English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For November 09/2020
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news

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Bible Quotations For today
Jesus Drives Out Of the Temple Sellers and Money Changers ..He said to them: “Stop making my Father’s house a market-place”
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint John 02/13-25:”The Passover of the Jews was near, and Jesus went up to Jerusalem. In the temple he found people selling cattle, sheep, and doves, and the money-changers seated at their tables. Making a whip of cords, he drove all of them out of the temple, both the sheep and the cattle. He also poured out the coins of the money-changers and overturned their tables. He told those who were selling the doves, ‘Take these things out of here! Stop making my Father’s house a market-place!’ His disciples remembered that it was written, ‘Zeal for your house will consume me.’The Jews then said to him, ‘What sign can you show us for doing this?’Jesus answered them, ‘Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up.’The Jews then said, ‘This temple has been under construction for forty-six years, and will you raise it up in three days?’But he was speaking of the temple of his body. After he was raised from the dead, his disciples remembered that he had said this; and they believed the scripture and the word that Jesus had spoken. When he was in Jerusalem during the Passover festival, many believed in his name because they saw the signs that he was doing. But Jesus on his part would not entrust himself to them, because he knew all people and needed no one to testify about anyone; for he himself knew what was in everyone.””

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on November 08-09/2021
Kuwait investigating four suspects over ties with Lebanon’s Hezbollah
Aoun Urges KSA to Differentiate between Stances of State and Individuals
Resignation of Lebanon minister could solve Gulf row: Arab League
Arab League Deputy Head Meets Aoun, Says Might Visit KSA ‘if Needed’
Report: Aoun, Miqati Agree on Need for Kordahi's Resignation
Arab League Says Kordahi Resignation May Resolve KSA Row
Miqati Promises '24/24' Electricity, Says IMF Talks 'on Track'
Higher Judicial Council Holds Lengthy Meeting amid Rift on Mezher
Khalil, Zoaiter to Sue Three Judges in Port Blast Lawsuits Saga
At Least Five Port Blast-Linked Lawsuits Filed on Monday
U.N. and Ministry of Interior Chair Elections Forum in Beirut
Al-Rahi Says 'Obstructors' May be Seeking to 'Secede from State'
Iran Says KSA Must Realize 'Pressures on Lebanon are Futile'
Rising pressure against Lebanon from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states may well be tied to Hezbollah’s role in Yemen./Ahmed Nagi/Carnegie/November 08/2021
On Some Origins of Disputes among the Lebanese/Hazem Saghieh/Asharq Al Awsat/November 08/2021
The judge game/Nicholas Frakes/Now Lebanon/November 08/2021

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on November 08-09/2021
Explosions heard over Syria’s Homs, Tartous: State media
After Kadhimi’s attempted assassination, accommodating pro-Iran militias no longer an option
Iraq’s Kadhimi Chairs Security Meeting after Drone Attack
Powerful Iranian General Visited Iraq after Attack on PM
Iran-backed militia staged attack on Iraq PM - officials, sources
Israel Says Downs Hamas Drone from Gaza
Nearly 20 Years on, Israeli Barrier Shapes Palestinian Lives
6 Palestinian Rights Activists Hacked by NSO Spyware
Kuwait Government Resigns for the Second Time this Year
Saudi-Led Coalition Says 115 Yemeni Rebels Killed

Titles For The Latest The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on November 08-09/2021
Iran and the American Elephant/Tariq Al-Homayed/Asharq Al Awsat/November 08/2021
Terror Terror on the Euphrates and the Hazards of a Challenged Imperialism/Charles Elias Chartouni/November 08/2021
Hamas is an armed front for Iran/Farouk Youssef/The Arab Weekly/November 08/2021
Cultural reinvention keeps great cities from fading/Rym Tina Ghazal/The Arab Weekly/November 08/2021

The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on November 08-09/2021
Kuwait investigating four suspects over ties with Lebanon’s Hezbollah
Ismaeel Naar, Al Arabiya English/08 November ,2021
Kuwait’s Public Prosecution office has begun an investigation with four Kuwaiti citizens accused of having ties with the Lebanese Hezbollah group, according to local media reports. Last Thursday, Kuwaiti security authorities arrested a group accused of working and collaborating with the Lebanese Hezbollah and forming a cell within the country. According to Kuwaiti newspaper al-Seyassah, Kuwait's State Security Service arrested a group that collaborated with Hezbollah and held them on charges of recruiting young people to work with the party in Syria and Yemen. Sources told the newspaper that the Ministry of Interior had received a security report from a neighboring country stating that the group consisted of four people, one of whom is a son of a former Member of Parliament, another a brother of a former MP, a third who was already named in previous cases linked to the hijacking of the Jabriya airplane in the 1980s, and a fourth is said to be a senior figure working in charitable works within Kuwait. Kuwait last month ordered Lebanon’s charge d’affaires to leave the country and recalled its ambassador from Beirut in protest over comments made by a Lebanese cabinet minister criticizing the Arab intervention in Yemen.

Aoun Urges KSA to Differentiate between Stances of State and Individuals
Naharnet/November 08/2021
President Michel Aoun on Monday stressed Lebanon’s keenness on “establishing the best ties with the brotherly Arab countries, especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries,” during talks with Arab League Assistant Secretary-General Hossam Zaki.
Moreover, Aoun emphasized “the need to differentiate between the stances of the Lebanese state and what might be uttered by individuals or groups, especially if they do not hold positions of responsibility, while taking into consideration the requirements of the democratic system which the Lebanese have chosen, which guarantees the freedom of opinion and thought within the law’s regulations.”Underlining to Zaki the need to “address what happened recently between Lebanon and KSA through honest dialogue,” the President welcomed “any effort by the Arab League to restore the brotherly ties.”
“Frankness in such situations is a key factor in reconciling viewpoints and mending any rift, and Lebanon will not hesitate to take any stance that contributes to preparing the atmosphere for such a frank exchange,” Aoun added. He also underscored that any dialogue between the two countries “must take into consideration national sovereignty and mutual keenness on institutionalizing the relations between the two brotherly states so that they do not get affected by any individual or transient incidents.”

Resignation of Lebanon minister could solve Gulf row: Arab League
AFP/09 November ,2021
The Arab League Monday backed the resignation of Lebanon’s information minister whose comments on the Yemen war sparked a damaging diplomatic row with Gulf States. “From the very beginning, the resignation could have defused the crisis,” the League’s assistant secretary general, Hossam Zaki told a news conference in Beirut. “We need stronger confirmation that this step could still happen,” he said following talks with parliament speaker Nabih Berri. Zaki, who also met Prime Minister Najib Mikati and President Michal Aoun said Information Minister George Kordahi’s departure could be a starting point for “detente” between Lebanon and Gulf states. The diplomatic rift, which threatens to plunge Lebanon deeper into meltdown, prompted Saudi Arabia and some of its allies to recall ambassadors and block imports from Lebanon. Import restrictions are a further blow to a country where a weak government is struggling to secure international aid, namely from wealthy Arab neighbors. The dispute was triggered by comments made by Kordahi in an interview taped in August before he became information minister and broadcast in late October. Kordahi characterized the Arab-led intervention in Yemen since 2015 as an “external aggression,” sparking rebukes from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Each of those states support the Arab-led military coalition against the Iran-backed Houthi militia fighting Yemen’s internationally recognized government. The diplomatic rift has prompted calls for the resignation of Kordahi, an ally of the powerful Shiite movement Hezbollah. Hezbollah, which is backed by Riyadh’s archrival Iran, has opposed calls for Kordahi’s resignation, saying he did nothing wrong. And Hezbollah deputy chief Naim Qassem went further on Sunday saying it was up to Saudi Arabia to “apologize.”Kordahi has said stepping down was out of the question. Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan said this month that Hezbollah’s dominance made “dealing with Lebanon pointless for the kingdom.”Read more: US says it understands Saudi Arabia’s concerns after Lebanon rift, calls for dialogue

Arab League Deputy Head Meets Aoun, Says Might Visit KSA ‘if Needed’
Associated Press/Agence France Presse/November 08/2021 
An Arab League delegation led by Assistant Secretary-General Hossam Zaki arrived Monday in Beirut in a bid to resolve Lebanon's row with the Gulf countries. Zaki said after meeting President Michel Aoun in Baabda that he came to see the Lebanese point of view in order to “make an effort to reconcile viewpoints and solve the problem with Saudi Arabia.”He added that the talks with Aoun were positive and “honest as usual.”Zaki stressed that the goal of the Arab League is to protect “the interests of Lebanon and the Gulf and to find a way out of this situation.”“I may visit KSA if needed, but we must first sense an easing of the crisis so that we can move to the next step,” he said. Zaki held talks later in the day with Prime Minister Najib Miqati. "We do not want this situation to continue. We want a breakthrough, a détente in this relationship," Zaki said after meeting Miqati. "We hope the starting point for that will begin here," he added. Zaki stopped short of calling for Kordahi to quit but suggested it was necessary. "There is a crisis that everyone can see and is aware of, and the majority of people know how to solve it," Zaki said. "But not a single step has been taken in that direction and this is necessary."
Miqati's office quoted the prime minister as saying that Lebanon wants normal relations to be restored with Saudi Arabia and Gulf Arab nations, adding that the Arab League can play a role in that. Miqati also said Lebanon will remove all obstacles to restore the relations, according to his office. The spat has threatened to destabilize Miqati's government, formed in September after a 13-month deadlock between rival Lebanese groups. Miqati has urged Information Minister George Kordahi to "do what needs to be done" -- an apparent appeal for him to step down but the minister has so far refused to apologize or resign. Saudi Arabia has withdrawn its ambassador from Beirut and asked the Lebanese envoy to leave the kingdom. It has also banned Lebanese imports, undermining the small nation's foreign trade and depriving it of millions of dollars even as it struggles amid an economic meltdown.
Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have also pulled their ambassadors from Lebanon, deepening the spat. Kordahi, who was named to the government by the Hizbullah-allied Marada Movement, has insisted Yemen's Houthis have the right to defend themselves and said he did not mean to offend with his comments, which were recorded before he became minister.

Report: Aoun, Miqati Agree on Need for Kordahi's Resignation
Naharnet/November 08/2021 
President Michel Aoun and Prime Minister Najib Miqati agree on the need for Information Minister George Kordahi’s resignation, governmental sources said.“They are surprised by his irresponsiveness to their calls for him to act according to his conscience and patriotic sense and to take the resignation decision,” the sources told al-Joumhouria newspaper in remarks published Monday. Kordahi’s resignation “would allow for addressing the crisis with Saudi Arabia, which took its measures against Lebanon based on stances taken by the minister prior to his appointment and also based on clarifications that he made following the eruption of the crisis,” the sources added.The sources also said that Kordahi has likely ignored the resignation calls due to “a host of influences, convictions and factors related to his political future and the interests of some forces that support him.”

Arab League Says Kordahi Resignation May Resolve KSA Row
Agence France Presse/November 08/2021
The Arab League Monday backed the resignation of Lebanon's information minister whose comments on the Yemen war sparked a damaging diplomatic row with Gulf States. "From the very beginning, the resignation could have defused the crisis," the League's assistant secretary general, Hossam Zaki, told a news conference in Beirut. "We need stronger confirmation that this step could still happen," he said following talks with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. Zaki, who also met Prime Minister Najib Miqati and President Michel Aoun, said Information Minister George Kordahi's departure could be a starting point for "detente" between Lebanon and Gulf states. The diplomatic rift, which threatens to plunge Lebanon deeper into meltdown, prompted Saudi Arabia and some of its allies to recall ambassadors and block imports from Lebanon. Import restrictions are a further blow to a country where a fragile government is struggling to secure international aid, namely from wealthy Arab neighbors. The dispute was triggered by comments made by Kordahi in an interview taped in August before he became information minister and broadcast in late October. Kordahi characterized the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen since 2015 as an "external aggression," sparking rebukes from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Each of those states support the Saudi-led military coalition against Iran-backed Huthi rebels fighting Yemen's internationally recognized government. The diplomatic rift has prompted calls for the resignation of Kordahi, an ally of the powerful Iran-backed Hizbullah. Hizbullah has opposed calls for Kordahi's resignation, saying he did nothing wrong. Hizbullah deputy chief Sheikh Naim Qassem went further on Sunday saying it was up to Saudi Arabia to "apologize." Kordahi has said stepping down was out of the question. Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan said this month that Hizbullah's "dominance" made "dealing with Lebanon pointless for the kingdom."

Miqati Promises '24/24' Electricity, Says IMF Talks 'on Track'
Naharnet/November 08/2021
Prime Minister Najib Miqati confirmed Monday that the parliamentary polls will be held before May 21st. "No one can prevent the holding of elections,” he affirmed. He also said that the negotiations with the International Monetary Fund are “on the right track,” and that the World Bank is “fully cooperating.”He added that he is trying to secure funds for the ration card – a monthly cash assistance for needy families – from the World Bank, and that the latter has already offered $295 million to support the public transport section. A plan for economic recovery was set in coordination with the Lazar financial advisory company, Miqati said, adding that his aim is to “protect the depositors’ rights” and to “restore trust in the banking sector.”The prime minister promised “24/24” electricity in the long term. He explained that, in the short term, the Iraqi fuel will secure 12 to 15 hours of electricity per day, but gas and electricity will be delivered to Lebanon from Egypt and Jordan (via Syria,) providing Lebanon with electricity “round the clock, once technical issues are solved.”Miqati stressed that he has sensed an international concern for helping Lebanon to exit its crisis and that the reconstruction of the Beirut Port is a matter of priority.

Higher Judicial Council Holds Lengthy Meeting amid Rift on Mezher
Naharnet/November 08/2021
The Higher Judicial Council has been meeting since 2:30pm to take decisions on dozens of topics, including the issue of Court of Appeals judge Habib Mezher, al-Jadeed TV said on Monday evening. “There is a sharp rift between judges on the issue of Habib Mezher, with a large number of them saying that Mezher did not err by deciding to merge the recusal file against Judge Tarek Bitar with the recusal file against Judge Nassib Elia, because he was officially tasked to be in charge of Chamber 12 of the Civil Court of Appeals,” al-Jadeed added. “Some judges consider that Mezher’s request that Bitar provide him with the complete file of the port probe to be legal, so that he can look into the case, seeing as there is no confidentiality among judges,” the TV network went on to say. Mezher sparked controversy after he started looking into the case against Bitar, with the Court of Appeals announcing that he had been “exclusively” tasked with handling a recusal lawsuit against Court of Appeals judge Nassib Elia. Bitar's probe into the port case was suspended on Thursday after Mezher notified him of a lawsuit filed against him by ex-minister Youssef Fenianos. Mezher also asked Bitar to hand over the details of the case to enable the court to review the lawsuit. The Beirut-based rights group Legal Agenda warned that Mezher's request to see the full content of the investigation violates the secrecy of the probe. The group also said that Mezher's known opinions critical of Bitar may constitute bias. According to media reports, Mezher is close to Hizbullah and the Amal Movement, which both have called for Bitar's removal and launched a fierce campaign against him over alleged selectivity in his summonings.

Khalil, Zoaiter to Sue Three Judges in Port Blast Lawsuits Saga
Naharnet/November 08/2021
Ex-Ministers Ali Hassan Khalil and Ghazi Zoaiter will file a lawsuit against Court of Appeals Judge Nassib Elia and Civil Court of Cassation Judges Jeanette Hanna and Naji Eid, al-Akhbar newspaper said Monday. The suit will accuse the three judges of committing “legal violations” in dealing with the recusal lawsuits previously filed by Khalil and Zoaiter, and will require the referral of Elia, Hanna and Eid to judicial inspection. Khalil and Zoaiter, charged with negligence over the Beirut port explosion, have repeatedly filed requests to dismiss the lead investigator into Beirut’s port blast, Judge Tarek Bitar, but the Court of Cassation and the Court of Appeals dismissed the lawsuits.
- Defendants versus victims’ families -
On the other hand, the lawyers of the families of the port blast victims will also take a host of legal measures against Court of Appeals judge Habib Mezher to penalize him for “committing a blatant violation” and to refer him to judicial inspection. Bitar's probe into the port case was suspended last week after Mezher notified him of a lawsuit filed against him by ex-minister Youssef Fenianos.The Court of Appeals head, Judge Habib Rizkallah, later announced that he had “exclusively” tasked Mezher with handling a recusal lawsuit against Judge Nassib Elia.

At Least Five Port Blast-Linked Lawsuits Filed on Monday
Naharnet/November 08/2021
The flurry of lawsuits in the port blast case continued on Monday, with at least five filed by various parties. “One was filed against the investigation judge into the Beirut port blast Tarek Bitar, three were filed against Higher Judicial Council member and the head of the 12th Chamber Judge Habib Mezher, and one was filed against the Lebanese state,” al-Jadeed TV said. Among the lawsuits was one by ex-ministers Ali Hassan Khalil and Ghazi Zoaiter against the Lebanese state. It was filed before the Court of Cassation. Ex-minister Youssef Fenianos meanwhile submitted a recusal suit against Court of Appeals judge Rosine Hjeily. The other three lawsuits were filed by the lawyers of the foreign victims and two activist groups against Court of Appeals judge Habib Mezher.

U.N. and Ministry of Interior Chair Elections Forum in Beirut
Naharnet/November 08/2021
The U.N. Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Joanna Wronecka, and Lebanon’s Minister of Interior and Municipalities, Bassam al-Mawlawi, chaired Monday the “Elections Forum” to discuss Lebanon’s preparations for the 2022 parliamentary elections and how the international community can best assist Lebanon. Held at the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities in Beirut, the “Elections Forum” brought together representatives of the Lebanese government, civil society and the diplomatic community, including the U.N. “I welcome the Government’s commitment to engaging jointly on the topic, as we share an interest in elections being held in accordance with the Lebanese Constitution, as a pillar of democracy, and in fulfillment of the aspirations of the Lebanese people,” the Special Coordinator said in her opening remarks. The discussions highlighted the importance of cooperation between different stakeholders for a successful elections process, including through "the activation and reinforcement of the Supervisory Commission for Elections (SCE), active participation of civil society, and meaningful inclusion of women."“While it is primarily incumbent on Lebanon to ensure the elections take place in accordance with the Constitution and the electoral law, we are here today to see how we, as the international community, can best support Lebanon,” the Special Coordinator added. Underlining the importance of "bold and profound" reforms for Lebanon, the Special Coordinator said the 2022 elections were critical to the success of the reform agenda and for rebuilding trust with the Lebanese citizens. The Special Coordinator added that she looks forward to future meetings of the Forum in continuation of the dialogue between the Government, domestic stakeholders and the international community in support of the electoral process

Al-Rahi Says 'Obstructors' May be Seeking to 'Secede from State'
Naharnet/November 08/2021
Maronite Patriarch Beshara al-Rahi on Monday lamented that “the government has been paralyzed in the most critical situation that requires its existence.”“We do not rule out that the obstructors’ objective might be to undermine Lebanon’s unity, fragment the state, rebel against it, secede from it, distort facts, sever its ties with its brothers and launch false accusations against those who are still under the authority of the state and its legitimacy,” al-Rahi said.“Our salvation in Lebanon lies in returning to our national principles through committing to coexistence and the National Pact,” the patriarch added.

Iran Says KSA Must Realize 'Pressures on Lebanon are Futile'
Naharnet/November 08/2021
Saudi Arabia must realize that “the approach of besiegement and pressures on Lebanon will not achieve any results,” Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman has said. The spokesman, Said Khatibzadeh, added that holding a new round of Iranian-Saudi talks hinges on “Riyadh showing more seriousness.”
Khatibzadeh’s remarks are related to the diplomatic crisis between Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. The crisis erupted over remarks made by Lebanese Information Minister George Kordahi about Yemen’s war but Riyadh has also cited the “dominance” of Iran-backed Hizbullah over Lebanon.

Rising pressure against Lebanon from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states may well be tied to Hezbollah’s role in Yemen.
Ahmed Nagi/Carnegie/November 08/2021
The diplomatic crisis between Lebanon and several Gulf states has little to do with the remarks of George Qordahi prior to his appointment as Lebanese information minister, in which he criticized the Saudi-led war in Yemen. Its main cause is Hezbollah’s growing role in Yemen and the party’s impact on the faltering talks in Oman between Saudi Arabia and Ansar Allah, better known as Houthis.
In the aftermath of Qordahi’s comments, Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador from Beirut and asked Lebanon’s ambassador to leave the kingdom. Riyadh had also indefinitely banned all Lebanese agricultural imports starting last April, after Captagon pills were found in a consignment of Lebanese pomegranates. The most recent Saudi actions were replicated by Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. While Qordahi’s remarks were a pretext for the Gulf states’ actions, their moves appeared to be premeditated and reflected growing Saudi displeasure with Hezbollah’s dominant position in Lebanon, as well as the group’s regional role on Iran’s behalf.
Saudi Arabia has long played a vital role in Lebanese affairs, and in 1989 it hosted the Taif conference that led to an agreement on a new constitution. After the assassination of Lebanon’s former prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005, which was followed by the withdrawal of the Syrian army from the country, Hezbollah’s role grew, putting Saudi-backed groups, including Sunni political parties, on the defensive. At the same time, Hezbollah became more active regionally, intervening in Syria to bolster President Bashar al-Assad’s regime and supporting Iran-backed Shiite movements elsewhere.
Hezbollah’s involvement in neighboring Yemen was of particular concern for the Saudis. The Saudi-led coalition’s military campaign against the Houthis, after they had seized control of Sanaa in September 2014, led to increased military cooperation and coordination between the Houthis and Hezbollah. Hezbollah took on several functions, including directly supervising the political, military, and media affairs of the Houthis. There have also been reports of involvement by Hezbollah military experts in Yemen.
The key question today, then, is why did Saudi Arabia escalate the crisis with Lebanon, when Hezbollah’s hostility toward the kingdom was known? A principal reason appears to be Hezbollah’s assistance to the Houthis in their ongoing offensive against oil-rich Ma’rib Governorate, the last stronghold of the Saudi-backed government of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi. In recent weeks, the Houthis have taken over districts in the southern part of the governorate and have advanced towards the city of Ma’rib. Saudi media outlets have accused Hezbollah of providing military support to the Houthis.
For Riyadh, if Ma’rib were to fall it would pose two major threats. First, it would greatly strengthen the Houthis and, therefore, make them far less likely to accept political compromises that fall short of recognizing their full control of Yemen. And second, the consolidation of Houthi rule on Saudi Arabia’s southern border could potentially allow the Houthis, and beyond that Iran, to use Yemen as a pressure point against the kingdom in the future.
In a recent round of negotiations between Riyadh and Houthi representatives in Muscat, Oman, in which the Omani mediator reportedly made significant progress, the Houthis refused to put an end to their offensive in Ma’rib. On the contrary, they stepped up their attacks in order to enter the city before an agreement. According to reports, Hezbollah’s leadership pushed the Houthis not to compromise with the Saudis before the fall of Ma’rib, so as to be able to transform their victory into political gains. The battle for Ma’rib is of central importance to Iran and Hezbollah, and the party’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, has mentioned it repeatedly.
Amid this crisis, two questions remain paramount for Lebanon. The first one is whether the Saudi dialogue with Iran that has taken place in Baghdad can continue under the present circumstances? Might those talks be adversely affected by recent developments on the Lebanese front? Or, conversely, might Saudi retaliation against Lebanon lead to progress in Yemen, in that Saudi Arabia would impose a quid pro quo in which it would reverse its measures against Lebanon in exchange for a settlement with the Houthis?
And the second question is how might the consequences of the battle for Ma’rib affect Lebanon? If the Houthis were to win, this would undoubtedly lead to an extension of Lebanon’s isolation by the Gulf states, at least until Saudi Arabia reached an agreement with the Houthis, which could take time. On the other hand, if the Houthis were prevented from taking Ma’rib, and talks in Oman advanced, this could have a positive impact on the Lebanese situation.
**Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

On Some Origins of Disputes among the Lebanese
Hazem Saghieh/Asharq Al Awsat/November 08/2021
There is a dispute among the Lebanese as old as the country itself. It can be summed up as two contrasting approaches to understanding matters and making sense of them.
The first approach gives the homeland precedence over the idea, while the second puts the idea before the homeland.
The first approach was developed by Maronite intellectuals and was subsequently adopted by the politicians and masses of that same sect. That is because the Maronites were the first sect to become aware of the importance of a nation’s existence in itself and of the importance of it having a state. For them, the Ottoman era had become a thing of the past that would not return in a different form or under a different label.
The homeland, simply put, is a series of concrete factors, like its residents, territory and interests. It is indicative that one of the presidents raised the country’s area (10,452 square kilometers), which is mere numbers, as a slogan for a broad political program.
Thus, the major concern of those advocating the homeland’s primacy has always been how to manage it: relations are built based on improving the residents’ financial, health and educational conditions; as for peace and stability, they are two basic prerequisites for doing so. Of course, over the decades, this course has deviated at several junctures, and it was marred by corruption, injustice and disparities, but what had been achieved was more than a little substantial. This is probably what has turned nostalgia for the pre-war era into a sort of national sport of words played by older generations, who yearn for the “politicians of that era” and whose photo albums brim with images demonstrating the “Lebanon that once was.” It is our belle epoque.
Evidence suggests that the Shiite sect has tried, through Moussa al Sadr, between the early sixties and the early seventies, to join that project and vision. The same recurred for the Sunni sect, but on a larger scale, with Rafic Hariri in the nineties. Consequently the theory prioritizing “the homeland over the idea” was thereby no longer limited to Maronites, though each sect continued to paint this theory with its community’s particular colors. Later on, with the collapse of ideologies and the exposure of the fraternal “tutelage,” in addition to the revelations regarding the nature of the resistance, increasing numbers became convinced of this theory.
Still, this does not mean there was no relation between the ideas and the project of “putting the homeland before the idea.” We have seen an abundance of morbid and folkloric ideas about the “country of the message,” “the country of letters,” and “the center where civilizations meet.” Many narratives on Lebanon being an idea have swept through this milieu, while limited time and an abundance of challenges have prevented the development of more serious ideas on democracy, justice and tolerance, as well as sectarianism and racism.
In any case, figures remained stronger than ideas. The former is solid achievements, and the latter is solace and entertainment. Fortunately, the ideas that prevailed seemed too wretched and frivolous to turn into a form of Lebanese nationalism or for us to become Lebanese nationalists.
As for the approach that gives the idea precedence over the homeland, its advocates endorsed it because of their dissatisfaction with the existing country. They leaned towards a vision of some kind of empire, and with every failure to turn that vision into reality, the idea became closer to one of an alternative homeland. They endorsed Syrian unity, then Arab unity, then the liberation of Palestine, and then Islamic struggle, and resistance was always part of those ideas. The country, here, is a trivial detail. With or without it, the cause lives on. Things would be better without it because its territory would then become an arena for war, and the people would become fighters and corpses. Nothing puts this line of thinking into better terms than the strange and negative definition for the term “patriotic:” he who fights colonialism and Zionism!
Indeed, prioritizing ideas strikes at least three foundations of a nation, any nation. It deals a blow to security and stability because we are constantly resisting, and it deals a blow to pluralism because this resistance is sacred and accepts no partners, which would necessarily be profane, and it strikes residents’ interests because it befriends those who supply weapons rather than those who supply commodities or capital.
The theory that gives ideas precedence thus inevitably clashes with the inhabitants’ lives, prosperity and freedom. At the end of the day, it only promises them death, even if that death is painted with a lot of “glory, pride and dignity.” Nostalgia, in this case, takes them to a time when the notion of a country came before the idea, and achievements came before poems. It remains worth contemplating that it is impossible to see residents leading stable lives and enjoying a degree of prosperity, yearn for the days when they were resisting and fighting. They may honor those days as a time when they did what had to be done, but the urge to undergo them again is limited to those who find it difficult to function in ordinary times.
This is not the case for Lebanon alone, but it applies to every place where ideas came first, leaving residents and their lives last, hit by the hardships of living, freedom and affluence.
Therefore, if the homeland is specific, then the idea is flexible, so those in charge of it can strive and make it something purely functional. In today’s Lebanon, we can see how an idea described as carrying tons of blood, martyrdom and sanctity is turning into a tool for the expansion of Iranian influence. Syria presents another eloquent example: The idea of “unity, freedom and socialism” has been turned into a regional role that lives on the oppression and crushing of the country’s population. Those looking for economic, health and education news will find nothing. Syria’s news is about steadfastness, obtaining arms, destroying projects, building strategic alliances, and confronting attacks that are no less strategic…
East Germany was perhaps the most important example in our era of the implementation of an idea protected by a wall. However, less than half a century seemed sufficient to turn that wall into piles of bricks and memorabilia.
The Lebanese, if the idea does not annihilate the country, may one day turn into collectors of bricks and memorabilia.

The judge game
Nicholas Frakes/Now Lebanon/November 08/2021
A demonstrator marches with a sign reading in English "I need to be able to tell our children I did not stay silent" in the Gemmayze neighbourhood as protesters head towards the port of Lebanon's capital on August 4, 2021, on the first anniversary of the blast that ravaged the port and the city. Photo: Joseph Eid, AFP. Lebanon’s politicians may be seen as many things. Fearmongering, ineffective, arguably corrupt. But one thing that is often left out is their tenacity to try and get things done…at least when it concerns or benefits them. War happens when it suits their interest. Peace happens when it suits their interest. Justice happens (or doesn’t happen) when it suits their interest. Since Judge Bitar announced that he wanted former PM Hassan Diab, and MPs and former ministers Ali Hassan Khalil, Yousef Fenianos, Nohad Machnouk and Ghazi Zeaiter to come in for questioning, they and their political allies have relentlessly tried to have Bitar removed from the investigation. Just like they did with his predecessor, Fadi Sawan. For a third time, the investigation was put on hold after Fenianos filed a lawsuit, forcing the judge to wait until the appeals court made a ruling on the matter. This was the fifteenth lawsuit filed against Bitar.
Another problematic judge
With Appeal Court Judge Nassib Elia rejecting cases filed against Bitar, the prospect of a suspension looked grim for those called in for questioning as suspects. So, Hassan Khalil and Zeaiter, whose complaint against Bitar had been rejected by Elia in September, filed a lawsuit against Elia. According to an announcement made by the Court of Appeals chief Habib Rizkallah on Saturday, the file is set to be reviewed by Judge Habib Mezher, who is seen by many as close to Hezbollah and Amal. Mezher’s first decision was to accept Fenianos’ complaint against Bitar and, thus, suspend the investigation for a third time. Rizkallah was forced to point out in the press that Mezher was in charge of the case against Elia, not Bitar. The lawyers of the victims of the Beirut port blast requested that the case against Elia and the case against Bitar be separated, thus making Mezher’s ruling to accept Fenianos’ complaint illegal.
According to the Associated Press, Mehzer had asked Bitar to hand over details of the case so that the court could better make a decision about his dismissal. The lawyers of the families of the victims said that they would be taking legal action with the Court of Appeals on Monday, calling on the judicial body to penalize Mehzer for “committing blatant fraud” and for there to be an investigation into Mehzer. The activist group Mutahiddoun also said that their lawyer, Rami Ollaiq, had filed a lawsuit with the Court of Appeals to have Mehzer recused because the judge has “political connections directly linked to the figures who have been summoned for interrogation, which allows for legitimate suspicion over his role and the motives of his decision in terms of the lack of objectivity, neutrality and impartiality.”No announcement has been made yet concerning Mehzer.
A Gulf of sorrow
In addition to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE breaking off relations with Lebanon, Yemen’s Saudi-backed government became the fifth country to expel Lebanon’s ambassador on Tuesday, November 2 following Information Minister George Kordahi’s comments about Saudi Arabia’s role in the ongoing civil war in Yemen. In addition to this, Bahrain urged its citizens to leave Lebanon following the ceasing of relations between the two countries. Kordahi’s choice: Upon his return from the COP26 in Glasgow, where he met various world leaders to ask for help, Mikati once again made it clear that Kordahi needed to resign to help the country out of this new crisis. “I call on the minister of information to listen to his conscience, take the position that should be taken and give priority to the national interests,” Mikati said in a November 4 speech, upon his return to Lebanon.
The embattled information minister responded by saying that he “will not resign and that is not going to change.”Without Kordahi’s resignation, the Saudis are not going to back down, stoking Lebanon’s fears that the diplomatic row would worsen the already dire economic situation in the country.
Hezbollah and its political allies, who have rallied behind Kordahi and whose supporters have been very vocal in celebrating both the former television star’s statements and the Gulf states’ withdrawal of their support for Lebanon, have conditioned their presence in Mikati’s government on Kordahi not resigning.
It may not have gone as planned: A major reason for the break in relations between the Gulf and Lebanon is the growing influence of Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran in Lebanon, a country where the Gulf has invested billions of dollars.
So by cutting off ties with Lebanon, the Gulf, in particular Saudi Arabia, are hoping that it will force a reckoning where the politicians will take action against Hezbollah and limit the armed party’s power.
However, the move may have the opposite effect.
For more on the intended and unintended consequences of the Saudi withdrawal from Lebanon, check out my piece here. A huge loss in trade: L’Orient Today’s Albin Szakola calculated how much Lebanon loses in terms of trade after the cut ties with Saudi Arabia. (While you’re there, also read his investigation into the fantastic takes of the Beirut port container terminal. )Mediation attempts: An Arab League delegation is in Beirut today, but no one has high hopes, despite diplomats saying it was all “going in the right direction”.
To the polls
On Thursday, November 4, Lebanon’s parliament reaffirmed that parliamentary elections would be held early on March 27, 2022 rather than the previously planned May 8. The bill, which had been sent back to the Parliament by President Michel Aoun who is against early elections, passed by 77 votes.
The session did not end without disagreements. The president’s son-in-law and president of the Free Patriotic Movement, Gebran Bassil, opposed the amendment saying that it would coincide with the Christian Lent.
During the Thursday vote, the FPM voted against the amendment and, after it passed, the party’s MPs walked out of the session. Independents win in universities: For the second year in a row, independent candidates won the majority of seats in the student councils of all the departments of the Universite Saint Joseph in Beirut. However, students affiliated with the Christian Lebanese Forces managed to win 49 seats, almost double compared to the 25 they won in 2020. The IMF talks: The IMF has begun “preparatory” talks with Lebanon on a new aid package after receiving an official request from Beirut, an IMF spokesman said Thursday.
Lebanon+
Hezbollah doesn’t have a sense of humor: Hussein Kaouk, a 28-year-old Lebanese comedian, is under attack by Hezbollah-affiliated media and social media accounts after local channel Al Jadeed aired one of his sketches where he criticizes Lebanese political parties. Kaouk has been under intense attacks on social media, with some accounts inciting violence against the comedian. We will not link to them for obvious reasons.
Podcasts: The Beirut Banyan’s host Ronnie Chatah decided to grace our ears with not one but two episodes this week. On Friday, November 5, Chatah released a short episode where he discussed next year’s planned elections, the international and regional posturing regarding Iran and the possible return of Syrian influence in Lebanon. He also spoke with musician and AUB philosophy instructor Rabih Salloum on Sunday where the two discussed his recent solo project Grave Jones as well as their experiences in Beirut since 2005.
Sarde After Dinner also released a new episode with the hosts, Medea Azouri and Mouin Jaber, speaking with photojournalist and Director of the Photography Department at Annahar Nabil Ismail about life in Beirut during the civil war, war in Lebanon and the effects that being a photographer in such times may have on an individual.
Agenda:
The lawyer for the foreign Beirut blast victims is filing a lawsuit on Monday with the Court of Appeals to penalize Judge Habib Mehzer and to investigate his attempt to remove the lead investigator of the Beirut blast Judge Tarek Bitar. The employees of the state-owned electricity distributor Electricite du Liban have scheduled a strike that is scheduled to last for several days. The families of the martyrs of the Fire Brigade will hold a press conference at 2pm to take a stand against the political interference into the Beirut blast investigation. Lebanon plays with Iran in the 2022 World Cup qualifiers at the Sidon stadium on Thursday, at 3 pm.  Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah makes a televised address at 4 pm on Thursday. Until next week, make sure to follow us on Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, or LinkedIn. We are here, if you have a tip, a concern, an idea or some feedback.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on November 08-09/2021
Explosions heard over Syria’s Homs, Tartous: State media
Reuters/08 November ,2021
Syria's state media said on Monday that its air defences intercepted an Israeli attack on sites in the central and coastal regions. State media had said earlier that air defences were intercepting "hostile targets" over the countryside around the city of Homs, after explosions were heard over Homs and the coastal city of Tartous. The Syrian military said in a statement that the attack came from north of Beirut and that air defences managed to shoot down most of the missiles used. Two soldiers were injured and there were some material losses, the military added.

After Kadhimi’s attempted assassination, accommodating pro-Iran militias no longer an option
BAGHDAD/The Arab Weekly/November 08/2021
With the failed assassination attempt against Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, have lost all chances of being accepted as part of the next government, Iraqi analysts said. The analysts add that Kadhimi is now likely to realise that, if he remains at the head of the government, the chances of striking a deal with these militias is no longer an option, nor is the track of leniency that he had followed with these militias, which have almost killed him. Sources close to Kadhimi rebuff Iran’s condemnation of the assassination attempt, saying that Tehran condemned the failed attempt only because it failed. They point out the drones were Iranian, the militias which launched them were Iranian or working for Iran and the orders to carry out the attack came from Iran; as for the condemnation of the attempt, it was in line with the Iranian practice of “taqiya” (dissimulation). Iraqi political analysts said that the leaders of the pro-Iran groups were waiting for the success of the assassination attempt to publish tributes to Kadhimi, proclaiming him a national hero, even if some of them had made public threats to kill him. They were however shocked by the failure of the attack and ended up denouncing it, as did Iran. It is widely believed in Iraq that the next target could be Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Sadrist movement, who came first in the elections at the expense of other Shia parties. Sadr’s rivals bet that his faction will disappear with its leader’s disappearance, thus bringing the pro-Iran groups back to the fore of the Shia scene. Since assuming the premiership, Kadhimi had tried to appease the militias affiliated with al-Hashed al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilisation Forces – PMF) and refrained from confronting them, despite their blatant violations of the law and flaunting of their defiance to the state’s sovereignty. He even attended their last military parade in Diyala, but he almost paid with his life for his hesitant stances towards these militias.Observers say that the failed assassination attempt is likely to put an end to the continued presence of these groups as an anomalous armed force, threatening and committing crimes and serving Iran’s agenda, while receiving funds from the Iraqi state.
Brinksmanship
A senior Iraqi security official told The Arab Weekly that with the targeting of Kadhimi’s residence the pro-Iran militias have squandered all the remaining chances of changing the course of events in their favour. The official added, “The pro-Iran militias and party leaders see themselves at a crossroads; either they gain positions in the new government, or set in motion pre-prepared scenarios to disrupt the situation.”He asserted that these pro-Iran militias see a “Houthi scenario” as one of their options, if they lose their standing as the dominant force with the state. Accordingly, they are considering the storming of the Green Zone and imposing their hold as a fait accompli. The source stressed that the troops belonging to the Counter-Terrorism Service, headed by Lieutenant-General Abdul-Wahhab Al-Saadi, could “thwart any potential threat to the political process”.The security official ruled out, however, the risk of confrontation between government security forces and the militias. But said government forces “were ready for any contingency”.Senior militia leaders in the PMF are said to be wary that the formation of the new government will end their hold on the so-called “deep state”. The fear in particular that kidnappings, killings and corruption cases could be opened, which would lead to their prosecution, conviction and sentencing. “Al-Fateh” (Conquest) list, which includes the largest Shia militias headed by Hadi al-Amiri and supported by the leader of the Rule of Law party Nuri al-Maliki, is pressuring the Sadrist movement to form a joint government.Maliki, Amiri and senior militia leaders believe that merely being marginalised in the new administration would mean their political end. Accordingly, they will not accept any situation that does not preserve their influence in the next government.
An Iraqi MP, who won a seat in the last elections but preferred not to be named, described the targeting of Kadhimi’s residence as a clear indication that the armed factions are ready to go for “the maximum level of escalation” in order to obtain the seats of which they think they were deprived by virtue of the new election law. The parliamentarian told The Arab Weekly he believed that Iraq is on the verge of armed confrontation between two forces; the first being that of the government backed by the Sadrist movement’s “Peace Brigades,” and the second being the Iranian-backed armed factions.
He said that the pro-Iranian armed factions’ fear of a Sadr-Kadhimi alliance and Lieutenant-General Ahmed Aborgev, the head of the Supreme Committee for Investigation of Major Corruption Cases, may eventually lead to the demise of many militia leaders. This fear “will push them to continue pushing for cabinet positions in exchange for the seats they lost in parliament.”

Iraq’s Kadhimi Chairs Security Meeting after Drone Attack
Asharq Al-Awsat/Sunday, 7 November, 2021
Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi escaped unharmed in an assassination attempt by armed drone in Baghdad, officials said on Sunday. Kadhimi appeared in a video footage published by his office on Sunday chairing a meeting with top security commanders to discuss the drone attack. "The cowardly terrorist attack that targeted the home of the prime minister last night with the aim of assassinating him, is a serious targeting of the Iraqi state by criminal armed groups," the premier’s office said in a statement issued following the meeting. Six members of Kadhimi's personal protection force stationed outside his residence in the Green Zone were wounded, security sources told Reuters.Three drones were used in the attack, including two that were intercepted and downed by security forces while a third drone hit the residence, state news agency INA quoted an interior ministry spokesman as saying.
A spokesman for the armed forces commander in chief said the security situation was stable inside the fortified Green Zone - which houses the residence, government buildings and foreign embassies - following the attack. No group immediately claimed responsibility. The attack came two days after violent clashes in Baghdad between government forces and supporters of Iran-backed political parties, most of which have armed wings, since those groups lost dozens of seats in parliament after a general election on Oct. 10.

Powerful Iranian General Visited Iraq after Attack on PM
Associated Press/Sunday, 7 November, 2021
A top Iranian general visited Baghdad after the assassination attempt against Iraq's prime minister, and said Tehran and its allies had nothing to do with the drone attack that lightly injured the Iraqi leader, two Iraqi politicians said Monday.
News of the visit came as an Iraqi army general said the investigation into the drone attack against Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi is ongoing but that indications point to Iran-backed factions. The general said Monday the drones used in the attack took off from areas east of the capital where Iran-backed militias have influence.The drone attack was also similar to ones carried out in the past by Iran-backed factions in Iraq. In September, for example, explosives-laden drones targeted the Irbil international airport in the country's north, where U.S.-led coalition troops are stationed, the army general told The Associated Press. He commented on condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to speak to the media. The two Shiite Muslim politicians requested anonymity because Esmail Ghaani's visit was not announced publicly. They quoted the Iranian general as saying that Tehran is not opposed to any politician named by the Shiite blocs in the newly elected parliament to become the next prime minister. Ghaani is the commander of Iran's Quds Force, which is mainly responsible for military and clandestine operations outside the country.Iran enjoys wide influence in Iraq through powerful militias it has been backing for years. Iran and Iraq both have majority Shiite populations. The failed assassination attempt against al-Kadhimi at his residence has ratcheted up tensions following last month's parliamentary elections, in which the Iran-backed militias were the biggest losers.
Al-Kadhimi suffered a light cut and appeared in a televised speech soon after the attack on his residence wearing a white shirt and what appeared to be a bandage around his left wrist. Seven of his security guards were wounded in the attack by at least two armed drones.
There was no claim of responsibility but suspicion immediately fell on Iran-backed militias. They had been blamed for previous attacks on the Green Zone, which also houses foreign embassies. The militia leaders condemned the attack, but most sought to downplay it. The two Iraqi politicians quoted Ghaani as saying: "Iran has nothing to do with this attack."One of the two officials said Ghaani met with al-Kadhimi on Sunday afternoon in Baghdad. Al-Manar TV, run by Hizbullah , said Ghaani also met with Iraqi President Barham Salih and other political figures in the country.
It quoted Ghaani as saying during his visit that "Iraq is in urgent need for calm." It added that Ghaani also said that any act that threatens Iraq's security should be avoided. The drone attack was a dramatic escalation in the already tense situation following the Oct. 10 vote and the surprising results in which Iran-backed militias lost about two-thirds of their seats. Despite a low turnout, the results confirmed a rising wave of discontent against the militias that had been praised years before as heroes for fighting Islamic State militants. But the militias have lost popularity since 2018, when they made big election gains. Many Iraqis hold them responsible for suppressing the 2019 youth-led anti-government protests, and for undermining state authority. Some analysts have said that Sunday's attack aimed to cut off the path that could lead to a second al-Kadhimi term by those who lost in the recent elections. On Sunday, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh condemned the assassination attempt on al-Kadhimi and indirectly blamed the U.S. Al-Kadhimi, 54, was Iraq's former intelligence chief before becoming prime minister in May last year. He is considered by the militias to be close to the U.S., and has tried to balance between Iraq's alliances with both the U.S. and Iran.

Iran-backed militia staged attack on Iraq PM - officials, sources
Reuters/November 08/2021
 A drone attack that targeted the Iraqi prime minister on Sunday was carried out by at least one Iran-backed militia group using Iranian-made equipment, Iraqi security officials and militia sources said. But the neighbouring Islamic Republic is unlikely to have sanctioned the attack as Tehran is keen to avoid a spiral of violence on its western border, the sources and independent analysts said.
Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi escaped unhurt when three drones carrying explosives were launched at his residence in Baghdad. Several of his bodyguards were injured. The incident whipped up tensions in Iraq, where powerful Iran-backed paramilitaries are disputing the result of a general election last month that dealt them a crushing defeat at the polls and greatly reduced their strength in parliament. Iraqi officials and analysts said the attack was meant as a message from militias that they are willing to resort to violence if excluded from the formation of a government, or if their grip on large areas of the state apparatus is challenged. "It was a clear message of, 'We can create chaos in Iraq - we have the guns, we have the means'," said Hamdi Malik, a specialist on Iraq’s Shi’ite Muslim militias at the Washington Institute. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack. Iran-backed militia groups did not immediately comment and the Iranian government did not respond to requests for comment. Two regional officials who spoke on condition of anonymity said Tehran had knowledge about the attack before it was carried out, but that Iranian authorities had not ordered it. "Iran did not plan it but Tehran also did not stop the group from carrying it out," one of the officials said, declining to name which group he was referring to. Militia sources said the commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guards overseas Quds Force travelled to Iraq on Sunday after the attack to meet paramilitary leaders and urge them to avoid any further escalation of violence. Two Iraqi security officials and three sources close to the militia groups, who spoke to Reuters on Monday on condition of anonymity, said the attack was committed by at least one of the Iran-aligned militias.
The two security officials said the Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq groups carried out the attack in tandem. A militia source said that Kataib Hezbollah was involved and that he could not confirm the role of Asaib.
Neither group commented for the record.
INTRA-SHI'ITE TENSIONS
The main winner from the election, Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, is a rival of the Iran-backed groups who, unlike them, preaches Iraqi nationalism and opposes all foreign interference, including American and Iranian. Malik said the drone strike indicated that the Iran-backed militias are positioning themselves in opposition to Sadr, who also boasts a militia - a scenario that would hurt Iran's influence and therefore would likely be opposed by Tehran. "I don't think Iran wants a Shi'ite-Shi'ite civil war. It would weaken its position in Iraq and allow other groups to grow stronger," he said.
Many Iran-aligned militias have watched Sadr's political rise with concern, fearing he may strike a deal with Kadhimi and moderate Shi'ites allies, and even minority Sunni Muslims and Kurds, that would freeze them out of power. The Iran-backed groups, which like patron Iran are Shi'ite, regard Kadhimi as both Sadr's man and friendly towards Tehran's arch-foe the United States.
MADE IN IRAN
One of the Iraqi security officials said the drones used were of the "quadcopter" type and that each was carrying one projectile containing high explosives capable of damaging buildings and armoured vehicles. The official added that these were the same type of Iranian-made drones and explosives used in attacks this year on U.S. forces in Iraq, which Washington blames on Iran-aligned militias including Kataib Hezbollah. The United States last month targeted Iran's drone programme with new sanctions, saying Tehran's elite Revolutionary Guards had deployed drones against U.S. forces, Washington's regional allies and international shipping. Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq are among the groups leading cries of fraud in the Oct. 10 election, but have provided no evidence for their assertions. The Iran-aligned groups lost dozens of parliamentary seats they had controlled for years in an election result that was seen as a rebuke to Iran-backed militias, which are accused of gunning down anti-government protesters in 2019 - a charge they deny. Supporters of Iran-backed militias have since the election staged weeks of protests near Iraqi government buildings.Reporting by Baghdad newsroom; Editing by Mark Heinrich

Israel Says Downs Hamas Drone from Gaza
Associated Press/November 08/2021
Israel's Iron Dome defense system intercepted a drone on Monday launched from Gaza by the Palestinian territory's Hamas Islamist rulers, the army said. "A short while ago, a UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) belonging to the Hamas terror organization approached the Gaza maritime zone and was intercepted," it said in a statement. Israel's army has previously downed Hamas drones, including during an 11-day conflict in May.  It has frequently responded to apparently hostile Hamas actions with air strikes targeting Islamist sites in the Gaza Strip. But tensions, which surged during the May fighting, have calmed in past weeks. Israel -- which has enforced a crippling blockade on Gaza since 2007, the year Hamas took power -- has allowed financial aid from Qatar to again be distributed in Gaza. It has also increased the number of work permits for Gazans to enter Israel and allowed more construction material to enter the strip, part of a series of measures aimed at maintaining a fragile calm.

Nearly 20 Years on, Israeli Barrier Shapes Palestinian Lives
Associated Press/November 08/2021
Three days a week, Palestinian farmers in the occupied West Bank village of Qaffin line up at a yellow gate and show military permits to soldiers in order to tend their crops on the other side of Israel's separation barrier. The farmers say that because of increasingly onerous Israeli restrictions they can no longer live off their land, which is suffering without proper cultivation. The olive groves just beyond the gate are scorched from a recent blaze — firefighters also need permission to enter. Nearly two decades after Israel sparked controversy worldwide by building the barrier during a Palestinian uprising, it has become a seemingly permanent feature of the landscape — even as Israel encourages its citizens to settle on both sides. Tens of thousands of Palestinians navigate its checkpoints every morning as they line up in cramped terminals to enter Israel for jobs in construction and agriculture. Farmers in Qaffin and dozens of other villages need permits to access their own private property. Israel says the barrier helped stop a wave of suicide bombings and other attacks by Palestinians who slipped into the country during the 2000-2005 uprising and is still needed to prevent deadly violence. Eighty-five percent of the still-unfinished barrier is inside the occupied West Bank, carving off nearly 10% of its territory. The Palestinians view it as an illegal land grab, and the International Court of Justice in 2004 said the barrier was "contrary to international law."In Jerusalem and the West Bank city of Bethlehem, the barrier is a towering concrete wall several meters (yards) high crowned with barbed wire and cameras. In rural areas it largely consists of barbed wire fencing and closed military roads. Along Israel's main north-south highway, it's concealed by earthworks and landscaping, so that motorists get no more than a passing glance at the reality of military rule. Palestinians in Qaffin say the wall has lopped off some 4,500 dunams (1,100 acres) of their farmland, all of it inside the West Bank.Ibrahim Ammar says he used to grow an array of crops including watermelon and corn, but is now limited to olives and almonds because they require less attention. Even during the annual olive harvest, which began last month, he can only enter his land three days a week and must apply for permits to bring family members along to help."My father, my grandfather, they were totally dependent on the land," he said. "Now I can't provide for myself and my children."
He drives a taxi to supplement his income. Other villagers work menial jobs inside Israel and its West Bank settlements. At least one resident, frustrated by the restrictions, grows vegetables on the roof of his home. "Three days is not enough to serve the land," said Taysir Harashe, who was mayor of the village when the barrier was built. "The land is getting worse and worse."The U.N. estimates some 150 Palestinian communities are in a similar predicament, and that 11,000 Palestinians live in the so-called Seam Zone inside the West Bank but west of the barrier, requiring Israeli permits just to stay in their homes. HaMoked, an Israeli rights group that helps Palestinians secure permits, says the farmers' situation is worsening. It says data obtained from the military through a freedom of information request shows that 73% of applications for permits were denied last year, compared to 29% in 2014. Less than 3% are denied on security grounds, it said.
In 2014, Israel stopped granting permits to relatives unless they are listed as agricultural workers on larger plots. In 2017, the military began dividing larger holdings among the members of extended families and ruled that anything smaller than 330 square meters (3,500 square feet) was agriculturally unsustainable. Owners of so-called "tiny plots" are denied permits. "There's no security justification," said Jessica Montell, the director of HaMoked, which is challenging the regulation before Israel's Supreme Court. "They've decided you own a plot of land that they think is too small to warrant cultivation."She said other regulations are based on "elaborate calculations" about how many hands are needed to tend to various crops. "It's a crazy table. They say if you are growing cucumbers you can get X number of helpers per dunam."Asked about the restrictions, the military said its forces aim to "ensure a smooth fabric of life for all sides." The military "sees great importance in the coordination of the olive harvest, and operates in accordance with guidelines and the situational assessment," it said in a statement. Israel has always said the barrier was not intended to delineate a permanent border, and some supporters said at the time that by reducing violence it would aid the peace process."The fence was built according to the needs of security only," said Netzah Mashiah, a retired Israeli colonel who oversaw construction of the barrier until 2008. "We understood while building it that it might be a border in the far future... but this was not the goal of this fence."
Indeed, the barrier only looks like a heavily guarded border.
Israelis and Palestinians live on both sides, and Israel is actively building settlements and settlement infrastructure east of the barrier. There have been no substantive peace talks in more than a decade, and Prime Minister Naftali Bennett is opposed to the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and other territories Israel seized in the 1967 war. In Bethlehem, the towering concrete wall is covered with political graffiti and often satirical artwork. One refers to an episode of Larry David's HBO comedy "Curb Your Enthusiasm" in which Jewish men avail themselves of a Palestinian restaurant to conceal their affairs from their wives. Another pays tribute to George Floyd, who died under the knee of a Minneapolis police officer last year. It became an eclectic tourist attraction after the world-famous graffiti artist Banksy secretly painted the wall in the 2000s. In 2017, he opened the "Walled-Off Hotel," a monument of bleak resistance-themed art. Abu Yamil, the owner of a nearby souvenir shop who declined to give his full name, sells Banksy prints and postcards among other trinkets. The 70-year-old waxes nostalgic about the situation decades ago, when Palestinians could travel freely. "It was occupation, but we lived together," he said. "I drove my car to Tel Aviv." Like many Palestinians, he doubts the unfinished barrier serves much of a security purpose — workers without permits have always managed to sneak in. "This wall will be here forever, because they don't want peace," he said. "Israel wants all the land."

6 Palestinian Rights Activists Hacked by NSO Spyware
Associated Press/November 08/2021
Security researchers disclosed Monday that spyware from the notorious Israeli hacker-for-hire company NSO Group was detected on the cellphones of six Palestinian human rights activists, half affiliated with groups that Israel's defense minister controversially claimed were involved in terrorism. The revelation marks the first known instance of Palestinian activists being targeted by the military-grade Pegasus spyware. Its use against journalists, rights activists and political dissidents from Mexico to Saudi Arabia has been documented since 2015. A successful Pegasus infection surreptitiously gives intruders access to everything a person stores and does on their phone, including real-time communications. It's not clear who placed the NSO spyware on the activists' phones, said the researcher who first detected it, Mohammed al-Maskati of the nonprofit Frontline Defenders. Shortly after the first two intrusions were identified in mid-October, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz declared six Palestinian civil society groups to be terrorist organizations. Ireland-based Frontline Defenders and at least two of the victims say they consider Israel the main suspect and believe the designation may have been timed to try to overshadow the hacks' discovery, though they have provided no evidence to substantiate those assertions. Israel has provided little evidence publicly to support the terrorism designation, which the Palestinian groups say aims to dry up their funding and muzzle opposition to Israeli military rule. Three of the hacked Palestinians work for the civil society groups. The others do not, and wish to remain anonymous, Frontline Defenders says.
The forensic findings, independently confirmed by security researchers from Amnesty International and the University of Toronto's Citizen Lab in a joint technical report, come as NSO Group faces growing condemnation over the abuse of its spyware and Israel takes heat for lax oversight of its digital surveillance industry. Last week, the Biden administration blacklisted the NSO Group and a lesser-known Israeli competitor, Candiru, barring them from U.S. technology. Asked about the allegations its software was used against the Palestinian activists, NSO Group said in a statement that it does not identify its customers for contractual and national security reasons, is not privy to whom they hack and sells only to government agencies for use against "serious crime and terror."An Israeli defense official said in a brief statement that the designation of the six organizations was based on solid evidence and that any claim it is related to the use of NSO software is unfounded. The statement had no other details, and officials declined requests for further comment. The official spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss security matters.
Israel's Defense Ministry approves the export of spyware produced by NSO Group and other private Israeli companies that recruit from the country's top cyber-capable military units. Critics say the process is opaque. It's not known precisely when or how the phones were violated, the security researchers said. But four of the six hacked iPhones exclusively used SIM cards issued by Israeli telecom companies with Israeli +972 area code numbers, said the Citizen Lab and Amnesty researchers. That led them to question claims by NSO Group that exported versions of Pegasus cannot be used to hack Israeli phone numbers. NSO Group has also said it doesn't target U.S. numbers. Among those hacked was Ubai Aboudi, a 37-year-old economist and U.S. citizen. He runs the seven-person Bisan Center for Research and Development in Ramallah, in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, one of the six groups Gantz slapped with terrorist designations on Oct. 22. The other two hacked Palestinians who agreed to be named are researcher Ghassan Halaika of the Al-Haq rights group and attorney Salah Hammouri of Addameer, also a human rights organization. The other three designated groups are Defense for Children International-Palestine, the Union of Palestinian Women's Committees and the Union of Agricultural Work Committees. Aboudi said he lost "any sense of safety" through the "dehumanizing" hack of a phone that is at his side day and night and holds photos of his three children. He said his wife, the first three nights after learning of the hack, "didn't sleep from the idea of having such deep intrusions into our privacy."
He was especially concerned about eavesdroppers being privy to his communications with foreign diplomats. The researchers' examination of Aboudi's phone determined it was infected by Pegasus in February. Aboudi accused Israel of "sticking the terrorist logo" on the groups after failing to persuade European governments and others to cut off financial support. Israel says the groups are linked to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a leftist political faction with an armed wing that has killed Israelis. Israel and Western governments consider the PFLP a terror group. Aboudi was detained years ago on allegations of being a PFLP member but denies ever belonging to the group. Tehilla Shwartz Altshuler, a legal expert at the Israel Democracy Institute, called the findings "really disturbing," especially if it is proven that Israel's security agencies, who are largely exempt from the country's privacy laws, have been using NSO Group's commercial spyware. "This actually complicates the relationship of the government with NSO," said Altshuler, if the government is indeed both a client and regulator in a relationship conducted under secrecy.
The executive director of Frontline Defenders, Andrew Anderson, said the NSO Group cannot be trusted to ensure its spyware is not used illegally by its customers and says Israel should face international reproach if it does not bring the company to heel. "If the Israeli government refuses to take action then this should have consequences in terms of the regulation of trade with Israel," he said via email. Al-Maskati, the researcher who discovered the hacks, said he was first alerted on Oct. 16 by Halaika, whose phone was determined to have been hacked in July 2020. Al-Haq engages in sensitive communications with the International Criminal Court, among others, involving alleged human rights abuses. "As human rights defenders living under occupation, we expect it was the (Israeli) occupation," Halaika said when asked who he believed was behind the hack. The phone of the third named hacking victim, Hammouri, was apparently compromised in April, the researchers said. A dual French national living in Jerusalem, Hammouri was notified by Israel on Oct. 18 of its intent to deport him, Frontline Defenders said. Hammouri declined to speculate who was behind the hack, saying "we have to determine who had the ability and who had the motive."After Halaika alerted him, Al-Maskati said he scanned 75 phones of Palestinian activists, finding the six infections. He could not determine how the phones were hacked, he said, though the timeline of evidence encountered indicated the use of a so-called "iMessage zero-click" exploit NSO Group used on iPhones. The exploit is highly effective, requiring no user intervention, as phishing attempts typically do.
Facebook has sued NSO Group over the use of a somewhat similar exploit that allegedly intruded via its globally popular encrypted WhatsApp messaging app. A snowballing of new revelations about the hacking of public figures — including Hungarian investigative journalists, the fiancée of slain Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi and an ex-wife of the ruler of Dubai — has occurred since a consortium of international news organizations reported in July on a list of possible NSO Group surveillance targets. The list was obtained from an unnamed source by Amnesty International and the Paris-based journalism nonprofit Forbidden Stories. Among those listed was an Associated Press journalist. From that list of 50,000 phone numbers, reporters from various news organizations were able to confirm at least 47 additional successful hacks, the Washington Post has reported.NSO Group denied ever maintaining such a list.

Kuwait Government Resigns for the Second Time this Year
Associated Press/November 08/2021
Kuwait's government resigned Monday for the second time this year, underscoring the political problems plaguing the small, oil-rich nation. The state-run KUNA news agency said Kuwait's ruler, Sheikh Nawaf Al Ahmad Al Sabah, received the government's resignation notice. However, the report did not say whether Sheikh Nawaf would accept the resignation, tendered by the country's prime minister, Sheikh Sabah Al-Khaled Al Hamad Al Sabah. The government previously resigned in January. On Sunday, Sheikh Nawaf granted an amnesty to opposition political members in part to resolve the ongoing deadlock in the country's government. Kuwait, an extraordinarily wealthy nation due to its oil reserves, has struggled in recent years to balance its budgets and encourage its population into the private sector. Its cradle-to-grave social benefits have drained coffers, challenging the nation during a recent slump in oil prices.
Kuwait's unusual combination of an emir-appointed government and elected parliament frequently gives rise to wrangling that analysts say impedes the country's economic and social progress. The parliament can introduce legislation and question ministers, though the country's emir retains ultimate authority and ruling family members hold senior posts.Last year, the ratings agency Moody's downgraded Kuwait for the first time in its history as the coronavirus pandemic burned a hole in the country's finances. Even with the treasury rapidly depleting, the government has no legal framework to deficit-spend beyond its current limit of $33 billion without parliamentary approval. Lawmakers have fiercely opposed raising the debt ceiling, fearing the money will be pillaged thanks to corruption.

Saudi-Led Coalition Says 115 Yemeni Rebels Killed
Associated Press/November 08/2021
The Saudi-led coalition battling Iran-backed Huthi rebels in Yemen said Monday it had killed 115 insurgents in the past 24 hours in air strikes around the northern Marib government bastion. Nineteen vehicles were destroyed in the raids that targeted the Sirwah district west of Marib city and Al-Jawf further north, it said in a statement carried by the official Saudi news agency SPA. Marib, capital of the oil-rich province of the same name, is the internationally recognised government's last bastion in northern Yemen. The Huthis began a major push to seize the city in February and, after a lull, they renewed their offensive in September. The coalition has since October 11 issued near-daily reports of bombing around Marib, saying it has since then killed hundreds of insurgents. AFP cannot independently verify the death tolls reported by the coalition and the Huthis rarely comment on losses. The Saudi-led coalition intervened in Yemen in 2015 to shore up the internationally-recognized government, a year after the Huthis seized the capital Sanaa. Since then, tens of thousands of people, mostly civilians, have died and millions have been displaced in what the United Nations calls the world's worst humanitarian crisis.

The Latest The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on November 08-09/2021
Iran and the American Elephant
Tariq Al-Homayed/Asharq Al Awsat/November 08/2021
Saudi Arabia has announced that the talks with Iran “are still exploratory, and they have not yielded substantive results yet.” In a US-Western statement, the White House warned Iran of the “accelerated pace of provocative nuclear steps.”
That all begs the question, will this statement or the negotiations with Saudi Arabia change Tehran’s behavior? Will it feel that there is a stick, not just a carrot? True, US sanctions on Iran were recently announced, but are they sufficient?
Besides all that, calls for raising the specter of military action against Iran are growing louder in Washington. For example, former US Middle East envoy Dennis Ross wrote a striking article for Foreign Policy arguing that Tehran no longer takes Washington seriously, and so the threat of military escalation must be put back on the table if the US hopes to make progress on the nuclear deal.
Once again, the question is: Will Iran learn and take the warnings and negotiations seriously? I doubt it. Iran is not merely procrastinating. It recently targeted a US base with a drone; we see armed groups loyal to Tehran trying to burn Baghdad to reverse the election results, and the Houthis’ terrorism persists.
Tehran is aware that the US administration is constrained by domestic problems and that Washington is disoriented by its reclassification of who constitutes an enemy. Iran also realizes that the American elephant is still in its allies’ room, not that of its enemies. On top of that, Washington continues to negotiate with Iran through a team of doves that does not include a single hawk. It has also yet shown its teeth in response to the acts of Iranian sabotage either. It is true that Washington has, for example, approved the sale of missiles to Saudi Arabia, which the State Department spokesperson said came after “an increase in cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia,” and the State Department said that the deal is “in keeping with the President’s commitment to support the territorial defense of Saudi Arabia.”
Despite that, Iran hasn’t yet felt the “stick” since the terrorist Qassem Soliemani was killed by an American drone strike in Baghdad. There is no doubt that Iran only understands the language of strength and that Tehran does not see that the negotiations are part of diplomatic solutions. Nor does it heed warnings.
Thus, the quadrilateral statement will have no impact, neither will Saudi-Iranian negotiations. Iran’s eyes are glued to Israel, as Republican Senator and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Jim Risch has said.
In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, he expressed his confidence that “Iran will never obtain a nuclear weapon,” stressing that “Israel would not allow it.” He added that it is not the US that will stop that from happening: “and it won’t be any of the sides sitting at the negotiation table… you know who I mean.”
Later during the important interview, when the senator is asked if the prospect of Israel doing so makes him afraid, he replies: “No, I am not afraid; I am confident that (Israel) will do so.”
And so, Iran has its eye on and fears Israel, not the Biden administration, and this is the language Tehran surely does understand.

Kadhimi...No Room for His Ambitions?
Ghassan Charbel/Asharq Al Awsat/November 08/2021
This time, the accusation cannot be thrown at “the remnants of Saddam Hussein”, nor can it be associated with ISIS or the “Great Satan.” The story is a fabrication of what Muqtada al-Sadr calls “the forces of no state.” The fingerprints are clear.
The assassination attempt against Mustafa Al-Kadhimi was not surprising. The man stood in the eye of the storm. He cannot be considered innocent. He did something that deserves severe punishment. He is the leader of the coup, which aims to restore the capabilities of the Iraqi state.
The mission is neither easy nor simple. No one expected the turbulent forces to lower their flags and cede their privileges and greed.
Mustafa Al-Kadhimi came from the world of information and analysis. He knew the story with its local, regional, and international thorns. He is not an adventurer or a gambler. He understands the difficulties and traps. He advances slowly and wisely. He acts as a demining expert. He stops the thunders, and when it is too complicated, he circumvents the threat, without forgetting the road and the conditions for driving in the minefields.
He advances and then retreats. He puts forward initiatives and waits. He offers solutions and makes compromises. In any case, he does not give up his battle, which is the restoration of the Iraqi state.
With thoughtful sentences and calm manners, he tried to use a player that the forest of guns succeeded in crushing over the past years: The ordinary Iraqi citizen, who sits with his fears and bitterness, with no affiliation except with the silent and patient majority.
The dream of a normal state has resurged among quite a few citizens. In the normal state, where the policeman assumes his duties, justice is justice… where the Iraqi decision is made in the elected legitimate institutions, and its first goal is to defend the security and interests of Iraqis and the stability and prosperity of their country. Kadhimi suffers when he hears that an Iraqi drowned after boarding the “death boats” trying to reach the European paradise; or that one of his compatriots was arrested in this or that country after escaping from the Iraqi hell. He suffers because Iraq already possesses the conditions for prosperity and a decent life if its state regains its presence and role, and joins the train of progress.
Kadhimi knows that the catastrophe began with the consolidation of the idea of the “Iraqi arena” instead of the Iraqi state. He is aware that the arena is a recipe for failure and abuse. It allows moving the pawns on the Iraqi scene and turning it into a theater for alternative wars, a platform for missiles and a card in a regional coup, in addition to destroying opportunities for stability, investment and prosperity.
The arena means Iraq remaining broken and threatened by internal strife, poverty, and rupture with its natural surroundings and the world.
Instead of this image, Kadhimi sought to present Iraq as the bridge between regional powers. A land of dialogue, partnership of interests, and a project of stability in a region that has bled for years, and has been left behind by the world caught up in the train of progress and successive technological revolutions.In harmony with President Barham Salih’s orientations, and relying on Iraq’s importance to the Arabs and the world, Al-Kadhimi began to weave the country’s Arab and international relations.
Some militias looked with great concern at a policy aimed at restoring balance, and enabling the state to address with one voice to the region and the world - the voice of the institutions free of the control of the factions and their dictionaries.
Kadhimi does not see Iraq’s interest in provoking Iran. He knows his country’s geography and composition. But he also does not see an interest in an Iraq affiliated with Iran and attached to its decision.
Realistically and calmly, he promoted Iraq’s right to address the countries of the region and the world from state to state, refusing to submit to the game of moving cards on the outskirts of the “Green Zone” and the echoes of stray missiles in the space of Baghdad or Erbil.
On the internal level, Kadhimi committed another “crime”. He denied the shadowy yet very blatant powers the right to kill anyone who disagrees with their positions. His policy contributed to uncovering the forces that deal with the protesters with silencers and daggers. His insistence on conducting proper investigations exposed the identity of the “death squads” that were chasing activists. It also revealed that some of the killers were hiding in uniforms and behind security posts. This is awful.
Some forces were betting that they would not leave their mark at the crime scene, and that the state would not dare to trace their fingerprints. The quiet man disappointed the gun barons’ expectations, enabling the average Iraqi citizen to recognize the perpetrators.
Kadhimi used the weapon of persuasion and patience. He was firm in restoring the morale of the military and security in the face of the various dangers facing the country. His conciliatory personality succeeded in reducing the level of sectarian tensions.
The country’s image at home and abroad improved. But it was necessary to let the Iraqis choose their representatives and clarify their orientations. He organized the elections in response to the demands of the Iraqi youth, and to test the citizens’ longing for a state project.
Some militias were surprised that their arsenals have failed to force the voters to pledge allegiance to them. They questioned the integrity of the elections, contrary to what Iraqi and foreign observers said. Those militias accused Kadhimi of manipulating the elections, knowing that their attempts to challenge the results lacked convincing arguments.
This is how the process of intimidation on the outskirts of the Green Zone began. The militias believe in guns and missiles, not in persuasion and votes. They use force to overturn facts and punish the citizen and the state.
The insistence on keeping Iraq as a regional arena explains the use of drones in the attempt to assassinate Kadhimi, who resides on the Iranian-American earthquake line. Fortunately for the Iraqis and the friends of Iraq, the attempt did not succeed. It is obvious that Arab and international reactions will double the isolation of those who use the dictionary of bombs and assassinations, but this does not mean that they will not try other means. After the elections, Iraq stands at a crossroads. The new government will either pursue the restoration of the state project or concede to the logic of the arena. Kadhimi, for his part, committed the crime of awakening the state project, a crime that deserves the people’s praise and the militias’ severe punishment. Some people believe that Kadhimi set the path for the return of the Iraqi state. Others see him as a dreamer whose ambitions have no room.

شارل الياس شرتوني: إرهاب على ضفاف نهر الفرات ومخاطر تحدي الإمبريالية
Terror Terror on the Euphrates and the Hazards of a Challenged Imperialism
Charles Elias Chartouni/November 08/2021
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/103977/103977/
The assassination attempt on Mustapaha al Khadhimi (Iraqi prime minister) has an unmistakable address, Esmail Qaani (the Quds Force Commander) and any other destination is an idle exercise in misinformation.The defeat of the pro-Iranian candidates in the last elections, the growing estrangement of Iraqi Shiites towards Iran and its militant branches in Iraq (‘Asa’ib ahl al Haq, Kata’ib Hezbollah), the obvious distancing of Muqtada al Sadr (the Iraqi religious leader) and the open antagonism between the Iraqi religious reference (مرجع تقليد, traditionist) in Najaf and Qom, the utter rejection of their legacy of corruption (Nuri al Maliki and acolytes) and repression, the resurgence of Iraqi nationalist pride vis à vis Iranian arrogance and condescendence, and the failure of Shiite trans-national political militancy as a power vector of Iranian imperial forays in various Arab countries, account altogether for the electoral defeat and the weariness from the Iranian imperial policy and its domestic political lieutenancy. The attempt on the life of prime minister al Khadhimi is quite symptomatic of the widening rejection of Iranian suprematism, and the malaise elicited amongst its Iraqi surrogates and their sense of fleeting influence. The openness towards the US and Western democracies, and the refusal of Iraqi leadership to align unilaterally Iran’s foreign policy and its strategic choices is no hazard, it’s a new policy course that the Iranian regime cannot condone at a time when it seems to lose its bearing, while negotiating an equivocal nuclear accord.
The Iranian imperial inroads are facing multiple obstacles ranging between the traditional Sunnite-Shiite rivalry and the post-revolutionary Shiite repudiation of the Iranian Islamic revolution and its composite legacy. The rise of strong opposition figures among clerics (al Sistani and al Sadr) and politicians (PM al Khadhimi) is no coincidence, it’s the expression of an enhancing tidal wave opposing the Shiite imperial strategy led by the Iranian regime and its destructive impact on native Shiite communities.
Paradoxically enough, Lebanese Shiites are still under the spell of the Shiite imperial paradigm nurtured by their central role within the Iranian imperial system, their consolidated extra-territoriality within Lebanon, their aspirations to pilot the eventual geopolitical reconfiguration of the Near East, the millenarian delusions of a Shiite regional political order, and a well entrenched state of delinquency endorsed by religious jurisprudence and suprematism. Iran’s endangered imperial inroads are going to be, more and more, at the source of major destabilization ventures throughout the Larger Middle East, especially at a time when external challenges are met with the declining fortunes of a bankrupted dystopia and its unraveling myths.

Hamas is an armed front for Iran
Farouk Youssef/The Arab Weekly/November 08/2021
In the context of the Egyptian effort to reach a long-term truce between Israel and Hamas, there is an implicit acknowledgment that what is happening in Gaza is not part of the tragic conflict which is supposed to be about the Palestinian cause.
The “Palestinian cause” is the comprehensive heading of a tragedy that some believe could blur the difference between its human aspect and its political manifestations, an issue where security measures are allowed to be more important than existential challenges, such as the right of return.
When Hamas emerged, it was not part of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, nor was it fit to be so, as it was a movement that combined religious and political dimensions. Also, its foreign ideological affiliations did not allow it to reach an understanding with other resistance factions. So it could not hide nor cover up the fact it was separate from the rest.
It is all about the movement’s political project, which was not patriotic, despite the fact that the liberation of Palestine was its declared goal. Before its dispute with the Fatah movement, Hamas had injected into the debate notions beyond Palestinian political realities. Such notions could still to stir emotions, as was the case with the slogan of “From the river to the sea” and other mantras related to historic Palestine.
At the time, Hamas appealed to those angry at the Oslo process and its Palestinian supporters. The agreement, which reduced President Yasser Arafat in size, from a historical leader to the governor of a province that does not enjoy any kind of sovereignty, was outside the pale of Palestinian popular imagination, which was shaped by a mixture of human suffering and armed struggle.
The Palestinians felt that their leadership had thrown away the precious time during which they had struggled to preserve their identity and recover their rights. However, Hamas, due to its ideological affinities, was not the appropriate national response to the Oslo process. It represented a drain on the Palestinian effort, which was reflected in the divisions over what it sought to achieve with weapons. This confused Palestinians who became divided over who stands with the Islamic resistance movement or who is against it.
If one stood with it, one erred away from the Palestinian nationalist compass, and if one stood against it, one was perceived as opposing the resistance. Hamas is not solely responsible for this thorny and complex situation. The Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority shares in the blame. It may even be the one that paved the way for all the failures that the Palestinian cause has witnessed, the repercussions of which were in the interest of the Zionist settler project.
However, Hamas, which opposes the Oslo Accords, did not bring the Palestinians closer to their cause. Instead, it widened the gap between them and that cause, Hamas being since its inception an armed front for Iran. Thus, it made the worst move possible when it replaced the Zionist project with the Iranian project. When the Iranians claim Hamas as their army they are not exaggerating.
Hamas is similar in its affiliation to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, much like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq. When Ismail Haniyeh conducted his latest war against Israel from Doha, he was receiving orders directly from Tehran.
Therefore, any indirect dialogue sponsored by Egypt between Israel and Hamas necessarily has to have Iran as a party, if not the most influential party. What Iran desires and hopes is implemented by Hamas, to the point of being the mailman between the two enemies and represents one of the two belligerents in the showdown.
In its conflict with Israel, Hamas represents Iran and has nothing to do with the Palestinian cause. It can be viewed as an armed Iranian militia operating in the context of a regional conflict. In this, it has become clear that the involvement of the Palestinians is necessary in order for the circle of Iranian hegemony to expand and for Iran to appear in a size beyond its real dimensions. Iran, which is a sponsor of gangs and financier of death squads, no longer talks about its geographical borders, but rather about the limits of its ideological scope.
The Egyptian position, although it involves some political wisdom, does not serve the interests of the Palestinian cause. Hamas has replaced Palestine and Israel can no longer be held accountable for what it is doing to the Palestinians, people and land.

Cultural reinvention keeps great cities from fading
Rym Tina Ghazal/The Arab Weekly/November 08/2021
While they have their detractors, “cultural capital” initiatives help us discover cities we may know nothing about and therefore develop a new appreciation for their cultural heritage.
Culture is the heart of a city and tells its story.
Such is the importance for modern cities to be seen as cultural hubs that vast sums are invested and innovative ideas implemented in the hope of being crowned the latest “capital of culture”. For the former industrial powerhouse of Glasgow in Scotland, for example, being awarded the European City of Culture in 1990 helped lift the metropolis’s image from violent and poverty-stricken to a vibrant centre for the arts. Other cities in Europe followed, using the “capital of culture” label to help turn around their post-industrial fortunes.
None of this was lost on the leaders of modern Middle East and Asian cities who realised that drawing in visitors for an experience rather than just a holiday was key to their success. But unlike some cities in Europe, which have allowed the benefits from being in the global cultural spotlight to fade, they realised that to maintain momentum they would have to reinvent.
Singapore and Hong Kong have both gone through cycles of cultural investment to remain relevant and attractive to visitors. Dubai’s hosting of Expo 2020 is perhaps the most clear example of a city that understands the need for reinvention. After the knocks of the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, the arrival of Expo to push the city into a new era could not be better timed.
While they have their detractors, “cultural capital” initiatives help us discover cities we may know nothing about and therefore develop a new appreciation for their cultural heritage. The Arab Capital of Culture has been crowned annually since 1996, with Irbid in Jordan the chosen city for 2021, Kuwait City for 2022 and Tripoli in Lebanon for 2023. The initiative was set up by the Arab League under the UNESCO Cultural Capitals Programme to promote and celebrate Arab culture, encourage cooperation and build understanding between cultures.
But what is the qualification criteria to become such a capital? and what is culture exactly? Is it rituals? Costumes? Arts and crafts? Is it defined by its people, history, buildings and architecture? UNESCO defines culture as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group that encompasses, not only art and literature, but lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs. Perhaps we can add “timelessness” to this definition. Cities may fall but their cultural contributions can outlive the people and the powers that built them. Babylon’s Hanging Gardens were one of the seven wonders of the ancient world and while no visual evidence exists, its cultural importance remains. The ruins of Babylon itself, the ancient Mesopotamian city, now lie within the borders of Iraq and are a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Between 626 and 539 BC it was the capital of the Neo-Babylonian Empire and represented the expression of the creativity of the empire at its height.
Fast forward 2,600 years and the importance of investing in cultural initiatives that bring people together, is on full display in Dubai. For 170 years, World Expos have provided a platform to showcase the greatest innovations from across the globe. In 1851, the first World Expo was held at The Crystal Palace, the centrepiece of London’s Great Exhibition, where it celebrated the industrial wonders of a rapidly-changing world. Dubai Expo, the first to be held in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia, recently held its grand opening ceremony beneath the world’s largest unsupported dome in the Al Wasl Plaza. The design was inspired by the shape of a 4,000 year old gold ring discovered at the Iron age Sarouq Al-Hadeed archaeological site in Dubai. The Dubai Expo theme and logo is a great example of reviving ancient cultural roots, creatively bringing back its history for a present day audience.
Destinations like Dubai, Singapore and Hong Kong constantly revitalise their cultural identities in a bid to remain relevant in a fast-paced, changing world that exists largely online and in which grand projects have increasingly limited shelf-lives. But is it worth it? Is building and sometimes rebuilding, culture into our urban environments important? According to recent studies, the answer is a resounding “yes” and it is closely linked to prosperity.
A UNESCO study in 2016 found culture has the power to make cities richer, safer, and sustainable. “Culture lies at the heart of urban renewal and innovation,” Irina Bokova, the former UNESCO director-general wrote in the foreword of the Global Report, Culture: Urban Future. The report, she added, provided “concrete evidence showing the power of culture as a strategic asset for creating cities that are more inclusive, creative and sustainable.”
A series of three reports focused on culture is scheduled for release this month by the King Abdulaziz Centre for World Culture (Ithra) in Saudi Arabia. The reports aim to promote a greater understanding of how the cultural and creative industry is evolving in Saudi Arabia and the region. One of the highlights is that cultural participation is on the rise across the MENA region, with growth prospects highest in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The report will show that Gulf states have adopted a top-down approach to cultural development. They are heavily investing public funds to establish institutions, frameworks, infrastructure and spaces to enable the creative industry not only to exist, but to thrive. In contrast, the Levant and North African Arab countries have pursued a bottom-up approach, driven by private and grassroots initiatives and a vibrant cultural scene. Both approaches seem to be working with 90% of MENA respondents saying cultural participation is important to them and 75% valued it more than other entertainment options such as watching TV or playing sport.
This widening desire for people to be involved in cultural experiences validates the approach to give cultural booster shots to metropolitan areas or risk an overall demise. Royal courts in the past would parade their opulence and cultural significance through their art pieces and prominent cultural figures of the time. However, today, the court of public opinion exists on a global grander scale. There is an intrinsic link between culture and economic prosperity, where there is a co-dependent requirement for extravagance, to keep a cultural city relevant and to hold the attention of the travelling masses.
Copyright: Syndication Bureau