Eric Bordenkircher/Middle East Quarterly/Can the Lebanese End the Hezbollah Dystopia?/إريك بوردنكيرشر/نشرة الشرق الأوسط الفصلية/هل يستطيع اللبنانيون إنهاء ديستوبيا حزب الله؟

Lebanon sits on the precipice of disaster… again.

Over the last several months, the Lebanese militia Hezbollah has regularly attacked northern Israel with an array of missiles, drones, and mortars. The militia’s unprovoked aggression threatens to subject Lebanon to another destructive conflict with its southern neighbor. Hezbollah’s actions are the latest incident in the group’s long history of defying the Lebanese state and manipulating Lebanon’s state of war with Israel.

For years, many Lebanese have wanted to have their cake and eat it too. They seek to espouse a loyalty to the Palestinian cause and desire the destruction of Israel while aspiring for a sovereign Lebanese state. To realize this objective, certain politicians repeatedly speak about having the Lebanese state rein in Hezbollah by disarming or integrating its militia into the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).¹

As the events of the last six months further demonstrate, Lebanese politicians are on a fool’s errand and many of Lebanon’s citizens live in a state of denial. Regaining their state and sovereignty while upholding the Palestinian cause is the equivalent of squaring a circle. Lebanese authorities cannot compete with Hezbollah—tactically, ably, ideologically, or rhetorically—regarding the confrontation with Israel. The militia’s independence, power, success, and symbolism preclude the state’s disarmament or integration of it into the LAF anytime soon.

Reclamation of the Lebanese state and Lebanon’s sovereignty would demand a change in attitude, not a change in the ownership of weapons. Yet any such change appears distant.

The state of war with Israel enables the survival of a rejectionist, maximalist ideology in Lebanon. This ideology empowers and lionizes Hezbollah’s resistance and its weapons. The realization of the ideology supersedes everyone and everything. Even a Lebanese state and society attempting to recover from a historic economic collapse or arresting and prosecuting the culprits of the third largest non-nuclear explosion is of secondary importance.

The maximalist, rejectionist ideology in Lebanon dates back to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Lebanon and other Arab countries believed the liberation of Palestinian land required the destruction of the Israeli state. Every inch of the Zionist presence in the Levant required removal. This maximalist objective demanded no moderation or compromise (no negotiation or recognition of Israel), only the maintenance of the state of war. To help achieve the outcome, the Lebanese government surrendered Lebanon’s sovereignty to the Palestinian cause in the Cairo Agreement of 1969. The agreement turned southern Lebanon into a base of operations for Palestinian organizations to launch attacks into Israel.

While a growing number of Arab states have abandoned the rejectionist approach to Israel by establishing relations during the last 45 years, Lebanon remains a fountainhead for maximalist outcomes. The reason is straightforward: Iranian interference. Iran’s entrance into Lebanese affairs beginning in the early 1980s through their creation of Hezbollah has perpetuated rejectionism. Iran’s continual financial, military, rhetorical, and spiritual support of Hezbollah has been critical to elevating Hezbollah’s voice and power, withstanding setbacks, and remaining resolute to its stated objectives. Iranian patronage of Hezbollah in an environment like Lebanon—a failed state—is an important dynamic because the militia operates with the belief that they will not be abandoned. It allows them to ignore or reject any conciliatory measures.²

The introduction of Hezbollah into the Lebanese equation from the 1980s onwards also accentuated another element to the struggle between the Israeli and Palestinian nations—the religious dimension. Hezbollah perceives the establishment of Israel as an unacceptable imposition of a non-Islamic presence in the Islamic world. According to this view, the presence of Israel must be removed like a cancerous tumor because it poses a threat to the Islamic world. Israel disrupts Islamic societies through its occupation of territory and presence in the region. Israel’s existence diffuses non-Islamic mores into the area and the land it governs. Because of this, there can be no accommodation with Israel or its acknowledgement. While countries like Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain have compromised their “Islamic identities and principles” by establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, Hezbollah, and by extension Lebanon, remain resolute in seeking Israel’s destruction.

Initially, Hezbollah’s rejectionism in Lebanon enjoyed a wide consensus. The Israeli security zone in southern Lebanon, an 800-square kilometer area established in 1978, demanded liberation in the eyes of most Lebanese. The Taif Accord, the document outlining a road map for post-civil war Lebanon, assigned Hezbollah with the task of liberating southern Lebanon. Its status in this regard ensured that Hezbollah retained its stockpiles of weapons at the exclusion of other Lebanese militias at the conclusion of the civil war.

It took ten years of military action for Hezbollah to achieve its assigned task. In May 2000, Israel withdrew its forces from the security zone. According to the United Nations Secretary General, Israel’s withdrawal fully complied with the stipulations of UN Resolution 425—a complete withdrawal from Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s weapons have since become woven into the fabric of the Lebanese state and society. Over the last 24 years, Hezbollah’s militia transformed its self-perceived raison d’être from liberator to liberator-protector of the Lebanese state. Hezbollah parliamentarian Mohammad Raad conveyed the self-asserted indispensability of Hezbollah in a recent comment about the appointment of a new Lebanese prime minister, declaring that the prime minister “must know the importance of the resistance in protecting the country and its crucial national role for Lebanon and the Lebanese.” ³

Hezbollah’s status as liberator-protector is seemingly unassailable. The obstacles to disarming the organization or integrating it into the LAF are formidable. Hezbollah has no immediate incentive to abandon its armed campaign. Their arms bring them power and prestige. Many Lebanese see the militia as a source of pride and would protest efforts to demilitarize it. Implementing the Arab Peace Plan of 2002, UN Resolutions 1559 (adopted in 2004) and 1701 (adopted in 2006)—disbanding and disarming all Lebanese militias (i.e., Hezbollah) by the state—would meet the militia’s opposition, and further fracture society.

The militia and its supporters either ignore, intimidate, or eliminate confrontational politicians, religious figures, public personalities, and civil society members. Walid Jumblatt, the former Progressive Socialist Party leader, parliamentarian, minister, and supporter of the Palestinian cause, declared in 2022 that “we can no longer accept the slogan ‘army, people, resistance.’”⁴ The comment, an attack on Hezbollah’s operational independence, fell on deaf ears. The Maronite Catholic Patriarch Beshara al-Rahi provoked outrage because of his concern for the safety of Maronites of southern Lebanon during the latest escalation of violence between Hezbollah and Israel. Authorities detained American University of Beirut professor Makram Rabah after a TV interview where he stated publicly known locations of Hezbollah.⁵ The academic remains under investigation. Former journalist and Hezbollah critic Hanin Ghaddar received a six-month prison sentence in absentia for defamation.⁶ Civil society activist and Hezbollah critic Lokman Slim received five bullets to the head in 2021.⁷

The voice of the people goes unheard. Election results and changes in governments do not compel the militia to alter its position. Nor does it require a parliamentary majority to do as it pleases, as shown by its decision to strike Israel in 2006. At the time, Hezbollah and its allies held just 56 out of 128 seats in parliament.⁸ Government policy is also openly defied. For example, despite the Lebanon government instituting a policy of non-involvement in the civil war in Syria, Hezbollah chose to intervene in the conflict. In Lebanon the organization acts with impunity and indifference to the wishes of the official authorities.

The strength of Hezbollah’s militia is the ultimate trump card for the organization in any domestic challenge or dispute. Hezbollah is battle-hardened from fighting in Syria and against Israel. It has built a network of tunnels, stockpiled weapons and drones, imported precision missiles capable of hitting targets hundreds of miles away, and even created its own airstrip in southern Lebanon. The capacities of the state military—the LAF—pale in comparison to Hezbollah in terms of capabilities and equipment. In fact, the LAF required the assistance of Hezbollah to defeat pockets of the Islamic State located on Lebanon’s eastern border with Syria.

Any attempt to use force to rein in Hezbollah would be ruinous. The reasons are several. Any confrontation initiated by the LAF would fragment the force, either resulting in elements refusing to fight or a mutiny. Soldiers will choose their well-being and communal and political identities over their obligation to defend the Lebanese state and nation. Anyone attempting to use force against Hezbollah would thus be bloodied and defeated. The events of 2008 affirmed this reality: Hezbollah seized most of west Beirut in a matter of hours after the state threatened the militia’s independence.⁹

Apart from the strength and operational independence of Hezbollah, elements of the Lebanese population who are not party members revere the militia, making it even more difficult to disarm the group or integrate it into the LAF.

Many Lebanese still see Hezbollah as the champion of resisting Israel. Hezbollah “succeeded” where other Arab states failed. The group’s “success” against Israel translates into credibility, respect, praise, popularity, and the perception of competence even among non-Hezbollah Lebanese. For them, the organization represents a lone “bright spot” or “asset” in an otherwise bleak Lebanese landscape. Some even want to be associated with the resistance. For example, the Shia Harakat Amal, fields its own militia. Several members have died in the recent fighting in the latest Hezbollah-provoked violence at the Israeli border. Of course, the identification with Hezbollah is far less pronounced among Lebanon’s non-Shia communities, in particular the Maronite Christians, but also the Sunni Muslims.

Political allies benefit from Hezbollah’s strength and popularity or are protected by it.

The founder of the Free Patriotic Movement, Michel Aoun, signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the militia in 2006. The partnership helped catapult the former head of the Lebanese Army into the presidency. As the head of state, Aoun helped further normalize the ultimately incompatible idea of co-existence between a state army and a militia. Witness his praise in 2022: “the Resistance (Hezbollah) has proven that it is an element of strength for Lebanon.”¹⁰ Aoun has more recently changed his tune. He recently criticized Hezbollah for engaging in “a losing battle.”¹¹ The comment is convenient for Aoun considering his presidential term ended and he subsequently stepped down as the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement. Having achieved what he wanted from the relationship with Hezbollah (the presidency), he evidently now feels free once again to revert to a critical stance.

Harakat Amal (Amal Movement), Hezbollah’s parliamentary Shia ally, has also benefited. Amal, particularly its leader Nabih Berri, has increased his stature by being a conduit for dialogue between the United States and Hezbollah during times of war and escalation. Another party member, former member and current parliamentarian Ali Hassan Khalil, received an arrest warrant regarding the Beirut Port blast. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah protested the measure and demanded the removal of the investigating judge. Nasrallah claimed the investigating judge was using “the blood of the victims to serve political interests.”¹² Khalil’s warrant was eventually cancelled.

Hezbollah’s adherence to a rejectionist ideology and its unassailable status has allowed it to control the resistance narrative in Lebanon. Hezbollah decides who can resist, when to resist, how to resist, and why to resist. Hezbollah employs a seemingly unending array of arguments for maintaining the resistance to Israel. It guarantees the movement’s indefinite primacy, buttresses their power, and perpetually places Lebanon on the brink of war—until the Israeli state can be vanquished.

To frame the resistance as more than just a self-interested Hezbollah and Iranian endeavor, Lebanese (national), Islamic, and Palestinian elements have participated in the resistance from Lebanon. Non-Hezbollah Lebanese militants (i.e. Amal) have lost their lives in the fighting at the border during the last six months. Hezbollah also operates Resistance Brigades for non-Shia Lebanese that allows Christians and Sunnis to participate in the fighting against Israel. Palestinian militants have also periodically launched rockets into northern Israel. All these actions are conducted under the auspices of Hezbollah. Little happens in southern Lebanon without the militia’s knowledge. To provide some perspective on the ubiquity of the organization’s watchful eye, an Irish member of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was shot and killed by “Hezbollah’s supporters” in December 2022 when his vehicle deviated from a designated route.

Iran’s scion will not relinquish the occupation argument. The reason is obvious. It is the easiest argument to advance, in order to rationalize its power, privileges, and weapons in Lebanon, and maintain popular support. It enables Hezbollah to portray its actions as sacrifices for the interests of the Lebanese nation. As a result, Hezbollah repeatedly discovers outstanding examples of occupation. No withdrawal is complete. No negotiation is final.

Take for example Israel’s May 2000 withdrawal from its security zone in southern Lebanon. Despite the withdrawal being acknowledged by the UN as fulfilling UN Resolution 425, Hezbollah maintains that Lebanese territory remains under Israeli occupation. The most prominent example is the Shebaa Farms, a 22-square kilometer area at the foot of the Golan Heights. Shebaa has become a part of the liberation narrative and arena for repeated armed conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. Just four months after the Israeli withdrawal, in October 2000, Hezbollah launched an attack that killed four Israeli soldiers.

Many Lebanese will tell you they had never heard of the Shebaa Farms until 2000, let alone whether the territory is Lebanese. The international community recognizes the Shebaa Farms as Syrian, not Lebanese territory. It fell under Israeli jurisdiction in 1967, a war that Lebanon did not participate in.

Another example is Lebanon’s maritime boundary with Israel. The discovery of gas fields under the floor of the Mediterranean Sea with a disputed boundary remains another potential conflagration point. The United States mediated a resolution to the boundary and the gas fields between Israel and the Lebanese government.¹³ However, several days after the announcement of the “historic” resolution, on October 29, Nasrallah declared that a portion of Lebanese territorial waters remain “occupied by the enemy” and demands liberation.¹⁴ An additional issue is an aperture in the U.S.-meditated resolution that can be exploited by Hezbollah. Israel’s economic rights to one of the disputed gas fields remains unresolved by the agreement.¹⁵ If the gas field yields exportable gas, Hezbollah can assert that Lebanon’s territorial rights are being infringed upon and justify aggression.

Demarcation of the Lebanese-Israeli land boundary is being discussed as a means to alleviate the Hezbollah-Israel violence erupting in the wake of the Hamas October 7 attacks. The Biden administration seeks a replication of its work on a resolution to the maritime boundary and gas fields. Considering Hezbollah’s interests in keeping the liberation argument alive, even if the border issues are resolved between the Lebanese and Israeli governments, Hezbollah will subsequently identify a new outstanding issue at the border. Do not be surprised if they raise the return of seven villages in northern Israel. Hezbollah believes the “Lebanese villages” were annexed by Israel in 1948.¹⁶

Somewhat ironically, withdrawals and negotiated resolutions have emboldened Hezbollah, not pacified or appeased the militia. Following the maritime agreement, Nasrallah declared: “You are mistaken if you think that the resistance in Lebanon has been deterred from attacking.”¹⁷ The comment is further evidence of its adherence to maximalist outcomes. Negotiations and concessions are not the end, they are a means to an end—the eventual destruction of the Israeli state.

Complementing the liberation argument is the belief that Hezbollah and its weapons protect Lebanon and its interests. Adopted after the May 2000 Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah believes its militia deters Israel from committing aggression against Lebanon or exploiting the country. The militia presents itself as providing another layer of security to Lebanese Armed Forces and additional leverage for Lebanon.

For example, Hezbollah interprets the 2022 resolution of the Israeli-Lebanese maritime boundary and the division of the gas fields as a “great historic victory.”¹⁸ Leading up to the “victory,” Nasrallah threatened war. He declared in July that “all the options are on the table” after the group launched three drones at a gas rig operating in Israeli waters.¹⁹ Hezbollah also conducted “exceptional mobilization” of its militia.²⁰ The group believes its threat of war, show of force, and actions extracted concessions from Israel—protecting and realizing Lebanon’s full interests.

Another example of the “protection argument” is Hezbollah’s entrance into the Syrian civil war. Hezbollah proclaimed that by entering the war in Syria, it was preventing spillover of the war into Lebanon and keeping Islamists from coming to Lebanon—the best defense is a good offense. Hezbollah’s decision ignored the Lebanese government’s policy of disassociation from the Syrian civil war. Lebanese civilians paid a deadly price for the intervention. Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria subjected Lebanese citizens to a series of suicide bombings by ISIS.²¹

On October 8, Hezbollah added solidarity with the Palestinians of Gaza to the resistance narrative. Hezbollah has launched almost daily attacks on northern Israel. The motivation is to pressure Israel into ending its attack on Gaza after Hamas launched its attack on October 7. After nearly a year, Hezbollah has failed to end the Israeli attack, while Lebanon is on the receiving end of Israeli responses.

Engaging with Israel over developments in Gaza cannot be connected to Lebanon’s national interests. Lebanon has no military obligations to the Palestinian people. Furthermore, if the militia cared about the plight of Palestinians, they would do more to alleviate the predicament of thousands of Palestinians residing in Lebanon. For decades Palestinians in Lebanon have lived in squalor and with few rights. It is evidence of Hezbollah’s manipulation of the state of war to advance its Islamic-Iranian agenda.

The solidarity argument adds to examples of Hezbollah actions that cannot be explained by liberating or protecting Lebanon. The most notable example is from 2006. Hezbollah militants crossed into Israel proper and killed and captured several Israeli soldiers. The act of aggression triggered a 33-day war. Nasrallah apologized to the Lebanese for the miscalculated aggression. Nevertheless, the militia continued to engage in similar activities. A recent example is the bombing at Megiddo Junction in 2023.

The state of war with Israel prevents Lebanon from developing along successful lines. It places Lebanon constantly on the precipice of a war that disrupts society, further corrodes the state, stalls recovery, and discourages development.

Over a dozen assassinations have occurred in Lebanon over the last 17 years. No guilty verdicts have been announced, let alone individuals brought to trial by the Lebanese judicial system. The international tribunal created to prosecute the assassins of former Prime Minister Rafiq el-Hariri only produced one conviction. The individual has never been arrested. The investigation into the Beirut port explosion is the latest search for justice to encounter delays and disruptions. Two different judges have been appointed to the case. Nasrallah has demanded the second judge be removed. Nasrallah claims the investigation into the port explosion is “politicized.”²²

The current situation demonstrates to citizens the state’s inability or unwillingness to provide security. Rights are infringed upon as demonstrated by the detainment of Professor Makram Rabah. Corruption and the defiance of the law are further enabled. Societal divides are aggravated and distrust deepens.

Lebanon is currently a dystopia. Its economy experienced an implosion not witnessed by another country in more than 150 years.²³ Since August 2019, the Lebanese lira lost 98 percent of its value.²⁴ The inflation rate stands at 212 percent.²⁵ Lebanon requires electricity from other countries.²⁶ Life-saving medicines are at a premium. Buildings collapse and thoroughfares become impassable during rainstorms. Citizens wait in lines for bread and gasoline.²⁷ Cholera outbreaks periodically afflict parts of the country.²⁸

Substantial development and investment remain a pipe dream. Why would a responsible investor consider Lebanon? The Lebanese themselves will not invest in the future of the country as demonstrated by the constant rate of emigration.

Even prior to the tit-for-tat exchanges between Hezbollah and Israel since Oct. 7, 2023, the situation has been ripe for violence. Hezbollah launched drones into Israel and at Israeli gas rigs in the Mediterranean Sea. Witness the threatening July 12, 2022, words of Nasrallah: “If you want to prevent Lebanon from exercising its right to save itself by extracting oil and gas, no one will be able to extract oil and gas.”²⁹ Nasrallah went a step further on February 16, 2023, by threatening to attack and kill Israelis over the gas fields. It did not concern the ownership of the gas fields, rather it was about the harvesting of the gas.

Lebanon’s relationship with “resistance” dates to 1967 when Palestinian fighters began launching attacks from Lebanon into Israel. During that time, the Palestinians and more recently Hezbollah have demonstrated little adherence to boundaries, the rights of citizens, agreements, or international edicts. The 57-year-old mostly low intensity conflict has only produced death, destruction, and uncertainty for Lebanon. The latest Hezbollah-initiated escalation of violence has the potential to produce irreparable damage to an already debilitated society and a floundering state. Any process that may bring change to this situation does not appear to be currently on the horizon. Disaster, meanwhile, as a result of the current direction remains a real possibility.

1. “Talks launched in Lebanon to integrate Hezbollah’s arms.” Gulf News, September 16, 2008.

2. Eric Bordenkircher, “‘Lebanonization’: Framing Policy for the Puzzles of the Middle East.” Middle East Policy. Spring 2020 (27:1), 46.

3. “Raad: PM-designate, ‘while not a saint’, must recognize ‘resistance national role,’ Naharnet Newsdesk, June 20, 2022.

4. “Joumblatt and Geagea take aim at Hezbollah’s weapons,” L’Orient Today, May 21, 2022.

5. “Lebanese academic criticizes Hezbollah for dragging country into war, gets detained – report,” The Jerusalem Post, March 19, 2024.

6. “Lebanon orders jail term for journalist who slammed army, Hezbollah in DC speech,” The Times of Israel, January 18, 2018.

7. Kareem Chehayeb, “Lebanon: The assassination of activist Lokman Slim, one year on,” Al-Jazeera, February 3, 2022.

8. Esther Pan, “Lebanon: Election Results,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 21, 2005.

9. Robert F. Worth and Nadia Bakri, “Hezbollah Seizes Swath of Beirut From U.S.-Backed Lebanon Government,” The New York Times, May 10, 2008.

10. “Aoun announces Lebanon’s official approval of border deal with Israel,” Naharnet Newsdesk, October 13, 2022.

11. “Aoun dubs Hezbollah’s involvement in Gaza war ‘a losing battle’,” Naharnet Newsdesk, March 15, 2024.

12. Kareem Cheheyab, “Beirut blast probe suspended again as judge issues arrest warrant,” Al-Jazeera, Oct 12, 2001.

13. Press statement from Antony Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State, “Historic Breakthrough on the Israel-Lebanon Maritime Boundary,” U.S. State Department, October 11, 2022.

14. “Nasrallah: Agreement is a ‘victory,’ but Lebanon did not get ‘100 percent of its demands’,” L’Orient Today, October 29, 2022.

15. https://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/292953-full-text-of-israel-lebanon-maritime-border-deal

16. Danny Rubinstein, “The Seven Lost Villages,” Haaretz, October 1, 2007.

17. “Nasrallah: Agreement is a ‘victory,’ but Lebanon did not get ‘100 percent of its demands’,” L’Orient Today, October 29, 2022.

18. Ibid.

19. Bassem Mroue, “Hezbollah threatens Israel with escalation in border spat,” Associated Press, July 13, 2022. Nasrallah warns of sea border ‘escalation’ if Lebanon demands not met”, Naharnet Newdesk, August 19, 2022.

20. “Hezbollah chief says armed group’s mobilization to end,” Reuters, October 27, 2022.

21. Laila Bassam, “Car bomb kills 20 in Hezbollah’s Beirut stronghold,“ Reuters, October 15, 2013. Kareem Shaheen, “Isis claims responsibility as suicide bombers kill dozens in Beirut,” The Guardian, November 12, 2015.

22. “Hezbollah chief Nasrallah says Beirut port explosion investigator biased,” Reuters, August 7, 2021.

23. Ben Hubbard, “Collapse: Inside Lebanon’s Worst Economic Meltdown in More Than a Century,” The New York Times, August 4, 2021.

24. “Lebanon to sell unlimited US dollars to prop up collapsing pound,” Reuters, March 21, 2023

25. “Trading Economics,”https://tradingeconomics.com/lebanon/inflation-cpi.

26. Nader Durgham and Liz Sly, “Lebanon’s national electricity grid collapses,” The Washington Post, October 9, 2021.

27. Sami Moubayed, “With worsening food shortage, Lebanon in a state of crisis,” Gulf News, August 1, 2022. Ben Hubbard, “As Lebanon’s Crisis Deepens, Lines for Fuel Grow, and Food and Medicine Are Scarce,” The New York Times, July 5, 2021.

28. “Lebanon warns deadly cholera outbreak ‘spreading rapidly’,” Al-Jazeera, October 19, 2021.

29. Tobias Siegal, “Nasrallah threatens war over Israel-Lebanon maritime border dispute,” The Times of Israel, July 13, 2022.