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LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
June 19/15

http://www.eliasbejjaninews.com/newsbulletins05/english.june19.15.htm

Bible Quotation For Today/If you love me, you will keep my commandments. And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Advocate, to be with you for ever
John 14/15-26: "‘If you love me, you will keep my commandments. And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Advocate, to be with you for ever. This is the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it neither sees him nor knows him. You know him, because he abides with you, and he will be in you. ‘I will not leave you orphaned; I am coming to you. In a little while the world will no longer see me, but you will see me; because I live, you also will live. On that day you will know that I am in my Father, and you in me, and I in you. They who have my commandments and keep them are those who love me; and those who love me will be loved by my Father, and I will love them and reveal myself to them.’Judas (not Iscariot) said to him, ‘Lord, how is it that you will reveal yourself to us, and not to the world?’Jesus answered him, ‘Those who love me will keep my word, and my Father will love them, and we will come to them and make our home with them. Whoever does not love me does not keep my words; and the word that you hear is not mine, but is from the Father who sent me. ‘I have said these things to you while I am still with you. But the Advocate, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, will teach you everything, and remind you of all that I have said to you."

Bible Quotation For Today/ You are no longer strangers and aliens, but you are citizens with the saints and also members of the household of God.
Letter to the Ephesians 02/11-21: "Remember that at one time you Gentiles by birth, called ‘the uncircumcision’ by those who are called ‘the circumcision’ a physical circumcision made in the flesh by human hands remember that you were at that time without Christ, being aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers to the covenants of promise, having no hope and without God in the world. But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far off have been brought near by the blood of Christ. For he is our peace; in his flesh he has made both groups into one and has broken down the dividing wall, that is, the hostility between us. He has abolished the law with its commandments and ordinances, so that he might create in himself one new humanity in place of the two, thus making peace, and might reconcile both groups to God in one body through the cross, thus putting to death that hostility through it. So he came and proclaimed peace to you who were far off and peace to those who were near; for through him both of us have access in one Spirit to the Father. So then you are no longer strangers and aliens, but you are citizens with the saints and also members of the household of God, built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, with Christ Jesus himself as the cornerstone. In him the whole structure is joined together and grows into a holy temple in the Lord;"

Latest analysis, editorials from miscellaneous sources published on June 18-19/15
Might Israel inspire an Alawite state/Michael Young/The Daily Star/June 18/15
How to Make Sure Iran's One-Year Nuclear Breakout Time Does Not Shrink/Olli Heinonen and Simon Henderson/Washington Institute/June 18/15
Why Lebanon’s Sunnis Support ISIS Dateline/Hilal Khashan/Middle East Quarterly/Middle East Forum/June 18/15
Riyadh Looks to Moscow/Simon Henderson/Washington Institute/June 18/15
Does CAIR Represent American Muslims/Johanna Markind/PJ Media/June 18/15
Blood leads to blood/The Daily Star/June 18/15
When Iran lost Arab media support/Abdulrahman al-Rashed/Al Arabiya/June 18/15
Donald Trump gives Hillary Clinton a lot to smile about/Joyce Karam/Al Arabiya/June 18/15
Air strikes mask U.S. strategic failure against ISIS/Chris Doyle/Al Arabiya/June 18/15
Yemen’s least bad option/Manuel Almeida/Al Arabiya/June 18/15

Miscellaneous Reports And News published on June 18-19/15
Rebels surround Druze village in Syria’s Golan
Tens of thousands in dire need of basic services in Syrian town'
ICRC aid reaches isolated Syrian town near Damascus, conditions 'dire'
Canada's FM Statement on Ramadan
Iraq denies ISIS claim it shot down fighter plane
Saddam’s army is secret of Baghdadi’s success
Melee erupts at Yemen peace talks, underscoring rifts
Obama praises pope's 'clear and powerful' message on climate
Suspect Held after 9 Killed at U.S. Black Church, Obama Slams 'Senseless' Attack
Obama: US needs to address gun violence after shooting
Hillary Clinton: U.S. must face 'hard truths' after South Carolina shooting
US Senate passes annual defense policy bill, veto threatened
Redesigned $10 US bill to feature a woman, democracy
Euro zone sets emergency summit on Greece as money flees
Fire guts Galilee church, arson suspected'
Morsi Appeals Protesters Jail Sentence
Bahrain Seizes Explosives Says Linked to Iraq, Iran
Rights group slams UK PM over Sisi invite
Obama sends ‘warmest’ Ramadan greetings to Muslims
Palestinians to submit first file to ICC next week
Private detective says whistleblower has revealed MH17 crash details
Rebel fire kills 8 in Syria’s Aleppo: Monitor
Charleston shooting suspect Dylann Roof arrested: police

Jehad Watch Latest Reports And News
Is What’s To Come In Syria Still Unsure?
Ramadan begins in Yemen: Islamic State murders 31 with bombs at Shi’ite mosques
New York: Muslim in Islamic State jihad plot tries to stab an FBI agent
Islamic State doctor: “I made a very well-educated and calculated decision to come here”
Islamic State in Nigeria murders 23 in jihad attacks on Chad police
Trinidad: Muslim convicts screaming “Allahu akbar” attack guards
Video: Talkin’ ’bout my Sharia generation
That Imaginary War Room
Clear Channel runs ad praising Muhammad, refuses ad criticizing Muhammad
Muslim clerics: Those who insult Muhammad have “no right to live”

Synod of Maronite Bishops Calls for 'Lebanonizing' Presidential Elections
Naharnet/June 18, 2015/Maronite bishops concluded on Thursday their four-day synod by urging political powers to overcome their disputes and work towards filling the vacuum in the presidency. They said in their closing statement: “We should 'Lebanonize' the polls and elect a new head of state.”They called on lawmakers to head to parliament and perform their national duty. “The elections are not restricted to Christians, but the whole of Lebanon is concerned with the presidency,” they declared. Moreover, the bishops called on “friendly countries” to support Lebanon to end its crisis. They also hailed the dialogue between the Free Patriotic Movement and Lebanese Forces and the talks between Hizbullah and the Mustaqbal Movement. Maronite Patriarch Beshara al-Rahi later held a mass to mark the end of the Synod. He reiterated before the congregation the need for political foes to resolve their differences, urging them to “assume their historic responsibilities and for MPs to elect a president.”“We must sit together, hold frank talks, and reach a reconciliation,” he added. Officials should not abuse their authority for obstructing state functioning, stressed al-Rahi. Lebanon has been without a president since May 2014 when the term of Michel Suleiman ended without the election of a successor. Ongoing disputes between the rival March 8 and 14 camps over a compromise candidate have thwarted the polls. Hizbullah's Loyalty to the Resistance and MP Michel Aoun's Change and Reform blocs have been boycotting electoral sessions over the dispute.

Al-Rahi, Archbishop of Milan to Visit Erbil on Friday
Naharnet//June 18, 2015/Maronite Patriarch Beshara al-Rahi is scheduled to travel to the Iraqi Kurdish region of Erbil on Friday to follow up the situation of Christians who have been displaced as a result of the Islamic State group's onslaught.Al-Joumhouria daily said that al-Rahi will be accompanied during the one-day visit by the Archbishop of Milan, Cardinal Angelo Scola, who arrived in Beirut on Wednesday, and several members of the Lebanese Council of Maronite Bishops. The newspaper quoted Bkirki sources as saying that when al-Rahi informed the Vatican about his plan to visit Erbil, church officials sent Scola as an envoy to accompany the Maronite patriarch. Their trip is aimed at stressing to the Christians in the region the Vatican's interest in solving the problems they are facing, said the sources.Al-Rahi and Scola are scheduled to meet with top officials in Erbil and the heads of Christian churches, they added. The patriarch last visited Erbil in August 2014.

Release of Hostages Reportedly Awaits Qatar's 'Ransom Payment'
Naharnet/June 18, 2015/The release of the Lebanese servicemen taken hostage by jihadists last year is awaiting Qatar's payment of a ransom, which is part of the prisoner exchange deal, al-Akhbar daily reported on Thursday. The newspaper quoted ministerial sources as saying that the release of the hostages hinged on the payment of “huge amounts of money to the terrorists as part of the deal.” The Islamic State group and al-Nusra Front took the soldiers and policemen hostage when they overran the northeastern border town of Arsal in August last year. While the negotiations carried out by an envoy from Qatar with al-Nusra Front have made progress, the talks with the IS have hit a standstill over their crippling demands. But there have been claims in the past two days that the IS is ready to restart the negotiations. Al-Nusra Front has reportedly said it would release the servicemen in its captivity in return for freeing around 16 Islamists from Lebanon’s Roumieh prison. The procrastination in the prisoner exchange and the paralysis in the talks with the IS have angered the relatives of the hostages, who on Tuesday blocked the Qalamoun highway which is a vital link between Tripoli and Beirut. Several family members talked to al-Mustaqbal daily published on Thursday about their suffering. They hoped that the so-called crisis cell headed by Prime Minister Tammam Salam would exert more efforts during the holy month of Ramadan to bring back their loved ones home. The relatives also criticized the policy adopted by the Lebanese authorities on not divulging any information on the case.

Report: Riyadh Makes Official Request to Freeze French Arms Delivery
Naharnet/June 18, 2015/Saudi Arabia has asked French authorities to freeze the delivery of weapons to the Lebanese army under a Saudi grant, As Safir daily reported on Thursday. The newspaper quoted informed French sources as saying that Paris received an official message from Riyadh in May asking it to freeze the delivery of the rest of the arms. The letter also requested France not to inform Lebanese authorities about the decision to freeze the delivery, they said. The Lebanese army received the first batch of weapons, including Milan anti-tank missiles, under the $3 billion Saudi grant in April. Thursday's report came a day after the same newspaper said that the are dysfunctional. But the military was quick to deny the report. It said in a communicate on Wednesday that the missiles “have no technical or production malfunction.” The army also urged the media to be accurate in dealing with any information relating to the military.

Salam: To endure, Lebanon needs a president
Hussein Dakroub/he Daily Star/ June 18, 2015/BEIRUT: Prime Minister Tammam Salam Wednesday lamented Parliament’s repeated failure to elect a president for more than a year, warning that a country without a head would not endure. Wrapping up a one-day official visit to Cairo during which he held talks with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi and Prime Minister Ibrahim Mahlab, Salam said the election of a president would bolster Lebanon’s immunity against security challenges the country is facing as a result of the 4-year-old war in Syria. Speaker Nabih Berri, meanwhile, called for the resumption of Cabinet and Parliament sessions to help the country overcome its deepening crisis as the executive and legislative branches of power have been paralyzed by political differences. “With our democratic system in Lebanon, there is room for differences. Sometimes, this room reaches [the level of] of obstruction. This is not comforting or useful” Salam told a joint press conference with Mahlab in Cairo. “All parties must realize that a country without a head will not endure. There is a coalition government trying today to temporarily fill the [presidential] vacuum. But we always insist on the call for the election [of a president] so that Lebanon can complete its immunity and strength,” said Salam who returned to Beirut Wednesday night.
Parliament failed on June 3, in its 24th consecutive session since April last year, to elect a president over a lack of quorum, prompting Berri to schedule a new session for June 24. Lawmakers from MP Michel Aoun’s bloc, Hezbollah’s bloc and its March 8 allies have been blamed for thwarting a quorum by consistently boycotting Parliament sessions. Salam’s talks with Sisi covered developments in the region, including the war in Syria and helping Lebanon cope with its repercussions, particularly the presence of more than a million Syrian refugees, the state-run National News Agency reported.
During the meeting with Salam, which was also attended by Mahlab, Sisi stressed Egypt’s position which supported a political solution to the Syrian crisis with priority to preserving the Syrian state, the NNA said.
It added that the talks also touched on the Lebanese presidential election crisis, with Sisi restating the Egyptian position that calls for the election of a president as soon as possible to achieve stability in Lebanon.
Salam and Sisi also discussed the issue of terrorism. The Egyptian president stressed the need for supporting Lebanon and its army in its war against terrorism and reiterated Cairo’s position, which called for forging an Arab strategy to fight terror and halt arms supplies and money to terrorist organizations, the NNA said.“The issue of terrorism is our main concern. We are working on a long-term objective to encourage moderation in our amidst, our peoples, our faith and our actions in order to be able to fight extremism and terrorism,” Salam said. He added that he discussed with Mahlab cooperation between the two countries in tourism, agriculture and energy.
Salam, who was accompanied by the of tourism, agriculture and energy and water ministers, also met with the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar Mohammad Ahmad al-Tayeb, after which Salam praised the latter for his moderate religious speech in light of the rise of extremism in the region. He also held talks with Arab League chief Nabil Elaraby. In Beirut, Berri called for Cabinet and Parliament to resume their meetings and warned of the consequences entailed by the policy of obstructing the role of the executive and legislative branches of power.
“We must not stay in this situation amid these difficult circumstances we are facing at all levels,” he was quoted as saying by lawmakers during his weekly meeting with MPs at his Ain al-Tineh residence. “What is required is a return to the reactivation of [state] institutions, starting with Parliament and the government.” Besides the yearlong presidential vacuum and Parliament’s inability to meet over a lack of quorum either to elect a president or approve urgent draft laws, Cabinet was thrown into paralysis earlier this month over the thorny issue of security and military appointments, prompting Salam to suspend sessions.
Backed by their allies in Hezbollah, the Marada Movement and the Tashnag Party, the ministers of Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement have said they would not allow the Cabinet to discuss any topic before it addresses appointments of new security chiefs, including the appointment of Aoun’s son-in-law, Brig. Gen. Shamel Roukoz, the head of the Army Commando Unit, as Army commander. In response, the FPM’s political rivals have accused it of attempting to paralyze the government over the issue of security appointments.Berri and Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs Mohammad Fneish from Hezbollah Tuesday ruled out the convening of the Cabinet soon because Salam’s ongoing consultations to break the deadlock over the appointment of senior security and military officers have so far been unsuccessful. Telecommunications Minister Boutros Harb said he would not accept the obstruction of the government’s work and called on Salam to call for a Cabinet session next week. “We are exerting pressure on premier Salam to call for a Cabinet meeting and we will not accept the continued disruption of its work,” Harb told reporters after meeting a delegation of Future lawmakers in the presence of independent March 14 MPs at his residence in Hazmieh.
The minister dismissed as “baseless rumors” media reports that the government would not meet during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan, which begins Thursday.
“The obstruction of the work of the Cabinet and Parliament is a catastrophe for Lebanon that leads to the disruption of the people’s interests and harms all the Lebanese. We reject this,” Harb said. He added that he would urge Salam to call for a Cabinet session next Monday or Thursday. The Future Movement blamed both Hezbollah and the FPM for the presidential vacuum and the Cabinet paralysis. “Hezbollah, which is disrupting state institutions, has blocked the election of a president through its regional agenda,” Future MP Ammar Houri said in an interview with Asharq radio station. “Hezbollah and its ally Gen. Aoun are obstructing the Cabinet’s work.” He urged Salam to call for a Cabinet session as soon as possible irrespective of the FPM ministers’ stance. “We will not accept in any form for any side to impose the [Cabinet] agenda on the prime minister,” Houri said.

4 candidates competing to head Army Intelligence: reports
The Daily Star/ June 18, 2015/BEIRUT: Media reports Thursday said four candidates were front runners for the post of Lebanese Army Intelligence chief, which will become vacant in September when Brig. Gen. Edmond Fadel is set to retire. Al-Joumhouriya newspaper identified the four as brigadier generals Kamil Daher, Richard Helou, Fadi Daoud and Wadih Ghafri. The brief report added that Defense Minister Samir Moqbel would chose one of the candidates. An-Nahar newspaper said that “a fierce competition is going on behind the scenes” over the post, and that a new intelligence chief would be chosen before Aug. 20, one month before Fadel is set to retire. Daoud and Ghafri, An-Nahar added, were backed by an unnamed “political authority,” while “church authorities” supported the appointment of Helou. It added that the fourth candidate, Daher, is widely popular among the Army’s rank and file, and is supported by its commander, Gen. Jean Kahwagi. An-Nahar said the term of Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Walid Salman, scheduled to retire on Aug. 7, is expected to be renewed. Several high ranking security officers had their terms renewed earlier this year, including Internal Security Forces chief Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Basbous, infuriating the Free Patriotic Movement whose ministers pledged not to let the Cabinet pass any decisions until potential successors are discussed. The last two weekly Cabinet sessions were cancelled as a result of the crisis.

Massive fire devours plastic crates in Beirut suburb
The Daily Star/ June 18, 2015/BEIRUT: Civil Defense forces doused a massive fire that sent plumes of black smoke over a Beirut suburb Thursday, a security source told The Daily Star. Firefighters arrived to the eastern suburb of Sin al-Fil to extinguish a blaze that was sparked in a large arena used to store plastic crates. The 500 square meters of land are located near Souk al-Ahad, a giant outdoor market situated under a highway overpass.No casualties have been reported. The blaze comes about two weeks after Al-Karout Grand Stores warehouse in the southern suburb of Hadath caught fire and burned for four days. Lebanon witnesses a high rate of fires in the summer due to high temperatures and poor fire safety regulations. Late last month, a blaze destroyed 60 percent of Beirut's upscale nightclub SkyBar. One month before that, two firefighters died fighting a blaze in a Mar Elias print shop, located in the basement of a 12-story residential building. Fires this year have also killed and injured a number of Syrian refugees in camps across the country.

Truce Reached after 2 Dead, Several Hurt in Ain el-Hilweh Clashes
Naharnet /A ceasefire was reached Thursday evening in the Ain el-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp after two days of clashes left two people dead and several others wounded, state-run National News Agency reported.“The joint security force has deployed in the Taytaba neighborhood where the fighting had erupted,” NNA said. Sidon MP Bahia Hariri of the al-Mustaqbal bloc had contacted officials from the Fatah, Hamas and Usbat al-Ansar movements prior to the truce, urging them to step up their efforts to pacify the situation.
The fighting involved groups led by Abed Sultan and "al-Maqdesi", NNA said. Hand grenades and RPG rockets were used in the confrontation, it added. The agency identified one of the dead as Palestinian national Mahmoud Samih and two of the wounded as M. Othman and O. Zubeidat. Several shops and cars sustained material damage as a house went up in flames after it was hit by a shell. The Palestinian forces exerted efforts to contain the situation after a state of extreme tension engulfed the camp, the agency said. It said masked gunmen appeared in several neighborhoods and that residents made several appeals for an end to the fighting. “Palestinian National Security Forces chief Maj. Gen. Sobhi Abou Arab is presiding over a broad meeting with the youth committees at the NSF headquarters, in a bid to reach a solution and restore calm and stability in the camp,” NNA added. The unrest had erupted on Wednesday following a personal dispute between two men. Ain el-Hilweh, the largest Palestinian camp in the Lebanon, is home to about 50,000 refugees who live in dire conditions and is known to harbor extremists and fugitives. By long-standing convention, the Lebanese army does not enter the country's 12 refugee camps, leaving security inside to the Palestinians themselves.

2 dead, 11 wounded in south Lebanon refugee camp clash
Mohammed Zaatari/The Daily Star/ June 18, 2015/SIDON, Lebanon: Two people were killed and at least 11 wounded when a personal dispute escalated into violent clashes between two militias in the south Lebanon refugee camp of Ain al-Hilweh Thursday.
Witnesses said machine guns, hand grenades and rocket-propelled grenades were used in the clashes between members of secular Fatah and al-Qaeda-linked Jund al-Sham, which is classified as a terrorist group by the Lebanese government. The fighting subsided around 7 p.m., after more than five hours of heavy clashes, with mediation of a local civilian group and the intervention of a year-old Palestinian security force responsible for maintaining order in the camp, which is off-limits to Lebanese security forces. The two men killed in the clashes were identified as Palestinians Mahmoud Osman, a militant who participated in the fighting, and civilian Mehdi Hasna, known by his nickname Al-Tabarawi, whose body was still lying in the streets two hours after the clashes ended. The wounded included at least one woman.The two groups have a long history of rivalry in the camp. Jund al-Sham in Lebanon, which belongs to a regional network believed to have been supported by slain Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, has been accused of assassinating many Fatah leaders.
Residents of the impoverished refugee camp could not have thought of a worse day to celebrate the first day of the holy month of Ramadan. After guns fell silent, families walked outside to survey the damage before returning home for Iftar. The five hours of clashes were enough to make the neighborhood of Taytaba look like a war zone. Weeping at the site of the damages caused to her family’s modest possessions, a woman was heard crying: “What is happening is unfair. What cause did it serve? Who will compensate us for this disaster?”
Bullet holes riddled walls and grenade blasts destroyed the humble Ramadan decorations along with the short joyful climate they had brought. The water and electricity networks in the affected neighborhoods were also damaged. A group called the Popular Initiative mediated between the rivals to end the clashes, a security source said. MP Bahia Hariri also helped by calling the leaders of prominent Palestinian factions in the camp.The fighting also destroyed seven cars and caused fires to a number of houses. Militants from both sides, who had deployed in the dozens, withdrew from the streets after the end of the clashes, but remained in the area in case of renewed fighting. Subhi Abu Arab, the head of the Palestinian joint elite force, told The Daily Star that all militants were told to return to the other parts of the camp from where they rushed to join the clashes.Fighting started Wednesday as a personal dispute between Palestinians Abed Sultan and Bilal Arqoub, members of the Fatah party and the Maqdisi group, respectively. Maqdisi, which is close to Islamist factions in the camp including Jund al-Sham, is headed by Fadi al-Saleh. Members of the two men’s families later got involved in the fighting, which quickly transformed into an armed clash between their militias and allies.

Lebanese-Egyptian filmmaker Nabiha Lutfi dies at 78
The Daily Star/June 18, 2015/BEIRUT: Distinguished Lebanese-Egyptian documentary filmmaker Nabiha Lutfi died in Egypt Wednesday, local media reported. She was 78. Lutfi, famous for her enthusiasm about Palestinian revolutionary movements, was born in the southern Lebanese city of Sidon on Jan. 28, 1937. She joined the American University of Beirut in 1953 to pursue a B.A. in political studies, but was expelled for participating in protests against the 1955 Baghdad Pact, a U.S.-sponsored NATO-like state alliance that aimed to fight Soviet influence in the Middle East. As a result, Egypt's anti-colonialist leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, a fierce opponent of the pact, invited Lutfi to continue her studies in Cairo.She graduated with a degree in Arabic literature from Cairo University 1957. Three years later, she joined the Higher Film Institute in Cairo and was in the first class to graduate from the institute in 1964. Her first film, “Cairo’s Millennium,” was completed in 1969.She returned to Lebanon in the late 1970s to shoot “Because the Roots Will Not Die,” a documentary recounting the massacres in the Palestinian refugee camp of Tal al-Zaatar by Christian militias in east Beirut. In the film, Lutfi, who was a member of the Palestinian Film Institute, investigated the dynamics between women in Lebanon’s refugee camps and the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel that residents of the camps participated in after the 1969 Cairo Agreement. Her filmography includes: "Prayer from Old Cairo," 1972; "Because the Roots Never Die," 1975; "My Bride," 1983; "Where to?," 1991; "Message from Hegaza," 1994; "She Cultivates, She Irrigates," 1999; "Mohamed Ali Street," 2003; "Carioca," 2009. She also co-founded the New Cinema Community in 1986 and the Association of Egyptian Women Filmmakers in 1990. Lutfi was honored by the Egyptian Film Festival in 2001, and received the National Cedar Medal in 2006 from then-Lebanese President Emile Lahoud. She was honored by the Catholic Film Center in February, and the Egyptian Film Critics Association in April, both in Cairo this year.

Fire guts part of Church of Loaves and Fishes on Sea of Galilee
Ori Lewis| Reuters/June 18, 2015 /TABGHA, Israel: An arson attack Thursday gutted part of a church at the traditional site of what Christianity reveres as Jesus' miracle of the feeding of the 5,000 on the shore of the Sea of Galilee, the Israeli fire brigade said. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered Israel's Shin Bet internal security service to launch a top-priority investigation, an official statement said, quoting him as describing the incident as "an attack on all of us."A verse from a Hebrew prayer denouncing the worship of "false gods" was spray painted in red on a church wall, suggesting Jewish zealots were responsible. Police detained for questioning 16 Jewish seminary students visiting the Sea of Galilee area from settlements in the Israeli-occupied West Bank but freed them within hours. A lawyer for the youngsters said there was no evidence against them. A spokesman for the fire brigade said a preliminary investigation showed the blaze broke out in several places inside the limestone Church of the Multiplication of the Loaves and Fishes, evidence that it was started deliberately. The church was built in the 1980s on the site of 4th and 5th century houses of worship that commemorated what Christian faithful revere as Jesus' miraculous feeding of 5,000 people with five loaves of bread and two fish. "Firefighters arrived at the scene ... and [the fire] was put out, but extensive damage was caused to the church both inside and out," police spokesman Micky Rosenfeld said. The Rabbis for Human Rights group said there have been 43 hate crime attacks on churches, mosques and monasteries in Israel and the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem since 2009. Dozens of arrests have been made in such cases, but there have been few indictments and convictions, with police and prosecutors acknowledging that the young age of many of the suspected perpetrators has led courts to show leniency."We will bring to justice those responsible for this criminal act," Netanyahu said in Thursday's statement. Desiree Bellars, a volunteer at the church from South Africa who lives at the site, said the blaze erupted in the dead of night. "All the electricity went out, the fire raged and the flames shot up into the sky," she told Reuters. No damage was reported to 5th century mosaic floors that have been restored in the church.

Suspect Held after 9 Killed at U.S. Black Church, Obama Slams 'Senseless' Attack
Naharnet/U.S. police on Thursday arrested a 21-year-old white gunman suspected of killing nine people in one of the nation's oldest black churches in Charleston -- a shooting rampage being probed as a hate crime. The carnage at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in the southeastern U.S. city was one of the worst attacks on a place of worship in the country in decades, and comes at a time of lingering racial tensions nationwide. Dylann Roof -- a slight man with a bowl haircut and a youthful face -- was taken into custody in neighboring North Carolina, about a four-hour drive from the scene of the shooting, Charleston Police Chief Gregory Mullen said. "I do believe it was a hate crime," Mullen said. A clearly frustrated President Barack Obama said the incident showed that the United States needed to look again at how violent people get their hands on guns, calling the killings "senseless.""At some point, we as a country will have to reckon with the fact that this type of mass violence does not happen in other advanced countries," Obama said at the White House.
"It doesn't happen in other places with this kind of frequency. And it is in our power to do something about it."Members of the church's mainly black congregation had gathered Wednesday evening for a Bible study meeting when the shooter walked into the building, sat for about an hour and then opened fire, Mullen said. Three men and six women were killed, and several other people were wounded. Among the dead was the church's pastor Clementa Pinckney, who was also a Democratic state senator.
Side streets around the church were sealed off with yellow crime scene tape. A police officer told AFP that some of the bodies of the victims were still inside. A support center for relatives of the victims was set up in a nearby hotel.
"The heart and soul of South Carolina was broken," a tearful state Governor Nikki Haley said.
- Hate crimes probe -
Detectives were headed to Shelby, North Carolina -- where Roof was apprehended during a traffic stop -- to interview the suspect and gather evidence, Mullen told reporters.The shooting comes at a time of heightened racial tensions in America, after several high-profile killings of unarmed black men at the hands of white police in recent months led to protests and a national debate on race.A Justice Department spokesperson said a hate crimes probe had been opened, with FBI agents working in tandem in with local police.
"The fact that this took place in a black church obviously also raises questions about a dark part of our history," Obama said. A picture on Roof's Facebook page showed him wearing a black jacket with patches emblazoned with the flags of apartheid-era South African and white minority-ruled Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. Jim Curley, owner of AC's Bar & Grill, which is located a few blocks from the church, said locals were shocked anyone would carry out an attack in the popular tourist area.
"This is really completely out of the blue... We have no idea what the motivation is," Curley told AFP. Darlene Green, a 56-year-old black resident of Charleston, agreed. "South Carolina is a place of warmth. It's not normally a place where you have violence like this," Green said. "Only (the suspect) and God know what happened."
- 'Dastardly act' -
Charleston is known locally as "The Holy City," due to its large number of churches and historical mix of ethnic groups that brought a variety of people to the Atlantic coast city."In this great country, we hold sacred the places where people come and practice their faiths in safety and in peace," Mayor Joseph Riley said. Dot Scott, the head of the local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), said the shooter may not have drawn attention because of the church's location.
"It sits in an area that a lot of the tourists frequent. It's not out of the ordinary that folks just walk into the sanctuary and sit and listen to what's going on," Scott told CNN. Officials have not released details about most of the victims, or say what kind of gun was used.
According to its website, the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church is the oldest such church in America's southern states. The church was founded in 1816 and in 1822 was investigated for its involvement with a planned slave revolt, the website states.
Republican presidential candidate Jeb Bush canceled campaign events that had been planned for Thursday in Charleston. Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, who was in Charleston earlier Wednesday, tweeted condolences.
The Charleston shooting is the latest on a long list of mass shootings in the United States. The deadliest in recent years include the April 2007 Virginia Tech shooting, when 32 were killed, and the December 2012 Sandy Hook elementary school shootings in Newtown, Connecticut, when a total of 27 people died, including 20 children. In August 2012, six people were shot dead at a Sikh temple in Wisconsin by a neo-Nazi U.S. military veteran. Charleston is famous for its cobblestone streets, Southern cuisine and nearby beaches and islands. The city is also known outside the United States for its namesake 1920s dance. Agence France Presse

When Iran lost Arab media support
Thursday, 18 June 2015
Abdulrahman al-Rashed/Al Arabiya
Media outlets speaking on behalf of Iran or defending its policies emerged in a short period of time. Most Arab media outlets marketed and defended Tehran’s stances until the Arab Spring that erupted in 2011. That is when they realized that Iran is just another country with regional ambitions that hides behind slogans of Islam, justice and hostility against the West, and that it has exploited the Arab media to dominate its Arab rivals. Most Arabs have been shocked by Tehran’s hideous actions in Syria. Admiration toward Iran, which spoke out in defense of Islam and Palestinian rights, turned into hatred and animosity. In response, Tehran established media outlets in different languages to compete with Arab counterparts. Nowadays, it is rare to hear Arab media outlets repeat Tehran’s statements against Israel, as they have finally realized that it is misleading propaganda. The Arab media is now concerned about protecting Arab audiences from falling into the trap of Iranian political exploitation that dominated for 30 years. Most of them have woken up, and now distinguish between truth and exploitation. This is what led Iran to open its own media institutions to alter Arab public opinion. It is also rare to hear statements from Tehran’s allies in Syria and Lebanon, although officials there always make statements against Zionist officials and hold them accountable for whatever suits their interests.
Iran’s excuses and threats
When U.S. warships intercepted an Iranian ship in the Red Sea - which was probably loaded with arms for Tehran’s Houthi allies in Yemen - Arab media outlets did not echo Iran’s excuses and threats. In the past, such an incident would have guaranteed an automatic response in support of Iran from dozens of Arab media outlets. Most of them have woken up, and now distinguish between truth and exploitation. This is what led Iran to open its own media institutions to alter Arab public opinion. We must not underestimate Iran’s attempts in this regard. Some Arab media figures echo Tehran’s stances of conflating the Syrian opposition with terrorist groups, suggesting the Syrian regime is key to the country’s unity, and doubting the aims of its rivals. Iran tries to do the same in Yemen by presenting isolated former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his Houthi allies as a popular and legitimate option. Since Iran knows that its media is now rejected by most Arabs, it is trying hard to reach Arab audiences in new and different ways, and to present differently-phrased proposals - most of which are offensive - to win propaganda battles and silence opposing views. It is also trying to grant popularity and credibility to its media outlets in the hope that they will dominate the intellectual and media arena. Iranian media is in crisis, as hostility toward it is affecting its status. However, while Iran’s battle to win Arab support and sympathy is difficult, it is not impossible.

Donald Trump gives Hillary Clinton a lot to smile about
Thursday, 18 June 2015
Joyce Karam/Al Arabiya
In the last 48 hours since he announced his candidacy for the 2016 race to the White House, Donald Trump has called his Republican running mates “sweating dogs”, “weak”, “phony” and “confused.” His candidacy, if for nothing else but attacking his fellow Republicans, should have the Democrats’ frontrunner Hillary Clinton ecstatic about its short and long term effects. Let's be honest, Trump, a real estate mogul and a TV star who is neither politically correct nor allegedly factual, is not running for the sake of becoming the next U.S. President. His goal as it has been for the last three decades is to gain media visibility -sometimes through personal and political controversies-, and this time by being the provocateur in chief. Win or lose in the actual race, Trump will ultimately have the last laugh by raising his public profile at the expense of other Republican candidates whom he will waste no time in lambasting.
Debate spoiler
The Republican party is already scrambling to do damage control following Trump’s fiery press conference on Tuesday where terms such as “Mexican rapists” and “stupid leaders” could haunt the party in the general elections. But the conference is only a prelude of what is to come as “The Donald” show goes to swing states, attracts big crowds and national coverage. Win or lose in the actual race, Trump will ultimately have the last laugh by raising his public profile at the expense of other Republican candidates whom he will waste no time in lambasting. More than anything, Trump could ruin the Republican’s early chance to collectively sell their improved brand at the first debate hosted by Fox News on August 6th. After years of trying to overcome the George W. Bush legacy and the far right anti-minority rhetoric, leading Republican candidates such as Jeb Bush and Marco Rubio are adopting a more reconciliatory approach in targeting Latino voters, and tackling social issues. Trump, a billionaire who knows that the party establishment needs him more than the other way around, has the charm and the ability to drive the debate off topic and steer the GOP rhetoric farther to the right. Six weeks into the debate, Trump qualifies on stage per Fox’s rules and as one of the “Top 10 candidates in an average of 5 national polls.” Republican groups, however, such as the “Club for Growth” are urging that he “should not be taken seriously” and to be excluded from all the debates.
Weakens Bush & Rubio
Trump’s entry to the race and his line of attack has been mostly focused on former Governor Jeb Bush and Senator Marco Rubio. Both candidates run close to Hillary Clinton in key swing states such as Ohio, Pennsylvania and Florida. While Trump might not sound Presidential in the traditional sense of the word, his ramblings and straight talk resonate with the average voter and have already earned him standing ovations in Iowa. Telling audiences that “this country does not need another Bush” and reminding of his stance against the Iraq war in 2003 is exactly the conversation that candidate Jeb Bush is trying to avoid on the national stage. Pointing to Rubio’s flip flop on immigration, and calling for erecting a wall on the southern border could force the Senator into taking a harder line on the issue and thus complicate his chances in the general elections. So far, Trump has shied away from harsh attacks on Hillary Clinton. Reminding voters of her “scandalous” email controversy and that she overemphasizes the gender card and her non grey hair, is almost a compliment from someone who has built a brand for his "combover" hairstyle. By driving the Republican debate to the right and rallying the base against Jeb Bush and Marco Rubio, Trump is doing Clinton a favor and lending her automatic advantage in the general elections. It’s a win-win strategy for Trump who is attracting double the media attention he drew with the Obama birth certificate controversy, and will boost his TV ratings after the elections’ circus is over. For Hillary Clinton, there is a lot to smile about with the Trump candidacy as he ticks off the Republican establishment and takes on her key rivals. The more inflammatory statements that Tump makes on immigrants and minorities the better it is for Democrats. They will use them to make the case that they are the party of “inclusiveness”, as the Republicans scramble and search for an end to their Trump-induced ulcers.

Air strikes mask U.S. strategic failure against ISIS
Thursday, 18 June 2015
Chris Doyle/Al Arabiya
If reports are true that separate U.S. attacks have terminated the lives of Nasir Al-Wuhayshi, the number two in al-Qaeda, and Mokhtar Belmokhtar, once a senior figure in al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, then no doubt there will be a riot of back-slapping going on in the corridors of the Pentagon. No tears should be shed for two men who have inspired and brought about so much suffering. But once the cheers have subsided, a more sober assessment is required. Have such high-value targeted assassinations worked thus far against both al-Qaeda and its offspring, including ISIS? How quickly do such outfits replace their leadership cadres, and does the killing of established leaders bring about other negative consequences, perhaps even more radical leaders. To what extent are the U.S. and others over reliant on such actions to paper over inadequacies in its overall strategy? Are such hits just short-term highs with the inevitable lows to come? The U.S. has had a consistent approach of taking out al-Qaeda and ISIS leaders. The story of the hunt for Bin Laden and his ultimate demise is now contested but was always a major goal of U.S. operations. The core al-Qaeda leadership has over the years been decimated by attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Wuhayshi may be the third deputy leader of al-Qaeda to have been killed. This in part explains why so much of al-Qaeda’s leadership fears to surface and why so little is heard from its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. But the organization has not expired and local regional leaderships arose most notably in Iraq, Yemen and in the Maghreb.
Have such high-value targeted assassinations worked thus far against both al-Qaeda and its offspring, including ISIS?One of the primary criticisms is that drone attacks have been far from targeted. According to the human rights group, Reprieve “attempts to kill 41 men resulted in the deaths of an estimated 1,147 people” as of November 24, 2014. In killing one leader many suffer so is there not a risk of being a recruiting sergeant? President Obama had to apologize for the killing of a U.S. civilian and an Italian civilian. Many were aghast that the President could authorize the killing of a U.S. citizen in Yemen, Anwar al-Awlaki, and what this meant in terms of a constitutional precedent. Yet as the most recent Pew poll shows, drone strikes are gaining in popularity in the United States with an approval rating of 58%. They are still seen as a low-cost high-gain option. Do not expect any chance in U.S. policy soon, or even after the drone-loving Obama leaves office. I once asked leading Bush-era Neo-Con, John Bolton about drones, and he cooed “they’re wonderful.”
Role of drones
Leaving aside the serious legal and moral concerns, an audit is required about the role of drones and targeted killings in battling jihadist groups and particularly ISIS. A major concern is that the U.S. is overly dependent on them and other forms of aerial bombardment. Almost a year on from U.S. strikes on ISIS it still has a pretty intact leadership and continues to hold huge amounts of territories and major cities. Local boots on the ground have been in short supply, highlighted by the failure to find enough Iraqis to train, only 7000 as opposed to the target figure of 24,000. Assassinations in Yemen against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have escalated clearly with some success. Wuhayshi may be the sixth major AQAP leader killed in suspected U.S. bombings this year. But it did not stop the group from seizing the port of Mukalla and expanding its domain. The U.S. has little regional support for its actions, a sign of a lack of confidence in Washington’s approach. The U.S. is also in the strange position of deploying drone attacks against AQAP whilst its regional ally, Saudi Arabia is leading a war against the Houthis in Yemen not AQAP. It looks less like a division of labour than a clash of priorities. In Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are supporting armed groups that include Jabhat Al Nusra, an al-Qaeda affiliate, whilst the U.S. has targeted Al Nusra as well as ISIS.
Paranoia
Nevertheless, AQAP’s leadership looks compromised and must be paranoid about having been infiltrated. If so and its leadership is diminished, one consequence could be to allow ISIS in Yemen to take over burnishing its brand and prestige. Another could that that a newer even more radical leadership emerge. But whilst assassinations against al-Qaeda have had an impact, ISIS has adapted as a very flexible organization that operates quite differently. It expects to have its leadership targeted and it is not clear who in its leadership has been killed. It is far more of a mass movement than al-Qaeda, having an army not just members. Whilst it is easier to join ISIS than al-Qaeda, the leadership has shielded itself very effectively from its lower ranks with a security apparatus built up with the assistance of its former Saddam-era Baathists. Supposedly Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was injured in a strike back in March but U.S. officials claimed they did not know he was a casualty. ISIS is more than capable of feeding misleading information into the media to confuse intelligence services. So far the U.S. and its allies have not impressed with their intelligence efforts, and as in Afghanistan, it appears human intelligence has taken a back seat to technology that worries many in intelligence communities. Could drone and aerial attacks be used more judicially? Certainly the demise of inspiration and transformational leaders such as the ‘Shaikh of the Slaughterers’, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Anwar al-Awlaki as well as Bin Laden, has impact. But the public relations costs of killing civilians has harmed U.S. standing and support, so are drone attacks overused? Above all, drone strikes have become a crutch to lean on that delays the root and branch rethink that is so desperately needed if ISIS are to be thwarted.

Yemen’s least bad option
Thursday, 18 June 2015
Manuel Almeida/Al Arabiya
Despite constant north-south tensions and a few border wars, by the 1970s the ambition of a unified state was well-established among both the elites of the northern Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the southern People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).
However, the 23 years between Yemen’s unification in 1990 and the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2012 did not live up to the promise the union had instilled in the minds of Yemenis. What got off to a bad start never really recovered. Less than four years into unity, during a short civil war with lasting effects, the southern socialist leader Ali Salem al-Beidh announced the creation of a new state with Aden as its capital. In an offensive that resembles the current push southward by the Saleh-Houthi alliance, northern military forces moved decisively on Aden and won the war, and Saleh dismantled the PDRY. Power became deeply centralized in Sanaa, while southerners lost thousands of public jobs and grew resentful of northern exploitation of the south’s natural resources. These and other grievances were channeled into the separatist movement known by its umbrella name Al-Hirak, which has now been forced to put aside its divisions and focus its efforts on countering the brutal aggression from pro-Saleh and Houthi forces.
Geneva peace talks
The ongoing U.N.-sponsored talks in Geneva between representatives of the various political factions, including Abdrabbu Mansour Hadi’s government in exile and Houthi rebels, will probably avoid touching on the sensitive but crucial issue of federalism.
No lasting solution for Yemen can avoid the issue of federalism, so the sooner it returns to the negotiating table the better Naturally, the focus is on a humanitarian truce during Ramadan and the absolute necessity of a peace agreement. Another sensitive and unavoidable issue is the future status of Saleh and his cohort. The initial refusal of negotiators from opposing camps to sit in the same room just shows how tough the process will be.
Given all these challenges, and the fact that many commanders continue to refuse to abandon Saleh, discussions on federalism would not only be premature, but also risk sending a message of detachment from the conflict and the dire humanitarian situation on the ground. However, no lasting solution for Yemen can avoid the issue of federalism, so the sooner it returns to the negotiating table the better. One of the main foundations for the peace talks is U.N. Security Council resolution 2216, which supports the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC). Among them is the Regions Committee’s final report of Feb. 2014, which proposes a federation with six regions (four in what used to be North Yemen and two in former South Yemen), as well as the names of each region, their governorates and capitals. NDC delegates authorized Hadi to form the committee after the agreement in Dec. 2013 in favor of federalization that still lacked decisions on the number of regions and their borders.
Unfeasible options
Before the Houthis took over Sanaa in September last year, most political groups had declared support for a federation with more than two regions, including different factions within the ruling GPC and Al-Islah. Opposing this arrangement were the Houthis, who favored a two-region federation along pre-unity borders, as well as Al-Hirak leaders, most of whom have insisted on separation despite divisions on the matter. However, the push by NDC representatives of the eastern governorates of Shabwah, Hadhramout and Al-Mahrah, formerly constituent parts of South Yemen, for the creation of an eastern region also works decisively against the idea of a two-region federation. Today, a permanent return to the status quo ante, with power centralized in Sanaa, seems unthinkable, but the return to two states looks equally impracticable. The Houthis are unlikely to be able to impose their preference for a federation with two regions only. They remain a northern force, not a national one, and their early military successes would not have been possible without the support from pro-Saleh military units. The actions of pro-Saleh and Houthi forces have only enhanced regionalist feelings and strengthened the resolve of cities and governorates such as Taiz and Marib, previously part of North Yemen, to guarantee at least a degree of formal autonomy from Sanaa. In fact, these widespread regionalist feelings had been around for quite a long time before unification, as academic Stephen Day shows in his important book “Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen.”
It would be a sign of progress if Yemen’s politicians again find themselves discussing details of the federation, although the major challenges would reside in the details. One of the key challenges - allocating power and authority across the various levels of government - has been left for the Constitution Drafting Committee. Another big unaddressed issue is resource-sharing among the different regions. Eventually, the talks currently centered on the ceasefire will have to focus on how the different groups can coexist in the future. The six-region federation looks increasingly like the least bad option for Yemen.

How to Make Sure Iran's One-Year Nuclear Breakout Time Does Not Shrink
Olli Heinonen and Simon Henderson/Washington Institute
June 18, 2015
The final deal needs to specify the total enrichment capacity of Iran's installed centrifuges, mandate a robust verification regime, and include other restrictions to the nuclear program's size and content.
Under the U.S. parameters for Iran's uranium enrichment program announced in Lausanne on April 2, Tehran will decrease its stock of about 19,000 installed centrifuges to just 6,104, with only 5,060 of these designated for enriching uranium. This arrangement will last for ten years, and all of the centrifuges will be first-generation IR-1s. The parameters also state that "Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium" during this period, and that it will "engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1." In addition, the amount of low-enriched stock that Iran can retain is capped at 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent-enriched uranium for the next fifteen years (i.e., uranium that contains 3.67 percent of the fissile isotope U-235).
The technical details underlying these parameters raise several concerns that go to the heart of the proposed deal's efficacy. For one thing, the 1,044 centrifuges designated only for non-nuclear enrichment will remain installed, so they could potentially be reconverted to enriching uranium in a short time regardless of technical or monitoring arrangements. More important, no details have been revealed about the agreed "schedule and parameters" for R&D on more advanced centrifuges. Iran's current timeframe for acquiring enough high-enriched uranium to make a nuclear bomb -- known as breakout time -- is around two or three months, and the United States wants a deal that extends that period to at least one year (see "Iran's Nuclear Breakout Time: A Fact Sheet," PolicyWatch 2394). In Washington's view, a full year would provide enough time to detect noncompliance and take diplomatic or military action if Tehran seems poised to make an illegal dash for a nuclear weapon. Yet the use of more efficient centrifuges would shorten that time, so Iran's determination to develop more advanced machines is as much a concern as, for example, its continuing retention of large low-enriched uranium stockpiles despite a commitment in the parameters that they be converted into less contentious forms (see David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini's June 5 article "State Department Explanation of Iran's Newly Produced 3.5 Percent Enriched Uranium Falls Short"). Using partially enriched feedstock could also reduce breakout time substantially.
Central to calculations about centrifuges is their efficiency, usually measured in terms of separative work units (SWUs), which relate to both the amount of material processed and the degree of enrichment reached. An SWU describes the annual enrichment output of a centrifuge, either as "SWUs uranium/year" or "SWUs UF6/year," where UF6 is uranium hexafluoride, the gaseous feedstock for a centrifuge. A typical 1,300-megawatt light-water power reactor requires 25 tons of 3.75 percent-enriched fuel annually. To produce this fuel from 210 tons of natural uranium, an enrichment effort of 120,000 SWUs is needed. But a nuclear explosive device requires high-enriched uranium (i.e., 90 percent or more U-235) containing twenty-five kilograms of U-235, and producing such material would necessitate an enrichment plant with an annual capacity of 5,000 SWUs.
Iran's IR-1 centrifuges are based on an original Dutch design that Tehran acquired from Pakistan. They are arranged in cascades at two known sites, Natanz and Fordow. According to analysts at the Institute for Science and International Security, Washington estimated the efficiency of an IR-1 at between 0.9 and 1.0 SWUs/year when assessing Iran's breakout capacity, whereas Tehran used a figure of 0.66 SWU/year. Therefore, from the U.S. perspective, Iran's allowed 5,060 IR-1s imply a breakout time of around a year.
The reality is more disturbing. The true performance of the IR-1s remains unknown -- their current capacity may be reduced by some parts of the enrichment cascades being isolated or individual machines being broken and not replaced, so their potential output may have been understated. Data derived from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) shows that IR-1s occasionally operate at 1 SWU/year or slightly better at Natanz and Fordow (see Figure 10 and Table 1 in "ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report," May 29, 2015). But in August 2014, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, stated that IR-1s had "a nominal output of over 3 SWUs, but in practice they yield less than 2 SWUs." He presumably meant SWUs UF6/year, so his figures translate to 1.3 SWUs uranium/year. This suggests that Iran's actual breakout time under the Lausanne parameters could be seven or eight months rather than a full year.
Salehi also noted that one of the new centrifuges Iran was working on, the IR-8, had an efficiency of 24 SWUs, a very high figure. At the very least this means that Iran's enrichment capacity could soar after the ten-year nuclear deal expires. And if IR-8s became operationally capable sooner than that, breakout time would shrink drastically. Similar arguments can be made for the other centrifuge types Iran is developing. The latest IAEA report (issued May 29) notes that in the R&D area of the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), "Iran has been intermittently feeding natural UF6 into IR-1, IR-2m, IR-4, IR-6 and IR-6s centrifuges, sometimes into single machines and sometimes into cascades of various sizes." That facility also contains an IR-5 centrifuge (into which uranium feedstock was placed for a while against the understandings of last year's Joint Plan of Action) and a prototype IR-8 (but without the piping needed for feedstock to be used). Little is known about many of these centrifuges; IAEA inspectors have seen them but are not permitted to scrutinize their inner workings.
Iran is presumably attempting to develop the most practical and efficient machine -- a goal that requires the optimal balance of centrifuge length, composition, and spin speed. It has already installed six cascades of the IR-2m, which has an estimated output of 3-5 SWUs uranium/year (or up to five times the efficiency of the IR-1). Another twelve IR-2m cascades are planned, and while none of them has been fed with UF6, the latest IAEA report indicates that two IR-1 cascades at the PFEP are currently enriching uranium. In addition, one IR-2m and one IR-4 cascade are fed with natural uranium, but the resultant enriched uranium and depleted "tails" are promptly remixed back to natural uranium. In total, the potential enrichment capacity of the operating IR-1, IR-2m, and IR-4 cascades at this R&D facility is 1,300-1,700 SWUs/year, so if they are maintained in the final agreement as they are currently, Iran's breakout time will drop to eight months (or perhaps even less if Salehi's previously mentioned efficiency estimates for IR-1s hold true).
Moreover, the IAEA report is heavily caveated with expressions like "declared facilities" (allowing for the possibility of undeclared facilities), and it repeatedly warns that "the full implementation of Iran's obligations is needed to ensure international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program." Indeed, major uncertainty persists regarding the potential existence of another secret installation like Fordow, the enrichment facility that Iran built inside a mountain and did not disclose until it was discovered by U.S. and other intelligence services. Estimating detection time for clandestine facilities is difficult at best (e.g., see "The Iran Time Bomb," March 22, 2015).
Even without hidden facilities, establishing most any Iranian violation of the agreement would likely take several months. First, the IAEA and respective agencies in Washington would have to come to that technical judgment; toward that end, inspectors would need timely access anywhere at any time to confirm such findings. The next step would be to get the political leadership to accept that judgment, then sell the conclusion to the international community.
In short, close attention to several technical factors is essential to the success of a nuclear deal, including the number and type of installed, operable centrifuges; Iran's inventories of enriched uranium; the dismantling of excess centrifuges; unfettered inspection access; and enhanced intelligence on and enforcement of compliance. To maintain a credible verification and monitoring scheme, Iran's installed centrifuge capacity should not exceed 5,000 SWUs per year. That calculation depends on the efficiency of the centrifuges, not just their number.
**Olli Heinonen is a senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center and a former deputy director-general for safeguards at the IAEA. Simon Henderson is the Baker Fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute. They coauthored Nuclear Iran: A Glossary of Terms, a joint publication of the Institute and the Belfer Center.

Riyadh Looks to Moscow
Simon Henderson/Washington Institute
June 17, 2015
Prince Muhammad's visit to Russia will increase speculation that Saudi Arabia's relationship with the United States is changing. On June 17, Saudi deputy crown prince and defense minister Muhammad bin Salman (a.k.a. MbS) arrived in Russia to meet with President Vladimir Putin. The visit, which was kept secret until a few hours before he left the kingdom, follows a series of recent communications between Putin and the prince's father, King Salman. In April, the two spoke by telephone, and on May 27, a Russian special envoy met with the king the day before the new Saudi ambassador presented his credentials in Moscow. Speaking this week, the Saudi envoy spoke of the "deeply rooted historical ties and the permanent evolution" of the relationship between the two countries.
In reality, bilateral relations have been awkward if not antagonistic. King Salman's father, King Abdulaziz, loathed "godless communists" and broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1938. It was not until 1992 -- after the Red Army's defeat in Afghanistan at the hands of Saudi-backed mujahedin fighters and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union -- that ties with Moscow were reestablished. Given MbS's growing prominence at home and his obvious closeness to his father -- who seems to use him as a special envoy in addition to his other responsibilities -- the possibility of significant upgrades to the Saudi-Russian relationship seems likely. Under King Abdullah, who died in January, ties were vexed by Moscow's support for Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria. Former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Bandar bin Sultan visited Russia at least twice but failed to change Putin's mind about backing Damascus. The Saudi Royal Court's official statement announcing MbS's trip described it as an opportunity "to discuss relations and aspects of cooperation between the two friendly countries." The agenda likely includes oil, a sector in which the prince has become a key decisionmaker. Saudi determination to retain market share even at the cost of lower revenues has hit Russia hard. For his part, Putin will want to further widen differences between Riyadh and Washington on the wisdom of a nuclear deal with Iran. After the recent Camp David meeting, President Obama described MbS -- who may only be twenty-nine years old -- as "wise beyond his years." The established Washington view is that the bilateral relationship is safe because of the administration's closeness with Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef (a.k.a. MbN) and new foreign minister Adel al-Jubeir, formerly the ambassador to the United States. But the king seems to favor his son over MbN, and it is likely significant that Jubeir was not sent on the Russia trip. Whatever MbS returns home with, it may prove important to the future of the U.S.-Saudi relationship.
**Simon Henderson is the Baker Fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute.

Why Lebanon’s Sunnis Support ISIS Dateline
Hilal Khashan/Middle East Quarterly/
Summer 2015 (view PDF)
The claim by a recent public opinion poll that only 1 percent of adult Lebanese Sunnis are supportive of the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)[1] must be taken with a large pinch of salt since “there is a vast gulf between how people say they behave and how they actually behave.”[2] In fact, since Lebanese Sunnis are willing to support whoever can defeat their enemies and restore their pride, many of them find ISIS appealing for qduite a few reasons: They have an aversion to Shiites and feel estranged from the Lebanese state while harboring nostalgia for the caliphate. Many admire power in any form, and others have a predisposition to anomic terrorism.Aversion to ShiitesThe rise to preeminence of Lebanese Shiites began after the Amal movement evicted the Lebanese army from the southern suburbs of Beirut in February 1984. A year later, Hezbollah made its debut and formed a militia to fight the Israel Defense Forces and its Southern Lebanese Army surrogate.
After a long period of Shiite ascendance, the prominence of Rafiq Hariri (left) revived Sunni political hopes in Lebanon, but his assassination in February 2005 crushed expectations. In May 2008, Hezbollah stormed mostly Sunni west Beirut and liquidated the militia of the Future Movement, headed by Hariri’s son Saad (right).
The Sunnis thus lost political prerogatives that had accrued to them from the 1943 National Covenant with the Maronites. Having already lost the support of the Palestine Liberation Organization due to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Sunnis suddenly found themselves giving way to a new Shiite contender that enjoyed strong regional support.The appearance of Rafiq Hariri on the political scene in 1992 revived Sunni hopes, but his assassination in February 2005 put a damper on their expectations. In May 2008, Hezbollah stormed mostly Sunni west Beirut and, in a matter of hours, liquidated the militia of the Future Trend movement, headed by Hariri’s son Saad. So after a long period of Shiite ascendance, the Sunni street rejoiced when an ISIS offensive rapidly seized Mosul and a large swath of Iraqi territory in June 2014. As a neighborhood leader in Tripoli put it: “Iraq witnessed a Sunni triumph against Shiite oppression. Forcing Tripoli’s Sunnis to denounce ISIS amounts to coercing them to exercise political self-suppression.”[3] The truth of the matter is that “hatred for Iran and Hezbollah has made every Lebanese Sunni heartily supportive of ISIS, even if its brutal methods will eventually affect them adversely.”[4]Estrangement from the Lebanese StateWhen Hezbollah shattered the main Sunni leadership, the Lebanese army watched but decided not to interfere. Weak Sunni leadership, both clerical and political, created a vacuum and caused the sect to drift apart and turn to radical Islamic leaders. One such leader was Salafi sheikh Ahmad al-Asir, whose movement had enjoyed the support and loyalty of hundreds of Sidon’s families. They were routed from the city by the Lebanese army and Hezbollah in June 2013. Going underground after the debacle, Asir transferred allegiance from an-Nusra’s Abu Muhammad Julani to ISIS’s Abu Bakr Baghdadi.[5] This defection also underscored the eclipse of the Sunni clerical institution Dar al-Fatwa, which in recent years had been the subject of financial scandals and political weakness. The decimation of the office of the Sunni prime minister, to whom Dar al-Fatwa reports, rendered it rudderless, and it lost its traditional role maintaining the cohesion of the Sunni community.
Some government officials privately admit that ISIS has established itself in Lebanese Sunni areas, including Beirut.
In addition, some government officials privately admit that ISIS has established itself in Lebanese Sunni areas, including Beirut,[6] and there are examples to support this belief. Government-salaried Sunni clerics in Sidon, the hometown of former prime minister Saad Hariri, were impelled to react angrily to the spate of pro-ISIS wall graffiti in that city and warned that unless the trend was arrested, “Sidon would become a fertile land for breeding terrorism.”[7] The Lebanese army frequently implements large-scale security measures in Sidon, despite insisting that “there is no fostering environment for ISIS in the city.”[8]In Tripoli, Lebanon’s second largest city and its most important Sunni hub, Future Trend parliamentary deputies continue to refuse to admit publicly that ISIS is present in the city, but their denials have failed to hide “the existence of a radical Islamic environment in the city.”[9] Several attacks on Lebanese army patrols and pro-Hariri activists in Tripoli succeeded in preventing formation of Iraqi-type awakening councils.[10] But the city is fully controlled by the army, internal security forces, and military intelligence. ISIS supporters are mainly located in its at-Tibbane neighborhood and are well known to the authorities, which choose to ignore them.[11] Pro-ISIS rallies outside mosques are commonplace in Tripoli after Friday prayers.[12] The twin explosions in January 2015 that rocked Tripoli’s Alawite Jabal Muhsin sector were ordered by ISIS operatives in Rumye prison in the hills overlooking Beirut. It was only then that the embarrassed Interior Ministry decided to dismantle ISIS’s operations room in the prison’s Block-B.[13] Even a cursory look at the situation leads to the conclusion that “ISIS does not need to come to Tripoli. It is already there.”[14] Dealing with the threat posed by ISIS is probably why the Interior and Justice portfolios in Tammam Salam’s cabinet were given to Future Trend figures.
Rising Sunni anger and ISIS’s successes do not bode well for Lebanese political stability.
But despite its anti-Sunni orientation, the army is careful not to get embroiled in confessional politics. Mindful that it disintegrated twice (in 1976 and in 1984) when it unabashedly took sides, the army command is obviously not interested in a third upheaval and seems to be keenly aware that Sunni approval of ISIS is a function of public distrust of the state machinery, including the military. Even though several Sunni soldiers have defected to an-Nusra and ISIS, the army command dismissed these as isolated cases.[15]Local observers note that the “seed of ISIS terror is found in every depressed area of Lebanon.”[16] Support for ISIS grows as Sunnis lament the sad state of their coreligionists in Iraq and Syria, comparing it to their own situation as Iranian-backed Hezbollah continues to exercise hegemony over Lebanese politics. Rising Sunni anger and ISIS’s successes do not bode well for Lebanese political stability.[17]Pining for the Caliphate
Unlike Shiites, who believe that the caliphate usurped the rights to the succession of Muhammad’s household, Sunnis have viewed the caliph as their legitimate leader for thirteen centuries. Yearning for a resurrection, the caliphate continued to live on after its 1924 abrogation by Turkey’s Kemal Atatürk as Sunnis “view it as the state of Muslim glory and justice.”[18] Its reestablishment, for example, was the raison d’être of Hassan Banna’s Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928. Lebanese Sunnis also find the neo-Ottoman policies of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party appealing and are particularly fond of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.[19]
Obsession with the caliphate has not spared Sunnis from delusional thinking. Arab fondness for Hitler is well documented, at times to the point of asserting that the tyrant viewed Islam and its culture with favor.[20] As Daniel Pipes points out: “Nazis portrayed Islam as an ally and, accordingly, called for its revival while urging Muslims to act piously and emulate Muhammad.”[21] It is also not rare for some Arabs to argue that Napoleon converted to Islam and sought to create a great Muslim empire.[22] In June 2014, ISIS’s Baghdadi announced the formation of the Islamic State and designated himself caliph. Given his extreme bloodletting, even against fellow jihadists, the announcement did not generate wide approval. However, the sight of cruising motorists in Sunni areas blowing their horns—the Lebanese tradition of expressing happiness—after Baghdadi’s announcement sent a muted message of approval. The issuance of the Islamic State’s passport was another cause for pride. It is difficult for Sunnis to disavow the inscription on IS’s passport that reads, “We will deploy armies for the holder of this passport, if harmed.”[23]Admiration for ISIS Power
Shakir Wahiyib is one of the chief executioners for ISIS and one of the few willing to bare his face during executions. ISIS resorts to such ruthless tactics without regard to human cost. The group’s rationale considers the use of power, as gross and as graphic as possible, as requisite to the subjugation of enemies. A flag vendor in Tripoli explained the popularity of ISIS: “People … like whoever is strong.”
Islam literally means submission to legitimate religious authority: “Believers, obey God, His Messenger, and those charged with authority among you.”[24] This imperative may well dispose believers to revere power and display intolerance for dissenting voices. Using Bin Laden’s famous strong-horse metaphor, Lee Smith argues that the “Sunnis have been a bloc of force that has never known accommodation or compromise, but has rather compelled everyone else to submit to its worldview.”[25] Because of the central role of the caliph in enforcing the Shari’a and spreading the faith to all corners of the globe, the “Sunni figure has often been the able statesman, the hero of conquests, or the victory-maker.”[26] In a study on Lebanese college students’ reaction to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, 82 percent of Sunni respondents chose Saddam Hussein as their preferred political leader. When U.S. president George Bush initiated Operation Desert Shield to prepare for the liberation of Kuwait, Hussein ordered the apprehension of several hundred Western nationals to deter U.S.-led military action. In response to a question on this, 98 percent of Lebanese Sunnis “thought the Iraqis were justified in taking Western hostages.”[27] Even Venezuela’s late president Hugo Chavez’s “anti-Israeli pronouncements enamored him to an Arab public hungry for a charismatic leader in the mold of Nasser.”[28]ISIS is no exception to the customary approach of Muslim power projected through strong leadership. If anything, it has exaggerated the use of coercion and carried it to new heights. ISIS adopted Abi Bakr Naji’s gruesome publication titled The Management of Savagery[29] as a means to apply Sayyid Qutb’s treatise Ma’alim fi-l-Tariq (Milestones).[30] The rationale is that only extreme terror can help construct the Islamic state on the ashes of degenerate apostate regimes. The use of awesome power, as gross and as graphic as possible, is requisite to the subjugation of enemies. As the jihadist sheikh Hussein bin Mahmud once said, “Let them [our enemies] find ruthlessness in you.”[31]
ISIS has had success in recruiting from a pool of alienated and radicalized Muslims as well as impoverished individuals. The Lebanese executioner Abu Asma al-Australi (above) abandoned his wrestling career to join the ISIS jihad. ISIS also succeeded in recruiting at least two Lebanese Christians from Tripoli to its ranks.
In its war in Syria and Iraq, ISIS resorts to ruthless tactics without regard to human cost. To win the battle for Tabaqa airbase in northeastern Syria, eventually overrun in August 2014, ISIS did not mind losing twice as many militants as government troops.[32] What matters more for ISIS was to strip Iraqi and Syrian soldiers to their underwear and march them to their humiliating death in order to project invincible power. Kobani is another example of ISIS’s efforts to achieve spectacular triumphs regardless of the cost. ISIS lost more than one thousand fighters before admitting that it had been driven out of the town by coalition airstrikes, even as it promised it would return to attack.[33] It avenged its defeat by burning a captured Jordanian pilot to death and parading Kurdish Peshmerga prisoners of war in metal cages.[34]Like most Muslims, Lebanese Sunnis see themselves as the victims of centuries of backwardness, marginalization, and defeat. They tend to favor any signs, however elusive, that signal reversing Sunni weakness. A flag vendor in Tripoli explained the popularity of ISIS: “[P]eople … like whoever is strong.”[35] Poor, angry and marginalized teenagers in Tripoli want “great victories.”[36] Even though public display of support for ISIS in Lebanon is punishable by law, “any young man in Tripoli, if asked, would confess how much he admired its power.”[37] When confronted with the brutality and viciousness of ISIS, its supporters often lean on the Qur’an to justify their position: “Muhammad … and those with him are firm of heart against the non-believers, compassionate among themselves.”[38]A Destination for the Alienated
There are reasons other than piety for Lebanese to join ISIS and other radical religious movements. Hezbollah fighters searching the bodies of Sunni militants in Syria often report finding spoons and personal memos about their scheduled lunches in heaven with the Prophet, as well as their first rendezvous with the promised seventy-two virgins.[39] But maladapted immigrants in the West also turn to militancy, and troubled individuals desperate for emotional freedom seek shelter in the crowd to avoid responsibility while indulging in abominable actions. Even scores of Muslim women in the West chose to join ISIS after Baghdadi declared the formation of the Islamic State. “Socially isolated and depressed … [m]any of them suffer from a lack of purpose in their daily lives.”[40]
Just as alienation can affect individuals from different walks of life, joining ISIS has appealed to recruits from a broad socioeconomic spectrum. Thus, Muhammad Emwazi, the British-educated butcher of ISIS, came from a well-to-do family in London[41] as did Egyptian soccer referee Mahmud Ghandur, who chose to abandon his promising career to join ISIS.[42] The Lebanese executioner called Abu Musab al-Australi abandoned his wrestling career and the comfort of Australia to answer the call of jihad and to mentor his 7-year-old child in the art of beheading.[43] The pool of alienated and radicalized youth did not just include maladjusted Muslim immigrants in the West or rising stars feeling empty inside and searching for meaning, but also poor persons saddled with the problems of poverty and crime. ISIS also succeeded in recruiting at least two Lebanese Christians from Tripoli to its ranks. The clichéd rationalization for their metamorphosis stresses ISIS’s taking advantage of the city’s “poor financial conditions to recruit them.”[44]More Trouble in the Making
What is happening in Syria and Iraq is a religious war with ethnic overtones. As a microcosm of the region’s religious and ethnic conflicts, it is difficult to imagine how Lebanon can be spared. The return of Saad Hariri to Lebanon to initiate dialog with Hezbollah, after years of self-exile, is linked to soaring Sunni extremism and Saudi determination to reverse it.[45] The eventual curtailment of ISIS’s presence in Syria and Iraq will take time, and it is unlikely that the group will be completely eliminated. But Lebanon already presents some of its hardened members with a convenient sanctuary since “it is an established fact that Arsal and Ain al-Hilwa Palestinian refugee camp near Sidon are sanctuaries for ISIS and other radical Islamic movements.”[46]
Syria and Iraq are experiencing a religious war with ethnic overtones; it is difficult to imagine how Lebanon can be spared.
Furthermore, while there are no accurate figures about the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, this group is thought to exceed one million persons. Among them, thousands of Islamist militants masquerade as refugees. Lebanon’s tenuous security situation largely depends on the whim of regional countries patronizing its antagonistic sects. In view of the spread of sectarian conflict in the region—and in the event it becomes permeable to its external environment—these refugees might well become Lebanon’s Trojan horse.Arabs missed their chance for religious reform in the nineteenth century, but the developments of the past few years suggest they are confronting the old problem. Lebanon is not exempt. When pressed to issue an anti-ISIS statement, Muhammad al-Juzu, a prominent Sunni Lebanese cleric, said only that “Hezbollah was a more difficult problem than ISIS.”[47]In view of the increasing sectarian tone of Hezbollah’s military intervention, not only in Syria but also Iraq and Yemen, one can expect Lebanese Sunnis to support its ISIS nemesis, however ephemerally. And while it is difficult to know the extent of this support, it is plausible to believe that it exceeds single digit levels.
**Hilal Khashan is a professor of political science at the American University of Beirut.

Tens of thousands in dire need of basic services in Syrian town
Geneva/Damascus - (ICRC) Around 40,000 people are in urgent need of basic services including water and electricity in the Syrian town of Moadamiyah, near Damascus. The town has been cut off from the rest of the country for several months. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) managed to enter the town this week and deliver aid for the first time since December 2014. “The humanitarian situation is desperate,” said the head of the ICRC in Syria, Marianne Gasser. “The streets are totally empty, shops closed. There is virtually no water and food is hard to come by. There has not been electricity in the city for two years. There is virtually no access to proper health care.”The ICRC and SARC brought in medicines for chronic diseases to treat around 5,000 patients; medicines for children; and medical equipment to help pregnant women during delivery. “But this is not enough. We need to come back soon with more aid for the civilians, whether it is food or basic medical materials,” said Ms Gasser. The ICRC and SARC continue to work in different parts of Syria, crossing front lines, bringing in aid and providing support. During the past week, food was delivered to collective kitchens run by SARC, NGOs and other charities in and around Aleppo: the food is sufficient to feed more than 120,000 people. In Hassakeh, which remains inaccessible by road, ICRC and SARC delivered medical equipment which was air-lifted from Damascus to health facilities in the governorate. *For more information about our activities in Syria, please visit https://www.icrc.org/en/where-we-work/middle-east/syria

Does CAIR Represent American Muslims?
Johanna Markind/PJ Media
June 18, 2015/Originally published under the title, “Does CAIR Represent Boston’s Muslim Community?”
Notwithstanding this powerfully staged April 2015 photo-op of CAIR chapter directors, none of the “chapters” fundraise, solicit membership dues, or undertake other activities demonstrating substantial community support. Some don’t exist at all.
The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), an unindicted co-conspirator in America’s largest terrorism financing case, which is officially banned from FBI cooperation, claims to be a mainstream organization advocating for the civil rights of American Muslims. Shortly after Usaama Rahim was shot by law enforcement in Boston on June 2, CAIR leapt into action.The national organization, that is. Its National Communications Director, Ibrahim Hooper, was quoted in an AP story on the day of the shooting as identifying Rahim, who was communicating with ISIS and under 24-hour surveillance by the Joint Terrorism Task Force, and serving as an intermediary with Rahim’s family. Hooper was also quoted by ABC, asserting that CAIR “will monitor the investigation” of the shooting. Its National Civil Rights Litigation Director, Jenifer Wicks, was quoted in a June 3 Boston Globe story, asking for an independent and thorough investigation “given the recent high profile shootings of African-American men.” Wicks’ name also appeared on a June 3 press release the national organization issued about the shooting.
Contrary to CAIR’s press release, it has no local chapter in Boston.
Although the press release coyly refers to “CAIR-Boston,” and although Hooper told MSNBC “two of our Massachusetts chapter board members were in the meeting” at which authorities showed the surveillance video of the shooting, there is no local chapter there – hence the need for the national office to jump in. One finds an occasional reference to CAIR Massachusetts as, for instance, on the CAIR Kansas website, but the link is defunct. The telephone directory has no listing of a number for CAIR or Council on American-Islamic Relations in Boston. CAIR’s chapter list, which records a total of 28 chapters (a Washington office and 27 state chapters), does not mention any CAIR branch in the state.On previous occasions, CAIR proudly proclaimed that it had at least 32 chapters. Back in July 2007, CAIR claimed to have grown to 33 chapters. In another publication from the same month, it claimed to have a total of 32 chapters across the United States. Five years later, it was claiming the same number of 32, “nationwide and in Canada.” Somehow it lost at least four United States chapters in the interim. There is a website for a National Council of Canadian Muslims, elsewhere referred to as CAIR-CAN; even if this is a vibrant organization, there is no information about local chapters. Counting Canada, CAIR has a total of 29 chapters.
Defunct chapter links on the CAIR Kansas webpage
CAIR websites (e.g., CAIR Kansas and CAIR Ohio) list defunct hyperlinks to CAIR Georgia, Nevada, New Jersey, and South Carolina, in addition to Massachusetts. CAIR’s list identifies chapters in Georgia and Kentucky but atypically lists no website or email address for either. It does include a hyperlink to a website for CAIR New Jersey, but the account has been “suspended.” It lists no chapters in Nevada, South Carolina, or Massachusetts. None of these chapters or pseudo-chapters (Massachusetts, Georgia, Kentucky, Nevada, New Jersey, or South Carolina) has its own employer identification number (EIN).There was an Atlanta-based “NGA” chapter, which had its own EIN, but it appears to be defunct. It has not filed a tax return since 2008, and reported no income after 2006. Its website returns “server not found,” and it does not appear on CAIR’s list.Let’s return to CAIR’s national office. In 2000, the year before 9/11, it had a membership of 29,000. By 2006, five years after 9/11, membership had dropped to under 1,700. In 2000, it received $732,765 income from membership dues. By 2004, which is to say, three years after 9/11, this Muslim Brotherhood organization claimed to have received only $119,029 income from membership dues. Its income for the latter part of the decade cannot be determined because, for three years, it failed to file tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service. For the years 2011-2013, it reported zero income from membership dues.As for fundraising, CAIR netted $106,879 this way in 2011, $233,084 in 2012, and only $39,732 in 2013.Amazingly, it still has plenty of money. In 2011, CAIR received $3,964,990 in “contributions, gifts, [and] grants.” In 2012, it received $1,581,411. In 2013, the amount was $2,201,843.For the years 2011-2013, CAIR reported the income at right.It should also be noted that in 2005, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, Inc., set up a new corporation, CAIR Foundation, Inc., transferred some assets to the new entity (“new CAIR”), and eventually renamed itself the Washington Trust Foundation, Inc. The relationship between the two corporations is, at best, confusing, with hundreds of thousands of dollars being lent back and forth between the two.In 2013, Washington Trust Foundation (“old CAIR”) reported “contributions, gifts, [or] grants” totaling $381,500. It reported no income from membership dues or fundraising events.It’s unclear from where new or old CAIR’s money is coming, but one thing is clear: it isn’t membership dues from the American Muslims CAIR claims to represent, and little is coming from formal fundraising efforts to the American Muslim community. Whatever persons or groups are financing CAIR – which last year the United Arab Emirates designated as a terrorist organization – it is reasonable to suppose that CAIR is representing their interests, not those of its “membership.”Even if the national CAIR organization truly represented its “membership” in the national American Muslim community, why is it pretending to represent the Massachusetts Muslim community?
Johanna Markind is associate counselor at the Middle East Forum

Canada's FM Statement on Ramadan
June 18, 2015 - Ottawa, Ontario - Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada
The Honourable Rob Nicholson, P.C., Q.C., M.P. for Niagara Falls, Minister of Foreign Affairs, today issued the following statement to mark the beginning of Ramadan:
“Today marks the beginning of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
“For Muslims, this is the month the Qur’an was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad.
“Ramadan is a time of fasting and contemplation. During this month, Muslims seek God’s mercy and blessing and aim to extend that same mercy to those who are less fortunate in society through charitable giving.
“It is also a time of sharing in the happiness of gathering with family and friends for the evening iftar and accompanying prayers.
“As Ramadan begins, I would like to extend my best wishes to Muslim communities in Canada and around the world.
“Ramadan karim.”

Might Israel inspire an Alawite state?
Michael Young/The Daily Star/June 18/15
Recently, there have been reports that Iran intends to send several thousand combatants to Syria, including Iranians as well as Iraqi, Afghan and other Shiites. This followed remarks by the head of the Quds Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Qasem Soleimani, in which he said that Iranian and Syrian plans in the Syrian war would “surprise” the world.
The purpose of these reinforcements is to come to the aid of an overstretched Syrian army, which has taken heavy losses and has had trouble finding new recruits. The broader aim is, reportedly, to consolidate Bashar Assad’s hold over Damascus, central Syria, around Homs and Hama, and the coastal areas. To pursue such a strategy it appears that Iran has persuaded Assad to withdraw his forces from outlying regions of Syria so that they can regroup in more defensible positions.
Yet after accounts came out that anywhere between 7,000 and 15,000 combatants (with some figures even higher) were present in Syria, Iran denied the stories last week. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Marzieh Afkham said the reports about “the military presence of countries friendly to Syria [were] unfounded,” before adding, “The Syrian government and people have the capacity to resist and will continue to do so.”
Her denials could have been an effort to downplay the difficult situation of the Assad regime. However, pro-Syrian sources in Beirut seemed to confirm that while Iran had sent a large number of advisers to Syria, as yet there were no combatants. Confusing matters further, a Syrian “security source” had told AFP earlier that Iran’s objective was to reach 10,000 men, “to support the Syrian army and pro-government militias, firstly in Damascus, and then to retake Jisr al-Shughur because it is key to the Mediterranean coast and the Hama region.”
While the details of Iranian-sponsored assistance remain uncertain, there are indications that the regime is indeed pursuing a fallback strategy to the Damascus-Homs-Latakia axis. There have been signs, for instance, in Swaida that the regime may be preparing to remove forces, while the takeover of Palmyra as well as of the 52nd Brigade military base in the south of the country, like the Al-Thala air base nearby, may have been facilitated by the fact that the army expected to pull out anyway.
In addition, Hezbollah’s offensive in the Qalamoun area is, by most accounts, a part of this broader plan. By securing control of the region, which lies between Lebanon and the Damascus-Homs highway, the party hopes to do two things: protect communication lines between the capital and the coastal areas and secure continuity between Shiite areas in Lebanon and the prospective Alawite-controlled ministate taking form in Syria.
This has long been on the mind of the Syrian regime and its allies. It is also one reason why the Syrian army and Iran’s proxies have engaged in mass sectarian cleansing in Homs province early on in the Syrian war, as well as in Qalamoun in 2013, sending well over a million Syrian Sunnis into Lebanon.
However, if pro-Syrian sources in Lebanon are to be believed the strategy of consolidation does not apply everywhere. For instance it appears that the regime does not want to give up on Aleppo, Syria’s second largest city. As the deputy foreign minister, Faisal Mekdad, recently stated, “All our strategic planning now is to keep the road to Aleppo open so our troops can defend the city.” This could either mean that the Syrians and Iranians are not always in absolute agreement, with some locations so symbolic that the Assad regime cannot afford to surrender them. Or it could mean that both sides have a more flexible view of what territorial consolidation implies.
But assuming that such a project is indeed the ultimate ambition of the Assad regime and Iran, what are its chances of succeeding? Ironically, the two may look at a similar experience in the region for inspiration, namely the Zionists’ takeover of Palestinian areas in 1948, their expulsion of the local population and their establishment of a state, followed by expansion.
To those who say that an Alawite ministate is not viable, Iran and Bashar Assad may be tempted to point to the outcome in Israel. But the idea of strengthening such a ministate has other implications. These relate to the debate over whether Iran and Russia have accepted the need to push Assad out of office, even if it means he remains in power during a transitional phase.
If Iran is indeed pushing for an Alawite ministate, then what purpose would Assad’s removal serve? The only thing that would mandate such a step is to facilitate negotiations for a resolution to the conflict in Syria. Yet the rationale behind a ministate, namely finalization of wartime boundaries, represents the opposite intent. The establishment of a ministate, while it might lead to negotiations in the future to firm up this entity’s boundaries, similar to the Arab armistice agreements with Israel in 1949, represents a strategy of confrontation, not compromise. As a result, any notion of destabilizing this effort by removing Assad from office seems highly improbable.
Above all an Alawite ministate would represent an unbearable burden for Lebanon. With well over a million Sunnis in the country, Shiites cannot welcome such an endgame. Syrian Sunnis would not return home and the Lebanese Shiites would have to face the consequences. As the Palestinians showed, refugee populations do not stay idle long. They mobilize to regain what was taken away from them. Lebanon’s past efforts to manage the Palestinians will seem easy in comparison.
Iran’s plans will become clearer in the coming weeks. But its hubris is already well in evidence. Tehran will bend the region beyond the breaking point to secure its own interests, even if it means that its allies pay a heavy price for this. The resulting fires are already burning the Middle East irrevocably.
**Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR. He tweets @BeirutCalling.

Blood leads to blood
The Daily Star/June 18, 2015/Of all the oppressed minorities in Syria over the last decades, the Kurds have arguably been the underdog. Tragic then are the reports that in winning back land from ISIS their armed units are potentially committing sectarian killings and ethnic cleansing. Not just in Syria, but in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, the authorities have feared the Kurds, realizing their aspirations of statehood were becoming more and more realistic. But as the Syrian Kurdish militia have won back Tal Abyad in recent days – with aerial assistance from the U.S. – rumors, denied by the Kurds, have swirled that they did not just liberate the land – they forced Sunnis and Turkmen to flee their homes and run for the Turkish border for sanctuary. This disturbing phenomenon of the oppressed becoming the oppressors is not without precedent, in this region and further afield. Closer to home, in Iraq, the majority Shiites, long neglected under Saddam Hussein, were all too happy to take over the reins following his downfall in 2003. And before long, Shiite militias were taking out their vengeance on Sunni civilians across the land. And many of the abuses suffered by Jews in the European pogroms of in the 19th and early 20th centuries are being repeated against the Palestinians in Israel today. Feelings of anger in these circumstances are natural, but these responses are misplaced, and reveal a horrifying lack of humanity among the perpetrators. And as long as Kurdish and international leaders continue to ignore such abuses of power, they will continue, increasingly bloody and sectarian, only further contributing to overall tensions across the region.