Mark Dubowitz & Haviv Rettig Gur/August 17/2026
The Houthis’ unprovoked aggression demands international action
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Al Arabiya English/17 August ,2026
The New Crescent: Mecca Pact Gives Rise to a Sunni Bloc, Posing New Challenges for Israel/Jonathan Spyer/The Jerusalem Post/August 17/2026
Selected Face Book & X tweets on August 18/2026

Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on August 17-18/2026
A Political Class Hatched by the Incubators of Occupations
Elias Bejjani/August 18/2026
The entire political class, from top to bottom, from the middle to the seventies, is a scumbag, hatched by the incubators of occupations... emasculated, with fabricated files, opportunists, corrupt, narcissistic, with no vision or cause. And there are no exceptions... politicians, party-owning companies, religious figures, and rulers who are themselves ruled. And of course, the flocks of sheep belonging to the party-owning companies.

The rulers & state of occupied Lebanon are mere marketing megaphones for the occupation of the Party of Satan and their foolish mullahs.
Elias Bejjani/August 15, 2026
Berri, Salam, and Aoun condemn Israeli strikes like parrots, while shamelessly and disgracefully marketing the crimes and occupation of the Iranian Hezbollah and the jihadism of the insane mullahs, failing to implement the required resolutions for Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of peace. It is truly a time of misery, drought, and eunuchs.

Elias Bejjani/Text, Video, Arabic and English/The Dhimmi and Sin of the Amnesty Law as it relates to the heroic South Lebanon Army and those forcibly displaced since 2000
With a reading of the article by director and writer Youssef Y. Khoury, which exposes and condemns the monstrous law: When Marika pardons Saint Rita
Elias Bejjani/August 14/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/08/156651/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PJnA_J3-JNo
A thousand salutes of respect and pride to our free and heroic southern people, who have been refugees since the year 2000 in Israel and various free nations.
To them we say: You are Lebanon, you are the cedar, and wherever you are, patriotism, faith, and Lebanon reside.
You are the ones who should forgive Lebanon’s rulers and political parties, not the other way around. The miserable reality is that both you and we are living in an era ruled by proxy rulers, puppets, and dhimwis—under the care of corrupt political party leaders who falsely claim to be Christians while, in heart, soul, and practice, they are Judases.
Yes, we live in a time when the majority of our heedless people are partisans like flocks of sheep led to the slaughterhouse without even a bleat.
And a thousand yes, our time is the time of people with robes, birettas, and bellies, whom the saints of the Church disown.
The remaining and most dangerous of our misfortunes lies in our country’s proxy and mercenary, humiliating Membersof the Parliament who sold their dignity, the homeland, and the citizens for less than thirty pieces of silver.
O our honorable displaced southern people wherever you are, strengthen your faith and be certain that you will return when Lebanon returns to its true Lebanese identity, for its return will not be complete until you return to it honored and cherished.

Video Link & Text of an Important & Extremely Informative Strategic Interview with Dr. David Wormser from Israel365 News YouTube Platform
The Interview addressing Lebanese, Iranian, Israeli, Turkish, and USA Roles, Intentions, and Schemes in the Ongoing War with Iran & Its Proxies …America & Israel’s New Strategy To Finish Iran Could End DISASTROUSLY!
The Interview was conducted by Israeli Rabbi Pesach Wolicki,from Israel365 News YouTube Platform
August 16/2026
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/08/156706/
Note: Categorization, transcription, texts, phrasing, titles, and summaries in both Arabic & English by Elias Bejjani with complete freedom and discretion
Introduction to Dr. David Wormser’s Analysis
In his insightful interview, Dr. David Wormser focuses extensively on what he identifies as the most dangerous and calculated Iranian scheme in the current geopolitical landscape: systematically planting discord, friction, and strategic division between Israel and the U.S. administration. Throughout the discussion, Dr. Wormser repeatedly emphasizes how Tehran leverages regional proxies and escalatory tactics—particularly in Lebanon and Gaza—not merely to launch direct attacks, but as a deliberate political weapon designed to rupture the U.S.–Israel alliance. By instigating localized military confrontations, Iran forces an escalatory cycle that exploits the United States’ deep aversion to conflict and Washington’s eagerness to contain regional crises. Dr. Wormser warns that Tehran is actively banking on this friction, calculating that U.S. pressure will force Washington to restrain Israeli responses, create severe diplomatic wedges between the two allies, and ultimately leave Israel isolated while allowing Iran to claim strategic victories and inflict grave political damage ahead of November.
Interview Headlines
Escalation in Southern Lebanon: Israel conducts major airstrikes targeting Hezbollah strongholds, including the critical Ali Taher Ridge and an Ansar strike eliminating a Radwan Force commander.
Lebanese Government Response: Lebanese officials condemn Israel’s actions and allege framework violations while failing to address or condemn Hezbollah’s breaches and re-entry into evacuated border zones.
Iranian Regional Strategy: Tehran signals red lines over the Ali Taher Ridge and utilizes regional proxies to instigate escalation cycles, aiming to strain U.S.–Israel relations and exert political pressure ahead of November.
Turkish Inroads and the Palestinian File: Turkey deepens its diplomatic footprint by hosting Mahmoud Abbas and orchestrating moves that risk bringing Hamas-aligned elements into control of Palestinian administrative structures.
Cairo Diplomatic Talks on Gaza: High-level discussions involving U.S. representation (Jared Kushner), Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey regarding post-war Gaza without direct Israeli participation pose serious existential concerns for Israel.
Summary of Topics Discussed
1. The Situation in Lebanon and the Lebanese Government’s Stance
Border Security Failure: Recent Israeli withdrawals from pilot zones in southern Lebanon revealed that Hezbollah fighters were quickly moving back into position, sometimes in close proximity to the Lebanese army.
Institutional Paralysis: Units within the Lebanese army containing Shiite elements sympathetic to Hezbollah have complicated disarmament efforts. Consequently, the Lebanese government remains largely incapable or unwilling to dismantle Hezbollah’s military infrastructure north of the Awali River.
Official Reactions: Statements from Lebanese leadership condemning Israel while ignoring Hezbollah’s violations indicate a troubling shift in the balance of power and expectations within Lebanon, effectively threatening a return to pre-war border security threats.
2. Iranian Threats and Regional Escalation
Strategic Significance of Ali Taher Ridge: Described as a major operational headquarters and a vital geographic link connecting the Bekaa Valley to southern Lebanon, the Ali Taher Ridge is a critical focal point for both Israeli security and Hezbollah operations.
Tehran’s Calculus: Iran’s warnings regarding the ridge reflect an intent to provoke escalation cycles before November. By instigating conflict through Lebanon, Iran seeks to strain the U.S.–Israel alliance, counter the American containment strategy, and project regional power.
3. Turkey’s Expanding Influence and the Palestinian File
Diplomatic Maneuvers: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s meeting with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas highlights Turkey’s ambition to position itself as a key patron of Palestinian leadership.
Hamas Integration: Under Turkish patronage, diplomatic efforts and technocratic committees risk sidelining moderate elements and allowing Hamas-adjacent factions to consolidate influence over Palestinian administrative and legislative futures.
Regional Friction: Provocative statements and maps from Turkish officials signal an increasingly hostile diplomatic environment that aims to present Israel with external faits accomplis.
4. Cairo Meetings on Gaza and Israel’s Existential Red Lines
Exclusion of Israel: Discussions in Cairo involving U.S. envoy Jared Kushner alongside Egyptian, Qatari, and Turkish representatives regarding the future of Gaza without direct Israeli presence are viewed as a dangerous departure from foundational security principles.
Existential Necessity: For Israel, the complete demilitarization and defanging of Gaza is a non-negotiable, life-and-death requirement. Dr. Wormser emphasizes that Israel must draw a firm red line against any externally brokered arrangements that compromise its sovereignty and long-term security.
Dr. David Wormser’s Biography
Dr. David Wormser is a prominent American foreign policy expert, strategic consultant, and Middle East analyst. He has held senior advisory and governmental roles, most notably serving as a special advisor on Middle East affairs to former Vice President Dick Cheney during the George W. Bush administration. Wormser is widely recognized for his strategic insights and firm positions on U.S. national security, defense, and Middle Eastern geopolitics—particularly concerning Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Islamist movements. He has authored numerous research papers and policy analyses published by prominent American think tanks and strategic research institutions.

Link to an important video report in English by Israeli Rabbi Pesach Wolicki,
Pesach Wolicki, presents facts, evidence, and documentation revealing the truth about what took place yesterday in southern Lebanon after Israel launched airstrikes and assassinated the military officials of the terrorist Hezbollah organization, Samir Al-Hajj Hassan and Mohammad Fakhr El-Din.
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/08/156690/
A complete exposure and debunking of the falsehoods contained in the Lebanese presidential statement, the fabrications of Lebanese officials, and the narratives promoted by much of the paid Lebanese and Arab media. The reality is that the jihadist terrorist organization Hezbollah, which occupies Lebanon, was the party that violated the ceasefire and triggered all Israeli military responses, resulting in the deaths of 11 people, most of them Hezbollah commanders and members.August 16/2026

The Use by President of the Republic Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, State Institutions, and the Media of the Terms “Massacre” and “Civilians” Is a Grave Mistake
Nadim Koteich/X Platform/16 August 2026
The use by President of the Republic Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, state institutions, and the media of the terms “massacre” and “civilians” is a grave mistake, because it generalized a dramatic narrative before the facts had been fully established.
What happened in Ansar is clear:
A commander in the Radwan Force was targeted, and the victims were his six family members. He alone is responsible for their safety and no one else. He appears to have used them as human shields, or he was negligent in protecting them and overestimated his ability to remain undetected.
As for Deir al-Zahrani, there is still no precise information regarding the targets, where four people were killed, including a child, as reported by news agency reports.
At least 7 out of the 11, at a minimum, died as a result of Hezbollah’s insistence on a battle it has lost and continues to stubbornly pursue, while preventing arrangements that could protect people.
The rush to use dramatic expressions does not give Nawaf Salam or Joseph Aoun any credit with the other side’s audience. Rather, it diminishes their personal credibility, as well as the credibility of Lebanese legitimacy and the protection of the ongoing negotiations.
If these are truly massacres, then why do we continue the negotiations!?
This old habit must stop out of concern for the national effort to end the war and save Lebanon. It adds nothing practical to protecting civilians or advancing the negotiations.
The party responsible for the bloodshed that occurred yesterday is Hezbollah first, second, tenth, and last.
Any other narrative only reinforces the militia’s narrative.

Video Link & Interview with Director Youssef Y. El-Khoury
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/08/156733/
A Critical Review of: All forms of governance, rulers, impotence, hesitation, cunning, and foolishness. Hezbollah's pre-Islamic concepts, absurd wars, hallucinations, suicide, disregard for its own community, and blind allegiance to the mullah regime. The possibility of the war in Lebanon taking on a religious dimension. The connection between dams in Christian regions, Hezbollah's tunnels, and the responsibility of the Aoun-Bassil movement.The Aborted Amnesty Law, and the Patriotism and Heroism of the South Lebanon Army.
Interview conducted by: Journalist Mohsen Hijazi from Al-Siyasa website
Date: August 17, 2027
Note: Transcription, summarization, phrasing, headings, conclusions, and English translation were handled independently and at the absolute discretion of Elias Bejjani, Publisher of the LCCC Website.
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2026/08/156733/
Interview Summary
The interview offered a wide-ranging critical review of the rapidly unfolding military and political developments in Lebanon, alongside an assessment of the field situation in the south. The discussion began with the recent military escalation, Israeli airstrikes in the south, and the targeting of several commanders and civilians.
Khoury sharply criticized political impotence and the state's lack of real effectiveness amidst escalating destruction, addressing ongoing debates surrounding the concept of resilience and the prevailing political discourse. He also reviewed the analyses of political commentators and military experts, refuting claims that link Israeli escalation solely to elections and emphasizing that operations are driven by long-term security and military strategies.
Regarding the battle of the hills and tunnels, Khoury delved into the details of capturing the "Ali al-Tahir" facility and the complex tunnel systems faced by the Israeli army. He expressed serious concerns that battles could take on ideological and Biblical dimensions tied to the historical names of hills and shrines in the region.
Furthermore, Khoury highlighted suspicions surrounding infrastructure projects and dams, raising intriguing questions about reports suggesting potential tunnel extensions or excavation work in non-Shiite areas. He questioned potential intersections between dam projects and infrastructure suspicions, calling for transparent judicial investigation and accountability if these facts prove true.
Topics Discussed in the Interview
Recent Israeli Escalation and Targeting in the South
Discussing recent airstrikes and assassinations (such as the targeting of Deir Zahrani and Ansar, and the death of leaders and civilians).
Addressing the controversy over the concept of "martyrdom" and the repercussions of heavy destruction on the infrastructure and topography of southern Lebanon.
Questioning the stance of the Lebanese state and the absence of practical guarantees amidst ongoing military operations.
Political and Media Narratives and Electoral Analyses
Addressing confusion in analyzing Israeli and Iranian motives and their reflections on the Lebanese arena.
Responding to arguments linking the war exclusively to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's electoral deadlines and the notion of "inflating facilities."
Highlighting the nature of Israeli society and its electoral and political awareness in reading battle outcomes.
The "Ali al-Tahir" Facility and New Tunnel Tactics
Reviewing details of the takeover of the Ali al-Tahir facility and the nature of fortifications and tunnels resembling North Korean designs.
Discussing modern military methods used by the Israeli army in handling tunnel networks and analyzing them step by step.
Religious and Ideological Dimensions of Hills and Shrines
Raising concerns about battles on certain fronts shifting toward religious or Biblical dimensions linked to historical names of hills and shrines in the south (such as Sajod, Mount Safi, and other hills).
Warning against potential efforts by extremist factions in Israel to tie these locations to historical or ideological roots.
Suspicions of Tunnel Networks Outside Shiite Areas and Dam Projects
Discussing reports about tunnel networks or attempted network expansions in non-Shiite regions (such as Keserwan, Matn, Batroun, and the Druze community).
Questioning the potential connection between dam projects (such as the Bisri, Mseilha, and Janna dams) and excavation work or infrastructure passages, amid calls for a transparent judicial inquiry.
Military History and Past Fortifications in and Around Beirut
Recalling historical memories and stories from the Lebanese Civil War regarding trench and tunnel networks that connected certain areas of Beirut and its suburbs (such as Tel al-Zaatar, Nabaa, and Gallery Semaan).

Report: Israel, Hezbollah agree to de-escalate after latest flare-up
Naharnet/17 August/2026
The Israeli airstrikes that assassinated two Hezbollah commanders represented “a harsh message to Hezbollah,” following “a security operation carried out about a week prior to the strikes, which Hezbollah is still keeping secret," a diplomatic source said, adding that it is likely to remain unclaimed. "High-level contacts took place between Beirut and Washington to contain the escalation, culminating in an agreement whereby Israel would settle for what it had done, in exchange for Hezbollah not retaliating for the assassination of the two commanders. This prompted intensive internal contacts among the three presidencies (Joseph Aoun, Nabih Berri and Nawaf Salam), which led to a commitment to de-escalation," the source told the Nidaa al-Watan newspaper. The source added that they believe that "the days leading up to the Israeli elections will be extremely difficult on both the security and military levels, given Benjamin Netanyahu's insistence on achieving a moral victory by decisively winning the battle over Ali al-Taher.” “Attempts to confine the confrontation geographically to this point appear uncertain, which increases the likelihood of its expansion should it erupt," the source warned.

Report: Israel preparing for possible days of combat in Lebanon
Naharnet/17 August/2026
The Israeli army is preparing for a possible return to “several days of combat” in Lebanon in light of the ongoing escalation on the Lebanese front, Israel’s Channel 12 has reported.
The report indicated that the Israeli army will not relinquish control of the tunnel complex in the Ali Taher heights in southern Lebanon. Israeli airstrikes on southern Lebanon killed at least 11 people Saturday, in the deadliest attacks since a truce between Israel and Hezbollah went into effect on June 20. Hezbollah hinted that it might retaliate. The Israeli military said in a statement it struck Hezbollah infrastructure in the areas of Ali al-Taher, Ansar and Deir al-Zahrani in response to an action against Israeli soldiers in the area. The office of Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Hezbollah violated the ceasefire by attacking Israeli soldiers inside Lebanon, seriously wounding three.

Strikes and shelling target al-Mansouri, Aitaroun and Bani Hayyan
Naharnet/17 August/2026
Strikes and shelling targeted the southern border towns of al-Mansouri, Aitaroun and Bani Hayyan on Monday as Israeli troops opened heavy machine gun fire towards several southern towns, including Hadatha and al-Khiam. An overnight strike targeted Wadi al-Hujeir, while artillery shelled on Sunday night Beit Yahoun and Hadatha. Israeli strikes on Saturday killed 11 people in southern Lebanon, in the deadliest attacks since a deal was reached in June aimed at ending hostilities. Israel and Lebanon announced the framework agreement in June, laying out a plan for Israeli forces to withdraw from southern Lebanon in exchange for Hezbollah’s disarmament. Hezbollah has refused direct talks and wasn’t party to the U.S.-mediated deal.

Aoun: Our first choice is to extend UNIFIL's mandate
Naharnet/17 August/2026
President Joseph Aoun on Monday welcomed a parliamentary initiative and petition calling for the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). "The presence of UNIFIL in the south is important in many respects. It helps to keep residents in their villages and towns and strengthens stability through cooperation and coordination with the Lebanese Army," Aoun said. He affirmed that "our first choice is to extend UNIFIL's mandate." "If it is not extended, the second choice is to adopt a formula that guarantees the continued presence of international forces in the south, within the required legal framework, and in a way that ensures these forces operate alongside and in coordination with the Lebanese Army, supporting stability and carrying out their assigned tasks," the president added. He pointed out that "Israel rejects the presence of UNIFIL and has been exerting pressure in this direction for nearly a year, while we are demanding its continued presence." “The fundamental idea is to create a breakthrough that guarantees the continued international presence in the south, whether through extending UNIFIL's mandate or through additional international forces, in a way that preserves stability and strengthens the role of the Lebanese state and army," Aoun went on to say.

Aoun calls for 'state-to-state' relations with Iran, full implementation of framework deal
Naharnet/17 August/2026
President Joseph Aoun reaffirmed on Monday Lebanon’s unyielding commitment to the full implementation of the Israeli-Lebanese framework agreement, underscoring the vital, supportive, and earnest role of the United States in facilitating the process.
Aoun described Washington as a steadfast partner in enforcing the agreement and cautioned that Israel cannot achieve its strategic objectives through sheer destruction, violence, and the targeted killing of innocent civilians. Israel and Lebanon announced the framework agreement in June, laying out a plan for Israeli forces to withdraw from southern Lebanon in exchange for Hezbollah’s disarmament. Hezbollah has refused direct talks and does not want to disarm while Israel has continued to strike southern Lebanon, killing an entire family in the village of Ansar on Saturday, including three children and two women.
Israel is also still occupying a "security" zone along the border. The agreement states that Israeli forces must gradually withdraw from pilot zones as the Lebanese army deploys there. Aoun said service-oriented ministries have begun deploying alongside the Lebanese Armed Forces across newly secured towns and villages, restoring critical civic infrastructure and public utilities for residents to return. The president added that diplomacy with Tehran must operate strictly on a state-to-state basis grounded in mutual respect and in non-interference in domestic affairs.

UNIFIL reports surge in military activity in South Lebanon
LBCI/17 August/2026
UNIFIL said in a statement that Israeli military activity in southern Lebanon has increased significantly over the past two weeks. According to UNIFIL, between August 5 and 16, its forces recorded an average of 137 projectiles per day, including 208 projectiles on Saturday and 185 on Sunday.

PM Salam: Lebanon insists on maintaining UN force in South Lebanon
LBCI/17 August/2026
Prime Minister Nawaf Salam received a parliamentary delegation headed by MP Melhem Khalaf, who handed him a copy of a letter signed by 86 MPs in support of maintaining the U.N. peacekeeping presence in Lebanon. The delegation included MPs Bilal Hachem, Hagop Pakradounian, Jamil Abboud, Adnan Traboulsi, Farid Boustany, Michel Moussa, Yassine Yassine, Hagop Terzian, Bilal Abdallah, Haidar Nasser, Imad Hoballah, Najat Saliba, Ibrahim Mneimneh, Paula Yacoubian, Salim Sayegh, Firas Hamdan and Walid Baarini. Salam thanked the MPs for their initiative and reiterated Lebanon’s official position that a U.N. force should remain in the south, with three key responsibilities: monitoring and reporting, coordination and communication. He said he had personally conveyed Lebanon’s position to the U.N. Secretary-General during his visit to Beirut and in subsequent contacts, adding that the U.N. chief understood the need for a continued U.N. presence in the south to replace UNIFIL, as also reflected in his latest report on the issue. Human Rights Watch urges UN to maintain peacekeeping force in South Lebanon. Following the meeting, Khalaf said the delegation’s discussions focused on preserving UNIFIL’s presence in southern Lebanon, particularly amid the current difficult circumstances. He said the petition signed by 86 MPs — more than two-thirds of Parliament — demonstrated a clear parliamentary will to maintain the U.N. umbrella in Lebanon. Khalaf stressed the importance of preserving UNIFIL’s core functions of monitoring, reporting, coordination and communication, which have been part of the force’s mandate since its establishment in 1978. He said the MPs’ initiative reflected their growing concern over the situation in Lebanon and the wider region, stressing the need to maintain stability, particularly in the south, through adherence to international legitimacy and U.N. resolutions. Khalaf acknowledged that the nature of the force could potentially change, but insisted that any future arrangement must remain a UN force that upholds international legitimacy.

MP Melhem Khalaf urges extending UNIFIL mandate to prevent vacuum in southern Lebanon
LBCI/17 August/2026
MP Melhem Khalaf stressed the need to maintain the presence of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to prevent a security vacuum in the south, citing its role in monitoring the Israeli withdrawal, maintaining security and stability, and supporting the Lebanese Army in extending state authority. Speaking during a visit to Baabda at the head of a parliamentary delegation calling for the renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate, Khalaf said a petition had been signed by 86 MPs. He added that 20 MPs from different political groups had met with President Joseph Aoun, who emphasized the importance of the issue and briefed them on his international efforts. Khalaf said that if UNIFIL’s mandate cannot be renewed, an international force should remain in southern Lebanon in any possible form. He also called for continued engagement with U.N. Security Council members and countries contributing troops to the force.

Fears of renewed fighting force southern Lebanon residents to leave homes again
LBCI/17 August/2026
Fear has become a constant reality for residents of southern Lebanon, who are living through a never-ending journey of displacement. A resident was seen carrying her sick husband and fleeing into the unknown, as their home near Ali al-Taher was no longer a safe shelter. The direct strikes on Deir el-Zahrani and Ansar were not the only reason behind the displacement. A report that a battle near Ali al-Taher was imminent was enough for residents to pack their bags, with Sidon becoming their first destination. Sidon is relatively the closest and safest option, and its social fabric provides reassurance to displaced people who prefer to remain near their hometowns. Most of those displaced in the latest wave, however, are people returning to shelters they had left after the ceasefire, where their places remained reserved in anticipation of any developments linked to the situation imposed by Israel through lines it draws and expands according to military needs. The Yellow Line has not changed since June, but incursions and airstrikes continue, while military operations are carried out according to clear rules of engagement. In this context, Israel claims that Hezbollah is violating the framework agreement, while Hezbollah, which has not claimed responsibility for any operation so far, maintains through sources close to it that the party continuously violating the agreement is Israel, and that the land remains Lebanese regardless of any other considerations.

Between war and the harvest: South Lebanon’s tobacco farmers hold on
LBCI/17 August/2026
In southern Lebanon, the war has disrupted the tobacco-growing season, leaving farmers struggling to protect their crops and preserve their livelihoods. Among them is Hamza, a tobacco farmer who looks at one of his plants with affection. The crop has helped him make a living and raise his children. In 2023, he rescued the plant from the threat of death in occupied Rmeich and moved it to safety in Ras al-Ain. But when war returned in 2026, his tobacco plants once again came under threat. For other farmers, saving even a single plant was impossible. Fields that were supposed to be covered with tobacco seedlings have instead been overtaken by grass, disrupting the agricultural cycle. The war broke out in late February, just as farmers were preparing to plant tobacco seedlings in March. Some farmers, however, chose to take the risk and continue working their land despite drones and artillery fire. Tobacco, long regarded as a crop of resilience, has become a symbol of their determination to remain on their land. In the besieged villages of Rmeich, a major center of tobacco cultivation, and Debl, access to farmers was limited. Phone calls became the only way to hear from them and learn about the condition of their land and the current season. The war has caused significant losses for farmers. While the Regie is set to purchase their crops, farmers say the state must also find ways to support all those affected. For these farmers, protecting their crops means more than preserving a livelihood — it means holding on to the land they have worked for generations.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on August 17-18/2026
Iran-US Memorandum of Understanding expires: What happens now?
Donald Self, Al Arabiya English/17 August/2026
There have been no talks officially announced on extending a ceasefire between the US and Iran as of Monday, which marks the end of the 60-day period stipulated in the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding. However, according to Al Arabiya’s sources, the two countries may be inching closer to extend the truce. The MoU was intended to halt more than three months of war that had taken thousands of lives and placed the region in a chokehold and continues to cause economic strain globally. Although the Islamabad Memorandum formally ended the war, it did not end military activity. In the weeks that followed, the United States and Iran repeatedly exchanged strikes and accusations of truce violations, Israel continued operations in Lebanon, and tensions in the Strait of Hormuz escalated as attacks on shipping, renewed US strikes, and the reimposition of the naval blockade exposed the disputed nature of the agreement.
Following the agreement’s expiration, there appears to be little appetite on either side to revive it. Speaking to the semi-official ISNA news agency, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on Saturday rejected descriptions of the Islamabad MoU as a ceasefire, arguing that it represented “the end of the war,” adding that “we did not have a ceasefire that would now require extension.” Meanwhile, he said the negotiations with Oman over the Strait of Hormuz continue but Araghchi emphasized that this would only be possible if a political solution was reached. The US position appears to be the opposite of Iran’s, treating the MoU as a ceasefire framework pointing to its provisions for the “immediate and permanent termination of military operations.” While traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains heavily disrupted and talks continue between Oman and Iran, President Donald Trump has said the US will declare the strait US territory “pretty soon” after “we finish defeating Iran.” Trump also declared that the US was in full control of the waterway. Iranians swiftly rejected these claims with Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi saying that the strait “has been Iranian, is Iranian, and will remain Iranian,” adding that only Tehran has the authority to open or close it. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also said on Friday that the US would apply measures that have “never been seen” on Iran. Any long-term diplomatic solution does not look likely in the short term. Fundamental disagreements remain over the nature of the conflict as well as the key issues. According to a Trump Truth Social post on Monday, Iran not having a nuclear weapon remains the “number one goal.”Iran’s controversial nuclear program was left ambiguous in the MoU, and remains no closer to a long-term resolution. Control over Hormuz remains contested. Parallel talks are ongoing between Iran and Oman to come to a provisional arrangement to manage shipping through the strait, but according to Tehran, any agreement is contingent on US concessions to Iran including compensation. The US has, in turn, rejected Iran’s demands of financial compensation while Trump insisted Tehran pays compensation to those killed and wounded in the war and be held “responsible for damages and deaths caused to the people of Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Gaza.”

Trump says Iran should surrender
Reuters/17 August ,2026
US President Donald Trump said on Monday that Iran should surrender to end a war with the US as talks between the countries remained stalled. “They should put up the white flag of surrender,” Trump told a Fox News reporter during a phone interview. An interim deal agreed to in June declared an “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts,” but quickly unraveled, with Trump saying it was “over” on July 7 and Iran’s foreign ministry declaring it “suspended” a week later. Under that memorandum of understanding, Iran and the US committed to negotiating a final deal - covering broader issues such as the fate of Iran’s nuclear program - in a maximum of 60 days, extendable by mutual consent. Monday marks 60 days since the MOU was signed. Trump also told Fox News that the midterms were not impacting his strategy on Iran. “Midterms have nothing to do with my thinking,” he said. Earlier on Monday, Trump posted on his Truth Social platform: “The number one Goal is, and always will be, that Iran cannot have, in any way, shape, or form, a Nuclear Weapon,” repeating one of his stated rationales for the war.

Trump says Iran won’t make deal he thinks is needed, threatens to bomb Oman
Reuters/18 August ,2026
President Donald Trump said on Monday that Iran would not make the deal he thinks is needed to end a war with the US and should surrender as talks between the countries remained stalled. “They’re not going to make the kind of a deal that I feel is necessary. Look, we’re in there for one reason: Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon,” he told reporters in the Oval Office. Asked whether the US was seeking to extend an interim deal with Iran, Trump said “no.” The interim deal agreed to in June declared an “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts”, but quickly unraveled, with Trump saying it was “over” on July 7 and Iran’s foreign ministry declaring it “suspended” a week later. Under that memorandum of understanding, Iran and the US committed to negotiating a final deal — covering broader issues such as the fate of Iran’s nuclear program — in a maximum of 60 days, extendable by mutual consent. Monday marks 60 days since the MOU was signed. Hours before, Trump told a Fox News reporter during a phone interview that Iran “should put up the white flag of surrender.”Separately, Oman and Iran have been in talks to try to reach an agreement to restore commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, which carried 20 percent of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas supplies before the US-Israeli attacks on Iran began in late February. “If Oman gets in the way, we’ll bomb the shit out of them,” Trump told Fox. When asked later in the Oval Office if he was out of patience with Oman, Trump told reporters: “No, I don’t think they behaved very well, but we’d handle them very easily, just like we do other things.” The dispute over control of the Strait of Hormuz has driven up fuel prices and put pressure on Trump to end a war that is unpopular at home ahead of the November midterm elections that will decide control of the US Congress. Trump told Fox News that the midterms were not impacting his strategy on Iran. “Midterms have nothing to do with my thinking,” he said.Earlier on Monday, Trump posted on his Truth Social platform: “The number one Goal is, and always will be, that Iran cannot have, in any way, shape, or form, a Nuclear Weapon,” repeating one of his stated rationales for the war.

Trump threatens to 'bomb' Oman, says Iran must 'put up white flag'
Agence France Presse/18 August ,2026
U.S. President Donald Trump on Monday threatened to bomb Oman if it "gets in the way" of a deal with Iran on the Strait of Hormuz and called for Iran to surrender. "If Oman gets in the way, we'll bomb the shit out of them," Trump told Fox News journalist Trey Yingst, referring to ongoing talks between Oman and Iran on control of the strait, while Washington is also pursuing its own talks. Trump also said that Iran should "put up the white flag of surrender," according to Yingst's post on X on his interview with the president.

UK PM exchanged messages with Trump aide imposter: Reports
AFP/17 August ,2026
New British Prime Minister Andy Burnham exchanged messages with someone posing as Susie Wiles, the White House chief of staff, several media outlets reported on Monday. According to Politico, which broke the story quoting anonymous sources, the British leader sent a “few messages” via an unspecified communication channel to a person he believed to be Wiles before becoming suspicious. The incident was deemed serious enough for the British embassy in Washington to raise the matter with the White House, according to two sources cited by Politico.Neither the date nor the content of the exchanges is known.
Burnham succeeded former Labour Party leader Keir Starmer as prime minister on July 20. “We do not comment on national security matters,” a spokesperson for Burnham’s Downing Street office said, without denying the exchanges. Burnham is not the first prominent British politician to fall victim to this type of hoax. In 2024, the British government released a video of a phone call in which the then foreign minister David Cameron was duped by someone posing as former Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko. The Foreign Office explained at the time that it had disclosed the incident to pre-empt any attempt by the perpetrators to manipulate the footage.

Top US Democrat slams Trump's 'inane' move to shrink South Korea military drill
LBCI/18 August ,2026
The top U.S. Senate Democrat on military affairs said Monday President Donald Trump's order to scale back drills with ally South Korea was "inane" and "haphazard." "This is another inane, haphazard decision by President Trump and his chaotic administration," Senate Armed Services Committee ranking member Jack Reed said in a statement, adding that "China and Russia are watching" how easily the Republican leader abandons his allies.AFP

Iran threatens to go on offensive in Strait of Hormuz if diplomacy with US fails
LBCI/18 August ,2026
Iran has decided to shift its policy from defensive to "fully offensive" due to the deadlock in efforts to agree a permanent end to ‌its war with the United States, a senior Iranian official told Reuters on Monday. Progress towards peace talks and a resumption of oil tanker traffic through the strategic Strait of Hormuz has ground to a halt, with no sign that the warring parties are moving towards ending the conflict that the U.S. and Israel launched on February 28. "Iranian entities must be prepared to escalate tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and wider region, as Iran will be ready to make ⁠decisions and take action on difficult decisions," the Iranian official said, adding that Tehran would conduct a "timely and precise" military attack to break the U.S. naval blockade if diplomacy failed. Monday marked the day by which Iran and the United States were expected to reach a final deal under a memorandum of understanding agreed in June and aimed at ending the war.

Iran condemns ‘suspicious’ drone attack on Iraqi Kurdistan PM’s office
Al Arabiya English/17 August ,2026
Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei condemned on Monday a drone attack that targeted the Iraqi Kurdistan prime minister’s office overnight, state media reported. Baghaei denounced the attack, “describing it as a highly suspicious development that requires vigilance and careful attention,” according to a statement carried by state news agency IRNA. Two Iranian drones targeted the Iraqi Kurdistan prime minister’s office and the home of the autonomous region’s intelligence chief overnight, authorities said Monday. “Following an investigation by the Kurdistan Counter-Terrorism Unit, my personal office and the home of the head of the Security and Intelligence Agency were targeted by Iranian drone attacks earlier today,” Kurdistan Prime Minister Masrour Barzani said, in a post on X. “This is a dangerous escalation and a direct threat to the security and stability of the Kurdistan region.”The regional Counter-Terrorism Directorate said there were no casualties in the attack. “Two Hadid-110 type explosive-laden drones were launched from across the Iranian border toward the private office of the Kurdistan region prime minister and the residence of the Parastin Agency director,” it said. Since the start of the Middle East war, the Kurdistan region, which hosts US troops and foreign oil firms as well as opposition groups exiled from Iran, has been targeted with more than 1,000 attacks by Tehran and pro-Iran militias inside Iraq. Drones have repeatedly been intercepted over Kurdistan’s capital Erbil, while others have struck opposition forces and US interests. With AFP

Yemen's Houthis say targeted Saudi military vessel in Red Sea
Agence France Presse/18 August ,2026
Yemen's Houthi rebels said on Monday they had targeted a Saudi military vessel and four accompanying boats in the Red Sea, as part of their maritime blockade of Saudi Arabia. Yahya Saree, military spokesperson for the Iran-backed Houthis, said they had "succeeded in targeting a military landing ship belonging to the Saudi enemy, accompanied by four military patrol boats, in the Red Sea off the coast of Mokha, using several ballistic missiles".

Netanyahu’s re-election hopes ride on divided party’s primaries
Reuters/17 August ,2026
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party will choose its candidates to fight in October elections on Monday, with analysts saying a shift further to the right by many members could threaten the Israeli leader’s chances of winning. The contenders who emerge from Monday’s primaries are already facing a brutal race — polls suggest Likud’s popularity has plummeted since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, and the party could lose a third of its seats. Researchers said Likud could have an even tougher fight if its 140,000 listed members choose a roster of populist, hard-right candidates, at a time when surveys show more of its traditional voters want to head closer to the political center. “The gap between Likud party members and Likud voters and the general public has increased substantially, and this might have a dramatic effect on Netanyahu’s ability to win,” said analyst Nimrod Nir, at the Hebrew University’s Agam Labs.
Netanyahu courting moderates
An Agam Labs survey published on August 11 showed more than half of Likud voters — 54.9 percent — wanted a more centrist government than Netanyahu’s current coalition, which includes ultra-Orthodox Jewish and nationalist parties. But just a third of the listed party members who will choose the candidates on Monday would like to see a center-right government, according to the survey. Two thirds wanted something similar to the outgoing coalition, formed after Netanyahu’s 2022 election victory. The current government includes National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir’s ultranationalist Jewish Power party and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionism, which have advocated for depopulating Gaza and resettling it. Netanyahu has been on a mission to recruit more moderate candidates, to balance out populists who have gained momentum in the primaries race. “As Prime Minister of Israel, I intend to deepen the unity within us,” Netanyahu said in a video statement posted on July 22. “Therefore I will work to establish a broad national government, a stable government that will ensure our security and future.”One senior former Likud member with knowledge of the party’s strategy said those efforts are so far not going well. “If (Netanyahu) improves the list and brings better people then maybe he will succeed but he’s not going in the right direction,” the former party member added, without going into further details. Four former and current senior Likud members, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the party was scrambling to win back voters who have drifted away since the last ballot.A spokesperson for the Likud party did not respond to a request for comment.
FIFTH OF ELECTORATE UNDECIDED
In the Agam Labs survey — which polled around 1,000 Likud members and more than 1,000 voters — the divisions got starker when it drilled down to specific issues. The current coalition has made concessions to the ultra-Orthodox leaders in its ranks who have been seeking to exempt their members from service in Israel’s conscript military. The issue has become particularly contentious during the Gaza war, with non-Orthodox Jewish Israelis asking why they should have to shoulder more of the burden of the fighting in Israel’s longest conflict. More than 80 percent of Likud voters want to see a rise in the number of ultra-Orthodox conscripts, according to the Agam Labs data, against just 65 percent among Likud members. Such divisive topics could be pivotal in a vote where around 20 percent of the overall electorate describe themselves as undecided. Many of those are disillusioned Likud people that the party wants to win back, pollsters and researchers say. “These are the people that are going to decide what’s going to happen with the election,” Gayil Talshir, a political scientist at the Hebrew University, said.

Netanyahu presses role for US general in Hamas disarmament
AFP/17 August ,2026
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US envoy Jared Kushner agreed on Monday that an American general would verify Hamas’s disarmament, an Israeli official said, as the premier insisted there would be no pullout from Gaza until then. The understanding marks a new attempt by President Donald Trump’s administration to satisfy Israel after Netanyahu, facing a tough re-election fight, publicly rejected the latest part of a US plan aimed at ending the devastating Gaza war. Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and a longtime family friend of Netanyahu, met the Israeli leader in Jerusalem a day after holding rare direct talks in Egypt with Hamas, which has publicly committed itself to the plan. The two sides “agreed that no redeployment or reconstruction would take place in the Gaza Strip before Hamas is disarmed throughout Gaza,” a senior Israeli official told AFP. “It was also agreed that the first step toward the demilitarization of the Strip would be to require Hamas to hand over its weapons for decommissioning under the supervision of an American general,” the official said. A roadmap agreed by Hamas on July 30 said that the decommissioning of weapons would be supervised by the International Stabilization Force, the nascent unit that aims to deploy to Gaza if the situation calms. It is led by US Major General Jasper Jeffers. Hamas had pledged to hand over its weapons to a new Palestinian governing body, an arrangement that brought skepticism from Netanyahu but which Trump hailed as a breakthrough. An official with Trump’s “Board of Peace” implementing the deal said that “every weapon collected will be fully decommissioned so it cannot be used again” and said that Israel “retains its full right of self-defense.”“If Hamas resorts to terror, violence or attempts to rearm, Israel will retain the right to act accordingly,” the official said.
Other Board of Peace members joining Kushner in the talks included former British prime minister Tony Blair. Kushner in the talks in Egypt had demanded that Hamas prove it is giving up its weapons and that the group-- whose unprecedented October 7, 2023 attack against Israel launched the Gaza war - renounce any future role in governing the Palestinian territory, according to sources in the negotiation. A Hamas official said the group, represented by its new leader Khalil al-Hayya, told Kushner it was committed to the Gaza plan and wanted pressure on Netanyahu.

Trump envoy predicts Hamas disarmament progress in about 30 days
AFP/18 August ,2026
Progress in getting Hamas to give up its weapons and move forward with a Gaza peace plan could materialize in about a month, US President Donald Trump’s envoy Jared Kushner said Monday. “We could be seeing progress... in as little as 30 days, hopefully starting to take some of the weapons out,” Kushner told Fox News while in Tel Aviv. Filling in Gaza tunnels, built by Hamas to maintain the group’s military operations during Israeli bombardments and to smuggle supplies, could happen in the next 60 to 90 days, Kushner said. “Progress could come quite soon but we do need cooperation from both sides,” he said. Kushner, who is Trump’s son-in-law, said he had met for nearly four hours with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a Trump ally, and reassured him on several sticking points. “There were some valid concerns” on the Israeli side, he said. For example, the Trump administration is committed to helping to rebuild Gaza -- destroyed by Israel in response to the October 7, 2023 attack by Palestinian militants -- he said. “But we will not allow Gaza to be rebuilt until the demilitarization occurs. Nobody wants to put more money into a place... if it’s just going to be taken over by terrorists,” he said. “We’re also not going to restrict Israel’s right to defend itself if there are any imminent threats and so we had to clarify what that means.”“For Israel we think it’s a win-win situation,” Kushner said. Either Hamas will go ahead in disarming “willingly over the next 60 to 90 days” or “Israel will have a lot more support from the US and others to go and finish the job in the appropriate way.” Kushner said he had had a “very cordial” meeting with Hamas officials, but “it’s very, very hard to trust a terrorist organization.”

Israeli official says Netanyahu, Kushner agree US general to supervise Hamas disarming
LBCI/18 August ,2026
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed on Monday with U.S. envoy Jared Kushner that a U.S. general should supervise Hamas's disarmament and said Israel would not pull troops from Gaza until then, an Israeli official told AFP. The two sides "agreed that the first step toward the demilitarisation of the Strip would be to require Hamas to hand over its weapons for decommissioning under the supervision of an American general," the Israeli official said. There was no immediate U.S. confirmation of any agreement. AFP

Kushner says Iran, US conversations are robust but no understanding yet
Reuters/17 August ,2026
US President Donald Trump's envoy Jared Kushner on Monday said conversations between the US and different areas of the Iranian government were probably more robust than ever, but the two sides had not yet reached an understanding.
Kushner, who is visiting the Middle East, made the comments in an interview with Fox News.

Kushner meets Netanyahu after talks with Hamas on Gaza plan
Associated Press/18 August ,2026
Mideast negotiator and Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner was meeting Monday with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu days after the premier rejected the 15-point, U.S.-backed road map to move the ceasefire deal forward in Gaza. The meeting, which had stretched to about three hours as of Monday afternoon, follows Kushner's two-hour meeting with the Hamas leader in Egypt, as the U.S. presses for Israel's approval of the road map. There is a lot at stake, including the lives of some 2 million Palestinians in Gaza, reconstruction of the war-demolished enclave and future control over it. Hamas says it has agreed to the road map, which includes disarmament, and the group is urging mediators and the U.S.-created Board of Peace to "compel" Israel to sign on. But Israel, which under the road map must gradually withdraw from Gaza, says Hamas must fully disarm before any Israeli withdrawal. Israeli troops occupy about 60% of the strip, and Netanyahu has previously threatened to control more. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Board of Peace Director Nickolay Mladenov were also in the meeting with Netanyahu, according to a source familiar with the plans and a diplomatic source. Both spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss a closed-door meeting. Israel did not immediately comment.
Meeting follows Kushner's conversation with Hamas
Kushner on Sunday met with Hamas chief Khalil al-Hayya in Cairo on disarmament, according to a regional official and a Hamas official, who both spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk to reporters. Officials from mediating countries Egypt, Qatar and Turkey also were there. The Hamas official said the Hamas leader demanded Israel halt its attacks on Gaza and withdraw to the so-called "yellow line" dividing the territory before beginning implementation. The yellow line was never precisely defined. Israeli forces have moved beyond it and now control about 60% of Gaza. In May, Netanyahu said the next step was to move to 70% control, with Israel "tightening the grip" on Hamas "from every direction."
Regional neighbors increase pressure on Israel
Several regional powers including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates issued a statement Sunday condemning Israel's rejection of the road map, saying, "Israel now bears responsibility for obstructing the efforts to bring peace in Gaza." Other signers included Jordan, Pakistan, Indonesia and the ceasefire mediators. The foreign ministers' statement called on the Board of Peace and the U.S. to take "immediate and concrete measures" to keep any party from obstructing the plan's implementation. Israel had no immediate response. The White House referred questions about Kushner's meetings to the Board of Peace, which did not immediately comment. The Tony Blair Institute also did not comment.
The visit sparks hope and doubt in Gaza
While some in Gaza hope that efforts to implement the road map will bring an end to the war sparked by the Hamas-led attack on southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, others remained skeptical.Mohammad Abu al-Qombuz cast doubt on all talks and visits currently taking place. "A conference here and there, it is all lies. We need a definitive solution that would work for everybody," said Abu al-Qombuz, who lives in a Gaza City tent camp, part of the territory's vast displaced population. Under the road map, Hamas would hand over weapons to the Palestinian technocratic committee meant to oversee daily operations in the territory. The committee has not yet entered Gaza. But Hamas has linked the surrender of its heaviest weapons to the creation of a Palestinian state and the road map entails the creation of a "credible pathway toward achieving Palestinian self-determination and statehood," something Israel's current government rejects. Until the road map is agreed to, other elements of the ceasefire are on hold, including reconstruction and the deployment of international forces to separate Israeli forces from committee-controlled areas. Netanyahu faces a challenging election on Oct. 27 as he tries to hold onto power with a coalition that includes ministers taking a harsh line on Gaza and it's not clear whether he will take decisive steps on the ceasefire before then. Also coming up is the anniversary of the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack on southern Israel that sparked the war.

Seven migrants dead, 50 rescued off Libya: Charity
LBCI/18 August ,2026
An Italian rescue charity said on Monday it pulled 50 people to safety from a double-deck wooden boat in international waters off Libya, and recovered seven bodies. "There was nothing that could be done for seven of them. Two of them are in critical condition due to suffocation," Emergency said in a statement. AFP

Saudi Arabia, Sudan establish coordination council to deepen bilateral ties
Al Arabiya English/17 August ,2026
Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan and his Sudanese counterpart Mohieddin Ibrahim signed a document in Riyadh on Monday establishing the Saudi-Sudanese Coordination Council. The Saudi foreign ministry said the council was established as part of efforts by the two countries to deepen cooperation and coordination and would serve as an institutional platform to develop and strengthen bilateral relations. The ministry added that the Saudi-Sudanese Coordination Council would provide an institutional framework bringing together relevant bodies from both countries to work toward tangible outcomes through clearly defined initiatives, projects and objectives, enhancing cooperation and integration and fulfilling the aspirations of the leaderships and peoples of both countries. Earlier in the day, the two foreign ministers chaired a meeting of the bilateral Follow-up and Political Consultation Committee, during which they reviewed relations between Saudi Arabia and Sudan and ways to develop them across various fields. They also discussed the latest regional developments and exchanged views on them. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to continuing efforts to strengthen bilateral relations and cooperation across various fields.

The Latest LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on August 17-18/2026
Tehran’s reshuffle leaves no pragmatic opening
Saeed Ghasseminejad & Janatan Sayeh/Iran International/August 17/2026
Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s latest appointments to Iran’s top security and paramilitary institutions are not routine personnel changes but a reflection of his priorities for tighter control over the institutions directing war and domestic repression.
The defining struggle in Tehran is not between moderates and hardliners. It is a contest within the hardline establishment and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) over power, patronage, and coercion.
The transition has occurred during a very turbulent time for the Islamic Republic, in the midst of a war with both the U.S. and Israel and only months after the largest anti-regime uprising. Mojtaba has also remained largely out of public view for months, fueling uncertainty over his status and capacity to lead. This vacuum gave rival security networks room to advance their own interests, but Washington should not mistake competition within the regime for a pragmatic opening.
The SNSC is the body that coordinates defense, intelligence, and foreign-policy decisions and its resolutions take effect only after approval by the supreme leader. The secretary therefore operates at the intersection of war, diplomacy, and internal security. Rezaei commanded the IRGC from 1981 to 1997, founded its intelligence unit, and served as Mojtaba’s military adviser since March. Mojtaba first named him his representative on the council and Pezeshkian then formally appointed him secretary.
The removal of Rezaei’s predecessor, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, is equally revealing. He held the secretary position for less than five months, an extraordinarily short tenure for a post usually held for years. Pezeshkian had reportedly asked him to remain and later acknowledged unspecified “differences,” exposing the friction between the presidency and Mojtaba’s emerging power center.
Zolghadr was a close ally of Ahmad Vahidi, the IRGC commander who played a central role in running the country during the war, while Rezaei has shown he is fully aligned with Mojtaba. Replacing one hardline IRGC veteran with another, therefore, reflects a shift in networks rather than ideology, placing the regime’s most important security forum under Mojtaba’s orbit.
The dispute over the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Washington and Tehran deepened that divide. Zolghadr voted in favor of it, while Rezaei had publicly questioned the agreement and later argued that Mojtaba had favored a different path. Zolghadr’s support for the memorandum made him less compatible with a leader determined to impose his own authority on the security establishment.
Taeb’s appointment is equally significant. He and Mojtaba both served in the Habib battalion during the Iran-Iraq War, beginning an alliance that later extended into years of behind-the-scenes schemes to influence Iranian politics. Taeb was sidelined late in Ali Khamenei’s rule after his removal as head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization in 2022, but Mojtaba has now restored him to lead the Basij once again.
The Basij paramilitary embeds itself across various sectors of Iranian society and mobilizes regime loyalists to surveil and repress dissidents. Taeb sharpened that coercive machinery during his tenure, a record that later drew sanctions from the United States, Canada, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. Mojtaba now has a trusted loyalist at the center of the institution most crucial for suppressing another nationwide uprising.
Taeb’s appointment decree instructed him to strengthen the Basij’s ‘intelligence network,’ expand its use of technology and improve coordination with other regime bodies. The priority is unmistakable: consolidation at the top and more effective control of the streets.
Ali Khamenei’s death was bound to trigger a struggle for power. For decades, access to political office, economic privilege, and security authority depended on proximity to him and his office. His death disrupted that system of patronage.
Mojtaba’s task is threefold. He must strengthen his own network, balance the influence of officials tied to rival centers of power, and sideline networks that flourished under his father and were opposed to Mojtaba. Rezaei’s elevation and Taeb’s return serve that purpose.
Washington should treat this reshuffle as a warning that Mojtaba is placing loyalists at the helm of the institutions that shape external and internal national security doctrines. This should put an end to Washington’s hope that pragmatists inside the regime can lead the country toward a different path.
The United States should reject bargains that strengthen the regime without verified changes in Tehran’s conduct. It should work with Israel and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf to deter Iranian aggression and constrain Tehran’s military partnership with Russia and China. It should also deny the regime’s repressive organs the finance and technology they need while expanding support for the Iranian people confronting the regime’s apparatus of oppression.
**Saeed Ghasseminejad is a Senior Fellow at the National Union for Democracy in Iran (NUFDI), the director of the Iran Prosperity Project, and an economic advisor to exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi.
** Janatan Sayeh is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies focused on Iranian domestic affairs and the Islamic Republic’s regional influence.

Jared Kushner's Gaza Strategy Could Reshape the Middle East
Ahmed Charai/Gatestone Institute/August 17, 2026
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/22798/jared-kushners-gaza-strategy
Netanyahu's substantive concern must remain at the center of any agreement. Israel cannot withdraw only to discover that Hamas has preserved tunnels, weapons, command structures or the capacity to rebuild them. October 7 made such a risk unacceptable. His requirement is therefore clear: Hamas must take irreversible steps toward genuine disarmament before Israel assumes an irreversible security risk.
Iran remains the central strategic challenge.... It retains financial resources, instruments of coercion and the capacity to rebuild. Time cannot be offered to Tehran as a strategic gift.
The answer, therefore, is not to resolve Gaza first and return to Iran later.
Israeli withdrawal cannot depend on promises; it must follow verified security guarantees.
The equation is not peace instead of security. It is security as the condition for peace, and peace as the foundation for prosperity.
For Netanyahu, the immediate question is not whether Hamas can be trusted. It cannot. The question is whether Kushner can construct an agreement in which trust is replaced by verification, reciprocity and enforcement—one that delivers Hamas's disarmament without compromising Israel's security and makes Israeli withdrawal the consequence of verified implementation rather than political promises.
It would put back on the table the proposition the Middle East urgently needs: that security can make peace possible, and that peace can make prosperity more powerful than confrontation.
Jared Kushner is not asking Israel to trust Hamas. Nor is he proposing that Israel exchange security for a diplomatic achievement. His approach is built around a more rigorous equation: measurable disarmament, independent verification and phased Israeli withdrawal, with each Israeli step conditioned on implementation of the corresponding security commitment. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces a consequential decision on Gaza. The political environment is difficult, the Israeli election is approaching, and every concession will be contested. But Israel's security cannot be subordinated to an electoral calendar. The question is more fundamental: can Hamas be verifiably disarmed while Israel withdraws without recreating the conditions that produced October 7? Jared Kushner is attempting to provide Netanyahu with a mechanism to achieve precisely that—and Netanyahu has strong strategic reasons to support it. Kushner is not asking Israel to trust Hamas. Nor is he proposing that Israel exchange security for a diplomatic achievement. His approach is built around a more rigorous equation: measurable disarmament, independent verification and phased Israeli withdrawal, with each Israeli step conditioned on implementation of the corresponding security commitment. Netanyahu's substantive concern must remain at the center of any agreement. Israel cannot withdraw only to discover that Hamas has preserved tunnels, weapons, command structures or the capacity to rebuild them. October 7 made such a risk unacceptable. His requirement is therefore clear: Hamas must take irreversible steps toward genuine disarmament before Israel assumes an irreversible security risk.
The importance of Kushner's approach is that it seeks to make that requirement executable. Hamas disarms in defined and verifiable stages; compliance is independently certified; Israel responds with the corresponding stage of withdrawal. Neither party receives the full benefit before fulfilling its obligations, and neither is required to surrender all its leverage at the outset.
This is why Kushner's sequence—Hamas, regional mediators, Netanyahu—is important. His objective should not be to bring Netanyahu assurances from Hamas. Israel has heard assurances before. It is to bring him a structure in which assurances are no longer necessary. The difficult questions are practical. Who verifies disarmament? Which weapons are covered? What happens to tunnels, production facilities and command infrastructure? What constitutes a breach, and what are its consequences? These provisions are not technical details surrounding an agreement. They are the agreement.
Kushner brings another advantage. The Abraham Accords gave him political capital in Israel and across the Arab world that few American negotiators possess. They also demonstrated a method: identify converging interests, construct reciprocal obligations and connect peace to tangible economic benefits.
Earlier this year, I argued that Kushner should avoid becoming too deeply involved in the Iranian file. That was not an argument for reducing pressure on Tehran. Quite the opposite.
Iran remains the central strategic challenge. Its military capabilities have been weakened and its economy severely damaged, but the regime has proved resilient. It retains financial resources, instruments of coercion and the capacity to rebuild. Time cannot be offered to Tehran as a strategic gift.
Iran has also skillfully shifted the focus of the confrontation. The debate over the vulnerability of the regime has increasingly given way to the Strait of Hormuz, energy security and the economic consequences of escalation. This places pressure not only on Washington and Israel but on the Gulf states, Europe and Asian economies whose interests are directly affected by the security of this vital passage.
The United States cannot carry that burden alone. Europe and Asia have substantial interests at stake and must assume their share of responsibility. Nor can Washington disregard Gulf partners that have taken significant risks and made consequential choices in support of the United States.
The answer, therefore, is not to resolve Gaza first and return to Iran later. The two challenges must be addressed simultaneously, but not necessarily by the same people or with the same instruments.
Pressure on Iran must continue. Kushner's particular diplomatic capital should be concentrated where it can produce a different kind of strategic result. That is Gaza.
Success there would not automatically disarm Hezbollah or separate the Houthis from Iran. These organizations have their own political structures, military interests and long-established relationships with Tehran. Pretending otherwise would underestimate both. But Gaza could demonstrate a different method.
Disarmament cannot be presented simply as surrender. It must open the door to reconstruction, investment and economic recovery. Israeli withdrawal cannot depend on promises; it must follow verified security guarantees. International and Arab financing must accompany credible governance and stability.
The equation is not peace instead of security. It is security as the condition for peace, and peace as the foundation for prosperity.
That principle could eventually be adapted to Lebanon. Restoring the Lebanese state's authority over weapons will require pressure and enforceable commitments, but it will also require offering Lebanon a credible economic future: reconstruction, Gulf investment, infrastructure and reintegration into the regional economy.
Yemen will require a different architecture, reflecting its internal political realities and the security requirements of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. But there too, military pressure alone has limits. Reconstruction and economic reintegration can become part of the incentives for a durable settlement.
This is where the legacy of the Abraham Accords remains relevant. Their significance was not simply normalization between governments. They demonstrated that diplomacy becomes more durable when peace creates tangible economic interests in preserving it.
Iran offers its region a permanent confrontation. The United States and its allies must continue to contain that threat and deny Tehran the time and space to rebuild its capabilities. But they must also offer a more compelling proposition: security, investment, economic integration and a future beyond permanent confrontation.
For Netanyahu, the immediate question is not whether Hamas can be trusted. It cannot. The question is whether Kushner can construct an agreement in which trust is replaced by verification, reciprocity and enforcement—one that delivers Hamas's disarmament without compromising Israel's security and makes Israeli withdrawal the consequence of verified implementation rather than political promises. That is a framework Netanyahu can support without retreating from Israel's fundamental security requirements.
If that mechanism can verifiably disarm Hamas, protect Israel's security and open Gaza to credible governance and reconstruction, it would represent more than the settlement of one war. It would put back on the table the proposition the Middle East urgently needs: that security can make peace possible, and that peace can make prosperity more powerful than confrontation. That is the strategic opportunity Jared Kushner is pursuing. It deserves to be taken seriously. Ahmed Charai is the Chairman and CEO of World Herald Tribune, Inc., and the publisher of the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, TV Abraham, and Radio Abraham. He serves on the boards of several prominent institutions, including the Atlantic Council, the Center for the National Interest, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and the International Crisis Group. He is also an International Councilor and a member of the Advisory Board at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
This article was originally published in the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune. It is reprinted here by the kind permission of the author.
© 2026 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.

European Leaders: In Urgent Need of Deradicalization
Robert Williams/Gatestone Institute/August 17, 2026
We have now arrived at a time when European leaders and "elites" are, once again, in desperate need of deradicalization -- from being "pro-Hamas."
Sometimes the sentiment is presented as "pro-Palestine," but it really has nothing to do with Palestinians and everything to do with hating Jews. If these protestors were actually pro-Palestinian, they would be demanding freedom of speech, equal justice under the law, better educational opportunities and better governance, where Palestinian leaders were less corrupt and did not shoot at their own people to prevent them from taking aid, or plant weapons depots among them to increase their own citizens' casualty rates.
"Do the Government and Parliament not understand that singling out the world's only Jewish state, holding it to standards not applied to anywhere else, and falsely accusing Israel of committing these terrible crimes is bound to drive hostility towards people who are identified with Israel, which is the vast majority of the Jewish community?" — Lord Austin, speaking at a debate in the UK House of Lords, June 10, 2026.
"The anti-semitism of today... is nothing but a wrench to unscrew, bit by bit, the whole machinery of our civilization... like a hand grenade tossed over the wall to work havoc and confusion in the camp of democracy. That is its real and main purpose." – German author Thomas Mann, NBC radio, March 9, 1940.
"Do the Government and Parliament not understand that singling out the world's only Jewish state, holding it to standards not applied to anywhere else, and falsely accusing Israel of committing these terrible crimes is bound to drive hostility towards people who are identified with Israel, which is the vast majority of the Jewish community?" — Lord Austin
After World War II, many of Europe's "elites," notably in Germany and Austria, were in grave need of denazification. We have now arrived at a time when European leaders and "elites" are, once again, in desperate need of deradicalization -- from being "pro-Hamas."
Sometimes the sentiment is presented as "pro-Palestine," but it really has nothing to do with Palestinians and everything to do with hating Jews. If these protestors were actually pro-Palestinian, they would be demanding freedom of speech, equal justice under the law, better educational opportunities and better governance, where Palestinian leaders were less corrupt and did not shoot at their own people to prevent them from taking aid, or plant weapons depots among them to increase their own citizens' casualty rates.
Some of Hamas's senior leaders continue to live comfortably, far from Gaza, in Turkey and Qatar, and are billionaires many times over. Until a string of assassinations, the combined wealth of just the top three leaders of Hamas was $11 billion.
As with Nazism, the ultimate aim of the pro-Hamas or "pro-Palestinian" movement in Europe – especially since Hamas's Iran-orchestrated invasion of Israel on October 7, 2023 – is to rid the world of Jews "by any means necessary," as the pro-Hamas crowds explain at their demonstrations. At least, the thinking seems to go, if the Jews are terrorized enough, perhaps they might flee Europe on their own.
The "pro-Hamas" sentiments among the governing classes in Europe appear to be guided by an overwhelming, almost frenzied obsession with Jews and the Jewish state -- often in a way that works against these countries' own national interests.
In Britain, for instance – a country literally circling the drain as it descends into migrant violence and chaos – there was recently a gruesome attempt by a Sudanese migrant to behead a British man in Belfast. What, though, is Parliament busy debating? Israel.
"This is already the second debate this week on Israel," Lord Austin told the House of Lords on June 10.
"Over the last few years, Parliament has discussed Israel more than any other issue — not just more than any international issue but more than any domestic issue, including the economy, unemployment, crime or the NHS. The public out there look at Parliament and think this is utterly mad."
In Ireland, currently facing its own huge self-inflicted problems with migrant crime, President Catherine Connolly praised her sister's participation in the May 2026 Hamas-aligned Global Sumud Flotilla by saying she was "very proud" of her. The flotilla has documented links to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. The sitting president of a European country is proudly boasting of her own personal links to an Islamic terrorist entity — and is admired for it rather than removed from office. The Irish government is also trying to pass a law boycotting Israeli goods, known as the "Occupied Territories Bill," thereby risking the violation of U.S. anti-boycott laws. Ireland is home to a large contingent of US companies, including tech giants such as X, Meta, Google and Microsoft. If, however, such a law were to pass, those companies might have to stop doing business in Ireland. Even if such a move would be a drastic blow to the Irish economy, in Ireland the hatred of the Jewish people and their tiny state might well supersede national interests.
France has opened a "war crimes" probe into Israel over its treatment of the Global Sumud Flotilla members. Meanwhile in France, violence in the cities has become so prevalent that authorities imposed nightly curfews to get through the 2026 FIFA World Cup. In June, Paris Mayor Emmanuel Gregoire granting honorary citizenship of the city to Gazans and the Arabs of the West Bank, as well as to "Palestinian journalists" -- many of whom have turned out to be –big surprise -- Hamas terrorists.
Nevertheless, European leaders can be seen hard at work accusing Israel of every imaginable crime and then turning around pretending to be "shocked" when Jews suffer the consequences of the hatred that these "leaders" help to create.
Lord Austin, speaking at the June 10 debate in the UK House of Lords, said:
"Do the Government and Parliament not understand that singling out the world's only Jewish state, holding it to standards not applied to anywhere else, and falsely accusing Israel of committing these terrible crimes is bound to drive hostility towards people who are identified with Israel, which is the vast majority of the Jewish community? This is why I believe Parliament is playing a large role in driving the explosion of antisemitism that we have seen on the streets of Britain."
The obsession with the Jews has spilled over into the rest of the culture. Jews have now become so deliberately ostracized and boycotted that they can barely find publishers for their books or a bookshop that will sell them. Their book festivals are boycotted by Nobel Prize Laureates such as J.M. Coetzee. While Jews can barely get published anymore, simply because of who they are, the publishing world is clamoring to publish Arab terrorists: Marwan Barghouti, a convicted terrorist serving five life sentences for murder, has a book, Unbroken: In Pursuit of Freedom for Palestine, scheduled for simultaneous publication in several countries on November 5, 2026. Boosting him as some sort of Nelson Mandela, the book will be carried by the leading publishing houses in Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Brazil, and the US. Genocidal Jew hate sells well.
Above all, perhaps, a story from Madrid about the actions of a public school shows the consequences of European government leaders' frenzied Jew-hatred -- of which Spain's Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez is one of Europe's most radical adherents. To remain in office, Sánchez depends on the even further-left Podemos, a party born of radical activism whose founders have long been entangled in troubling financial networks linked to regimes hostile to the West — in particular Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro.
A public school in Madrid recently saw 10-year-old students performing – as if straight out of an actual Hamas summer camp for kids -- a pro-Hamas play, dressed as Hamas terrorists, in keffiyehs, military clothing and balaclavas, carrying toy weapons while chanting, "With strength and courage, we will not surrender."German author Thomas Mann (1875-1955), speaking on NBC radio on March 9, 1940, said: "The anti-semitism of today... is nothing but a wrench to unscrew, bit by bit, the whole machinery of our civilization... like a hand grenade tossed over the wall to work havoc and confusion in the camp of democracy. That is its real and main purpose."The Nazis almost succeeded. European leaders are now doing just about everything in their power to destroy Western civilization. They have facilitated mass migration from the Middle East and Africa, including all the third-world "traditions" that come with it. This time, no one will come to save the Europeans from themselves.
**Robert Williams is based in the United States.
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/22737/european-leaders-need-deradicalization
© 2026 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute.

The Mecca Agreement: A Threat to Regional Security?
Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/August 17/2026
While the Mecca Agreement is being touted by some as countries finally taking responsibility for their own defense instead of relying exclusively on the United States (as Saudi Arabia currently does), this arrangement looks set to produce "unintended consequences."
The US seems to forget that after World War II, the last thing it wanted was for Europe and other regions to have strong military forces. Many in the West concluded that Germany had effectively started two world wars in one century and, in general, had trouble playing nicely with others. While protecting its allies might be expensive for the US, not protecting them could well cost more.
The same holds true for an alliance such as the Mecca Agreement. At first glance, it looks as if the Saudi-Pakistani-Turkish alliance might help the United States share a defense burden. In a longer view, the pact could well end up creating a far bigger defense burden.
The countries in the Mecca Agreement are not necessarily becoming America's enemies. They could, however, work against the interests of the US and the West.
Saudi Arabia, which may have been flirting with the idea of joining the Abraham Accords but always came up with some "poison pill" and has just been permitted by US President Donald J. Trump to enrich uranium for nuclear reactors, has chosen to enter a defense partnership with Turkey and Pakistan – two countries whose governments have fiercely anti-Israel positions.
The concern, therefore, is that an increasingly powerful Turkey is seeking to translate the expansion of its military capabilities into a regional hegemony while simultaneously embracing an aggressive posture toward Israel, Cyprus and Greece.
If, for instance, Turkey receives the F-35 stealth fighter jets it is seeking from the United States, then attacks Israel, and Israel retaliates, will Pakistan then claim Turkey has "been attacked" and launch nuclear weapons at Israel? Is that long-term desire, in fact, at the root of the "defense pact"?
Turkey, moreover, is rapidly expanding its influence in Syria. Both Turkey and Qatar are major allies of the government of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, while Turkey has been deeply involved in developing Syria's new armed forces.
Turkey is positioning itself as a leader of an increasingly assertive Sunni Islamist-oriented bloc. Pakistan is trying to convert its nuclear status into greater political influence, and Saudi Arabia is their financier and potential nuclear weapons partner.
The real danger is the strategic direction it represents, in response to a perceived decline in American influence, growing Turkish power, weakening prospects for a peaceful Middle East, and now the emergence of a new regional bloc whose leading members increasingly regard Israel, Cyprus, Greece and the West in general not as potential partners, but as adversaries.
The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan on August 7 should serve as a wake-up call for the United States and Israel. While it is being touted by some as countries finally taking responsibility for their own defense instead of relying exclusively on the United States (as Saudi Arabia currently does), this arrangement looks set to produce "unintended consequences." (Image source: OpenAI)
The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan on August 7 should serve as a wake-up call for the United States and Israel. The agreement, which states that an armed attack against any one of the three countries will be considered an attack against all of them, has been presented by its signatories as a purely defensive agreement. Pakistani and Turkish officials insist that it is not directed against any particular country.
That, however, is possibly not quite true, and only part of the issue.
While the Mecca Agreement is being touted by some as countries finally taking responsibility for their own defense instead of relying exclusively on the United States (as Saudi Arabia currently does), this arrangement looks set to produce "unintended consequences."
The US seems to forget that after World War II, the last thing it wanted was for Europe and other regions to have strong military forces. Many in the West concluded that Germany had effectively started two world wars in one century and, in general, had trouble playing nicely with others. While protecting its allies might be expensive for the US, not protecting them could well cost more.
The same holds true for an alliance such as the Mecca Agreement. At first glance, it looks as if the Saudi-Pakistani-Turkish alliance might help the United States share a defense burden. In a longer view, the pact could well end up creating a far bigger defense burden.
For nearly a century, the US has generously provided protection against countries threatening the West and Western interests. Now, in the Mecca Agreement, three important Muslim countries, two of them longtime partners of the United States and one a NATO member, are building a regional security framework that does not depend on Washington.
For decades, Saudi Arabia has regarded the United States as its principal security guarantor. Turkey remains a NATO member. Pakistan has had a long and complicated security relationship with Washington. Now these three countries are establishing their own collective-defense mechanism.
Some of America's traditional partners apparently no longer have confidence in the United States as their protector. Saudi Arabia is clearly declaring that it no longer wants to place all its security eggs in the American basket.
The countries in the Mecca Agreement are not necessarily becoming America's enemies. They could, however, work against the interests of the US and the West.
The seeds of Saudi mistrust were planted years ago. In 2019, Iran was blamed for the devastating attack on Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities, temporarily knocking out a huge portion of Saudi oil production.
Yet Washington did not launch the military response many Saudis apparently expected. The episode reportedly "shook Saudi faith in the US." The Middle East Institute wrote that the 2019 Iranian attack and the lack of a US response "virtually eliminated any Saudi confidence in the US security commitment."
The Mecca Agreement appears to be another consequence of this loss of confidence.
Saudi Arabia brings enormous financial resources to the new partnership. Pakistan brings military experience and, significantly, is the only Muslim-majority country possessing nuclear weapons. Turkey brings one of NATO's largest militaries and a rapidly advancing indigenous defense industry.
This does not necessarily mean that Pakistan's nuclear umbrella has been extended to Saudi Arabia or Turkey. Moreover, it does not mean that the three countries will automatically go to war whenever one is attacked. Indeed, the operational details remain vague.The political symbolism, however, should not be underestimated. For Israel, the development is especially disturbing because it comes at a time when hopes of normalization with Saudi Arabia appear remote.
Saudi Arabia, which may have been flirting with the idea of joining the Abraham Accords but always came up with some "poison pill" and has just been permitted by US President Donald J. Trump to enrich uranium for nuclear reactors, has chosen to enter a defense partnership with Turkey and Pakistan – two countries whose governments have fiercely anti-Israel positions.
Jonathan Spyer, director of research at the Middle East Forum, wrote that before the Hamas invasion of Israel on October 7, 2023, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was often viewed alongside the leaders of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain as part of an emerging Gulf leadership seeking to move beyond traditional regional rivalries and toward economic and technological cooperation, including closer relations with Israel.
"It should not be assumed that Riyadh has conclusively abandoned this orientation," Spyer cautioned. Nevertheless, he noted, in the post-October 7 Middle East, military considerations and "religious and civilizational symbolic loyalties" have returned to center stage. The Mecca Agreement gives Saudi Arabia the opposite strategic framework precisely when Washington had hoped that deeper US-Saudi security cooperation could help facilitate Saudi normalization with Israel.
Turkey's role is particularly dangerous. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey has for years positioned itself as one of Israel's most hostile adversaries. Ankara has maintained close relations with Hamas and has repeatedly provided political support to the terrorist organization (such as here, here, here and here). The concern, therefore, is that an increasingly powerful Turkey is seeking to translate the expansion of its military capabilities into a regional hegemony while simultaneously embracing an aggressive posture toward Israel, Cyprus and Greece.
If, for instance, Turkey receives the F-35 stealth fighter jets it is seeking from the United States, then attacks Israel, and Israel retaliates, will Pakistan then claim Turkey has "been attacked" and launch nuclear weapons at Israel? Is that long-term desire, in fact, at the root of the "defense pact"?
Spyer warns that the emerging Turkey-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia alignment is, at the rhetorical level, "jointly and extremely anti-Israel." He points to Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif's recent call for a united Islamic front against Israel and Erdogan's claim that Zionism threatens everyone. More significantly, Spyer notes that Turkey and Qatar have been among Hamas's "practical supporters."
The Mecca Agreement, therefore, cannot be examined in isolation.
Turkey, moreover, is rapidly expanding its influence in Syria. Both Turkey and Qatar are major allies of the government of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, while Turkey has been deeply involved in developing Syria's new armed forces. Israel, Cyprus and Greece therefore face the possibility of a growing Turkish strategic footprint stretching through Syria and into the wider Sunni Muslim world, backed by closer military cooperation with nuclear-armed Pakistan and Saudi financial power.
Turkey, in addition, brings sophisticated military technology to the equation. Ankara and Islamabad have steadily expanded their defense-industrial relationship, including cooperation involving aircraft, drones, and other military systems. Saudi money could significantly accelerate these projects.
Turkey is positioning itself as a leader of an increasingly assertive Sunni Islamist-oriented bloc. Pakistan is trying to convert its nuclear status into greater political influence, and Saudi Arabia is their financier and potential nuclear weapons partner.
Even if the Mecca Agreement never becomes a genuine "Islamic NATO" and remains partly symbolic, that does not make it harmless.
The real danger is the strategic direction it represents, in response to a perceived decline in American influence, growing Turkish power, weakening prospects for a peaceful Middle East, and now the emergence of a new regional bloc whose leading members increasingly regard Israel, Cyprus, Greece and the West in general not as potential partners, but as adversaries.
**Khaled Abu Toameh is an award-winning journalist based in Jerusalem.
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/22797/mecca-agreement-regional-security
© 2026 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.

The Islamic Republic’s Revolutionary DNA
Mark Dubowitz & Haviv Rettig Gur/August 17/2026
https://www.fdd.org/podcasts/2026/08/14/the-islamic-republics-revolutionary-dna/
What makes the Islamic Republic of Iran different from a conventional regime seeking security, prosperity, and survival? Its ideological DNA fuses Maoist revolutionary thought, Frantz Fanon’s vision of anticolonial struggle and redemptive violence—channeled through Iranian intellectual Ali Shariati—and a revolutionary Shia theology of martyrdom, resistance, and struggle against oppression.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, founder and first Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, forged these currents into a revolutionary state whose legitimacy rests not simply on governing Iran, but on resisting an international order it considers fundamentally unjust.
That helps explain the regime’s remarkable ability to turn military defeats, economic devastation, and mass suffering into narratives of resistance, sacrifice, and even victory.
Haviv Rettig Gur — Middle East analyst at The Free Press, and host of Ask Haviv Anything — joins Mark Dubowitz on The Iran Breakdown to unpack the ideological DNA of the Islamic Republic, why it has endured, and what its enemies still misunderstand about the regime they are fighting.
DUBOWITZ: So welcome to The Iran Breakdown. I’m Mark Dubowitz and I am really honored today to have a close friend and really a mentor, intellectual mentor, though he may not admit that because for him to be the intellectual mentor and for me to be the intellectual student, he may not be very proud of how far or not far I’ve come. But Haviv Rettig Gur, many of our listeners know him. He’s one of Israel’s really most important public intellectuals, and he does what very few public intellectuals in Israel are able to do, which is really to communicate in perfect English to a foreign audience. So, Haviv, wonderful to have you on the show.
RETTIG GUR: Thank you, Mark. People don’t know that just before we started filming, I was saying, look, I learned from you what actually is happening in Iran, so if we could talk about the grand things, but sure, I’ll take the credit there for teaching you about these things. All right.
DUBOWITZ: Well, so Haviv has an amazing podcast called Ask Haviv Anything, and it’s a great title for a podcast because Aviv is exactly the kind of person you literally can ask Haviv anything, and he’s always going to give you a very smart, thoughtful, well-informed answer. And Haviv, I’m not going to get into the details of Hormuz or how do we blow up Pickax Mountain or how much damage have we done to Iran’s missile shield or what’s Trump going to do before midterms and after midterms? Because we have a number of guests who certainly spend a lot of time thinking and talking about that. What I want to do is really zoom out. And the area that I struggle with a lot is really just trying to understand the Islamic Republic’s ideology and how it fits into the broader Islamist ideology that is so threatening to the United States, to Israel, and to the West.
So, help our listeners and viewers really understand the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei. Who are these people? What motivates them and how are they connected to the broader ideological jihad against the West?
RETTIG GUR: So, the easy question, thank you so much for having me. The basic way I think to look at this region, the Iranian regime is the most extraordinary representation, the most successful and failed at the same time example of a very powerful, coherent, thought out old, century and a half old doctrine that has been coalescing in certain ideological wings of Islam in the Middle East. This isn’t all Muslims; this isn’t all Muslim factions. This isn’t even all places where there’s violent conflict in the Middle East. But there is this doctrine of permanent asymmetric struggle against the forces that these people believe are keeping Islam down, keeping Islam from realizing its great redemptive purpose in the world. The word they use to describe this struggle is Mukawama, which means literally just resistance. It’s literally in Arabic, the word you would use to describe resistance, electrical resistance and copper wires.
It’s just the word resistance. But it means vastly more than the simple English word of resistance, like a resistance movement against a colonial occupation of some kind. It’s an entire religious doctrine and vision of history. And what’s extraordinary about the Iranian regime specifically, and you can talk a little bit about, there’s some elements of this in Erdogan’s AKP Party, which is a Sunny version of some of these salaphist ideas, and there’s all Hamas, certainly the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. But what’s extraordinary in the Iranian regime is that they have managed to fuse a whole bunch of traditions, a whole bunch of ideas percolating through the Middle East for 150 years into a single coherent political system where suffering, devastation, failure, military failure, the decapitation of the entire leadership of the regime, strengthen the regime rather than weaken it. This is a system that is amazing, extraordinary.
It’s a true achievement just in political science terms. And when you begin to understand the ideas at the core of this system, you begin to understand, first of all, why Trump is having such a hard time bringing them to heal. You begin to understand why they’re so resilient despite causing so much damage to the Iranian economy over so many years. How they survive again and again, Iranian revolts and rebellions by people whose lives they’ve ruined, millions upon millions of people whose economy they have broken and shattered the people they rule and oppress. Why they’re so resilient. And I’m happy to get into it, but just in Hebrew, we have a phrase on the edge of the fork, Al-Qama’s leg, just the tiniest little taste of it.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is not at its core the kind of normal state that pursues security and prosperity that classical political science talks about. It is a revolutionary project. It is organized around this idea of perpetual mukawama, perpetual resistance. And that functions as a kind of operational engine, ideological engine. You want to understand what the IRGC is, why Iran has a separate military separate to the Iranian state military called the IRGC. You need to understand the Mukawama. You want to understand why they built out this vast proxy system, why they spent so many billions on Hezbollah over the years. You need to understand this idea of the Mukawama. So, if that’s okay, can I just get into that? Because once people have a sense of that, a whole lot of, I think also policy prescriptions become clear.
DUBOWITZ: Yeah, Haviv, please continue. I mean, I’ll just keep—
RETTIG GUR: Going. This is—
DUBOWITZ: Exactly where I want to go. Yeah.
RETTIG GUR: There were four, maybe five elements that come together to form the Iranian regime. The first one is Maoism. And specifically, there was this idea that Mao had of protracted people’s war. That’s what he called it. And it’s a kind of long-term guerrilla struggle, long-term popular struggle. It takes a long time to bring down the class super structures that Mao saw in the capitalist system. And in the internal Chinese Civil War where the communists then win, he led a kind of long-term popular struggle that slowly wears down, grinds down the stronger opponent, the opponent that controls all the power levers in society at the beginning of this conflict, of this conflict of the proletariat rising up. And so, it’s a war of attrition, a war of popular mobilization. Hold that thought in your mind, that example of Mao’s popular war. Then you have Frantz Fanon, this brilliant psychiatrist who volunteers as a doctor in the National Liberation Front of Algeria when it is fighting in the late ’50s, early ’60s when it’s fighting the French colonial rule in Algeria.
And he writes a book called The Wretched of the Earth that is beautiful, fascinating, and terribly damaging in the history of the world. In this book, Fanon talks about the state of the colonized, the psychological state of specifically Algerian Muslims, but he’s referring to a much larger human condition in a period of imperialism and colonialism. And one of his main arguments is that when you are that colonized person, in American terms, because everything is coded racially because of the American historical experience, let’s call it brown people colonized by white Europeans, it’s not quite how it works everywhere. But when you are that underclass in this large colonial superstructure, Fanon argues that violence, including suicide violence, in other words, martyrdom, is purifying. It restores the human dignity of the oppressed because it humiliates, it brings down a peg, those who had been above the oppressed. And so, violence is healing.
Violence heals psychological wounds. It heals historical wounds. Hold that thought. And then you have Anu Shia theology. In the year 680, there was a battle in Karbala, which is today in Iraq. And in this battle, two essentially claimants to being the heirs of Muhammad as the religious and political leadership of the new Islam, Imam Hussein and the Umayyad Caliph, Yazid, face off in this battle in Karbala. Yazid kills Hussein. That moment is essentially the moment where Shia and Sunni are born as two distinct paths or branches of Islam. The followers of Hussein who believe Hussein should not have died in that battle; Hussein was the rightful heir of Muhammad. They’re the Shia. And the followers who believe that the right people won and the right people carried on the torch, they’re essentially the Sunni. And one of the core ideas of the Shia is that Hussein’s, for example, the next Imam, his son, goes into occultation, disappears from history, but will return.
And he is the Mahdi, the Messianic figure at the end of days. Now, there’s many different kinds of Shia, a lot of discussion about this, but basically there is this mythical, not mythical in the sense that it’s not true, but foundational moment in the founding of Shiism. And the moment of the founding of Shiism is a moment in which the proper religious path, the proper religious leader, the Imam, the divine messenger loses. And the evil, powerful, Hussein had a much smaller force. Yazid had a much larger force. The powerful, the arrogant one, and the humble but true, spiritually correct, lost. And Shiism is all about that great sort of framework of the weak, the humble, but the true and correct and faithful. And so, Imam Hussein’s martyrdom at Karbala is usually for centuries talked about in Shia Islam by Shia theologians as a kind of quietistic, pietistic kind of a story.
It’s a tragedy built into reality. And when the tragedy is overcome by the return of the Mahadi of the true heir to Muhammad, then the tragedy of the world, the brokenness of the world will be overcome. In the 1970s, you have thinkers, Shia thinkers like especially Ali Shariati, but not only. Ali Shariati gives a speech in 1971 called Red Shiism versus Black Shiism. And he says, Black Shiism is everything I just described. It’s a Shiism that says Hussein died in this battle, but his descendants will return and history will be set right again. And that’s the great redemptive arc of history. And therefore, we await patiently. Shiism is framed for centuries as quietistic suffering and piety, et cetera. And Ali Shariati says, this is a mistake. Imam Hussein is not this call for us to be quiet. In fact, he is the underclass, the revolutionary, the Marxist revolutionary overthrowing or challenging the great powers of the world.
This is exactly the kind of Marxist re-imagining of a religious leader that you have in the very same year, 1971 over in Peru where there’s a Catholic priest who writes a book, a famous book called A Theology of Liberation, which is the beginning of South American Liberation Theology within Catholicism, which essentially reframes Jesus as the Marxist, redemptive Messiah figure, revolutionary. Everything that he is religiously, he is also as a class, overlapping the class more and the religious revolution. And so, Ali Shariati fuses Maoist protracted people’s war as the mechanism by which the people, the proletariat overcomes the powerful. And Fanon saying violence is redemptive, violence is restorative, violence is important. And Shia eschatology that says, how do we. It isn’t just that we await the coming of the Mahadi. Imam Hussein’s story is the story of active revolution to bring the Mahadi. And he fuses all these things into a kind of Shia Marxism that is the main intellectual source.
Again, he’s not the only guy doing this kind of stuff, but he’s one of the main teachers of a gentleman named Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Revolution. In this system that they build, there’s a whole lot more I left out, Kanafani and others, but in this system that they build, it’s not just name-dropping. People can just drop this into ChatGPT, and it’ll lay out for them all the different pieces. It’s really fascinating and important. And you can’t understand what’s happening in the Middle East today without understanding these profound ideas. In this system, weakness, humility become a kind of spiritual purity that draws divine protection, that gives you military success over the long term against the arrogant and powerful. And this is key to understand. I don’t know if that was clear. So let me just clarify. Ruhollah Khomeini, student of Shariati, student of all of these people, reader of all of these thinkers, develops a special version of this Shia eschatology.
And I’m sorry for going into the weeds, we’re about to come out of it. And he develops a theory of weakness that’s really, really powerful. Islam has been struggling for two centuries to understand what happened to it, why it became weak. With the entry into the Middle East of European empires in the 19th century, Britain and France, et cetera, Muslim theologians began to seriously debate what happened to them. Islam is supposed to be the top, and it’s not supposed to be at the bottom with any Christian empire stomping over Islamic territory. Islam is supposed to be a vehicle for grand world redemption. And Islam is backward and Islam is geopolitically weak and Islam is poor. And what does that mean? And what did we do wrong? And how do we get back to our rightful place in history? And they develop all kinds of answers.
We have to turn pietistic. We have to develop a better industrial policy. There’s a million answers that Muslims, especially in the Arab world, but not only in the Arab world, turn to, to try and respond to the discovery with European imperialism chopping up the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century that they are in fact profoundly weak and that this is a theological crisis. Because again, Islam shouldn’t be in centuries of retreat. Khomeini enters this conversation drawing on all these threads, and he comes with a theory. And his theory is very simple. He says, “The world is divided between the oppressed, the Mustadafin, the humble, the weak, and the Mustakbirin, the powerful, the arrogant.” We see that in the Battle of Karbala in 680. There’s the weak, the humble, but also the faithful, the holy, the Mustadafin in Imam Hussein, and the powerful and arrogant in the Khalif Yazid.
And says Khomeini, what we know that the arrogant don’t know and what Ali Shariati teaches us and what Fanon and Mao, et cetera, show us is that in fact, the weak are secretly the powerful. The weak, because they are weak, cannot trust in their power. They have to trust in God. They have nothing else to trust. And God ultimately will side. It is easier for the weak, for the humble to turn to faith, to be honest in their faith than it is for the powerful who trust in the power they have in this world. And so, the powerful end up losing God’s grace, God’s support, and the weak end up guaranteeing almost God’s support. And then the week end up winning. And that’s the core story of Islam. That’s certainly the story of Shiism. The weak win. There’s also a battle of Badr with Muhammad.
It’s one of the sort of defining battles in Muhammad’s career where the Muslim, the earliest Muslims face a battle against more powerful forces, but they emerge victorious and that establishes Muhammad in some sense. And so, there’s this recurring theme of weakness, but faithful is the guarantor of eventual victory. Khomeini says a very simple thing. The musta defin, the humble and oppressed. They’re not just Shia. They’re not just Muslims. They’re not just the Iranian proletariat. There’s a global revolutionary class and its struggle against the powerful all over the world. What a guy named Kanafani, a Palestinian theoretician in Lebanon calls the great beast, which is sort of the global imperialist construct. The war in Vietnam, he talks about how there’s a piece of this great beast. Its head is in East Asia; its arteries go into South America and Africa. Its heart of course is the Middle East, Palestine, Israel.
And this great beast is one single structure. When you carry out a terror attack against Jews in Israel, you are also hurting the Americans in Vietnam. You are also hurting oppressive military dictatorships in Chile. It’s all one thing. This is sort of the birth of the intersectional concept in academia is born in Middle Eastern revolutionary thought. Khomeini takes all of these different pieces, and he says there’s a global revolution. There’s a global class struggle. There’s a global religious struggle, which is the same as this class struggle, but it’s cosmic. It’s not just about this materialistic Marxist sort of class war. And this struggle is theological and political at once. And Israel in his system is the heart of the beast, as Kanafani said. And the purpose of the Iranian revolution that he founds is to be the vanguard of this global revolution. And the first act that will prove that this revolution really is the pivot of history that it’s intended to be, the beginning of the coming of the Messianic age that he perceives, is that Islam will finally overcome the historical humiliation, the signal of its retreat and weakness and falling away from God’s strength and power and grace in Islam’s weakness represented by the weakest thing that ever pushed Islam back, which is the Jews of Israel.
And so, Iran’s revolution will mobilize all the week of the world across, it’s a global revolution. He gave speeches against Iranian nationalism. He said nationalism itself is part of how the arrogant divide us and control us. The arrogant, powerful, mainly he’s talking about the West. He’s against nationalism. He wants a transnational global revolution. It is possible to look at the Iranian regime and say it is essentially sort of Maoism in Shia drag. You could do that, but it’s not that simple in the sense that Khomeini brought into this Maoist revolutionary idea the immensely powerful and mobilizing eschatology of Shia Islam. And so, it becomes this cosmic theological thing. Long story short, and it’s been a very long story, so let me cut it very short. The result is that the people ruling Iran today are a cult of redemptive martyrdom. The main tool that the weak use to overcome the strong.
It’s not enough that you have God on your side in some theoretical sense. You need a specific mechanism for closing the gap in power. And the mechanism, because you are the side that has faith, is martyrdom. And so, what you actually have, and Khomeini writes this and talks about this, and you saw them sending kids to walk across minefields in the Iran-Iraq war and talking about it in terms of martyrdom. And Hezbollah putting out these videos in Hebrew, in bad Hebrew to scare Israelis for decades, talking about how we love death and you love life and therefore we’re going to win. What they mean by we love death is we have faith and we know that our martyrdom, like Imam Hussein’s martyrdom in the battle of Karbala will trigger generations more of martyrs. And so, our willingness to sacrifice closes the gap in power. And so, the Iranian regime is essentially a cult of redemptive martyrdom.
And what that means is I put out a two-hour exposition on this. On February 25th of this year, the active hostilities between the US and Iran began on February 28th. And my argument was literally the YouTube thumbnail of this episode of the podcast said bombs won’t bring them down. The bottom line is when you inflict damage on this regime, when you kill the armies of its proxies, you don’t generate fear. You don’t generate a calculation of costs like you would for a normal. When you decapitated Venezuela, when Trump arrested Maduro, the number two, the vice president of Maduro’s own regime suddenly played ball with America because she doesn’t want to be decapitated, right? When you decapitate the Iranian regime, it’s the opposite. It doesn’t generate that kind of calculation of cost that to a Western thinking would seem to make sense. It gives them the opposite.
It generates a narrative fuel. It legitimizes the core belief, and it allows them to further mobilize. In other words, they closed ranks. Conventional bombing, conventional military pressure, conventional targeting of their assets in the Strait of Hormuz are not enough. I’m a big fan of smashing all the capabilities of this regime. I am a big supporter of the war that then happened. But if that’s all you do, and this I said before the war, that’s my one credit, it’s not going to get the job done. The Iranian regime has a couple of very clear motives, and the motives are totally inexplicable to, I think, from what I’ve seen, forgive me, to the Trump White House. They want to redeem Islam. They want to redeem Islam from centuries of weakness. And Israel is the biggest symbol of that weakness because it’s the weakest thing that ever pushed the Muslim back.
Their mechanism is permanent struggle and a mass martyrdom ethos where they’re literally willing to die. And all of their proxies share in this. Now all the Shia proxies, obviously, Hezbollah, the Houthis, but Hamas on the Sunni side, it’s not an accident that Hamas calls its military branch the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigade. Izz ad-Din al-Qassam was an Imam in Haifa, who in the 1930s was mobilizing the Arabs of Haifa to begin a kind of terror war against British rule and against the Jews. And he dies. He kills a few people, and he’s hunted down by the British police and he’s killed in 1935. And as he dies, the story goes, he yells, “There’s only this jihad or death.” In other words, he is exactly the Sunni martyr image where through martyrdom we find redemption and through martyrdom we create new generations of martyrs, which makes us unkillable and ultimately victorious.
And faith is the engine that drives it and we have faith and the other side doesn’t because they’re the powerful and arrogant. And so, Hamas’s own sense of itself, it’s a Sunni, it’s different. There’s no Imam Hussein there, but it’s the same. It’s the same strategy and it’s the same basic religious idea. So let me stop there.
There are huge consequences to this on how you fight, on who will actually bring down the Iranian regime. And just simple deterrence will never work. Bombing another generation of Iranian leadership out of existence won’t work. I’ll stop there.
DUBOWITZ: Okay. Wow. That was an absolute tour de force. Okay, so I want you to wrestle with this because I think there are at least three fundamental weaknesses in the Islamic Republic’s approach to reality. The first is that as Khomeini said at the time of the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Revolution is not about the price of watermelons. So today, all these years later, 47 years later, the Islamic Republic of Iran, a country of 92 million people, a huge country, territory more than twice the size of Texas. It’s not ISIS, it’s not Al-Qaeda. They’re ruling a real country with 92 million people. And the price of watermelons has increased sharply because the inflation is running at 80 percent, 90 percent, 110 percent, depending on what you’re looking at. The currency’s collapsed. They’re facing a severe economic crisis. So, Khomeini may not have cared about the price of watermelons, but there are 92 million Iranians who do.
So, argument one is you can have this very elaborate, very sophisticated theological and philosophical construct about self-sacrifice and martyrdom and the wretched of the earth. But when you’ve got 92 million people who need to be fed, you have to cope with that. Argument two is in 1979, it was an Islamic revolution, not an Iranian revolution. So, I’d push back a little bit on the characterization. I think Khomeini would have called it a Islamic revolution. And certainly, those who were his fellow travelers on the left, the communists, the communist Iranian party, they would’ve though of it as more of an Iranian revolution, but he ended up mowing them down, taking over and creating this theological state. The problem with the Islamic Revolution is that 47 years later, his mosques are empty and the majority of his people are secularizing at a extraordinary pace and abandoning the faith.
And the majority of his people despise the regime and want a better life and have been on the streets repeatedly since 1999, 2009, 2017, 18, 19, 2022, 2023, 2025, 2026. And Haviv, I’m going to take a bet for a nice dinner in Tel Aviv, that they will be back on the streets again in the coming months and years. So he’s got the second problem, or the Islamic Republic has the second problem that the majority of people don’t believe in the Islamic Revolution anymore and want a better life. The third problem he has, and it’s very much connected to the second problem and the first problem, is that the majority of Mojtaba Khamenei, his sons who is his successor, the majority of his citizens prefer life over death. They’re very similar to Americans, Israelis, and other Westerners. They actually want to live a better life, and they don’t want to sacrifice their lives for this cause.
So Mojtaba Khamenei is facing a serious problem to this construct, and that is a collapsing economy, a population, the majority of whom despise his regime, a population that had been on the streets repeatedly to challenge the regime and will be back on the streets, a population that prefers life to martyrdom, and having a more and more difficult time recruiting these true believers who are willing to sacrifice themselves for this messianic cause. And then I would just say the final problem he has is that his ability to mobilize these co-religionists in the Middle East, which had been very successful for decades, both on the Sunni and Shiite sides of the streets, have been dealt quite a blow by the combined forces of the United States and Israel. And in fact, more and more Muslims across the Middle East in countries that have been ravaged by the Islamic Republic or by Islamism in general are turning away from it.
And you’ve got obviously the examples of countries that have turned away for it, like the UAE, maybe increasingly like Saudi Arabia and others that are examples of success about how faithful Muslims can live a much better life when they’re not dedicated to death, but when they’re dedicated to prosperity and peace. With all that in mind. Minds, is that enough to overcome the ferocity and intensity and obsession of the Islamists of Iran? Or do you still remain as skeptical, and I’d say overall negative about the prospects of bringing down this regime?
RETTIG GUR: Yeah, you’re exactly right on all of that. The title of that episode, the theology lesson before the war began was How to Win Iran’s Forever War, which is to say, oh, you absolutely need to win, and you absolutely need to kill the supreme leader who is this religious. And is the engine driving the nuclearization efforts? And you absolutely need to have that military element. It’s just not enough. So, if you have this regime, we’ll take it piece by piece with all the things you’ve said. If you have this regime, that’s very hard to break from the outside because the mass death of its own ranks, it knows how to absorb that, knows how to metabolize that, so to speak. And in fact, that validates its narrative of the weak and resisting the powerful. It’s not vulnerable from the outside in that way, but you can dismantle the capabilities from the outside in order to open up the potential for the place where it is profoundly vulnerable, which is the inside.
The same ideology that the elements of Iranian society that support the regime, which different scholars give different percentages, but it runs the gamut between five and 20 or five and 15 percent. A small minority of Iranians literally actually support the regime. Everyone else hates it. And I don’t think there’s a nation on earth with the scale of the gap between the economic potential, the easy, obvious, automatic economic potential of that economy and what it actually manages to realize because it’s ruled by crazy idiots. And I’m talking about the energy sector. I mean, Iran sits on, you’ll know this far better than I, the world’s third biggest gas reserve, fourth biggest oil reserve. Iran should have the technological prowess of Israel. The Iranian expat world around the world includes some of the world’s top mathematicians in the most important tech companies. It should have Israeli tech prowess with Saudi extraction money.
That should be what Iran’s economy actually looks like, except for this regime, which for 47 years has brought them to a place where I read recently their nominal GDP per capita is Haiti. The wealthiest country, one of the wealthiest countries in the world in terms of literally resources can’t run a currency. And it’s because of the –
DUBOWITZ: And the interesting thing is, Haviv, just real quick, I don’t remember the exact date, but there was a time at which Iran and Israel had the same GDP per capita. It was around 13, 1400. And in the ensuing years, Israel went to a GDP capita of about 69, 70,000, which puts it at European standards and above. And the Iranian GDP plunged by another 20, 30 percent. So I mean, it’s actually incredible to see – It’s incredible. These two countries that started basically in the same place economically 30 years ago. And now today, I mean, the absolute gap, it’s quite astonishing. And then again, to your point about Iranians, I say this often on the show, the only place where Iranians don’t succeed in the world is inside the Islamic Republic.
RETTIG GUR: It’s in Iran. And people will, by the way, jump to sanctions. Well, of course it’s just sanctions. That’s not nearly enough to explain the collapse. It has a lot to do with the fact that well over 50 percent of the GDP of the entire country is literally owned. Multiple, some mining sectors and energy sectors, entire industries, and the biggest industries are literally owned by the IRGC. And another 20 percent or whatever it is, there are all these assessments online people can find from all the different think tanks are owned by something called these bonyads, these foundations that are charitable foundations, with air quotes, but in fact are totally controlled by the office of the Supreme Leader and are a patronage system to maintain the regime in place. Here’s the thing. This all matters to the regime’s own story because the fact that the regime’s rank and file believe in the redemption story is both its strength, unbelievable resilience, but also its biggest weakness.
Because if you switch over from, it’s awfully hard for the Iranian regime in Iran in the Persian language today to argue that it is the Musta de Fin, the humble, faithful, revolutionary, rather than the exact arrogant, oppressive force that is the evil force of the world. No Iranian outside of that, I think 5 percent, but let’s give it to them 15 percent outside that religiously sort of following, literally just agreeing part of the population. No other Iranian even has the time of day to even hear it. They joke, they laugh about it. There’s a whole culture of spray-painting graffiti all over Iran against the regime that mocks this stuff, that talks about the Iranian revolution. It’s literally in the name of the ideological army, the IRGC, the Revolutionary Guard Corps. That’s Taura, which they talk about the new Taura as these young people who are rejecting as a generational cultural shift, this whole ethos of mass martyrdom.
And they talk about how we want life. This is what the word life is doing in the revolution, in the protests for women. How did it go? Women.
DUBOWITZ: Woman life freedom.
RETTIG GUR: Woman life freedom. So, woman, I get it was literally about women’s headwear and the oppressive Islamic modesty patrols, et cetera. And freedom I get. Why is life stuck in there? Life is stuck in there because they’re saying, dear regime who thinks that your great engine of power and mobilization and coherence and ultimately closing the gap despite the weakness you impose on us by running this country into the ground, they’re essentially the biggest robbery of a nation that has happened in the last century. I mean, it’s just unbelievable. And you do all that to tell us that actually if we’re all just willing to die, then we will trigger, we will catalyze the great world revolution on which the cosmic redemption of Shia Islam depends. No, actually we want life. We don’t want martyrdom. And so, there is these revolutionaries in Iran today. They’re the real humble revolutionaries and they’re rejecting the whole thing.
What my problem, my concern about the war effort, I think President Trump’s decision to go to this war was a tremendous gift to the Iranian people. Obviously, a gift to the Israeli people, even if that’s not how it was intended. The average Emirate believed it was a gift to the Emirates until Iran started bombing them. And that only clarifies to them that over the long term, we still need to get this done, get this regime the hell out of the region, get this regime to fall. It’s not like people don’t understand what they’re looking at. I do think that this was a tremendously important step, but it was not accompanied and no Westerner really knows. My main critique, of course, is to my own leadership, to the Israeli leadership. Where’s the story? Where’s the story? People live in stories. The power of this regime, even in the minority of Iranians who support it, they’re enough to go into the streets and beat up or beat to death protesters who rise up against the regime.
So, there’s still enough of them that we have to have this story. We have to talk to them. This Iranian regime survives to some significant degree on this grand and frankly, incredible, just beautiful, redemptive, and it’s powerful as most Marxist movements have always been. They talked a good game, and we have to be able to challenge their story. You’ve seen the story—
DUBOWITZ: Collapse. I would say, just to jump in, I mean, I think there’s a few things, and again, it’s terminology. I think it always really matters. The same way that it’s not an Iranian revolution, it’s an Islamic revolution, that it’s the Islamic Republic of Iran, and it’s that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. I always push back against the idea that it’s an Iranian regime. I think that this wonderful country of Iran with an incredible history and culture and art and food and music and really an ancient civilization. This was not a country drawn up by British and French colonialists with a stroke of a pen on the map. This goes back millennia in the same way that the Jewish state goes back, millennia, and Jewish civilization and the Israeli kingdom goes back, millennia. That this is a country that is being illegally occupied by a clerical military dictatorship.
And we need to help liberate the Iranian people from this illegal occupation by this group of suicidal jihadis.
RETTIG GUR: There’s so many specific things we can be doing that’ll be more powerful than any single round of airstrikes. The leaders of Iran control all the economy of Iran. And their children live, and you’ve talked about this a lot, and FDD as I think I learned about it, I believe, from an FDD report the first time. Their children live these wealthy Western or in the Gulf Emirates lives of non-piety. The same regime that has modesty patrols killing women in the streets of Iran for their headwear not being precisely where it should be, have their daughters marrying with almost transparent wedding dresses in opulent mansions and opulent hotels either in Dubai or in California.
DUBOWITZ: Well, the great irony, Haviv, is that—
Yes, but actually in North Tehran, I mean the great untold story is that in North Tehran, in the suburbs of North Iran behind high walls are lavish mansions where the sons and daughters of the revolutionary elite are throwing amazing parties and raves and weddings and women in bikinis and guys flexing their muscles. And I mean, if you’ve watched the great series Tehran, there’s a few episodes that really depict this, and it’s true. I mean, the absolute hypocrisy inside Iran, and Iranians know this, and they see it, and they see it, and they know not about just the corruption, but just about the absolute flagrant hypocrisy between these revolutionaries preaching martyrdom and their sons and daughters who are enjoying the pleasures of the flesh and drinking alcohol in these lavish mansions in raves is infuriating to the vast majority of Iranians.
RETTIG GUR: Right. And this is not simple hypocrisy. Very few political elites are not hypocritical anywhere, including the well-best run democracy. This is a hypocrisy precisely on the very things with which they oppress brutally millions and millions of their countrymen. And so yes, this actually is something that needs to be a vast public propaganda information war effort. There’s a lot of other things. For example, the brand of the Mukawama of the resistance reached a peak. We have polling on this in the Arab world. And when you would poll ordinary Saudis and Egyptians and Algerians and Lebanese about Hezbollah, for example, as the vanguard of the Mukawama against the Zionist interloper, and Arab posters pulled the popularity of Hezbollah over the years. Immediately after 2006 when the Israeli Second Lebanon War started by Hezbollah when it attacked and killed and kidnapped Israeli soldiers in July of 2006, and that begins the second Lebanon war, Israel fought fiercely against Hezbollah, but Hezbollah was still standing and still shooting rockets by the time of the ceasefire of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, et cetera.
And that moment where Hezbollah is still standing, having borne the brunt of this massive Israeli assault, that moment made Hezbollah one of the great heroes of the Arab world. And its leader Nasrallah was, I think they gave 15 leaders in a poll. They asked ordinary Arabs not in Lebanon, not Shia, Sunni, to poll their hero. The leaders that had highest favorability, Nasrallah was consistently at the top. The Mukawama brand, the resistance hero was this grand story that Hezbollah had acquired from the 2006 war. In 2011, the revolution against Assad in Syria begins. And Iran gives Hezbollah the order to deploy as one of the major fighting forces in the vanguard in Syria to defend this regime against, frankly, the Sunni majority of Syria. The Alawite Assad regime, which is an offshoot of Shiism and is allied with Iran against the Sunnis of Syria. There are three or four cases where Hezbollah surrounded a city, surrounds a town, blockades the town until people are dying from mass starvation in that town.
Hezbollah mass murdered its way. It cut this bloody sway through the Syrian countryside villages cities. It was the vanguard of Assad’s forces in places where Assad’s own military was almost unable to fight. It was massively upgraded by the Iranians. It gained a tremendous amount of military experience, and it was horrifically brutal. And the entire and very quickly, within two years, or it wasn’t in 2011, literally, I think the main fighting of Hezbollah begins in 2013. Within two years of it entering that war, its popularity in the Arab world, Nasrallah’s position in those lists of which Arab leader do you fancy, do you think is a good leader, do you think is a heroic Arab revolutionary, collapses. And the Mukawama brand becomes something disgusting. And most Arabs and most Sunnis in the world come to see Hezbollah as an arm of oppression, of Persian oppression of Arabs, or of Shia brutality against Sunni, of sectarian brutality and violence.
And all of that is to say, and by the way, Hezbollah never recovered from that. And Hezbollah was dramatically weakened by it and became seen even in Lebanon. A lot of the story of Lebanon having new pockets of ability to talk about how Hezbollah is not something that even comes before the Israeli attack and Hezbollah after October seven, after the Israeli response to Hezbollah’s months and months of shelling the north. Hezbollah is suddenly weakened by the Israelis and suddenly the Lebanese can talk about how Hezbollah’s a terrible force in their world. Some of that began before October seven, and it comes from this collapse of Hezbollah’s popularity in the Arab world because of the Syrian war. The more you show that the Iranian regime is not Iranian, and it’s not even Islamic, it’s a specific kind of. You can be a very different kind of Muslim.
It’s a specific Maoization of Shia eschatology to build a grand, glorious world revolution through the sacrifice of Iranians and Arabs living in the proxy areas that Iran has built its proxies. It is all death, all war, a martyrdom cult that has nothing else to offer. I don’t mean this as polemic. It literally builds nothing. It produces nothing. It innovates nowhere. There’s nothing happening in Iran worth buying. There’s no technological advancement. It has built a nuclear program slower and more painfully and with more mistakes and more infiltrated by foreign intelligence services than anyone else who ever built a nuclear program. It’s an incredibly incompetent regime that has achieved one great thing, one thing at which it has proven phenomenally competent. And that’s the oppression of its own people, the dividing of its own people, the destruction of other power centers in Iranian society. As you mentioned, the communists of Iran looked at these revolutionary Islamists and said, “Hey, they’re basically communists.” I mean, they talk the same talk, they read the same Mao, and they went with them in this revolution.
And then of course, Khomeini kills them all. So, they went with him and then Khomeini purged them all and just stayed on top, stayed in that purge where the communists helped get him there. But he then systematically went to student groups. He went to all kinds of different elites, and he systematically either replaced, oppressed, started tracking, imprisoned, all of these different power centers in Iranian society. The only achievement this government ever has, by the way, it tracks Iranians with all of these AI tools of internal intelligence using pretty sophisticated Chinese systems to track their populations. The internet goes down, and then they kill 40,000 Iranians. And then the BBC, which in Gaza believed every single statement by Hamas about every death toll of every airstrike, whether the airstrike happened or not, won’t report what’s coming out of the reports of tens of thousands of dead in Iran.
And it says, “I have no evidence. Why do I have no evidence?” The internet’s down. The control of that population is literally its only achievement. And so, the more that you can tell a story loud and proud, President Trump keeps talking, and this frustrates me. I don’t know why he would know this. I don’t know why he would understand this. Who would’ve told him? But I wish he did understand this. President Trump keeps talking about the Iranians. The vocabulary that accompanies the negotiation, his vocabulary that basically talks of, it’s a kind of saber rattling, the standoff, the sort of high noon kind of draw your gun. They’re saying you have to pay us reparations. So, he says, “Well, you have to pay more reparations.” That kind of ego battle. I get it. I get why he does that. I get why they do it.
He shouldn’t do that. He should say every time they say you owe us reparations, he should say, “You have murdered X number of women for modesty laws. You kill regime opponents for wanting the price of watermelon to go down. You believe that you don’t owe your people prosperity and happiness.” If he says that out loud now when the internet works in Iran, that will have more of an effect on this regime because it will exactly undermine them in that place where they are terrified, which is internally. Do everything you can at every turn and every moment to show the hypocrisy because it is foundational and fundamental. The story that allows them to have the resilience, military resilience. An enemy that is willing to die is undeterrable. And that’s the basic military problem, but that’s also exactly what’s destroyed Iran. And so highlight that. Go for that. Go for that jugular, which will actually bring down that regime, not immediately, not in three years, maybe in 10 years.
The CIA was convinced that the Soviet Union would last forever until it fell. And then we learned just how fragile it was internally, even as it looked powerful enough to fight wars all over the world. That’s the situation of the Iranian regime. It is fillible from within and within needs to be the great strategy of the West. And I’m not even talking about intelligence stuff, which you’ll know better than I, what the possibilities are there, but go into that society. That is their strategic Achilles heel. Most Iranians want it. And that I think is the grand strategy. And also, obviously decapitate them, bomb, pick ax mountain, do whatever you can at that level. That is not the decisive level because of this ideology at the core of the regime.
DUBOWITZ: Well, it’s exactly right. And you mentioned the Soviet Union. I mean, I think President Reagan was a president, I think surprisingly for many who understood the war of ideas. He understood that you had to de-legitimize the Soviet Union, that every time you got up, you had to say it is inevitable that Marxism Leninism will end up on the ashleep of history. As he said in his famous Westminster speech in 1982 to the British Parliament, would get up and he would talk about these courageous anti-Soviet dissidents behind the Iron Curtain, and he would say their names and he would meet them. And Reagan understood that.
RETTIG GUR: There haven’t been famous Iranian dissidents in the White House in this war, and that’s a tremendous loss. And when you understand the regime, you understand that that’s a third aircraft carrier task force in terms of probably it’s three more aircraft carriers. Of the two working in that region, this would be the three, four, and five in terms of the power it would have in the narrative inside Iran. And yes, the Iranian regime is better at keeping the internet off in Iran than it is at deploying an Air Force. The Air Force never flew. It does not know how to build an Air Force. It does know how to control the people. So that’s where you have to fight the big and the great fight. And it begins by controlling the narrative around the world.
DUBOWITZ: Okay, Haviv, I think we’re getting to the end of the episode but wondering if you have any final thoughts or insights on this problem.
RETTIG GUR: I hate to bring it home, but one of the interesting things to see in this Israeli government and this American administration is that they have an excellent sense of the nature of the enemy, of the danger of the enemy. I have some friends in the Democratic Party I’ve talked to in the US, whether activists or even members of Congress I’ve interviewed who really understand the nature of the Iranian regime and what’s bad about it and why it’s a force of terrible instability and unsustainable and all of that. They might not agree with a particular war or Trump or whatever, but they get the nature of the enemy. But the people who mainly get the nature of the enemy the best are Netanyahu, not literally Netanyahu alone. The Israeli political. There’s not fundamental difference on Iran between Netanyahu and Eisenkot, for example, just so I don’t step into the Israeli election here.
But the Israeli leadership really gets the nature of this regime, and the Trump administration seems to really get the nature of this regime. And if JD Vance in his negotiations doesn’t understand, the Iranians are running him through a very fast school on the nature of the regime. And I think he’ll understand. I don’t know if politically he’ll admit it, but I think he gets the nature of this regime at this point.
But they’re bad at telling the story. They’re astonishingly bad at telling the story. Trump didn’t do the thing that American presidents generally do before going to war, which is build the coalition, tell the story, tell the nature of this regime. Explain why actually this regime is not something that can be contained because it literally its only story is that revolutionary ethos Netanyahu needs to tell not just on Iran, but also in Lebanon. And of course, in Gaza, tell the story, open your mouth and tell a story that is destabilizing to the enemy. That has always, I mean, that’s in sun too. I mean, this is not a new idea. It’s been remarkable to me to watch how people who get the point don’t understand that they need to or don’t know how to fight the war of narratives. And that in this war to me has been a bigger Achilles heel, a bigger problem, a bigger mistake.
It has set back the war effort more than the discovery of the extent to which Iranians close her mouth. In other words, that’s the big strategic problem. That’s not the big strategic problem. This, not telling the story in ways that destabilize the enemy is the big strategic problem. And this enemy really is destabilizable and is very tolerant of other mechanisms that we need but are not going to be decisive because they’re very tolerant of it for all the reasons we’ve mentioned. So it’s time to get up, to wake up, and to tell that story, what this regime is, why it has to fall, why it’s going to fall, why it’s hypocrisy, why it’s brutal, why it’s destructive of Iran, nevermind of all the rest of the region, and the whole story of why the Mukawama is one big fat lie is going to do more damage to the Mukawama than any particular airstrike or any hundred airstrikes.
DUBOWITZ: Yeah. Amen to that, Haviv. And listen, thank you. Thanks for being on this episode. Thank you for telling the story. And I would strongly encourage all listeners and viewers to tune into Ask Haviv Anything where Haviv every week tells the story on different topics in a way that as you can tell from Haviv’s episode today, grounded incredible facts, history, and understanding of intellectual history and ideas, which is really something that is often missing in how we understand our enemy. So, Haviv, thank you. And thanks for everything.
RETTIG GUR: Thank you, Mark. Thanks for having me. Thanks for having me.

The Houthis’ unprovoked aggression demands international action
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Al Arabiya English/17 August ,2026
The Houthis have intentionally started and expanded conflict by targeting ships, infrastructure, and countries that did nothing to provoke them.
Their campaign seeks to broaden instability far beyond Yemen’s borders. The international community cannot sit silent while this group wreaks havoc on global peace, security, and the free flow of commerce that sustains economies worldwide.
Recent unprovoked attacks on shipping and energy targets
In the most recent escalation, Houthi forces struck the Tanzania-flagged cargo ship Tihamah in the Bab al-Mandab Strait with ballistic missiles. The attack killed four crew members – three Pakistanis and one Indonesian – and two Yemeni rescuers who arrived to assist, marking the first known fatalities from Houthi fire on Red Sea shipping since the broader US-Israeli conflict with Iran began in February. This strike forms part of a wider pattern of recent unprovoked aggression. In late July and early August 2026 the group announced a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia and claimed multiple attacks on Saudi-linked oil tankers in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. They also launched drones and missiles at Saudi energy facilities, including Aramco’s Jizan refinery and related sites along the Red Sea coast, causing fires and disruption. Concurrently, the Houthis struck government-held ports such as Mokha in Yemen and military positions, killing dozens of troops and civilians in escalations that have frayed the long-standing de facto truce. These actions target commercial vessels and energy infrastructure belonging to or linked with countries that had not initiated hostilities against the group. They deliberately threaten one of the world’s critical maritime chokepoints, raising insurance costs, forcing ships to divert, and injecting fresh uncertainty into global supply chains already strained by regional conflict.
Iran’s central role as sponsor and supplier
The Houthis operate as a core ally and proxy of Iran within the so-called Axis of Resistance. According to successive United Nations Panel of Experts reports and independent assessments, Iran has long been the principal external supplier of weapons, ballistic-missile technology, drone components, training, and other forms of support that enable the group’s long-range capabilities. Recent developments reinforce this pattern: Reports in mid-2026 described Iranian flights carrying IRGC personnel, missile and drone experts, and related equipment into Houthi-controlled territory, as well as major interceptions of Iranian arms shipments destined for the group. This sustained backing allows the Houthis to field sophisticated systems capable of striking distant shipping and energy targets. Without Iranian material, technical, and financial assistance, the scale and precision of the recent campaign would be far more limited. Treating the Houthis solely as a local Yemeni actor ignores the external sponsorship that turns them into a transnational threat to navigation and energy security.
Dangers of continued international inaction
If the international community responds only with statements of concern and limited measures, the consequences will worsen. Successful attacks without meaningful accountability embolden the Houthis and demonstrate to other non-state actors and their sponsors that aggression against global trade routes can succeed at acceptable cost. Shipping remains vulnerable, energy markets face added volatility, and regional states must divert resources to defense rather than reconstruction or development. Inaction also risks further escalation. An empowered group may expand its target list, deepen coordination with other Iranian-aligned forces, or provoke responses that draw additional countries into prolonged confrontation. The precedent normalizes the use of asymmetric strikes on civilian commercial traffic and energy infrastructure as tools of coercion. Over time this erodes the norms of freedom of navigation and collective security, making the international system more fragile and more expensive to maintain.
What the international community must do
The United Nations, and especially the Security Council, must move from monitoring to enforceable action. This includes rigorous enforcement and, where necessary, strengthening of the existing arms embargo, expanded targeted sanctions on individuals and entities involved in weapons transfers and financing, and clearer interdiction authorities. The Council should also sustain and intensify reporting mechanisms while authorizing practical steps to protect commercial shipping. European states, the United States, and other major trading nations should intensify coordination with Middle Eastern countries most directly affected – particularly Saudi Arabia, whose energy infrastructure and shipping have been repeatedly targeted. Shared intelligence, joint naval presence, coordinated sanctions enforcement, and aligned diplomatic pressure are essential. These efforts must be pursued in close partnership with the internationally recognized Yemeni government and regional partners who bear the immediate costs of Houthi aggression. A durable response requires a regional and international coalition dedicated to two complementary goals: Degrading the Houthis’ ability to project force beyond Yemen and systematically cutting the channels through which they receive weapons, components, training, and financial support from Iran. Interdiction of smuggling routes by sea and air, tighter financial controls, and consistent diplomatic isolation of the sponsorship network are indispensable. Without interrupting the supply lines, temporary military responses will produce only temporary pauses.
Accountability or a dangerous precedent
In conclusion, the international community cannot sit by while the Houthis attack others unprovoked in order to expand war and the instability on which they thrive. The Houthis and their principal financial and military sponsor must be held accountable through coordinated, sustained measures. Failure to do so sets a clear example that determined non-state groups backed by external powers can impose costs on global commerce and regional security with limited consequence. That example will be studied and, in time, imitated by others. Decisive collective action is the only responsible course if freedom of navigation and basic international norms are to be preserved.

The New Crescent: Mecca Pact Gives Rise to a Sunni Bloc, Posing New Challenges for Israel
Jonathan Spyer/The Jerusalem Post/August 17/2026
Jerusalem, and Islamic Claims There, Are Likely to Form the Symbolic Element That Knits the Emergent Group Together
The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed on August 7 by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, represents the first formalization of the slow emergence of a conservative Sunni Islamic bloc intended to provide a strategic counterweight against both Israel and Iran. In recent months, many Middle East analysts have taken note of this nascent development.
The implications of the emergence of this bloc are already more than symbolic. It has its foundations in existing and growing bilateral ties between these countries in the fields of trade and economic relations and military cooperation, and is not only a matter of declarations.
Symbols, and especially Jerusalem, often end up acquiring practical political and sometimes military form, as has been witnessed in the region over the last three years.
The Mecca pact does not include all members of this axis. In their different ways, Qatar and the emergent regime in Syria are both components of the emerging bloc. Indeed, in many ways these countries are a more natural fit for membership than Saudi Arabia. The pact is therefore significant mainly because it indicates that Riyadh seeks at least one foot in this emergent axis.
Israel should be watching the slow crystallization of this bloc carefully. Jerusalem, and Islamic claims there, are likely to form the symbolic element that knits the emergent group together. Symbols, and especially Jerusalem, often end up acquiring practical political and sometimes military form, as has been witnessed in the region over the last three years.
The Mecca pact was announced with portentous language, which promised more than it looks set to immediately fulfill. According to the key part of the joint statement: “The agreement is intended to strengthen collective deterrence against any act of aggression, and stipulates that any armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all. It further provides for the enhancement of all aspects of defense cooperation among the three states.”
Trilateral pact seeks to replicate NATO’s Article 5, treating an attack on one as an attack on all This sounds – and is intended to sound – like an unambiguous joint military guarantee, reminiscent of NATO’s Article 5, according to which an armed attack against one alliance member “shall be considered an attack against them all.”
No one, however, seriously believes that the Mecca pact obliges, say, Turkey to enter war against India if Pakistan is attacked by it, or Pakistan to fight Iran if the IRGC or one of its proxies attacks Saudi Arabia. The latter instance, indeed, has already been tested with subsequent Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, predictably triggering no response from Riyadh’s new fellow Mecca pact members. No one also expects Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella to now be extended over Saudi Arabia and Turkey either.
In this regard, it is worth remembering that NATO’s Article 5 itself does not oblige member states to declare or enter war against a country attacking a fellow NATO member. Rather, Article 5 only requires a member state, in such an eventuality, to “take such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.” The Mecca pact is more vague and does not detail what an attack “on one member as an attack against all” is supposed to imply. But while the declaration contains less than meets the eye, this should not lead to the conclusion that the emergence of the Mecca pact is entirely without significance.
But while the declaration contains less than meets the eye, this should not lead to the conclusion that the emergence of the Mecca pact is entirely without significance.
The core element in it is the bilateral relationship between Turkey and Pakistan. The steady growth and solidifying of strategic and defense ties between these two countries over the last decade has been a notable element of the regional strategic picture.
In a deal worth $1.5 billion in 2018, Pakistan’s navy purchased four MILGEM-class ships from Turkey. The deal constituted Turkey’s largest single defense export agreement. The two countries are cooperating on drone development. Turkey has helped upgrade Pakistan’s fleet of F-16 fighter bombers. Turkey is today Pakistan’s fourth-largest supplier of arms (the largest is China).
Ankara and Islamabad are united by a similar outlook combining conservative Sunni political Islam with an assertive, increasingly militant stance toward rivals. The Mecca pact is intended to form a component in the formalization of growing practical ties between these allies. Saudi Arabia’s place at this particular table is more complex. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was, until the outbreak of war in the region three years ago, often grouped alongside the leaders of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain as one of a group of emergent Gulf leaders seeking to transcend old allegiances and rivalries, and move closer to Israel as part of an orientation geared toward economic and technological development.
The Abraham Accords of 2020 represented the organizational manifestation of this trend. It should not be assumed that Riyadh has conclusively abandoned this orientation. But in the new post-October 7 Middle East, military defense and religious and civilizational symbolic loyalties are very much back front and center.
In this environment, Riyadh has noted well what currently looks like the failure of the US to achieve its war aims against Iran, or to adequately defend Gulf countries against Iranian attacks. The more general desire of Washington to withdraw from major commitments in the Middle East has surely also been noted. In this environment, Riyadh has noted well what currently looks like the failure of the U.S. to achieve its war aims against Iran, or to adequately defend Gulf countries against Iranian attacks.
Saudis hedge to signal to the US and regional allies that they have other options
This does not mean that Saudi Arabia is now placing its trust in Islamabad or Ankara for its defense. It does mean that the Saudis are hedging, and want to convey to the US and its regional allies that they have options, and many potential partners (even ones who, in practical terms, can apparently promise little in kinetic terms against Iran and its proxies).
Even after the current agreement, Saudi Arabia remains a sought-after outlier in the emergent Sunni alliance, rather than a core component of it. Other than Turkey and Pakistan, the third key member of the group is Qatar, with extensive ties and a common outlook to both of these countries.
From an Israeli point of view, a number of elements regarding this alliance (Turkey-Pakistan-Qatar) should be noted: it is on the rhetorical level jointly and extremely anti-Israel. A week ago, Pakistani defense minister Khawaja Asif called for a “united military front” of the Islamic world against Israel. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently said, “Zionism threatens not only me, not only our party, not only our alliance; it threatens everyone,” and so on. The rhetoric is also backed up by actions. Turkey and Qatar are, along with Iran, the main practical supporters of Hamas.
Lastly, there is an additional member of this alliance: the emerging Sunni Islamist regime of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Turkey and Qatar are the main allies of that new regime. Ankara is currently engaged in the building of a 200,000-strong new Syrian army, controlled and staffed by Sunni Islamist commanders.
Ankara is currently engaged in the building of a 200,000-strong new Syrian army, controlled and staffed by Sunni Islamist commanders.
A recent Channel 11 news report revealed that an unnamed Middle East country had advised another unnamed Middle East country to conclude an agreement with Israel in order to buy time and build strength before breaking the agreement and launching war with Israel. While the names of the countries were not revealed, Middle Eastern strategic logic would suggest that the advised country was almost certainly Syria, and the advising one either Turkey or Qatar.
This appears to indicate that the anti-Israel statements of this emergent alliance are not just rhetoric. Rather, they form an integral element in its strategy. Strategic planners in Jerusalem should be taking careful note.
**Published originally on August 15, 2026, under the title “The New Crescent: Mecca Pact Gives Rise to a Saudi-Led Sunni Bloc, Posing New Challenges for Israel.”
**Jonathan Spyer oversees the Forum’s content and is editor of the Middle East Quarterly. Mr. Spyer, a journalist, reports for Janes Intelligence Review, writes a column for the Jerusalem Post, and is a contributor to the Wall Street Journal and The Australian. He frequently reports from Syria and Iraq. He has a B.A. from the London School of Economics, an M.A. from the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, and a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics. He is the author of two books: The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict (2010) and Days of the Fall: A Reporter’s Journey in the Syria and Iraq Wars (2017).

Selected Face Book & X tweets on August 18/2026
Guila Fakhoury
Six years ago today, I lost the person who shaped me into the person I am today. I lost my dad, my friend, and my hero.I will forever carry your love, your strength, your values, and the way you loved all of us. I am going to be honest, it has not been easy. Losing you left a space that can never truly be filled. But I know your love lives on in me in the choices I make, in the values I hold close, and in the memories I will continue to carry with me. I especially wish you were here with us as we celebrate your Macy getting married. But I know you will be watching over her, blessing her, and guiding her as she begins this beautiful new chapter.May your soul rest in peace, my hero.

Khan Fatima
https://x.com/Khan_Fatimaa1/status/2089238698282127582/video/1
SHOCKING: In Pakistan, 32-year-old Abdul Mohamed married 10-year-old Priya now pregnant after paying her father just $580. This barbaric child marriage is legal under Sharia law.Islam is savage & incompatible with civilization. Ban Islamists and deport them all?

Hussain Abdul-Hussain
https://x.com/hahussain/status/2089117094377926753/video/1
The great Lebanese singer Elissa gives back the Palestinian kufiyya when someone handed it to her at a concert in Tunisia. The Lebanese are proud of their national identity and have their own problems to deal with. Whatever happens between the Palestinians and Israel is not the business of the Lebanese.

DutchIrani
When I first started doubting Islam, I felt ashamed of myself. I carried that guilt for years until it began showing physically. Even after I became an ex-Muslim, the fear and shame remained deeply ingrained. I’ve spent much of my life feeling responsible for everyone else, apologising for taking up space and questioning whether I was allowed to choose myself.
It took me years back in the Netherlands to stop hating myself for existing. To wake up without feeling guilty for who I was, to stop shrinking myself to keep others comfortable, and to finally realise that my life is only mine to live.

Amjad Taha أمجد طه
When you see flames in one apartment and warn the whole building, that isn’t "influence." That's humanity.The Muslim Brotherhood is the fire. Your country is the building.
I can sound the alarm, but I can’t fight your fire for you. You are the firefighters.
I’m a Muslim Arab from the UAE, which banned the Muslim Brotherhood. I’m warning you about the fire we already recognized.
Don’t attack the alarm because you’re afraid to face the flames.

Masih Alinejad
I have seen five hitmen in court, men hired by the government of my own country, Iran, to kill me. So every time I walk alone in the street, I look over my shoulder. I imagine someone coming from behind and shooting me, in the head, in the heart. That image plays in my mind again and again. Yesterday, I was parking my bicycle when a woman behind me suddenly pulled out her phone, pointed it directly at me, and took a picture. In Persian, she said, let me take a photo of you … I don’t know why, but I smiled at her. Inside, though, my first thought was: She’s going to shoot me in the head. I hate that this is where my mind goes. I hate living with this feeling. And then I think about the protesters and women inside Iran and Afghanistan who live with this terror every single day, where simply daring to say NO can mean prison, torture, or death.

Barak Ravid
Netanyahu brought with him to the meeting with Kushner the head of the Shin Bet, David Zini, and the head of Military Intelligence, Shlomi Binder, to brief him on Hamas's violations in Gaza, according to a source familiar with the details.

Tom Harb
Solidarity with @elissa . As a Lebanese Christian who lived her country’s history, she has every right to refuse the keffiyeh.Under Arafat, the PLO turned parts of Lebanon into a state-within-a-state and committed massacres against Christians (Damour 1976), Chekka and others. The keffiyeh isn’t neutral , it’s the symbol of that Islamic movement.
She simply said no. Classy and rooted in reality.

Annmarie Hordern
WSJ: Arab intelligence officials have picked up evidence—including communications between Iran and militia allies in countries such as Yemen and Iraq—of a strategic shift inside the country’s hard-line leadership to get their forces ready to widen the war and raise the costs for the U.S., officials familiar with the findings say. Alarming weaker Gulf countries like Kuwait, Iran’s leaders are increasingly talking about offensive operations on enemy territory.

American Task Force on Lebanon
https://x.com/ATFLebanon/status/2089185446920180013/video/1
Following in the wake of a successful bipartisan US Congressional staff delegation visit, the American Task Force on Lebanon (ATFL) is hosting a high-level board trip to continue critical discussion with Lebanon’s top leadership on key security, political, and economic issues facing the country. The trip kicked off Sunday evening with a dinner to welcome the ATFL board and align on strategic priorities ahead of upcoming meetings and engagements. Amid a critical and historical moment in US-Lebanon relations, the aim of this board trip is to advance ATFL’s mission of strengthening bilateral ties between Washington and Beirut.