LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
November 01/15

Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
http://www.eliasbejjaninews.com/newsbulletins05/english.november01.15.htm 

Bible Quotation For Today/You are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of Hades will not prevail against it.
Matthew 16/13-20: "When Jesus came into the district of Caesarea Philippi, he asked his disciples, ‘Who do people say that the Son of Man is?’And they said, ‘Some say John the Baptist, but others Elijah, and still others Jeremiah or one of the prophets.’He said to them, ‘But who do you say that I am?’Simon Peter answered, ‘You are the Messiah, the Son of the living God.’And Jesus answered him, ‘Blessed are you, Simon son of Jonah! For flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father in heaven. And I tell you, you are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of Hades will not prevail against it. I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatever you bind on earth will be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven.’ Then he sternly ordered the disciples not to tell anyone that he was the Messiah.

Bible Quotation For Today/Christ came as a high priest and entered once for all into the Holy Place, not with the blood of goats and calves, but with his own blood, thus obtaining eternal redemption."
Letter to the Hebrews 09/01-12: "Even the first covenant had regulations for worship and an earthly sanctuary. For a tent was constructed, the first one, in which were the lampstand, the table, and the bread of the Presence; this is called the Holy Place. Behind the second curtain was a tent called the Holy of Holies. In it stood the golden altar of incense and the ark of the covenant overlaid on all sides with gold, in which there were a golden urn holding the manna, and Aaron’s rod that budded, and the tablets of the covenant; above it were the cherubim of glory overshadowing the mercy-seat. Of these things we cannot speak now in detail. Such preparations having been made, the priests go continually into the first tent to carry out their ritual duties; but only the high priest goes into the second, and he but once a year, and not without taking the blood that he offers for himself and for the sins committed unintentionally by the people. By this the Holy Spirit indicates that the way into the sanctuary has not yet been disclosed as long as the first tent is still standing. This is a symbol of the present time, during which gifts and sacrifices are offered that cannot perfect the conscience of the worshipper, but deal only with food and drink and various baptisms, regulations for the body imposed until the time comes to set things right. But when Christ came as a high priest of the good things that have come, then through the greater and perfect tent (not made with hands, that is, not of this creation), he entered once for all into the Holy Place, not with the blood of goats and calves, but with his own blood, thus obtaining eternal redemption."

Titles For Latest LCCC Bulletin analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on October 31-November 01/15
Question: "What is the meaning of BC and AD (B.C. and A.D.)?/November 01/15
Muslim Blood and Al-Aqsa/Bassam Tawil/Gatestone Institute/October 31/15
The Arabian peninsula without Arabs/Abdulrahman al-Rashed/Al Arabiya/October 31/15
The Americas moving Left/Eyad Abu Shakra/Al Arabiya/October 31/15
Children are at school to learn, not get beaten/Yara al-Wazir/Al Arabiya/October 31/15
Turkey After the Snap Elections: War Cabinet or Peace Cabinet/Soner Cagaptay/The Washington Institute/October 31/15
Russia in Southern Syria: Israeli and Jordanian Concerns/Nadav Pollak/The Washington Institute/October 31/15
Obama Administration Moves Cautiously Ahead on Geneva-3/Middle East Briefing/October 31/15
Assad as a Bargaining Chip/Middle East Briefing/October 31/15
Iran’s Continuing Missteps Jeopardize Geneva-3 Chances/Middle East Briefing/October 31/15
The Need for a New Iran Containment Policy/Middle East Briefing/October 31/15

Titles For Latest LCCC Bulletin for Lebanese Related News published on  October 31- November 01/15
Lebanese Security Forces Arrest Lebanese IS Member Planning Suicide Attack against Army
Report: Bkirki Denies Donating Land to Resolve Trash Disposal Dispute in Keserouan
Report: New Spot in Khaldeh Proposed as Substitute to Kfour Landfill
Report: Progress Achieved in Trash Crisis as Salam to Convene Cabinet soon
Aoun: We Want President to Represent Christians, Won't Choose 'the Unknown'

Titles For Latest LCCC Bulletin For Miscellaneous Reports And News published on  October 31- November 01/15
Halloween in Canada
Romania in Mourning after Bucharest Club Blaze Kills 27
Russia doubts ISIS claim that it shot down airliner
Turkish jets hit ISIS targets in Syria
U.S. announces $100 mln in new aid to Syria opposition
Oman, Yemen warn coastal areas as severe cyclone approaches
Special Forces in Syria does not mean U.S. entering war: Kerry
U.N.: Syrian talks ‘hostage’ to Assad’s future
New U.S.-backed Syria militia hits ISIS
Palestinian wielding knife shot dead: Israeli police
Saudi FM: U.S. support of Gulf at ‘record high’
Australia reportedly mulls sending refugees to Kyrgyzstan
U.S. recognizes dangers in Syria ground operation
Modern radicalism has ‘no boundaries,’ says Tunisian foreign minister

Links From Jihad Watch Site for  October 31-November 01/15
Watch: Islamic State releases video of shooting-down of Russian plane
Islamic State group in Egypt claims it downed Russian airliner, killing 224 people
Islamic State supporters celebrate Trudeau’s election in Canada
Egyptian TV host and historian agree: Burning is “the only solution for the Jews”
Thousands of Muslim migrants in Europe “mysteriously disappear”
US to allocate $100 million more to “moderate” Syrian opposition
Kashmir villages clash over who would get the honor of burying slain jihad terrorist
Bangladesh: Muslim group murders publisher of Islamocritical writer they murdered previously
UK: Judge says Muslim’s Islamic State execution videos “bear no relation whatsoever to the true practices and principles” of Islam
Video: Islamic State threatens Obama, beheads four Kurdish fighters

Muslim Blood and Al-Aqsa
Bassam Tawil/Gatestone Institute/October 31/15
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6756/muslim-blood-aqsa
We all know perfectly well that Al-Aqsa mosque is in no danger. Ironically -- I am ashamed to admit it -- thanks to the Israel Police, Al-Aqsa is the safest mosque in the Middle East.
Today we sacrifice both our sons and daughters on the altar of empty slogan -- lies such as "Al-Aqsa mosque is in danger," in the vain, blasphemous notion that omnipotent, omniscient Allah needs us to die as martyrs for his sake.
Muhammad's hadith says one drop of Muslim blood is more valuable than the Kaaba in Mecca, so the same must be true for the stones of Al-Aqsa, which is less holy to Islam than the Kaaba.
The hypocrisy and politicization of Islam has led our sheikhs deliberately to misinterpret verses in the Qur'an, and in that way we disrespect the words of Allah. There are clerics present Islam as a hideous religion bent on murder and paganism, and on sanctifying the stones of Al-Aqsa mosque more than the lives of faithful Muslims.
The Qur'an promises the Children of Israel that they will return to the land of Israel from the four corners of the earth... so we should have greeted their return as living proof of the words of Allah and the realization of the prophecies of Muhammad. Instead, we fight the Jews, which means we fight the wishes of Allah.
The Qur'an tells us that the Jews are the chosen people and the inheritors of the land, so why do our religious leaders deny it and refuse to admit that the Qur'an does not name or even hint at "Palestine" or "Palestinians?"
If the Jews had come without divine intervention, they would not have been able to overcome the Arab armies that attacked them during the wars after that. Their victory was proof that Allah was on their side.
When the Second Caliph, Omar bin al-Khatab, conquered Jerusalem, he and his advisor Caab al-Akhbar (a Jew who converted to Islam) both affirmed that the location of the Temple of the Jews had been on the Temple Mount, next to today's Al-Aqsa mosque.
When we claim that Jesus was a Palestinian, we make ourselves an international laughing stock.
According to a hadith attributed to the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.A.S), "One drop of faithful Muslim blood is more valuable than the entire Kaaba." However, as far as the Palestinian national religious leadership is concerned, the words are meaningless. In their unclean hands and with their perverted agenda, Muslim blood has become a political pawn in the game of "attack the Jews."
The recent bloodshed in the Palestinian territory and inside Israel, particularly Jerusalem, based on the claim that "Al-Aqsa mosque is in danger" -- and the fatal stabbings of Jews by knife-wielding Palestinians -- are cruel examples of how Hamas and the Islamic Movement's clerics distort the words of Allah (S.W.A.T.) and the Prophet, and present Islam as a hideous religion bent on murder and paganism. They seem to care more about the stones of Al-Aqsa mosque than about the lives of faithful Muslims.
Under cover of the slogan "Al-Aqsa mosque is in danger," the Palestinian Authority (PA), Hamas and PLO leaders, as well as Israeli Arab Knesset members and the Islamic Movement in Israel, send innocent young Palestinians to murder Jews at a time when we all know perfectly well that Al-Aqsa mosque is not danger. Ironically -- I am ashamed to admit it -- thanks to the Israel Police, Al-Aqsa is the safest mosque in the Middle East.
We all remember how, during the war last summer, the Hamas leadership gave the order to fire rockets at Jerusalem. They might easily have hit Al-Aqsa mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Hamas nevertheless ordered the rockets to be fired. And we all see how our brother Arabs and Muslims blow up mosques and churches full of worshippers throughout the Middle East, while the Israel security forces safeguard Al-Aqsa and the churches in Jerusalem. Not only that, but, unlike the rule of Jordan before 1967, the Israelis allow freedom of worship for followers of all religions at all the holy sites throughout the country, especially in Jerusalem.
The hypocrisy and politicization of Islam has led our sheikhs deliberately to misinterpret verses in the Qur'an, and in that way we disrespect the words of Allah. There are clerics who present Islam as a hideous religion bent on murder and paganism, and who care more about the stones of Al-Aqsa mosque than about the lives of faithful Muslims.
The Qur'an tells us the Jews are the chosen people and the inheritors of the land, so why do our religious leaders deny it and refuse to admit that the Qur'an does not name or even hint at "Palestine" or "Palestinians?"
The Qur'an promises the Children of Israel that they will return to the land of Israel from the four corners of the earth, so we should have greeted their return, especially during the first half of the last century, as living proof of the words of Allah and the realization of the prophecies of Muhammad. Instead, we fight the Jews, which means we fight the wishes of Allah while killing our own children and denying the miracle of the return of the Jews to their country. Our feeble claim is that they are not the Children of Israel because those spoken of in the Qur'an do not exist. How can we expect any intelligent person to believe that?
If the Jews had come after the ravages of the Second World War -- starving refugees, weak, alone, frightened -- without divine intervention, they would not have been able to overcome the Arab armies that attacked them after the declaration of the State of Israel and during the wars after that. Their victory was proof that Allah was on their side. By denying it, we turn Muhammad into a liar (Allah forbid!) and say he was not a true prophet, and that the Qur'an's prediction of the return of the Jews was not the word of Allah.
Denial of the existence of the Temple of the Jews on the Temple Mount is the height of Muslim hypocrisy and a distortion of both Jewish and Muslim history. We forget that, according to our historians, when the Second Caliph, Omar bin al-Khatab, conquered Jerusalem, he and his advisor Caab al-Akhbar (a Jew who converted to Islam) both affirmed that the location of the Temple of the Jews had been on the Temple Mount, next to today's Al-Aqsa mosque.
When we Palestinians deny that the Jews are the descendants of the Children of Israel in order to deny Allah's promise to give them the blessed land, we turn ourselves into the descendants of the Canaanite and Jebusite who lived in the land of Israel at the time of Moses, may he rest in peace. He and Joshua bin Nun conquered the land and killed them, down to the last one. They were infidels whose deaths were ordered by Allah. Our attempt to claim them as our forefathers, and therefore as assets, is shamefully nothing but stupidity.
We know that some of those who live in our villages are Jews who converted to Islam after the Muslim conquests beginning in the 7th century, and most of us are the descendants of foreign workers who came to British Mandate of Palestine from the various Arab countries in the wake of the Zionist enterprise. By trying to trace our "ancestry" to the Canaanites, we lie to ourselves and demonstrate our silliness and self-deception to the world. And when we try to claim that Jesus was a Palestinian, we make ourselves an international laughing stock.
In that way we return to the days of the jahiliyya, the time before Islam, when we buried our female babies alive in the sand lest they become whores. Today we sacrifice both our sons and daughters on the altar of empty slogan -- lies such as "Al-Aqsa mosque is in danger," in the vain, blasphemous notion that omnipotent, omniscient Allah needs us to die as shaheeds [martyrs] for his sake. Muhammad's hadith says one drop of Muslim blood is more valuable than the Kaaba in Mecca, so the same must be true for the stones of Al-Aqsa, which is less holy to Islam than the Kaaba.
The attempt by Hamas and the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel to incite another intifada based on the nonsense that "Al-Aqsa mosque is in danger" has two objectives: one is to fire up a religious war of Muslim against Jew, like ISIS; the other is the Qatar-funded Muslim Brotherhood's desire to create public unrest that will lead to the overthrow of the Palestinian Authority.
The Islamists have also been stupid in their timing, creating an unnecessary and unreal crisis at a time when the entire Arab world is engaged in destroying itself, as Shi'ites kill Sunnis and Sunnis kill Shi'ites, creating millions upon millions of refugees to top off the hundreds of thousands of Arabs killed during the so-called Arab Spring. The people of the Middle East do not have the time to deal with the useless fabrications of Sheikh Ra'ed Salah, leader of the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel.
Mahmoud Abbas and the rest of the Palestinian Authority's upper echelons have been blind to Hamas's cunning plots to end Fatah's hold on the West Bank. What happened to the PA in Gaza when Hamas took over in 2006-2007 will happen again in the West Bank; Mahmoud Abbas and his crew will be thrown off the highest buildings in Ramallah or executed with a bullet to the back of the head.
If in fact Hamas does take over the West Bank, our lives will become nightmares because like the Gazans, we will have to obey the orders of the Hamas Islamic Emirate. Then the dream of a Palestinian state will evaporate forever -- because a terrorist Islamic emirate, a twin to the one in the Gaza Strip, will be universally unacceptable. As for the Jews, once again we have played into their hands. They again destroy the houses of killers who are too stupid to understand anything beyond the incitement and hatred they absorb from the mosques, the Palestinian media and the social networks. By following ISIS, all they are doing with their knives is cutting the future Palestinian state to shreds. The time has come for us to realize that using knives (shibrie) against the Jews will not yield us even a sliver of land (shiber), and we have to change our strategy. We need to talk to the Israelis and get our Palestinian state by peaceful means. They will give it to us: they have offered to do so many times already -- otherwise we will not get it at all.
*Bassam Tawil is a scholar based in the Middle East.
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The Arabian peninsula without Arabs
Abdulrahman al-Rashed/Al Arabiya/October 31/15
Recent scientific studies suggest that in 60 years the temperature and humidity in our region will reach 70 degrees Celsius; it will be impossible to live in the Arabian Peninsula. Indeed, the presence of oil resources and air-conditioning technology changed our lives in the region, but the world is now a whole lot different than 2,000 years ago. Before oil was discovered, there was no life in the peninsula due to its arid climate. To escape famine, people were accustomed to continual migrations to the Levant and East Africa. They were known as tough fighters living through invasions from foreigners, such as the Vikings in northern Europe, the Mongols in Central Asia, and indeed, al-Qaeda fighters today. Arabian Peninsula tribes kept on migrating as “fighter tribes” for hundreds of years, before and after the advent of Islam, and they reached Europe and East Asia. Even after the advent of Islam, Arabs did not stay in the Peninsula. No caliph has lived in the Peninsula since the Umayyads and the Ottomans; they all left the peninsula to Baghdad, Damascus, Cairo, Granada and Istanbul, and established their kingdoms over a period of 1,300 years. Without the high income from oil production, Riyadh and the rest of the region may not be able to survive a projected period in which scientists believe temperatures will rise. Life is still very harsh in this desert and almost impossible in some areas in the Peninsula, such as the Empty Quarter (Rub' al Khali), the largest contiguous sand desert in the world. Such areas remained uninhabited with the exception of a few nomads and oil companies operating in small settlements.
Harsh scenarios
In Riyadh, thirst is on the rise with an increasing number of inhabitants in the Saudi capital, the largest city in the peninsula. Riyadh’s population reached 6 million and in just 5 years, it is estimated to reach 11 million. This capital isn’t even ready to have 1 million extra inhabitants on its soil and using its waters. However, like the rest of the peninsula region, it thrives on the desalination of sea water, and its inhabitants only pay only 5 percent of the total cost of production and transfer - the government pays the remaining 95 per cent of the charges. Without the high income from oil production, Riyadh and the rest of the region may not be able to survive a projected period in which scientists believe temperatures will rise and become unbearable by the end of the century. The increase in the population of these hot and dry cities exceeds the abilities of their natural resources to be home to them – this is a common problem in the world. Cities like Las Vegas, Phoenix, San Diego and Los Angeles, drink from the water provided by the Colorado River, under an agreement held between seven U.S. states. The situation is more difficult for the Peninsula's populations due to temperatures rising every year and intensifying dust storms, which fill emergency rooms in hospitals with people suffering from asthma and other respiratory illnesses. These people fall prey to the pharmacies and drug stores that are selling breathing aids at extremely high prices. The inhabitants of this desert have no choice but to search for solutions, much like those living in the Arctic and like the Arabs during ancient times. I am currently following up the news of Abu Dhabi’s upcoming Masdar City, which will rely on on solar energy and other renewable energy sources, in the search for future solutions. The idea is to build a city without carbon dioxide, cars or exhausts, which are mainly the cause of rising temperature in the region. I am also interested in science news and companies looking for solutions to water, irrigation and how to improve agriculture with small amounts of water. Scientists expect temperatures and humidity to rise in an unbearable way after 60 years, but we already know and feel that life is tough with the decreasing supplies of water. We have no choice but to engage in scientific research and focus on studies about our local environment. In California, universities are teaching students how to design cities with hot weather under the old Arab architectural systems, where streets are narrow and daily life requires a minimal presence of cars. Maybe one day, universities in our region will decide to search for solutions that suit us.

The Americas moving Left
Eyad Abu Shakra/Al Arabiya/October 31/15
Argentinian voters went the other day to polls to elect a new president who will take over from President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. Opinion polls have been showing Daniel Scioli the Peronist Left candidate comfortably leading his main conservative opponent Mauricio Macri. Less than two weeks before that Justin Trudeau, the leader of Canada’s Liberal party, ended nine years of extremist Conservative rule. As for the U.S.A, thanks to his domestic programs President Barack Obama is shown by opinion polling to be enjoying a 51 percent approval rating despite his disastrous foreign policies. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton seems to be in a very good shape in primaries campaign while Republican contenders sink in bottomless pit of pandering to the extreme religious and racist in pursuit of votes. From Canada in the northern part of North America to Argentina in the southern part the winds of politics are blowing left, keeping in mind of course that what matters most in global affairs is the U.S. compass.
Many were taken by surprise by Trudeau Jr’s decisive victory. The son of the later charismatic ex-Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau who led Canada for around 15 years (1968-1979) and (1980-1984) soundly defeated Stephen Harper, the most hawkish right wing leader in Canada’s recent history.
During his nine-year term in office Harper adopted all kinds of reactionary and offensive stances bordering on outright racism, especially against Muslins, immigrants and Palestinian rights; benefitting from a divided opposition between the Liberals and the New Democratic party leftists. By the end of the day, however, the Canadian had enough, and the Harper “experiment’ ran out of steam the moment a credible alternative became available. In Latin America – Central and South America – long regarded by Washington as its “back garden” the picture has been somewhat different. Throughout the Cold War, Washington benefitted from a “triple alliance” comprising of the Church, the military and the rich whether from landed aristocracy or agents and dealers of American business interests and monopolies.
Thus, this “alliance” ruthlessly exploited and subjugated the poor peasant and working class as well as persecuted middle class liberals and progressives. Military dictatorships never hesitated in resorting to excessive violence, bloody purges and violation of human rights. “Death Squads” were formed to carry out kidnappings and assassinations, only to be confronted by radical revolutionary organizations that became active in the countryside, jungles, as well as inner cities.
Collapse of the USSR
The end of the Cold War marked by the collapse of the USSR brought down the logic on which the aforementioned “triple alliance” depended and flourished. Even the stance of the (Catholic) Church began to change; indeed, in many cases, the Church began to openly side with the poor against the military, monopolies and foreign interests defended and bankrolled by military dictators. Actually, even before the disintegration of the USSR “Revolutionary Theology” started to emerge in several countries like Colombia. Evangelical missionary activities by some Protestant groups, furthermore, antagonized the Catholic churches locally pushing them to cement their ties with their local poor population who became their incubators and protectors. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton seems to be in a very good shape in primaries campaign while Republican contenders sink in bottomless pit. A leading example was what happened in Nicaragua after the victory of leftist Sandinitas, where no less than three ministers in the Sandinistas’ first cabinet were Catholic priests. One of those was Father Miguel D’Escoto Brockmann, the foreign minister between 1979 and 1990, and president of the UN General Assembly between September 2008 and September 2009. Soon rightwing dictatorship began to fall throughout Latin America (especially in South America, and more so in countries with strong trade unions and educated, cultured and organized infrastructures, such as Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, as well as Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador. Given this fact, the ascendancy of the Left in South America is not surprising. It is now becoming the rule while the reign of the Right is the exception. In fact only two Latin South American countries, Colombia and Paraguay, are governed by right-wing governments.
Back in Argentina, outgoing President Fernandez de Kirchner is leaving office – after succeeding her late husband Nester Kirchner – only because constitutionally she is not allowed to serve a third term. However, she has handpicked and run the campaign of Daniel Scioli, the governor of Buenos Aires Province, and she considers his victory a victory of her moderate leftist line against Macri, the right-wing businessman Mayor of Buenos Aires, and president of the famous Boca Juniors Sports Club (for whose soccer team played the legendry Diego Maradona). Early opinion polls showed Scioli garnering around 39 percent of the votes against 30 percent for Macri with a good showing for the young third candidate Sergio Massa, a one-time ally of Kirchner. The issue (as per the much closer result later) would be decided by a second round run-off.
Petty bidding
Going with the tide Hillary Clinton emerged with flying colors from her Congress hearings on the Benghazi events of 2012, when she was secretary of state. Her impressive and confident performance greatly enhanced her status as the Democrats’ frontrunner for the November 2016 presidential elections.
Her position was further strengthened by Vice President Joe Biden’s announcement that he had withdrawn from the race, later joint out of the arena by Rhode Island former governor and senator Lincoln Chafee. This means the only candidates still challenging the former First Lady are Vermont’s senator Bernie Sanders and Maryland’s ex-governor Martin O’Malley; although there is a consensus that, now the clouds of Benghazi are vanished, neither is capable of stopping her bandwagon. In the words of veteran California Democratic Senator Dianne Feinstein, “Had somebody come to my home this morning and say, ‘You know, I think that put her in the White House’.”Such talk may sound like well-founded optimism from a leading Democrat; but what is beyond doubt is that the GOP candidates as so preoccupied with their petty bidding and extremist outbidding that they look unable to come up with a coherent policy presented as an alternative to Obama’s “non-politics”.

Children are at school to learn, not get beaten
Yara al-Wazir/Al Arabiya/October 31/15
It emerged this week that Egyptian child Bibawi Farajallah was beaten by his teacher after asking another pupil to move his head so he could see the blackboard that the teacher was writing on. The teacher used an electric wire to strike Farajallah 40 times. The child’s father recounted the barbaric act in an interview with Al Arabiya News. Schools are meant to represent a safe place for children to learn and develop. The evidence is overwhelming and saddening; A 20-year study in the Canadian Medical Journal Association indicated that corporal punishment is severely detrimental to a child’s cognitive development, and the effects last well into adulthood. It makes kids aggressive rather than teaching them self-control. A similar study based in Tanzania showed that 21% of children who had been subject to physical punishment showed aggression towards authority, as well as elevated levels of hyper-activity. Additionally, it affects the ability of a child to interact with members of their families, their moral and motivation, and how they view cultural values.
In Egypt, corporal punishment is actually banned. The statistics regarding how many young Arabs have been subject to corporal punishment at schools is sparse, but data from UNICEF and UNRWA suggests that it is in the millions. A school principal based in Saudi Arabia has described banning corporal punishment to be a “threat” to teachers. The authority and credibility of a teacher is not linked to whether or not the have the legal right to physically punish a child, and it must not be viewed that way. The credibility of a teacher is a function of their ability to educate a child. There are numerous effective alternatives for disciplining children
Understanding what it is they are seeking, using their first name, and communicating in a way that they can relate to are all methods that science (and practice) have proved successful in getting to the root cause of problematic behaviour. The key taking is to remain calm in order to communicate effectively and connect emotionally, rather than physically punish a child. These methods have been tried and tested and are a summary of what appears in numerous psychological journals and magazines. It is clearly insufficient to expect laws and decrees to be an effective method to combat corporal punishment in schools. Instead, there must be a behavioural change from both parents and teachers. Parents need to make a decision as to how they want their child to be raised, and what their definition of a successful school education is: is it a fearful child who has trouble with authority and believes violence is the only method to achieve discipline? Or is a successful school one where the child feels comfortable, motivated, and learns effectively? In order to make this decision, parents need to be informed of the impact that physical discipline may have on their child’s development. It is clearly insufficient to expect laws and decrees to be an effective method to combat corporal punishment in schools. Once the decision is made, it is their responsibility to lobby schools to respect the way in which they have chosen to raise their child. Parents are ultimately the main customers of the school, and once they pressure school management to take their children’s development as seriously as the school takes education, then their child can succeed.

Turkey After the Snap Elections: War Cabinet or Peace Cabinet?
Soner Cagaptay/The Washington Institute/October 31/15
If this weekend's results compel the AKP to form a coalition, its choice of partners could have very different implications for Turkish policy on the PKK, the Syrian Kurds, the fight against ISIS, and other issues.
In the June 7 elections, Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its thirteen-year legislative majority, winning only 258 seats in the 550-member parliament. The party is now hoping to restore that majority in a November 1 revote. Yet renewed conflict against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) could play a major role in shaping both the vote tallies and the resultant government.
On July 24, Turkish officials ended peace talks with the group after PKK members carried out execution-style murders of two off-duty police officers. Some polls suggest that the subsequent government crackdown has helped the AKP, boosting its Turkish nationalist credentials with voters. If the party regains its parliamentary majority this weekend, it will be in no small part due to the war against the PKK. Yet if the party fails to win a majority, it will have to form a coalition. In that case, one of two outcomes will likely emerge, with strikingly different consequences for the PKK fight and other issues: an AKP coalition with either the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) or the social-democratic Republican People's Party (CHP).
AKP-MHP COALITION: WAR CABINET
If the AKP joins forces with the MHP, it would bring nearly the entire spectrum of the political right together under one government for the first time in four decades. Such a coalition would be reminiscent of the 1970s-era National Front (Milli Cephe) governments formed by a coalition of center-right, Islamist, and nationalist parties, including the MHP and the National Salvation Party, the AKP's predecessor. Given its similarly strong (albeit completely right-wing) mandate, an AKP-MHP coalition would drive a socially conservative agenda on domestic issues and a nationalist agenda on foreign policy. And on the Kurdish issue, it would continue the war against the PKK while adopting a tougher posture against the group's Syrian franchise, the Democratic Union Party (PYD).
Since coming to power in 2002, the AKP has followed a foreign policy doctrine shaped by Islamist solidarity and autarkical Turkish nationalism. Typically, junior partners in Turkish coalition governments take the foreign affairs portfolio. If the MHP follows suit, its strong conservative-nationalist tendencies would keep it from posing a major challenge to the AKP's foreign policy line on most issues. As a Turkish nationalist party, however, the MHP has a deep interest in Turkic communities overseas and deep antipathy toward the PKK's cause, so it would likely insist on shaping policy in several specific cases, occasionally creating problems for the AKP.
Iraqi Turkmens. Since the rise of ISIS, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has taken over the multiethnic Iraqi city of Kirkuk to stave off a jihadist takeover. Thus far, Ankara's strong economic ties with the KRG and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's warm relations with its leader, Masoud Barzani, have tempered Turkish nationalist reactions to de facto Kurdish domination of the city and its large Turkmen population. Once in a coalition, however, the MHP would take issue with the situation, potentially undermining Turkish-KRG ties.
Ukraine. Russian occupation has left Crimea's indigenous Tatar community -- linguistic and historical kin of Anatolian Turks -- in harm's way. The MHP may not be able to force the AKP to dilute its intimate relationship with Moscow, which involves deep energy and commercial ties as well as personal rapport between Erdogan and President Vladimir Putin. Yet the MHP's persistent focus on Tatar suffering under the Russians would likely create bilateral problems that Erdogan would be forced to manage.
Syria. Since the beginning of the civil war next door, Turkey has followed a singular objective: ousting President Bashar al-Assad. This stance has eclipsed other concerns there, including the fate of Syria's 250,000 Turkmens. An AKP-MHP government would dedicate much more significant resources to helping that population and building them up as a fighting force. In fact, the MHP would likely insist on prioritizing the Turkmen issue over other aspects of Syria policy, including the fight against Assad and U.S.-Turkish cooperation against ISIS -- especially in cases where the party believes such efforts would disadvantage the Turkmens.
Kurdish-related problems with Washington. The MHP has long opposed the AKP's peace talks with the PKK, and it would use its leverage in a coalition cabinet to ensure that the talks do not resume. It would also take strong issue with U.S. assistance to the PYD, which has been fighting ISIS in Syria. The MHP views the PKK and PYD as essentially the same group; Turkey and the United States have both designated the PKK as a terrorist entity, but only Ankara has so designated the PYD. Continued cooperation with the Syrian Kurdish group -- even against ISIS -- could be a deal breaker for the MHP, potentially even forcing Erdogan to roil relations with Washington in order to maintain his governing coalition at home.
Massive Kurdish-liberal unrest. As a sine qua non for entering the coalition, the MHP would demand further escalation of the war against the PKK. Coupled with a potential anti-PYD policy in Syria, this stance would draw the ire of Kurdish nationalists in Turkey, sparking massive unrest in the predominantly Kurdish southeast as well as the larger cities, where liberal and leftist anti-AKP Turks could join in on the rallies. In fact, such unrest would be the most likely cause of an AKP-MHP government falling before the next election cycle. Deterioration of the Kurdish situation at home could in turn damage Ankara's ties with the KRG, which has been a unique mainstay of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP.
AKP-CHP COALITION: PEACE CABINET
Of the four parties likely to win entry into parliament on November 1, the CHP is the only faction that stands in the middle on the Kurdish issue, sharing neither the AKP/MHP's deep hostility toward Kurdish nationalism nor the close embrace of the Kurdish cause shown by the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP). In a coalition with the AKP, the CHP would insist on ending hostilities with the PKK and turning back to the peace talks. It would also push for further Kurdish cultural rights within a broader agenda of more rights for all citizens, reflecting its efforts to become a social democratic liberal movement. Given the party's unique position between two nationalist extremes, a CHP coalition could help bring the country's Turkish and Kurdish parts together politically. Such a coalition would also bring the country's two largest opposing political blocs under one government, helping defuse political tensions.
Less involvement in Syria. The CHP has long taken issue with the AKP's active support of Syrian rebels. If it were to gain the Foreign Ministry portfolio in a coalition government, it would no doubt downgrade this support and scale down Turkey's overall involvement in Syria, thereby bringing Ankara's policy closer to Washington's. Scrutinizing and potentially ending Turkish support to rebels in northwestern Syria would also bring Ankara somewhat closer to Russia, whose ongoing military intervention has centered on rebels in that part of the country. In addition, a CHP-led Foreign Ministry might open communication channels with the Assad regime, in line with the current international initiative to find a negotiated solution to the war.
Pivoting toward NATO. Under a CHP foreign minister, Turkey would gradually turn back to its traditional foreign policy partners, including NATO. Kemal Kirisci of the Brookings Institution has likened this potential shift to a giant tanker slowly changing course. Given Turkey's preoccupation with the Middle East under the AKP, any reorientation toward NATO would be gradual and would require support from Turkey's allies in Washington.
Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family Fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute, and author of The Rise of Turkey: The Twenty-First Century's First Muslim Power (Potomac), named by the Foreign Policy Association as one of the ten most important books of 2014.

Russia in Southern Syria: Israeli and Jordanian Concerns
Nadav Pollak/The Washington Institute/October 31/15
New Russian airstrikes in the south could portend a wider regime, Hezbollah, and Iranian ground campaign there, potentially violating Israel's Golan redline and exacerbating Jordan's refugee problems.
On October 28, for the first time since Moscow began its air campaign in Syria, Russian jets reportedly targeted rebel forces in the south. The strikes focused on Tal Harra -- which is less than twelve miles from the Israeli border -- and other locations in Deraa province. Such operations raise concerns in Israel and Jordan and will likely test Russia's relations with both countries. The strikes should not come as a surprise, however. Over the past few weeks, Russia's statements, diplomatic maneuvers, and battle dynamics have suggested that its plans may expand to other areas, including the south.
RUSSIAN STATEMENTS
On October 23, during the annual meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club -- a premier forum that gives participants rare private access to Russian officials -- President Vladimir Putin and other figures spoke about the Kremlin's strategy in Syria. According to a memo issued by the Eurasia Group, some of these Russian elites indicated that the intervention will extend to the south. They added that the Syrian army, Hezbollah, Iranian forces, and various Shiite militias will serve as the boots on the ground for the entire intervention, supported by Russian airstrikes. So far, Russian and allied offensives have focused on northern and central Syria, but Wednesday's strikes indicate they may now be turning more attention to the south.
SOUTHWARD GROUND ADVANCES
In mid-October, the Syrian army, Hezbollah reinforcements, and local militias loyal to the regime turned back a rebel offensive in the southern province of Quneitra. Hezbollah reportedly contributed around 500 fighters to the battle, helping the regime take back the Tal al-Ahmar height, the so-called "UN Hill," and other important posts that could help Bashar al-Assad's forces expand their hold in the area. It is not yet clear whether the army will take advantage of this momentum and push forward in Quneitra or simply maintain the current situation.
In the regime's view, severing logistical and operational links between rebels in the south and those in the Damascus suburbs is crucial to defending the capital. Some reports indicate that the regime is already concentrating forces for a renewed offensive in the south. If the army decides to push forward, it might ask for increased Russian air support. The Syrian air force has operated in the south before, but it has been hesitant to execute airstrikes near the Israeli border since September 2014, when one of its fighter jets was shot down after crossing into Israeli airspace. Requesting Russian airstrikes is a smart move, as Damascus probably assumes that Israel will not challenge the Russian air force.
DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERS
On October 24, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced that Russia will coordinate its military operations with Jordan, including airstrikes. If Moscow is in fact planning to expand its air campaign in the south, establishing coordination with Amman was a necessary step. For the Assad regime, the southern border province of Deraa is where the rebellion began, so regaining control over this area would symbolize strength and a return to stability. To reach that goal, Assad and his allies will have to weaken the southern rebels, which requires a firmer hold on the border crossings with Jordan.
In early 2015, regime forces partnered with Hezbollah, Iranian, and Shiite militia personnel to execute a surprise offensive in northwestern Deraa, demonstrating how much they value this area. Yet according to a September report by the International Crisis Group, the offensive ended in March with no significant gains. On October 29, a Lebanese newspaper close to Hezbollah wrote that the Syrian army is planning a new offensive in the area, and that the latest airstrikes are part of this operation.
Deraa and its surroundings are also of great importance to Jordan, as anything that happens in that area can affect border security and the flow of refugees into the kingdom. Jordan is reportedly supporting the opposition there in an advise-and-equip capacity, mainly through the Military Operations Command (MOC) in Amman, which is helping the rebels with weapons and planning operations.
RAMIFICATIONS FOR ISRAEL AND JORDAN
For Israel, sustained Russian air activity near its border would be a worrisome signal. If Hezbollah and Iran use Russian air cover to move closer to the border, they will cross one of Israel's redlines. Earlier this year, Israel reportedly targeted Hezbollah and Iranian commanders in the Golan Heights for that reason. Jerusalem has conveyed this and other redlines to the Russians more than once, so any further Hezbollah/Iranian challenges in the Golan would greatly test Israeli-Russian coordination. They would also test Russian-Iranian relations -- on the one hand, Moscow does not want to aggravate Israel by facilitating Iranian provocations, but on the other hand, it needs Iranian boots on the ground to fight the rebels.
As for Jordan, a more intense air campaign in Deraa could further increase the cross-border refugee flow. Since Russia and the Assad regime began their offensive in the north, more than 120,000 civilians have reportedly left their homes to escape the fighting. If this is any indicator of what can happen in Deraa, Jordan should be worried. The kingdom is already struggling under the financial and infrastructure pressures of helping the hundreds of thousands of refugees in its territory, and if many more arrive, its ability to help them would be limited.
Jordan and Israel also want to keep the extremist factions in southern Syria at bay. They have managed to do so thus far, but a greater Russia and regime presence in the south might change that. As other analysts have pointed out, the Russian intervention in the north is already pushing more moderate factions into the hands of extremist groups such as al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, and there is no reason to believe that the dynamics in the south would be different. Moderate southern rebels have cooperated with Jabhat al-Nusra in the past, so they already share operational linkages. If these rebels come to believe that they are alone in fighting the regime and Russia, at least some of them would likely strengthen their relations with Jabhat al-Nusra or other extremists, especially now that Jordan has apparently agreed to coordinate with Moscow. A weakened moderate front and a strengthened extremist front would pose a clear threat to Israel and Jordan.
WHAT ARE JORDAN AND ISRAEL'S OPTIONS?
Although neither country has many options for keeping the Russian air force out of the south, Israel could reiterate to Moscow that it will take action if Hezbollah or Iranian elements join any ground offensive close to the border. It is still a big question whether Israel would actually strike if Russian forces are in the area, but restating its oft-repeated redline could give Moscow pause about enabling an Iranian/Hezbollah front in the Golan.
If Hezbollah, other Iranian proxies, or Syrian forces do move closer to the border, Israel could use ground fire against them, including artillery or tanks. It could also use standoff weapons from its airspace. Yet both options are risky because they could escalate the situation with any Russian forces operating in the area. Unexpected errors tend to happen in combat situations -- whether it is Israeli artillery rounds interfering with Russian close air support, a human error leading to target misidentification, or similar problems, the probability of friction between Israel and Russia would increase.
Given their limited options, Amman and Jerusalem should express their concerns to their close ally, the United States, who can in turn convey them to Moscow. Jordan and Israel both have strong militaries, but they are not in the same league as Russia's. The only country currently involved in the Syrian quagmire that can guarantee their interests is the United States.
CONCLUSION
For now, southern Syria is not a top priority for Russia and its coalition of ground forces, as intense battles are ongoing in Aleppo, Hama, and other places to the north. Yet the south may be part of Russia's broader strategy, and it could still allocate some resources to the area even while occupied elsewhere. If this week's southern airstrikes lead to expanded Russian, regime, and allied activity there, it would test Moscow's complicated relations with Israel, Jordan, Iran, and Hezbollah. To forestall or manage such escalation, Jerusalem and Amman should ask Washington to make sure that Russia takes their interests into account, particularly regarding Iranian and Hezbollah operations near the borders.
Nadav Pollak is the Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation Fellow at The Washington Institute.

Obama Administration Moves Cautiously Ahead on Geneva-3
Middle East Briefing/October 31/15
shutterstock_250391155Following the Oct. 23 four-way talks in Vienna, Austria between the foreign ministers of Russia, the United States, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, the Obama Administration is moving cautiously forward on the creation of a platform for talks to end the Syrian war. While the initial meeting in Vienna did not achieve any breakthroughs, Secretary of State John Kerry reported back to Washington that the meeting set the basis for follow-up talks, which could be expanded to include other key regional players, including Jordan, Egypt and Iran. One of the factors leading to Kerry’s cautiously optimistic report was the Russian acknowledgement that they made a “colossal mistake” by attacking Free Syrian Army forces during the initial phase of their bombing campaign, which began Sept. 30. While the Russians offered not-credible excuses, including that they were ignorant of the fault lines among the Syrian rebel forces, and that they were relying on the Syrian government for targeting intelligence, Kerry nevertheless concluded that Russia was prepared to make adjustments to their combat operations.
Kerry had told Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that no transitional government could be formed in Syria without the involvement of the Free Syrian Army, which is comprised exclusively of Syrian nationals, the vast majority of whom defected from the Syrian Army.
The Pentagon has concluded that the Russian Air Force is running up against significant fighter plane maintenance problems, due to the heavy load of sorties and the difficult climate conditions in the area. A Pentagon spokesman confirmed that the US is aware of such Russian problems, but said that they are common for such deployments and are not different than difficulties that the US Air Force has encountered in Iraq. However, the maintenance challenges have not, according to the Pentagon, reduced the number of Russian sorties carried out in Syria in the past week.
Secretary of State Kerry, for the time being, has the White House backing as he further pursues the diplomatic track with Lavrov. Obama has been justifiably criticized for his failure to devise a Syria policy; however, Kerry has concluded that there are three areas of possible common interest with Moscow: The defeat of ISIS, the political negotiation for a transitional government and the eventual departure of Bashar Assad, and the maintaining of Syria’s territorial integrity. Kerry believes that Turkey will support those three principles, largely because Syrian territorial integrity means that the US and Russia will oppose any moves to create an independent Kurdish state on Syrian, Turkish and Iraqi territory. Kurdish forces in northern Syria are engaging in ethnic cleansing of Sunnis, and this is driving Turkey to consider taking military action to prevent any Kurdish moves to independence. Any such eruption, the Obama Administration believes, would lead to chaos. For the time being, Russian President Vladimir Putin sees a benefit to dealing primarily with the US, despite his well-known frictional relationship with President Obama. Russia does not want to bring the Europeans into the negotiations at this point, because the American-Russian bilateral work is tantamount to the US accepting a “G-2” process, led by Washington and Moscow. This, in Putin’s view, assures that Russia has a say in the future of Syria. The next step in the very preliminary process is to secure Saudi acceptance of the two cardinal principles of talks: A unity government and territorial integrity. Kerry believes that Saudi Arabia is tied up in Yemen and will accede to the initial phase of the Geneva-3 effort. Iran, however, poses a much greater challenge for any successful Geneva-3 process. Already, Iran is slowing down its compliance with the P5+1 agreements, and the Obama Administration is reading this as a consequence of an as-yet unresolved factional dispute within the Iranian leadership. Ultimately, for any Geneva-3 process to actually get off the ground—and that still remains a long way off—Iran will have to be included, and will have to be willing to make some serious concessions, including the ultimate departure of Assad.

Assad as a Bargaining Chip
Middle East Briefing/October 31/15
assadThe Russian movie in Syria had one star: Time. And the role of this star was a difficult one. Time was a good guy to a certain point after which it would turn into an increasingly bad guy. The producer, Mr. Putin, needed enough time to strengthen Assad and the Iranians in Syria. But he was aware that he should not be dragged for a long time into the Syrian quagmire. Therefore, the role of time had to be dosed carefully by the producer to avoid turning it from an ally to an enemy. But the moment Mr. Putin was writing the plot of his story in Syria, he was also unintentionally writing his competitors’. For it was simple for those competitors to reverse the order of Putin’s designed role for time to undo the whole Russian plot. The strategic fault of Mr. Putin’s move was in that this move’s calculations turned to be its main weakness. Putin based his decision to interfere on several factors: Europe’s sense of the emergency of the refugee crisis which was turning rapidly into a domestic political issue – Russia’s policy to strengthen relations with Tehran and preserve Assad as they are the only allies left in the Middle East – the US reluctance to do anything meaningful related to Syria and the rise of ISIL which caused a tide of global public opinion calling for actions to stop its horrendous atrocities, which was to be the main asset in Russia’s support.
Yet, the Russian President knew that the allowed time and altitude of his operation in Syria is limited due to the nature of the situation there and to the limits of Russian power. Syria is different than Ukraine in many aspects and the Arabs were determined to confront the Russian intervention with all possible means as it was obvious to all that such intervention enhances Iran’s role there. Furthermore, the Russian intervention meant that the refugee crisis will be extended and the West was running out of patience with Putin’s heavy-handed surprises. As Putin was reading the pluses and minuses of his bold script so were all the other parties. It took only few days to decode it. Furthermore, the Russian president believed he could cast his intervention in an anti-ISIL context to prevent his adversaries from limiting his space even more. But his forces targeted non-ISIL groups in a sign of lack of sensitivity to the tactical environment of the Russian move in Moscow’s strategic quarters.
The counter-tactic was almost easy to devise. It was sufficient for all to focus for enough time on the fact that Russia was targeting non-ISIL opposition groups in order to dismantle Putin’s attempt to sideline his adversaries by casting his move as an anti-terror measure. Moreover, the amount of arms given to the non-ISIL opposition groups in a matter of few weeks, following the Russian intervention, was substantial in both quality and quantity. But the most important element in the picture that led to reducing Mr. Putin’s maneuverability was the fact that the Syrian army could not build a coherent counter offensive using Russia’s brutal air campaign. The picture was getting even clearer when it became obvious that the Russian leader’s space is indeed very limited: The Europeans did not move actively to support his intervention, the Arabs were quick to respond by arming more opposition groups and the US hardened its political stand all the while leaving a pass out to Moscow.
So far, the Russian movie in Syria was turning in the opposite direction of the original script approved by the producer. Therefore, a quick move was warranted. And this is what we see now. The meetings between the main players in Vienna are signs that if the Russian move had any benefit at all, it energized the international community to end Syria’s civil war. Yet, two issues are emerging as pivotal, one is a negotiating chip and the other is related to the essence of the crisis. The first is Assad’s political fate. As the Syrian President is already consumed and have largely exceeded his shelf value, he is used today as a mere stick that could be put on the wheels of any proposed solution if those wheels were to go in an unfavorable direction to Iranian and Russian objectives. Those objectives represent the second issue which is related to the essence of the crisis. Before the Russian intervention in Syria, Moscow’s leverage in the crisis was minimal. The deal between Tehran and Putin was something like the following scenario: Iran says: We will both lose if the Arabs won Syria. Your presence in the west coast of the country will be decided by pro-West forces and our presence will certainly be terminated. Let us work together towards an end game that preserves the core of our interests there. Russia says: Even if the price is to sacrifice Assad at one point down the road? Iran says: the guy is already consumed and exhausted. Even the Alawi community does not want him. He could be used as a barraging chip to reach our ends. But you would have to go to Syria to get at least this result or at most a good portion of Syria.
And we are at this particular moment when Assad will not be dropped from calculations unless Russia and Iran gets at least their minimum objectives. These objectives are summarized in one single word: Presence. In fact, Assad will be artificially inflated by all possible tricks including this empty tactical insistence that he remains and sending more Iranian and Russia forces to Syria. The Arab position, however, is hardening in the opposite sense. No deal with Assad, and even if Assad is out, no Iranian presence in Syria will be tolerated. Usually, the current configuration leads to an escalation on the ground before the final sessions of the talks. But this escalation would certainly have a negative impact on these final sessions due to the fact that the Syrian crisis has the Syrian Sunni population, which will be suffering even more, as a genuine part of the picture. The only way to go around this is to intensely the talks and shorten their period as much as possible. No one can predict with any certainty the outcome of this bad movie which currently has more than one script and one producer. Yet, we seem to be inching towards the moment when we can tell with more confidence how it will end. What should be hoped for in the current moment is two things: 1) Short talks-and that will not be achieved without the continuation of the current international engagement. 2) Turning Syria into a starting point for a kind of regional modus vivendi which should reduce regional tension to a manageable level.

Iran’s Continuing Missteps Jeopardize Geneva-3 Chances
Middle East Briefing/October 31/15
jawadIran watchers took note on Oct. 22 that when Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed the annual Valdai Club forum in the Black Sea resort Sochi, a top Iranian official was seated on the podium. It was not Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, but was Speaker of the Majlis Ali Larijani. After Zarif’s pivotal role in the successful conclusion of the P5+1 agreement, it would have been logical for him to be representing the Iranian Republic at the prestigious Russian forum. But since Oct. 7, Zarif has been grounded by Supreme Leader Khamenei, barred from further communications with US Secretary of State John Kerry, in particular. Larijani’s presence was the latest signal that hard-line factions were making their move in Tehran. Larijani is widely viewed in Washington as a centrist, who is one of the prime Iranian channels to the Russians for President Hassan Rouhani. When Putin needs to get a direct message to the Iranian Supreme Leader, he works through General Qasem Solemani, the head of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Secretary of State John Kerry has taken careful note of the shifting factional tide in Tehran. The country is heading into crucial Majlis elections in February 2016, and already, the Guardian Council has taken some steps aimed at improving the chances of a conservative victory. They decreed recently that current members of the Majlis are not automatically vetted to run in February. The 12 clerics who make up the Guardian Council have absolute control over who is certified to run. The February elections will also choose the 80 members of the Assembly of Experts, the body that chooses the next Supreme Leader, when Ali Khamenei either dies or steps down.  Kerry’s worry, going into the start of a new diplomatic effort to end the four-and-a-half year Syrian war, is that he is not certain of who would be designated to head an Iranian delegation to the talks, which began on Oct. 23 with a meeting in Vienna, Austria between the United States, Russia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia at the ministerial level. He also knows that Iran has been adamant that Bashar Assad must remain in power indefinitely. If Iran does not alter that position, no talks can proceed. Iranian military advisors in Syria have also presented an overly optimistic picture of the state of the war, since the Russian bombing campaign began Sept. 30. As the result, Assad has tended to dig in his heels further.
Kerry understands that Russia and Iran will be key to any successful Geneva-3 effort, and he worries that if the wrong Iranians are doing the negotiating, the process will collapse before it gets off the ground.  Washington is also concerned that the Iranians have already misread the situation in Iraq, as well as in Syria. For a long time Tehran was fully prepared to go along with a partitioning of Iraq, knowing that the Shia area in the south is the center of Iraq’s vast oil and gas deposits. They envisioned an oil deprived Sunni entity in the north of Iraq as another Yemen, with few resources to develop. The split between Iranian and Iraqi Shia clerics is also intensifying, in the context of Iran’s recruiting of Iraqi volunteers to go fight in Syria against the Islamic State, the Nusra Front and other rebel forces. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani has criticized the deployment of Iraqi Shia to Syria, while the Islamic State continues to control significant parts of Iraq. And he has called on Prime Minister Abadi to crack down on corruption, including the estimated $20-35 million a month in Iraqi oil revenues that go directly to the Iranian Quds Force, on orders from the ruling Dawa Party. The efforts to achieve a Geneva-3 breakthrough are far more complex than the P5+1 negotiation on Iran’s nuclear program. If any of the parties to the process maintain an inflexible hard line, the whole effort can fall apart. Kerry does not have the option of waiting until after the Majlis elections to proceed with bringing Iran into the talks. By that time, US presidential elections will be in full swing, and Kerry knows that whoever is elected President in November 2016 will take a much more hard line against Russia and Iran (and China). Kerry is convinced that the last best chance for achieving a diplomatic solution to the Syria tragedy is in the next 12 months.

The Need for a New Iran Containment Policy
Middle East Briefing/October 31/15
iranFollowing the debate in Tehran about the regional crisis, we find out that the favorable game of balancing different and opposed blocks is currently the one most important factor that shapes Tehran’s regional policy. The powerful faction of the “arm of the revolution”, that is the Revolutionary Guards Corps (RGC), is obviously enjoying a good day in spite of some skepticism expressed by its leaders following the conclusion of the nuclear talks. Assisted by the conservative wing of Iran’s body politic of apocalyptic fanatics, it is evident now that the region and the US together have to pay for the error of separating the nuclear deal and its strategic context. Rhetoric apart, the nuclear deal in itself may not be objectionable. The point here is that it was not supplemented to a comprehensive strategy to check an Iran free of sanction, which many global powers try to gain favor with. This obviously creates considerable problems in the Middle East. The choice was not easy-either a nuclear Iran under intense international pressure to wreak havoc in its region or a non-nuclear Iran, more self-confident and more powerful free to also wreak havoc in the region. The common factor in both scenarios is Tehran’s behavior. That suggests that a new containment policy should be devised to limit Iran’s destructive role in the Middle East. This “new containment policy” must respect the nuclear deal, as it is now a fait accompli either we like it or not. Yet, there are many other aspects in Tehran’s behavior that, if done by any other nation on earth, require a response.
Signaling to the Iranians the deserved rejection of its regional policies, support for terrorism and political oppression is one way to get Tehran to debate the value of its current course. The Obama administration seems to have contented itself with signing the nuclear deal as the “major accomplishment in foreign policy” but without devising a strategy for the post nuclear deal Iran. As usual, we have seen an administration more focused on domestic politics, spinning, rhetoric and a miserable poverty of strategic thinking. In the optics, the President may gain time promising Mr. Putin with a quagmire in Syria or talking Abadi away from inviting the Russians to Iraq. Yet, this is reactive. It is not a strategy. Furthermore, wishing the Russians a quagmire in Syria is simply insane. It is anger at self but misplaced. We know it is not easy. Yet, it is abundantly clear that Iran, which has just showed the world its utter carelessness for the UN and even the nuclear agreement when it tested ballistic missiles, is not intent on behaving responsibly in its collapsing region. If the US asks regional power not to seek nuclear weapons, which it correctly does, it should be willing to provide the alternative.
And if the US is sincere in fighting terrorism, it has to address at least its direct reasons and make a serious effort to fight it.
Time is now to discuss a new containment policy to prevent Iran from behaving imputatively in the Middle East. But such a policy should be drawn only after trying otherwise to influence Iran’s behavior. While we strongly believe that the balance of political power inside Iran is left without any serious attempt to influence it, pushing forward a project of regional security forum must come parallel with an open conversation in Washington, particularly in the Congress, about this new containment policy. If serious enough, this should be reflected on the debate in Tehran, where the moderates do not receive any assistance, while the “arm of the revolution” and the fanatics mock the international community in a moment marked by greedy day dreaming and shortsighted political goals. President Obama’s Middle East policy was, in a sense, a continuation of President Bush’s. Both spread the seeds of chaos each on his own way. And both paved the road for authoritarianism and violence, not for democracy and peace. It is too much for the US to weather 16 consecutive years of catastrophic policy of the kind we witnessed. But it is even more so for a region that cannot yet rid itself of its demons and embarrass its future.