English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For June 04/2022
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
#elias_bejjani_news

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Bible Quotations For today
You have heard that it was said, “You shall love your neighbour and hate your enemy.”But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Matthew 05/43-48:”‘You have heard that it was said, “You shall love your neighbour and hate your enemy.”But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may be children of your Father in heaven; for he makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the righteous and on the unrighteous. For if you love those who love you, what reward do you have? Do not even the tax-collectors do the same? And if you greet only your brothers and sisters, what more are you doing than others? Do not even the Gentiles do the same? Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect.”

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on June 03-04/2022
Macy Fakhoury started this petition
Lebanese spy chief says he will visit Syria over missing US reporter
Can Miqati be re-appointed as PM?
Aoun urges Social Affairs Arab Ministers to help crisis-hit Lebanon
One soldier killed, five injured in army raid in Baalbek
UNEP, Sweden Embassy celebrate Swedish National Day in Byblos on June 6
Lebanese security chief fears ‘social chaos’ from political paralysis
Geagea says its time to 'get down to work'
Lebanese Security Chief Fears Political Paralysis, Social Collapse
Mikati Favorite to Retain Position as Lebanese PM
Lebanon Cenbank Governor, Brother Sue State over ‘Mistakes’ in Embezzlement Probe
Lebanon's Tourism Minister Calls for Removing Posters of Hezbollah Leaders from Airport Road
Lebanon’s election offers lessons for now and the future/Elie Abouaoun/The Arab Weekly/June 03/2022
Lebanon… Hochstein’s Majority/Mustafa Fahs/Asharq Al Awsat/June 03/2022
Justice… A Firebird/Hussam Itani/Asharq Al Awsat/June 03/2022

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on June 03-04/2022
At 100 days, Russia-Ukraine war by the numbers
Biden decides on Saudi visit as OPEC+ boosts oil production
US uses OPEC+ decision, Yemen truce to send positive signals about US-Saudi ties and Biden visit
Israel warns over Iran nuclear program
Jerusalem holds annual Pride Parade despite threats
Kuwait summons US diplomat over 'homosexuality' posts
What is behind Turkey's Syria incursion threats?
Israel Raises Iran Concerns with Visiting UN Nuclear Chief
Report: Iranian Police Arrest Man after Attack on Cleric
Iran probes death of another Revolutionary Guard colonel, denies assassination
Data puts Turkey's annual inflation at 73.5%, a 24-year high
Iraqi State TV Station Threatened for Criticizing Iran's Khamenei, Soleimani
Canada/Statement by Minister Joly on the 100th day of the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Titles For The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on June 03-04/2022
Biden Is No Friend of Israel/Con Coughlin/Gatestone Institute/June 03/2022
Israeli-Saudi Deal Over Two Islands Is a Step Toward Peace/Orde Kittrie/ Insight/June 03/2022 |
Hamas as Tehran’s Agent/Jonathan Schanzer/Middle East Quarterly/June03/2022 |
Antioch: Christendom’s First Great Reconquest Over Islam/Raymond Ibrahim/June 03/2022
Iran: Towards a Summer of Discontent/Amir Taheri/Asharq Al Awsat/June 03/2022

The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on June 03-04/2022
قدم الدعم المعنوي لعائلة الشهيد عامر فاخوري الذي اعتقل وقتل في سجون لبنان الخاضعة لإرهاب وhحتلال إيران وحزبها الشيطان ولطاقم من الحكام الأبالسة وتجار الهيكل.
بلعبة سياسية وسخة قضوا على حياة رجل وقضوا على عائلته التي جمعت نفسها وقامت من تحت الرماد، لتسترد حق والدها المغدور . انا مع الحق لذلك كونوا معنا من اجل انجلا تتكرر مثل هذه الاعمال المهينة .
https://www.change.org/p/hold-general-abbas-ibrahim-accountable-for-the-kidnapping-and-torture-of-u-s-citizens?recruiter=719360675&utm_campaign=signature_receipt&utm_medium=facebook&utm_source=share_petition&fbclid=IwAR3xmfwGrE-09BCU_aC5dP-cTSXu_K8ut3qbqlx_AlwUchcQAPd88o0XnjY
Macy Fakhoury started this petition
General Abbas Ibrahim is responsible for the Lebanese General Security, the same facility where U.S. Citizen, Amer Fakhoury, faced severe torture and mistreatment that ultimately led to his death. This is the same man who has attempted to silence Amer Fakhoury's daughters, who have Co-founded the Amer Fakhoury Foundation, through threats and the taking of a family member that is still in Lebanon. The family of Amer Fakhoury continuously receive direct and indirect threats each time they speak out against Abbas Ibrahim. The same man responsible for the torture and threatening of U.S. Citizens, is on his way to the United States via private plane, paid for by our U.S. Dollars, to meet with State Department officials. The foreign agent who ordered the kidnapping and torture of our father is en route to the United States. This is insulting to the family of a former U.S. Hostage, and to all Americans who expect their country to put their lives first.

Lebanese spy chief says he will visit Syria over missing US reporter
Reuters/June 03, 2022
BEIRUT: Lebanon’s intelligence chief has said he will visit Syria for talks with Syrian leaders about the fate of a US reporter who went missing in Syria a decade ago. Major General Abbas Ibrahim, said US officials want him to resume efforts to bring home Austin Tice and other Americans missing in Syria. Tice, a freelance journalist and former marine, disappeared while reporting in 2012. In an interview with General Security magazine, his agency’s official publication, Ibrahim said that in past talks with Damascus on Tice, Syria had raised demands related to the withdrawal of US forces, a resumption of diplomatic relations, and the lifting of some US sanctions. “We are working to resume the negotiations from where they ended” at the end of former President Donald Trump’s term, he said. He did not say when he planned to visit Syria. In May, US President Joe Biden told Tice’s parents that his administration would work “relentlessly” until his return was secured. “The American officials want me to resume my efforts to resolve this problem. They want their people back. This is what they are aiming for,” Ibrahiam said. Ibrahim, who said he met with Tice’s mother during a recent trip to the United States, said Syria had not given “clear answers” on Tice’s health or the conditions of his detention. He said he could not confirm whether Tice was alive in the absence of confirmation from the Syrian government. The United States suspended its diplomatic presence in Syria 2012 as it descended into a civil war which the United Nations says has killed at least 350,000 people.Last year, Washington said it would not normalize or upgrade diplomatic relations with Syria, citing what it described as atrocities inflicted on the Syrian people.
Officials at the US Embassy in Lebanon could not be reached for comment.

Can Miqati be re-appointed as PM?
Naharnet/June 03/2022
The Shiite Duo and the Progressive Socialist Party lean toward re-appointing Caretaker Prime Minister Najib Miqati, media reports said Friday. On the other hand, the Lebanese Forces party has stressed the need to name a sovereign PM, who guarantees that only the state take the war and peace decisions. The LF might suggest former President of the U.N. Security Council Nawwaf Salam, while the reformist MPs reportedly prefer not to name an LF-backed candidate and might name MP Halima Qaaqour. The PSP MPs have said that the government must be led by the majority and its PM must be sovereign. They stressed that it should be a political not a technocrat government. Yet, media reports have said that the PSP also leans towards re-appointing Miqati, a choice backed by France and Washington, according to al-Akhbar newspaper. The Free Patriotic Movement is reportedly against re-appointing Miqati who according to the FPM has been protecting the Central Bank governor. It called for a government that represents all parties, suggesting the name of Jawad Adra. Miqati had expressed in an interview his unwillingness to be re-appointed, suggesting other names like MPs Abdel Rahman Bizri, Ashraf Rifi and economist Amer Bsat. The binding Parliamentary consultations are expected to start at the middle of next week following the election of the parliamentary committees' members.

Aoun urges Social Affairs Arab Ministers to help crisis-hit Lebanon
Naharnet/June 03/2022
President Michel Aoun met Friday with a delegation from the Council of Arab Ministers for Social Affairs. "We hope to come up with recommendations that we can work on for the benefit of the Lebanese people," Head of the Council Minister Ayman Al-Mufleh said.
Aoun stressed Lebanon's need for the assistance of the Arab countries to overcome the difficult economic, social and humanitarian conditions it is going through. He told the delegation that Lebanon has been through crisis and disasters and needs to strengthens its social security, the Presidency said. "The Council's visit is an attempt to improve the situation (in Lebanon) through an action plan with a specific time frame," Social Affairs Caretaker Minister Hector Hajjar said. The delegation also met with Caretaker Prime Minister Najib Miqati and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. "We urge the Arab countries to intensify their efforts to support Lebanon at this difficult stage and to help it recover," Miqati said.

One soldier killed, five injured in army raid in Baalbek
Naharnet/June 03/2022
A soldier was killed Friday and five others were injured in an exchange of fire during a raid carried out by the Lebanese Army in Baalbek. The army announced in a statement the death of its soldier. It added that the soldiers have arrested a number of wanted persons in al-Shrawneh neighborhood in Baalbek. Media reports said the army arrested 4 persons related to a drug dealer nicknamed "Abu Salleh" who managed to escape.

UNEP, Sweden Embassy celebrate Swedish National Day in Byblos on June 6
Naharnet/June 03/2022
Sweden has chosen “Sustainable Sweden” as a theme for the Swedish National Day celebrations on June 6th. The event will take place in the historic citadel in Byblos in partnership with the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), Byblos Municipality, Volvo Cars and others. "The aim is to showcase sustainable solutions from different sectors, and to demonstrate that you can host an event with zero plastic waste, recycling and no food waste," UNEP Representative Sami Dimassi and Sweden Ambassador to Lebanon Ann Dismorr said Friday in a joint statement. Dimassi and Dismorr went on to say that the "Municipality of Byblos has been working hard since 2018 to reduce plastic waste and installing solar panels in the old town." "Volvo cars has a clear goal to be a climate neutral company by 2040 with a circular economy model. They also abide by the Paris Agreement principles," the statement added," they added. "In Lebanon, many civil society initiatives working for a greener future gives us hope," the statement said. "In Lebanon, Sweden supports renewable energy applications in Lebanese rural areas in the North together with ESCWA and the preparation of local wastewater treatment and reuse plans in Zahle and Ablah with International Water Management Institute. Sweden is also funding Berytech’s sustainable agriculture program, Water and Energy for Food, to stimulate innovation in this sector. This year, Sweden has also worked with FabricAID to promote more sustainable fashion consumption in Lebanon." The statement concluded that "this is an example of how we can all contribute. Our lifestyles are associated with two thirds of all greenhouse gas emissions. We can start with ourselves, change our behavior, and inspire others. It is time for bold choices and urgent action to secure a better future on a healthy planet."

Lebanese security chief fears ‘social chaos’ from political paralysis
The Arab Weekly/June 03/2022
A senior Lebanese security official has said the risk of political paralysis has increased since an election produced a fractured parliament last month, warning of a possible "disaster" because there is no majority to legislate. Major General Abbas Ibrahim also said he was concerned about social instability, saying this worried him more than political instability in a country suffering one of the world's sharpest financial meltdowns. "The results of this election could cause a disaster since we have large political blocs with widening gaps between them on various issues and no majority to pass laws," Ibrahim told General Security magazine, an official publication of his security agency, which was published on Thursday. The May 15 election, Lebanon's first since its economy collapsed in 2019, resulted in the heavily-armed, Iran-backed Hezbollah group and its allies losing their majority. Reform-minded newcomers and the Saudi-aligned Lebanese Forces, a Christian party, gained seats. Analysts have said the more fractured legislature increases the chance of political paralysis and tension among Lebanon's bickering politicians, at a time when the country is in dire need of government decisions to address the economic crisis. The meltdown has sunk the Lebanese pound by more than 90% since 2019, frozen depositors out of their savings in the banking system and led poverty to soar. "The people have a right to object and raise their voice over the collapse of the Lebanese pound but we don't want matters to turn into chaos and we are working very hard to prevent the country from entering social chaos," Ibrahim said. The outgoing government reached a draft IMF agreement in April, conditional on Beirut enacting reforms that its politicians have long failed to deliver. Parliament narrowly re-elected veteran Shia Muslim politician Nabih Berri as speaker this week.

Geagea says its time to 'get down to work'
Naharnet/June 03/2022
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea said Friday that his party has not participated in the parliamentary elections "for titles" but "to serve people.""We have to start working and to complete what we had started in 2005," Geagea noted in a meeting, praising his team who he said contributed to the party's success.
Geagea added that the elections are now "behind us," and that it's time to "draw up a road map and get down to work."

Lebanese Security Chief Fears Political Paralysis, Social Collapse
Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 3 June, 2022
A senior Lebanese security official has said the risk of political paralysis has increased since an election produced a fractured parliament last month, warning of a possible "disaster" because there is no majority to legislate. Major General Abbas Ibrahim also said he was concerned about social instability, saying this worried him more than political instability in a country suffering one of the world's sharpest financial meltdowns."The results of this election could cause a disaster since we have large political blocs with widening gaps between them on various issues and no majority to pass laws," Ibrahim told General Security magazine, an official publication of his security agency, which was published on Thursday. he May 15 election, Lebanon's first since its economy collapsed in 2019, resulted in the Iran-backed Hezbollah party and its allies losing their majority. Reform-minded newcomers and the Lebanese Forces - a Christian party - gained seats. Analysts have said the more fractured legislature increases the chance of political paralysis and tension among Lebanon's fractious politicians, at a time when the country is in dire need of government decisions to address the economic crisis.The meltdown has sunk the Lebanese pound by more than 90% since 2019, frozen depositors out of their savings in the banking system, and led poverty to soar. "The people have a right to object and raise their voice over the collapse of the Lebanese pound but we don't want matters to turn into chaos and we are working very hard to prevent the country from entering social chaos," Ibrahim said. The outgoing government reached a draft IMF agreement in April, conditional on Beirut enacting reforms that its politicians have long failed to deliver. Parliament narrowly re-elected veteran Shiite politician Nabih Berri as speaker this week.

Mikati Favorite to Retain Position as Lebanese PM
Beirut - Caroline Akoum/Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 3 June, 2022
Lebanon will soon embark on a mission to designate a new prime minister, who will be tasked with forming a new government. Prime Minister Najib Mikati's government is now operating in a caretaker capacity after parliamentary elections were staged last month. President Michel Aoun is tasked with calling parliamentary blocs to hold consultations with him (Aoun) to name a new premier. He will likely set the date for the consultations after the formation of the parliamentary committees by next Tuesday. The president is not bound by a constitutional deadline to call for the consultations, an issue that had previously sparked disputes in the country when Aoun was accused of violating the constitution when he held talks ahead of the consultations to agree on a new PM before scheduling the meetings with parliamentary blocs. Sources close to the president said Aoun will set the date for the consultations after the election of the parliamentary committees. Mikati is likely to retain his post, but talks between the blocs over the name of the new PM will intensify when the date of the consultations is announced. Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) MP Bilal Abdullah told Asharq Al-Awsat that it was "necessary to select a premier who is sovereign and who leans towards reforms so he can complete demanded reforms and the agreement with the International Monetary Fund."The PSP will discuss this issue with its allies, such as the Lebanese Forces and "sovereign" MPs, he added. LF press official Charles Jabbour confirmed Abdullah's remarks, adding that Hezbollah and its ally, the Amal movement, will likely name Mikati as PM. This means they want to revive the caretaker government, but make some changes to some ministers, he added. "We will wait and see what head of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), Gebran Bassil, will say about this," he said. Sources from Hezbollah and Amal said they have received signals from Mikati that he is willing to retain his post. Abdullah, meanwhile, warned of attempts to impede the formation of a new government. He did not rule out the possibility that Hezbollah and its allies, which include the FPM, would impose conditions and take advantage of the fragmentation of the other camp. He stressed it was imperative to form a new government and for the caretaker one to be replaced. While Bassil has yet to comment on the name of a new PM, his movement already appears to be setting conditions.
FPM MP Jimmy Jabbour said the Strong Lebanon (FPM) bloc has not discussed the possibility of re-designating Mikati. He remarked that the technocrat government - meaning the caretaker cabinet - has proven its failure because not all parties named a technocratic minister. "We have several reservations against Mikati and we have major conditions that should be agreed upon before naming a premier," he told local radio. "The new government should reflect the results of the parliamentary elections," he suggested. "Everyone should join in proposing solutions to the crisis."
"The situation in Lebanon cannot tolerate the formation of a weak majority government and it cannot be held hostage to one political camp."Charles Jabbour said the opposition must be united and agree on a single candidate as prime minister. This figure should have a clear vision of how to manage the state, especially the decision of war and peace that should be in the hands of the government. He must also prioritize mending Lebanon's relations with Arab countries. He underscored the importance of the opposition cooperating with the LF so that their candidate will enjoy the majority of votes and be named PM.

Lebanon Cenbank Governor, Brother Sue State over ‘Mistakes’ in Embezzlement Probe
Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 3 June, 2022
Lebanon's central bank governor and his brother are suing the state over what they say were "grave mistakes" made by a public prosecutor in his investigation of whether they had embezzled public funds, according to a copy of the lawsuit.Their claim has led to concerns that the public probe into the two brothers could stall, after similar lawsuits paralyzed an investigation into the devastating 2020 explosion at Beirut's port.Public prosecutor Jean Tannous has been investigating allegations of embezzlement and other misconduct at the central bank involving $300 million in gains made by a company owned by Raja Salameh, brother of Lebanese Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh. The brothers have denied the accusations. his week, they filed a suit against the Lebanese state accusing Tannous of committing "grave mistakes" through the course of his probe, according to a copy of the lawsuit seen by Reuters on Friday. Tannous declined a Reuters request for comment while Riad Salameh did not immediately respond to a similar request. he document alleges that Tannous is biased and lacks the legal authority to access bank information, arguing that only the central bank's special investigation commission has that prerogative.The commission is typically headed by the central bank governor. Salameh told Reuters earlier this year he stepped back from presiding over it as far as it pertains to his case, "so there is no conflict of interest".The lawsuit also claims that Tannous's attempt to obtain account information from commercial banks in January as part of the probe violated banking secrecy laws. It also accuses Tannous of circumventing official channels to coordinate directly with judiciaries abroad on the probe. Riad Salameh is facing judicial probes in at least five European nations over the same accusations of embezzlement and money-laundering. n May, French investigative judge Aude Buresi traveled to Beirut and met with Tannous, Lebanon's top prosecutor Ghassan Oueidat, and other judges. During her visit, the central bank's special investigation commission handed over account information on Raja Salameh from nine Lebanese banks to Oueidat, in the first known case of such information-sharing. izar Saghieh, the head of rights watchdog Legal Agenda, said the lawsuit could "freeze the case indefinitely" as it was filed to a public court whose members have yet to be named. imilar lawsuits filed to this body have managed to stall another state investigation into the causes behind the Beirut port blast, which killed more than 215 people.

Lebanon's Tourism Minister Calls for Removing Posters of Hezbollah Leaders from Airport Road
Beirut - Paula Astih/Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 3 June, 2022
Lebanon's Tourism Minister Walid Nassar issued on Thursday a decree that allows tourist institutions to exceptionally and selectively list their prices in US dollars or Lebanese pounds. The final bill will also be issued in either currency. The move is temporary and will end in September, the end of the tourism season in Lebanon, which is suffering from an unprecedented economic crisis. Nassar told Asharq Al-Awsat that his ministry has kicked off measures to promote tourism, whether by welcoming tourists at the airport or organizing taxi services from the facility.
He revealed that it has also called for the removal of posters of Hezbollah leaders and slain members that have been posted along the airport highway. The posters will be replaced with images of various Lebanese regions, he added. His efforts have been positively received, he revealed. "We are also planning to hold festivals in Downtown Beirut, specifically in Nejmeh square after the barricades have been removed around the area," he added. Nejmeh square is also home to the parliament building. Last week, security forces removed concrete barriers that had been placed around 2019 to deter anti-government protesters from storming parliament. With the election of a new legislature, which includes opposition figures, the barriers were removed. Before the crisis in Lebanon, Nejmeh square was a popular area for festivals and boasted several restaurants and cafes.
On the decision to list prices in dollars and Lebanese pound, Nassar said it stemmed from the government's inability to come up with a stable exchange rate. The move will create competition between institutions and will attract hard cash that is needed to pay salaries and other needs, he added. Nassar predicted Lebanon will have a promising summer and that some 10,000 to 12,000 people will arrive in the country daily in June. Seventy percent of arrivals are Lebanese expatriates and the rest are foreigners. A tourist normally spends around 1,500 dollars on their trip, meaning the season will likely generate around 3 billion dollars, he added, hoping that the situation in Lebanon remains calm on the security and political levels. The move to list prices in dollars was welcomed by the tourism sector. Secretary General of the Federation of Tourism Establishments Jean Beiruti told Asharq Al-Awsat that the move is "bold and the result of two years of hard work."

Lebanon’s election offers lessons for now and the future
Elie Abouaoun/The Arab Weekly/June 03/2022
While some of the results indicate positive breakthroughs and progress, it is only fair to acknowledge that the current context is unfavourable for structural political, economic or social changes.
As the minister of interior announced the results of Lebanon’s May 15 legislative elections, speculation began about whether or not the configuration of the new parliament foretold a brighter future for the tormented country. While some of the results indicate positive breakthroughs and progress, there are several nuances indicating that much greater change is still needed to put the country on a steady path to recovery. At least 80% of parliamentary seats were won by the same traditional corrupt parties or figures that have formed the political system for decades. This figure may be stunning to some, given that these are the parties and figures directly responsible, certainly to varying degrees, for Lebanon’s current predicament. However, a closer look at the results of the 2022 elections reveals that the commitment of hundreds of thousands of voters and the relentless efforts of Lebanon’s diaspora groups actually led to some important breakthroughs in a context of restrained electoral competition. Although these breakthroughs would not have been possible without the convergence of other contextual factors (such as the nature of the electoral law, manoeuvres in some districts by traditional parties, withdrawals of some candidates), they do indeed constitute a basis for hope, point to some immediate political gains and most importantly to call for a larger mobilisation in favour of change in the upcoming 2026 elections.
Flaws in the process
Without consideration of the results, it is obvious that several flaws of the electoral process continue to allow or encourage fraud and undermine the legitimacy of future popular consultations. Outrageous and uncontrolled electoral spending, the persistent buying of votes, iniquitous paid-for media appearances, an electoral management body (EMB) entirely subdued by the ministry of interior, lacking funding, a restrictive voting procedure that requires travelling to one’s hometown to vote, intimidation (at gun point in some cases), impunity and co-optation (or inaction) of the judiciary as well as other violations, all need to be addressed as soon as possible, not a few weeks before the 2026 elections. The starting point for an overdue and much needed electoral reform would be the establishment of a robust independent EMB and the adoption of voting mega centres.
While the final reports of the main Electoral Observation Missions (including the European Union, LADE) have not yet been published, it is expected that the final verdict, as foreshadowed by the statement of the international support group for Lebanon, will consider that the multiple infractions and irregularities do not substantially challenge the outcome of the election. As in 2018, the international community will endorse the outcome of a deceitful consultation, call for reforms but will not use any of its leverage tools to push for these reforms.
The performance of traditional parties
Despite notable setbacks and with the exception of the disoriented constituency of former PM Saad Hariri (who decided to boycott the vote), most of the other parties survived the elections and proved, once again, that they can count on a core, loyal support base regardless of how badly they behave in both the government and parliament.As the country faces its largest peace-time economic and financial crisis, compounded by the reverberations of COVID-19 and the Port of Beirut explosion, voters did not seem to find enough ground to oust a consortium of complicit criminal politicians linked by interconnected interests. Such a situation defies China’s Emperor and “Martial King” Cao Cao’s basic premise that “Human nature advances towards gain and retreats from pain." It appears that the Lebanese citizen prefers pain over gain, so long as the instinct of fear is suppressed, even hollowly, by a corrupt and criminal “leader”.
The main political parties did not see a drastic decrease in their popular votes compared to 2018, with the notable exceptions of the Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM, founded by the current President of the Republic Michel Aoun and now headed by his pro-Hezbollah son-in-law former minister Gebran Bassil) and the notorious Al-Kataeb, each losing around 31% of their popular votes. The rest, including the ultra-corrupt Amal movement, either had slightly fewer, equal, or even more votes, despite the fact that over the last two years, the ability of these parties to provide direct assistance to their constituencies has been curtailed by the financial and banking crises. This brings the “fear factor” in Lebanon’s identity-based politics to the forefront.
Traditional, mostly feudal, political leaders constantly cultivated fear of the other as a justification for their unchallenged leadership. The surge in the popular votes of the hardline Christian Lebanese Forces (LF) party as well as the surprising performance, against all odds, of Walid Jumblatt, who mobilised his supporters under the banner of confronting an extermination campaign, prove that the apprehensions of the demographic minority groups continue to shape their political and electoral behaviour. Thus efforts should be pursued to gradually shift the political paradigms in Lebanon from being identity-based to cause-based. It is deplorable that in this same context of radicalisation of Lebanon’s politics, Hariri’s boycott allowed bigger gains for radicalised and potentially violent groups such as Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiyah, Al-Ahbache or retired general and former minister Ashraf Rifi, known for his fanatic diatribes against Hezbollah, its allies and their constituencies.
Hezbollah's influence
Since May 15, several media outlets and expert analyses emphasised the losses incurred by Hezbollah in the elections. While it is true that the “Party of God” lost many seats usually taken by its non-Shia allies, there are still other spheres in which Hezbollah maintains and even advanced its influence.
First, one must consider that the Hezbollah-led majority reached 71 seats in 2018 but decreased by five MPs after October 2019. So the 2022 losses should be calculated against 66 not 71 seats. Also, over the years, Hezbollah has adopted a multidimensional strategy comprised of multiple political assets to complement its military apparatus. In addition to forming a political belt of non-Shia allies (Christians, Alawites, Druze, and Sunnis), the assets included a massive infiltration of the public administration and other entities including the general labour union and transportation union.
Most importantly, Hezbollah and its main ally Nabih Berri’s Amal movement championed an exclusive representation of the Shia community through the control of all the parliamentary seats allocated to their community and the entire quota share of the Shias in any government. In Lebanon’s power-sharing system, this means that they can veto any decision or void any session of the parliament or the government, simply by asking all Shia members not to attend, or vote against.
Of these three avenues of political leverage, the one and only area that Hezbollah lost influence in this election is the belt of non-Shia allies. Through frantic and successful efforts by the party to ensure that all the preferential votes of their constituencies went to their Shia candidates, the vote had to come at the expense of their own allies, with the exception of Aoun’s FPM which still benefited from Hezbollah’s electoral largesse. Hence the surge (+16%) in the total number of popular votes obtained by Hezbollah compared to 2018.
This increase in preferential votes was counterbalanced by an unprecedented number of spoiled ballots (around 6,000 in the South II district alone) indicating a strong resentment by Hezbollah’s own popular base against the many traditional or corrupt figures endorsed by the party. Being unable to vote outright against Hezbollah’s lists, one form of protest was to cast a spoiled ballot.
Even if the total number of seats currently claimed by the pro-Hezbollah coalition is three to five short of the 65 needed for an absolute majority, the party can still bet on the usual swings of other blocs such as Walid Jumblatt, some independents and anti-Israel change-oriented MPs when its existence or vital interests are under threat.
Ultimately, the party can still resort to intimidation and direct action, mobilising its armed members when political means do not work out. Therefore, aside from the modest significance of the few breakthrough instances in this election, the actual implications on Hezbollah’s real influence should not be over-estimated since the party retains the ability to use other means, including its military might, to leverage political decision-making in Lebanon.
The change parliamentarians
For the first time in Lebanon’s modern history, a sizeable number of candidates from outside the traditional political structures won this many seats in the parliament. While around 30+ MPs claim to represent the “change movement”, there is a solid block of 13 MP with enough commonalities to establish a new way of doing business in the country’s legislative assembly. For such an endeavour to succeed, this group of 13 MPs, their allies, and supporters, as well as the public opinion need to remain sober and pragmatic.
Without falling into excessive pessimism, it is only fair to acknowledge that the current context is unfavourable to structural political, economic or social changes. While the parliament remains largely under the control of traditional and/or corrupt parties, the domestic ramifications of Hezbollah’s regional agenda(s) will persist, including lose border control and adversarial relations with some GCC countries. The party’s excess of power, impunity, veto power and uncontrolled military capabilities will shape Lebanon’s political landscape for years to come.
The banking conglomerate, in association with other influential political and religious actors, remains a powerful speculator and spoiler and continues to refuse any attempt to endorse a financial recovery plan that includes an equitable distribution of the sector’s losses incurred over the years. As a behavioural consequence of greed, the social roots of an overt and extremely powerful culture of corruption can hardly be tackled in the midst of a severe crisis such as Lebanon’s. Without social and cultural change, very little can be done to curb corruption in the public and private sector and/or to move forward with structural political, economic, fiscal, or social reforms.
Accordingly, and because the “ambition of respectability does not make one a saint”, the group of newly-elected reform-oriented MPs needs to maintain a balance between objectives, tools and resources while managing the expectations of the public. Overpromising will only cause harm, as will weak communication or the lack of thereof, especially since these 13 MPs are already targeted by harsh slander campaigns aimed at discrediting them.
It is naïve to believe that the 13 MPs can form one coherent parliamentary bloc that will survive the tumultuous four-year mandate. However, there is no reason why these MPs should not consider tactical alliances amongst themselves and with other traditional parties in the parliament when it comes to a specific draft law, vote or position. Most importantly, as a small opposition group, they should emphasise the accountability of executive power rather than a wholesale ideological discourse to fix Lebanon’s endemic problems, while being a minority in the parliament and not represented in the government.
As any other collective of human beings, some of the new MPs will prove to be incompetent, opportunistic, or corrupt. Given the sensitivity of the issues at stake and given that they are new to their roles, all MPs claiming to be “change-oriented” should start by establishing a transparent and rigorous accountability mechanism for their own performance. Potential disappointment from any lack of performance or misdeeds of some should not stymie the experience of having a group of reform-oriented MPs who are not affiliated with traditional parties and who deserve the benefit of the doubt.
Looking forward
If anything, many Lebanese still rejoice over the loss of disreputable and obnoxious figures who dominated Lebanon’s political life for years, such as Elie El-Ferzli, Talal Arslan, Assad Hardane or Marwan Kheireddine. The fact that the LF MP Antoine Habchi made it to the parliament in Baalbeck-Hermel despite an overt campaign of intimidation by Hezbollah against his allies and supporters, the loss of one seat by the LF in Bcharre to the pro-Syrian neo-feudal figure William Tawk, the tenuous success of Frangieh in his own breeding ground Zgharta and other surprises confer a special significance on this election, in that no political group feels safe enough or in full control of its constituency.
This will force even the traditional parties to revisit the way they conduct business, leaning towards closer scrutiny and greater selectiveness in the choice of their political representatives. Moreover, the small but mighty impact of the diaspora vote adds to the assets that voters, inside and outside Lebanon, may optimise in the future. It should not be discounted that the 2022 consultation constitutes a political precedent that needs to be capitalised upon and built out for a better outcome in 2026 or before, if this parliament does not make it to the end of its term. At the same time, Lebanon is still in a calamitous free fall that needs to be stopped or at least decelerated through two inevitable measures: continued, but conditional financial and political support to the Lebanese Armed Forces & Internal Security Forces to prevent their collapse, combined with a financial recovery plan asserting an equitable distribution of losses amongst all stakeholders. These measures surpass the capacity of the Lebanese themselves and require consistent international support.

Lebanon… Hochstein’s Majority
Mustafa Fahs/Asharq Al Awsat/June 03/2022
With immense difficulty and effort, Hezbollah’s candidate for the Speakership, Nabih Berri, was elected for the seventh time. However, Berri’s victory seemed like it had been achieved in the dead of night, as the number of votes that he and his deputy received affirmed that the national consensus around him, which he had boasted of for three decades, is now a thing of the past.
He had exploited this parliamentary consensus in his games to distinguish himself from his partner and sponsor, Hezbollah. The slim majority he and his deputy obtained are very much aware that this post-October 17 parliament will pave a bumpy road. More broadly speaking, Lebanese political life has changed fundamentally after May 15. The majority of 65 (out of 128) deputies exposes the minority ruling the country, as all burdens emerging in the near and medium term, which will almost certainly be the most difficult in the country’s history, will fall on their shoulders.
The minority is behaving as though it were a majority. It has the capacity to disrupt crucial constitutional processes, as the first session demonstrated that the opposition, in all its forms, refuses to validate the decisions taken by the deputy in power with its stamp of approval and that it is preparing to challenge the executive in the future.
Thus, a political clash is imminent; it will either paralyze the country and create a governmental and presidential vacuum or compel the majority to opt for confrontation and fill these positions to its liking, even if this would create chaos and spark civil unrest.
The trio in power (Hezbollah, the Amal Movement and the Aounists) know that they have lost a lot of their momentum but maintain several levers of power.
They have a winning card in their pocket despite the awkwardness it creates for the party. Close inspection of how the positions were distributed demonstrates that they were not purely a reflection of alliances imposed by the size of parliamentary blocs.
Indeed, Nabih Berri and Gebran Bassil, with Hezbollah’s backing, are preparing for a collision course with domestic rivals. They have no recourse but to exploit their ties to foreign players to bully and intimidate these rivals, and it is clear that what brings the duo (Berri-Bassil) together at a critical moment is the process of demarcating the country’s maritime borders with Israel.
The issue has drawn great interest in Washington, which sees it as a strategic priority in the conflict over fossil fuels in the Eastern Mediterranean, as these resources have become urgently needed by Western countries as they seek to reduce their dependence on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine.
And so it is likely that the two sides will bet on this issue, relieving the pressure being exerted by the US administration, seeing it as an opportunity to revive Gebran Bassil’s political future and ensure a quiet retirement for Berri, extinguishing the specter of US sanctions being imposed on his entourage.
Another dimension to the majority ensured in the dead of night is that the US envoy tasked with mediating the maritime border negotiations, Amos Hochstein, will return to Beirut and resume his meetings with the decision-makers involved in these negotiations, from Speaker Nabih Berri to Deputy Gebran Bassil, and this time they will be publicly joined by Deputy Speaker Elias Bou Saab, thereby representing the ruling majority of this bankrupt republic.
Hochstein, a biased mediator representing not one but two states, is very much aware of the situation that the Lebanese negotiators have found themselves in. He might be preparing to barter Lebanon’s wealth and borders in exchange for these negotiators’ interests and political future. On the other hand, this trio will manage this matter from the standpoint that only it is capable of taking major decisions and deciding on whether they will be implemented or even imposed on the Lebanese under the pretext of political and strategic realism. In other words, the plan is to blackmail the Lebanese by threatening to deprive them of the revenues they so badly need. And so… It isn’t far-fetched to see Baabda Palace’s pre-election update on the negotiations over Line 23 and its announcement that Line 29 had been given up on for nothing in return as a sign of goodwill to the US and, behind it, Israel. We can also see Bassil’s statements about peace with the Israeli entity in the same light. Indeed, these statements explicitly announced that Lebanon is prepared to resume negotiations from where they left off, affirming Lebanon’s readiness to waive its rights. This behavior may explain the statements that some US diplomats have made about the opposition, in which they shed doubt on its chances of winning seats because they know who can seal the deal.

Justice… A Firebird
Hussam Itani/Asharq Al Awsat/June 03/2022
The word “justice” was heard several times during the newly elected Lebanese Parliament’s first session, immediately followed by the word “annulled” being yelled out by the Speaker of the Parliament representing the ruling coalition majority.
It is as though the current government is unable to hear words such as “justice for victims of the Beirut explosion”, as some of the accused of being responsible for their murder, injury, and displacement, were sitting among their peers in Parliament. They cannot hear “justice for Lokman Slim” either, as the party accused of his assassination is well represented in Parliament, or “justice for the depositors” who lost their savings due to the complicity of the authorities, Parliament, and the banks.
Social media users swiftly pointed to the demand for” justice” and its imminent annulment. In the end, the newly elected Parliament, with 13 new deputies belonging to the bloc “17 October revolution”, is not yet out of the hands of those responsible for leading Lebanon into the abyss and is hindering all efforts at a solution. The same applies to the executive and judicial branches, which orbit around the “traditional ruling blocs.”
It was no coincidence that those who supported October 17 and followers of traditional parties came together, each from a different standpoint, and harshly criticized the “change deputies.” Unfortunately for the latter, the hopes being pinned on them are commensurate with the scale of destruction that we have recently seen in Lebanon. While their rivals have all the state tools, funds, arms, and media outlets they need, these deputies have nothing but an audience that demands to have their catastrophes resolved.
As for justice, a term that was repeated during the new Lebanese Parliament’s first session, it is more like the firebird of Slavic mythology. Its ability to radiate light and its dazzling beauty are only commensurate to the degree of difficulty of reaching it and entrapping it in a cage. The most one could hope for is managing to get a feather from the wing of a firebird to light the darkness of his home and his life.
This sought-after but paralyzed justice would appear increasingly elusive the more we pursued it. Attributing super powers to the new deputies does not help them or their voters, nor do the attempts to reinvigorate the political process. The fact that amid the economic collapse, we have powerful forces is determined to defend the regime, even if that means paving this path with violence, assassination and naked repression, leaves little room for these representatives to begin implementing the programs and ideas they pushed for, most of which are delusional. The regime, in contrast, is rooted in the structure of Lebanese society, its sects, clans, and social classes. It is aware of the threats posed by voices questioning partial identities.
Some perhaps believe that what has happened in Lebanon since the legislative elections, all the way up to the parliament session, was nothing more than the noisy bickering over the causes of their country’s demise, demonstrating that those taking part in this theater are too weak to fix the situation, and are, in fact, “tokens” that the ruling group is exploiting to market to foreign powers in Lebanon.
It is not unreasonable to believe that this sideshow obscures another grave threat to Lebanon and the region, one that has been voiced during the recent speeches of the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, the specter of an imminent regional war based on a misguided bet on Lebanon’s oil and gas resources, which we still need to cross a long and thorny road to exploit. The Secretary-General, addressing those who celebrated the election of 13 deputies pushing for change, told them what they do not want to hear: There is no escape from this noose tied on your neck. We promise you nothing but wars, “victories,” and blood, as well as more civil strife, the disintegration of the state, and the erosion of society. The pretexts for the next wars have already been formulated. If the argument about protecting Lebanon’s oil wealth at sea does not work, then there is nothing wrong with waging war for any other reason.
So far, despite the good intentions and loud but ineffective voices for change in Parliament, the kind of political bloc needed to dismantle the ruling clique and its networks, from banks to armed militias, has not yet been formed. Destruction is still the only item on the agenda of the regime’s owners and protectors. Lebanon has not developed an ability to fight its diseases. Meanwhile, the feuds from among the figures of this regime and its clients continue, and politicians addicted to gambling with what they do not have and continue to recalibrate according to tactical demands.
The dream of granting the victims of crime committed by these corrupt, violent, and unaccountable groups justice is far from our grasp, a firebird. But it seems inevitable to run after it in hope that a feather of hope drops from the bird’s wing.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on June 03-04/2022
At 100 days, Russia-Ukraine war by the numbers
Associated Press/June 03/2022
One hundred days into Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the war has brought the world a near-daily drumbeat of gut wrenching scenes: Civilian corpses in the streets of Bucha; a blown-up theater in Mariupol; the chaos at a Kramatorsk train station in the wake of a Russian missile strike. Those images tell just a part of the overall picture of Europe's worst armed conflict in decades. Here's a look at some numbers and statistics that — while in flux and at times uncertain — shed further light on the death, destruction, displacement and economic havoc wrought by the war as it reaches this milestone with no end in sight.
THE HUMAN TOLL
Nobody really knows how many combatants or civilians have died, and claims of casualties by government officials — who may sometimes be exaggerating or lowballing their figures for public relations reasons — are all but impossible to verify. Government officials, U.N. agencies and others who carry out the grim task of counting the dead don't always get access to places where people were killed. And Moscow has released scant information about casualties among its forces and allies, and given no accounting of civilian deaths in areas under its control. In some places — such as the long-besieged city of Mariupol, potentially the war's biggest killing field — Russian forces are accused of trying to cover up deaths and dumping bodies into mass graves, clouding the overall toll. With all those caveats, "at least tens of thousands" of Ukrainian civilians have died so far, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Thursday in comments to Luxembourg's parliament. In Mariupol alone, officials have reported over 21,000 civilian dead. Sievierodonetsk, a city in the eastern region of Luhansk that has become the focus of Russia's offensive, has seen roughly 1,500 casualties, according to the mayor. Such estimates comprise both those killed by Russian strikes or troops and those who succumbed to secondary effects such as hunger and sickness as food supplies and health services collapsed. Zelenskyy said this week that 60 to 100 Ukrainian soldiers are dying in combat every day, with about 500 more wounded. Russia's last publicly released figures for its own forces came March 25, when a general told state media that 1,351 soldiers had been killed and 3,825 wounded. Ukraine and Western observers say the real number is much higher: Zelenskyy said Thursday that more than 30,000 Russian servicemen have died — "more than the Soviet Union lost in 10 years of the war in Afghanistan"; in late April, the British government estimated Russian losses at 15,000. Speaking on condition of anonymity Wednesday to discuss intelligence matters, a Western official said Russia is "still taking casualties, but ... in smaller numbers." The official estimated that some 40,000 Russian troops have been wounded. In Moscow-backed separatist enclaves in eastern Ukraine, authorities have reported over 1,300 fighters lost and nearly 7,500 wounded in the Donetsk region, along with 477 dead civilians and nearly 2,400 wounded; plus 29 civilians killed and 60 wounded in Luhansk.
THE DEVASTATION
Relentless shelling, bombing and airstrikes have reduced large swaths of many cities and towns to rubble. Ukraine's parliamentary commission on human rights says Russia's military has destroyed almost 38,000 residential buildings, rendering about 220,000 people homeless. Nearly 1,900 educational facilities from kindergartens to grade schools to universities have been damaged, including 180 completely ruined. Other infrastructure losses include 300 car and 50 rail bridges, 500 factories and about 500 damaged hospitals, according to Ukrainian officials. The World Health Organization has tallied 296 attacks on hospitals, ambulances and medical workers in Ukraine this year.
FLEEING HOME
The U.N. refugee agency UNHCR estimates that about 6.8 million people have been driven out of Ukraine at some point during the conflict. But since fighting subsided in the area near Kyiv and elsewhere, and Russian forces redeployed to the east and south, about 2.2 million have returned to the country, it says. The U.N.'s International Organization for Migration estimates that as of May 23 there were more than 7.1 million internally displaced people — that is, those who fled their homes but remain in the country. That's down from over 8 million in an earlier count.
LAND SEIZED
Ukrainian officials say that before the February invasion, Russia controlled some 7% of Ukrainian territory including Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014, and areas held by the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk. On Thursday, Zelenskyy said Russian forces now held 20% of the country. While the front lines are constantly shifting, that amounts to an additional 58,000 square kilometers (22,000 square miles) under Russian control, a total area slightly larger than Croatia or a little smaller than the U.S. state of West Virginia.
THE ECONOMIC FALLOUT IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE ...
The West has levied a host of retaliatory sanctions against Moscow including on the crucial oil and gas sectors, and Europe is beginning to wean itself from its dependence on Russian energy. Evgeny Gontmakher, academic director of European Dialogue, wrote in a paper this week that Russia currently faces over 5,000 targeted sanctions, more than any other country. Some $300 billion of Russian gold and foreign exchange reserves in the West have been frozen, he added, and air traffic in the country dropped from 8.1 million to 5.2 million passengers between January and March. Additionally, the Kyiv School of Economics has reported that more than 1,000 "self-sanctioning" companies have curtailed their operations in Russia. The MOEX Russia stock index has plunged by about a quarter since just before the invasion and is down nearly 40 percent from the start of the year. And the Russian Central Bank said last week that annualized inflation came in at 17.8 percent in April.Ukraine, meanwhile, has reported suffering a staggering economic blow: 35% of GDP wiped out by the war. "Our direct losses today exceed $600 billion," Andriy Yermak, the head of Zelenskyy's office, said recently. Ukraine, a major agricultural producer, says it has been unable to export some 22 million tons of grain. It blames a backlog of shipments on Russian blockades or capture of key ports. Zelenskyy accused Russia this week of stealing at least a half-million tons of grain during the invasion.
... AND THE WORLD
The fallout has rippled around the globe, further driving up costs for basic goods on top of inflation that was already in full swing in many places before the invasion. Developing countries are being squeezed particularly hard by higher costs of food, fuel and financing. Crude oil prices in London and New York have risen by 20 to 25 percent, resulting in higher prices at the pump and for an array of petroleum-based products.Wheat supplies have been disrupted in African nations, which imported 44% of their wheat from Russia and Ukraine in the years immediately before the invasion. The African Development Bank has reported a 45% increase in continental prices for the grain, affecting everything from Mauritanian couscous to th e fried donuts sold in Congo. Amin Awad, the U.N. crisis coordinator in Ukraine, said 1.4 billion people worldwide could be affected by shortages of grain and fertilizer from the country. "This war's toll on civilians is unacceptable. This war has no winner," he told reporters in Geneva via video from Kyiv on Friday. "Today we mark a tragic milestone. And we know what is needed the most: An end to this war."

Biden decides on Saudi visit as OPEC+ boosts oil production
Agence France Presse/June 03/2022
U.S. President Joe Biden will visit Saudi Arabia this month, reports said Thursday, a stark reversal for a leader who once called for the kingdom to be made a pariah. The reported decision comes hours after Saudi Arabia addressed two of Biden's priorities by agreeing to a production hike in oil and helping extend a truce in war-battered Yemen. The New York Times, The Washington Post and CNN, quoting anonymous sources, said that Biden would go ahead with the long-rumored Saudi stop on an upcoming trip. CNN said that Biden would meet Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler, 36-year-old Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who was accused by U.S. intelligence of ordering the 2018 murder of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi. White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said she had no travel to announce, adding only: "The president will look for opportunities to engage with leaders from the Middle East region."However, a senior administration official told AFP that if Biden "determines that it's in the interests of the United States to engage with a foreign leader and that such an engagement can deliver results, then he'll do so." While not confirming the trip, the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said there was "no question that important interests are interwoven with Saudi Arabia." The trip would reportedly happen around the time Biden travels to a NATO summit in Spain and Group of Seven summit in Germany later this month. He is also widely expected to travel to Israel where, as in Saudi Arabia, he is sure to face pointed questions about slow-moving U.S. diplomacy with the two countries' rival, Iran.
While running for president, Biden called for Saudi leaders to be treated as "the pariah that they are" after the ultraconservative kingdom's chummy relationship with his predecessor Donald Trump.Trump had largely shielded Saudi Arabia from consequences after Khashoggi, a U.S. resident who wrote critically about Crown Prince Mohammed in The Washington Post, was lured into the Saudi consulate in Istanbul where he was strangled and dismembered. And Trump's son-in-law and top aide, Jared Kushner, had developed a close bond with the prince known by his initials "MBS," reportedly conversing with him over WhatsApp chats. Shortly after taking office, Biden released the intelligence report that said MBS authorized Khashoggi's killing and his administration imposed visa restrictions on dozens of Saudis accused of threatening dissidents. Biden also scaled back support from a Saudi-led air campaign in Yemen amid revulsion over civilian casualties. The reported plan for Biden to visit the kingdom drew fire from opponents of the Saudi government, including Abdullah Alaoudh, the son of an imprisoned scholar. "MBS has blood on his hands," he said in a statement. "If Biden gives him the U.S. meeting MBS so desperately wants, the bloody handshake will send a clear message to tyrants everywhere: you can always count on America to betray its values and reward bad behavior," Alaoudh added.
MBS says doesn't 'care' -
A close partner of the United States since the World War II era, Saudi Arabia has repeatedly managed to woo administrations in Washington that initially sought a greater distance. U.S. officials were pleasantly surprised on Thursday as major oil producers led by Saudi Arabia grouped under OPEC+ agreed to a larger than expected hike in oil production. A rise in supply could help bring down skyrocketing prices at the pump, seen as a major contributor to sagging poll numbers for Biden whose Democratic Party faces difficult congressional elections in November. Officials in Washington said that Saudi Arabia was also supportive in diplomacy that led Thursday to the extension of a fragile two-month truce between Yemen's Riyadh-backed government and Iranian-affiliated Huthi rebels. "Saudi Arabia demonstrated courageous leadership by taking initiatives early on to endorse and implement terms of the U.N.-led truce," Biden said in a statement. Saudi Arabia has also addressed concerns of U.S. officials who saw the kingdom as overbearing in troubled Lebanon. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, presenting an annual report on religious freedom, praised "important recent moves" to increase interfaith dialogue even as he acknowledges that the kingdom still bans any public practice of religions other than Islam. How to address human rights will likely be a complicated question for Biden, with MBS reportedly angered when U.S. officials previously raised the killing of Khashoggi.The senior U.S. official downplayed the controversy, saying that there were concerns over human rights "as with many countries where we share interests." The official said that "much" of the concern over Saudi Arabia's behavior "predated our administration" and said there "are also strategic priorities that are important to address, and our contacts and diplomacy have intensified recently." In a rare interview earlier this year with The Atlantic, MBS said of whether Biden understood him: "Simply, I do not care.""It's up to him to think about the interests of America," he said with a shrug.

US uses OPEC+ decision, Yemen truce to send positive signals about US-Saudi ties and Biden visit
The Arab Weekly/June 03/2022
Riyadh / Washington/The US administration is sending positive signals about the prospects of its relations with Riyadh and is indirectly confirming that President Joe Biden intends to visit Saudi Arabia later this month. US officials have specifically expressed satisfaction at Riyadh's recent addressing of two of Biden's "priorities" by agreeing to an OPEC+ production hike in oil and helping extend a truce in war-battered Yemen. They were said to have been "pleasantly surprised" by the agreement of major oil producers led by Saudi Arabia to a larger than expected hike in oil production. OPEC+ member nations announced Thursday they would raise production by 648,000 barrels per day in July and August. A rise in supply could help bring down skyrocketing prices at the pump in the US, seen as a major contributor to sagging poll numbers for Biden whose Democratic Party faces difficult congressional elections in November. White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre acknowledged Saudi Arabia's role “in achieving consensus" among the oil producers' bloc. She thanked the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Iraq as well. Washington also lauded Saudi diplomatic role which led Thursday to the extension of the fragile two-month truce between Yemen's Riyadh-backed government and Iran-backed Houthi rebels. "Saudi Arabia demonstrated courageous leadership by taking initiatives early on to endorse and implement terms of the UN-led truce," Biden said in a statement.
White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre told reporters that Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Saudi King Salman deserved credit for their roles in the truce extension in Yemen's war. "This truce would not be possible without the cooperative diplomacy from across the region. We specifically recognise the leadership of King Salman and the crown prince of Saudi Arabia in helping consolidate the truce," she said. Washington said Saudi Arabia has also addressed concerns of US officials who saw the kingdom as overbearing in troubled Lebanon. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, presenting an annual report on religious freedom, praised "important recent moves" to increase interfaith dialogue even as he acknowledges that the kingdom still bans any public practice of religions other than Islam.
Analysts say in its climb-down from its human rights posturing, the Biden administration nevertheless wants to convince Americans that it has achieved results that are favourable to US interests. But American signs of “optimism” are matched by Saudi silence, which might mean that Riyadh does not see evidence of real change in Washington's policies towards the kingdom and the region as a whole.Riyadh has sent signals in recent months that it is not in a rush to bridge gaps in the US-Saudi relationship that were of Washington's own doing. In a rare interview earlier this year with The Atlantic, MBS said of whether Biden understood him: "Simply, I do not care."
"It's up to him to think about the interests of America," he said with a shrug.
The US administration is this time showing more eagerness than the Saudi leadership to display flexibility over contentious issues, the analysts say.
But they believe it has yet to demonstrate clear signs of its desire to develop a better relationship with the kingdom, especially by revising Biden's position on Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The issue has been at the centre of disagreements between Riyadh and Washington since the arrival of Joe Biden in the White House and US intelligence publication of reports which sought to implicate the crown prince in the 2018 murder of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Normalisation of the relationship between Prince Mohammed and President Biden is bound to be key in any rapprochement bid or any US presidential visit to Saudi Arabia for that matter. Reflecting their leaders lack of enthusiasm for Biden's potential visit, Saudi officials have not talked much about the matter and the Saudi media showed no interest in it, in contrast to previous US presidential visits, including that of former US President Donald Trump to Riyadh. The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States has frayed since Biden took office a year and a half ago.
Saudi crown prince plays a vital decision-making role in the relationship and no form of partnership can be considered without his approval. The strategic partnership between the two countries has suffered as result of US ambiguities about Iran as Washington set out to revive the 2015 nuclear deal and because of the role of Tehran's proxies, especially in Yemen. In such issues, Washington is accused by Gulf capitals of not taking into account the interests and national security imperatives of Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, in Washington signals continue to emerge that Biden is moving ahead with the visit. The New York Times, The Washington Post and CNN, quoting anonymous sources, confirmed the upcoming trip. CNN said that Biden would meet Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler, 36-year-old Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said she had no travel to announce, adding only: "The president will look for opportunities to engage with leaders from the Middle East region." However, a senior administration official told AFP that if Biden "determines that it's in the interests of the United States to engage with a foreign leader and that such an engagement can deliver results, then he'll do so." While not confirming the trip, the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said there was "no question that important interests are interwoven with Saudi Arabia."The trip would reportedly happen around the time that Biden travels to a NATO summit in Spain and a Group of Seven summit in Germany later this month. He is also widely expected to travel to Israel where, as in Saudi Arabia, he is sure to face pointed questions about slow-moving US diplomacy with the two countries' rival, Iran. A close partner of the United States since the World War II era, Saudi Arabia has repeatedly managed to woo administrations in Washington that initially sought to place themselves at a greater distance.

Israel warns over Iran nuclear program
Agence France Presse/June 03/2022
Prime Minister Naftali Bennett warned the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency Friday that Israel was prepared to use it's "right to self defense" to stop Iran's nuclear program. The comments came after IAEA chief Rafael Grossi met Bennett Friday morning during a whirlwind visit. Bennett's warning is a reiteration of Israeli vows to do whatever it takes to stop Iran from obtaining a nuclear bomb. It comes with tensions rising over stalled efforts to revive a 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and world powers aimed at preventing Iran from developing such a weapon. Bennett said in a statement that he has made it clear that Israel prefers diplomacy, but "it reserves the right to self-defense and to action against Iran in order to block its nuclear program should the international community not succeed in the relevant time frame."Grossi's visit came after te global nuclear watchdog on Monday said it still had questions which were "not clarified" despite long-running efforts to get Iran to explain the presence of nuclear material at threeh undeclared sites. The issue of the sites is one of the remaining obstacles to reviving the 2015 deal which gave Iran relief from crippling economic sanctions in exchange for curbs on its nuclear activities. Experts consider Israel as the only nuclear power in the Middle East, though the country refuses to confirm or deny that it has such weapons. Iran has always denied seeking a nuclear bomb. Israel is staunchly opposed to the 2015 agreement which it perceives as a threat to its security. In October Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid said that, "If a terror regime is going to acquire a nuclear weapon, we must act." He added that Israel "reserves the right to act at any given moment in any way." This week the Israeli army held military exercise over the Mediterranean and in the Red Sea. Israeli media reported the exercise simulated a wide-scale attack on Iran, including on its nuclear facilities. When questioned by AFP on Thursday, the army did not comment on the nature of the drills, but confirmed that it prepares and trains "continuously for several scenarios including threats from Iran".

Jerusalem holds annual Pride Parade despite threats
Associated Press/June 03/2022
Thousands of people have attended the annual Jerusalem Pride Parade amid heavy protection by Israeli police, who arrested three people suspected of threatening the event. Past years have seen religious radicals attack participants. Jerusalem is home to a large ultra-Orthodox Jewish community and other conservative religious groups, and many residents oppose the event. The Jerusalem parade is much smaller than the yearly festivities in the more liberal Tel Aviv, Israel's commercial hub on the Mediterranean Sea. Up to 7,000 people attended the Jerusalem march this year, police said. Police could be seen deployed on nearby rooftops and a police helicopter hovered overhead. The police said they arrested two suspects with batons, tear gas and gloves in their car who were heading to the parade area. In 2015, an Israeli man stabbed 16-year-old Shira Banki to death and wounded several others at the Jerusalem Pride Parade; he had recently been released for a similar attack on parade participants in 2005. The attack was widely condemned across Israel's political spectrum. Earlier Thursday, police said they had apprehended a 21-year-old European citizen residing in Jerusalem on suspicion of sending threats to an organizer of the parade and to several members of parliament who support LGBTQ rights. The police provided no further details. "We will not allow the Pride Parade to take place in Jerusalem, the holy city. Shira Banki's fate awaits you," read the threat sent to liberal Labor party lawmaker and longtime LGBTQ-rights supporter Gilad Kariv. Some members of Israel's ultra-religious community oppose the parade, homosexuality, and LGBTQ rights, and say the event should not take place in the holy city. A far-right anti-LGBTQ group, Lehava, usually stages a counter-protest nearby. Earlier this week, Israel's defense minister said the government would consider designating Lehava a terrorist organization for affiliation with the late Rabbi Meir Kahane and his violent, anti-Arab ideology. Israel has emerged as a major gay-friendly travel destination in recent years, in sharp contrast with the rest of the region, where gays are often persecuted and even killed. Members of the LGBTQ community serve openly in Israel's military and parliament, and many popular artists and entertainers as well as the country's current health minister are openly gay. But leaders of the LGBTQ community say Israel has a long way to go to promote equality.

Kuwait summons US diplomat over 'homosexuality' posts
Agence France Presse/June 03/2022
Kuwait's foreign ministry summoned the top U.S. diplomat in the Gulf Arab emirate over American embassy posts on social media in "support of homosexuality", it said on Friday. The U.S. embassy in Kuwait had published a picture of an LGBTQ+ flag on its Instagram and Twitter accounts to mark the start of Pride Month on June 1. "All human beings should be treated with respect and dignity and should be able to live without fear no matter who they are or whom they love," the embassy's tweet said. Many in Kuwait took to social media to express their discontent over the posts, saying they went against the country's Muslim beliefs. Kuwait's foreign ministry said in a statement that it had summoned the U.S. embassy's charge d'affaires James Holtsnider over "social media references and tweets supporting homosexuality". It said a memorandum had been handed to Holtsnider "confirming Kuwait's rejection of what was published and stressing the need for the embassy to respect the laws and regulations in force in Kuwait". The tenure of the former U.S. ambassador to Kuwait, Alina Romanowski, ended in April, making Holtsnider the top U.S. diplomat in the Gulf country for the time being. Homosexuality is illegal in Kuwait, as in most Muslim countries. But in February Kuwait's constitutional court overturned a law that criminalizes "imitation of the opposite sex" in a move Amnesty International said was a breakthrough for transgender rights in the region. The U.S. embassies in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also shared similar posts marking Pride Month.

What is behind Turkey's Syria incursion threats?
Associated Press/June 03/2022
In northern Syria, residents are bracing for a new fight. With the world's attention focused on the war in Ukraine, Turkey's leader says he's planning a major military operation to push back Syrian Kurdish fighters and create a long sought-after buffer zone in the border area. Tensions are high. Hardly a day passes by without an exchange of fire and shelling between the U.S.-backed Syrian Kurdish fighters, and Turkish forces and Turkey-backed Syrian opposition gunmen. Analysts say Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is taking advantage of the war in Ukraine to push his own goals in neighboring Syria — even using Turkey's ability as a NATO member to veto alliance membership by Finland and Sweden as potential leverage.But a major incursion by Ankara comes with risks and complications, threatening to upset Turkey's ties with both the United States and Russia. It also risks creating a new wave of displacement in a war-ravaged region where the Islamic State group still lurks in the shadows.Here's a look at the situation on the ground and some of the key issues:
TURKISH AMBITIONS
Erdogan last month outlined plans to resume Turkish efforts to create a 30-kilometer (19 mile) deep buffer zone in Syria, along its southern border through a cross-border incursion against U.S.-allied Syrian Kurdish fighters. Erdogan wanted to create that zone in 2019 but a military operation fell short of achieving it."We'll come down on them suddenly one night. And we must," Erdogan said, without giving a specific timeline. Since 2016, Turkey has launched three major operations inside Syria, targeting Syria's main Kurdish militia — the People's Protection Units or YPG — which Turkey considers to be a terrorist organization and an extension of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK. The PKK has for decades waged an insurgency within Turkey against the government in Ankara. The YPG, however, forms the backbone of U.S.-led forces in the fight against Islamic State militants and has been a proven top U.S. ally in Syria. Turkey, through the three previous military operations in Syria, already has control over a large chunk of Syrian territory, including the towns of Afrin, Tel Abyad and Jarablus. Ankara plans to build thousands of housing units in those areas, to ensure what it says will be the "voluntary return" of 1 million out of the 3.7 million Syrian refugees currently in Turkey. Erdogan said Wednesday that Turkish troops now aim to take new areas, including the towns of Tel Rifaat and Manbij, which sits on a major intersection of roads on Syria's west-east highway known as the M4. Turkey says the Syrian Kurdish fighters use Tel Rifaat as a base to attack areas held by Turkey-backed Syrian opposition fighters. There have been also reports that Turkish troops might enter the strategic border town of Kobani, where the U.S. military and Kurdish fighters first united to defeat IS in 2015. The town holds powerful symbolism for Syrian Kurds and their ambitions of self-rule in this part of Syria.
WHY NOW?
Analysts say Erdogan likely sees a confluence of circumstances, both international and domestic, that make an operation in Syria timely. The Russians are preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, and the Americans need Erdogan to drop his objections to the expansion of NATO to include Finland and Sweden. "They (Turks) sense an opportunity to try and get concessions from the West," said Aaron Stein, head of research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. A Syria offensive could also be used to rally Turkish nationalist voters at a time when their economy is in decline, with inflation running at 73.5%. Turkey is set to hold presidential and parliamentary elections next year, and previous incursions into Syria to drive out the YPG have bolstered support for Erdogan in past balloting. So far, there are no signs of mobilization pointing to an imminent invasion, although the Turkish military could be called upon fairly quickly. Syrian Kurdish fighters, however, say they are taking Turkey's latest threat seriously and have been preparing for a possible attack. They warn that an incursion would affect their ongoing fight against IS and their ability to protect prisons in northern Syria where thousands of extremists, many of them foreign nationals, have been locked up since IS was defeated territorially three years ago.
TURKEY'S US AND RUSSIA TIES
A large-scale military operation carries high risks and is likely to anger both the U.S and Russia, who also have a military presence in northern Syria. Turkey and Russia support rival sides in Syria's 11-year conflict but have been closely coordinating in the country's north. While Russia has not officially commented, it has in recent days sent fighter jets and helicopter gunships to a base close to the border with Turkey, according to Syrian opposition activists. As one of Damascus' closest allies, Russia's role in Syria has been paramount in turning the tide of the conflict in Syria — which started amid Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 — in favor of Syrian President Bashar Assad. The Syrian opposition fighters were relegated to an enclave in the northwest and Turkey's sphere of influence. But with Moscow focused on Ukraine, it's unlikely Vladimir Putin will stand in Erdogan's way over what is essentially just a strip of land along Turkey's southern border. Washington has made clear its opposition to a Turkish military incursion, saying it would put at risk hard-won gains in the campaign against IS. "We recognize Turkey's legitimate security concerns on its border. But again, we are concerned that any new offensive would further undermine regional stability," said State Department spokesman Ned Price. Stein, the analyst, said any operation would be complicated because of Russian presence in both potential hotspots, Kobani and Tel Rifaat. Whether an operation takes place boils down to the question on how far Erdogan is prepared to go in Syria, particularly in and around the Kobani area — and whether he would be unchallenged by Moscow and Washington. "How much risk does he want to take? The evidence that we have is that he takes a lot of risk," Stein said.

Israel Raises Iran Concerns with Visiting UN Nuclear Chief
Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 3 June, 2022
Prime Minister Naftali Bennett accused Iran of deceiving the international community about its atomic activities as he met with the visiting head of the UN nuclear watchdog on Friday. Rafael Grossi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, paid a brief visit to Israel, which has long accused Iran of pursuing nuclear weapons and is opposed to any return to the 2015 nuclear agreement between Tehran and world powers, The Associated Press said. Bennett “expressed Israel’s deep concern regarding Iran’s continued progress toward achieving nuclear weapons while deceiving the international community by using false information and lies,” his office said in a statement. He “emphasized the urgent need in mobilizing the international community to take action against Iran, using all means, in order to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear weapons."Israel is widely believed to be the only nuclear-armed state in the Middle East but has never publicly acknowledged having such weapons. Israel was a staunch opponent of the 2015 nuclear deal and welcomed the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the agreement, which caused it to collapse. The Biden administration has been trying to renew the accord, which lifted sanctions on Iran in return for limits to and oversight of its nuclear program. Iran has always said its nuclear activities are for purely peaceful purposes but has stepped up uranium enrichment after the collapse of the nuclear accord to near weapons-grade levels. The US and its allies say Iran has failed to answer questions from the IAEA over potential undeclared nuclear activities. The US, Britain, France and Germany plan to table a resolution at next week's meeting of the IAEA board of governors to urge full compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. “It is essential that Iran does fully comply with its legal binding obligations under the NPT and separately with its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA without further delay,” State Department spokesman Ned Price said Thursday. Bennett called on the board of governors to deliver a “clear and unequivocal message” to Iran. Israel — which is not a party to the NPT — recently accused Iran of stealing classified documents from the IAEA and using them to deceive international inspectors nearly two decades ago. It released what it said were some of the documents. Iran has dismissed the allegations as lies. US intelligence agencies, Western nations and the IAEA have said Iran ran an organized nuclear weapons program until 2003. Neither the US nor Israel has ruled out the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Bennett's office said that while Israel prefers diplomacy, “it reserves the right to self-defense and to action against Iran in order to block its nuclear program should the international community not succeed in the relevant time frame.”

Report: Iranian Police Arrest Man after Attack on Cleric
Asharq Al Awsat/June 03/2022
Iranian security forces on Friday arrested a young man following an assault on a top provincial cleric in the central city of Isfahan, Iranian media reported. The cleric appeared unharmed in a video broadcast after the attack. According to the semiofficial Fars news agency, the unidentified man accosted prayer leader Yousef Tababaeinejad as he was talking with some worshipers after Friday prayers and attempted to stab him in the neck with a "sharp metal object." The report said mosque guards quickly detained the him and added that the case is under investigation. A video on Iranian media later showed Tababaeinejad speaking to a reporter afterward and saying the assailant seemed to be a young man, in his 20s. Such attacks are uncommon in Iran though in the early 1980s, clerics were targeted by armed opposition groups, mostly during or after Friday prayers. Over the past months, there have been chants against clerics during protest gatherings in Iran over price hikes and the slashing of subsidies by the government. In early April, a stabbing attack in the revered Imam Reza shrine in the northeastern city of Mashhad killed three clerics. Tababaeinejad, a hard-line cleric appointed by the country's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, is known as a vocal opponent of social media and music, saying they are part of the West's software war against Islamic beliefs.

Iran probes death of another Revolutionary Guard colonel, denies assassination
Associated Press/June 03/2022
Iran said on Friday it has launched an investigation into the death of a member of its Revolutionary Guards and denied reports that he had been assassinated. "A member of the Revolutionary Guards died in recent days in an accident in his home," the official news agency IRNA said, citing what it called an informed source.  It rejected "allegations" by foreign-based opposition media that Colonel Ali Esmailzadeh, a commander of the Guards' external operations unit, the Quds Force, had been killed in recent days in Karaj, west of Tehran. The denial comes days after the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps accused Israel of shooting dead Colonel Sayyad Khodai on May 22. Iran on Monday vowed to avenge the death of Khodai, 50, who was gunned down by assailants on motorcycles outside his home in the east of the Iranian capital.It was the most high-profile killing inside Iran since the November 2020 murder of top nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh -- an act the Islamic republic also blamed on its arch enemy Israel. IRNA said an investigation had been opened into the latest death, without giving further details. The Guards are designated as a terrorist group by the United States.

Data puts Turkey's annual inflation at 73.5%, a 24-year high
Associated Press/June 03/2022
Annual inflation in Turkey hit 73.5% in May, the highest rate since 1998, according to official data released Friday as a cost-of-living crisis in the country deepens. The Turkish Statistical Institute said the rate represented an increase of almost 70% from the month before. Consumer prices were up nearly 3% from April, the institute reported. While many countries are seeing rising consumer prices, critics blame Turkey's problems on President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's economic policies. The Turkish leader insists that high borrowing costs cause inflation - a position that contradicts established economic thinking - and advocates lowering interest rates to boost growth and exports. Turkey's central bank has cut rates by 5 percentage points since September, to 14% before pausing them in January. The Turkish lira lost 44% of its value against the U.S. dollar last year. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which led to a surge in gas, oil and grain prices, has compounded the situation in import-reliant Turkey. The sharpest increases in annual prices were in the transportation sector, at 107.6%, followed by food and non-alcoholic drinks prices at 91.6%, according to the statistical institute's data.

Iraqi State TV Station Threatened for Criticizing Iran's Khamenei, Soleimani
Baghdad - Fadhel al-Nashmi/Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 3 June, 2022
The state-run Iraqiya television station found itself in hot water after political analyst Sarmad al-Tai made a scathing critique of President of the Supreme Judicial Council Faiq Zidan, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and slain Iran Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani. Journalists revealed to Asharq Al-Awsat that security forces were deployed to the station's headquarters on Thursday to protect it against threats from pro-Iran factions. The factions had turned to social media to openly threaten the channel and the organizers of the show from where the criticism was made. On Wednesday, Al-Tai appeared on the live show that is hosted by Saadoun Mohsen Damad. Responding to a question about the judiciary and how to improve it, he replied: "Mr. Faiq Zidan knows that he can't play with fire forever. He is delusional in believing that the youth, who believe in change, will fear arrest warrants that he issues against them. I am one of them, and I challenge him to intimidate us.""We have confronted Khamenei and Qassem Soleimani, who has slaughtered and killed us. The nooses are around our necks and Iraq is greater than them. Iraq is greater than Faiq Zidan, who manipulates the Supreme Court and abuses the judiciary to launch a political and security coup against the results of the parliamentary elections."The elections were held in October and dealt a strong blow to pro-Iran factions. Al-Tai lived for years in Iran's city of Qom where his family fled the oppression of the former regime in Iraq. He studied fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) in Qom, but in recent years has adopted anti-Iran views. He also believes that the Iraqi judicial authorities are being pressured by the politicians and that they are abusing their position to silence rivals.
His severe criticism on live television marked a precedent in Iraq, made even more significant since it was made on a channel that usually sides with the government and is funded by the people. The show has since been taken off the air.Al-Tai's remarks were both applauded and slammed in Iraq. The Iraqi Media Network regretted his comments, saying it was "not responsible for the guests' abuse of the freedom of expression accorded to them."
It added that it reserves the right to sue whoever abuses this freedom to "insult national figures and constitutional institutions, especially the judiciary," it added. The judiciary issued an arrest warrant against Al-Tai, who resides in Erbil, the capital of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. He already has an outstanding warrant for his arrest issued in wake of a complaint filed by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. For his part , Zidan issued a strongly worded statement against Iraqiya, saying he regretted that it hosted a figures who "have a negative (extremist) view of the judiciary." It also regretted that it airs a show that is hosted by a journalist who has "negative and extremist views, as well."Some parties, lawmakers and organizations rejected the threats against Iraqiya, Al-Tai and Damad. The Press Freedom Advocacy Association in Iraq questioned Zidan's criticism of Al-Tai and Damad, whom it said is "known for his professionalism and objective positions in a show he has hosted for over a decade."In a statement, it said a television station that is funded by the people should include all points of view and host everyone, regardless of their convictions. The Iraqi people share different views and convictions and the channel cannot simply host guests who express the same positions based on political demands. It slammed authorities for halting Damad's show, urging caretaker Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi to "assume his responsibilities and fulfill the pledges he made two years ago in protecting press freedom." Independent lawmaker Sajjad Salem tweeted his support to press freedom and freedom of expression.

Canada/Statement by Minister Joly on the 100th day of the Russian invasion of Ukraine
June 3, 2022 –Toronto, Ontario –Global Affairs Canada
The Honourable Mélanie Joly, Minister of Foreign Affairs, today issued the following statement:
“Today marks 100 days since Putin has unjustifiably and illegally invaded Ukraine. For 100 days innocent Ukrainians have suffered, with many having needlessly perished. For 100 days Vladimir Putin has attempted to destroy Ukraine’s economy, resulting in a food security crisis felt the world over. For 100 days Russia has lied and spread false information. 100 days too many. But for 100 days the Ukrainian people have held strong. Their courage and resilience inspires us all.
“As the Russian regime lied, intimidated and manufactured a crisis, Canada relentlessly pursued a diplomatic solution, urging President Putin to de-escalate and engage in a meaningful dialogue. We worked with partners to coordinate our responses to deter further Russian aggression.
“When Putin ignored all diplomatic efforts and launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Canada, along with its international partners, took action.
“Since the beginning of this war, Canada has stood up and responded to the Russian regime by taking the following actions:
sanctioned more than 1,050 individuals and entities linked to Putin’s regime;
restricted financial transactions and trade and investment between Canada and Russia;
supplied military equipment to Ukraine’s security forces;
allocated $280 million in humanitarian and development assistance;
offered of up to $1.87 billion in financial assistance to support the Ukrainian government and economy this year;
closed off Canadian airspace and waters to Russian-owned aircraft and ships;
provided immigration support for those affected in Ukraine; and
supported Ukraine in international courts and multilateral forums, such as the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.
“We are not done. We continue to work with the international community to do everything we can to end the Russian regime’s aggression. As the world reacts to the horrific events across Ukraine, Canada will not relent in holding Putin and his enablers accountable and supporting a full investigation of reported war crimes by the International Criminal Court.
“Canada is unwavering in its support to Ukraine.”

The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on June 03-04/2022
Biden Is No Friend of Israel
Con Coughlin/Gatestone Institute/June 03/2022
The real crime, one that represents a serious breach of the long-standing intelligence-sharing arrangements between the US and Israel, is that one of President Joe Biden's senior officials has been willing to betray the trust of such a close ally.
At a time when tensions are already running high between Iran and the West over the stalled nuclear talks, there are quite justifiable concerns in Israel that the leak will prompt Iran to exact revenge by attacking Israeli targets, even if it later transpires that Israel was not responsible for the assassination.
The timing of the leak also indicates an underlying willingness on the part of the Biden administration to undermine Israel when, in public, the White House is seeking to portray itself as an ally of Israel, as indicated by its recent seeming decision not to remove the IRGC from the US list of designated terrorist organisations.
As for motivation, it is unclear if the leak was deliberate, to harm Israel, or from not fully appreciating the jeopardy it could potentially cause Israel, an act which would reflect the Biden administration's profound lack of understanding as to what is at stake with the entire Iran issue.
Nothing better illustrates the Biden administration's deep-seated antipathy towards Israel than the leaking of highly classified material about the alleged role Israeli intelligence played in the assassination of a top-ranking Iranian terrorist, Colonel Sayad Khodayee, of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Pictured: General Hossein Salami, head of the IRGC, attends Khodayee's funeral in Tehran, on May 24, 2022.
Nothing better illustrates the Biden administration's deep-seated antipathy towards the State of Israel than the leaking of highly classified material about the alleged role Israeli intelligence played in the assassination of a top-ranking Iranian terrorist.
For decades, Israel and the US have enjoyed a unique intelligence-sharing relationship whereby the two countries share the most sensitive material on their respective intelligence, security and military operations.
But the deep-seated bond of trust that forms the bedrock of this vital relationship has been seriously compromised as a result of the Biden administration's egregious decision to leak details of Israel's alleged involvement in the killing of Colonel Sayad Khodayee, a senior commander in the Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Khodayee, a 50-year-old officer in the IRGC's Quds force, was killed earlier this month when two gunmen on a motorcycle opened fire as he sat in a car outside his home.
He has subsequently been identified as the deputy head of Unit 840, which is tasked with conducting attacks against foreign targets, including against Israel. Western intelligence sources say Khodayee was directly responsible for attempted terrorist attacks against Israelis, European and American civilians as well as government officials from as far afield as Colombia, Kenya, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates and Cyprus.
Khodayee's importance to the Quds Force was reflected in the fact that several senior commanders of the IRGC and Quds Force paid their respects at his funeral in Tehran.
The Israeli government, which has a long-standing policy of neither confirming nor denying its involvement in overseas operations, declined to comment on the killing, which took place in Tehran on May 22.
Iran, however, was quick to blame Israel for carrying out the attack, with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi claiming "the hands of global arrogance" -- a reference to Israel and the US -- were responsible.
"I call on security officials to seriously investigate the crime and I have no doubt that revenge on criminals for the pure blood of this honourable martyr is inevitable," he said.
IRGC spokesman Ramazan Sharif said the killing of Khodayee would strengthen its determination to "defend security, independence and national interests and to confront the enemies of the Iranian nation".
Iran's view that Israel was behind the shooting will have been strengthened, moreover, by the leaking of classified information by the Biden administration claiming Israel was responsible for the attack.
According to a detailed report into the killing in The New York Times, an administration official claims that Israel provided Washington with a top secret briefing that it was behind the killing.
Whether or not this report is true is almost academic. The real crime, one that represents a serious breach of the long-standing intelligence-sharing arrangements between the US and Israel, is that one of President Joe Biden's senior officials has been willing to betray the trust of such a close ally.
The anger felt by Israel's entire security establishment about the leak were reflected in comments made by Israeli Member of Knesset Ben Barak, the chair of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee who is also a former deputy head of Mossad. Speaking on Israel's Radio 103 FM, Barak declared:
"We have very many close relationships and a lot of cooperation between us, which all depend on trust, and when it is violated in some way then it damages future cooperation."
At a time when tensions are already running high between Iran and the West over the stalled nuclear talks, there are quite justifiable concerns in Israel that the leak will prompt Iran to exact revenge by attacking Israeli targets, even if it later transpires that Israel was not responsible for the assassination.
The timing of the leak also indicates an underlying willingness on the part of the Biden administration to undermine Israel when, in public, the White House is seeking to portray itself as an ally of Israel, as indicated by its recent seeming decision not to remove the IRGC from the US list of designated terrorist organisations.
As for motivation, it is unclear if the leak was deliberate, to harm Israel, or from not fully appreciating the jeopardy it could potentially cause Israel, an act which would reflect the Biden administration's profound lack of understanding as to what is at stake with the entire Iran issue.
Israel had fiercely resisted Iran's demand, made during the nuclear talks, that removing the IRGC from the terrorist list was a pre-condition of agreeing to a new deal. But Mr Biden has denied the Iranian demand, and last week confirmed that the IRGC would remain on Washington's Foreign Terrorist Organizations list.
Whatever goodwill Mr Biden hoped to generate with Jerusalem by keeping the IRGC on the list will, though, have been dissipated by his administration's utterly contemptible treatment of its Israeli ally.
*Con Coughlin is the Telegraph's Defence and Foreign Affairs Editor and a Shillman Journalism Fellow at Gatestone Institute.
© 2022 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.

Israeli-Saudi Deal Over Two Islands Is a Step Toward Peace
Orde Kittrie/ Insight/June 03/2022 |
Israel and Saudi Arabia have reportedly agreed on a security arrangement enabling Egypt to transfer to the Saudis two strategic islands near Israel. In return for Israel’s acquiescence, Saudi Arabia is set to allow Israeli airlines to fly more frequently over its airspace. The deal is expected to be announced by President Joe Biden during his trip to the Middle East at the end of June.
While the two islands — Tiran and Sanafir — have no civilian inhabitants or known natural resources, tensions related to their strategic location contributed to two Arab-Israeli wars. Now, they could provide a stepping-stone to Arab-Israeli and indeed Muslim-Israeli peace. To capitalize on this opportunity, the Biden administration should encourage Saudi Arabia to take additional, public steps toward peace with Israel. There are several specific steps the Saudis should take, both in relation to the island transfer and in other arenas.
Causes of War
Both Tiran and Sanafir are located in the Strait of Tiran, the narrow body of water connecting the Gulf of Eilat to the Red Sea. Whoever controls the islands can block maritime access to Israel’s port of Eilat and to Jordan’s only port, Aqaba. In contrast with Israel’s other ports, all located on the Mediterranean, Eilat is the only one from which ships can reach India and East Asia without sailing around the southern tip of Africa or transiting Egypt’s Suez Canal.
Egypt’s closures of the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping were a major cause of the 1956 and 1967 wars between the two countries. The 1956 war erupted after Egypt tightened its blockade of Israeli shipping through the strait and closed the airspace over it to Israel’s airlines, blocking the only feasible Israeli air route to Africa. This, combined with Egypt’s closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping, spurred Israel to seize the Sinai Peninsula (plus the two islands) in October 1956.
Israel’s 1957 withdrawal from Sinai (and the two islands) was conditioned on placing UN peacekeepers near the strait. The United States affirmed Israel’s right to transit the strait, and Egypt issued a non-binding, indirect, unwritten, non-public, and ambiguous statement to a UN official that Egypt would not interfere with any commercial shipping to or from Eilat.
In May 1967, Egypt reneged, expelling the peacekeepers and once again blocking the strait. At the time, 90 percent of Israeli oil imports passed through it. President Lyndon B. Johnson commented that “if a single act of folly was more responsible for [the Six Day War] than any other, it was the arbitrary and dangerous announced decision that the Straits of Tiran would be closed.”
During the 1967 war, Israel again seized Tiran and Sanafir. The islands returned to Egypt only as part of the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty, which legally obligated Egypt to allow Israel “unimpeded and non-suspendable” navigation of the strait, limited Egypt’s military presence on the islands, and established a multinational peacekeeping force — eventually the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) — to help ensure “freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran.”
The Island Transfer Proposal
The Saudis now claim, and Egyptian President Abdul Fatah al-Sisi has stated, that Tiran and Sanafir have continuously belonged to Saudi Arabia. According to this version of history, Egyptian troops are said to have occupied the islands in 1950, and periodically thereafter, with Saudi permission because Egypt was considered more capable of defeating Israel militarily.
Yet Egypt made peace with Israel in 1979, and Saudi Arabia has inched closer to doing the same in recent years. In a sign of the two countries’ prioritization of national interests over lofty pan-Arabist goals, Cairo and Riyadh in 2017 agreed to transfer control of Tiran and Sanafir back to Saudi Arabia.
Sisi’s opponents responded by claiming the islands belong to Egypt, and accused him of ceding the islands in exchange for billions of dollars in Saudi trade and investment. Although protests erupted in Egypt against the proposed transfer, Sisi stuck with the plan.
Israel’s Role
The need for Israel to agree to the islands’ transfer to Saudi Arabia results from Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty obligations.
In April 2016, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir stated in a media interview that Riyadh is “committed” to continuing Egypt’s approach to the islands. Riyadh has now reportedly agreed to unimpeded navigation and to limiting its military’s presence on the islands, but not to a continuation of the MFO presence. The newly agreed deal reportedly involves MFO monitoring from Egyptian soil several kilometers away.
Given the strategic and historical significance of Tiran and Sanafir, it is remarkable that Israel would even consider their transfer from Egypt, a peace partner with treaty obligations, to Saudi Arabia, which has yet to formally recognize Israel.
Options for Using the Island Transfer to Advance Normalization
Given Saudi Arabia’s wealth and custodianship of Islam’s holiest sites, it is the most important Arab country with which Israel could make peace. Israeli-Saudi peace would almost certainly spur progress with both the Palestinians and additional Arab or other Muslim countries.
The Saudis have in recent years reportedly been tip-toeing closer to normalization with Israel, including through confidential intelligence cooperation, greenlighting the Abraham Accords, and allowing Israeli businesspersons to visit the kingdom.
However, the Saudis have avoided major public steps toward peace with Israel. These would represent a higher stage of engagement, are typically harder to reverse, and would provide vital cover to others considering steps towards peace with Israel.
Reportedly, the only public step to which Riyadh agreed in exchange for the island transfer is to authorize more Israeli airliners to cross Saudi airspace en route to other destinations. Saudi Arabia was reportedly also considering allowing Israeli Muslim pilgrims to fly directly from Israel to Saudi Arabia, but that was reportedly omitted from the final deal. Notably, Biden’s announcement of the deal will reportedly not include a public meeting between Israeli and Saudi officials.
In exchange for Saudi Arabia being given what are in essence the keys to Israel’s outlet to the Indian Ocean and most of Asia, Riyadh should be pushed to provide more in return, including public evidence that its attitude towards Israel has truly and sustainably changed. Indeed, Saudi Arabia should be strongly encouraged to move as close to normalization as possible with Israel. Full Saudi normalization would surpass in importance the Abraham Accords, the signal foreign policy achievement of Biden’s predecessor.
Biden’s proposed visit to Saudi Arabia at the end of the month would represent an improvement in U.S.-Saudi relations, which have been strained by disputes over human rights abuses, the Yemen war, and the Saudi murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi. A public Biden administration report concluded the murder was approved by Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). As a presidential candidate, Biden promised to make Saudi Arabia a “pariah.” A piqued Riyadh has reportedly refused U.S. requests to ramp up oil production in response to market pressures resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
MBS has reportedly told the Biden administration that improved U.S.-Saudi ties are a prerequisite for progress on Saudi-Israeli relations. If the United States is to bring MBS in from the cold and Israel allows Saudi Arabia to control Tiran and Sanafir, the Saudis should be willing to take public steps toward peace with Israel. The flourishing relationship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates has already provided the Saudis with examples of the many benefits of peace.
The United States and Israel should insist that the island transfer be accompanied by a public, legally binding, written Saudi commitment mirroring Egypt’s peace treaty obligations to limit its military presence and guarantee “unimpeded and non-suspendable” Israeli navigation of the Strait of Tiran. The Saudi foreign minister’s 2016 statement is all too reminiscent of the non-binding, indirect, unwritten, and ambiguous 1957 Egyptian affirmation of Israel’s rights, on which Cairo reneged in 1967.
In addition, Riyadh’s Tiran and Sanafir obligations should be made directly to Israel, which would represent an important step toward Saudi recognition of the Jewish state. The Biden administration should further urge that the island transfer be accompanied by establishment of an Egyptian-Israeli-Saudi mechanism to ensure that the three countries’ navies avoid friction while operating in close proximity near the islands. Such a mechanism can build on two of the Arab-Israeli regional security agreements that were agreed upon by Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and 13 Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, in 1994 at the height of the Oslo peace process but stalled because diplomacy collapsed soon thereafter.
For example, the parties adopted — but never implemented — an agreement on preventing incidents at sea and concluded text for a framework agreement on maritime search and rescue. The parties also reached — but never implemented — an agreement on prior notification of certain military activities. These agreements should be resuscitated, adapted as necessary, and then implemented. They could at first be implemented by Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia — specifically tailored to Tiran and Sanafir — and then expanded to other Arab signatories.
The Biden administration should also encourage public Saudi cooperation with Israel in the defense arena. This could include Saudi participation alongside Israel in U.S. and other allied military exercises and in multinational military task forces. A larger step would be for Saudi Arabia to participate with Israel — and presumably the United Arab Emirates — in sharing early warnings of attacks by Iranian ballistic and cruise missiles and drones.
Other steps that stop short of full diplomatic relations with Israel include liaison offices such as those upon which Israel and Morocco agreed in December 2020. Since then, the Israeli and Moroccan governments have signed numerous joint memoranda of understanding, creating frameworks for cooperation on issues including finance and investment, aviation, trade, defense, and science and technology cooperation in fields including agriculture, water management, and renewable energy.
Israel and Saudi Arabia could sign joint memoranda of understanding on some of the less sensitive issues, such as water management. They could also foster cooperation agreements between leading companies and amongst academic institutions.
Officials in Riyadh have often said that normalization with Israel is contingent on progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The Biden administration should thus enlist Saudi involvement in strengthening the existing but underfunded multilateral scientific partnerships that benefit Israelis, Palestinians, and other Arab countries. These include the Middle East Consortium for Infectious Disease Surveillance and the Middle East Regional Cooperation Program.
abia should be the ultimate goal. It may not be imminent, but the Biden administration can use Tiran and Sanafir as major stepping stones in that direction.
*Orde F. Kittrie is a law professor at Arizona State University and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He previously served for over a decade at the U.S. State Department, including as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs and as lead attorney for strategic trade controls. FDD is a Washington, DC-based nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy. Follow him on Twitter @OrdeFK.
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2022/06/02/israeli-saudi-deal-islands-step-toward-peace/

جوناثان شانزر/ ميدل إيست كوارترلي: منظمة حماس الإرهابية هي أداة لحكام إيران الملالي
Hamas as Tehran’s Agent
Jonathan Schanzer/Middle East Quarterly/June03/2022 |
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/109121/109121/
Since the late 1980s, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been plying the Hamas terrorist group with cash and weapons while also teaching it how to be self-sufficient. With hundreds of millions of dollars from the Islamist Shiite regime in Tehran pouring into its coffers, the Sunni group has evolved over the past decades into the foremost Palestinian terror organization, capable of hitting Israel’s main population centers and strategic infrastructure. Yet Iran’s role is often overlooked when assessing the performance of Hamas in its multiple armed confrontations with Israel. Surprisingly, Israeli officials tend to downplay the Iranian regime’s role even though history shows that Tehran has played a major part. With continued Iranian assistance, Hamas can only be expected to grow in sophistication and lethality.
THE EARLY YEARS
The Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas as it is known after its Arab acronym, is the Palestinian offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, with roots dating back to the late 1920s. It was founded under its current name in December 1987 during the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or intifada, with the explicit goal of destroying the State of Israel and “rais[ing] the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine,” as a stepping-stone to the creation of a worldwide Islamic community.[1]
Within a couple of years, the nascent terror organization found assistance from the Islamic Republic in Iran, following what Hamas spokesman Ibrahim Goshi called “meetings at the highest level.”[2] Until then, Tehran had primarily funded its Lebanese offshoot Hezbollah and, to a lesser extent, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a small terrorist group that also vowed to destroy Israel.
While Hamas attracted funds from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab sources, according to Israeli security sources, Iran initially provided it with an estimated US$30 million annually, along with military training abroad.[3] In 1991, Hamas opened offices in Tehran and, later that year, Tehran invited the organization to a conference with other Iranian clients to promote the “Islamic intifada.”[4]
Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin expected the PLO to counter the rise of Hamas.
With assistance from Iran, Hamas began to professionalize. In 1991, the organization established its military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, and the following year Egyptian intelligence reported that Iran was training up to three thousand Hamas terrorists.[5] That same year, a Hamas delegation led by Politburo chief Musa Abu Marzouk visited Tehran for meetings with key Iranian officials, report-edly including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.[6]
The Oslo Years
In September 1993, the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed a historic declaration of principles that provided for Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for a transitional period of up to five years, during which Jerusalem and the Palestinians would negotiate a permanent peace settlement. The PLO had been exiled to Tunisia in 1982 after a decade of terror attacks on Israel launched from Lebanese soil. The PLO was further ostracized by most Arab states following its support for Saddam Hussein’s brutal occupation of Kuwait in 1990. For Yasser Arafat, the Oslo process offered a golden opportunity to reassert the PLO’s (and his own) relevance and to push Hamas to the periphery. Hamas was keenly aware of this as was Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, who expected the PLO to counter the rise of Hamas without the constraints of Israel’s supreme court or human rights groups. Hamas, thus, vowed to derail the PLO’s “betrayal of the Palestinian cause.” The group found encouragement from Iran’s supreme leader, who urged Palestinian clerics to “fill their sermons with slogans against Israel and the White House and the treasonous PLO leaders.”[7]
In December 1993, Marzouk returned to Iran and met with President Ali Rafsanjani. Soon after, Hamas launched its first wave of suicide bombings—a tactic up to that point associated with the Iran-backed Hezbollah. Hamas’s first successful suicide bombing rocked the northern Israeli town of Afula in April 1994, and by the autumn, the organization had launched three more suicide bombings. Amidst the carnage, Osama Hamdan, the group’s envoy to Tehran, boasted of flourishing ties with the regime.[8]
During the 1990s, Hamas terrorists refined their tactics in Iranian training camps located in Iran, Syria, and Sudan. Indoctrinated by Iran and ready to die for their cause, the fighters returned to the West Bank and Gaza to carry out terror attacks and suicide bombings. Iran also hosted conferences with Hamas, PIJ, and other terror groups, during which the regime pledged money, training, arms, and operational guidance.[9] And while Arafat turned a blind eye to Hamas’s murderous campaign—if not tacitly encouraged it—his Gaza chief, Muhammad Dahlan, accused the organization of acting on behalf of “foreign interests”—a clear reference to Iran.[10]
In 1998, Hamas founding leader Ahmad Yassin visited Tehran for what was effectively a state visit where he lauded “Iran’s support for the Palestinians’ struggle against Israel.”[11] The following year, Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati boasted that “Iran is the main supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah and their struggle against Israel.”[12] By 2000, Iran had gifted Hamas as much as $50 million annually, plus training and other assistance.[13]
When Arafat waged his war of terror at the end of September 2000 (euphemized as “al-Aqsa Intifada”), Hamas viewed the development as both a vindication of its militant approach and a golden opportunity to erode the control of the PLO-dominated Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and Gaza. So did the ayatollahs in Tehran, who quickly transferred at least an additional $400,000 to Hamas.[14] In April 2001, Hamas Politburo chief Khaled Meshal attended a conference in Iran alongside Hezbollah and PIJ leaders, asking the regime for political, financial, and military support.[15] According to a leaked South African document from later that year, Hamas maintained a military headquarters in Iran with the regime financing the organization through a “Fallen Soldiers Fund” in Lebanon.”[16] Israeli intelligence at the time assessed that Hamas leaders traveled to Tehran “every three to four weeks.”[17]
As the Palestinian war of terror progressed, Hamas took a leading role in the violence with Arafat’s tacit blessing. This allowed the PLO chairman to instigate the most horrendous atrocities and then feign innocence by ascribing them to “extremist fringe groups” over which he allegedly had no control. In the coming years, Hamas perpetrated the greatest number of terror attacks and the most gruesome suicide bombings, including the June 2001 bombing of a Tel Aviv disco in which twenty-one people were murdered and the March 2002 Passover massacre in which twenty-nine people were killed. The Passover massacre triggered Operation Defensive Shield, the biggest Israeli military operation since the 1982 Lebanon war, and signaled a turning point in the war of terror.[18]
By the time the Israelis quelled the Palestinian terrorist campaign in mid-2005, and despite their killing of top Hamas leaders (including Yassin), Hamas had emerged as equal politically and superior militarily to the PLO. This was the result of an Israel miscalculation; the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had emasculated the PLO’s West Bank’s terror infrastructure while leaving Hamas’ primarily Gaza-based infrastructure largely intact. This led to internecine strife in the territories, contributing to chaos that ultimately favored Hamas, not to mention its patron in Tehran.
Hamas Conquers Gaza
Jerusalem’s summer 2005 withdrawal of its military forces from the Gaza Strip and the evacuation of twenty-two Israeli villages with their 8,600-strong population[19] provided the next major boost for Hamas. Though the move was designed to bolster the PLO’s standing in the area, in the eyes of the local population, it appeared to be an Israeli defeat at the hands of Hamas as the group that had spearheaded the anti-Israel “armed struggle.”
The Gaza withdrawal was not the only Israeli error. Jerusalem also acquiesced in Washington’s call for Palestinian parliamentary elections in the West Bank and Gaza (held on January 25, 2006). Again, the idea was to sideline Hamas, but instead the organization reaped the fruit of its burgeoning prestige and won 74 of the 132 parliamentary seats. Fatah, the PLO’s foremost constituent organization, which had dominated the Palestinian Authority since its creation in May 1994, was roundly defeated, winning only 45 seats.[20]
Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip provided a major boost for Hamas.
A stalemate ensued for a year-and-a-half as Mahmoud Abbas, who became PLO chairman and PA president upon Arafat’s death in November 2004, refused to recognize the elected Hamas government. Hamas responded by intensifying its military buildup in Gaza, taking full advantage of the Israeli withdrawal, which left the Philadelphi security route along the Egyptian border and the Rafah crossing—the strip’s main entry point to Egypt—wide open. This enabled Hamas to smuggle huge quantities of weapons and explosives into Gaza with significant help from Tehran. They did so through a network of rapidly expanding underground tunnels built with Iranian assistance. Hamas terrorists were also able to leave the enclave at will for training in Iran.[21]
No less importantly, the tunnels enabled Hamas to smuggle large sums of money into the strip with little difficulty. According to a prominent Hamas leader, Iran provided $22 million in cash in 2006. During a December 2006 Tehran visit by the Hamas-led government’s prime minister, Ismail Haniyeh, the Khamenei regime pledged $250 million—a significant increase over previous years.[22]
A full-blown crisis emerged in early June 2007 when Hamas and the PLO fought for the strip’s control. By June 14, all of Gaza had come under Hamas’s domination with some 160 PLO fighters killed and another 700 wounded.[23] Tehran was suspected to be behind the Islamist group’s success, with U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice voicing concerns about Iranian support for Hamas during congressional testimony later that year.[24] Hamas never denied Tehran’s support. During his December 2006 visit to Tehran, Hanieh applauded the Islamic Republic as “the Palestinians’ strategic depth”—reaffirming the unanimity within the organization’s leadership regarding Tehran’s championship of the Palestinian cause:
[Israelis] assume the Palestinian nation is alone … This is an illusion … We have a strategic depth in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This country [Iran] is our powerful, dynamic, and stable depth.
[25]
Hamas-affiliated journalist Zaki Chehab reported, “The Iranian connection is real and long-standing. It is one whose deep roots I witnessed at first hand.” He confirmed that by way of countering the sanctions on Hamas, Iran “was prepared to cover the entire deficit in the Palestinian budget, and [to do so] continuously.” The Bonyad-e Mostazafan za Janbaza (Foundation of the Oppressed and War Veterans), a fund controlled by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), reportedly provided significant support.[26] Hamas fighters also continued to train in Iran.[27]
The Early Gaza Wars
In the wake of the Gaza takeover, Washington attempted to halt Iranian assistance to Hamas. In July 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Iran’s Martyrs Foundation, citing declassified intelligence showing that the foundation funneled money to Hamas, among others.[28] Later that year, Treasury targeted the IRGC’s elite Quds Force and Bank Saderat, also citing declassified evidence that they funded Hamas (as well as Hezbollah and PIJ).[29] However, Iranian cash continued to flow to Gaza as did Iranian weapons. The tunnels connecting Gaza to the Sinai Peninsula, many dug with Iranian funding or technical assistance, facilitated the smuggling of weapons to the coastal enclave.[30]
Better armed and trained than ever thanks to Tehran, and flush with large quantities of weapons and ammunition won by the defeat of the PLO/PA, Hamas continued to overhaul its fighting capabilities. By the end of 2008, according to Israeli intelligence sources, there were more than twenty thousand armed terrorists directly subordinate to the organization’s Izz ad-Din Brigades or designated to be integrated into this force during a conflict.[31]
By the end of 2008, according to Israeli intelligence sources, Hamas had more than twenty thousand armed terrorists.
This Iran-backed military buildup, together with its absolute control of the Gaza Strip, enabled Hamas to establish a balance of deterrence with Jerusalem whereby it disrupted the lives of a growing number of Israeli cities and villages at the relatively low cost of limited retaliatory Israeli air strikes. During 2008, 1,665 rockets landed in Israeli territory—more than twice the previous year and nearly ten times as many as in 2005—endangering the country’s strategic infrastructure (e.g., the Ashdod port, the Ashkelon power station, hospitals, educational and academic institutions) and disrupting the daily lives of nearly one million Israeli citizens—about 15 percent of the total population.[32] Many of these rockets were either provided by Iran, or were assembled locally with assistance from the Tehran regime.
In late February 2008, as Hamas intermittently battered Israeli population centers with rockets, Jerusalem mounted its first major military response. Operation Warm Winter was brief, just four days, targeting a handful of Hamas terrorists along with the organization’s rocket facilities.[33]
The next war came on December 27, 2008, eight days after Hamas had unilaterally abrogated an Egyptian-mediated, informal six-month lull agreement (tahdi’a) with Israel and resumed its rocket attacks. Codenamed Operation Cast Lead, Jerusalem’s immediate goal was to strike tunnels, rocket facilities, and other Hamas military assets built with Iranian largesse. One week into the war, the IDF sent in ground troops. Israeli troops found booby traps and other deadly surprises waiting for them, courtesy of Iran. The IDF pushed forward under air cover, achieving most of its objectives. By the time Jerusalem ended the operation on January 18, 2009, and withdrew its forces from Gaza after twenty-two days of fighting, Hamas’s infrastructure had been seriously damaged despite the organization’s attempts to downplay its losses.[34]
After Cast Lead, it was clear that Tehran was helping Hamas prepare for the next round. In January 2010, Mossad agents assassinated a senior Hamas official in Dubai who had acted as liaison to Iran for weapons procurement.[35] Seven months later, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned a senior Quds Force official who, according to the accompanying press release, “oversees distribution of funds to Levant-based terrorist groups and provides financial support for designated terrorist entities including … Hamas.”[36] In March 2011, the IDF interdicted a Liberian ship sailing to Egypt and seized Iranian weapons, including anti-ship missiles, destined for Hamas. The following month, Israeli forces killed two Hamas weapons procurers, striking their car near Port Sudan in eastern Sudan—a jurisdiction that Iran often used to transfer weapons to the African continent. For its part, the State Department designated a senior Hamas official as a terrorist that year, noting extensive links to Iran.[37]
In March 2011, the IDF interdicted a Liberian ship and seized Iranian weapons destined for Hamas.
War came to Gaza again in 2012. This time the context was perhaps even more important than the conflict itself. On the night of October 23, Israeli fighter jets entered the skies over Khartoum and bombed the Yarmouk weapons factory, which belonged to the IRGC.[38] The targeted weapons—Iranian-made Fajr-5 rockets—were bound for Gaza and Hamas.
Three weeks later, as Hamas once again fired rockets into southern Israel, the Israeli Air Force launched Operation Pillar of Defense against Hamas targets throughout the strip. The operation’s primary target was the Iranian-provided Fajr-5 rockets, most of which (about 100) were destroyed in the early days of fighting.[39]
The following year, the speaker of Iran’s parliament met with Imad Alami, the Hamas representative to Tehran and a key figure in procuring funds and weapons, who had been sanctioned a decade earlier by U.S. Treasury.[40] Suspicions that the meeting was part of an Iranian effort to replenish Hamas’s arsenal were confirmed in March 2014 when the IDF intercepted a Panamanian-flagged cargo vessel carrying Iranian-supplied M-302 rockets and other advanced weapons bound for Gaza.[41]
War began again in early July 2014 and lasted for fifty-one days (July 4-August 21). Hamas fired nearly five thousand rockets and missiles that struck deep in Israeli territory with some targeting Jerusalem and even Israel’s international airport. As Hamas rockets were pounding Israel’s cities and villages, an Iranian official boasted that Tehran was “sending rockets and military aid [to the organization].” Following the war, Khamenei’s foreign affairs advisor Ali Akbar Velayati stated, “Without the help of Iran, [Hamas] could not have obtained these rockets, with such long range and accuracy.”[42]
Velayati was not lying. Hamas’s longer-range M-302 and M-75 rockets had been smuggled to Gaza courtesy of Iran. Hamas also had more shorter-range rockets thanks to Tehran, as the speaker of Iran’s parliament, Ali Larijani, boasted.[43] During the war, the IDF was also surprised by the extent of Hamas’s underground attack tunnels that snaked into Israeli territory, believed to have been built with Iranian assistance.[44]
After the conflict, Hamas’s deputy leader Abu Marzouk spoke of positive “bilateral relations between us and the Islamic Republic of Iran” while Qassem Soleimani, Quds Force commander and a favored Khamenei protégé, described Hamas leaders as “my dear brothers” and reaffirmed Tehran’s support.[45]
On September 9, 2015, U.S. Treasury sanctioned four Hamas financial facilitators and one company. Among those sanctioned was Saleh Arouri, head of Hamas military operations in the West Bank, who was also a Hamas fundraiser. In the years that followed, Arouri visited Iran at least five times.[46]
In August 2019, the Treasury Department issued more sanctions, this time targeting “financial facilitators moving tens of millions of dollars between Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and HAMAS’s operational arm, the Izz-Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades in Gaza.” One key figure Treasury indicated was Muhammad Sarur,
[a] middle-man between the IRGC-QF and HAMAS and worked with Hezbollah operatives to ensure funds were provided to the Izz-Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades. … in the past four years, the IRGC-QF transferred over U.S. $200 million dollars to the Izz-Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades.
[47]
In May 2020, Iran’s supreme leader stated,
Iran realized Palestinian fighters’ only problem was lack of access to weapons. With divine guidance and assistance, we planned, and the balance of power has been transformed in Palestine, and today the Gaza Strip can stand against the aggression of the Zionist enemy and defeat it.
[48]
A few months later, Jerusalem seized $4 million from Gaza businessman Zuhair Shamalach, who tried to funnel the money from Iran to Hamas.[49]
Iranian Arms Fuel 2021 Gaza War
On May 10, 2021, Hamas again began firing rockets toward Jerusalem. The terror group claimed to be defending al-Aqsa Mosque from “Zionist machinations”—the standard Palestinian-Arab rallying cry for anti-Jewish violence since the 1920s. But there was another aspect to its action that escaped notice at the time: the growing number of Israeli strikes against Iranian targets in Syria in an attempt to halt Tehran’s military entrenchment in that country and the smuggling of advanced weapons to Hezbollah.
In April, weeks before the war, an Iranian general warned,
The Zionists imagine that they can continuously target the Syrian territories and conduct mischief in different places and in the sea and receive no response. … the Resistance Front will give a principal response.
[50]
Similarly, IRGC commander Hossein Salami declared that “the evil deeds committed by the Zionists in the region will turn against themselves and expose them to real dangers in the future.” Shortly thereafter, Salami declared that Israel’s “biggest weakness is that any tactical action could bring about a strategic defeat … just a single operation can ruin this regime.”[51]
Once war erupted, Hamas revealed the advances it made with Iranian help, firing off larger salvos of rockets than ever before. Also, as analyst Michael J. Armstrong observed,
Accuracy has improved … About 50 per cent of the rockets arriving over Israel have threatened populated areas. That’s up from 22 per cent in 2012 and 18 per cent in 2014. Fewer rockets land in empty fields after missing their targets.
[52]
For the IDF, rocket range was also a concern. Most Hamas rockets were short-range threats. The locally produced Ayyash rocket, however, could fly 240 kilometers, reaching deep into Israel. Hamas claimed to have thousands of rockets with a similar range, thanks to Iran. It also managed to import Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets from Iran and M-302 rockets from Syria, with ranges of 480, 750, and 180 kilometers, respectively.[53]
Hamas also succeeded in flying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the skies over Israel. Hamas said its drones were built locally, but weapons specialists noted similarities with Iranian drones. Ephraim Sneh, a retired Israeli brigadier general and former deputy defense minister, noted, “The design [of Hamas weapons] is Iranian but the production is local.” Or as Scott Crino, the CEO of consulting firm Red Six Solutions, said, “Iran’s hands are all over this.” Upon closer examination, the Shehab Kamikaze drones Hamas launched at Israel resembled the Iranian Ababil-T and Qasef-series UAVs deployed in Yemen by the Iran-backed Houthis.[54]
The May 2021 Gaza war also witnessed another Hamas innovation with Iranian assistance: unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). The Israeli navy intercepted one, reportedly deployed to attack the Tamar offshore natural gas rig. The UUV was reportedly a commercial vehicle converted for military use and loaded with up to 110 pounds of explosives.[55]
The 2021 war also revealed a massive underground project, which the IDF called the “Hamas Metro.” This labyrinth of subterranean commando tunnels was suspected to have been built with Iranian financial or even technical assistance.[56]
Hamas in Lebanon
One aspect of the 2021 Gaza war that baffled the Israeli political and security establishments was the mass riots by Israel’s Arabs in support of Hamas. The cities of Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, Ramla, and Lod, among others—long considered show-cases of Arab-Jewish coexistence—were rocked by violence as Arab rioters attacked their Jewish neighbors, burned cars, synagogues, and other buildings, threw stones and Molotov cocktails, and even fired weapons. Here, too, Iran had a hand. As noted by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs,
Israeli security officials see the outbreak of violence by Israeli Arabs as a response to incitement choreographed by Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards sitting in a Beirut command center.
[57]
The existence of this command center was confirmed by a senior Israeli intelligence official.[58]
Iran’s role was evident in other ways, too. On the night of May 13, terrorists fired three rockets at Israel from Lebanon; all landed in the Mediterranean Sea. Four days later, another six rockets were fired into Israel from the Shebaa Farms border area on the intersection of the Lebanese-Syrian-Israeli border; all landed in Lebanese territory. On May 19, terrorists fired four more projectiles from near the city of Tyre. Israel’s Iron Dome defense system knocked one out of the sky. Another landed in an uninhabited area, and two more splashed into the Mediterranean.[59]
Israel’s U.N. ambassador warned, “Hamas has been building its own military force covertly in Lebanon.”
The rockets were a reminder of Jerusalem’s warning to the United Nations in 2017 that Hamas was “colluding with Hezbollah and its sponsor in Tehran to expand its malicious activities … to areas within Lebanon.” A 2018 letter by Israel’s U.N. ambassador Danny Dannon further detailed the military cooperation between Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas in Lebanon. It placed a special emphasis on an operation
led by Saleh al-Arouri, the Lebanon-based deputy head of Hamas’ Politburo, and Saeed Izadi, head of the Palestinian Branch of the Iranian al-Quds Force … Iran has publicly declared its commitment to increase its support for Hamas.
[60]
The letter also stated that
Hamas has been building its own military force covertly in Lebanon. Hamas has recruited and trained hundreds of fighters … who will operate as a force on Hamas’ behalf in Lebanon. At the direction of Hamas operative Majid Hader, Hamas has assembled infrastructure in Lebanon ready to manufacture its own missiles and unmanned aircraft. … [Hamas] also intends to use its armed force and growing arsenal of rockets to pull Lebanon into conflict with Israel. This intention increases the possibility of a conflict that could engulf the entire Middle East.
[61]
That same year, then-Shin Bet chief Nadav Argaman warned that “Hamas was trying to build a ‘post’ in Lebanon.”[62] One Lebanese outlet picked up on the story, noting that Hamas intended to drag Lebanon into a future Hamas-Israel conflict, forcing Israel to fight on two fronts.[63]
Conclusion
During the 2021 Gaza war, Tehran did not hide its patronage of Hamas. Supreme Leader Khamenei openly cheered Hamas.[64] Esmail Qaani, who succeeded Soleimani as Quds Force commander, called Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh to offer moral support and lauded Hamas military chief Muhammad Deif as a “living martyr.” An IRGC statement warned that “in the future, the Zionists can expect to endure deadly blows from within the occupied territories.”[65] After the war, Haniyeh thanked “the Islamic Republic of Iran, [which] did not hold back with money, weapons, and technical support.”[66]
As of March 2022, according to one senior Israeli intelligence official, Hamas received $80 million annually from Iran. Hamas engineers are also studying precision guided munition (PGM) technology in Iran to learn how to target Israel more accurately in future wars.[67] And while Hamas has other patrons, including Turkey, Qatar, and Malaysia, none of them have influenced the organization’s military or financial capabilities like the Islamist regime in Tehran. This assistance and money will only grow if the Biden administration resuscitates the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and relaxes sanctions on Tehran.
*Jonathan Schanzer is senior vice president for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and author of Gaza Conflict 2021: Hamas, Israel and Eleven Days of War (FDD Press, 2021). Follow him on Twitter @JSchanzer. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2022/06/02/hamas-as-tehrans-agent/

Antioch: Christendom’s First Great Reconquest Over Islam
Raymond Ibrahim/June 03/2022
Today in history, on June 3, 1098, one of Christendom’s greatest victories over the jihad took place: the liberation of the ancient Christian city of Antioch—where the very word “Christian” was first coined (Acts 11:26)—from under the yoke of Islam.
Context: In the years following the Battle of Manzikert (1071), which saw the Seljuk Turks defeat the Eastern Roman Empire and conquer that ancient bastion of Christianity, Anatolia (modern day Turkey), immense persecutions of Christians followed. Whether an anonymous Georgian chronicler tells of how “holy churches served as stables for their horses,” the “priests were immolated during the Holy Communion itself,” the “virgins defiled, the youths circumcised, and the infants taken away,” or whether Anna Comnena, the princess at Constantinople, tells of how “cities were obliterated, lands were plundered, and the whole of Anatolia was stained with Christian blood”—it was the same scandalous tale of woe.
Enter the First Crusade. To quote historian Thomas Madden, paraphrasing Pope Urban II’s famous call at Clermont in 1095, “The message was clear: Christ was crucified again in the persecution of his faithful and the defilement of his sanctuaries.” Both needed rescuing; both offered an opportunity to fulfill one of Christ’s two greatest commandments: “Love God with all your heart” and “love your neighbor as yourself” (Luke 10:27).
Christians from all around Europe, under the leadership of the Franks, hearkened to the call and took the cross. After a long and arduous journey into Turkic-controlled Asia Minor—which saw the crusaders meet and defeat their Muslim foes in at least two encounters—by October 1097, the Europeans were at and besieging the walls of Antioch.
For long, Antioch had resisted Islam; even when “all the East was shaken and the successors of Muhammad were subjugating by force entire provinces to their impious superstition and perverse dogma,” chronicler William of Tyre writes, Antioch had “as long as possible refused to bear the domination of an infidel nation,” that is, until its capture by the Turks in 1084. Now, more than a decade later, its indigenous Christians were much oppressed by their Turkish master, Yaghi-Siyan, who had demanded more jizya payments, launched sporadic persecutions, forced Christians to convert to Islam, and converted Antioch’s main cathedral into a horse stable
“Alas! How many Christians, Greeks, Syrians, and Armenians, who lived in the city, were killed by the maddened Turks,” lamented Fulcher of Chartres, who travelled with the crusaders. “With the Franks looking on, they threw outside the walls the heads of those [Christians] killed, with their petrariae and slings. This especially grieved our people.”
In response—and because the Frankish and Norman warrior aristocracy had no qualms about giving tit for tat—Bohemond, a Norman prince, “brought those [Muslims] he had captured back to the gate of the city, where, to terrify the citizens who were watching, he ordered that they be decapitated” and their severed heads catapulted over the city walls. (Anna Comnena, who had met and described Bohemond as a towering “marvel for the eyes to behold,” added that “a certain charm hung about this man but was partly marred by a general air of the horrible.” He was clearly not one to be cowed by Islamic terror tactics.)
After eight months, the strong walls of Antioch could still not be breached. Starved crusaders were reduced to eating dogs, rats, and thistles; many died of starvation, thirst, and pestilence. A particularly severe winter set in.
Eventually, a Muslim tower captain—an Armenian Christian converted to Islam during Yaghi’s persecutions—made a deal with Bohemond. And so, today in history, on June 3, 1098, under the cover of night, the emaciated Europeans, having clandestinely been brought up over the walls into the city, ran wildly slaughtering anyone in the streets. “Those who were Christians chanted Kyrie Eleison”—the Christian mantra, “Lord have mercy,” in Greek—“to make it clear to our men that they were not Turks but Christians.” Once their startle was over, however, these same Christians, “Syrians, Armenians, and the true believers of other nations, rejoiced exceedingly over what had happened. They at once took arms and joined forces with the army.” The result was a bloodbath not unlike those Muslims had visited upon Christian cities all throughout Anatolia in the preceding decades.
As with the later crusader sack of Jerusalem in 1099, this incident is regularly cited by Islam’s apologists to demonize the crusaders. In reality, it was a drop in the bucket of what Muslims had done to countless Christians during the preceding decades—an inconvenient fact ignored by Islam’s whitewashers. Nor were the motives of crusaders and jihadists the same: the former engaged in violence to liberate oppressed Christian cities and regions, whereas the invading Muslims came to conquer what was never theirs.
On the very next day, Kerbogha, the atabeg or Turkish lord of Mosul, arrived with an enormous relief force. Antioch was quickly blockaded, and they who only yesterday were the besiegers became the besieged. Another famine struck—by the time the crusaders took Antioch, most of its stores had been depleted by the besieged—and the hold upped warriors were reduced to eating shoes and drinking horse blood. After marching thousands of miles, fighting, starving, and dying, they were granted nary a day to celebrate the liberation of Antioch.
Was God not on their side? These were times to try men’s souls. Morale reached a new low, as captured in the all too contemporary sounding lament of Guy, Bohemond’s brother, who heard of the plight of his brethren:
All powerful God, whose judgement never errs, who never permits the unjust to triumph over the just, why have you betrayed those who, out of love for you, have given themselves over to daily torment and death, who have left their relatives, wives, sons, the greatest honors, their native land, and why have you exposed them, without the aid of your protection, to be cut down by the swords of abominable men?… But so be it. It may be that you want them to die for you, and that you will crown them with glory and honor, yet … [y]ou have plunged the entire Christian world into the depths of despair and incredulity, and you have provoked the worst men [Muslims] to display relentless aggression against your people. From this day forth no man will expect anything great from you, since those who believed themselves dearer to you than all other mortals have been subjected to such an unworthy fate. Therefore, O most gracious one, from now on why should they call upon you, when your own people will expect such a death?
There was nothing to it but for the famished, desperate, and outnumbered crusaders to sally forth and meet the hordes besieging them—but that is another story.
This article was adapted from Raymond Ibrahim’s book (which includes the follow up battle against Kerbogha), Sword and Scimitar: Fourteen Centuries of War between Islam and the West.

Iran: Towards a Summer of Discontent
Amir Taheri/Asharq Al Awsat/June 03/2022
For the past two weeks a large number of Iranians, perhaps hundreds of thousands, have been taking part in protest marches in more than 100 cities across the nation to vent their anger against a system that they consider to be corrupt, incompetent and oppressive.
At the same time the government is facing the threat of massive bread shortages later this year amid reports that wheat stocks have fallen to a record low while talks to purchase 6.2 million tons of wheat, more than half of Iran’s annual consumption, from Russia seem to have stalled.
There is other bad news for the government as oil exports which have been picking up thanks to the Biden administration’s decision to ignore sanctions imposed by Trump, show a downturn partly because of competition from Russia, which is offering significant discounts to capture a larger part of Iran’s market share in Asia. Also bad news is the deadlock in Vienna talks to revive the so-called “nuke deal” and let the Islamic Republic off the hook of some sanctions.
So, should we expect the Islamic Republic facing the perfect storm in what could become a summer of discontent?
This is not the first time that Iranians try to show their anger at the state of their country by protest marches. In fact, some, not to say many, Iranians have been doing so since he very first weeks of rule by Khomeinist clerics in 1979.
In the past decade Iran has witnessed at least three major nationwide uprisings that shook the regime but led to no major change of direction. In every case, the regime succeeded in reasserting its control with a mixture of bribes and brutality while taking advantage of the fact that the protests did not produce a coherent leadership at the national level.
So, why should this time be different?
Although it is still too early to tell, some facts may point to that direction.
The first is that previous uprisings were limited in their overall political scope.
Some, like the March 1979 mass demonstration, were related to single issues, like protest against enforced hijab or crackdown against particular political groups as was the case in 1981 and 1982.
Other protests were related to sectional interests such as the losses suffered by small savers in Tehran’s stock exchange and investment in bogus companies.
Other single issues that prompted protests included transport and sugar-cane workers fighting for better wages and working conditions, and teachers demanding greater academic freedom and a fairer scale of salaries.
Other protests were related to single political issues, such as the Green movement against alleged election fraud that gave Mahmud Ahmadinezhad a second presidential term.
Despite their different motivations and themes all those protests had one feature in common: none was aimed at regime change and all could be contained within the present system.
This time, however, the latest protests appear to be different in a number of ways.
First, the main theme, although not the immediately acknowledged one, is regime change.
The movement was triggered by the collapse of a tall building, the Metropole Tower in the southern oil city of Abadan which claimed dozens of lives. Initially, the tragedy was blamed on an unscrupulous local cow-boy builder looking for quick profit.
Within days, however, a leaflet circulated in Abadan, a number of questions: “Who gave him the building permit? The local mayor? But who appointed the mayor? The Interior Minister? But who appointed the Interior Minister?” The leaflet ended with the Persian proverb: The fish rots from the head, not from the tail!
For the first time some protesters started chanting “Down with Khamenei”, targeting the “Supreme Guide”. He fueled popular anger by refusing even to refer to the tragedy for several days before asking his office to issue an insipid note of solidarity with the victims. This prompted further anti-regime slogans such as “Islamic Republic should be dissolved” and “Sayyed Ali”, leave the country!”
Unlike previous times, Khamenei missed the opportunity to pretend to side with protesters in blaming unidentified officials for not being “Islamic” enough.
Another difference this time was that many protesters, perhaps even a majority, represented a wide spectrum of opinion.
In some cities, at least 10 or 12 we could check with some reliability, slogans such as “Reza Shah, Bless Your soul!” hinted at a surge of nostalgia about the monarchy. But, unlike some previous occasions, even those protesters who felt no nostalgia about the old monarchy, did not challenge those slogans let alone part ways with demonstrators who chanted them.
This is important because it may indicate that the regime cannot work its way out of a tight corner by inviting Iranians to continue fighting the fallen monarchy rather than the incumbent despotism.
And that may signal an even more important development: a move towards national consensus on the need for a change of direction if not straightforward regime change.
So far such a move had been stalled because the regime’s many opponents regarded it as their second choice, each being its own first choice. That meant that each group would rather see the present regime remain in place to prevent a rival opposition group from replacing it.
It is too early to say whether there has been a major change in that mindset. But from what one could gather based on incomplete information, Iran’s disparate opposition groups seem to be moving towards some at least tactical cohesion.
A potentially more important new feature is the support shown by a part of the Shiite clerical establishment in Qom that had tried to hide behind the quietest tradition while maintaining courteous relations with the ruling clergy and its military-security support-base.
The protests have also opened what could become a breach within the Khomeinist establishment with some members of the Islamic Majlis (the ersatz parliament), a number of state-funded celebrities and “Islamic” intellectuals, masters of equivocation, mumbling expressions of support for protesters calling for regime change.
Whether the protests continue or where they will end up it is too early to tell. But one thing is clear: something has snapped between the Khomeinist regime and many Iranians, producing a gap that can no longer be bridged with the usual slogans.
As we move towards a summer of discontent, the Islamic Republic is domestically in its weakest position in years. Is Iran moving towards a crossroad? We have to wait and see.