English LCCC Newsbulletin For
Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For July 10/2025
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
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Bible Quotations For today
Jesus Sends Out the Twelve Apostles
Preach The Holy Bible
Saint Matthew Holy Bible/10:05-15/These twelve Jesus sent out,
instructing them, “Go nowhere among the Gentiles and enter no town of the
Samaritans, but go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. And proclaim
as you go, saying, ‘The kingdom of heaven is at hand.’Heal the sick, raise the
dead, cleanse lepers, cast out demons. You received without paying; give without
pay. Acquire no gold or silver or copper for your belts, no bag for your
journey, or two tunics or sandals or a staff, for the laborer deserves his food.
And whatever town or village you enter, find out who is worthy in it and stay
there until you depart. As you enter the house, greet it. And if the house is
worthy, let your peace come upon it, but if it is not worthy, let your peace
return to you. And if anyone will not receive you or listen to your words, shake
off the dust from your feet when you leave that house or town. Truly, I say to
you, it will be more bearable on the day of judgment for the land of Sodom and
Gomorrah than for that town.
Titles For The
Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published
on July 09-10/2025
The Official Lebanese Response to the American Paper: Is A Weak, Flowery
Statement Reflecting the State’s Impotence and Complicity with the Iranian
Occupation/Elias Bejjani/July 07/ 2025
Israel army says launched ‘special, targeted operations’ in south Lebanon
Israeli strike kills Hezbollah operative in Babliyeh
Reports: Barrack to visit Israel, tells Lebanon there's a 3-month window
Qassem denies divisions within Hezbollah, says group 'has recovered'
Report: Hezbollah tells US ready for concessions in return for 'victory image'
Report: US seeking direct talks with Hezbollah
President Aoun meets Cyprus' leader in Nicosia
US envoy calls for change in Lebanese political culture in interview with LBCI
Lebanon
Reviving May 17 Agreement could be a solution for Lebanon/Nadim Shehadi/Arab
News/July 09, 2025
Now Is Not the Time to Ease Up on Hezbollah—or Beirut/David Schenker/The
Washington Institute/July 09/2025
A weakened Iran and Hezbollah gives Lebanon an opening to chart path away from
the region’s conflicts − will it be enough?/Mireille Rebeiz, Dickinson
College/The Conversation/July 09/2025
Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published
on July 09-10/2025
Only 6 crew rescued, 15 missing after Houthis sink Greek ship Eternity C
in Red Sea
Yemen crisis ‘deeply volatile and unpredictable,’ UN special envoy tells
Security Council
UN chief outlines four options for embattled Palestinian relief agency UNRWA
Israel insists on keeping troops in Gaza. That complicates truce talks with
Hamas
US sanctions UN rights expert for Palestinian territories Francesca Albanese
Jordan resumes aid convoys to Palestinians in Gaza as conditions deteriorate
40 Palestinians killed in Gaza as Netanyahu and Trump meet over a ceasefire
Palestinian Authority welcomes French president’s affirmation of recognizing
statehood during UK parliament speech
UN mission in Libya urges immediate de-escalation in Tripoli
Jailed Kurdish militant leader urges PKK fighters to disarm
Armenia, Azerbaijan to meet for peace talks in UAE Thursday
A church bombing leads Syria's Christians to consider leaving as foreign
fighters remain
Titles For
The Latest English LCCC analysis &
editorials from miscellaneous sources
on July 09-10/2025
Iran: Will the West Finish the Job?/Amin Sharifi/Gatestone Institute/July
09/2025
An Opportunity Not to Be Missed: Agenda for the Trump-Netanyahu Meeting/Dana
Stroul, Robert Satloff/The Washington Institute/July 09/2025
How Turkey Views the Iran-Israel Confrontation/Soner Cagaptay/The Washington
Institute/July 09/2025
How Iran’s Turn to Nationalism Affects U.S. Policy/Patrick Clawson/The
Washington Institute/July 09/2025
The Iran-Israel War Returns to the Shadows, for Now/Behnam Ben Taleblu and
Bridget Toomey/FDD-Policy Brief/July 09/2025
Netanyahu’s gift to Trump marks a ‘historic horizon’ for Mideast peace/Jonathan
Schanzer/ New York Post/July 09/2025
How Russia established deterrence with its neighbors/Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib/Arab
News/July 09, 2025
Selected Tweets for 08 July/2025
The Latest English LCCC
Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on July 09-10/2025
The Official Lebanese Response to the American Paper: Is A Weak, Flowery
Statement Reflecting the State’s Impotence and Complicity with the Iranian
Occupation
Elias Bejjani/July 07/ 2025
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2025/07/144961/
What was dubbed the “Lebanese response” to the American paper, delivered by the
US presidential envoy of Lebanese origin, Tom Barrack, was nothing more than a
childish and pathetic attempt at verbal appeasement and circumlocution, dodging
the truth and confronting reality. It’s a flowery and frivolous text, devoid of
substance, national or sovereign stance, commitment, or vision. Its sole purpose
is to buy time, flatter Hezbollah, and cowardly avoid confronting it and
implementing UN resolutions.
Spiritually, the content of this response echoes what is written in Revelation
(03:15-16): “I know your deeds, that you are neither cold nor hot. I wish you
were either one or the other! So, because you are lukewarm—neither hot nor
cold—I am about to spit you out of my mouth.”
First: A Cowardly Response Lacking Substance, Timeline, and Blindness to
International and Regional critical and historical Changes
The document handed to Barrack doesn’t even meet the minimum standard of a
responsible political response. It’s a flimsy, flowery statement, replete with
trite pleasantries, and devoid of any clear commitments. More dangerously, it
includes no timeline for disarming “Hezbollah” or dismantling its military and
intelligence infrastructure, rendering it without any executive value in the
eyes of the international community. Most critically, it deliberately ignores
the recent international and regional developments.
Second: Joseph Aoun… A Sovereign and Free President, or a Puppet in Iran’s
Hands?
Practically, President Joseph Aoun has disappointed and failed hopes with his
ambiguous and complicit stances regarding “Hezbollah’s” weapons, occupation, and
terrorism. This raises serious doubts about his independence and prompts
critical questions about whether this man is merely a soft façade for an Iranian
militia authority. The evidence is that his advisory team (the “advisory
battalion”) includes figures subservient to Hezbollah, such as former minister
Ali Hamieh, in addition to specific Christian and Maronite figures in particular
who were once pillars of the catastrophic President Michel Aoun’s tenure, and
who, along with him, contributed to handing Lebanon over to the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard.
Third: Barrack Said It Clearly: “Solving Hezbollah is Your Responsibility”
Tom Barrack didn’t beat around the bush or flatter anyone. He stated it frankly
and in sophisticated yet firm diplomatic language: “Isn’t Hezbollah a political
party in Lebanon? Do you think a foreign country will disarm a political party
in a sovereign country? This is your problem, and you have to solve it
yourselves.”
The message is clear: the time for duplicity, deceit, semantic games, and
tiresome cleverness is over. What’s required is a sovereign and courageous
Lebanese decision.
Fourth: Hezbollah is an Iranian Army with No Connection to Lebanon
It’s disgraceful at the popular, official, and media levels to continue calling
“Hezbollah” a Lebanese party. It is nothing but a branch of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard in Lebanon, and its leaders boast about this Trojan
subservience. Its leaders and military personnel are merely tools and executive
mouthpieces who don’t make their own decisions, and any dialogue with them is
folly, ignorance, and a blatant surrender that serves only Tehran’s terrorist
and expansionist agendas. Therefore, there is no solution except for the
complete eradication of its military, security, media, educational, and banking
systems. Anything else is a waste of time and a betrayal of sovereignty.
Fifth: “Last Chance”… And Israel Is Freed from Its Restraints
Barrack said it with a warning tone: “President Trump’s patience won’t last… and
if you don’t assume your responsibilities, you’ll be left alone to face your
destiny.”
In this context, we see that Israel, which was restrained by America for a long
time, has clearly received the green light to end the Iranian-Lebanese threat.
The recent airstrikes coincided with Barrack’s visit, and this is no
coincidence; rather, it’s a message by fire: “The countdown has begun, so make
up your minds.”
Some Tweets Commenting on the Farce and Childishness of Lebanon’s Rulers:
“The real equation isn’t that disarmament will lead to civil war, but that not
disarming will lead to a devastating regional war… And Barrack said it: No
American guarantees to rein in Israel!”
“Barrack delivered the response and left relieved, because the ball is now in
the Lebanese court. But he didn’t offer an opinion because he knows that facts,
not statements, will decide the truth.”
“The situation is like gathering contradictions in one paper. What’s simply
required: a clear timeline for confining weapons… But no one dares to admit that
the state is dead!”
“The American envoy didn’t need to read the response. He politely said: We won’t
dictate how you handle the weapons file, but if you don’t, you’ll pay the
price.”“Only one answer should have been given: Yes, we will disarm Hezbollah
within 3 months.”
“The Lebanese response = stammering, feigned cleverness, evasion, and
submission. The state and Hezbollah are in the same boat… headed to the bottom.”
“The Iranian regime in Lebanon must be overthrown immediately, otherwise a new
Middle East will be built without us… or upon our ruins.”
“We will not coexist with weapons anymore. We want it to be an official
decision, not vague wishes. The era of infantilization is over.”
Conclusion: Lebanon Faces a Moment of Truth… And the Hour of Reckoning
Approaches
The deliberate blindness of Aoun, Salam, and the ruling class in
Lebanon—comprising groups of armed factions and corrupt individuals—to the
international and regional changes forcibly imposed by Israeli Prime Minister
Netanyahu and US President Trump, means that Lebanon, within this new Middle
East project centered on peace, will not be allowed to remain under the rule of
the Iranian occupation and its Lebanese “Trojan horses.” Hezbollah will
undoubtedly be militarily eliminated, and its current Iscariot leaders, as well
as the Lebanese puppet officials will likely be removed, perhaps imprisoned and
prosecuted.
By these standards, the official Lebanese response was nothing short of a new,
despicable scandal, confirming that the state is captive to Hezbollah. Joseph
Aoun squandered a rare opportunity to prove his courage and independence,
appearing as a leader with a castrated will, managed from behind the scenes.
Nawaf Salam, indecisive and cowardly, remains mired in the outdated, rotten
culture of Yasser Arafat and Gamal Abdel Nasser, and is controlled by grudges,
hatred, and the illusions of resistance and liberation.
The American message arrived like a slap in the face to the entire political
class: “Either you bear your responsibility, or prepare for strong winds that
will leave nothing standing.” While the state stumbled in its stammering, the
voice of free Lebanese was clearer than ever: “We refuse to let Lebanon remain
hostage in the grip of the Iranian occupation. We demand that Washington, the
world’s greatest power, place Lebanon under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter, and declare it a failed, rogue state incapable of governing itself.”
Israel army says launched
‘special, targeted operations’ in south Lebanon
AFP/July 09, 2025
JERUSALEM: Israel’s military said Wednesday its troops entered southern Lebanon
as part of targeted operations to dismantle infrastructure belonging to the
Iran-backed militant group Hezbollah. “Following intelligence information and
the identification of Hezbollah weapons and terrorist infrastructure in several
areas of southern Lebanon, the soldiers launched special, targeted operations to
dismantle them and prevent Hezbollah from reestablishing itself in the area,” an
army statement said. The military did not immediately respond to an AFP request
for comment on whether this was the first time Israeli troops had operated on
the ground in Lebanon since a November ceasefire.But the army shared a video
captioned “footage from a targeted nighttime operation of the 9th Brigade in
southern Lebanon,” showing troops walking on the ground. AFP was unable to
verify the footage, the time or location it was shot. The army statement said
the 9th Brigade was in the Labbouneh area, just over the border. Troops from the
300th Brigade operated in the Jabal Blat area further west, also within sight of
the frontier. Despite a November truce with Hezbollah, Israel has kept up its
strikes on Lebanon, mainly saying it is targeting the group’s sites and
operatives but also occasionally members of their Palestinian ally Hamas. The
November 27 ceasefire sought to end more than a year of hostilities with
Hezbollah, including two months of all-out war that left the group severely
weakened. Under the ceasefire deal, Hezbollah was to pull its fighters back
north of the Litani river, about 30 kilometers (20 miles) from the Israeli
border, leaving the Lebanese army and United Nations peacekeepers as the only
armed parties in the region. Israel was required to fully withdraw its troops
from the country but has kept them in five places it deems strategic.
Israeli strike kills
Hezbollah operative in Babliyeh
Naharnet/July 09, 2025
An Israeli drone strike on a car in the Sidon district town of Babliyeh on
killed one person overnight Tuesday, the Health Ministry said. The Israeli army
said the strike killed “Hussein Ali Mezher, the fire array officer for the
Zahrani sector of Hezbollah's Badr unit.”
“As part of his duties, the (operative) advanced plans to launch numerous
rockets at the State of Israel and IDF (Israeli army) forces. He was also
recently involved in efforts to rebuild Hezbollah's artillery units in southern
Lebanon,” the Israeli military claimed.
Reports: Barrack to visit
Israel, tells Lebanon there's a 3-month window
Naharnet/July 09, 2025
U.S. envoy Tom Barrack told the Lebanese officials he met with during his latest
visit to Beirut that there is a “three-month window” to reach a solution
regarding Hezbollah’s arms, al-Akhbar newspaper reported on Wednesday. Barrack
warned that “the failure to achieve a major change will lead to maintaining the
current situations in terms of the continuation of the Israeli war, the absence
of any step toward reconstruction and the reluctance to give any financial
support to the Lebanese state,” the daily added, quoting a “highly informed
source.”
Moreover, al-Akhbar quoted the source as saying that Barrack’s initial paper
included “a mechanism for handing over the weapons in batches” and that the U.S.
had indicated that Lebanon had until November to implement the demands.
Political sources meanwhile told Asharq al-Awsat newspaper that Barrack would
visit Israel soon before returning to Lebanon in two weeks. President Joseph
Aoun, Speaker Nabih Berri and PM Nawaf Salam meanwhile stressed that Lebanon and
Israel should take “simultaneous” steps, the sources added, noting that “Barrack
did not give U.S. guarantees regarding Israel’s withdrawal or the expansion of
its attacks, but has however promised to help Lebanon.”
Qassem denies divisions within Hezbollah, says group 'has recovered'
Naharnet/July 09, 2025
Hezbollah "has recovered and is now ready" to confront Israel in case of an
attack on Lebanon, the group's leader Sheikh Naim Qassem said in a televised
interview. The interview was recorded on June 11 but only broadcast Tuesday on
Lebanese pan-Arabist news channel al-Mayadeen. Qassem said that President Joseph
Aoun is being "very pressured" by the U.S. and other Arab countries to disarm
Hezbollah by all means, even by force. "But he knows this would lead to strife
and would not be fruitful," Qassem told journalist and director of al-Mayadeen
Ghassan Bin Jeddo. "Lebanon is strong because of Hezbollah's weapons and we will
not accept that Lebanon becomes weak," Qassem said, adding that the medium and
heavy arms that have been destroyed during the war with Israel are south of the
Litani River, in a hint that Hezbollah has weapons in other regions across the
country. Qassem denied internal divisions within Hezbollah. "Usually, when there
are wings, you can see them, right? Because they fly... I haven't seen any wings
yet," he sarcastically said. Two months of full-fledged war with Israel last
fall dealt heavy blows to Hezbollah, with its longtime leader Sayyed Hassan
Nasrallah killed in a September Israeli airstrike. Hezbollah also lost a
strategic ally when Islamist-led rebels ousted longtime Syrian ruler Bashar
al-Assad. "Hezbollah communicated with the Lebanese army when problems occurred
in the Hermel area" on the Lebanese-Syrian border, Qassem told Bin Jeddo. "There
were armed men trying to enter Lebanese territory but Hezbollah was not involved
and we have no intention of fighting them so we communicated with the army."
Report: Hezbollah tells US ready for concessions in return for
'victory image'
Naharnet/July 09, 2025
The head of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc MP Mohammad Raad carried a message to
Speaker Nabih Berri on the eve of the Lebanese response to U.S. envoy Tom
Barrack’s paper, sources from the U.S. Republican Party said. “Hezbollah,
through its representative, told Berri that it is ready to offer full
concessions to the United States in return for being able to claim a victory
image through the media,” the Janoubia news portal quoted the sources as saying.
Hezbollah demanded “a partial Israeli withdrawal from five border points and the
release of some of the captives, in order to promote such a step as a heroic
achievement that would restore some of its eroding popular legitimacy,” the
sources claimed.
Report: US seeking direct talks with Hezbollah
Naharnet/July 09, 2025
The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump is seeking to hold direct
negotiations with Hezbollah in parallel with Washington’s efforts with the
Lebanese state, a Western diplomatic source in Jerusalem said. The talks would
be aimed at “convincing Hezbollah to give up its weapons in return for broad
U.S. guarantees,” the source told Kuwait’s al-Jarida newspaper. “There are
efforts to arrange a meeting for U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Trump’s envoy to
Syria Tom Barrack, who is currently tasked with Lebanon’s file, or for his
assistant, with the head of Hezbollah’s bloc in the Lebanese parliament,
Mohammad Raad,” the source added. “Preparatory meetings between the two sides
have already been held in Beirut and officials from a ‘suspended’ Lebanese
movement hosted some of those meetings,” the source said, in an apparent
reference to al-Mustaqbal Movement. The Western diplomatic source added that the
U.S. side believes that “direct meetings would contribute to resolving the issue
of arms, because Hezbollah would more accurately understand the consequences of
its refusal to hand over the weapons.”“The U.S. can also offer guarantees
demanded by Hezbollah, including the prevention of assassinations against its
leaders and discussing how a part of its fighters can be integrated into the
Lebanese Army,” the source added. “The arrangements for these negotiations took
place behind the scenes, which has infuriated Israel and sides in Lebanon that
are close to the Lebanese Presidency,” the source said.
President Aoun meets Cyprus' leader in Nicosia
Naharnet/July 09, 2025
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun met Wednesday with Cyprus' President Nikos
Christodoulides at the Presidential Palace in the capital Nicosia. Aoun said
after the meeting that all what he wants for Lebanon, the region and the world
is "just peace through dialogue" while Christodoulides voiced Cyprus' support
for Lebanon's stability, unity, and territorial sovereignty.
US envoy calls for change
in Lebanese political culture in interview with LBCI Lebanon
Arab News/July 09, 2025
BEIRUT: Lebanon’s politicians have spent 60 years “denying, detouring and
deflecting,” the US special envoy Tom Barrack said in an interview broadcast on
Tuesday.Barrack has been in Lebanon to talk with political leaders over
Washington’s proposals to disarm the powerful militant group Hezbollah.
Asked whether the Lebanese politicians he has been dealing with were actually
engaging with him or just buying time, the diplomat responded “both.” “The
Lebanese political culture is deny, detour and deflect,” Barrack said. “This is
the way that it's been for 60 years, and this is the task we have in front of
us. It has to change.”After meeting President Joseph Aoun on Monday, he reacted
positively to the Lebanese government’s response to a US plan to remove
Hezbollah’s weapons.In an interview with Lebanese broadcaster LBCI, Barrack said
he believed the president, prime minister and the speaker of the house were
being “candid, honest, and forthright” with him. But he warned Lebanon’s
politicians that the region is changing and if the politicians didn’t want to
change as well “just tell us, and we'll not interfere.”While he did not disclose
the details of the US proposals, or the Lebanese response, Barrack said
Lebanon’s leadership had to be willing to take a risk.“We need results from
these leaders,” he said. Lebanon’s politicians have long been accused of
corruption and putting self-interest first ahead of the good of the nation and
the Lebanese people.
Public anger came to a head in 2019 with mass public protests against corruption
and financial hardship.The Lebanese economy spiraled into a financial crisis
with the country defaulting on its debt and the currency collapsing.
Barrack, who is also Washington’s ambassador to Turkiye and special envoy for
Syria, said the US was offering Lebanon a helping hand rather than trying to
interfere in its politics.“We’ve only said one thing, if you want us to help
you, we're here to usher, we’re here to help. We’re here to protect to the
extent that we can,” he said.“But we’re not going to intervene in regime change.
We’re not going to intervene in politics. And if you don’t want us, no problem,
we’ll go home. That’s it.”Barrack said Hezbollah, which is viewed as a terrorist
organization by the US and is also a political party with 13 MPs in Lebanon “is
a Lebanese problem, not a world problem.”“We’ve already, from a political point
of view, said it’s a terrorist organization. They mess with us anywhere, just as
the president (Trump) has established on a military basis, they’re going to have
a problem with us. How that gets solved within Lebanon is another issue … It’s
up to the Lebanese people.”Barrack said the disarmament of Hezbollah had always
been based on a simple fact for President Donald Trump: “One nation, one people,
one army.”“If that's the case, if that’s what this political body chooses, then
we will usher, will help, will influence, and will be that intermediary with all
of the potential combatants or adversaries who are on your borders,” Barrack
said. The diplomat dismissed media speculation that the US had set timelines for
its proposals, but said while Trump had been extremely proactive on Lebanon, he
would not wait long for progress.
“Nobody is going to stick around doing this until next May,” he said. “I don’t
think there’s ever been a president since Dwight Eisenhower who came out with
such ferocity for Lebanon. On his own, he (Trump) has the courage, he has the
dedication, he has the ability. What he doesn’t have is patience.
“If Lebanon wants to just keep kicking this can down the road, they can keep
kicking the can down the road, but we’re not going to be here in May having this
discussion.”During the near hour-long, wide-ranging interview, Barrack, whose
grandparents emigrated from Lebanon to the US, everybody across Lebanon’s many
religions and sects was tired of war and discontent. “If we have 19 different
religions and 19 different communities and 19 different confessionals, there's
one thing that’s above that, and that’s being Lebanese,” he said.The Trump
administration is keen to support Lebanon and Aoun, who became president in
January, as the country struggles to emerge from years of economic hardship,
political turmoil and regional unrest.Hezbollah, which is backed by Iran, had
become the most powerful military force in the country and a major political
power, but was significantly weakened by an Israeli campaign against the group
last year.Its weapons arsenal has remained an ongoing thorn in the side of
US-Lebanon relations. Along with disarming Hezbollah, the US proposals presented
to Lebanese officials by Barrack last month are thought to include economic
reforms to help the country move forward.
Reviving May 17 Agreement could be a solution for Lebanon
Nadim Shehadi/Arab News/July 09, 2025
Historians describe it as a perfect failure: because it was both perfect and it
failed. It was also called mission impossible because of the Syrian opposition
to it. The May 17 Agreement of 1983 between Israel and Lebanon, however, remains
the only official document negotiated directly between the two states — and
there are many reasons why we should go back to it to get us out of the current
impasse.
Yes, we are at an impasse and there are very good reasons for it. Simply put,
there are too many overlapping conversations happening at the same time, between
the wrong people, and they need to be separated to get the right results. This
is heavily dependent on who is discussing what: the interlocutor is key. The
optics are bad, as when the government makes promises, they are almost
immediately contradicted by Hezbollah. Lebanon is losing credibility and we are
being lectured about missed opportunities and about being “left behind” while
the region moves forward. It is painful to watch and there are rumors of
resignations and of the government collapsing. This is the last thing we need.
The core problem is and has always been the Israel-Lebanon border. In 1983, it
was the Palestine Liberation Organization launching rockets and operations
across it, while today it is the arms of Hezbollah and Israel’s attacks and
invasions to counter them.
The government of Lebanon is working on two fronts. It is negotiating its
relations with Israel after a war that it did not participate in and had no say
on how it started or how it ended. At the same time, it is negotiating with
Hezbollah over the application of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which
Lebanon has twice committed to — firstly in 2006 under the government of Prime
Minister Fouad Siniora and then in November 2024 under Najib Mikati.
Both cases were huge feats of internal and external diplomacy, which should be
seen as a success of the Lebanese system and not as a failure. But both
agreements were for no more than a cessation of hostilities, which is less than
a ceasefire and certainly far from an end to the state of war between the two
countries.
The debate over Hezbollah’s arms has to remain internal and is no less
complicated than that over the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in
the US. The narrative is tied to that of resistance to the 22-year Israeli
occupation of south Lebanon between 1978 and 2000, which the Lebanese state
recognizes. In a nutshell, Hezbollah can give up its arms but not its status as
a resistance force. Disarming Hezbollah is about the future of the country,
while Hezbollah’s resistance is part of its past. It is also about coming to
terms with a humiliating military defeat while maintaining the glories of past
successes. This is a delicate balance that can only be achieved through
conversations within the party, between the party and its community, and with
the rest of the country. This is also tied to reconstruction and recovery, both
from last year’s war and the economic and financial crisis. Trust me, it is
difficult enough without external participation and it has to happen in-house.
Disarming Hezbollah is about the future of the country, while Hezbollah’s
resistance is part of its past.
In comparison, the question of relations with Israel is straightforward — and
this is where reviving the May 17 Agreement comes in. It was a result of Israel
and Lebanon engaging in direct state-to-state negotiations, with American
facilitation and guarantees. The agreement was approved by the Lebanese
parliament after long discussions, with every point of the text widely
discussed.
In his recently published memoirs, former Lebanese Foreign Minister Elie Salem
emphasized that it was not a peace treaty and did not result in the
normalization of relations, such as an exchange of ambassadors. It was also not
connected with the Syrian presence in the country — this was the only way to
sell it internally. In a way, all three parties approached the negotiations with
widely differing expectations.
David Kimche, the Israeli negotiator, has described how every point was hotly
debated and had to be sold to all the different parties in Lebanon. He explained
that his Lebanese counterpart Antoine Fattal was a Chaldean by religion, his
deputy and head of the military committee was Shiite and the civilian members
included another Shiite, a Sunni Muslim, a Maronite and a Greek Orthodox
Catholic. It was inconceivable that such a team could agree on any major issue,
especially as each had to separately consult with their community leaders.
Fattal pointed out that his delegation was like a convoy that had to
continuously adjust its speed to that of the slowest ship.
Salem recounted how, with the approval of US envoy Philip Habib, President Amine
Gemayel had to withdraw from the agreement after Israel insisted on conditions
about a simultaneous Syrian withdrawal that were not part of the text. There was
already enough pressure from Damascus against the agreement — under the slogan
that the two paths, those of Lebanon and Syria, were intertwined. Hafez Assad
was obviously concerned that an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon would trigger
calls for Syria to do the same, which is what ultimately happened after Israel
did finally withdraw in 2000.The main reason for the Lebanese government to
revive the May 17 Agreement is to regain the initiative and earn credibility by
owning the process and separating the Israeli component from the internal
Lebanese discussion with Hezbollah. It would be almost impossible to initiate
such a direct state-to-state process with Israel, but it is feasible to pick up
where they left off and move forward. As Fattal explained about the complexity
of Lebanon’s internal situation, the overall package is more important than the
contents.
• Nadim Shehadi is an economist and political adviser.
Now Is Not the Time to Ease Up on Hezbollah—or Beirut
David Schenker/The Washington Institute/July 09/2025
https://eliasbejjaninews.com/2025/07/145024/
After
giving Lebanese officials a much-needed ultimatum for disarming Hezbollah and
implementing financial reforms, Washington is now in danger of letting them once
again punt these all-important tasks.
On July 7, U.S. Special Envoy Tom Barrack traveled to Beirut three weeks after
giving the Lebanese government a letter demanding immediate steps to disarm
Hezbollah and other militias. The June 19 ultimatum and accompanying roadmap for
implementation gave Beirut several months to make significant progress toward
this goal and initiate financial and economic reforms, reflecting Washington’s
growing frustration that such efforts had stalled.
Lebanon offered an initial response to the letter during this week’s visit, and
while the details have not yet been made public, Barrack said he was
“unbelievably satisfied” with the reply. It is unclear why he was so
pleased—unconfirmed reports from Lebanon and Israel suggest that Beirut merely
re-committed to disarming Hezbollah south of the Litani River by the deadline,
with wider disarmament occurring sometime in the future. If these rumors are
true, the Iran-backed terrorist group will retain its weapons, and Lebanon’s
chance to achieve sovereignty will be deferred or even missed entirely.
Diverging Approaches
After Hezbollah attacked Israel on October 8, 2023, in support of the Hamas
invasion from Gaza, Israel responded with a limited war of attrition against the
Lebanese militia. The crisis escalated further nine months ago, when Israel
initiated a major campaign that severely degraded Hezbollah’s leadership,
arsenal, and border deployments. These operations created an opportunity for
Lebanese authorities to take long-delayed action of their own against the group,
thereby curtailing Iranian influence in Beirut and establishing a truly
sovereign state. Indeed, the November 2024 ceasefire committed Beirut to
confiscating Hezbollah’s weapons and dismantling its military infrastructure
throughout the state, while the newly elected president and prime minister
pledged to implement sweeping financial reforms.
Yet the succeeding months have cast a stark light on Washington and Beirut’s
diverging views regarding the urgency of these measures. The Trump
administration correctly assessed that the moment for bold action is now, since
Hezbollah is at its weakest point in decades but could once again reconstitute
itself absent proactive Lebanese efforts to consolidate this degradation, much
like it did after the 2006 war. Yet Beirut apparently calculated that avoiding a
major confrontation with Hezbollah was more urgent than disarming it—a
conclusion based not only on the group’s proven history of murdering political
opponents, but also on wider fears of reviving the state’s long-dormant civil
war.
From the beginning, President Joseph Aoun has stated that Beirut will not
forcibly disarm Hezbollah. Instead, he has sought to convince the militia to
give up its arms through negotiations or integrate with the Lebanese Armed
Forces. Both of these approaches are problematic. Incorporating Hezbollah into
the LAF would risk undermining one of Lebanon’s few functioning national
institutions. Moreover, the previous two decades have proven such dialogue to be
a standard delay tactic for Hezbollah and successive Lebanese governments, with
the group treating discussions about a “national defense strategy” as a
euphemism for keeping (and expanding) its arsenal.
Today, Hezbollah says it has no interest in disarming—Secretary-General Naim
Qassem has indicated that it will not discuss a “national defense strategy” or
the disposition of its weapons until Israel fully withdraws from Lebanese
territory. As for Barrack’s ultimatum, Qassem declared, “We have the right to
say ‘no’ to them, ‘no’ to America, ‘no’ to Israel.” And during a July 5
procession in Beirut commemorating the Shia holiday of Ashura, Hezbollah members
struck a defiant tone by brandishing their weapons in the streets of the
capital.
Lost Momentum
The current state of affairs is particularly disappointing given U.S. and
Israeli optimism after the November ceasefire. Initially, the LAF was responsive
to tasking requests, repeatedly confiscating Hezbollah weapons and dismantling
infrastructure when notified of their location by the U.S.-led ceasefire
mechanism, which is largely based on Israeli intelligence. While taking pains to
be as nonconfrontational as possible, the LAF was largely effective, taking
action against more than 400 Hezbollah sites south of the Litani River. Yet
efforts to demilitarize the group north of the Litani were never as robust and
have since stalled—not because the LAF is unwilling, but rather due to a lack of
political guidance from Beirut.
The new government has yet to pass the requisite financial reforms either.
Sweeping legislation is desperately needed to extricate the state from a crisis
that has included a 98 percent currency devaluation since 2018, a 40 percent
contraction in GDP, and banking losses of nearly $80 billion. Yet the
parliament—led by Speaker Nabih Berri, a staunch Hezbollah ally—has only passed
one such measure so far, a banking secrecy law. Despite the urgency, legislators
have been loath to make difficult and likely unpopular austerity decisions prior
to next year’s parliamentary election.
The loss of momentum has frustrated Lebanon’s foreign supporters, with
Washington and the Gulf states increasingly turning their attention to other
regional priorities. Improbably, Syria seems to have supplanted Lebanon as the
more promising bet. During his May visit to Riyadh, President Trump publicly
mentioned Lebanon just once but met directly with Syria’s new president and
declared that he would lift all sanctions on Damascus. Gulf reconstruction money
is now flowing into Syria while Lebanon languishes in the rubble of war. In
addition, Syrian officials have been meeting with Israel and reportedly
considering more normal relations with Jerusalem, even as Lebanese legislators
squabble over how best to placate the terrorist militia that has repeatedly
brought Israeli military destruction raining down upon their country.
Policy Recommendations
Lebanon’s response to Barrack’s ultimatum should have been an inflection point.
If Beirut had affirmed that it would take more proactive steps to confiscate the
remainder of Hezbollah’s weapons, the United States could have pressed for the
cessation of Israeli airstrikes, the withdrawal of remaining Israeli forces,
progress on delineating the border, and postwar reconstruction.
Instead, Barrack was inexplicably conciliatory toward Hezbollah, describing
Iran’s top terrorist proxy in the Middle East as a “political party” that “also
has a militant aspect to it.” The administration is apparently trying to cajole
the group into capitulating, but now is hardly the time to go soft on Hezbollah
or Beirut.
If Lebanon once again punts on reform and wider disarmament efforts, Barrack
says the US would politically disengage. Washington has several other options:
Sanction Nabih Berri and other parliamentarians who obstruct progress.
Slow-roll U.S. support for the international financial institutions that would
bankroll Lebanon’s reconstruction (e.g., the World Bank and IMF), encouraging
other donors to do the same. Saudi Arabia has already independently warned
Beirut that no aid will be forthcoming unless Hezbollah disarms.
End or dramatically curtail the United Nations peacekeeping mission. The
Security Council is currently discussing whether to renew the mandate of the UN
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), whose more than 10,000 troops in the
south—the densest concentration of peacekeepers on earth—have long
disincentivized the Lebanese government from exercising sovereignty there. Now
more than ever, shaking up this dysfunctional dynamic could spur Beirut to
action.
Get more serious about targeting Hezbollah’s influence within the Lebanese
state. Existing U.S. sanctions have largely focused on Hezbollah’s own finances.
To break the organization’s grip on Lebanon’s security institutions, however,
the Trump administration should consider targeting the key officials within
these institutions who collude with Hezbollah. Washington could also press for
the LAF and Internal Security Forces (ISF) to end their coordination with the
militia.
In the meantime, Israel will undoubtedly persist with its now-routine airstrikes
on Hezbollah targets throughout the state. In fact, given the Lebanese
government’s longstanding aversion to confronting the group, Israeli military
action might be Beirut’s preferred scenario. In the decades since the civil war,
Lebanese officials have generally punted on difficult issues to avoid rekindling
that devastating conflict, and their apparent response to Barrack is consistent
with this approach. Yet it is hardly “safe” to keep deferring the problem of
Hezbollah’s weapons, which have all too often been trained on the Lebanese
people or invited Israeli attacks.
The new government in Beirut clearly wants to end Israeli strikes and preserve
its relationship with Washington. Yet as long as Hezbollah retains a residual
military capability, Lebanon’s politics will not reflect the new postwar
reality, and sovereignty will remain elusive.
**David Schenker is the Taube Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute,
director of its Rubin Program on Arab Politics, and former assistant secretary
of state for Near Eastern affairs in the first Trump administration.
A
weakened Iran and Hezbollah gives Lebanon an opening to chart path away from the
region’s conflicts − will it be enough?
Mireille Rebeiz, Dickinson College/The Conversation/July 09/2025
https://ca.yahoo.com/news/weakened-iran-hezbollah-gives-lebanon-201105028.html
After a 12-day war launched by Israel and joined briefly by the United States,
Iran has emerged weakened and vulnerable. And that has massive implications for
another country in the region: Lebanon.
Hezbollah, Tehran’s main ally in Lebanon, had already lost a lot of its
fighters, arsenal and popular support during its own war with Israel in October
2024. Now, Iran’s government has little capacity to continue to finance, support
and direct Hezbollah in Lebanon like it has done in the past. Compounding this
shift away from Hezbollah’s influence, the U.S. recently laid down terms for a
deal that would see the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon in
return for the total disarmament of the paramilitary group – a proposal
seemingly backed by the Lebanese government. As an expert on Lebanese history
and culture, I believe that these changing regional dynamics give the Lebanese
state an opening to chart a more neutral orientation and extricate itself from
neighboring conflicts that have long exacerbated the divided and fragile
country’s chronic problems.
The shaping of modern Lebanon
Ideologically, developments in Iran played a major role in shaping the
circumstances in which Hezbollah, the Shiite Islamist political party and
paramilitary group, was born. The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 toppled the
widely reviled and corrupt Western-backed monarchy of Shah Mohammad Reza and led
to the establishment of an Islamic republic. That revolution resonated among the
young Shiite population in Lebanon, where a politically sectarian system that
was intended to reflect a balanced representation of Muslims and Christians in
the country had led to de facto discrimination against underrepresented groups.
Since Lebanon’s independence from France in 1943, most of the power has been
concentrated in the hands of the Maronite Christians and Sunnis, leaving Shiite
regions in south Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley lacking in development projects,
social services and infrastructure.
At the same time, Lebanon for decades had been irreparably changed by the
politics of its powerful neighbor in Israel.
In the course of founding its state in 1948, Israel forcibly removed over
750,000 Palestinians from their homeland – what Palestinians refer to as the
Nakba, or “catastophe.” Many fled to Lebanon, largely in the country’s
impoverished south and Bekaa Valley, which became a center of Palestinian
resistance to Israel. In 1978, Israel invaded Lebanon to push Palestinian
fighters away from its northern borders and put an end to rockets launched from
south Lebanon. This fighting included the massacre of many civilians and the
displacement of many Lebanese and Palestinians farther north.
In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon again with the stated purpose of eliminating the
Palestinian Liberation Organization that had moved its headquarters to the
country’s south. An estimated 17,000 to 19,000 Lebanese and Palestinian
civilians and armed personnel were killed during the conflict and the
accompanying siege of Beirut. It was in this cauldron of regional and domestic
sectarianism and state abandonment that Hezbollah formed as a paramilitary group
in 1985, buoyed by Shiite mobilization following the Iranian revolution and
Israel’s invasion and occupation.
Hezbollah’s domestic spoiler status
Over time and with the continuous support of Iran, Hezbollah become an important
player in the Middle East, intervening in the Syrian civil war to support the
Assad regime and supporting the Kata'ib Hezbollah, a dominant Iraqi pro-Iranian
militia.
In 2016, Secretary General of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah officially recognized
Iran’s role in funding their activities.
People march with flags and placards.
With Tehran’s support, Hezbollah was effectively able to operate as a state
within a state while using its political clout to veto the vast majority of
Lebanese parliamentary decisions it opposed. Amid that backdrop, Lebanon endured
three long presidential vacuums: from November 2007 to May 2008; from May 2014
to October 2016; and finally from October 2022 to January 2024. Lebanon also
witnessed a series of political assassinations from 2005 to 2021 that targeted
politicians, academics, journalists and other figures who criticized Hezbollah.
How the equation has changed
It would be an understatement, then, to say that Hezbollah’s and Iran’s weakened
positions as a result of their respective conflicts with Israel since late 2023
create major political ramifications for Lebanon. The most recent vacuum at the
presidential level ended amid Hezbollah’s military losses against Israel, with
Lebanon electing the former army commander Joseph Aoun as president. Meanwhile,
despite the threat of violence, the Lebanese opposition to Hezbollah, which
consists of members of parliament and public figures, has increased its
criticism of Hezbollah, openly denouncing its leadership and calling for
Lebanon’s political neutrality. These dissenting voices emerged cautiously
during the Syrian civil war in 2011 and have grown after the Oct. 7 Hamas
attacks and the subsequent war on Gaza. During the latest Israel-Iran war, the
Lebanese opposition felt emboldened to reiterate its call for neutrality.
Enabled by the U.S’s growing tutelage over Lebanon, some opposition figures have
even called to normalize relations with Israel. These efforts to keep Lebanon
out of the circle of violence are not negligible. In the past, they would have
been attacked by Hezbollah and its supporters for what they would have
considered high treason. Today, they represent new movement for how leaders are
conceiving of politics domestically and diplomacy across the region.
The critical regional context going forward
As the political system cautiously changes, Hezbollah is facing unprecedented
financial challenges and is unable to meet its fighters’ needs, including the
promise to rebuild their destroyed homes. And with its own serious internal
challenges, Iran now has much less ability to meaningfully support Hezbollah
from abroad. But none of that means that Hezbollah is defeated as a political
and military force, particularly as ongoing skirmishes with Israel give the
group an external pretext. The Hezbollah-Israel war ended with a ceasefire
brokered by the United States and France on Nov. 27, 2024. However, Israel has
been attacking south Lebanon on an almost daily basis, including three incidents
over the course of 10 days from late June to early July that have left several
people dead and more than a dozen wounded. Amid these violations, Hezbollah
continues to refuse to disarm and still casts itself as the only defender of
Lebanon’s territorial integrity, again undermining the power of the Lebanese
army and state. Lebanon’s other neighbor, Syria, will also be critical. The fall
of the Assad regime in December 2024 diminished Hezbollah’s powers in the region
and land access to Iraq and Iran. And the new Syrian leadership is not
interested in supporting the Iranian Shiite ideology in the region but rather in
empowering the Sunni community, one that was oppressed under the Assad
dictatorship.
While it’s too early to say, border tensions might translate into sectarian
violence in Lebanon or even potential land loss. Yet the new Syrian government
also has a different approach toward its neighbors than its predecessor. After
decades of hostility, Syria seems to be opting for diplomacy with Israel rather
than war. It is unclear what these negotiations will entail and how they will
impact Lebanon and Hezbollah. However, there are real concerns about new borders
in the region.
The U.S. as ever will play a major role in next steps in Lebanon and the region.
The U.S. has been pressing Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah, and the U.S Ambassador
to Turkey and special envoy for Syria Thomas Barrack said he was “unbelievably
satisfied” by Lebanon’s response thus far. But so far, there has been no
fundamental shift on that front. Meanwhile, despite the calls for neutrality and
the U.S pressure on Lebanon, it is hard to envision a new and neutral Lebanon
without some serious changes in the region. Any future course for Lebanon will
still first require progress toward peace in Gaza and ensuring Iran commits not
to use Hezbollah as a proxy in the future.
*Mireille Rebeiz is affiliated with American Red Cross.
The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published
on July 09-10/2025
Only 6 crew rescued, 15 missing after
Houthis sink Greek ship Eternity C in Red Sea
Reuters/July 09, 2025
ATHENS/DUBAI: Rescuers pulled six crew members alive from the Red Sea after
Houthi militants attacked and sank a second ship this week, while the fate of
another 15 was unknown after the Iran-aligned group said they held some of the
seafarers. The Houthis claimed responsibility for the assault that maritime
officials say killed four of the 25 people aboard the Eternity C before the rest
abandoned the cargo ship. Eternity C went down Wednesday morning after attacks
on two previous days, sources at security companies involved in a rescue
operation said. The six rescued seafarers spent more than 24 hours in the water,
those firms said. The United States Mission in Yemen accused the Houthis of
kidnapping many surviving crew members from Eternity C and called for their
immediate and unconditional safe release. “The Yemeni Navy responded to rescue a
number of the ship’s crew, provide them with medical care, and transport them to
a safe location,” the group’s military spokesperson said in a televised address.
The Houthis released a video they said depicted their attack on Eternity C. It
included sound of a Yemen naval forces’ call for the crew to evacuate for rescue
and showed explosions on the ship before it sank. Reuters could not
independently verify the audio or the location of the ship, which it verified
was the Eternity C. The Houthis also have claimed responsibility for a similar
assault on Sunday targeting another ship, the Magic Seas. All crew from the
Magic Seas were rescued before it sank. The strikes on the two ships revive a
campaign by the Iran-aligned fighters who had attacked more than 100 ships from
November 2023 to December 2024 in what they said was solidarity with the
Palestinians. In May, the US announced a surprise deal with the Houthis where it
agreed to stop a bombing campaign against them in return for an end to shipping
attacks, though the Houthis said the deal did not include sparing Israel.
Leading shipping industry associations, including the International Chamber of
Shipping and BIMCO, denounced the deadly operation and called for robust
maritime security in the region via a joint statement on Wednesday. “These
vessels have been attacked with callous disregard for the lives of innocent
civilian seafarers,” they said. “This tragedy illuminates the need for nations
to maintain robust support in protecting shipping and vital sea lanes.”
Rescue search
The Eternity C and the Magic Seas both flew Liberia flags and were operated by
Greek firms. Some of the sister vessels in each of their wider fleets had made
calls to Israeli ports in the past year, shipping data analysis showed.
“We will continue to search for the remaining crew until the last light,” said
an official at Greece-based maritime risk management firm Diaplous. The EU’s
Aspides naval mission, which protects Red Sea shipping, confirmed in a statement
that six people had been pulled from the sea. The Red Sea, which passes Yemen’s
coast, has long been a critical waterway for the world’s oil and commodities but
traffic has dropped sharply since the Houthi attacks began. The number of daily
sailings through the narrow Bab Al-Mandab strait, at the southern tip of the Red
Sea and a gateway to the Gulf of Aden, numbered 30 vessels on July 8, from 34
ships on July 6 and 43 on July 1, according to data from maritime data group
Lloyd’s List Intelligence. Oil prices rose on Wednesday, maintaining their
highest levels since June 23, also due to the recent attacks on ships in the Red
Sea.
Multiple attacks
Eternity C was first attacked on Monday afternoon with sea drones and
rocket-propelled grenades fired from speed boats by suspected Houthi militants,
maritime security sources said. Lifeboats were destroyed during the raid. By
Tuesday morning the vessel was adrift and listing. Two security sources told
Reuters that the vessel was hit again with sea drones on Tuesday, forcing the
crew and armed guards to abandon it. The Houthis stayed with the vessel until
the early hours of Wednesday, one of the sources said.Skiffs were in the area as
rescue efforts were underway. The crew comprised 21 Filipinos and one Russian.
Three armed guards were also on board, including one Greek and one Indian, who
was one of those rescued. The vessel’s operator, Cosmoship Management, has not
responded to requests for confirmation of casualties or injuries. If confirmed,
the four reported deaths would be the first fatalities from attacks on shipping
in the Red Sea since June 2024. Greece has been in talks with Saudi Arabia, a
key player in the region, over the latest incident, according to sources.
Yemen crisis ‘deeply volatile and
unpredictable,’ UN special envoy tells Security Council
Ephrem Kossaify/Arab News/July 09,
2025
NEW YORK CITY: The UN Security Council convened on Wednesday for a briefing on
the escalating conflict and humanitarian crisis in Yemen, amid growing concerns
about regional instability and the resumption of Houthi attacks on commercial
shipping in the Red Sea. The UN’s special envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg,
described the present period as “deeply volatile and unpredictable,” while
noting that there were some fragile hopes for a deescalation following the
recent ceasefire agreement between Iran and Israel.
However, he cautioned that the Houthis continue to launch missile attacks
against Israel, and recently targeted two commercial vessels in the Red Sea,
resulting in civilian casualties and potential environmental damage. They were
the first such assaults on international shipping in more than seven months.
“These attacks threaten freedom of navigation and risk dragging Yemen further
into regional crises,” Grundberg warned, as he underscored the imperative need
to safeguard civilian infrastructure and maintain stability in the country.
He emphasized that while the front lines in the Yemen conflict have largely
held, military activity persists across several governorates, with troop
movements suggesting an appetite for escalation among some factions. Grundberg
urged all parties involved in the conflict to demonstrate a genuine commitment
to peace, including the release of all conflict-related detainees, a process
that has been stalled for more than a year.
He also highlighted the dire economic situation in the country, describing it as
the “most active front line” of the conflict, with currency devaluation and
worsening food insecurity pushing millions toward famine. In a call for
practical cooperation, Grundberg praised recent developments such as the
reopening of Al-Dhalea Road, which he said has eased movement and improved
economic activity. He urged both sides to build on such progress to restore
salaries, services and oil production. The UN’s under-secretary-general for
humanitarian affairs, Tom Fletcher, briefed council members on the accelerating
food-security crisis in the country.
“More than 17 million people are going hungry in Yemen, with numbers expected to
rise to over 18 million by September,” he said, highlighting the threat to more
than a million malnourished children under the age of 5.Despite funding
shortfalls, Fletcher said progress had been made in controlling cholera
outbreaks and scaling up nutritional treatments, with more than 650,000 children
receiving life-saving aid. He also cited local-level agreements in Taiz
governorate for the joint management of water supplies, and the reopening of a
key road between Aden and Sanaa that is facilitating civilian and commercial
transport for the first time in seven years.
However, he stressed the urgent need for increased funding of relief efforts,
and called for the immediate release of detained UN workers and employees of
nongovernmental organizations, echoing Grundberg’s demands. The US Ambassador to
the UN, Dorothy Shea, condemned the recent Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red
Sea, including the sinking of the cargo vessel Magic Seas, describing them as
“destabilizing” and a violation of freedom of navigation. She urged the Security
Council to renew calls for transparency regarding Houthi attacks on commercial
vessels, and reaffirmed the US position in support of Israel’s right to
self-defense against Houthi missile and drone attacks. She also condemned the
continuing detention by the Houthis of UN and NGO workers and called for their
immediate, unconditional release. “The United States remains committed to
depriving the Houthis of resources that sustain their terrorist actions,” she
said, stressing that any assistance provided to the Houthis constituted a
violation of US law as a result of the group’s designation by Washington as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization.
In addition, Shea called for the termination of the UN Mission to Support the
Hudaydah Agreement, which she described as outdated and ineffective. Established
following the 2018 Stockholm Agreement between the Yemeni government and the
Houthis, the role of the mission has been to monitor the ceasefire agreement in
the port city of Hodeidah (the UN uses an alternative spelling of the city’s
name), oversee the redeployment of forces, monitor ports to ensure they are used
for civilian purposes, and facilitate coordination between stakeholders in
Yemen, including UN agencies.
UN chief outlines four options for embattled Palestinian
relief agency UNRWA
Reuters/July 09, 2025
UNITED NATIONS: A review of the embattled United Nations Palestinian relief
agency UNRWA, ordered by Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, has identified four
possible ways forward for the organization that has lost US funding and been
banned by Israel.
The proposals, seen by Reuters, are: inaction that could see the potential
collapse of UNRWA; a reduction of services; the creation of an executive board
to advise UNRWA; or maintaining UNRWA’s rights-based core while transferring
services to host governments and the Palestinian Authority. While Guterres
ordered the strategic assessment of UNRWA in April as part of his wider UN
reform efforts, only the 193-member UN General Assembly can change UNRWA’s
mandate.
UNRWA was established by the General Assembly in 1949 following the war
surrounding the founding of Israel. It provides aid, health and education to
millions of Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.
“I believe it is imperative that Member States take action to protect the rights
of Palestine refugees, the mandate of UNRWA and regional peace and security,”
Guterres wrote in a letter dated on Monday and seen by Reuters submitting the
UNRWA assessment to the General Assembly. The review comes after Israel adopted
a law in October, which was enacted on January 30, that bans UNRWA’s operation
on Israeli land — including East Jerusalem, which Israel annexed in a move not
recognized internationally — and contact with Israeli authorities. UNRWA is also
dealing with a dire financial crisis, facing a $200-million deficit. The US was
UNRWA’s biggest donor, but former President Joe Biden paused funding in January
2024 after Israel accused about a dozen UNRWA staff of taking part in the deadly
October 7, 2023, attack by Palestinian militants Hamas that triggered the war in
Gaza. The funding halt was then extended by the US Congress and President Donald
Trump.
Four options
The UN has said nine UNRWA staff may have been involved in the Hamas attack and
were fired. A Hamas commander in Lebanon — killed in September by Israel — was
also found to have had an UNRWA job. The UN has vowed to investigate all
accusations and repeatedly asked Israel for evidence, which it says has not been
provided. Israel has long been critical of UNRWA, while UNRWA has said it has
been the target of a “fierce disinformation campaign” to “portray the agency as
a terrorist organization.” Guterres and the UN Security Council have described
UNRWA as the backbone of the aid response in Gaza.The first possible option
outlined by the UNRWA strategic assessment was inaction and the potential
collapse of the agency, noting that “this scenario would exacerbate humanitarian
need, heighten social unrest, and deepen regional fragility” and “represent a
significant abandonment of Palestine refugees by the international
community.”The second option was to reduce services by “aligning UNRWA’s
operations with a reduced and more predictable level of funding through service
cuts and transfer of some functions to other actors.”The third option was to
create an executive board to advise and support UNRWA’s commissioner-general,
enhance accountability and take responsibility for securing multi-year funding
and aligning UNRWA’s funding and services. The final potential option would see
UNRWA maintain its functions as custodian of Palestine refugee rights,
registration, and advocacy for refugee access to services, “while progressively
shifting service provision to host governments and the Palestinian Authority,
with strong international commitment to funding.”
Israel insists on keeping troops in Gaza. That complicates
truce talks with Hamas
AP/July 10, 2025
JERUSALEM: As Israel and Hamas move closer to a ceasefire agreement, Israel says
it wants to maintain troops in a southern corridor of the Gaza Strip — a
condition that could derail the talks. An Israeli official said an outstanding
issue in the negotiations was Israel’s desire to keep forces in the territory
during a 60-day truce, including in the east-west axis that Israel calls the
Morag corridor. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because they
weren’t authorized to talk with the media about the negotiations.
Keeping a foothold in the Morag corridor is a key element in Israel’s plan to
drive hundreds of thousands of Palestinians south toward a narrow swath of land
along the border with Egypt, into what it has termed a “humanitarian city.”
Critics fear the move is a precursor to the coerced relocation of much of Gaza’s
population of some 2 million people, and part of the Israeli government’s plans
to maintain lasting control over the territory. Hamas, which still holds dozens
of hostages and refuses calls by Israel to surrender, wants Israel to withdraw
all of its troops as part of any permanent truce. It is adamantly opposed to any
lasting Israeli presence inside Gaza.
As part of the proposed truce, Israel and Hamas would hold fire for 60 days,
during which time some hostages would be freed and more aid would enter Gaza.
Previous demands by Israel to maintain troops in a separate corridor stalled
progress on a ceasefire deal for months. The office of Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu declined to comment on how the Morag corridor was playing into
ceasefire talks. Netanyahu was in Washington this week to discuss the ceasefire
and other matters with US President Donald Trump, who has pushed both sides to
bring an end to the war in Gaza.
Israel’s desire to keep troops in Gaza was among the ceasefire sticking points
discussed Tuesday by senior officials from the US, Israel and Qatar, according
to a White House official who spoke on condition of anonymity because they were
not authorized to comment publicly. “We want to have peace. We want to get the
hostages back. And I think we’re close to doing it,” Trump said Wednesday in
response to a question about the officials’ meeting.
Hamas said in a statement late Wednesday that Israeli troop withdrawal from Gaza
was one of several remaining sticking points in the talks, without mentioning
Morag specifically.
Morag corridor is one of three that carve up Gaza
During their 21-month campaign in Gaza, Israeli forces have seized wide swaths
of land, including three east-west corridors that have carved up the Palestinian
enclave.
In April, Israel seized the Morag corridor — named after a Jewish settlement
that existed in Gaza before Israel withdrew from the territory in 2005.
The corridor, located between Gaza’s southernmost city of Rafah and its
second-largest city Khan Younis, stretches about 12 kilometers (7 miles) from
Israel to the Mediterranean coast and is about 1 kilometer (half a mile) wide.
At the time, Netanyahu said it was part of a strategy of “increasing the
pressure step by step” on Hamas. Netanyahu called Morag a “second Philadelphi,”
referring to another corridor that runs along Gaza’s border with Egypt. Israel
has repeatedly insisted it must maintain control of Philadelphi to prevent
cross-border arms smuggling. Egypt denies arms are moved through its territory.
Since the collapse of the last ceasefire in March, Israel has also reasserted
control of the Netzarim corridor, which cuts off Gaza’s northern third from the
rest of the territory and which it used to prevent Palestinians from returning
to northern Gaza before the last truce. It was not immediately clear how Israeli
troops in the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors factor into the ceasefire
negotiations.
Morag allows Israel to set its population movement plan into motion
The foothold in Morag has effectively cut the Rafah area off from the rest of
Gaza.
Rafah, once a city of tens of thousands of people, is currently all but
flattened and emptied of its population following Israeli evacuation orders.
With those conditions in place, Israel says it seeks to turn the Rafah area into
a “sterile zone” free of Hamas militants where it wants to move hundreds of
thousands of Palestinians into a “humanitarian city.”Most of Gaza’s population
has already been displaced multiple times throughout the war and squeezed into
ever smaller pieces of land. Rights groups see the planned new push to get them
to head south as forcible displacement. Israel’s idea is to use Morag as a
screening zone for Palestinians being moved south, to prevent Hamas from
infiltrating the area, according to Kobi Michael, a senior researcher at two
think tanks, the Institute for National Security Studies and Misgav. That would
allow Israeli troops to operate further north without Palestinian civilians
getting caught in the crossfire, he said.
A no-go for Hamas
Michael said the move might allow Israel to ramp up the pressure on — and
possibly defeat — Hamas in northern Gaza, where guerilla-style fighting
continues to dog Israeli troops. And that, he added, could lay the groundwork
for an end to the war, which Israel has vowed to continue until Hamas is
destroyed. But critics say the plan to move Palestinians south paves the way for
the expulsion of Palestinians from the territory and for Israel to assert
control over it, a priority for Netanyahu’s powerful far-right governing
partners. Netanyahu has said that any departures would be “voluntary.” But
Palestinians and human rights groups fear that concentrating the population in
an area hard-hit by the war with little infrastructure would create catastrophic
conditions that leave Palestinians no choice but to leave. Michael Milshtein, an
Israeli expert on Palestinian affairs and former military intelligence officer,
called the plan to move Palestinians south through the Morag corridor a “crazy
fantasy.” He said the current negotiations could crumble over the Israeli demand
because it signaled to Hamas that Israel does not intend to withdraw forces
after the ceasefire expires, something Hamas will not accept. “For Hamas, it’s a
no-go,” he said. “If those are the terms, I can’t see Hamas agreeing.”
US sanctions UN rights expert for Palestinian territories
Francesca Albanese
AFP/July 09, 2025
WASHINGTON: US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Wednesday announced Washington
was sanctioning the United Nations special expert on the Palestinian
territories, following her criticism of Washington policy on Gaza.
“Today I am imposing sanctions on UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur
Francesca Albanese for her illegitimate and shameful efforts to prompt
(International Criminal Court) action against US and Israeli officials,
companies, and executives,” Rubio said on social media.
In a subsequent statement, he slammed the UN expert’s strident criticism of the
United States and said she recommended to the ICC that arrest warrants be issued
targeting Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Rubio also attacked her
for “biased and malicious activities,” and accused her of having “spewed
unabashed antisemitism (and) support for terrorism.”He said she escalated her
contempt for the United States by writing “threatening letters” to several US
companies, making what Rubio called unfounded accusations and recommending the
ICC pursue prosecutions of the companies and their executives. “We will not
tolerate these campaigns of political and economic warfare, which threaten our
national interests and sovereignty,” Rubio said. Albanese has leveled broadsides
against the policies of US President Donald Trump, particularly the plan he
announced in early February to take over the Gaza Strip and resettle its
residents elsewhere.That proposal, short on details, faced a resounding
rejection from Palestinians, Middle East leaders and the United Nations.
Albanese dismissed the Trump proposal as “utter nonsense” and an “international
crime” that will sow panic around the world.
“It’s unlawful, immoral and... completely irresponsible because it will make the
regional crisis even worse,” she said on February 5 during a visit to
Copenhagen.
Jordan resumes aid convoys to Palestinians in Gaza as
conditions deteriorate
Arab News/July 09, 2025
LONDON: Jordan on Wednesday resumed the dispatch of relief convoys to the
besieged and war-torn Gaza Strip after months of an Israeli blockade that
hindered humanitarian aid from reaching the Palestinian coastal enclave. The
Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization sent 40 trucks loaded with basic food
supplies into Gaza as part of Amman’s humanitarian efforts to support
Palestinians. The initiative was in collaboration with the World Food Programme
and the Jordanian armed forces. The aid and food will be distributed in northern
Gaza to ensure it reaches the most affected families and supports Palestinians
as humanitarian and living conditions continue to deteriorate due to Israeli
attacks since late 2023. Hussein Shibli, the secretary-general of JHCO, said the
resumption of convoys highlights Jordan’s commitment under King Abdullah II to
support Palestinians. Jordan collaborated with the WFP to deliver a mobile
bakery that supplied thousands of loaves of bread daily to residents in northern
Gaza. Shibli said that cooperation with the WFP included projects for
distributing meals and clean water, because infrastructure was severely damaged
during Israeli bombings. Jordan was among the first countries to conduct airlift
missions in the early days of the war, delivering relief to Gaza. More than
56,000 Palestinians have reportedly been killed in Israeli strikes on Gaza,
which have been described as genocide by human rights groups and several heads
of state.
40 Palestinians killed in Gaza as Netanyahu and Trump meet
over a ceasefire
AP/July 09, 2025
DEIR AL-BALAH: At least 40 Palestinians were killed in Israeli airstrikes in the
Gaza Strip, hospital officials said Wednesday, as international mediators raced
to complete a ceasefire deal. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had a
second meeting in two days with US President Donald Trump at the White House on
Tuesday evening. Trump has been pushing for a ceasefire that might lead to an
end to the 21-month war in Gaza. Israel and Hamas are considering a new
US-backed ceasefire proposal that would pause the war, free Israeli hostages and
send much-needed aid into Gaza. Nasser Hospital in the southern city of Khan
Younis said the dead included included 17 women and 10 children. It said one
strike killed 10 people from the same family, including three children. The
Israeli military did not comment on specific strikes, but said it had struck
more than 100 targets across Gaza over the past day, including militants,
booby-trapped structures, weapons storage facilities, missile launchers and
tunnels. Israel accuses Hamas of hiding weapons and fighters among civilians.
Struggle to secure food and water
Many Palestinians are watching the ceasefire negotiations with trepidation,
desperate for an end to the war. In the sprawling coastal Muwasi area, where
many live in ad-hoc tents after being displaced from their homes, Abeer Al-Najjar
said she had struggled during the constant bombardments to secure sufficient
food and water for her family. “I pray to God that there would be a pause, and
not just a pause where they would lie to us with a month or two, then start
doing what they’re doing to us again. We want a full ceasefire.”
Her husband, Ali Al-Najjar, said life has been especially tough in the summer,
with no access to drinking water in a crowded tent in the Middle Eastern heat.
“We hope this would be the end of our suffering and we can rebuild our country
again,” he said, before running through a crowd with two buckets to fill them
from a water truck. People chased the vehicle as it drove away to another
location.Amani Abu-Omar said the water truck comes every four days, not enough
for her dehydrated children. She complained of skin rashes in the summer heat.
She said she was desperate for a ceasefire but fears she would be let down
again. “We had expected ceasefires on many occasions, but it was for nothing,”
she said. The war started after Hamas attacked Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, killing
around 1,200 people and taking 251 hostage. Most of the hostages have been
released in earlier ceasefires. Israel’s offensive in Gaza has killed more than
57,000 Palestinians, more than half of them women and children, according to
Gaza’s Health Ministry.The UN and other international organizations see its
figures as the most reliable statistics on war casualties.
Netanyahu and Trump meet again
Netanyahu told reporters in the Capitol on Tuesday that he and Trump see “eye to
eye” on the need to destroy Hamas. He added that the cooperation and
coordination between Israel and the US is currently the best it has ever been
during Israel’s 77-year-history.
Later this week, Trump’s Mideast envoy, Steve Witkoff, is expected to head to
the Qatari capital of Doha to continue indirect negotiations with Hamas on the
ceasefire proposal. Witkoff said late Tuesday that three key areas of
disagreement had been resolved, but that one key issue still remained. He did
not elaborate.After the second meeting, Netanyahu said he and Trump also
discussed the “great victory” over Iran from Israeli and American strikes during
the 12-day war that ended two weeks ago. “Opportunities have been opened here
for expanding the circle of peace, for expanding the Abraham Accords,” said
Netanyahu, referring to normalization agreements between Israel and multiple
Arab nations that were brokered by Trump in his first term. Washington has been
pushing for normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Palestinian Authority welcomes French president’s affirmation of recognizing
statehood during UK parliament speech
Arab News/July 09, 2025
LONDON: The Palestinian Authority welcomed on Wednesday the statements made by
French President Emmanuel Macron during his state visit to the UK, in which he
affirmed Paris’ position to recognize a Palestinian state as a way to ensure
stability in the Middle East. The Palestinian Authority’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Expatriates said that Macron is leading French efforts to revive the
peace process with the Israeli government and contribute to implementing the
two-state solution. During his speech at the UK parliament on Tuesday, Macron
said, “With Gaza in ruin and the West Bank being attacked on a daily basis, the
perspective of a Palestinian state has never been put at risk as it is. “And
this is why this solution of the two states and the recognition of the State of
Palestine is … the only way to build peace and stability for all in the whole
region,” Macron said. Organizers of a planned international conference sponsored
by Saudi Arabia and France in mid-June had to postpone the event due to the
Iranian-Israeli conflict that erupted. Several Labour lawmakers from the UK’s
ruling party have called on Kier Starmer’s government to recognize a Palestinian
state and to join France in this effort.Macron also called for an immediate
ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, where Israel has been launching military campaigns
since late 2023 following Hamas’ cross-border raids on Israeli towns. The
Palestinian Authority urged European countries that have yet to recognize
Palestine to support and follow France’s position, according to Wafa news
agency.
UN mission in Libya urges immediate de-escalation in
Tripoli
Reuters/July 10, 2025
TRIPOLI: The UN Mission in Libya urged on Wednesday all Libyan parties to avoid
actions or political rhetoric that could trigger escalation or renewed clashes
in Tripoli, following reports of continued military buildup in and around the
city. Libyan Prime Minister Abdulhamid Al-Dbeibah ordered in May the dismantling
of what he called irregular armed groups, which was followed by Tripoli’s
fiercest clashes in years between two armed groups that killed at least eight
civilians.“The Mission continues its efforts to help de-escalate the situation
and calls on all parties to engage in good faith toward this end ... Forces
recently deployed in Tripoli must withdraw without delay,” the UN Mission said
on social media.A Tripoli-based Government of National Unity under Al-Dbeibah
was installed through a UN-backed process in 2021 but the Benghazi-based House
of Representatives no longer recognizes its legitimacy. Libya has had little
stability since a 2011 NATO-backed uprising ousted longtime autocrat Muammar
Qaddafi. The country split in 2014 between rival eastern and western factions,
though an outbreak of major warfare paused with a truce in 2020. While eastern
Libya has been dominated for a decade by commander Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan
National Army, control in Tripoli and western Libya has been splintered among
numerous armed factions.
Jailed Kurdish militant leader urges PKK fighters to disarm
Arab News/July 09, 2025
ANKARA, Turkiye: The jailed leader of a Kurdish militant group renewed Wednesday
a call for his fighters to lay down their arms, days before a symbolic
disarmament ceremony is expected to take place as a first concrete step in a
peace process with the Turkish state.
In a seven-minute video message broadcast on media close to the militants,
Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, declared
that the peace initiative had reached a stage that required practical steps.
“It should be considered natural for you to publicly ensure the disarmament of
the relevant groups in a way that addresses the expectations of the (Turkish
parliament) and its commission, dispels public doubts, and fulfills our
commitments,” Ocalan said. “I believe in the power of politics and social peace,
not weapons. And I call on you to put this principle into practice.”In his video
message — his first public appearance since being seen during his trial more
than two decades ago — Ocalan, 76, also expressed his support for the
establishment of a parliamentary committee to help oversee the peace initiative.
The PKK leader, who has been imprisoned on an island near Istanbul since 1999,
first urged the PKK in February to convene a congress and formally dissolve
itself. Responding to his call, the PKK announced in May that it would disband
and renounce armed conflict, ending four decades of hostilities.
Ocalan’s call to end the fighting marked a pivotal step toward ending the
decades-long conflict that has claimed tens of thousands of lives since the
1980s.
His message broadcast on Wednesday appeared to be aimed at convincing fighters
who may still be hesitant about abandoning armed struggle. He delivered his
message flanked by fellow inmates.In a speech to lawmakers from his ruling
party, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said he expected imminent progress
in the peace initiative, adding that once firmly established, the effort would
benefit not only Turkiye but the broader region. Erdogan also expressed hope
that the process would advance without attempts to sabotage it. “Once the wall
of terror is torn town, God willing, everything will change. More pain and tears
will be prevented,” Erdogan said. “The winners of this (process) will be the
whole of Turkiye — Turks, Kurds and Arabs. Then it will be our entire region.”
“We hope that this auspicious process will conclude successfully as soon as
possible, without any road accidents, and without it being sabotaged by dark and
corrupt circles,” he said.
In a first step toward the PKK’s disarmament process, a group of its fighters is
expected later this week to lay down their arms in a symbolic ceremony to be
held in Sulaymaniyah, in northern Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdish region. Aysegul
Dogan, the spokeswoman for Turkiye’s pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy
Party said the symbolic laying down of arms would take place on Friday. “We
consider this to be a historic moment and a historic development,” she said,
adding that representatives from the party would travel to Sulaymaniyah to
witness the event. Zagros Hiwar, a PKK spokesman, said that a group of 20 to 30
fighters would descend from the mountains and destroy their weapons in front of
civil society organizations and invited observers.The PKK has long maintained
bases in the mountains of northern Iraq. Turkish forces have launched offensives
and airstrikes against the PKK in Iraq and have set up bases in the area. The
Iraqi government in Baghdad announced last year an official ban on the
separatist group, which has long been prohibited in Turkiye.
On Tuesday, Turkiye’s intelligence chief, Ibrahim Kalin, traveled to Baghdad to
discuss the peace process and other security issues with Iraqi Prime Minister
Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani and other officials, the state-run Anadolu Agency
reported.
Armenia, Azerbaijan to meet for peace talks in UAE Thursday
AFP/July 09, 2025
BAKU: The leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan will meet on Thursday in the United
Arab Emirates for peace talks, two days after the US expressed hope for a swift
deal. Baku and Yerevan fought two wars over the disputed Karabakh region, which
Azerbaijan recaptured from Armenian forces in a lightning offensive in 2023,
prompting the exodus of more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians. The arch foes agreed
on the text of a comprehensive peace deal in March, but Baku has since outlined
a host of demands — including amendments to Armenia’s constitution to drop its
territorial claims for the Karabakh — before signing the document. On Wednesday,
the Armenian government said Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev will meet the following day in the UAE capital, Abu
Dhabi, “within the framework of the peace process between Armenia and
Azerbaijan.”The Azerbaijani presidency issued an identical statement. The
announcement came a day after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed hope
for a swift peace deal between the Caucasus neighbors.
Aliyev and Pashinyan last met on the sidelines of the European Political
Community summit in Albania in May.
A church bombing
leads Syria's Christians to consider leaving as foreign fighters remain
OMAR SANADIKI and BASSEM MROUE/Associated
Press/July 09/2025
FILE - A statue of the Virgin Mary stands on the top of a cliff with a view of
the houses of Maaloula, a village where Aramaic is still spoken, located some 60
km northern Damascus, Syria, Dec. 25, 2024. (AP Photo/Leo Correa,
File)ASSOCIATED PRESS
DAMASCUS, Syria (AP) — The day after last month's deadly suicide attack on a
church outside Syria's capital, hundreds of Christians marched in Damascus
chanting against foreign fighters and calling for them to leave the country.
The June 22 attack on the Mar Elias church, killing at least 25 people and
wounding dozens, was the latest alarm for religious minorities who say they have
suffered one blow after another since President Bashar Assad was removed from
power in December.
Muslim militant groups led by the Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which is headed
by Syria’s interim president Ahmad al-Sharaa, now control much of the country.
While the new government has condemned attacks on minorities, many accuse it of
looking the other way or being unable to control the armed groups it is trying
to absorb.
Among the groups are thousands of foreign fighters, who often hold a more
extreme Islamic ideology than many of their Syrian counterparts. In a highly
unusual move, al-Sharaa early on promoted a half-dozen foreign fighters to ranks
as high as brigadier general. How Syria's new leaders address the treatment of
minorities, and the presence of foreign fighters, is being closely watched by
the United States and others moving to lift long-standing sanctions on the
country.
Fears of a mass Christian exodus
Syria's top Greek Orthodox religious authority has called the church bombing the
worst crime against Christians in Damascus since 1860, when thousands were
massacred within days by Muslim attackers. Two weeks after the church attack, it
is not clear who was behind it. The government blamed the extremist Islamic
State group, which did not claim responsibility as it usually does. A
little-known group called Saraya Ansar al-Sunna said a member carried out the
attack, but the government called the group merely a cover for IS.
Al-Sharaa vowed that those behind the bombing will be brought to justice and
called for national unity against “injustice and crime.”But many Christians in
Syria were angered by what they saw as an inadequate government response,
especially as officials did not describe the dead as “martyrs,” apparently
depriving them of the honorific reference because they were not Muslims. The
attack has raised fears of a mass exodus of Christians similar to what happened
in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the rise of sectarian
violence.“I love Syria and would love to stay here, but let's hope that they
don’t force us to leave,” said Kameel Sabbagh, who stayed in Syria throughout
the conflict that began in 2011 when Assad cracked down on anti-government
protests and morphed into a civil war. The years of chaos included the rise of
IS in Syria, whose sleeper cells still carry out deadly attacks. Hundreds of
thousands of Christians did leave during the civil war during multiple attacks
on Christians by mostly Muslim militants, including the kidnapping of nuns and
priests and destruction of churches. Some priests estimate a third of Christians
left. “We are a main component in this country and we are staying,” Greek
Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch John X Yazigi said during the funeral for the
church bombing victims, in an apparent reference to concerns that Christians
will be forced to leave.
Islamization of Syria
Christians made up about 10% of Syria’s prewar population of 23 million,
enjoying freedom of worship under the Assad government and some high government
posts.
Initially, many Christians were willing to give the new authorities a chance.
In a nationwide survey conducted in May by local research group Etana, 85% of
Sunnis said they felt safe under the current authorities, compared with 21% of
Alawites and 18% of Druze. Militant groups have been blamed for revenge killings
against members of Assad’s Alawite sect in March and clashes with Druze fighters
weeks later.
Christians fell in the middle in the survey, with 45%.
But now, “the size of fear has increased among Christians,” said politician
Ayman Abdel Nour, who recently met with religious leaders. He said they told him
that many Christians might decide that leaving the country is the only solution.
The attack came as Christians noticed growing signs of Islamization. In some
Christian neighborhoods, Muslim missionaries have marched through the streets
with loudspeakers calling on people to convert to Islam. Last month, Syrian
authorities said women should wear the all-encompassing burkini for swimming
except in upscale resorts. Bearded gunmen beat up men and women partying at
nightclubs in Damascus. Today, Social Affairs Minister Hind Kabawat is the only
Christian, and only woman, out of 23 cabinet ministers.
One Christian who spoke on condition of anonymity out of security concerns said
he had applied to immigrate to Canada or Australia.
Many foreign fighters could stay
The Interior Ministry has said the church attacker was not Syrian and had been
living in al-Hol camp in the northeast, where thousands of family members of IS
fighters have been held since the extremists' defeat in 2019. The U.S.-backed
Syrian Democratic Forces that control the camp, however, said their
investigation showed that the attacker did not come from al-Hol. Days later,
dozens of Syrian Christians marched near the attack site chanting “Syria is
free, terrorists out.”During the civil war, tens of thousands of Sunni Muslim
fighters from more than 80 countries came to take part in battles against Assad,
who was backed by regional Shiite power Iran, Tehran's proxies and Russia. They
played an instrumental role in ending 54 years of Assad family rule, seeing
their fight as a holy war. Days after Assad's fall, al-Sharaa thanked six
foreign fighters by promoting them to the ranks of colonel and brigadier
general, including ones from Egypt and Jordan as well as the Albanian Abdul
Samrez Jashari, designated as a terrorist by the U.S. in 2016 for his
affiliation with al-Qaida's branch in Syria.
Among the groups enjoying wide influence in post-Assad Syria are the Turkistan
Islamic Party in Syria, who are mostly Chinese Muslims; Junud al-Sham, mostly
ethnic Chechen gunmen; and Ajnad al-Qawqaz, mostly Muslim fighters from the
former Soviet Union.
Al-Sharaa has said many foreign fighters are now married to Syrian women and
could end up getting citizenship, and has given no indication whether any of the
fighters will be asked to leave the country.
*Recon Geopolitics, a Beirut-based research center, warned last month in a study
on foreign fighters in Syria that the situation could get worse, with founder
Firas al-Shoufi saying “time is not on Syria’s side."
The Latest English LCCC analysis & editorials from miscellaneous
sources
on July 09-10/2025
Iran: Will the West Finish the Job?
Amin Sharifi/Gatestone
Institute/July 09/2025
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/21731/iran-finish-the-job
Iran's suspension of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
is not a turning point. It is business as usual. Tehran's decades-long strategy
-- deny, delay, deceive -- continues, and the West still refuses to call it for
what it is: a slow-motion march toward nuclear capability.... It has never
stopped.
The problem is not that Iran has "suspended cooperation." The problem is that
the West keeps treating each step as if it is a fresh crisis that can still be
reversed with enough diplomacy.
Iran will not stop, and diplomacy has an extremely low probability of working
for a serious, long-term solution. Forty-six years of sanctions, deterrence, and
inspections have all failed. Regime change appears the only realistic solution.
It is what many Iranians still risk their lives demanding, what most of Iran's
neighbors would welcome, and what the broader international community would
ultimately benefit from.
Iran's suspension of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
is not a turning point. It is business as usual. Tehran's decades-long strategy
-- deny, delay, deceive -- continues, and the West still refuses to call it for
what it is: a slow-motion march toward nuclear capability.
Iran's suspension of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
is not a turning point. It is business as usual. Tehran's decades-long strategy
-- deny, delay, deceive -- continues, and the West still refuses to call it for
what it is: a slow-motion march toward nuclear capability. Some commentators are
now warning that Iran has suspended cooperation and may finally pursue the bomb,
as if that is not already taking place. Iran has been pursuing nuclear weapons
for decades. It has never stopped.
Iran started and developed its nuclear program in secrecy, lying to the world
for years. It has repeatedly breached agreements and violated international
limits whenever it saw an opportunity. It built secret facilities at Natanz and
Fordow, buried centrifuges deep underground, and enriched uranium to higher
levels while misleading international inspectors. Even when inspectors were
allowed in, Iran's disclosures were at best partial, its cooperation selective.
Every so-called "deal" was a "pause" button, never a stop.
Iran has blocked inspections, cut off surveillance, or expelled international
monitors on numerous occasions. It works. Iran's strategy is not just deception,
it is an escalation calibrated to force concessions, followed by brief
de-escalations to defuse international pressure for a while. Western diplomats,
desperate to avoid escalation, invariably rush to the table -- and Iran buys
more time.
Some argue that diplomacy is still the best way forward. However, decades of
talks have only delivered temporary pauses while Iran has advanced step by step.
Sanctions have been imposed, lifted, reimposed, and bypassed. Airstrikes have
damaged facilities, but apparently have not permanently destroyed them or the
stockpiles that Iran may have already dispersed across multiple secret
locations. Deterrence has so far failed to stop Iran's continued progress.
The IAEA considers anything enriched above 20% as weapons-usable. In 2023, the
IAEA reported uranium particles enriched to 83.7%, close to weapons-grade of
90%. By early 2025, Iran had a stockpile of approximately 408 kilograms of
uranium enriched to 60 percent, enough for nine nuclear bombs. It makes sense
that a regime pursuing a nuclear program for years would have moved its
stockpile to multiple locations before the strikes, to make it difficult to
track.
By suspending cooperation with IAEA, Iran evidently wants to exploit the
situation and frame this suspension as a direct response to what it portrays as
"Western provocation." Tehran, it appears, wants the general audience in the
West to believe that this step is reactive, not calculated, as if Iran had been
happily cooperating until the West supposedly pushed it too far. Iran's nuclear
program, however, did not start under pressure. It started in secret.
What Iran wants is clear: the bomb. Its leaders have implied as much (such as
here and here.) Whether through negotiations or defiance, the path leads to the
same destination. Iran's ambition is embedded in the regime's doctrine,
exporting the revolution, as attributed to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini:1
"We shall export our revolution to the whole world. Until the cry, 'there is no
god but God' resounds over the whole world, there will be struggle."
He evidently means the destruction of the entire, in his view corrupt, infidel
Western civilization, including the Great Satan, the United States of America.
The Little Satan, Israel, it seems, is in the way. Israel has so far contained
Iran's ambitions by absorbing the direct costs of this confrontation, including
repeated proxy wars, missile attacks, and the constant threat of annihilation.
The problem is not that Iran has "suspended cooperation." The problem is that
the West keeps treating each step as if it is a fresh crisis that can still be
reversed with enough diplomacy. Meanwhile, Iran continues to advance, using
talks as shields to buy time at each step.
Anyone with basic pattern recognition would agree: Iran will not stop, and
diplomacy has an extremely low probability of working for a serious, long-term
solution. Forty-six years of sanctions, deterrence, and inspections have all
failed. Regime change appears the only realistic solution. It is what many
Iranians still risk their lives demanding, what most of Iran's neighbors would
welcome, and what the broader international community would ultimately benefit
from. Iran's suspension of cooperation today is simply the next step in a long,
familiar design. The only question is whether the West finally unites to end
this grotesque cycle before Iran rebuilds, recovers, and resumes its march
toward its bomb.
Amin Sharifi is an expert in international relations and the Middle East. He is
presently based in Sweden.
1 Robin Wright's In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade, which discusses the
export of the revolution and attributes similar statements to Khomeini, and the
U.S. Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism reports from the 1980s
and 1990s, which often paraphrase or directly quote Khomeini's statements about
exporting the revolution.
© 2025 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No
part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied
or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.
An Opportunity Not to Be Missed:
Agenda for the Trump-Netanyahu Meeting
Dana Stroul, Robert Satloff/The
Washington Institute/July 09/2025
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/opportunity-not-be-missed-agenda-trump-netanyahu-meeting
The two leaders should focus on articulating a vision for a diplomatic agreement
with Iran, sketching a common roadmap on Gaza, setting the stage for further
Arab-Israeli normalization, and updating the parameters of bilateral strategic
cooperation for a new regional reality.
On July 7, President Trump hosts Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu for
their third Oval Office meeting in the past six months. Following U.S. and
Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities and the subsequent ceasefire, the
visit is a crucial opportunity for the two leaders to set the table and
transition from military action to political outcomes, capitalizing on Iran’s
unprecedented weakness to advance U.S. interests.
On the Agenda
Unfinished business with Tehran is the meeting’s most pressing bullet item. The
ceasefire that President Trump imposed on Iran and Israel is vulnerable to
cheating. There is no clarity on the definition of violations or the means and
methods of enforcement; more important, the ceasefire offered no durable
solution to the problems still posed by Iran’s badly damaged nuclear program,
its renewed incentive to seek a nuclear weapons capability, and its decision to
suspend cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The
president has been ambivalent on the need to follow up military action with
diplomatic engagement in order to confirm that Iran will not try to reconstitute
its “obliterated” nuclear facilities. He has also sent confusing signals that
U.S. “maximum pressure” will not apply to Iran’s oil exports.
In Jerusalem, Defense Minister Israel Katz has described a policy that amounts
to “aggressive containment” of Iran, suggesting that Israel might prefer to
apply the same playbook it has used during the ceasefire with Hezbollah—namely,
responding with military force whenever it identifies a suspect site or
suspicious activity. Without agreed “rules of the road,” however, this approach
could clash with President Trump’s focus on de-escalation.
The major military achievements against Iran’s terrorist proxy network, missile
program, and nuclear facilities will help the two leaders address the second
item on their agenda: the festering Gaza conflict. Without progress on that
issue, it will be impossible to advance Israel’s integration across the region,
especially normalization with Saudi Arabia.
So far, President Trump has not publicly pressured Netanyahu to wind down
operations in Gaza or otherwise change course there. In fact, he has provided
enormous political and practical support since the start of his second term—he
refused to criticize Israel’s decision to suspend food and medical assistance
for months; he provided $30 million to fund the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation as
an alternative vehicle for aid delivery; and he accelerated military sales and
deliveries. He has also eschewed pressuring Israel on policies in the West Bank
that could push normalization beyond reach, such as public threats to annex
parts of the territory.
The U.S.-Israel relationship itself will be another key agenda item. Trump’s
decision to join Israel’s campaign and bomb Iranian nuclear sites—which Israel
much preferred to whatever plans it had for addressing the regime’s most
hardened targets—represented a historic turning point in a relationship that has
been undergoing rapid change since Israel was absorbed into U.S. Central
Command’s area of responsibility in 2021, and especially since the Hamas attack
of October 7, 2023. The past two years have seen a dramatic shift in Israel’s
longstanding security doctrine. Previously, Jerusalem accepted U.S. support but
also insisted on the principle of “defending itself by itself.” In the new
strategic reality, however, Israel relied on a U.S.-led coalition to counter
Iran’s missile and drone attacks in April 2024, then worked directly with the
United States in an offensive military coalition to achieve their shared goal of
massively damaging Iran’s nuclear program. With change happening so quickly—in
the bilateral relationship, in the capabilities of regional partners, and in the
decimation of their shared adversary Iran—the two leaders will need to start
talking about how U.S. support should evolve to reflect this emerging reality,
including high-priority discussions on how to replenish Israel’s stockpile of
antimissile interceptors.
Recommendations for the U.S. Approach
Given that Iran and its regional proxy network have reached a moment of peak
vulnerability, now is the time for the United States to press its advantage and
lock in diplomatic achievements that reflect this power imbalance. President
Trump can kickstart this process by gaining Netanyahu’s agreement on a common
path forward regarding top regional priorities. These include:
Articulating the U.S. vision for a diplomatic agreement with Iran. Under such an
agreement, Tehran should be required to confirm that any residual nuclear
program is solely for peaceful purposes by forswearing enrichment, sending any
remaining enriched uranium out of the country, and agreeing to intrusive
international inspections. The United States should also press for limits on
Iran’s production and export of ballistic missiles, drones, and related
components, among other restrictions.
To facilitate these goals, the president can point to his broad sanctions relief
in Syria as a demonstration of his readiness to relieve Iran’s economic pressure
once the regime does what is necessary to dispel concerns about its intentions
and capabilities. In the meantime, he should affirm that any Iranian effort to
reconstitute the nuclear program could trigger additional U.S. military strikes;
indeed, a second round of strikes would be an even more instructive lesson about
U.S. determination than the first round.
Sketching a common roadmap to deliver long-term security for Israel. Trump and
Netanyahu should discuss a series of diplomatic arrangements that build on
Israel’s impressive post-October 7 military achievements against Hamas,
Hezbollah, Iran, and other adversaries. Saudi normalization, an expanded
disengagement/non-belligerence accord with Syria, and even a framework for peace
with Lebanon are all possible, but they will remain elusive until the Gaza
conflict is resolved and Israel allays fears about potential unilateral
annexations in the West Bank.
The first step should be a U.S. push to end the Gaza war, with a focus on
releasing all Israeli hostages, exiling key Hamas leaders, and implementing a
phased Israeli military withdrawal to Gaza’s periphery. These steps would open
the door to deploying a joint Palestinian and Arab security presence that has
the formal blessing of the Palestinian Authority and is tasked with collecting
Hamas weapons, securing and delivering humanitarian aid, and setting the
framework for a post-Hamas future. Trump also should make a clear statement
about his expectations for the way ahead in the West Bank, noting U.S.
opposition to any Israeli annexation of West Bank territory outside of
agreements with the Palestinians.
In addition to demanding Israeli action, the president should make substantial
“asks” of Arab leaders. For example, Egypt and Qatar need to exert pressure on
Hamas’s external leadership to accept these terms, while Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, and other states should use their influence to prepare for
a new Arab role on Gaza and proactively engage the PA on serious reforms.
Dispatching Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff to
the region immediately following the Trump-Netanyahu meeting would send a
message that the United States is counting on Arab leaders to do their part.
Launching the serious work needed to define the parameters of U.S.-Israel
strategic cooperation in the post-Iran strike era and, separately, the future of
U.S. assistance. Talks should start soon on a new memorandum of understanding
regarding the future of U.S. military assistance. Toward that end, the president
should direct the Pentagon to assess Israel’s current missile defense needs, and
engage Congress on the urgency of rapidly replenishing the interceptors that
defended Israeli territory and citizens from Iranian and proxy attacks. Apart
from the MOU, situations in which U.S. forces essentially complete Israeli
operations should be a rare occurrence—the partnership’s new parameters need to
reflect the understanding that Israel will take the lead on its own operations,
while closely consulting with Washington in all such scenarios given the risk to
U.S. forces and assets in the region.
*Dana Stroul is the Kassen Senior Fellow and director of research at The
Washington Institute and former deputy assistant secretary for the Middle East
at the Pentagon. *Robert Satloff is the Institute’s Segal Executive Director and
Howard P. Berkowitz Chair in U.S. Middle East Policy.
How Turkey Views the Iran-Israel Confrontation
Soner Cagaptay/The Washington Institute/July 09/2025
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-turkey-views-iran-israel-confrontation
Despite long opposing Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, Ankara has a strong national
security interest in avoiding moves that result in either direct Turkish
hostilities with Iran or the collapse of the Islamic Republic.
On June 22, Turkey’s Foreign Ministry issued a rather muted response to the U.S.
bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities. In contrast to its often-harsh statements
condemning U.S. policy in the Middle East over the past decade, Ankara simply
expressed “deep concern” over the strikes while constructively noting that it
“stands ready to fulfill its responsibilities and contribute positively.”
This shift in tone is at least partly attributable to the strong chemistry
between President Trump and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. But how much does it
reflect Ankara’s real views—not just of the twelve-day war between Iran and
Israel, but also of Turkey’s long-term interests regarding both countries? And
how should Washington manage differences between U.S. and Turkish policy on
these matters?
How Turkey Views Iran and Israel
The key to assessing Ankara’s approach here is to remember that it is nonbinary—although
Turkey has undergone periods of open hostility or rivalry with Iran over the
centuries, it has also experienced deep tensions with Israel for more than a
decade now. As such, it does not currently favor either country. In the context
of the latest war, this means that Ankara is fine with Iran’s nuclear wings
being clipped but simultaneously alarmed to witness Israel’s overwhelming
military superiority—and worried about the potential consequences if the Islamic
Republic begins to collapse under the pressure.
Turkey vs. Iran. When the Ottoman and Persian Empires became neighbors in the
fifteenth century, they soon began pushing against each other for control of
what is now eastern Turkey and western Iran. After a series of long,
inconclusive wars eventually bankrupted their treasuries—the pre-modern version
of mutually assured destruction—they settled on power parity in the
mid-seventeenth century and agreed to avoid future wars at any cost. Indeed,
they have eschewed major conflict for three centuries now. With the exception of
smaller wars across Ottoman-controlled Iraq in the nineteenth century and minor
land swaps, the Iran-Turkey border has been among the most stable in the Middle
East, hewing quite close to its original 1639 contours.
In the Erdogan era, Iran and Turkey fought a long proxy conflict in Syria, with
Tehran supporting the Assad regime and Ankara backing the rebels. Yet this did
not change their broader strategic thinking—they still viewed each other as
equally powerful and, hence, avoided direct hostilities.
Considering this historic balance, the idea of Iran becoming a nuclear power is
anathema to Turkey. If Tehran gained that edge, it would effectively end the
three-century power parity with its nonnuclear rival. Ankara has therefore
generally supported measures aiming to prevent this outcome, despite taking
opportunistic, counterproductive steps at times (e.g., allowing its banks to
violate nuclear sanctions against Iran in order to raise cash). Yet recent
trends in Israeli-Turkish relations (see below) also make Ankara almost certain
to oppose one of the strongest preventive measures—massive Israeli military
intervention against Iran’s nuclear program.
Turkey vs. Israel. Turkey was the first—and for decades only—Muslim-majority
state to recognize Israel, granting it diplomatic recognition in 1949. Turkey’s
Kemalist-era secularism and Israel’s policy of cultivating regional partners
beyond its immediate circle of neighbors both played a role in this dynamic,
producing deep security, intelligence, military, and economic ties by the end of
the twentieth century.
Yet their relations have taken a nosedive in the Erdogan era of
non-Western-centric Turkish foreign policy. In 2006, Erdogan stoked tensions by
hosting a delegation from the terrorist group Hamas. Ties collapsed completely
during the 2010 flotilla incident, when Israeli forces boarded a Turkish ship
attempting to bypass their blockade of the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, killing
eight Turkish citizens and one U.S.-Turkish dual national. The long tenure of
Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu only accelerated this freefall—the
strong, mutual dislike between him and Erdogan made it all but impossible for
the two countries to reset their ties in any lasting fashion. Meanwhile, Israel
established contacts with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a group led by an
offshoot of Turkey’s domestic nemesis, the terrorist-designated Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK)—a move intended in part as a response to Ankara’s ties with
Hamas.
The events of the past two years have further muddied the bilateral picture.
Last December, Turkey abetted the fall of Damascus to rebel groups led by Hayat
Tahrir al-Sham, another designated terrorist group. This power move irked
Israeli policymakers, with some concluding that a rising Turkey had become their
new regional competitor. Yet policymakers in Ankara increasingly feel the same
about the military might that Israel has flexed since October 2023, from
destroying Hamas and Hezbollah’s leadership and infrastructure to decapitating
Iran’s senior military ranks and completely dominating the country’s airspace.
Assuaging Turkey’s Real Security Concerns
Although Ankara will oppose any further Israeli military targeting of Iran for
the reasons discussed above, it is still quite likely to support U.S.
nonmilitary measures aimed at ending Tehran’s nuclear ambitions once and for
all, including further sanctions, dialogue, and economic pressure. If President
Trump sticks to the diplomatic path and presses Israel to do the same, he will
find an ally in Ankara.
But Washington should also acknowledge that there are potential limits to how
far Erdogan is willing to go even if the parties avoid further military action.
Turkey has credible security concerns about the very real prospect of the
Iranian regime teetering or collapsing under the weight of international
pressure:
Refugee flows. Turkey already hosts nearly four million refugees, mostly from
Syria and other unstable countries, so it is well aware that military escalation
with Iran could generate more refugee flows. Although most of Iran’s main
population centers are hundreds of miles from the Turkish border, many citizens
who have fled the Islamic Republic over the decades have nevertheless chosen
Turkey as their preferred haven, largely because of its close and easy
connections to eventual destinations in Europe and the United States.
Power vacuum and rump PKK. Ankara is deeply worried that anti-Turkey elements
would exploit a weakened or collapsed regime in Iran to plan cross-border
attacks on Turkey, similar to how nonstate actors like the Islamic State and PKK
exploited past power vacuums in Iraq and Syria to kill Turks. This is an
especially significant concern amid Ankara’s ongoing disarmament talks with the
PKK. The Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK)—the PKK’s Iranian Kurdish
offshoot—has not yet heeded PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s February call to
disarm. If Iran descends into instability, PJAK could emerge as the latest PKK
regional offshoot to undermine Turkish security using another state’s territory.
Making the Most of Trump and Erdogan’s Chemistry
Because Ankara generally abhors Middle East instability, it will likely support
diplomatic steps to prevent Iran from reestablishing a nuclear weapons
capability while opposing military steps that could greatly erode the state’s
authority or topple the regime entirely. In this regard, the Trump
administration can expect Turkey to implement deeper economic sanctions, commit
to avoiding questionable bank activities or other moves that enable Iranian
sanctions busting, and help with the diplomatic track once U.S.-Iran talks
resume. The sweet spot here would be the United States adding the full set of
Iranian issues to its bilateral strategic dialogue with Turkey, assuring Ankara
that the goal is not to collapse the regime but rather to pressure it into
permanently giving up its nuclear ambitions—an outcome that Turkish officials
support.
The personal chemistry between the two presidents is the game-changing factor
that could enable such a strategic alignment. Erdogan is deeply grateful to
Trump for suspending sanctions against Syria, which could help stabilize
Turkey’s long border with its southern neighbor. In addition, Trump’s policy
decisions and stated views on regime change more or less mesh with Erdogan’s red
line on avoiding Iranian state collapse. The Turkish leader is therefore likely
to align more robustly with the Trump administration’s diplomatic plans for
Iran.
Again, though, Ankara is highly unlikely to support—let alone join—further U.S.
military action against Iran. The Islamic Republic has never been weaker, and
follow-on strikes could push it to the breaking point. In that scenario, Turkey
could miss the moment to secure its interests or even fall completely out of
line with U.S. policy toward Iran. Similar risks would emerge if Israel renews
its air war. In either eventuality, Washington should rely on direct
communication between the two presidents to prevent tensions from escalating
into a full-blown bilateral crisis. The Trump administration should also
consider furthering its efforts to build Israeli-Turkish confidence more broadly
by bringing the two parties together for more talks on another recent source of
bilateral tension: their cross-border activities in southern and northern Syria,
respectively.
**Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute,
director of its Turkish Research Program, and author of its recent paper
“Building on Momentum in U.S.-Turkey Relations.”
How Iran’s Turn to Nationalism Affects U.S. Policy
Patrick Clawson/The Washington Institute/July 09/2025
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-irans-turn-nationalism-affects-us-policy
The Supreme Leader and his domestic echo chambers have shown a remarkable shift
in emphasis from religious authority to full-throated pre-revolutionary
nationalism, and Washington should adjust its messaging accordingly.
On July 5—after twenty-four days without a public appearance, including the
twelve spent at war with Israel—Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei showed up at what
Iranian outlets are misleadingly calling a public setting, namely, a religious
ceremony in a mourning hall. Had he continued to stay out of sight that day,
there would have been much comment. After all, this was Ashura, customarily
observed as the most sacred day of the Shia calendar and accompanied by huge
street parades. Ashura marks the battle in which Imam Hussein was killed by the
great power of the day, the Umayyad Caliphate, whose leader (Yazid) is depicted
as supremely evil in holiday iconography. One might have thought Khamenei would
draw parallels between that battle and today’s struggle against Israel and the
United States, but he did no such thing. In fact, he did not speak at all—in
contrast to his frequent addresses before large public audiences, attendance at
the religious ceremony was tightly controlled.
Khamenei’s low-profile outing echoed his posture during Israel’s military
campaign. Authorities offered no public word about where he was, conveniently
forgetting a 2005 speech in which the Supreme Leader mocked U.S. leaders for
“disappearing” after the September 11 attacks. “If a bitter experience happens
to Iran,” Khamenei declared at the time, “we ourselves will don battle garb and
stand ready to sacrifice.” Instead, he was nowhere to be seen, sparking rumors
that his health was failing.
He did record three speeches for broadcast during the crisis—on June 13, June
18, and June 26—but they contrasted strikingly with his prewar speeches. For one
thing, he appeared tired, dare one say feeble, during his June 26 address and
seemed to get lost at times.
More important, the content of that third speech represented a huge shift from
the past. Speaking on the first day of Muharram, a month particularly revered
among Shia, he said exactly nothing about Muharram. Yet the original Persian
version of his speech referred to “the nation” and “Iran” twenty times while
mentioning Islam only once (sort of). His sole reference to God used the word
“Parvadegar” rather than Allah, which is a very Persian way of saying “The
Almighty” and extremely unusual for a cleric. Similarly, he began with “Salam”
and “Dorud”—the first being the traditional Islamic greeting, and the second
being the pre-Islamic greeting traditionally derided by the Islamic Republic’s
core revolutionaries. He also emphasized that Iran “possesses an ancient
civilization,” declaring, “Our cultural and civilizational wealth is hundreds of
times greater than that of the U.S.” This statement was part of a lengthy
paragraph in which not one word was said about Islam. The passage was
particularly odd because Iranian clerics have long described the country’s
pre-Islamic past as a time of ignorance and ridiculed those who glorify ancient
Iran.
Another hint of Khamenei’s turn to nationalism surfaced when famed eulogist
Mahmoud Karimi performed at the Ashura ceremony and Khamenei requested he sing
“Ey Iran Iran”—a patriotic rather than religious song. The lyrics were modified
for the occasion to include some references to Islam, but the request was in
keeping with Khamenei’s unusually nationalist tone. (The song’s name is very
similar to the de facto pre-revolutionary anthem “Ey Iran,” which, after not
being heard for years, was played at large anti-Israel gatherings at Azadi
Square and in front of state media.)
Why It Matters
These nuances merit close scrutiny because Khamenei’s speeches traditionally
serve as important indicators of where the Islamic Republic is headed. In this
case, his June 26 speech signaled a turn toward nationalism, and regime outlets
swiftly and vigorously picked up the theme, toning down their references to
religion and disseminating ubiquitous images of heroes from the pre-Islamic epic
poem Shahnameh battling the enemy—in some cases using arrows shaped like
missiles.
Open imageiconIranian newspaper image showing a pre-Islamic archer firing a
missile instead of an arrow, with the hands of fellow citizens assisting him.
Iranian newspaper image showing a pre-Islamic archer firing a missile instead of
an arrow, with the hands of modern citizens helping.
This nationalist focus has come at the expense of the Islamic Republic’s
founding principle, the guardianship of the Supreme Jurist (velayat-e faqih).
Next to nothing is being said about the people’s religious obligation to follow
the Supreme Leader’s orders, raising questions about how important the post will
be going forward even if Khamenei returns to his normally vigorous demeanor. For
years now, various aspects of regime power have been shifting from the clerics
to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Khamenei’s latest rhetorical theme
embodies that trend. Further shifts could prove worrisome given that the IRGC
seem less cautious than Khamenei. Yet public statements by military officials
and other intriguing indicators suggest that some IRGC elements are more
interested in wielding national power than projecting revolutionary values.
Open imageiconIranian mural image showing a pre-Islamic warrior figure taking
part in a modern missile barrage.
Iranian mural image showing a pre-Islamic warrior taking part in a modern
missile barrage.
U.S. Policy Implications
In light of this apparent shift, the Trump administration should condition its
approach to the Islamic Republic based more on a Persian nationalist mindset
than any claimed Islamic identity. For instance, in thinking about its next
nuclear steps, Tehran will likely be less concerned about past fatwas that
supposedly prohibit the production of nuclear weapons. Instead, its decisions
will be based more on what it deems best for defending the nation—a calculus
that could lead the regime to accelerate rather than abandon the nuclear program
given the proven shortcomings of its other national defense elements.
Similarly, Washington should be more aware of how its words and actions will be
perceived through the filter of Iranian national pride and fears. In his June 26
speech, for instance, Khamenei made much about President Trump’s call for Iran
to “surrender,” claiming it proved that America’s true agenda “isn’t about
enrichment or the nuclear industry” but rather about defeating “the great
country of Iran” and “insulting” its people.
To appeal to those who love Iran but detest the Islamic Republic, the
administration should flesh out Trump’s calls to “make Iran great again” with
real, widely publicized details about how the United States would work with the
country if the two sides reach a new deal. Given Iran’s past disappointments
about what the 2015 nuclear deal would bring, U.S. officials need to be quite
specific about what they actually can do to return the country to normal trade,
finance, investment, and travel arrangements—and, crucially, what Tehran must do
to convince banks and other private entities outside U.S. government control
that Iran is no longer too risky of a jurisdiction for such engagement. The
latter effort will require Iranian officials to focus on decreasing corruption,
halting the arbitrary arrest of foreigners, and increasing transparency in
multiple sectors. More problematic but also useful would be discussions about
how regional security could lead to security for Iran—that is, if Tehran takes
real steps to reduce its threats to neighbors, this could be met by reassuring
steps from others.
*Patrick Clawson is the Morningstar Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute
and director of its Viterbi Program on Iran and U.S. Policy.
The Iran-Israel War Returns to the Shadows, for Now
Behnam Ben Taleblu and Bridget Toomey/FDD-Policy Brief/July 09/2025
The war between Iran and Israel has returned to the shadows. Iran-backed Houthi
rebels in Yemen have resumed attacks against Israeli territory and struck
commercial vessels in the Red Sea. Closer to home, U.S. officials warn of
possible Iran-backed sleeper cells and cyberattacks. The strikes are not all
carried out by one side. In Iran, a series of explosions have been reported
since a tenuous ceasefire between the Jewish State and the Islamic Republic took
effect on June 24. Iranian authorities were only able to explain away some of
them. It’s deniable gray-zone violence, but to ignore it jeopardizes the
hard-won conventional gains of Israel and America in the post-October 7 Middle
East.
Explosions Reported in Iran Post-Ceasefire
Iran International reported explosions in western Tehran on June 28. On June 29,
an explosion was reported at a refinery in Tabriz. The Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed the second explosion was due to an accident involving
a nitrogen tank; however, local authorities said unexploded Israeli ordnance
detonated during its disposal. Israel struck the Tabriz refinery earlier in the
month, but Iranian officials had denied damage to the complex. Videos showed
explosions in Shahr-e Ray, home to a key refinery and military base in
southeastern Tehran, on July 1 — a week after the ceasefire between Iran and
Israel. Israel targeted the area multiple times during the conflict.
While Israel has not claimed what appear to be attacks, given the strategic
locations of recent explosions and Israeli intelligence networks embedded in
Iran, the theory of foreign sabotage cannot be dismissed.
The Proxy War Against Israel Continues
On July 6, Iran’s proxy in Yemen, the Houthi rebels, launched a ballistic
missile toward Israel following extensive strikes days earlier by Jerusalem
against Houthi targets. The group claims approximately 75 drones and missiles
launched at Israel since the end of the ceasefire in Gaza in March 2025. This
includes at least one attack launched in coordination with Iran during the war.
Houthi leaders have framed their recent attacks as continued support for the
Palestinian cause, but in all likelihood, they are a way for Iran, whose media
outlets have been trumpeting the strikes, to land blows against Israel without
paying the price of another conventional conflict on its territory.
Iranian Threats Reach Beyond the Middle East
During Israel’s Operation Rising Lion, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Commissioner Rodney Scott warned, “the threat of sleeper cells or sympathizers
acting on their own, or at the behest of Iran has never been higher.” Over the
past decade and a half, the Islamic Republic has attempted numerous kidnappings
and killings in the United States, including a half-baked attempt on President
Donald Trump’s life. There have also been reports of Iranian activity in the
United Kingdom and Germany.
Additionally, a U.S. government factsheet cautioned, “Despite a declared
ceasefire and ongoing negotiations towards a permanent solution,
Iranian-affiliated cyber actors and hacktivist groups may still conduct
malicious cyber activity.” Malicious Iranian cyber actors have targeted
Americans and U.S. critical infrastructure for more than a decade.
The U.S. and Israel Cannot Overlook the Shadow War
While both nations operate in the shadows, Iran deserves special mention.
Tehran’s targets reach far beyond Israel. And so long as Iranian asymmetric or
covert activity is not treated as a direct attack by Iran itself, the regime is
unlikely to change course, be it by reining in its regional proxies or
terminating its transnational terrorist apparatus. For every attack launched by
elements of Iran’s Axis of Resistance or a gun for hire, the regime in Tehran
should know that it will have more to lose than to gain. As the cycle of
violence that preceded the Iran-backed October 7 terrorist attack against Israel
has shown, even low-level and deniable proxy activity can escalate into open
conflict.
**Behnam Ben Taleblu is a senior fellow and senior director of the Iran Program
at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).
**Bridget Toomey is a research analyst.
Netanyahu’s gift to Trump marks a ‘historic horizon’ for Mideast peace
Jonathan Schanzer/ New York Post/July 09/2025
https://nypost.com/2025/07/08/opinion/netanyahus-gift-marks-historic-horizon-for-mideast-peace/
When Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited President Donald Trump at
the White House Monday, he celebrated his country’s victory over the Islamic
Republic of Iran — after a brief but intense 12-day war — with an unusual gift.
“I want to present to you, Mr. President, the letter I sent to the Nobel Prize
committee,” Netanyahu told Trump, handing over a sealed envelope. “It’s the
nomination of you for the Peace Prize, which is well-deserved. And you should
get it.”
Netanyahu, his generals and his spymasters pulled off a remarkable feat when
they launched a surprise attack against the Iranian regime last month.
Israel had complete air superiority as it freely struck Iranian nuclear and
military sites.
But Israel’s war would never have ended as it did had Trump not dispatched
American B-2 bombers to drop 14 Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs on three
Iranian nuclear sites — capabilities Israel lacked. The moment Trump unleashed
them was the moment the Iranian regime capitulated. Now, Trump says, Iran’s
clerical leaders wish to discuss an end to hostilities, as the regime that
famously called for “death to America” seems to cower before America’s might. A
lot could go sideways, but a weakened regime in Iran is a potential game-changer
for the entire Middle East — and, as Netanyahu’s Nobel nomination suggests, for
the prospects of a lasting peace.
The Iranian regime has cast a dark shadow over most of the region since its
inception in 1979. It has waged war against America’s allies across the Middle
East, and its terrorist proxies have destabilized one country after another.
Now, thanks to Trump, the regime in Tehran is reeling, and the Israelis, over
the course of more than 600 days of war, have neutralized those proxies. This
leaves the region ripe for change. We’re already seeing the early signs. Peace
between Israel and Syria is now on the horizon, Trump noted Monday as he and
Netanyahu spoke to the press.
After the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in December, Syria’s new
leader, purportedly reformed jihadist Ahmad al-Sharaa, declared his intent to
normalize relations with Israel. On Tuesday, the State Department dropped its
official designation of al-Sharaa’s Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham group as a foreign
terrorist organization, a major step toward the normalization goal. Remarkably,
Trump now believes that other Middle Eastern states may soon follow Syria’s
lead. Of course, sealing a relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia would be
the president’s crowning achievement. Trump drew remarkably close to closing
that deal during his first term, but fell just short.
Now, the Saudis are drawing near to it again, with senior Riyadh officials
meeting with Trump at the White House just days ago. Hamas, the terrorist group
that once ruled the Gaza Strip, is now perhaps the greatest challenge for
Trump’s vision for a new Middle East. The Iran-backed proxy has been badly
beaten by Israel, but it still stubbornly refuses to release 50 Israeli hostages
(20 of them thought to be still living) to end the war. It remains to be seen
whether Steven Witkoff, Trump’s chief negotiator, can wear down Hamas at the
bargaining table. In the meantime, Trump appears to be making plans to find
alternative futures for the people of Gaza.
Speaking with Netanyhau Monday, Trump hinted at Arab states’ growing willingness
to provide new leadership in the Gaza Strip, even floating the possibility of
offering Gazans a choice to relocate. In Iran, in Syria, in Saudi Arabia, and
perhaps even in Gaza, the region may be on the precipice of an “historic
horizon,” in the words of US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee. While Huckabee,
the first evangelical Christian to represent America in the Holy Land, is
inspired by faith, the major players appear to be responding to hard power.
We’ll soon see how successfully Trump and Netanyahu can wield that hard power,
and leverage the victories they’ve achieved, to help forge a more prosperous and
peaceful Middle East.
**Jonathan Schanzer is executive director of the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies. Follow him on X @JSchanzer.
How Russia established deterrence
with its neighbors
Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib/Arab
News/July 09, 2025
During a recent vacation in Georgia, it was interesting to see how people
perceived the war in Ukraine. It was also interesting to see the war’s impact on
their own understanding of how their country should deal with Russia in order to
avoid suffering the same fate as Ukraine. Georgia is a small country next to a
strong neighbor and every Georgian I met told me a wise policy would be to be on
good terms with Russia and not to rely on the West.
Russia controls almost 20 percent of Georgian territory. It rules Abkhazia on
the Black Sea and South Ossetia in the north of the country. The border between
Russia and Georgia is studded with mountains. Russia wants to keep an eye on its
smaller neighbor, especially as it is a candidate country for both the EU and
NATO. Moscow wants to make sure that, behind that mountainous area, the West
will not push for a government that is antagonistic to the Kremlin.
Last month, the Georgian parliament’s speaker criticized NATO’s response to
Georgia’s membership request, which was made in 2008, saying that the country
needs more than words, it needs real protection. The impression is that the West
uses countries like Ukraine as fodder to undermine Russia, while having no real
interest in their well-being. More than three years on from Russia’s full-scale
invasion, Ukraine is destroyed. It has lost parts of its territory. It will
probably become a rump state and there is no real support for stopping Russia.
On the contrary, facing Russian determination, the US is pressuring the weaker
party, which is Ukraine, to compromise.
My tour guide told me that this goes back centuries. Whenever Georgians have had
problems with their neighbors, they have asked for help from European countries
but have never received any assistance. I am not sure if this is true or not,
but it is certainly the prevailing perception.
The lesson is very clear: it is better for the neighbors of Russia to toe the
line with Moscow rather than to butt heads with the Russian president. The West
is unreliable — it will offer empty words of support but will never confront
Russia to save a democracy. If Russia’s neighbors are now convinced of that,
then Moscow has already won. It has established deterrence.
It is important to understand the Russian psyche, which extends beyond the
current president. It goes back to the Second World War. Russians believe that
the West is arrogant and treacherous. They believe the US left Russia to bear
the brunt of fighting the Nazis. They believe the Americans adopted a strategy
of buck-passing. They let the Soviet army do the bulk of the fighting and the US
intervention was deliberately delayed. The Normandy landings only happened once
victory was a done deal.
Countries like Georgia understand that. They will not settle for promises from
the West.
Late former President Mikhail Gorbachev complained about the West’s arrogance.
The Soviet Union was a superpower, which the US did its best to fight
economically during the Cold War. Gorbachev accepted the dismantling of the
Soviet Union in return for promises from the West that it would help lift Russia
economically. However, according to a well-known Russian professor colleague of
mine, those promises were nothing but lies. Once the communist threat was gone,
the West did not lift a finger to prevent the economic collapse of Russia and
the independent states that were part of the Soviet Union.
The Russians claim that one of the conditions for dismantling the Soviet Union
was to stop the expansion of NATO. However, NATO has its open-door policy and it
has kept on expanding to the east.
NATO has deployed missile defense systems in Poland and Romania. When Russian
President Vladimir Putin asked George W. Bush about this, the US president
insisted that they were to prevent Iranian missiles from reaching Europe. Putin
did not buy it.
There is deep mistrust of the West. Hence, even though the Soviet Union
collapsed, Russia still wants to be sure that all its neighbors are in its
orbit. Even if this means it has to cross mountains and subdue a piece of land
to make sure it can keep a close eye on a neighboring government, as it did with
Georgia. Russia is also playing the minorities and ethnicities card. In Ukraine,
it is using the ethnic Russian population in the Donbas to justify its invasion.
However, regardless of whether the president really cares about these people,
the Russians do not want NATO troops on their doorstep. NATO’s raison d’etre is
to counter Russia. During the Cold War, there was a kind of military balance.
The Warsaw Pact was an Eastern alliance to counter NATO. The fall of the Soviet
Union led to the demise of the Warsaw Pact. Nevertheless, Russia still feels it
needs to keep the states in its vicinity in its orbit to fend off any threats
emanating from the Western camp. This is why it sees the war in Ukraine as an
existential matter. Western countries do not see the war in Ukraine as an
existential matter. This is why Russia is ready to sacrifice far more than they
are. Countries like Georgia understand that. They will not settle for promises
from the West. They need a firm commitment, which the West is unable or
unwilling to provide. Until it does so, Russia’s neighbors know that their
security is better guaranteed by being on good terms with Moscow.The fact that
Russia was able to impose this attitude on its neighbors means it has won.
Moscow has established deterrence. That is the purpose of war: to deter any
current or future threats. No neighbor of Moscow wants to develop a relationship
with the West that will fuel the ire of the Russian bear.
• Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib is a specialist in US-Arab relations with a focus on
lobbying. She is co-founder of the Research Center for Cooperation and Peace
Building, a Lebanese nongovernmental organization focused on Track II.
Selected
Tweets for 08 July/2025
Hicham Bou Nassif
My work on the 1983 May 17 Lebanese-Israeli agreement is out in the Middle East
Journal. Thousands of declassified documents show the following:
1) Israel has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon. The negotiations centered on
security measures aiming to prevent cross-border attacks against Israel, the
fate of the Saad Haddad militia, and normalization procedures.
2) The U.S. supported Lebanon all the way during the negotiations and was closer
to the Amin Gemayel government in Beirut than to the Menachem Begin
administration in Jerusalem. The myth of the joint American-Israeli conspiracy
to impose a humiliating diktat on a prostrated Lebanon is just that, a myth
3) Walid Jumblat opposed May 17 because he worried lest Syria's Hafiz al-Asad
kill him. Robert McFarlane (Reagan's envoy to the Middle East) concluded after
meeting Jumblat in Paris on August 27, 1983, that the U.S. needed to get Jumblat
"off the hook" with Asad for the Druze leader to be able to agree to May 17.
McFarlane reported to Washington after the Paris meeting that "It was abundantly
clear that Jumblat was fearful for his life, for good reason". This is the third
piece I publish on the Lebanese civil war based on derestricted American
diplomatic documents. The first two pertained to the Robert McFarlane mission in
Lebanon, and the role that Israel's Uri Lubrani played in the 1983 Mountain War.
I am happy sharing all three pieces with friends who would like to read them.
Nadine Barakat
Tom Barrak being interviewed by Ricardo Karam at Raya Daouks place.
Raya Daouk is Michel Aoun’s girlfriend (not sure how and why
She tried invite Tom to dinner several times and it was not approved given the
chances that
@Gebran_Bassil
could be there which is a bad reputation
She arranged for an interview with Ricardo Karam (aouni/kulluna irada/ judge
Ghada apun) and brought in to backstage the corrupt lawyer of gebran Bassil
@w_akl
Wadih Akl (French connections with French dirtbags like Bourdon and others)
Raya Daouk has been trying to lobby to take gebran Bassil off the sanctions
lists (unsuccessful, of course)
The non stop attempts of Aounis to align themselves with the administration,
sneaking in, to try to clean up the dirty image of Gebran are becoming
ridiculous.
It is important to point out that this clan, consisting of below people, HAS to
be as far away as possible from any interactions with any US government
officials:
- Mounir Younes: Hezbollah spy fired from kuweyt
- Ghada Aoun: Bashar Assad/Hezbollah officer of the court in Lebanon
- Wadih Akl: Hezbollah/gebran/french/leftists lobby in France corrupt as shit
- #Kulluna_Irada & it’s Soros backed media: Hezbollah useful idiots, radical
leftists
- Gebran Bassil MPs: corrupt and facilitators of Hezbollah and money laundering
plans and sanctions evasions
They use those social encounters to clean up their dirty faces. And we should
not be enabling this moving forward. As a matter of fact, their visas to the US
should be revoked!
@USAMBTurkiye
@SteveWitkoff
@MorganOrtagus
@StateDept