English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For November 11/2020
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
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Bible Quotations For today
The glory that you have given me I have given them, so that they may be one, as we are one
John 17/20-23: “‘I ask not only on behalf of these, but also on behalf of those who will believe in me through their word, that they may all be one. As you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may they also be in us, so that the world may believe that you have sent me. The glory that you have given me I have given them, so that they may be one, as we are one, I in them and you in me, that they may become completely one, so that the world may know that you have sent me and have loved them even as you have loved me

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on November 10-11/2021
UN Offers Diesel Fuel to Lebanon’s Vital Facilities
Diplomats concerned Gulf spat could harm Lebanese in region
Kuwait to limit visas for Lebanese over Gulf row
Berri to Aoun: Judiciary Mustn't be Judiciary of Those in Power
Kuwait to Limit Visas for Lebanese over Gulf Row
Qassem Says KSA 'Stirred Problem with Lebanon', Hits Out at Jumblat
Miqati Reveals Initiative to Aid Areas Hit by Port Blast, Urges 'Proper' Judicial Conduct
Khoury Warns against Turning Judiciary into a 'Victim'
Judges Association Asks Politicians Not to Interfere in Judiciary
UK Ambassador Marks Decade of Military Cooperation in Bekaa Visit
Not a Game Show: Kordahi at Center of Lebanon-Saudi Row
MIKATI REITERATES KEENNESS ON PRESERVING FRATERNAL RELATIONS WITH GCC COUNTRIES
Can Saudi Arabia-Lebanon Relations Be Salvaged?/Adnan Nasser/The National/November 10/2021
The Arsenal of Names and Meanings in Lebanon/Hazem Saghieh/Asharq Al-Awsat/November, 10/2021
Migration is not a choice/Ana Maria Luca/Now Lebanon/November 10/2021

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on November 10-11/2021
Israel readying for possible Iran conflict, officials say
World Bank Urges Israel to Stop Deductions of Palestinian Clearance Revenues
Kadhimi’s Advisor Stresses Need to Hold to Account Perpetrators behind Attack on Iraq PM
US Stresses its Right to Defend ‘Iraqi Partners’
High Council of State Chief Calls for Boycott of Libya Elections
Arab Coalition Destroys Houthi Defense System in Marib
Jordan Says King Abdullah Met with Israeli Islamist Lawmaker
Extended Collaboration between Qatar Fund for Development and UNRWA
In calling for talks with Ethiopia, was Egypt’s FM disconnected from events or trying to score points?
UAE FM visits Syria as US tries to slow down regional momentum
French-Moroccan Audrey Azoulay re-elected as UNESCO chief

Titles For The Latest The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on November 10-11/2021
Khalifa Haftar Can Make or Break Libya’s Paris Peace Conference/Ahmed Charai/The National/November 10/2021.
Biden Administration Hesitates to Condemn Iranian Terrorism in Iraq/Hussain Abdul-Hussain/The National/November 10/2021
Why Turkey and Azerbaijan Won’t Get a Corridor Across Armenia/Michael Rubin/The National/November 10/2021
Only Diplomacy Can Save Afghanistan from Disaster/Lise Howard and Michael O'Hanlon/The National/November 10/2021
The Jihad on Mimicry/Raymond Ibrahim/November 10/2021
How Palestinian Leaders Inflict Pain on Their People; EU Shrugs/Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/November 10/2021
Libya’s zero-sum game/Habib Lassoued/The Arab Weekly/November 10/2021
Syrian Kurds, weakest link in Russo-Turkish Syrian adventure/Nikola Mikovic/The Arab Weekly/November 10/2021
Iraq’s moment of truth in wake of attempt on PM’s life/Baria Alamuddin /Arab News/November 11/2021

The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on November 09-10/2021
UN Offers Diesel Fuel to Lebanon’s Vital Facilities
Beirut - Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday, 10 November, 2021
United Nations Deputy Special Coordinator in Lebanon Najat Rochdi, announced that in the past five weeks, the agency delivered 2.23 million liters of diesel to 445 Lebanese facilities, including 295 water pumping stations and 150 health facilities.“This contribution helped ensure the continued provision of vital health care services and it also assisted to the continuation of the work of 14 public hospitals,” she said. Rochdi stressed that the continuous implementation of the emergency fuel supply plan, as part of the emergency response plan for Lebanon (ERP), would not have been possible without the generosity of donors within the Lebanese Humanitarian Fund, especially Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, Ireland, Switzerland, Canada, France and Italy, and also the contributions of donors within the UN Central Emergency Response Fund. In a tweet, Rochdi said addressing Lebanon’s fuel shortages is within the ERP’s priority to alleviate the people’s suffering. “Through the fuel supply plan launched in September, we were able to maintain critical health, water and sanitation services for the most vulnerable and preserve lifesaving activities in all Lebanese districts,” she said.

Diplomats concerned Gulf spat could harm Lebanese in region
BEIRUT (AP)/November 10/2021
Lebanon’s ambassadors who were recently asked to leave Bahrain and Saudi Arabia amid an unprecedented diplomatic spat with Gulf countries expressed fear Wednesday the dispute could harm the interests of Lebanese living in the region.
The warning, which included concerns that bilateral relations could further worsen, came as the daily al-Qabas newspaper reported that Kuwait halted issuing visas to Lebanese citizens. The dispute over comments made by a Lebanese Cabinet minister marks the worst row between Lebanon and Saudi Arabia in decades. The ambassadors spoke during a meeting in Beirut with Prime Minister Najib Mikati, who had earlier asked the minister to resign. Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese have been living in Gulf nations for decades and transfer billions of dollars every year back to their home country. Any measures against them could have dramatic effects on Lebanon, which is already in the middle of the worst economic crisis in its modern history. Lebanon’s Information Minister George Kordahi criticized the war in Yemen that a Saudi-led coalition is waging against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels, describing it as “absurd” and an “aggression” by the kingdom. Kordahi made his comments in August before he took the ministerial post and Lebanon has said the remarks about Yemen, aired in late October, do not represent official government views.
Mikati’s office quoted the ambassadors as saying that “every day of delay in solving the crisis will make it more difficult to fix relations and take them back to where they were.”Saudi Arabia has withdrawn its ambassador from Beirut and asked the Lebanese envoy to leave the kingdom. It has also banned Lebanese imports, undermining the small nation’s foreign trade and depriving it of millions of dollars as it struggles amid the economic meltdown. Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have also pulled their top diplomats from Lebanon, deepening the discord.
Kordahi, who was named to the government by a party allied with the militant Hezbollah group, has insisted Yemen’s Houthis have the right to defend themselves. He said he did not mean to offend with his comments, which were recorded before he became minister.
Mikati’s office quoted the Lebanese ambassadors to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain as saying that they have concerns that the crisis could affect the future of relations between Lebanon and Gulf nations as well as “the interests of Lebanese citizens there.”

Kuwait to limit visas for Lebanese over Gulf row
AFP/November 10/2021
Kuwait is to limit the number of visas it issues for Lebanese nationals as a diplomatic row festers between Beirut and Gulf states, a security source in the emirate said Wednesday. “A verbal decision has been taken to be stricter in granting tourist and business visas to Lebanese,” the source told AFP, asking not to be identified. The source stressed that no official decision had been made and that visas for visitors from Lebanon have not been suspended. Like neighbouring Saudi Arabia, Kuwait recalled its ambassador from Beirut after Lebanon’s information minister criticised a Riyadh-led military intervention in the Yemen conflict, sparking a row with Gulf states. Kuwait, home to some 50,000 Lebanese, has also asked Beirut’s charge d’affaires, its highest-ranking diplomat in the emirate, to leave the country. Lebanon’s ambassadors to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain on Wednesday met with Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati in Beirut to discuss the impact of the crisis on the country’s expatriate community. They expressed “fears of worsening repercussions on bilateral ties between Lebanon and Gulf states and the interests of Lebanese living in these countries,” according to a statement from the premier’s office.
More than 300,000 Lebanese live in Gulf Arab states, providing a key lifeline for Lebanon’s faltering economy, according to the Gulf Labour Markets and Migration think tank. The latest diplomatic row has turned into a showdown over Lebanon’s powerful Shiite movement Hezbollah which is backed by Iran, the regional rival of Sunni powerhouse Saudi Arabia. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan has said Hezbollah’s dominance of Lebanese politics made “dealing with Lebanon pointless for the kingdom”.Kuwait, which has a sizeable Shiite community, is currently holding 16 of its own nationals suspected of helping to finance Hezbollah, according to local media.In 2015, Kuwait said it dismantled a cell accused of collusion with Iran and Hezbollah. Saudi Arabia also announced a ban on Lebanese imports. The kingdom is Lebanon’s third-largest export market, accounting for six percent of the country’s exports in 2020, worth around $217 million, according to Lebanon’s chamber of commerce

Berri to Aoun: Judiciary Mustn't be Judiciary of Those in Power
Naharnet/November 10/2021 
President Michel Aoun tweeted Wednesday that “innocents do not fear the judiciary.”He added that “those who put themselves in the accusation position mustn't blame those who think badly of them.”Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri swiftly responded to Aoun's tweet, saying that “the judiciary should not be the judiciary of those in power.”Aoun’s statement follows a recent flurry of complex lawsuits that have impeded the probe. The total number of lawsuits filed against lead investigator in the port blast case Judge Tarek Bitar now exceeds 15, according to judicial sources. The latest came amid a campaign led by Hizbullah and Amal demanding Bitar's replacement over allegations of "bias."

Kuwait to Limit Visas for Lebanese over Gulf Row
Agence France Presse/November 10/2021
Kuwait is to limit the number of visas it issues for Lebanese nationals as a diplomatic row festers between Beirut and Gulf states, a security source in the emirate said Wednesday. "A verbal decision has been taken to be stricter in granting tourist and business visas to Lebanese," the source told AFP, asking not to be identified. The source stressed that no official decision had been made and that visas for visitors from Lebanon have not been suspended. Kuwaiti newspaper al-Qabas had earlier reported that the Kuwaiti interior ministry had "suspended the issuance of all types of visas for Lebanese nationals until further announcement."“The Lebanese who have residency permits in the country are not included in the decision and they have the right to return to the country,” al-Qabas quoted Kuwaiti security sources as saying. Like neighboring Saudi Arabia, Kuwait recalled its ambassador from Beirut after Lebanon's information minister criticized a Riyadh-led military intervention in the Yemen conflict, sparking a row with Gulf states. Kuwait, home to some 50,000 Lebanese, has also asked Beirut's charge d'affaires, its highest-ranking diplomat in the emirate, to leave the country.
Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese work in Gulf Arab states including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain. The row has turned into a showdown over Lebanon's Hizbullah, which is backed by Iran, the regional rival of Sunni powerhouse Saudi Arabia. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan has said Hizbullah's "dominance" of Lebanese politics made "dealing with Lebanon pointless for the kingdom."Kuwait, which has a sizable Shiite community, is currently holding 16 of its own nationals suspected of helping to finance Hizbullah, according to local media.
In 2015, Kuwait said it dismantled a cell accused of collusion with Iran and Hizbullah.

Qassem Says KSA 'Stirred Problem with Lebanon', Hits Out at Jumblat
Naharnet/November 10/2021
Hizbullah deputy chief Sheikh Naim Qassem on Wednesday stressed that “it was Saudi Arabia that started the problem with Lebanon” and not the other way around, amid an unprecedented diplomatic crisis with Riyadh and other Gulf capitals. “We don’t demand anything from it other than stopping its interference in our domestic affairs,” Qassem added. Turning to the issue of the Tayyouneh-Ain al-Remmaneh incidents, Qassem said Hizbullah and Amal Movement “spared the country a descent into the unknown through dealing wisely with the massacre that the Lebanese Forces committed.” He also called for “a fair, upright and transparent judiciary not affected by all pressures from here or there.”As for the parliamentary elections, Hizbullah number two said “some in Lebanon have recently woken up to aim at Hizbullah in order to gain some money ahead of the parliamentary elections.”“But this will not be of use to him,” Qassem added, apparently referring to Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblat and his latest remarks. He added: “Hizbullah supports holding the electoral juncture on time and we will accept the people’s word and choice.” He meanwhile criticized “those receiving money from the U.S. embassy to employ it in the elections.”

Miqati Reveals Initiative to Aid Areas Hit by Port Blast, Urges 'Proper' Judicial Conduct

Naharnet/November 10/2021 
Prime Minister Najib Miqati visited Wednesday the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of Beirut and discussed with Metropolitan Elias Aude the repercussions of the Beirut port blast and the country’s economic hardship.
“We discussed the living, educational and health conditions of the Lebanese,” Miqati said after meeting Aude. He added that a proper and fair judiciary is the only resort to reach a result regarding the port blast, and said he supports Bitar, when asked by a journalist if he supports Judge Tarek Bitar to lead the port blast investigations. “We don’t interfere with the judiciary,” he added. Miqati briefed Aude about launching an initiative tomorrow, Thursday, from the Grand serail. The B5 initiative in collaboration with the World Bank and the European union aims to aid the commercial enterprises that have been damaged by the explosion.“Beirut will re-enter the business arena,” Miqati said.

Khoury Warns against Turning Judiciary into a 'Victim'

Naharnet/November 10/2021 
Minister of Justice Henry Khoury warned Wednesday against turning the port blast case into a “judicial drama.”Khoury felt sorry for the “unprecedented violation of the sanctity of the Palace of Justice.”
The minister stressed that the Palace should remain “a safe haven for lawyers and judges to practice their mission and duties away from any pressures.”Khoury advised against the “classification of judges” and “vilifying” or “supporting” them, saying that these alignments in the port blast case “will distort the truth.”He also affirmed that the probe will continue, emphasizing that he, as a minister, is keen on protecting the judicial body “from becoming a victim” before it acquires the port blast victims’ rights.

Judges Association Asks Politicians Not to Interfere in Judiciary
Naharnet/November 10/2021 
The Lebanese Judges Association warned Wednesday against judicial politicization, urging the politicians to stop interfering in the Judiciary and to “let the judicial path go on without abuse.”They said in a statement that “Lebanese politicians tend to destroy anything they deal with.”“They disrupted the economy, looted the banking sector, deformed the public sector, frustrated the people, displaced the youth, polluted the air and failed the country until we started begging for crumbs from countries and institutions,” the Judges Association decried.

UK Ambassador Marks Decade of Military Cooperation in Bekaa Visit
Naharnet/November 10/2021
Marking over “a decade of strong bilateral military partnership and friendship,” British Ambassador to Lebanon Ian Collard made a visit to the 2nd Land Border Regiment in the Bekaa, the British embassy said.
Accompanied by Defense Attaché Lieutenant Colonel Lee Saunders, Head of conflict, stability and security programs in Lebanon Sam Lones, and Head of Security Program Sarah Kronfol, Ambassador Collard met with Colonel Mohammed Daaboul, head of the regiment along with his senior Lebanese officers and soldiers.“The UK has been a steadfast supporter of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), the sole legitimate military force able to protect and defend Lebanon. Since 2010, the UK has committed over £84 million allowing the LAF to optimize its capabilities, develop and modernize to become a respected, professional army able to defend Lebanon and provide security along its border with Syria,” the embassy said.“Through the Land Border Regiments program, we have helped train and mentor over 24,400 LAF troops, built 79 border watchtowers and Forward Operating Bases along the Lebanese border with Syria, donated 240 Land Rovers, 12 Mobile Observation posts, 867 radios, 3300 sets of Personal Protection Equipment, and 100 RWMIK vehicles earlier this year,” the embassy added. After the visit Ambassador Collard said: “It is a privilege to visit the 2nd Land Border Regiment in the Bekaa and see and hear how UK support is helping the army to maintain security and stability along this rugged landscape of the border with Syria. We believe in the Lebanese Army’s capabilities as the sole legitimate military force in Lebanon, providing security to all citizens during such unprecedented and challenging economic times.”“My visit also marks over a decade of significant practical and tactical UK support to the LAF. I am delighted that UK collaboration with the leadership of the Lebanese Armed Forces has supported the strengthening and resilience of the LAF so that it is able to secure Lebanon’s border with Syria,” he added. “Today, the Lebanese Army should be proud of its achievements, after the courageous battle of Fajr el Jouroud against Daesh, which enabled the Lebanese state to expand its authority and sovereignty over its territory,” Collard went on to say. “Our support to the Lebanese Army continues and we remain committed to standing by the people of Lebanon,” he added.

Not a Game Show: Kordahi at Center of Lebanon-Saudi Row
Naharnet/November 10/2021
George Kordahi was popular among TV viewers in the Middle East for his dapper charm. He schmoozed with beautiful women, dropped jokes and recited lines of Arabic poetry — all the while weighing in with his political opinions about the region's events. Now the former host of the game show "Who Wants to Be a Millionaire" is Lebanon's information minister, and those opinions have landed Kordahi at the center of his country's worst-ever crisis with Saudi Arabia. Kordahi refuses to resign or apologize to the Saudis, whose financial backing Lebanon desperately needs. Instead, the former entertainer known for his smooth style is relying on the backing of Saudi Arabia's nemesis, Lebanon's powerful Iran-backed Hizbullah. Kordahi became a politician only late in life, joining the Lebanese Cabinet in September at the age of 71. But he had plenty to say about politics in his years as an entertainer.
Appearing on a Lebanese talk show called Talk of the Town in 2017, he handed a red rose to each of the four women sharing the stage with him. The female host gushed that viewers can see for themselves how gallant he is. Seated between the three daughters of Lebanon's president, Kordahi said it was his luck and privilege to be among such "glorious women."Yet alongside the compliments, he expressed hardline views on limiting free expression. Commenting on domestic affairs, he said an information minister should regulate social media, rein in what he said were smear campaigns and act as a censor instead of the security agencies. The current diplomatic crisis goes back to comments he made Aug. 5, a month before he became information minister. In the remarks, which were recorded and aired later, he defended Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi rebels. This angered Saudi Arabia, which has been leading a military coalition fighting the Houthis in a brutal and deadlocked war in Yemen.
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries have withdrawn their ambassadors from Lebanon in protest over the comments. The diplomatic spat is putting hundreds of millions of dollars in trade and assistance from the oil-rich nations at risk at a time of dire need for Lebanon.
The tensions have exposed the depth of Lebanon's problem with its former ally Saudi Arabia. Hizbullah increasingly dominates national politics, moving Lebanon further into Iran's orbit, Riyadh's arch rival. Kordahi's predicament also underscores the price of political aspirations in the Middle East's polarized atmosphere, particularly since the divisive 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. As host of the "millionaire" show launched in 2000, Kordahi appealed to audiences from Morocco to Oman with his guttural voice and use of the Arabic language in a way that transcended local dialects.
He peppered his show with references to poetry, literature and the Quran — a sure way to the hearts of many young Muslims, especially coming from Kordahi, who is Christian. At the time, the second Palestinian uprising dominated the news. Kordahi's show took on the Palestinian cause, an issue that united Arabs. In one episode, the contestants were the mothers of three Palestinians killed in the violence. They ended up winning $100,000.
In 2011, the anti-government protests of the Arab Spring spread across the region.
Kordahi chose to side with Syria's Bashar Assad and its Lebanese ally, Hizbullah, losing many fans and financial supporters in the process.
During a lecture in Damascus in 2011, Kordahi said the protests against Assad were "a foreign conspiracy" and praised the long-time ruler as a real reformer. At the time, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations were backing Assad's armed opposition. The Saudi-owned MBC channel dismissed Kordahi as he was preparing a new show, posting on its website that it was out of respect for the Syrian people. Kordahi left the network for posts in Lebanese media, including a stint in one allied with Hizbullah. Kordahi, who also has a perfume and clothing line in his name, began toying with a career in politics. In 2013, he was named for parliament on a list allied with Michel Aoun, the current Lebanese president and at the time the head of the largest Christian party. The elections never took place. That year, Hizbullah sent troops to Syria to back Assad's embattled forces in the border province of Homs. In an interview on Syrian TV, Kordahi praised Hizbullah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, saying "I see myself in him."When he finally entered Lebanese politics, Marada, a Christian party allied with Syria and Hizbullah, named him to the post of information minister. In his first comment as minister, he appealed to the Lebanese media to refrain from hosting analysts who warn of doomsday scenarios in Lebanon. Many perceived it as a call for censorship.
Attempts to reach Kordahi were unsuccessful.
When the crisis with Saudi Arabia erupted, he first tweeted that his comments intended no offense. Then he held a press conference. "Lebanon should not remain subject to extortion from anyone, any country or any ambassadors," he said. To his backers, Kordahi is a symbol of national dignity, freedom of expression and resistance to Gulf interference in Lebanese affairs. Posters of Kordahi have appeared in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad, with the words: "Yes George, the war in Yemen is absurd." Hassan Fadlallah, a Hizbullah lawmaker, said Kordahi did nothing wrong. "Some people with no dignity and no national honor are exaggerating, saying this will ruin the country." To his critics, his comments and refusal to resign are reckless. "The public is paying the price of people who named themselves officials and show no responsibility," tweeted Lebanese singer Elissa.
Public figures from the Gulf called Kordahi ungrateful and even called for firing his daughter, who works at MBC. Saudi officials said the problem is bigger than Kordahi's comments — rooted in a system that has allied itself with Iran. Mediators suggested his resignation is a first step toward reconciliation.
Salem Zahran, a political analyst, said Kordahi inadvertently stumbled into a fight not of his making. He suggested the Saudis were lashing out because they are frustrated over the stalled war in Yemen, particularly as Houthi rebels advance in the strategic province of Marib.
"It is not his fault. Destiny put him in this reality," Zahran said. "Every Lebanese is born a politician until proven otherwise."

MIKATI REITERATES KEENNESS ON PRESERVING FRATERNAL RELATIONS WITH GCC COUNTRIES
NNA/November 10/2021
Prime Minister, Najib Mikati, on Wednesday reiterated his keenness on preserving the brotherly relations that link Lebanon with the Gulf states. He also stressed the substantial need to prioritize supreme national interests above personal ones.
Mikati’s fresh stance came in a meeting with Lebanon’s ambassadors to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Fawzi Kabbara, and the Kingdom of Bahrain, Milad Nammour, with whom he broached the repercussions of the recent relationship crisis between Lebanon and GCC countries.
For their part, ambassadors Kabbara and Nammour expressed their fear concerning a possible aggravation of the crisis repercussions on the future of bilateral relations between Lebanon and the Gulf, especially on the interests of Lebanese communities in GCC countries. Separately, Mikati welcomed Egyptian ambassador to Lebanon, Yasser Alawi, with whom he discussed the most recent developments of the situation in Lebanon and the region, as well as bilateral relations. Prime Minister Mikati then met with the representative of fuel companies distributors’ syndicate, Fadi Abou Chakra, and the syndicate’s secretary, Hussein Ghosn, with whom he discussed the fuel tariff as issued by the Lebanese Central Bank. Following the meeting, Abou Chakra announced the issuance of a fuel price schedule today, which included a request to the Central Bank to secure 10 percent of fuel prices in fresh USD and 90 percent in Lebanese pounds.

Can Saudi Arabia-Lebanon Relations Be Salvaged?
Adnan Nasser/The National/November 10/2021
The Saudi leadership is making a serious error in judgement by reducing diplomatic ties with Lebanon. It is more of a symbolic gesture in protest than a pragmatic decision predicated on evidence that such a move will produce the kind of relationship both nations would like to foster.
Lebanon and Saudi Arabia are now mired in a new diplomatic rift after pro-Houthi comments made by Lebanese information minister George Kordahi angered the kingdom. The ties between these two nations were already strained, begging the question: Can Lebanon’s relationship with Saudi Arabia be salvaged?
Kordahi, a former game show host turned politician, said in August that the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen were “defending themselves” from Saudi aggression. That his comments came a couple of weeks before the new Lebanese government, in which he serves, was formed and took an official stance of neutrality on the conflict has made little difference for the Saudis and their allies in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain. Each of these states, which are involved in a coalition against the Shia militants in Yemen, quickly suspended contact with Beirut. Kordahi’s blunt criticism was the last straw for the Saudis, who are now using it as a pretext to argue Lebanon has fallen under the control of Hezbollah, a militant and political party, who is aligned with Iran and provides the Houthis with material support.
Lebanon’s new prime minister, Najib Mikati, had initially asked Kordahi to take the “right” position and adopt the country’s official stance on the question of the Saudi military campaign in Yemen. This appeal to the information minister’s ostensible patriotism apparently has been agreed upon. Kordahi said he is willing to resign if it “guarantees” a change in Gulf policy towards Lebanon. Mikati also lobbed harsh words regarding Hezbollah and its allies, saying “anyone who thinks they can impose on the Lebanese choices that steer them away from their history, their Arab depth, and their close ties with the Arab countries and the Gulf states, especially with Saudi Arabia, is also wrong.”
With such statements, Mikati is applying all crisis control mechanisms to save Lebanon’s Gulf connections and let normal relations resume. Additionally, Lebanon’s President Michel Aoun made his own efforts to calm the row with Saudi Arabia by calling for the “best relations” with the Gulf, alongside proposals for solidifying them via new bilateral agreements.
As Lebanon’s top officials scramble to salvage their country’s ties with fellow Arab states, some are calling on all actors to consider the damaging repercussions this new rift has on Lebanese livelihoods.
In an appeal to the Gulf countries, Arab League secretary-general Ahmed Aboul Gheit requested that they “reflect on the measures proposed to be taken in order to avoid further negative effects on the collapsing Lebanese economy.” A delegation from the Arab League arrived in Beirut to get a better understanding of Lebanon’s official position and to find an exit that is suitable for both Arab countries. It is extraordinary that Saudi Arabia is open to restoring relations with the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and negotiating with the Iranians, but is punishing Lebanon because of one political party—Hezbollah. But while Riyadh prefers not to deal directly with the government, it is still maintaining contact with some political leaders.
Right before departing, Walid Bukhari, the former ambassador to Lebanon, met with the leader of the right-wing Christian Lebanese Forces party, Samir Geagea. The meeting lasted for an hour and a half, with the conversation focusing on political developments in Lebanon and the growing opposition to Hezbollah’s influence. Geagea’s party is accused by Hezbollah for trying to trigger a sectarian war between Christians and Muslims after seven pro-Hezbollah protesters were killed in the Christian-majority suburb of Tayouneh. Last July, Geagea said that, for the past fifteen years, Lebanon has been “cursed” with groups that are acting against the country’s national interest, including not having good foreign relations.
That may be true, however, this chapter of Lebanon’s political crisis is caused by Saudi Arabia’s hatred for Hezbollah’s activities in the region and increased influence in Lebanon’s institutions. As Saudi foreign minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan al-Saud said in a recent interview, Kordahi’s comments are a symptom of Hezbollah’s continued domination of Lebanon’s politics.
Moreover, Riyadh is now more determined to make the Lebanese understand that it wants Hezbollah to be controlled and kept in check. Saudi Arabia is making clear that it is not obliged to come to Lebanon’s economic aid while one of its political parties is actively participating in a war against the security of the kingdom. Hezbollah’s involvement in Yemen is due to its ideological allegiance to Iran, not to defend Lebanon’s national interest. Decisionmakers in Riyadh certainly understand this fact.
Nevertheless, the Saudi leadership is making a serious error in judgement by reducing diplomatic ties with Lebanon. It is more of a symbolic gesture in protest than a pragmatic decision predicated on evidence that such a move will produce the kind of relationship both nations would like to foster. The best strategy is engagement, not isolation. It will only compound Lebanon’s crisis by not giving the Lebanese a strong international partner—something they so desperately need. It also will force them to increasingly rely on Hezbollah for their only means of survival, something Saudi Arabia claims to be against.
If Riyadh truly wants to combat Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon, it should start by delivering to the Lebanese Armed Forces its promised payment of $3 billion to upgrade some of its obsolete hardware with more modern weaponry. Saudi Arabia can also send much-needed fuel to Lebanon’s citizens—who are suffering from one of their worst energy shortages in decades—instead of letting Hezbollah appear as the “people’s champion” by bringing in Iranian oil.
The Saudis and the Gulf have the ball on their side of the court. If the Lebanese are put in a corner to choose humiliation over Iranian support, they will certainly and justifiably choose the latter. The Lebanese need a viable alternative to Hezbollah, but, given the Gulf’s recent actions, that is unlikely to manifest anytime soon.
*Adnan Nasser is an independent Middle East analyst. He has a BA in International Relations from Florida International University. Follow him on Instagram @revolutionarylebanon or contact him at Anass018@fiu.edu.

The Arsenal of Names and Meanings in Lebanon
Hazem Saghieh/Asharq Al-Awsat/November, 10/2021
When Lebanese people say “the Movement” (haraka in Arabic), they are referring to the Amal Movement led by Nabih Berri. For there are no other political groups that use this word to describe themselves; if they are found, they are regional, like the “Independence Movement,” which is only active in the Zgharta region. Indeed, since the demise of the “Arab Nationalist Movement” in the late 1960s the term “the movement” was no longer adopted by groups operating at the national level, at least not in Lebanon. Only in the mid-1970s did Imam Mousa al-Sadr revive it in a different context.
As for “Current” (Tayyar - which, while officially translated, in English, into “movement”, literally translates to “current”- in Arabic) it refers to the “Free Patriotic Movement” (Al Tayyar al-Watani al-Hor). The word “Future” prevails for referring to the Future Movement (Tayyar al-Mustaqbal), which is also referred to as a “current.” As for the “Marada Movement” (Tayyar al-Marada) in Zgharta and the “Dignity Movement” (Tayyar al-Karameh) in Tripoli, and others like them, they are regional parties that do not have the capacity to compete over meanings on a national scale.
With the term “party,” things change. Lebanon has seen the rise of well-established parties with a national reach founded as far back as the 1920s and 30s, such as the “Communist,” “Syrian Nationalist,” and “Phalangist” (aka Kataeb) parties. In the late 1940s and early fifties, the “Progressive Socialist Party” and the “Arab Baath Party” coming from Syria emerged. This is to say nothing about the parties that have always been there, like the “Najada Party” and the “National Liberal Party.” Even today, demand for the term “party” continues to go strong. The “Lebanese Forces” have transformed themselves into a party, and there are, of course, as in the cases of the “current” and “movement,” regional politicians and others operating at a neighborhood level who use the term “party” to label their few supporters.
Despite that, if you say “the Party” it is understood that you are referring to Hezbollah. It alone is the party, as affirmed by all, including the leaders of some of the other parties. This phenomenon seems funny and pathetic when leaders of the “Communist” and “Syrian Nationalist” parties use the term “the Party” to refer to Hezbollah rather than their own. Once we add that the latter is the only one that has the term god in its name, the exclusivity and infallibility are heightened further.
The same is true for the word “Sayyed” - a title used to refer to male descendants of Shiite religious families and is generally translated into “sir” or “master.” Many of these sayyeds turned into politicians, as was the case for Hussein al-Husseini, and more than a few of them have held ministerial positions or become deputies. However, all of them had that title followed by their first names. Even Mousa al-Sadr, the most important of them all until his disappearance in 1978, was commonly referred to as “Sayyed Mousa.” As for the Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, he has become the only one referred to when one says “the sayyed”. He alone is the sayyed whose first name doesn’t have to be mentioned. To refer to the sayyed who preceded him as that same party’s leader, that is, Abbas al-Moussawi, one had to mention his first name for others to know who is being referred to.
And, of course, the word “resistance,” with all the magical connotations bestowed upon it, refers to none other than Hezbollah. Those using the term to refer to the “Palestinian resistance” must say “Palestinian” loudly to be understood. Those referring to the Communist resistance to the Israeli invasion, which was called “the Lebanese National Resistance Front - Jammoul,” have to pinch their interlocutor to be understood. The word “Jammoul” could be understood as a name given to a nice lady.
In contrast to the claims tyrannical regimes and their parties usually make to promote the image they want to present about themselves and others, it is not the “masses” who grant the terms “party,” “sayyed” and “resistance,” if not history and God, their exclusivity. Manufacturing meanings in this manner stems only from an entrenched proclivity to impose this singularity on society so long as the imposition of the one party and the one leader who runs it is not ripe until further notice. That is how the burning desire to sum up the country and its history operates and how this summary is then imposed in the form of a regime that governs minds before governing reality, teaching us what can and cannot be said and done.
Engaging language and creating new meanings for words is not new to wars of subordinating minds and spirits. However, what makes this process more repugnant is that we in Lebanon have gotten used to the word “Raiis” (president) referring to three people simultaneously (president, speaker of parliament and prime minister), and the term encompasses more than a few of the countries’ former presidents, prime ministers and speakers, who maintain the title “Raiis” even after their death. We recall that Fouad Chehab, whose honorary titles were excessive, was given the title “Prince and Major General, President.” However, he suffered a resounding defeat in 1968 that left him isolated before eventually being forgotten. And the Lebanese had a lot of fun with the title “ruler” (amid in Arabic) which exclusively referred to Raymond Edde, turning the title into more of a joke that could be affectionate or lightly ironic. In any case, the “amid” ended up in a room in a Parisian hotel, where he took his last breaths.
That, in general, is the habit of free people when they intend to remain free, uttering what their minds dictate and their minds only uttering what freedom dictates.

Migration is not a choice
Ana Maria Luca/Now Lebanon/November 10/2021
Instead of putting pressure on countries to stop travel to Belarus and raising awareness on Lukashenko’s instrumentalization of the migration crisis, the EU should pay more attention to the political situation in those countries..
Imagine you’re a Syrian refugee in Lebanon. Facing the worst economic crisis the world has seen in 150 years, the country’s political elite took 13 months to negotiate the formation of a cabinet. Not only has the government reached a deadlock due to disagreements over the Beirut blast investigation, but it also faces diplomatic isolation by the Gulf states due to controversial statements made by the cabinet spokesman. Meanwhile, some political forces incite sectarian clashes. General rejection and violence against refugees has increased.
Fuel prices have skyrocketed because of the constant plunge of the local currency. It costs at least half the local average salary, which has dropped to about $200/month, to keep the lights on for most of the day. No Syrian refugee even earns that much to begin with. Between October 2019 and June 2021, the cost of food increased by 404 percent, resulting in “worrisome food insecurity levels among Syrian refugee families,” the UNHCR has said.
Thousands of Lebanese have emigrated in the past two years, many to the Gulf states and many to Europe. Hundreds of at risk and economically troubled Syrians have taken boats to Cyprus, many facing death, losing sons and daughters and being taken back to Lebanon. They were aware of the risks when they made that decision. Some made it to the other side. Out of those who didn’t, many are willing to try again.
Pressure from Brussels
The European Commission said yesterday that it has reached out to Lebanon’s government, among a number of other governments, to raise awareness over the migration crisis at the Belarus-Poland border and the risks of serious abuses many travelers have to face when taking that road to Europe. The EU said Tuesday it was pressing more than a dozen countries to prevent their nationals leaving for Belarus on a perilous attempt to get into the bloc, AFP reported. Brussels says the crisis at the border is an orchestrated campaign by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko to destabilize the EU by encouraging migrants to its borders, especially Poland and Lithuania, where governments are not the most welcoming for immigrants. “This is part of the inhuman and really gangster style approach of the Lukashenko regime,” a European Commission spokesman, Peter Stano, told journalists.
The EU already pressured Iraq into stopping flights from Baghdad to Minsk and has contacted another 13 countries, some states of origin, others of transit – Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo, Egypt, Georgia, Guinea, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. Another 20 countries, including Syria and Iran, are “monitored”, as their governments are not necessarily cooperating.
The three-way row between Belarus, Poland and Brussels has indeed taken the spotlight. Up to 4,000 people, reportedly mainly Iraqi Kurds, set up camp near the Polish border and made a collective attempt to push across on Monday. Polish officials said Wednesday that large groups, ranging from several dozen to two hundred people, crossed the border from Belarus in three places overnight, but “all were pushed back”. Poland has deployed 15,000 troops on the border. People can’t cross, but they also cannot return, as the Belarus authorities do not allow them to leave.
It’s not the route that matters
That is only one focal point of the tragedy. For over six years now, refuge seekers have been smuggled through the Balkans, families separated by traffickers, people left stranded to fend for themselves on the streets of Belgrade, some suffocating in lorries. But it is always the novelty and the extreme that catches attention. Then people get used to the news, the spotlight fades and the file ends up blocked, then forgotten, as diplomats don’t know how to solve it. Until another outrageously cruel abuse is exposed or another tragedy occurs. Conditions of living for refugees have worsened in all the host countries in the Middle East, and Lebanon, as seen above, tops that list.
The number of people entering the EU by crossing the Western Balkans has almost doubled this year, EU border agency Frontex said in August. An estimated 27 180 illegal border crossings occurred on the Western Balkan route between January and August, the majority of people coming from Syria and Afghanistan. The increase can be attributed to the resumption of migratory movements after the lifting of COVID-19 restrictions, Frontex said. But the EU border agency was not at all painting the whole picture, because beyond COVID-19 it becomes political and no one wants to look at that. Syrians in Syria, including those who dared to return to their home country, still face detention, torture, summary executions, and other abuses. Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have stated it in reports released in the past two months.
Afghanistan has been taken over by the Taliban.
Conditions of living for refugees have worsened in all the host countries in the Middle East, and Lebanon, as seen above, tops that list. Beyond the subhuman conditions over 60 percent of refugees live in, some Lebanese towns have also imposed curfews on Syrians. Many resort to begging and working severely underpaid jobs to survive from day to day. In Turkey, Syrian refugees have been increasingly facing violence. In August, protests erupted in Ankara after reports that a Syrian refugee had stabbed two Turkish men in a fight.
Treating the effect, not the cause
Since 2011, the EU has given Lebanon EUR 722 million in humanitarian funding to respond to urgent needs of Syrian refugees. In March 2021, the EU announced EUR 50 million for Lebanon during the Brussels V Conference as part of the Syria Crisis response. This is part of the regional funding to support the needs of the most vulnerable Syrian refugees across the region. During the summer of 2021, the EU released EUR 5.5 million to strengthen the COVID-19 response in Lebanon. In 2021, the EU is contributing EUR 30 million to support around 660,000 Syrian refugees with multi-purpose cash assistance to meet their food and basic needs.
The question that comes to mind is: at what rate? A Reuters report said in June that Lebanese banks have swallowed some $250 million in two years, between 2019 and 2020, just by playing on the different exchange rates between the dollar and the Lebanese pound. They don’t have much choice. Afghanistan is not safe, Syria is not safe, Iraq is not safe, Lebanon is not safe and neither is Turkey.
The EU is the most important humanitarian assistance provider to the Syrian refugees in Lebanon and probably the entire region too. But that money needs to be audited and it remains to be seen how much of it really reaches its intended beneficiaries. But all the money the EU has sent to Lebanon in the past decades has not and will not stop Syrian refugees from being at risk. It will also not stop them from trying again and again to reach Europe, because that is where they might have a chance at building a life.
They are aware of the risks they are likely to face when they take the Belarus route or the Balkan route. They know they can end up in de facto prisons, that they can be beaten by right-wing groups, that they face hunger and cold in forests at the Polish border or on the Balkan fields, that they can die in lorries trying to cross into Hungary or Austria. It’s not awareness campaigns that they need. They need the EU to get more involved at the political level, to help find solutions for both Lebanon and Syria. Everyone is very much aware around here. People may be very much aware in Afghanistan, Morocco, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Cameroon what they risk if they pay smugglers to cross borders. But they don’t have much choice. Afghanistan is not safe, Syria is not safe, Iraq is not safe, Lebanon is not safe and neither is Turkey.
*Ana Maria Luca is the managing editor of @NOW_leb. She tweets @AnaMariaLuca79.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on November 10-11/2021
Israel readying for possible Iran conflict, officials say
JERUSALEM (AP)/November 10, 2021
Top Israeli defense officials say the country is preparing for the possibility of an armed conflict with regional arch-rival Iran and its proxies. Israeli army chief of staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kohavi said Tuesday that the Israeli military was “speeding up the operational plans and readiness for dealing with Iran and the nuclear military threat.” Israel considers Iran an existential threat, and has warned that it would act with military force if needed to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Last month Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid said that “if a terror regime is going to acquire a nuclear weapon we must act.”
Iran insists its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only. Tehran is set to renew nuclear talks with world powers this month, after the 2015 accord to curb its nuclear program collapsed following the U.S.’s withdrawal from the agreement in 2018. Addressing lawmakers at a meeting of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense committee, Kohavi said the military “continued to act against our enemies in covert operations and missions around the Middle East” during the past year. His remarks came following a string of reported Israeli airstrikes in Syria. Israel has staged hundreds of strikes on Iran-linked military targets in neighboring Syria in the past decade, but rarely acknowledges its operations. It has said that Iran's presence near its northern frontier is a red line, and that it targets arms shipments bound for Iranian-backed Lebanese militant group Hezbollah and Iran-linked facilities in Syria. Speaking during a visit to a defense industry factory in the northern city of Shlomi, near the Lebanese border, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz said that Israel was “working all the time to prevent war — carrying out operations, conveying messages, preventing (a military) build-up.”In the event of war, he said, “we will be prepared to execute operations that haven't been seen in the past, with means that weren't in our hands in the past, that will harm the heart of terror and its abilities."

World Bank Urges Israel to Stop Deductions of Palestinian Clearance Revenues
Ramallah - Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday, 10 November, 2021
The World Bank called on Israel to stop deductions from Palestinian tax revenues and address the outstanding financial issues. It urged donors to resume aid to public finances despite the severe economic challenges facing the Palestinian Authority (PA).The World Bank issued a report on the Palestinian economic situation, noting that the Authority still faces severe challenges. Despite significant increases in fiscal revenues, the fiscal situation remains fragile due to high public spending and low external financing. The Bank will present the report, issued on Tuesday, at the donors' meeting in Oslo on October 17. It indicated that "after accounting for the advance payment given to the PA on clearance revenues by the Israeli government, and donor financing, the PA's deficit is expected to reach $1.36 billion in 2021." The PA may encounter difficulties in meeting its recurrent commitments by the end of the year.
No longer able to borrow from domestic banks, the Authority may be forced to accumulate further arrears to the private sector, pulling away more liquidity from the market. The projected gap remains very large, according to the report. In the immediate term, the report calls on donors to help reduce the budget deficit and the Israeli government to address some of the outstanding fiscal leakages. For example, the Israeli civil administration collects tax revenues from businesses operating in Area C, and the Israeli government collects exit fees at the bridge. However, there has not been a systematic transfer of these revenues to the PA as requested by the signed agreements. "Releasing some of these funds would provide much-needed quick financing in these difficult times."The World Bank report came when the Authority said it is suffering the worst financial situation since its establishment due to Israel's deduction of clearance revenues, the Covid-19 crisis, and the decline in external support. According to the latest data, budget support was only ten percent of what was received during the same period last year. Growth reached 5.4 percent in the first half of 2021 and is expected to reach six percent this year. However, growth in 2022 is predicted to slow to around three percent as the low base effect weakens and sources of growth remain limited. According to the report, the Palestinian economy is showing signs of recovery mainly due to improved activity in the West Bank.
However, Gaza still suffers from a challenging economic situation with very high unemployment and deteriorating social conditions. In the current economic context, the outlook is uncertain as sustainable sources of growth remain limited. World Bank Country Director for West Bank and Gaza, Kanthan Shankar, announced that the current consumption-led growth in the West Bank reflects a rebound from a low base in 2020, exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis. The economy still suffers from restrictions on movement, access, and trade, the biggest impediment to investment and access to markets, said Shankar. "The way ahead is still uncertain and depends on coordinated actions by all parties in revitalizing the economy and providing job opportunities for the young population." The report also examines the accumulated effects of years of blockade on Gaza's economy, which is currently a fraction of its estimated potential.
"Gaza's contribution to the overall Palestinian economy was cut by half over the past three decades, narrowing to just 18 percent currently."Gaza has also undergone deindustrialization, and its economy has become highly dependent on external transfers. Gaza's economic decline has had a severe impact on living standards, with an unemployment rate of 45 percent and poverty reaching 59 percent due to the 11-day conflict and worsening COVID-19 conditions.

Kadhimi’s Advisor Stresses Need to Hold to Account Perpetrators behind Attack on Iraq PM
Baghdad - Fadhel al-Nashmi/Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday, 10 November, 2021
Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s political advisor, Mashreq Abbas vowed on Tuesday that the perpetrators behind the attempt on the PM’s life will be brought to justice. In a tweet, he said: “We will never back down from bringing the terrorists, who tried to assassinate the prime minister, to justice.”Shortly after Sunday’s drone attack, Kadhimi said his government “knows very well” who was behind the assassination attempt, vowing that they will be uncovered. Abbas made his tweet hours after the president, prime minister and head of the judiciary met with the so-called “Coordination Framework.” The Framework is a grouping of pro-Iran Shiite factions that were on the losing end of last month’s parliamentary elections. The factions had been staging protests for days in an attempt to reverse the results of the polls that they claimed were rigged. They have not provided evidence of their claims. Tensions had mounted between the protesters and security forces ahead of the attempt on Kadhimi’s life, with clashes leaving dozens injured. Observers speculated that Abbas’ tweet may have been a response to the outcome of the meeting with the Coordination Framework. A statement issued at the end of the talks may have been interpreted as an attempt to sidestep the attack on the PM. Informed sources at the meeting said the talks did not reach tangible results over main issues that were on the table, starting with the clashes that took place between supporters of the pro-Iran factions and security forces, the attempt on Kadhimi’s life and the stance from the results of the elections.
This means Iraq is headed towards further political deadlock, especially since factions from the Framework have been openly accused of carrying out the assassination attempt. Some political circles revealed that the PM had, through a political figure, sent a strongly-worded message to some of the complicit parties in the attack, vowing that he will pursue them no matter the cost. The statement issued after the meeting with the Coordination Framework condemned “the crime that targeted protesters and stressed the need to continue relevant investigations to bring those involved to justice.”Two people were killed and dozens injured in last week’s clashes between supporters of the pro-Iran factions and security forces. The attack on the prime minister came second in importance in the closing statement. It said that it rejects and condemns the attack on the PM’s residence, stressing the need for an investigation to uncover the perpetrators and hold them to account. It urged the need to ease tensions and end the media incitement by all parties. It called for reassuring the Iraqi people and easing their concerns.The statement tackled the need to reach a “legal approach to the crisis of the biased elections results so that the trust of all parties can be restored in the voting process.”It called for a “national meeting to discuss ways to resolve this difficult crisis. All parties underscored their keenness on civil peace and the need to address pending issues through legal and political frameworks.”What the “legal framework” is remains to be seen. Iraq’s electoral commission said Monday that a manual vote recount in some polling stations where complaints were filed by pro-Iran groups did not show any “fraud”. The electoral commission said in a statement that a manual vote recount at 4,324 polling stations indicated no irregularities.
It appears as though the members of the Coordination Framework are divided over how to address the current crisis over the elections results, attack on the PM and clashes between protesters and security forces.
A visit by Iran’s Quds Force chief, Esmail Ghaani, to Baghdad on Monday has not helped resolve these differences, while some factions have questioned the assassination attempt altogether. Head of the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq group, Qais Khazali, speculated in remarks to Al-Jazeera on Tuesday that Israel and the United States may have been behind the attack. “We have called for an accurate technical investigation in the evidence” found in the attack against the PM, he added. He rejected accusations that some pro-Iran factions, including his own, were involved in the attack.
“We reject such accusations, which have prompted us to demand a trusted investigation,” he stressed. Meanwhile, Hadi al-Ameri, head of the Fatah alliance that includes the majority of the pro-Iran factions, called on Tuesday for media calm and allowing the judiciary to carry out probes into the protest clashes and attack on Kadhimi. “We all trust the judiciary, its fairness and courage. We hope everyone would remain calm because the situation in Iraq cannot tolerate more escalation,” he said.

US Stresses its Right to Defend ‘Iraqi Partners’

Washington - Elie Youssef/Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday, 10 November, 2021
Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby condemned the assassination attempt against Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, stressing the US has the right and responsibility to protect itself and its troops, and to help defend its Iraqi partners. “We're going to continue to do what we need to do to make sure that our troops are protected, and our facilities are adequately defended,” Kirby said in a press briefing on Monday. A drone laden with explosives targeted Kadhimi’s residence in Baghdad last Sunday. Kirby did not specify the party behind the assassination attempt, but he said there are multiple groups operating inside Iraq that are backed by Iran, who are capable of these kinds of attacks. State Department spokesperson Ned Price said Monday the US reserves the right in coordination with the Government of Iraq, to respond to aggression at a time and place, and with the means of its choosing. However, he clarified that “before we speak about a response, we will let the Iraqi investigation proceed. We will continue to consult closely with our Iraqi partners.”He added: “We are outraged, and we strongly condemn the attack on Iraq’s prime minister.”
Price said Kadhimi represents not only the head of government, but the state of Iraq, in his capacity as the commander-in-chief of Iraq’s security forces. “Therefore we believe that this was an attack not only on him, but also on the sovereignty and stability of the Iraqi state,” he added.
Echoing Kirby’s remarks, Price said he did not want to get ahead of the Iraqi investigation. “We have seen a number of aggressive actions conducted by Iran-backed groups, including in Iraq. But when it comes to this attack, I wouldn’t want to characterize what the investigation has uncovered yet or what it may uncover in the days to come. We will stay in close touch with our Iraqi partners on that,” he went on to say. Price expressed Washington’s concerns with the proliferation of drone technology – some of it Iranian-made – in the region. He noted that just days ago, the US had announced additional policy tools to pursue those who have been responsible for proliferating some of this technology in the region.

High Council of State Chief Calls for Boycott of Libya Elections

Cairo - Khaled Mahmoud/Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday, 10 November, 2021
Head of Libya’s High Council of State, Khalid al-Mishri called on Tuesday for a “peaceful sit-in” in front of the headquarters of the High National Election Commission in protest against the laws that will be adopted for the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. Mishri, a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood and one of Turkey’s most important allies in western Libya, met in Tripoli on Tuesday with several members of the parliament and state council. He also met with municipal chiefs, heads of syndicates and other prominent officials.During the meeting, he urged new escalation against the elections, calling for a boycott, whether by voters or candidates, in protest against the laws that will be adopted for the polls. Addressing whom he described as supporters of the elections - countries, voters and candidates alike, he said: “We warn you, do not underestimate our backers.”The closing statement from the meeting said that holding the presidential elections without a constitutional foundation “paves the way for dictatorship, regardless of the results.”It urged listening to the voice of the people and their choices, holding head of the elections commission and a number of lawmakers responsible for all consequences that could eliminate all steps that support stability. Meanwhile, first deputy speaker of parliament, Fawzi Al Noueiri urged the elections commission to amend Article 12 of the presidential elections law in what observers said was a precursor for allowing head of the Government of National Unity (GNU), Abdulhamid Dbeibeh to run for president. Fifty-six lawmakers have also backed Al Noueri’s demand.The article stipulates that presidential elections candidates must stop all political work three months before the elections are held. Dbeibeh is still practicing his duties as head of government. The elections are scheduled for December.

Arab Coalition Destroys Houthi Defense System in Marib
Asharq Al-Awsat/Wednesday, 10 November, 2021
The Saudi-led Arab coalition announced on Wednesday that it has destroyed an air defense system belonging to the Iran-backed Houthi militias in southern Marib in Yemen. The coalition stressed that it constantly firmly deals with the sources of threat in order to protect civilians and civilian locations from hostile attacks.

Jordan Says King Abdullah Met with Israeli Islamist Lawmaker
Associated Press/November 10/2021
The head of the Islamist party in Israel's governing coalition has met with Jordan's King Abdullah II in Amman, the latest sign of warming ties between the two countries. The Jordanian Royal Palace said in a statement that Abdullah and United Arab List lawmaker Mansour Abbas discussed "the latest developments in the Palestinian territories and ways to advance the peace process." The king restated his commitment to a two-state solution to the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Abbas's office confirmed that he met with the Jordanian leader in Amman, but provided no additional details.Abbas and his four-seat United Arab List made history in June by becoming the first Arab party to join an Israeli ruling coalition, enabling Prime Minister Naftali Bennett to form a government and oust longtime leader Benjamin Netanyahu. Since the inauguration of Israel's new government in June, Bennett has prioritized mending fences with neighboring Jordan. In September, Israeli President Isaac Herzog met Abdullah in the Jordanian capital less than two months after Bennett met Abdullah in secret. The two countries signed a peace accord in 1994 and share close security ties, but recent years saw relations sour over Israeli policies toward the Palestinians and frictions at the contested Jerusalem holy site known to Jews as the Temple Mount and Muslims as the Noble Sanctuary.

Extended Collaboration between Qatar Fund for Development and UNRWA

Naharnet/November 10/2021. 
The Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD) has announced a US$ 18 million contribution to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in support of its core resources for 2021 and 2022. The total contribution of US$ 18 million will be disbursed in multiple tranches, with US$ 10 million in 2021 and US$ 8 million in 2022. Qatar is the first Arab country to have ever signed a multi-year agreement with UNRWA in 2018 -- with the previous agreement covering core UNRWA resources throughout 2019 and 2020. Furthermore, QFFD has contributed US$ 7 million to UNRWA in support of its emergency program in Syria. "This generous contribution will cover urgently needed cash assistance, education, health and vocational training program for Palestine refugees in Syria," UNRWA said in a statement. "The general situation in Syria is still causing immense challenges for Palestine refugees. This contribution from QFFD comes at a much-needed time due to the deteriorating living situation and difficult socioeconomic conditions inside Syria which are further impacting an already vulnerable Palestine refugee population, with increasing levels of poverty and food insecurity, as well as fuel and electricity shortages," it added. During his visit to Doha, UNRWA Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini signed the partnership agreement with QFFD Director General, Khalifa Jassim Al Kuwari. “UNRWA is extremely proud of its partnership with QFFD and the government of Qatar,” said Lazzarini. “Their regular support over several decades has greatly contributed to the Agency’s ability to deliver health, education and lifesaving services to Palestine refugees.” In commenting on the timeliness of this "outstanding show of support," he said: “At a time of intense pressure on our Agency, the generosity of the government of Qatar and QFFD sends a clear message of solidarity to the Palestine refugees.”UNRWA said it is intensifying its outreach to donors and partners ahead of the International Conference on UNRWA that will be held in Brussels on 16 November under the chairmanship of Jordan and Sweden. The conference is seeking to establish a plan whereby the international community provides the Agency with sufficient and sustainable funding to allow the continuation and modernization of the services that Palestine refugees receive as part of the UNRWA mandate from the United Nations General Assembly.

In calling for talks with Ethiopia, was Egypt’s FM disconnected from events or trying to score points?
The Arab Weekly/November 10/2021
CAIRO--When he called on the Ethiopian government to resume negotiations on the Renaissance Dam “as soon as possible,” was Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry betraying a total disconnect from realities on the ground in the Horn of Africa or was he making an awkward diplomatic move aimed at scoring points against Addis Ababa? That is the question on the minds of many Egyptian experts. A number of analysts said Shoukry’s call showed the depth of the crisis faced by Egyptian diplomacy and its obliviousness to developments in the neighbouring region, even though such developments are crucial to Egypt’s vital interests and its formulation of pertinent diplomatic positions. The Egyptian chief diplomat, they point out, did not seem to recognise that the Ethiopian government faces an existential challenge with the advance of armed rebels.
The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and its ally the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) have claimed several victories in recent weeks, taking towns about 400 kilometres from the Ethiopian capital and have not ruled out marching on Addis Ababa. The escalating military situation is likely to push Abi Ahmed to adopt more hardline stances in various issues, especially the Renaissance Dam crisis. But even more likely is the inability of his government to talk about any such “side issues” as foreign concerns are definitely in the back burner.
In a statement he made after meeting with his US counterpart, Anthony Blinken, on Monday, the Egyptian foreign minister called for quick resumption of negotiations with Addis Ababa over the Renaissance dam dispute. His comments raised questions in Cairo and other capitals about the rationale for Shoukry’s talk about negotiations with Ethiopia at this particular juncture. Analysts said Shoukry, who knows very well that the situation in Addis Ababa would not allow the government to resume negotiations, seemed to be repeating diplomatic clichés that were out of time and place. Egyptian political sources told The Arab Weekly they worried such official statements could hurt Egypt’s diplomatic credibility and reflect negatively on its performance in discussing vital foreign issues, especially in key world capitals such as Washington. The sources revealed that Egypt’s security agencies and political bodies outside the foreign ministry have had to intervene on previous occasions to correct and limit the damage from ill-considered statements.
Some Egyptian commentators tried to defend Shoukry’s utterances arguing the chief diplomat was just highlighting his country’s commitment to a peaceful settlement and avoiding hints of a possible recourse to the military option in the dispute with Ethiopia.
The director of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, former ambassador Ezzat Saad, told The Arab Weekly that Shoukry’s statement was meant to emphasise Egypt’s principled position on peaceful settlement of the dispute, regardless of changing conditions in Ethiopia. He added that the minister attempted to score points in Washington at the expense of Addis Ababa in response to Ethiopia’s bellicose and hostile statements in the dam row. Others said Shoukry was merely echoing the stance expressed by US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken.
“The crisis in Ethiopia also puts the stability of the Horn of Africa at risk,” Blinken said. “We continue to engage with all parties to the conflict and with partners in the region to encourage peace negotiations without preconditions in pursuit of a ceasefire.”The US chief diplomat added that despite the tumult, the US continues to support a negotiated agreement to the dispute between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam that addresses the interests of all parties. But a number of political sources in Cairo worried Shoukry could be displaying limited grasp of the Renaissance Dam crisis and the prospects of diplomatic resolution of the dispute. This, they say, explains why ten years have elapsed since the onset of the crisis with no tangible progress being achieved.
The sources revealed that in a memorandum submitted before leaving his position recently, Egypt’s former envoy to the United Nations, Mohamed Idris, enumerated a number of errors he said had plagued his country’s diplomatic approach. He held Shoukry personally responsible for Cairo’s failures in managing the Renaissance Dam issue at the last session held by the UN Security Council on the dam crisis. The sources added that Shoukry could have used his visit to Washington, where he attended US-Egyptian Strategic dialogue meetings, to argue that the serious problems Ethiopia faces today show that the international community should have intervened to save Ethiopia first from its own prime minister.
They pointed out to other cases in which they claim Shoukri failed to adequately manage diplomatic issues with other countries such as Libya, where the appointed Egyptian chargé still works from a hotel room because the Egyptian embassy building in Tripoli has yet to open despite announcements to the contrary.

UAE FM visits Syria as US tries to slow down regional momentum
The Arab Weekly/November 10/2021
DAMASCUS--The United Arab Emirates’ top diplomat met Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus Tuesday for the first time since Syria’s war began, triggering US criticism aimed at slowing down the momentum for Arab normalisation with Syria. The visit is widely seen as a sign of regional efforts to end Assad’s diplomatic isolation as Syria grapples with a spiralling economic crisis caused by years of conflict and compounded by Western sanctions. “President Assad received UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan” and an accompanying delegation, Syrian state news agency SANA said.
“They discussed bilateral relations between the two brotherly countries and ways to develop cooperation in different sectors that are of common interest,” it added. The meeting is the latest sign of warming ties between Syria and the UAE after the oil-rich Gulf state broke ties with Damascus in February 2012. According to UAE state media, the foreign minister “underlined the UAE’s keenness on ensuring the security, stability and unity of Syria”. During the talks he also expressed “support for all efforts made to end the Syrian crisis, consolidate stability in the country and meet the aspirations of the Syrian people,” the official WAM news agency said. But the UAE’s ally Washington quickly expressed concern over the signal sent by the encounter. “This administration will not express any support for efforts to normalise or rehabilitate Bashar al-Assad, who is a brutal dictator,” State Department spokesman Ned Price told reporters.
The UAE severed relations as Syria’s repression of nationwide protests demanding regime change was escalating into a devastating war with many regional world powers backing different factions in the conflict, which has left nearly half a million people dead. Syria is backed by the Gulf states’ regional rival Iran, but in December 2018 the UAE reopened its embassy in Damascus, suggesting an effort to bring the Syrian government back into the Arab fold. The move was followed by the UAE’s calling in March this year for Syria to return to the Arab League — having been a key backer of its suspension in November 2011.
‘Arab fold’
Egypt, home of the pan-Arab body, said Tuesday that relations should eventually be restored with Syria but that Damascus needed to first address concerns such as the humanitarian effects of the war. Addressing the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, Egypt’s Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry said that Syria needed to “show greater moderation in how it regains the trust of both the region and in its own internal dynamics”. Damascus is struggling to secure international aid, namely from oil-rich Arab regional neighbours that supported the opposition in the early days of the war. Last month, the UAE’s economy ministry said it agreed with Syria on “future plans to enhance economic cooperation and explore new sectors”.A ministry statement said the UAE was Syria’s most prominent global trade partner, with a 14 percent share of Syria’s foreign trade. Also last month, Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan discussed developments in Syria with Assad in the second call between the two leaders since March last year.
Emirati channel
Analyst Nicholas Heras of Newlines Institute in Washington said that the “UAE is Assad’s lifeline” in light of crippling Western sanctions. “Damascus needs the Emirati channel… to eventually access critical funding and business acumen for an Assad-led reconstruction process in Syria,” Heras said. The UAE is not the only Arab country moving closer to Assad’s government. In October, Assad called King Abdullah II of Jordan for the first time since the start of Syria’s conflict. The two neighbours had reopened a major border crossing days earlier. The UAE is one of the six Gulf Cooperation Council member states that took a tough stance against Damascus in 2012 and eventually recognised an opposition umbrella group as the representative of Syria. Some regional powers see warming up to Damascus as a way of luring Syria away from the exclusive regional influence of Iran — a staunch supporter of Assad’s government that has expanded its military footprint in Syria throughout the course of the conflict.Saudi has also moved closer to Syria with a number of contacts made with Damascus in recent months. The US is trying to slow down the process of Arab normalisation with Syria as its seeks concessions from the Assad regime over its political and constitutional plans for the future and ties to Iran, Russia and militant groups in the region.

French-Moroccan Audrey Azoulay re-elected as UNESCO chief
The Arab Weekly/November 10/2021
PARIS – The UN cultural agency UNESCO on Tuesday re-elected French-Moroccan Audrey Azoulay as its director-general for a second mandate, with the former French culture minister hailing a new confidence and unity in the organisation. UNESCO had been riven by divisions when Azoulay took office in 2017 with both Israel and the United States exiting the agency over accusations of anti-Israeli bias. Unchallenged, Azoulay won her new mandate at UNESCO’s general conference with 155 votes in favour, just nine against and one abstention. “I see this result as a sign of regained unity within our organisation. Over the last four years, we have been able to restore confidence in UNESCO, and in some respects this has also been about restoring UNESCO’s confidence in itself,” she said. “We regained serenity by reducing the political tensions that stood in our way and by looking for common positions on subjects that were divisive in the past,” she added. UNESCO, which in 2020-21 received total funding of $1.4 billion from compulsory member contributions and donations, has been at the forefront of high-profile projects such as rebuilding the old city of Mosul in Iraq and schools in the Lebanese capital Beirut damaged by the August 2020 blast. Azoulay’s greatest challenge for her second four-year term will be seeking to woo Israel and the US back into the organisation, which oversees the coveted World Heritage label for humanity’s most cherished sites worldwide. A source close to Azoulay, who asked not to be named, said that there were “positive signs” that the two countries could be considering a return. For some, the return of the US would be a welcome balance to the growing importance and influence of China which now makes up over 15 percent of the total compulsory budget contributions.
Azoulay was born in France to a Jewish Moroccan family. Her father, Andre Azoulay, has been a royal adviser in Morocco since 1991.

The Latest The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on November 10-11/2021
Khalifa Haftar Can Make or Break Libya’s Paris Peace Conference

Ahmed Charai/The National/November 10/2021.
America’s support for the Libyan peace process is strongly signaled by the presence of U.S. vice president Kamala Harris. Her attendance means that the White House is paying attention and also that the administration is setting the stage to take credit for what may be an historic achievement—ending the civil war that has attracted legions of foreign mercenaries and slaughtered tens of thousands of Libyans.
“We want to show our support for the Libyan people as they move toward national elections and as they focus on the importance of the withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries," White House officials said.
America pushed for national elections and the expulsion of foreign fighters and it prevailed on both counts. National elections are now scheduled for the end of December 2021 to replace an interim government in Tripoli led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dabaiba. Also, the interim government has asked all foreign military forces, in particular the mercenaries affiliated with Turkey and Russia, to leave Libya before those elections. While Libyans may be able to decide their future in a free and fair election at year’s end, it is unlikely that the Turkish and Russian-backed forces will exit without additional pressure.
Like Caesar’s Gaul, Libya is divided into three parts. In the east—between Benghazi and the Egyptian frontier—sit Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s forces. They have repeatedly tangled with Libyan Arab Armed Forces, the nation’s official army, and the periodic gun battles have deterred rebuilding efforts and demoralized the population.
In the west, a motley mix of Russian-funded mercenaries, Turkish-backed paramilitaries, nascent Islamist militias, and tribal warlords are fighting for dominance. In the center, Haftar’s soldiers control large swaths of land while the central government holds sway in many cities and large towns.
Another year of war will not change this painful, political geography. What’s heartening is that most of the partisans in this civil war seem to realize that basic fact. Hence the Paris peace conference. The key challenge ahead is managing the election and the peaceful transfer of power, both scheduled to occur in the coming months.
A first step is demilitarizing the jagged frontline in this east-west civil war, the central lands nominally controlled by the official government. Here, Haftar, whose forces still control most of eastern and central Libya, has surprised many observers by endorsing a new government and the coming elections. This suggests the general sees an opportunity: although he was in danger of being marginalized after a stinging defeat last year, both he and the central government know that any new government will need the general’s support to be successful. While Haftar’s endorsement may be to his own political advantage, it is also to his nation’s advantage by bringing peace one step closer. Haftar, a former resident of northern Virginia, still sits astride oil terminals, with enough firepower and political sway to thwart any plans for peace. His role in partially lifting an oil blockade in 2020 shows that he remains a linchpin in eastern Libya, where he has built up a security apparatus over the past six years.
Striking a deal with Haftar would probably help secure Libya's stability and strengthen U.S. influence in the region. It would also give Vice President Harris a winning hand at the Paris conference.
President Joe Biden likes to say that “America is back.” In Paris next week, the Biden administration should act to give hopes to millions of Libyans who yearn for a better life
*Ahmed Charai is a publisher of The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune. He is on the board of directors for the Atlantic Council, an international counselor of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, and a member of the Advisory Board of The Center for the National Interest.

Biden Administration Hesitates to Condemn Iranian Terrorism in Iraq

Hussain Abdul-Hussain/The National/November 10/2021
If Washington and the West stand behind the anti-Iran coalition, it might be able to overcome Tehran and disband its troublemaking militias.
Proxies of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) sent an exploding drone to assassinate the prime minister of Iraq, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, on Sunday morning, according to reporting by Reuters. Kadhimi survived. The U.S. State Department condemned “this apparent act of terrorism” but refused to name the perpetrator. If the Biden administration offers nothing more than this tepid response, one should expect Tehran to escalate its violent campaign to overturn the result of last month’s general election in Iraq, which resulted in a historic defeat for pro-Iran forces.
Of all the armies and militias in the Middle East, the one that uses explosive drones in its attacks the most is the IRGC and its proxy militias. Hence Iran’s fingerprints on the failed attempt to eliminate Kadhimi were too obvious to hide.
Tehran denounced the attack, but its real message for Iraqis was that a bloodbath awaits those who insist on forming a government that reflects the results of the October election.
Voters delivered a humiliating defeat last month for Iran’s Iraqi Shiite militias, whose bloc shrank from forty-eight to nineteen seats in Iraq’s 329-member parliament. Nationalist and anti-Tehran parties surged, but no coalition won a majority; Forming a government would be challenging even in the absence of Iranian threats.
Kadhimi did not run for election and has no bloc or constituency of his own, which makes the attempt to kill him an odd choice for Iran, at least at first glance. But it is exactly Kadhimi’s non-partisanship that has won him—and by extension the October 10 elections—immense credibility. That makes him a stumbling block in the way of Tehran’s efforts to annul the results.
Iran’s methods in Iraq come straight out of its playbook for Lebanon, where Tehran employed Hezbollah to reverse the verdict at the polls. An anti-Iran coalition prevailed in Lebanon in 2005 and 2009, but Hezbollah militias that operate outside the law repeatedly shut down the government. Facing coercion, the Lebanese Parliament approved Hezbollah’s preferred candidate for president as well as changes to electoral law that eventually allowed the party to prevail in the 2018 election.
Behind a democratic façade, Hezbollah now calls the shots in Beirut. Over the past few weeks, for example, the party has forced Lebanon’s cabinet to suspend its meetings because the cabinet will not dismiss the judge investigating a massive explosion last year at the Beirut Port.
Tehran’s proxies in Iraq are also trying to shut down the state. In early November, militias held a sit-in in Baghdad in protest of the election results. When their protest went unnoticed, protesters affiliated with the militias tried to swarm the Green Zone, a heavily protected area that houses the residences of top Iraqi officials and the U.S. Embassy.
Facing an advancing mob, security forces opened fire and killed at least one individual. The mob retreated, but Iran escalated by ordering the attempt on Kadhimi’s life.
Iran and its proxies are now trying to deflect blame for the failed assassination attempt. Saeed Khatibzadeh, the spokesman of Iran’s Foreign Ministry, condemned the attack and warned of “security conspiracies.” Qais al-Khazaali, chief of the pro-Iran militia Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, said that because no one was killed, a committee should be formed to investigate the attack and make sure that it was not an accidental explosion.
Khazaali, like Khatibzadeh, also warned of a foreign conspiracy to start a civil war.
Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the only one of Iran’s allies whose bloc performed well in the October elections, taking thirty seats, reiterated the claim that “the enemies of Iraq” were trying to start a civil war.
Instead of promising to help Baghdad bring the perpetrators to justice, the Biden administration only offered assistance in investigating the attack. This signal of a tame response will likely persuade Iran that it has nothing to lose by ordering its militias to engage in more violence. Tehran’s goal will be to annul the results of the election, if not officially, at least practically through the formation of a militia-friendly cabinet.
Iraq is not a lost cause, however, and has advantages compared to Lebanon. First of all, it is simply much bigger and would be harder for Iran to digest. The Shiite, Sunni, Kurdish, and independents who did well in last month’s elections recognize the severity of the problem and vowed to disband the militias. Most importantly, this multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian coalition enjoys the full support of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the top Shiite religious authority in the world, based in the southern Iraqi city of Najaf.
If Washington and the West stand behind the anti-Iran coalition, it might be able to overcome Tehran and disband its troublemaking militias.
*Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD, a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy. He Tweets @hahussain.

Why Turkey and Azerbaijan Won’t Get a Corridor Across Armenia

Michael Rubin/The National/November 10/2021
If Turks hope to enjoy unhampered trade with Central Asia all the way to the Chinese border, then Armenians in Artsakh should enjoy the same unhampered trade through Turkey all the way to France or the United Kingdom.
It has now been one year since Armenia and Azerbaijan accepted a ceasefire ending the forty-four-day war between Azerbaijan and Artsakh, the unrecognized Armenian state in Nagorno-Karabakh. The war left Artsakh as a rump state and saw Armenia return Azerbaijani districts that it had occupied during the first war with Azerbaijan shortly after the Soviet Union’s fall. The agreement, published on the Kremlin website, also allowed Russia to insert nearly 2,000 troops as peacekeepers between the two sides and called for an exchange of prisoners of war and other hostages. The final clause declared:
All economic and transport connections in the region shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to arrange unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions. The Border Guard Service of the Russian Federal Security Service shall be responsible for overseeing the transport connections.
In recent months, however, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev have sought to redefine the clause in two important ways. Firstly, they interpret it as granting them a corridor that will bisect sovereign Armenian territory. Secondly, they ignore the first sentence that seeks to unblock economic and transport connections across the region. The Biden administration should make clear such reinterpretation is unwarranted and illegitimate.
Initially, there was optimism among Turks and in Central Asia that vehicular traffic from Nakhchivan, an Azerbaijani exclave separated from the rest of Azerbaijan by Armenia’s Zangezur corridor, could revive the moribund economy in eastern Turkey and expand trade and tourism across Central Asia. Aliyev’s cocky belligerence soon quashed that possibility. “The creation of the Zangezur corridor fully meets our national, historical, and future interests. We will be implementing the Zangezur corridor, whether Armenia wants it or not,” he said earlier this year on Azerbaijan's state-controlled television. That Secretary of State Antony Blinken certified that Azerbaijan had committed itself to diplomacy and eschewed military force just two days after Aliyev made his threat demonstrates either State Department incompetence or a deliberate violation by Blinken of the Freedom Support Act.
Regardless, Turkey supported Aliyev’s bluster. Turkey’s official state-run television channel blamed Joseph Stalin who, while People’s Commissar for Nationalities, awarded Zangezur to Armenia, which the channel claimed was until then Azeri. The irony here, of course, is that Stalin had similarly transferred Nagorno-Karabakh, historically Armenian territory, to Azerbaijan. By laying claim to Zangezur, the Turkish and Azeri governments undermine the legitimacy of Aliyev’s claims to Nagorno-Karabakh. A subsequent Turkish article argued, “The Zangezur Corridor was the most important clause in favor of Azerbaijan and Turkey,” no matter that the ceasefire agreement called for a transport link rather than a formal corridor.
Erdoğan addressed the issue with more finesse than his Azeri partner. He said that any meeting with the Armenian leader to discuss ending Turkey’s blockade of Armenia required first fulfilling Azerbaijan’s demands. “God willing, the problem between Azerbaijan and Armenia will be overcome with the opening of the corridors,” Erdoğan said in September. When Armen Grigoryan, secretary of the Security Council of Armenia, acknowledged in October that Armenian roads could be open to Azerbaijani and Turkish traffic albeit under Armenian control and without a loss of sovereignty, Aliyev again allowed his triumphalism and expansionism to get in the way of a pragmatic solution. Speaking at a joint news conference with Erdoğan, Aliyev said, “Both Turkey and Azerbaijan will take necessary steps for the realization of the Zangezur Corridor… to unite the entire Turkic world."
Both President Joe Biden and Blinken have repeatedly declared that “diplomacy is back,” but when it comes to the South Caucasus, it is absent. This is unfortunate because there is a real opportunity to promote peace within the region and advance American interests. A common refrain among the State Department’s unofficial Turkey lobby and beneficiaries of Azerbaijan’s “caviar diplomacy” is that Azerbaijan is a better ally to the United States than Armenia because of Yerevan’s ties to both Moscow and Tehran. Put aside that, in reality, Azerbaijan’s ties to Russia and Iran have grown exponentially over recent years. If Washington’s goal was to scale back Armenia’s ties to Russia and Iran, then the best way forward would be to pressure Turkey and Azerbaijan to lift their double blockade of Armenia in order to reduce Armenian dependence upon Russia and Iran. Turkey should open its borders to Armenian trade as should Azerbaijan. While Turkey hopes its trucks could drive through Zangezur to Armenia, Armenian vehicles should likewise be able to drive from Yerevan to Istanbul. If Turks hope to enjoy unhampered trade with Central Asia all the way to the Chinese border, then Armenians in Artsakh should enjoy the same unhampered trade through Turkey all the way to France or the United Kingdom.
Aliyev made a mockery of the Section 907 waiver allowing U.S. assistance to the autocratic petrostate. It is time to revoke the waiver until the Azeri dictator proves his commitment to peace and diplomacy by opening Azerbaijan’s borders to Armenian trade. Likewise, if Blinken truly wants to encourage peace in the region, he should recall newly appointed Jeffrey Flake, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey, and direct him to return to Ankara only when he can drive there from the Armenian capital.
*Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he specializes in Iran, Turkey, and the broader Middle East. He also regularly teaches classes at sea about Middle East conflicts, culture, terrorism, and the Horn of Africa to deployed U.S. Navy and Marine units. You can follow him on Twitter: @mrubin1971.

Only Diplomacy Can Save Afghanistan from Disaster
Lise Howard and Michael O'Hanlon/The National/November 10/2021
A deal would not turn Afghanistan into a foreign policy success for the United States and broader global community. But it could help reduce the rates of unnecessary and preventable death in the land of the Hindu Kush.
With winter and starvation looming in Afghanistan, and uncertainty over terrorist threats there growing, it is time for the Biden administration to lead an international effort to cut a deal with the Taliban. We should insist on at least minimal standards for women and minority rights, as well as some travel and press freedoms, in exchange for diplomatic recognition and some limited degree of economic assistance. There must also be dialogue and information sharing on the terrorist threat from Afghanistan, even if the Taliban will not actively collaborate with us against extremists.
The politics of this idea may be unappealing to a Biden administration still reeling from the August debacle, captured by television for all the world to see, in Kabul and the rest of Afghanistan. But this is a manageable risk. After all, whether rightly or not, most Americans agreed with President Joe Biden’s decision to pull out U.S. (and, therefore, all NATO/foreign) forces this year.
Moreover, there has been an important benefit to the rapidity of the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan—relatively little violence, compared with past years as well as the expectations of many for an intensifying civil war. Yet any such silver lining is at dire risk due to the humanitarian situation. With the UN World Food Program and Food and Agricultural Organization both estimating that some 20 million Afghans are in serious danger of food shortages, it is entirely possible that hundreds of thousands of Afghans could die of starvation or famine-related disease this upcoming winter. Such losses would dwarf the rates of violence from the civil war.
We cannot and will not get all we want from the Taliban government. Already, it has refused to broaden its leadership ranks to create the inclusive regime it promised. Some revenge killings have occurred. Women have been removed from all higher ranks of government offices, denied access to higher education and to workspaces; restrictions have been placed on their apparel. Many fear to move about freely. Media have been curtailed, as has travel in and out of the country.
Although NATO and its democratic Afghan allies were defeated in the war, not all is lost. We have considerable leverage if we will use it correctly. So far, the Taliban has not gained access to diplomatic recognition, or to the international bank coffers of the Afghanistan government. The Biden administration has recently agreed to provide more humanitarian assistance through UN agencies, increasing total U.S. assistance to almost one-half billion dollars this year. But even with this aid, health clinics are shutting down while Covid-19 continues to ravage the country, money supplies are inadequate, and food stocks are low after a serious drought and bad harvest in much of the land. The Taliban know all this; they know they need help. They also do not seem anxious to pick a military fight with the United States again, as their imperfect but still considerable collaboration with us in permitting a massive evacuation effort from the country in August attests.
As such, the basic outlines of a deal can be imagined:
-Food and healthcare must be made available to all without prejudice based on gender, religion, or politics.
-Girls and women must have basic educational and legal rights, as must minorities—including access to higher education and to employment opportunities.
-If there is to be some version of Sharia law, it should be instituted only in consultation with other conservative Sunni countries where such legal codes and punishment systems have been moderated over the years.
-There must be no active collaboration between the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and the Taliban must accept that if they cannot control ISIS-K on their territory, the United States may take direct action against it ourselves at times.
-In exchange, the international community will recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan, allow access to some fraction of the country’s foreign holdings each year, and provide considerable humanitarian assistance for years to come as needed (even if substantially less than the aid amounts previously provided).
To make all this work verifiably, the Taliban must accept an international observation force on the ground to monitor these promises. It must also be empowered to investigate any acts of violence that could violate the Taliban’s promises of amnesty to former enemies, and to monitor courts and prisons. While incidents of revenge killings since the Taliban took over do not appear systematic or widespread to date, it is hard to be sure. An international peacekeeping operation under UN auspices, composed mainly of troops from Muslim-majority countries (not to include Afghanistan’s neighbors), could provide the necessary degree of independent confirmation that the basic elements of this package are being adhered to. Such missions are inexpensive and abide by the three doctrinal rules of peacekeeping: consent, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defense. They have a good track record around the world of holding parties to ceasefires or peace agreements accountable through transparency, cajoling, and where necessary the withholding of financial aid. They help deter fresh rounds of civil war as well.
This kind of agreement needs to happen soon if the worst of the winter tragedy is to be mitigated. Such a deal would not turn Afghanistan into a foreign policy success for the United States and broader global community. But it could help preserve what appears to be the one major and underappreciated benefits of the rapid Taliban takeover to date: a reduction in the rates of unnecessary and preventable death in the land of the Hindu Kush.
*Lise Howard, author of Power in Peacekeeping, is professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University, and president of Academic Council on the United Nations System.
*Michael O’Hanlon, author of The Art of War in an Age of Peace: U.S. Grand Strategy and Resolute Restraint, holds the Philip H. Knight Chair in Defense and Strategy at the Brookings Institution.

The Jihad on Mimicry
Raymond Ibrahim/November 10/2021 
A group of young students in France is under severe threat from Muslims. An Oct. 14, 2021 report has the details:
Several Nantes high school students have been subjected to harassment and threats online for several days… It all started with a video shot in January in a private setting and which was not intended to be broadcast…. [T]he 17-second film made during a birthday party shows young people, then in third grade, laughing as they imitate Muslims praying. The images nonetheless ended up on Twitter and Instagram in early October, prompting a torrent of insults and death threats.
On being asked if the students were behaving maliciously, one source acquainted with the incident said it was “more of a very stupid game,” adding, “we can see that things are already going wrong.” Indeed, since then, the death threats to the students have reached the point that “police patrols had to be deployed around the high school frequented by the victims.”
The déjà vu nature of this otherwise unremarkable account is especially interesting. As documented in these two articles, in 2015, a group of Christian students in Egypt made a 30-second iPhone video mocking the Islamic State; they appear laughing and joking, as they pretend to be members of the Islamic State praying to Allah before they pretend to slit the throats of each other, an ISIS trademark.
Rather than doing what France’s Muslims are currently doing—threatening that nation’s young jokesters—Egypt’s Muslims went into full-blown attack mode. One Christian shop owner recounted their wild reaction to learning about the video in 2015:
There were three or four marches in different places in the village, as our village is a very big village. They were chanting slogans against Christians and Christianity. They were chanting: “With our souls and blood, we will defend you, oh Islam! We will not leave you; we will take revenge for you!”
They were pelting Christian homes with stones, pounding threateningly on doors and windows, attacking shops owned by Coptic Christians. They destroyed the door of my shop and they destroyed a photo studio owned by the father of one of the boys.
For three days we were living in terror and panic. We stayed in our homes and our children didn’t go to their schools. We also couldn’t go to church to attend the masses for [Coptic] Holy Week.
Another local Copt described how his home was attacked:
On Thursday evening [4/9/2015], the Muslim demonstrators attacked our home. They pelted it with stones and insulted us. They were shouting, “Oh kafirs (infidels), we can’t let you live here. We will oust you from our village.” They also stole the windows from our home…. We were unable to go to the church during these events. Also, we didn’t go to the church on Saturday to attend the Easter mass. Until now, we have been staying at our homes and are afraid that the attacks against us will be renewed.
After the Muslim mob had had its fill, it was the Muslim authorities’ turn: at least four of the teenagers were arrested on the charge of “insulting Islam,” detained for 45 days, and subjected to “ill-treatment,” according to one human rights group.
Then, in early 2016, three of these Christian teenagers were sentenced to five years imprisonment. The fourth defendant, 15, was handed a juvenile detention for an indefinite period. They “have been sentenced for contempt of Islam and inciting sectarian strife,” explained their defense lawyer, Maher Naguib: “The judge didn’t show any mercy. He handed down the maximum punishment.”
In other words, mocking the Islamic State—which we are regularly assured is an “extremist group” that has little to do with “true” Islam—is, according to Egypt’s judiciary (to say nothing of the people) tantamount to expressing “contempt of Islam,” and therefore deserving of punishment “without mercy.”
What can be learned from these two cases of non-Muslims miming Muslims—the one from Egypt the other from France?
First, any claims that those Muslims currently threatening students in France are “extremists” or “radicals,” or that they “do not represent Islam”—as we are often and forever told whenever a Muslim “misbehaves”—must be rejected out of hand: when the same exact thing happened in Egypt, Muslims everywhere rose in violence and the authorities themselves arrested, abused, and sentenced the “blasphemers” to prison.
That’s because if you want to know how Islam truly behaves, especially vis-à-vis the infidel, see how it behaves on its own turf, where it is in a position of power and authority, as opposed to where it is a minority faith (e.g., France). Nor is Egypt alone; most Muslim nations exhibit such wild reactions to and have severe laws against “blasphemy.” It seems to be a near-weekly occurrence in Pakistan.
Here, then, is yet another example that the sort of behavior Westerners find extremely distasteful—threatening to kill children or teenagers because you find their private jests offensive—is 100 percent Islamic.

How Palestinian Leaders Inflict Pain on Their People; EU Shrugs
Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/November 10/2021
The peaceful protests were swiftly and violently crushed by the Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces. Again, those protests and the crackdown did not seem to be of any interest to many in the international community, especially the Western donors that fund the PA. Had the demonstrations taken place against Israel, they would doubtless have received extensive coverage and howls of outrage from the mainstream media in the West.
The protesters have appealed to the European Union for help, to no avail. Attempts by the protesters to gain the attention to their plight from the international media have also been totally ignored. This is the same EU that is quick to criticize Israel over the issue of construction in the settlements....
Abbas's sanctions... have made the civil servants and their families vulnerable to extreme poverty. — Salah Abdel Ati, head of the International Commission to Support the Rights of the Palestinian People, Alwatanvoice.com, November 3, 2021.
According to [Hamed] Abu Wadi, the PA leadership cut off the salaries as a means of silencing and punishing its critics.
"You are the ones who provide aid to the Palestinian Authority, which is depriving us of our salaries and rights in violation of the law." — Hamed Abu Wadi, civil servant affected by Abbas's sanctions, addressing the European Union; Facebook, October 25, 2021.
Palestinian leaders are punishing their own people as part of the power struggle between the PA and Hamas. Again, this is happening as the world turns away from the perpetrators and fixes its obsessive gaze on Israel.
If the Biden administration is serious about reviving a peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, it should start by trying to make peace between the Palestinian mini-state in the Gaza Strip and Abbas's PA entity in the West Bank.
If the EU really cares about ending the suffering of the Palestinians, it first needs to hold Abbas responsible for imposing sanctions on his people and to demand that Hamas cease using the Gaza Strip as a launching pad for waging jihad (holy war) on Israel.
The peaceful protests were swiftly and violently crushed by the Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces. Again, those protests and the crackdown did not seem to be of any interest to many in the international community, especially the Western donors that fund the PA. Pictured: A bleeding protester scuffles with PA security forces during a demonstration in Ramallah on June 24, 2021.
When Palestinians living in the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip demonstrate against Israel, many in the international community, including the mainstream media, are quick to notice the protest.
It seems much less newsworthy, however, when the Palestinians take to the streets to protest against Palestinian leaders, including the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas.
When foreign journalists talk about the dire economic situation in the Gaza Strip, they tend to neglect mentioning the responsibility of the PA and Hamas for the suffering of the Palestinians living there. Instead, the journalists almost always choose to pile the blame on Israel. Somehow, no effort is made to hold the PA or Hamas governments accountable for the misery of their people.
The two rival parties have been at each other's throats since 2007, when Hamas staged a violent coup against the PA, threw PA officials from the top floor of high buildings, and seized control of the entire Gaza Strip. Since then, Hamas has turned the Gaza Strip into a base for Iranian-backed terrorist groups and a launching pad for firing thousands of rockets at Israel.
On the other side of Israel, in the West Bank, the PA, for its part, has since been making huge efforts to topple the Hamas regime, including by imposing financial sanctions on the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in the hope that a harsh way of life will induce the residents one day to revolt against Hamas.
In recent weeks, hundreds of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip have been protesting sanctions imposed on them by the PA in the West Bank, including cutting off salaries to civil servants who are suspected of not being sufficiently loyal to the Palestinian leadership in the West Bank.
The protesters have appealed to the European Union for help, to no avail. Attempts by the protesters to gain the attention to their plight from the international media have also been totally ignored. This is the same EU that is quick to criticize Israel over the issue of construction in the settlements or other measures, such as the recent decision to label six Palestinian NGOs as terrorist organizations because of their affiliation with the PLO's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States and Europe.
In 2017, PA President Mahmoud Abbas imposed a series of financial sanctions on the Gaza Strip as part of his effort to undermine Hamas. The sanctions included, among other things, cutting off salaries to thousands of civil servants, halting financial aid to needy families and refusing to pay for electricity supplied by Israel to the Gaza Strip. In addition, Abbas suspended funding medical transfers for patients from the Gaza Strip to hospitals in the West Bank.
The sanctions triggered a wave of protests in the West Bank, where Palestinians took to the streets to demand that Abbas immediately lift the sanctions. The peaceful protests were swiftly and violently crushed by the PA security forces. Again, those protests and the crackdown did not seem to be of any interest to many in the international community, especially the Western donors that fund the PA. Had the demonstrations taken place against Israel, they would doubtless have received extensive coverage and howls of outrage from the mainstream media in the West.
The same, of course, applies to the recent anti-PA protest in the Gaza Strip. The protesters are accusing Abbas of discrimination because his sanctions target only Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip.
Salah Abdel Ati, head of the International Commission to Support the Rights of the Palestinian People, said that the continued suffering of civil servants whose salaries were suspended by Abbas was the "result of the discriminatory policies of the Palestinian Authority."
Abdel Ati accused Abbas of failing to implement court rulings ordering the PA to restore the salaries and rescind its decision to force thousands of employees into early retirement.
Abbas's sanctions, he added, have made the civil servants and their families vulnerable to extreme poverty.
On October 31, a committee representing 600 Palestinians whose salaries were cut off by Abbas organized a sit-in in front of the headquarters of the Fatah faction (headed by Abbas) in the Gaza Strip to demand an end the sanctions.
The protesters accused the PA leadership of punishing Palestinians in the Gaza Strip for their alleged affiliation with Abbas's political rivals, including Hamas and ousted Fatah leader Mohammed Dahlan, an outspoken critic of the Palestinian leader.
Earlier, the committee sent a message to the EU in which they complained about Abbas's punitive measures against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. The message was sent ahead of a visit to a number of EU countries by PA Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh.
Hamed Abu Wadi, one of the civil servants affected by Abbas's sanctions, appealed to the EU countries to pressure the PA government to resume the payment of the salaries.
According to Abu Wadi, the PA leadership cut off the salaries as a means of silencing and punishing its critics.
Addressing the EU, he wrote: "You are the ones who provide aid to the Palestinian Authority, which is depriving us of our salaries and rights in violation of the law."
Another victim, Emad Abu Taha, also called on the EU to exert pressure on the PA to respect the law and implement judicial rulings to restore the salaries of the employees.
In addition to the civil servants, Abbas's sanctions have also affected dozens of Palestinian prisoners from the Gaza Strip who are being held in Israeli prison for security-related offenses.
The prisoners have reportedly threatened to go on a hunger strike in protest of Abbas's sanctions, saying the PA leadership has ignored repeated appeals to restore their salaries.
Abbas did not suspend the payments to the prisoners because of their involvement in terrorism. His policy of paying allowances to thousands of prisoners and families of Palestinians killed while carrying out attacks against Israelis remains in effect. Since the PA was established in 1994, it has spent billions of dollars paying monthly salaries to imprisoned and released terrorists, and allowances to wounded terrorists and the families of dead terrorists.
Instead, Abbas decided to punish the prisoners from the Gaza Strip because of their affiliation with his political rivals.
The families of the prisoners said that they sent a letter to Abbas, but have not received any reply. The families are now threatening to step up their protests against Abbas's measures, which, they added, are "a clear violation of Palestinian laws."
Again, Palestinian leaders are punishing their own people as part of the power struggle between the PA and Hamas. Again, this is happening as the world turns away from the perpetrators and fixes its obsessive gaze on Israel.
If the Biden administration is serious about reviving a peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, it should start by trying to make peace between the Palestinian mini-state in the Gaza Strip and Abbas's PA entity in the West Bank.
If the EU really cares about ending the suffering of the Palestinians, it first needs to hold Abbas responsible for imposing sanctions on his people and to cease using the Gaza Strip as a launching pad for waging jihad (holy war) on Israel. This -- and not daily doses of Israel-denunciation -- is the sole means of helping the Palestinians and achieving stability and peace in the Middle East.
*Khaled Abu Toameh is an award-winning journalist based in Jerusalem.
© 2021 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.

Libya’s zero-sum game
Habib Lassoued/The Arab Weekly/November 10/2021
Libyan watchers will have to pay close attention to developments in the North African country in the coming days. They should expect surprises at any moment, especially with the presidential elections, now that the registration of candidates has started for the first round of the ballot scheduled for December 24. The House of Representatives decided that presidential elections would take place before the legislative ballot. Now, there are two possibilities. The first is that one of the presidential candidates wins in the first round an absolute majority, (50 percent of the votes plus 1) and is thus declared the winner. But a date for the legislative elections would remain to be set. The second possibility is that the first round does not produce a winner with an absolute majority, which would require a second round. The date of second round will be set by the Electoral Commission and is likely to coincide with the day of the legislative elections, which could be about 52 days after the first presidential ballot, which puts it on the anniversary of the Libyan uprising, on February 17. Libya is still divided horizontally and vertically. Its society, authority and military are split. There is no real will to achieve national reconciliation nor unify the armed forces. Indeed, the country is so divided that the main candidates will be unable to travel and campaign all around the country.
Libya’s presidential race is, in this way, unique. Candidates calling for unity find themselves to be the cause of sharp disunity among voters. So far, all indications are that the country may once again be hurled into a cycle of violence and chaos, as the militias are still keeping their weapons, foreign mercenaries remain stationed in their camps and the trumpets of hatred are still being blown. If he wins the elections, Haftar will have to exercise his functions from Benghazi or from Sirte, using one of them as a temporary alternative capital. Meanwhile the western region and Tripoli, could actually secede from his authority. Indeed, Libya may be heading for actual partition, as previously threatened by a number of Misratan notables, Brotherhood leaders and warlords. The so-called February 17 movement, or Revolutionary Current, based in a number of cities, mainly Misrata and Al-Zawiya, wields weapons as well as the keys to wealth in the west of the country, although it is geographically weak. Its influence is virtually limited to the cities of the northwestern coast and the Amazigh regions in the Western Mountains, but insists nonetheless on imposing its will nationwide. It even tells the UN mission and the international community that it will not accept the victory of Haftar or one of the symbols of the former regime, even if that means waging a new war.
There are other figures considering a run for the presidency. The most prominent of them is the Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah, who has used his term in office as premier since mid-March as a campaign platform. He postures as the representative of the rich, whether they made their wealth under the previous regime or during the past ten years. Dbeibah tried at first to postpone the elections, in order to give himself and his government more time to prepare for clinching control of the country during the next phase. However, foreign powers pressured the House of Representatives to issue two laws regulating presidential and parliamentary elections, without heeding the criticisms of the State Council, the Brotherhood and their allies. When Dbeibah tried to overstep his boundaries, his government was censured. All attempts to postpone the elections failed and Dbeibah’s found no support. The premier fell into a trap named Article 12. That article of the election law was drafted by the House of Representatives and custom-tailored to meet the needs of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. It stipulated that whoever wanted to run for president among senior officials must relinquish his public office three months before election day. Haftar did just that and Dbeibah mocked him at first, assuming that the elections would not take place on time. But when the international community insisted on holding the ballot on schedule, Dbeibah sought to persuade the House of Representatives to amend Article 12 based on a proposal from the Electoral Commission, that was endorsed by the United Nations, Germany and Italy. His proposed amendment would have made it possible for any senior official to run for president if he just gave up his position before election day.
The proposal was officially rejected, so the prime minister’s only alternative was to persuade a number of deputies to send a letter to the commission calling on it to amend the article itself. But this was not feasible because the request would have come from outside the parliament and a plenary session. Furthermore, it defied all logic for parliament to accept amendments to the electoral law during the period when candidacies are being registered. But will Dbeibah and his team give up? No one can predict what will happen in the coming hours and days, but what is certain is that there is a battle of wills and an open confrontation between protagonists. In fact, presidential elections could be the starting point for a new crisis making things worse than before, especially since the political players do not recognise each other. Indeed, each one believes his survival depends on the elimination of the other.

Syrian Kurds, weakest link in Russo-Turkish Syrian adventure
Nikola Mikovic/The Arab Weekly/November 10/2021
The fate of the Syrian Kurds depends on lucrative deals between Russia and Turkey. The two countries, as well as the United States, are known for pursuing their political interests in Syria at the expense of the Kurds. How will the latest behind-the-scenes arrangements affect Syria’s largest ethnic minority?
As a small participant in the big Syrian game, the Kurds try to maintain good relations with both Washington and Moscow. They know that the US is a major global power and that Russia has a very strong influence in Damascus. The problem, however, is that the US has repeatedly shown that it is not willing to allow relations with Turkey, a NATO ally, to deteriorate over the Kurds. That is why they have to turn to Russia and their client Bashar Assad for real protection.
Ever since President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan met in the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi on September 29, Turkey has been preparing for a military action in northern Syria. Reports suggest that Ankara plans to carry out a new operation against the Syrian Kurds and capture the city of Tel Rifaat, as well as Kobane, a town known as the Kurdish Stalingrad. Kobane has been under the control of the Kurdish-dominated People’s Protection Units (YPG) since 2012, while Syrian and Russian troops entered the border town in 2019 during an earlier Turkish incursion.
Over the past few weeks, Turkish and Russian officials have been negotiating a deal to address Ankara’s concerns with regards to the YPG, an organisation which Turkey considers a terrorist group due to its links with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Ankara is reportedly considering leaving some small parts of Idlib, Syria’s remaining rebel-held territory, to Russian forces in return for support for an operation in northern Syria. At the same time, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Russian military are in talks to withdraw Kurdish units from areas adjacent to the Turkish border to avoid a military confrontation with Turkey. According to reports, the Russians are trying to convince the SDF to withdraw its fighters from the north of Syria to prevent another Turkish military operation that would have catastrophic consequences for the Kurds. The hope is that the SDF would relocate to the south of the international M4 highway, which is 32 kilometres from the Turkish border.
From a purely military perspective, the Turks seem to be ready to launch an offensive against the YPG. Besides Tel Rifaat and Kobane, other potential target areas would include Manbij, west of the Euphrates and Ain Issa and Tal Tamr, east of the river. The military units of Turkish proxies in Idlib have been put on a full level of combat readiness. Starting another incursion into Syria is now a matter of a political deal between Turkey and Russia.
Policy makers in Ankara are unlikely to have any fears that the Kurds could provide a strong resistance to the Turkish army. Indeed, due to the deteriorating economic situation in Turkey, a small victorious operation in Syria against the Kurds would be more than beneficial for Erdogan. However, it is not very probable that Turkey would start an offensive until it makes a final deal with Russia and gets the green light from the US.
Erdogan and President Joe Biden met in Rome at the G20 Summit on October 30 and the Turkish leader reiterated Ankara’s discomfort over US support for YPG fighters in Syria. Some Syrian Kurds, on the other hand, accuse the US and Russia of inaction in the face of a possible Turkish offensive. Moscow’s position is clear. If the Kurds do not withdraw from certain places in the north of Syria and allow Russian troops and the Syrian Army to establish full control over the region, the Kremlin will simply turn a blind eye to the Turkish actions. It is entirely possible that Russia will first make a deal with Ankara that would include a “land swap”, the Kurdish-controlled territories for a portion of Idlib.
As reported by several Russian and pro-Assad sources, the Syrian Army is preparing for an offensive on parts of Idlib that are controlled by Turkey-backed forces. The action could apparently follow even if Moscow and Ankara do not reach a compromise over the YPG-held territory.
There were also reports that Russia increased the number of jets operating in northern Syria, which could be interpreted as a message to its Turkish partners; do not start a military campaign until we reach the final deal that includes the fate of the M4 highway. For both Moscow and Ankara, the M4 has strategic importance, which is why the highway is expected to eventually be under joint Turkish-Russian control. At this point, the M4 remains closed and the six kilometre-wide security corridors to the north and south of it have not been created.
In the short-term, most likely in December in Kazakhstan’s capital city of Nur-Sultan, Russia and Turkey will probably discuss this issue. Meanwhile, it remains to be seen if Ankara will get the approval for a limited military action in the region. One thing is for sure, regardless of the situation in Syria, Moscow and Ankara will keep doing business as usual. Their situational partnership will prevail over disagreements regarding the position of the Syrian Kurds, the weakest link in the Russo-Turkish Syrian adventure.
Copyright: Syndication Bureau

 بارعة علم الدين:  لحظة الحقيقة في العراق بعد محاولة اغتيال رئيس الوزراء
Iraq’s moment of truth in wake of attempt on PM’s life

Baria Alamuddin /Arab News/November 11/2021
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/104034/104034/

There is no mystery about who tried to kill Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi. The target himself declared: “We know them very well and we will expose them.” Security sources confirmed that the perpetrators were Iran-backed paramilitaries. Al-Kadhimi should publicly name the perpetrators so that there can be no room for doubt that members of Al-Hashd Al-Sha’abi tried to assassinate their own commander-in-chief.
Prior to the attack, Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq leader Qais Al-Khazali issued threats and accusations against Al-Kadhimi. This warlord, who was responsible for overseeing the killings of hundreds of demonstrators in 2019 — and who is culpable for innumerable assassinations and sectarian killings — shamelessly accused the prime minister of cracking down on thuggish Hashd agitators who were seeking to forcibly overturn the election results by throwing rocks at security forces. Al-Khazali then risibly alleged that Iraqi intelligence staged the attack against Al-Kadhimi, who is the former chief of the same intelligence apparatus.
A Kata’ib Hezbollah spokesman quipped: “Nobody in Iraq has the desire to lose a drone over the house of a former prime minister.” And Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada Secretary-General Abu Alaa Al-Wala’i implied that Al-Kadhimi deserved to be assassinated, taunting that he would never again be prime minister.
The Hashd militias believe they can collectively escape accountability; that, whenever the state acts against them, they can flood the capital with their shock troops and assassinate whoever speaks out. They want everybody to know they were responsible — that is the point. They may only be able to win a few pitiful parliamentary seats, but they crave to be perceived as the real power in Iraq, willing to murder anybody who stands in their way.
Sunday’s attack demonstrates how much militants fear Al-Kadhimi obtaining a second term, as he is perhaps the only politician in Iraq with sufficient courage to act against paramilitary dominance. However, as one analyst pointed out, this “stupid and short-sighted move” has already backfired against the militias. It has given Al-Kadhimi greater popular legitimacy, while showing the Hashd up as the murderous, cowardly criminals they are.
Last month’s elections represented a moment of truth for the Iranian proxies in Iraq, Lebanon and elsewhere. Until now, Hezbollah and the Hashd had always been able to gerrymander sufficient support in elections to build parliamentary alliances and exert control over the executive. However, crises in both states have resulted in a spectacular plunge in nationwide popularity for these groups and their allies.
Sunday’s attack has given Al-Kadhimi greater popular legitimacy, while showing the Hashd up as the murderous, cowardly criminals they are.
In Iraq, this saw the Hashd’s Fatah list collapse from about 50 parliamentary seats in 2018 to a pitiful 14 out of 329 seats. Moreover, the January 2020 killing of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani means there is no effective figure to bully rival blocs and compel sectarian Shiite factions to act together, although his hapless replacement, Esmail Ghaani, rushed to Baghdad immediately after the Al-Kadhimi attack in an attempt to manage the fallout from the crisis.
Iran has no intention of relinquishing its billions of dollars of investment in its transnational paramilitary proxies. Thus, if Hezbollah and the Hashd are to retain political dominance, they must enforce this through naked military muscle.
The Al-Kadhimi assassination attempt is a tangible example of this shift toward outright confrontation. In parts of the country, Hashd forces are the de facto powers. Many divisions of the security forces are largely composed of personnel originating from paramilitary groups, particularly the Badr Organization. They owe their primary loyalties to figures like Hadi Al-Amiri. In Lebanon, it is perhaps only a matter of time before we see Hezbollah resorting to assassinations and even more aggressive street-level agitation.
These Iranian proxies are demonstrating their readiness to plunge their nations into full-blown conflict as a means of neutralizing democratic setbacks. In the belief that they are the strongest force on the field, some hard-liners apparently embrace the prospect of war, believing they will emerge supreme.
For the Iraqi state and the international community, the Hashd’s electoral defeat represents an unmissable opportunity to curtail its dominance; through the reduction of its budget, the sidelining of Iran-affiliated hard-liners and by challenging the Hashd’s ability to illegally seek revenues from checkpoints, extortion and crime. Arab states must play a greater role in recalibrating Iraq’s lopsided relationship with its eastern neighbor. The Hashd, Hezbollah and other proxies flourished before the eyes of the world as an instrument of Iran’s aggressive regional brinkmanship. The world has failed to act for too long, and US President Joe Biden cannot afford any further foreign policy disasters after Afghanistan.
The fact that Iraqi militants can try to assassinate the prime minister, then openly taunt him about the attack, demonstrates — as if further proof was needed — that no genuine democratic process can exist in nations where militias can outgun the state, exist outside that state’s laws, and plunge this explosive region into renewed conflict.
It is no longer enough for the international community to applaud Al-Kadhimi’s efforts to restrain the Hashd from afar. Al-Kadhimi became the target and needs muscular Arab and Western backing if Iraq is not to permanently become an ungoverned space, dominated by paramilitaries who believe that they are at war against the civilized world.
The strike against the prime minister’s residence at the heart of Baghdad was a moment of truth: It is time for the people of Iraq and Lebanon to confront their demons of destruction. Recent events prove that they can either prosper as sovereign nations or wither as Iranian colonies.
Al-Kadhimi and his Lebanese counterpart Najib Mikati would find strong nationwide support — and they must be given equally unstinting international support — if they were to seize the opportunity to salvage their nations while they still can.
**Baria Alamuddin is an award-winning journalist and broadcaster in the Middle East and the UK. She is editor of the Media Services Syndicate and has interviewed numerous heads of state.