LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
December 06/15
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
http://www.eliasbejjaninews.com/newsbulletins05/english.december06.15.htm
Bible Quotations For Today
On the eighth day they came to circumcise the child, and
they were going to name him Zechariah after his father. But his mother said,
‘No; he is to be called John
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Luke 01/57-66: "Now the time came
for Elizabeth to give birth, and she bore a son. Her neighbours and relatives
heard that the Lord had shown his great mercy to her, and they rejoiced with
her. On the eighth day they came to circumcise the child, and they were going to
name him Zechariah after his father. But his mother said, ‘No; he is to be
called John.’They said to her, ‘None of your relatives has this name.’Then they
began motioning to his father to find out what name he wanted to give him. He
asked for a writing-tablet and wrote, ‘His name is John.’ And all of them were
amazed. Immediately his mouth was opened and his tongue freed, and he began to
speak, praising God. Fear came over all their neighbours, and all these things
were talked about throughout the entire hill country of Judea. All who heard
them pondered them and said, ‘What then will this child become?’ For, indeed,
the hand of the Lord was with him.
Rejoice, you childless one, you who bear no children, burst
into song and shout, you who endure no birth pangs; for the children of the
desolate woman are more numerous than the children of the one who is married.
Letter to the Galatians 04/21//31/05,01: "Tell me, you who desire to be subject
to the law, will you not listen to the law? For it is written that Abraham had
two sons, one by a slave woman and the other by a free woman. One, the child of
the slave, was born according to the flesh; the other, the child of the free
woman, was born through the promise. Now this is an allegory: these women are
two covenants. One woman, in fact, is Hagar, from Mount Sinai, bearing children
for slavery. Now Hagar is Mount Sinai in Arabia and corresponds to the present
Jerusalem, for she is in slavery with her children. But the other woman
corresponds to the Jerusalem above; she is free, and she is our mother. For it
is written, ‘Rejoice, you childless one, you who bear no children, burst into
song and shout, you who endure no birth pangs; for the children of the desolate
woman are more numerous than the children of the one who is married.’Now you, my
friends, are children of the promise, like Isaac. But just as at that time the
child who was born according to the flesh persecuted the child who was born
according to the Spirit, so it is now also. But what does the scripture say?
‘Drive out the slave and her child; for the child of the slave will not share
the inheritance with the child of the free woman.’ So then, friends, we are
children, not of the slave but of the free woman. For freedom Christ has set us
free. Stand firm, therefore, and do not submit again to a yoke of slavery."
Russia-Turkey-GCC: Is a Truce in Syria Still Possible/Middle East
Briefing/December 05/15
The Imbroglio in Syria: Erdogan or Putin in the Anti-ISIL Coalition/Middle East
Briefing/December 05/15
Hollande’s War Plan Under Review in Washington and Moscow/Middle East
Briefing/December 05/15
Washington Used Hotline to Moscow after Su-24 Downing/Middle East
Briefing/December 05/15/
Russia Devouring the Eastern Mediterranean/Burak Bekdil/ Gatestone
Institute/December 05/15
Why is the dollar surging in Iran/Mohammad Ali Shabani/Al-Monitor/December 05/15
Turkey takes a hit from the Russian hammer/Cengiz Çandar/Al-Monitor/December 05
Analysis: The end of the post-World War II order/JOHN LLOYD, REUTERS/J.Post/12/06/2015
Ethnic Cleansing Threatens Syria's Unity/Fabrice Balanche/Washington
Institute/December 05/15
Tehran’s plan for the Arabs: the quota system/Abdulrahman al-Rashed/Al Arabiya/December
05/15
Swords are mightier than words in the war on ISIS/Hisham Melhem/Al Arabiya/December
05/15
Vital steps to eradicate violence against women/Yara al-Wazir/Al Arabiya/December
05/15
Titles For Latest LCCC Bulletin for Lebanese Related News published on
December 05-06/15
Suspect Blows Himself up in Army Raid in North, Injures 7
Report: Aoun to Meet Nasrallah Soon to Address Presidential Elections
Report: Hariri in Beirut next Week to Follow up on Franjieh Nomination
Moussawi: If Arsal is Occupied, what is the Plan to Liberate it?
Ahmed Hariri: Failure to Approve Political Settlement Will Lead to Election of
President with Blood
Titles For Latest LCCC Bulletin For Miscellaneous Reports And News published on
December 05-06/15
U.N. summit to combat financing of terror
Obama Says U.S. 'Will not Be Terrorized' in Wake of California Attack
Fabius: Assad's Departure Not Necessary before Political Transition
Baghdad Calls on Ankara to 'Immediately' Withdraw Troops from Northern Iraq
U.S. puts request for bigger Turkish air role on hold
Report links Paris militant group to Britain, police cautious
Russia bans 'undesirable' US-funded foundation
Veteran Israeli Dove Yossi Sarid Dies at 75
Risk of Huge IS Influx into Libya, France Warns
Links From Jihad Watch Site for
December 05-06/15
San Bernardino jihad murderer linked to jihadi mosque in Pakistan
Pataki dares Lynch to arrest him for urging “war on radical Islam”
Islamocritical ex-Congressman to Atty General: “Prosecute me. I dare you.”
SB jihadi to Christian coworker: “Christians and Jews deserve to die”
Machete-wielding Muslim slashes man’s throat in London tube station
Islamic State jihad suicide bombers murder 27 on island in Lake Chad
NY Times: “Non-Muslim extremists” more lethal than jihadis
New Glazov Gang: When Islamic “Refugees” Turn to Terror
Video: Robert Spencer on Hannity: the SB jihad attack and jihad denial
Suspect Blows Himself up in Army Raid in North, Injures
7
Naharnet/December 06/15/A wanted suspect blew himself on Saturday during an army
raid against his residence in the northern region of Deir Ammar, announced the
military in a statement. It said that Mohammed Mustafa Hamza first tossed two
hand grenades at the troops, one of which exploded, wounding seven soldiers. He
then detonated an explosives belt, killing himself and two of his relatives. The
National News Agency said his mother, Hasna Hamza, and niece, Israa Mohammed al-Sayyed,
were killed in the blast. A number of other civilians at the scene were wounded,
said the army communique. NNA said the suspect's sister Safa Hamza was among the
wounded. Voice of Lebanon radio (93.3) identified some of the injured soldiers
as Hassan Safa, Fadi Kanj, Khodr Deeb, Wassim Khalifeh, and Hassan Tleijeh. A
number of Lebanese and Syrian nationals were arrested in connection to Hamza,
added the army. The military police is tackling the investigation in the case
along with the concerned judiciary. Hamza, a fugitive, is wanted for opening
fire at two army patrols in the Mankoubin neighborhood in the northern city of
Tripoli in 2014, continued the military statement. He also joined an armed group
in opening fire at a military surveillance post on September 24, 2014. The
incident left several soldiers dead and one civilian injured. Media reports had
said earlier on Saturday that Hamza was linked to the armed group of Osama
Mansour, who was shot dead by security forces in Tripoli in April. Mansour and
extremist Shadi al-Mawlawi had led armed groups that engaged in deadly
gunbattles with the army in Tripoli and its surrounding areas in October.
Report: Aoun to Meet Nasrallah Soon to Address Presidential
Elections
Naharnet/December 06/15/Change and Reform bloc leader MP Michel Aoun is expected
to hold talks soon with Hizbullah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah to tackle the
latest developments related to the presidential elections, reported the daily An
Nahar on Saturday. A date for the meeting has not been scheduled yet. The two
officials are expected to tackle the emergence of Marada Movement head MP
Suleiman Franjieh as a presidential candidate. Aoun himself is a candidate and a
fellow member of the March 8 alliance. Media reports have said that Hizbullah is
committed to Aoun's nomination as president “as long as his candidacy still
stands,” a stance that was echoed by Franjieh. Political powers are leaning
towards the nomination of Franjieh as part of a greater settlement aimed at
resolving the political deadlock in Lebanon. The country has been without a
president since May 2014 when the term of Michel Suleiman ended without the
election of a successor. Ongoing disputes between the March 8 and 14 camps over
a compromise candidate have thwarted the polls.
Report: Hariri in Beirut next Week to Follow up on Franjieh Nomination
Naharnet/December 06/15/Head of the Mustaqbal Movement MP Saad Hariri is
expected to make a return to Lebanon to follow up on the latest developments
linked to the presidential elections, revealed the daily An Nahar on Saturday.
It said that he is likely to return next week, either on Tuesday or Wednesday,
to follow up on the efforts to nominate Marada Movement chief MP Suleiman
Franjieh as president. The lawmaker's nomination will be officially announced on
Tuesday or Wednesday, added the daily. Hariri is currently in Riyadh where he
arrived from Paris. He is set to meet with a number of Lebanese officials to
address the presidential elections, including Justice Minister Ashraf Rifi.
Franjieh had received on Friday a telephone call from French President Francois
Hollande to discuss the presidential elections. The call came a day after Hariri
had met the French leader in Paris. The Marada Movement chief has emerged as a
potential presidential candidate as part of a greater settlement aimed at ending
the political deadlock in Lebanon. There are however voices of dissent among the
Kataeb Party, Lebanese Forces, and Change and Reform bloc over the nomination of
Franjieh. Lebanon has been without a president since May 2014 when the term of
Michel Suleiman ended without the election of a successor. Ongoing disputes
between the rival March 8 and 14 camps over a compromise candidate have thwarted
the polls. Hariri had last paid a visit to Beirut in February to mark the tenth
anniversary of his father's assassination.
Moussawi: If Arsal is Occupied, what is the Plan to
Liberate it?
Naharnet/December 06/15/Hizbullah MP Nawwaf al-Moussawi condemned the state's
inaction in tackling the presence of al-Nusra Front extremists in the
northeastern border region of Arsal, vowing that the party will “pursue the
criminals wherever they are," reported the National News Agency on Saturday. He
said: “We ask the interior minister, government, and all state institutions what
they plan to do now that they have acknowledged that Arsal is being occupied?”
“Seeing as Arsal is occupied, then the state should devise a plan to liberate it
and its people,” he urged. Interior Minister Nouhad al-Mashnouq had acknowledged
on Thursday that the Arsal region is indeed “occupied” by gunmen from Syria. He
stressed that the army has not taken any action over the situation “to avoid
dragging Lebanon into the Syrian conflict.”Moussawi continued by hailing the
release of the 16 servicemen who were being held hostage by the al-Nusra Front,
noting however how “some sides sought to acquit these takfiri and terrorist
groups of their crimes to employ them for political purposes.”“We should
therefore protest against all attempts to acquit these groups,” the lawmaker
added. Al-Nusra Front should be “uprooted from Lebanese soil because it violates
Lebanon's diversity,” he demanded. “Whoever tries to incorporate this group
within Lebanon’s political fabric is insulting this identity,” he declared. “We
should therefore stand united to eliminate these terrorist and takfiri groups
from Lebanon,” Moussawi said. “This can only be achieved through a united stance
on these groups,” he stated. The servicemen were released on Tuesday through a
Qatari-sponsored deal that included a prisoner swap that saw the release of
inmates from Lebanese and Syrian jails. Footage of the exchange showed images of
armed Nusra Front members freely roaming the Lebanese area of Arsal. Speaker
Nabih Berri on Wednesday condemned such images, saying that the country's
sovereignty has been violated. Some 30 servicemen were abducted in the wake of
clashes with the Nusra Front and Islamic State group in August 2014. The Islamic
State continues to hold nine hostages.
Ahmed Hariri: Failure to Approve Political Settlement Will
Lead to Election of President with Blood
Naharnet/December 06/15/Secretary General of the Mustaqbal Movement Ahmed
al-Hariri warned on Saturday of the serious repercussions of the failure to
adopt the settlement that is being devised to resolve the political deadlock and
presidential vacuum in Lebanon. He warned: “The failure of the settlement may
lead to the election of a new president with blood.” Efforts are underway to
reach an agreement over the nomination of Marada Movement leader MP Suleiman
Franjieh as president. “The prolongation of the crisis for several more months
will result in the election of a president in blood, rather than in a calm
atmosphere,” Hariri warned. “Do we want another civil war?” he asked. “The
conditions for the approval of the current settlement are not ripe yet,” he
noted however. “The initiative launched by Mustaqbal Movement chief MP Saad
Hariri is aimed at saving Lebanon from collapse,” he stressed. The emergence of
Franjieh as a candidate has also led to talks of a political settlement. There
are however voices of dissent among the Kataeb Party, Lebanese Forces, Change
and Reform bloc, and some March 14 officials over the nomination. Lebanon has
been without a president since May 2014 when the term of Michel Suleiman ended
without the election of a successor. Ongoing disputes between the rival March 8
and 14 camps over a compromise candidate have thwarted the polls.
U.N. summit to combat financing of terror
The Associated Press, United Nations Saturday, 5 December 2015/The United States
is organizing a summit of finance ministers from U.N. Security Council nations
aimed at strengthening global efforts to combat “the financing of terrorism” —
especially methods used by ISIS militants. The U.S. Mission to the U.N. said
Friday that Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew will chair the Dec. 17 meeting which
will adopt a new resolution on the sanctions regime against al-Qaeda and the
ISIS, focused on the growing ISIS threat. Lew said cutting ISIS off from the
international financial system and disrupting its financing “are critical to
effectively combatting this violent militant group.”“A united international
front is vital to achieve that goal, and this meeting marks an important step in
coordinating our efforts,” he said in a statement. U.S. Ambassador Samantha
Power said Tuesday that the U.S. is working on a draft resolution “that will
consolidate and streamline the council’s recent efforts on ISIL financing, as
well as include new steps to make the sanctions more effective.” She stressed
Friday that “the United States is focused on using every tool in its toolbox to
defeat ISIL.”Russia has also circulated a draft resolution aimed at tightening
the U.N. crackdown on the financing of IS and other extremist groups. The
Security Council adopted a Russian-sponsored resolution on Feb. 12 which is
aimed at halting illicit oil sales, trading in antiquities, and ransom payments
for hostages that are key methods used by militant groups to finance their
operations.
Power said the new Russian effort is focused on the same thing the U.S. is
focused on and expressed guarded optimism that U.S. and Russian ideas can be
melded into a resolution.
Obama Says U.S. 'Will not Be Terrorized' in Wake of
California Attack
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/December 06/15/President Barack Obama insisted
that the United States "will not be terrorized" and renewed his call for tighter
gun control measures in a weekly address Saturday that focused on the deadly
attack in California. As it became increasingly likely that the San Bernardino
shooting spree that left 14 people dead was inspired by the Islamic State group,
Obama vowed that investigators would "get to the bottom" of how and why the
rampage occurred. "It is entirely possible that these two attackers were
radicalized to commit this act of terror," Obama said in remarks that expanded
beyond his initial singular focus on gun control. "We know that ISIL and other
terrorist groups are actively encouraging people -- around the world and in our
country -- to commit terrible acts of violence, often times as lone wolf
actors," he said using an alternate acronym for the Islamic State group. "All of
us -- government, law enforcement, communities, faith leaders -- need to work
together to prevent people from falling victim to these hateful ideologies." The
attackers, U.S.-born Muslim Syed Farook, 28, and his 29-year-old Pakistani wife
Tashfeen Malik, were killed during a police manhunt. The FBI is investigating
possible links to groups outside the United States and said the rampage is being
probed as "an act of terrorism."
Obama used the address to renew his calls for this latest mass shooting to
prompt a rethink on gun laws that allow virtually any adult to buy deadly
weapons and munitions. "This tragedy reminds us of our obligation to do
everything in our power, together, to keep our communities safe," Obama said.
"We know that the killers in San Bernardino used military-style assault weapons
-- weapons of war -- to kill as many people as they could. It's another tragic
reminder that here in America it's way too easy for dangerous people to get
their hands on a gun."
Obama again touted measures, which he may yet try to introduce by executive
order. Such a move would prompt a political and legal storm in the run-up to the
2016 presidential election."Right now, people on the No-Fly list can walk into a
store and buy a gun. That is insane," Obama said. "If you're too dangerous to
board a plane, you're too dangerous, by definition, to buy a gun."Officials have
seized thousands of rounds of ammunition from the home of the couple, who were
armed with assault rifles and handguns -- all legally purchased. Republicans who
vehemently oppose gun control measures have accused Obama of politicizing a
tragedy that was the result of radicalism. "As President, my highest priority is
the security and safety of the American people. This is work that should unite
us all -- as Americans -- so that we're doing everything in our power to defend
our country," he said. "That's how we can honor the lives we lost in San
Bernardino. That's how we can send a message to all those who would try to hurt
us. We are Americans. We will uphold our values -- a free and open society. We
are strong. And we are resilient. And we will not be terrorized."
Fabius: Assad's Departure Not Necessary before Political
Transition
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/December 06/15/The departure of Syrian President
Bashar Assad is no longer necessary before any political transition in the
war-torn country, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said in an interview
published Saturday. The comments mark a softening of Paris' position on the
Syrian president as attention turns to the fight against the Islamic State group
which staged a series of bloody attacks on the French capital last month,
killing 130.
"The fight against Daesh is crucial, but it will only be totally effective if
all the Syrian and regional forces are united," Fabius told the French regional
newspaper Le Progres, using an Arabic acronym for IS. "How is it possible that
Bashar Assad is president, he who committed so many atrocities, and who has a
large part of the population against him?" he said."A united Syria implies a
political transition. That does not mean that Bashar Assad must leave even
before the transition, but there must be assurances for the future".Until now,
France, along with Washington and other Western powers fighting IS jihadists
have long insisted Assad must step down as part of any political solution to the
four-year Syrian conflict. Paris has been adamant in its opposition to Assad,
describing him as a "butcher" of his own people in a civil war that has so far
claimed a quarter million lives and created millions of refugees, triggering the
biggest humanitarian crisis since World War II. On a trip to Washington last
week, French President Francois Hollande reiterated his determination to see
Assad step down in order to give Syria a chance for peace, saying "it should be
as soon as possible."But there have also been signs Paris might moderate its
position as its priority shifted to tackling Islamic State militants which
staged a series of deadly attacks on Paris last month. Last month, Fabius
sparked speculation after telling France's RTL radio "regime forces" could
potentially join the fight against IS. He told Le Progres that "the experience
of recent decades, whether it is in Iraq or in Afghanistan, shows that Western
forces on the ground quickly appear like occupation forces. "The operations must
be led by local forces: Syrian, moderate, Arab, Kurdish, or, if necessary, then
in coordination with the Syrian army, which is impossible without a political
transition", he told the Lyon-based paper.
Baghdad Calls on Ankara to 'Immediately' Withdraw Troops
from Northern Iraq
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/December 06/15/Baghdad demanded Saturday the
immediate withdrawal of forces it said Turkey illegally deployed in Iraq, which
is struggling to assert its sovereignty while receiving foreign assistance
against the Islamic State group. A senior officer from the Kurdish forces in the
region -- which are allied to Ankara -- downplayed the deployment as a routine
training rotation but a Turkish paper said it was part of deal to set up a
permanent base. The Turkish troops, tanks and artillery were sent to Nineveh, a
northern province largely held by IS, in an area currently controlled by Kurdish
forces but also claimed by Baghdad. Facing major political pressure as a result
of statements by American officials, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has
taken an increasingly hard public line on foreign forces in Iraq over the past
week, terming the deployment of ground combat forces a "hostile act". "The Iraqi
authorities call on Turkey to... immediately withdraw from Iraqi territory," a
statement from his office said. "We have confirmation that Turkish forces,
numbering about one armored regiment with a number of tanks and artillery,
entered Iraqi territory... allegedly to train Iraqi groups, without a request or
authorization from Iraqi federal authorities," it said. The deployment "is
considered a serious violation of Iraqi sovereignty," it added. Major General
Nureddin Herki, the commander of Kurdish peshmerga forces in the area, said the
newly-arrived Turkish troops were part of a routine rotation in a training
programme accompanied by a protection force that has since returned to Turkey.
"Before some time, a number of Turkish officers arrived to train Hashad al-Watani
forces in the Zilkan base," Herki said in a statement, referring to volunteer
anti-IS fighters. "Another team arrived to the camp to replace the previous
team, and the mission of the (new) force that came was only to protect the
trainers and return the previous team to Turkey," he said. Herki rejected
reports that a large Turkish force had deployed to take part in an operation to
recapture the nearby city of Mosul from IS. But Turkish media reported much more
major deployment than that described by Herki. "Turkey is establishing a base in
the Bashiqa region of Mosul with 600 soldiers," Turkish newspaper Hurriyet
reported on its front page. The newspaper said that an agreement to do this was
concluded early last month between Iraqi Kurdish regional president Massud
Barzani and then Turkish foreign minister Feridun Sinirlioglu. The peshmerga
forces deployed in the Bashiqa area are loyal to Barzani's party, which has
close ties to Ankara. Baghdad's relations with Turkey have improved recently but
remained strained by Ankara's relationship with Barzani and differences over the
Syrian civil war. Abadi has repeatedly said Iraq needed all the help it could to
fight IS but is also walking a fine line between receiving that support and
projecting sovereignty. The Turkish deployment is just the latest in a series of
challenges he faced over the past week that have pushed him to take a hard line
on foreign forces helping Iraq against IS, which overran large parts of Iraq
last year. Calls from two American senators for the number of U.S. troops in
Iraq to be tripled combined with Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter's
announcement that Washington would send a special forces contingent to fight IS
in Iraq and Syria put Abadi under heavy pressure. Shiite paramilitary forces
dominated by Iran-backed militias came out strongly against the U.S., and Abadi
issued his own series of increasingly strident statements on foreign forces.
U.S. puts request for bigger Turkish air role on hold
Reuters, Washington Saturday, 5 December 2015/Since Turkey shot down a Russian
fighter jet last week, the United States has quietly put on hold a long-standing
request for its NATO ally to play a more active role in the U.S.-led air war
against ISIS. The move, disclosed to Reuters by a U.S. official, is aimed at
allowing just enough time for heightened Turkey-Russia tensions to ease. Turkey
has not flown any coalition air missions in Syria against ISIS since the Nov. 24
incident, two U.S. officials said. The pause is the latest complication over
Turkey's role to have tested the patience of U.S. war planners, who want a more
assertive Turkish contribution - particularly in securing a section of border
with Syria that is seen as a crucial supply route for ISIS. As Britain starts
strikes in Syria and France ramps up its role in the wake of last month's
attacks on Paris by the extremist group, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter
publicly appealed this week for a greater Turkish military role. The top U.S.
priority is for Turkey to secure its southern border with Syria, the first
official said. U.S. concern is focused on a roughly 60-mile (98-km) stretch used
by ISIS to shuttle foreign fighters and illicit trade back and forth. But the
United States also wants to see more Turkish air strikes devoted to ISIS, even
as Washington firmly supports Ankara's strikes against Turkey's Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK), viewed by both countries as a terrorist group. Carter told
a congressional hearing this week that most Turkish air operations have been
targeted at the PKK rather than at ISIS, but U.S. officials acknowledge some
promising signs from Turkey, including moves to secure key border crossings. For
example, Turkish F-16 fighter jets last month joined an air operation to support
Syrian rebels taking back two villages from ISIS along the so-called Mara Line,
a senior Obama administration official told reporters, speaking on condition of
anonymity. The United States does not give data on the number or type of
missions conducted by Turkish air force flights in Syria.Turkey rejects any
suggestion it is not playing its part in the fight against ISIL. "We have taken
part in at least half of the operations," a senior Turkish official told
Reuters. "Apart from that, Turkey takes part in identifying targets and
providing logistics and bases. We are in close cooperation with the U.S."
Russian President Vladimir Putin branded Turkey's shoot-down a war crime on
Thursday and said Turkey would face further sanctions. Moscow has already banned
some Turkish food imports as part of a wider package of retaliatory sanctions.
The United States hopes that tensions between Moscow and Ankara will ease
quickly, allowing Turkey to take a more prominent role inside the U.S.-led
coalition's air campaign, the first official said. The Pentagon declined to
comment on the status of Turkish flights since the shoot-down. Two Turkish
officials declined to directly comment but stressed that Turkey remained part of
the air coalition. "For us nothing has changed," a senior Turkish official told
Reuters. U.S. officials stressed that overall coalition air operations had been
unaffected by the tensions between Turkey and Russia. There is debate within the
Obama administration on how hard to push Turkey. U.S. officials broadly
acknowledge its support has been vital to the U.S.-led campaign in Syria,
allowing the coalition to stage strike missions out of a Turkish air base.
Turkey, for its part, has grown frustrated over the past few years at what it
sees as indecision on the part of the United States and its Western allies,
arguing that only Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's removal from power can
bring lasting peace.
Report links Paris militant group to Britain, police cautious
London, Reuters Saturday, 5 December 2015/The militant network behind last
month’s attacks in Paris had links to people in Britain, the Wall Street Journal
has said in a report that British police described on Saturday as “speculative.”Several
people suspected of having connections to Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) militant and alleged ringleader of the Nov. 13 attacks,
are based in Britain, according to two unidentified Western officials the
Journal cited late on Friday. The officials told the Journal those people,
including some of Moroccan heritage, were based in the Birmingham area in
central England, about 120 miles (190 km) from London. There has been no
official suggestion in London of any direct links between the group that carried
out the attack that killed 130 people and British militants. But jihadi groups
are often loosely arranged and contacts, including the use of social media, are
widespread. West Midlands Police, based in Birmingham, said on Saturday that
media reports regarding the Paris attackers and potential contact with people or
places in the city were “speculative.” Assistant Chief Constable Marcus Beale
said the force’s counter-terrorism unit was “working hand-in-hand” with
counter-terrorism colleagues in London, the national counter-terrorism network
and security services to provide support to the French and Belgian
investigations into the attacks. Britain’s Mirror newspaper reported that
British police were investigating claims that a member of the gang that attacked
Paris made several phone calls to Birmingham in the run-up to the atrocity.
“They were made shortly before the Paris attacks. British police are urgently
investigating whether anyone in the UK was involved in those atrocities and also
whether there is a linked terror cell based here,” the Mirror cited a source as
saying. Britain suffered by far its worst militant Islamist attack in July,
2005, when 52 people were killed by suicide bombs on underground trains and a
bus. Britain is on its second-highest alert level of “severe,” meaning a
militant attack is considered highly likely. This is mainly due to the threat
the authorities say is posed by ISIS militants in Syria and Iraq and their
encouragement of supporters to carry out attacks in their homelands. Charles
Farr, the director general of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism,
said last month that up to 800 Britons had traveled to Iraq and Syria, some to
join ISIS. About 50 percent had returned home while about 70 were believed to
have been killed, Farr said. Britain says seven plots have been foiled in the
last year, although not on the same scale as those carried out in Paris, and
counter-terrorism officers make on average an arrest every day.
Russia bans 'undesirable' US-funded foundation
By AFP, Moscow Friday, 4 December 2015/Russian prosecutors on Friday declared a
U.S. government-funded foundation an ‘undesirable’ organisation, the fourth
entity to be banned under a controversial law targeting foreign groups accused
of political meddling in the country. The U.S. Russia Foundation for Economic
Advancement and the Rule of Law (USRF), which promotes private sector
development and institution building in Russia, will be banned as its activities
“present a threat to the foundations of Russia’s constitutional system and state
security”, Russia’s Prosecutor General said in a statement. The Prosecutor “has
decided to declare as undesirable” its activities and banned its president, U.S.
citizen Mark Pomar, from entering Russia until 2025, the statement added. The
decision now needs to be rubber-stamped by the justice ministry, which keeps a
register of “undesirable” groups. Prosecutors accused USRF - which has had an
office in Russia since 2009 - of financing local NGOs that “participate in
political processes”, branded “foreign agents” by the Russian justice ministry.
Critics of the law on “undesirable” organisations - under which Russian
activists who cooperate with these groups can face fines and prison time - say
it strips local NGOs of crucial funding they could not receive from domestic
donors. On Monday, New York-based foundations run by financier George Soros -
the Open Society Foundation and its Assistance Fund - were slapped with the
‘undesirable’ label and banned from the country.
Veteran Israeli Dove Yossi Sarid Dies at 75
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/December 06/15/Veteran Israeli dove Yossi Sarid,
who championed the cause of a Palestinian state over a political career spanning
three decades, died on Friday evening at the age of 75. Sarid, who was a member
of parliament from 1974 to 2006 and served in the government of Yitzhak Rabin
which signed the Oslo accords with the Palestinians in the 1990s, died of a
heart attack at his home in Tel Aviv. Opposition Labor party leader Isaac Herzog
paid tribute to an "important leader of the Israeli peace camp, a leader whose
clear and sharp voice always sounded obstinately and fiercely, with a brave
unwavering truth, which he believed with all his heart." Environment minister
then education minister, Sarid led the dovish Meretz party from 1996 to 2003
and, even after his retirement from politics, continued to champion the cause of
peace through regular newspaper columns. Asked last year about the prospects for
Israel under what is widely regarded as its most right-wing government ever,
Sarid said: "Two main things keep me awake at night -- the occupation of the
West Bank and inequality in society, because both threaten the existence (of the
state) and not just its quality."
In his final column, published in the Haaretz newspaper on Friday, he railed
against Israeli authorities for the disparity in treatment between Jews and
Palestinians convicted of terrorism offenses. "Your Jewish terrorists come
first. Their homes will not be demolished, their families will not bear the
blame," he wrote. He was referring to a deterrent policy regularly implemented
against the family homes of suspected Palestinian attackers, but not against
those of Jews. Sarid was also an outspoken champion of secularism and strongly
opposed the privileges granted by the Israeli state to ultra-Orthodox Jews,
which include generous subsidies to religious schools as well as exemptions from
military service. He led Meretz out of government in 2000 in a row over
religious education. Born in 1940 when Palestine was still under British
mandate, Sarid worked as a journalist for Israeli army radio before making his
first steps into politics as ruling party spokesman in the 1960s. Asked to sum
up his own legacy in a 2014 interview with a Tel Aviv University student
magazine, Sarid said it was as someone who had never been afraid to voice
unpalatable truths. "I made a name for myself in my different positions as
someone who is determined to go against the wind when it's bad, to swim against
the stream if it's dirty, and is prepared to pay the price for his
determination."
Risk of Huge IS Influx into Libya, France Warns
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/December 06/15/There is an increasing risk of
Libya becoming a haven for combatants from Islamic State, even as western
nations target the extremist jihadist group in Iraq and Syria, the French
defense minister warned in comments published Sunday. "We see foreign jihadists
arriving in the region of Syrte (northern Libya) who, if our operations in Syria
and Iraq succeed in reducing the territorial reach of Daesh (Islamic State, IS)
could tomorrow be more numerous," defense minister Jean-Yves Le Drian told the
Jeune Afrique weekly. Le Drian ruled out military intervention in Libya but
warned the West had to try to foster Libyan unity in the face of such a threat.
"It is a major risk and that's why there absolutely must be understanding
between the Libyans," said Le Drian. Analysts believe Libya would present a less
hospitable environment for IS than Syria and Iraq. But Tripoli is hampered in
presenting a united front as rival governments vie for power -- a militia
alliance including Islamists that overran Tripoli in August 2014, and the
internationally recognized administration that fled to eastern Libya. The
current chaos in Libya with groups of competing militias since the overthrow and
death of dictator Moammar Gadhafi in 2011 has allowed IS to build influence,
notably in Gadhafi's coastal home town of Sirte, east of Tripoli. And there are
widespread fears the group could exploit tribal conflicts further into Africa.
Recognizing Islamic State's increasing Libyan reach, Le Drian said he feared
that ultimately the group could form one half of a double-edged jihadist
challenge in conjunction with Boko Haram, which pledged allegiance to their
fellow Islamic extremists in March and which has been bringing terror to
Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. "There is a major risk of a link being forged
with Boko Haram," said Le Drian, urging Libya's rival administrations to make
common cause while urging neighbors Algeria and Egypt to work diplomatic
channels to that effect. But Le Drian insisted that France would not countenance
military action at least while the Libyans are divided among themselves. "That's
not on the agenda. One cannot release the Libyans from their responsibilities by
suggesting there might one day be an intervention. They must find solutions
themselves."
Russia-Turkey-GCC: Is a Truce in Syria Still Possible?
Middle East Briefing/December 05/15
The leaked reports circulating in Ankara that there have been a dispute between
the Turkish Armed Forces and President Erdogan about shooting the Russian jet
will take time to verify. Yet, it has been persistently reported, for few months
now, that the Turkish Army is not happy with the way Erdogan handled Turkey’s
policy on the Syrian crisis. We believed at the time that these reports were not
accurate. We even estimated that allegations that the Turkish army is trying to
inch Erdogan out of the decision making process related to Syria, were grossly
exaggerated.
The assessment we had was that the Turkish Armed Forces were increasingly
playing a more integrated role within the security related political process in
view of the security environment in and around the country. Therefore, and if
our assessment is accurate, any alleged dispute in Ankara around the Russian jet
incident maybe at best a manageable difference between the Turkish military and
Erdogan.
These leaked reports will not amount to anything significant. What could,
however, is the Western position on Erdogan after the Russian jet incident.
But first, to another related development. Russia’s influential Pravda carried
an opinion November 19 threatening Saudi Arabia and Qatar that in its fight
against terrorism “Russia will act in accordance with Article 51 of the UN
Charter. The article regulates the right to self-defense for a state, Putin
stated. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stressed out at a meeting with
his Lebanese counterpart that Russia would be implementing the article by all
means – military, diplomatic and financial ones”.
Furthermore, Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov conveyed an oral warning
message through a Lebanese politician to both Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
The CEO of the Institute for the Middle East, Yevgeny Satanovsky said that the
two countries should be afraid of Russia’s punishment. “Russia stepped on the
warpath, grabbed a large tomahawk, arrows and went to work. Everything else does
not matter. Russia was not coordinating its actions with international
organizations to take Berlin in 1945”, the expert added.
The threat added to an already inflamed situation. Qatar started a public
campaign to support Erdogan. Pakistan has previously announced that “any threat
to Saudi Arabia will be met by a strong action from Islamabad. The Saudis chose
not to respond to the Russian threats. Even the cabinet meeting that followed
the incident by few days neglected what happened altogether.
Where are the limits of rhetoric in all this?
Difficult to say. The most likely course is that Russia will not take any
practical steps beyond the threats. The reason is that Moscow simply used the
incident to its favor very rapidly indeed. It increased its military control
over the Assad part of Syria by a substantial leap in the quality of its
military systems deployed there.
Su-24M, Slava-class missiles, S-400 surface-to-air missiles, several units of
Spetsnaz commandos, and other naval capabilities were added to Russia’s forces
in Syria within a week after downing the jet.
On the diplomatic front, France which used to adopt a hardline policy towards
Syria seems now to be willing to work with the Russians to fight ISIL. This was
enough to indicate that any attempt to drag NATO to Ankara’s positions regarding
the Russian operation in Syria was unsuccessful.
Furthermore, the Pentagon has announced plans to send additional Special Forces
to Syria based on positive assessment of the impact of the first 50 that were
sent there earlier.
All the while, Assad forces and their allied Shia militias are waging a
relentless offensive from Aleppo to Homs to Dara to the Hasakah province. The
situation around Aleppo seems pretty difficult for the opposition. There is
almost no presence for ISIL in that region. Obviously, Assad forces are slowly
achieving some progress in that area.
What can we make of all this?
Moscow used shooting its jet by Turkey to move in two simultaneous paths. The
first is to harden its political discourse related to Syria’s crisis and its
stand on the political solution there. This was done while gaining more
international backing particularly in Europe. The second was to try to put both
the Syrian opposition and its regional backers on the defensive. In other words,
Moscow used the incident to advance quickly towards achieving its initial goal
in Syria.
There is obviously a new momentum created by the Russian intervention in Syria
and by the escalation of Russia’s military capabilities there. This momentum
manifests itself in both the military situation on the ground and the diplomatic
campaign to widen the group of global powers which are ready to support Moscow’s
effort in Syria or simply to go and do what should be done to fight ISIL. UK
just joined the coalition which adds a positive step to the West’s moves to
counter Russia’s strategic plans for Syria.
It is difficult to say where all this will go. Reducing the Syrian crisis to
merely defeating ISIL, or even defeating the non-ISIL opposition is a major
mistake for one obvious reason: When this crisis started, there was no ISIL in
Syria. In fact, there was no armed opposition whatsoever.
Meanwhile, efforts to form a unified delegation that represents the non-ISIL
opposition is accelerating. Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UN envoy Staphan de
Mistura are involved in intense talks about the formation of the delegation.
Saudi Arabia is waiting the results of these talks to call for a conference in
Riyadh for the representatives that will be chosen. Obviously, each country will
be willing to include the closest groups to its policy. In any case, the
opposition is almost unanimous in wanting all foreign troops out, particularly
Iranian forces and their allies.
Whatever the delegation that will come out, it will trigger tension within the
opposition groups which already fight each other sometimes with no valid reason.
Saudi foreign minister said however that his country insists on a balanced
representation for all Syrian minorities in any unified opposition delegation.
Representatives of the minorities will certainly be added to the delegation. But
in order to guarantee that this is not merely a decorative addition, the active
groups on the ground have to commit to respecting the rights of all civilians
including minorities. Observers from within Syria’s active civil society and
activists group should be provided with means to report to the world any
violations of this commitment.
Globally, the diplomatic effort has recognized, correctly in fact, that its
efforts should indeed focus on the proposed ceasefire. So much so that even the
transitional government is looked at as a tool to enact the proposed ceasefire.
Yet, it is the transitional government that will lay the tone of what will
happen the day after. Turkey has to be a partner in each step on this road in
order to avoid more “Russian Jet” incidents and to coordinate moves in North of
Syria. Turkish interests there have to be considered in any future plans.
Any breakthrough around what we called before a “Taif Deal” for Syria” (Similar
to that which ended the civil war in Lebanon in the 80’s) will face its first
serious test just after it is reached, if ever. It might be helpful to
immediately move, that is the following morning after signing the deal, on the
requirements to sustain it. A road map for the steps required after the deal
should gain the same importance as the deal itself and be as compact in time as
possible. For the window of opportunity, just after reaching the deal, to change
some key elements on the situation on the ground may be short.
In any case, it is clear that the Paris climate summit created a positive
momentum to cross the Turkish-Russian crisis and gave a leeway to the diplomatic
process. This process is walking now a tightrope. The global engagement should
be sustained at this critical moment to bring Syria’s civil war to an end.
Reaching a ceasefire in Syria will be very difficult. Sustaining the ceasefire
will be even more difficult. The one golden role that should never slip away is
that people on the ground are the only forces that can defeat ISIL. Those people
on the ground must have hope in a better tomorrow. This hope will not come with
Assad still in power. They saw the man yesterday and they know that he is as
ruthless as ISIL. Why fight terror to live under terror?
However, ceasefire in Syria is still possible. The international community has
to remain engaged and laser focused on reaching this goal.
Then, a collective war against ISIL.
The Imbroglio in Syria: Erdogan or Putin in the Anti-ISIL Coalition?
Middle East Briefing/December 05/15
When France’s President Francois Hollande was in Moscow he heard from President
Putin two important things:
* “We all agree that it is impossible to successfully fight terrorism in Syria
without ground operations, and no other forces exist today that can conduct
ground operations… In this respect, I feel that President Assad’s army and he
himself are our natural allies in the fight against terrorism”. Putin said.
* Putin pointed out also that Russia is willing to help Syrian opposition groups
to fight ISIL. Moreover, he promised that his forces will avoid “any strikes
against territories and armed forces that are themselves fighting terrorists”.
However, when Hollande was still on his way back home, Russian air raids bombed
mercilessly site of non-ISIL opposition groups around Aleppo and elsewhere in
Syria.
The problem with the promises of the Russian President is that they cannot fit
together in one package. According to Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron
there are around 70,000 moderate Syrians in the armed opposition groups. These
groups were generally formed before ISIL becomes active in Syria. The reason of
their being is to fight Assad. They fought the Syrian dictator, still fight him
and will fight him until he goes. How would it be possible to promise to protect
Assad and to promise at the same breath not to fight those who want him killed
or out of their country?
Before Mr. Hollande’s visit, as after his visit, Mr. Putin was consistent with
himself. Only during the visit he had to step out of his way in a not very
convincing fashion. Or maybe it was just Russian hospitality?
It was remarkable as well that Mr. Putin, standing side by side with Hollande
who went to Russia to offer coordination in military operations in Syria, stated
his position on the proposed global coalition to fight ISIL. “We (Russia) do not
need such cooperation, with anyone, any coalition or country”, the Russian
President said.
In this, President Putin was consistent. He understands that for any coalition
to be established, it has to be based on a common objective. What will the
common objective be in this case? To keep Assad as he says, or to consider him
part of the problem as the Syrians, the US and the Europeans say? To target the
non-ISIL opposition as Mr. Putin does, or to focus on ISIL as the current
coalition, however inaccurate the name is, does?
The story with President Erdogan is a little different. In many of the Turkish
President’s policies we saw examples of cruelty, shortsightedness, and even
abhorrent decisions. Yet, Mr. Erdogan is so important to US access to Syria and
to NATO’s role there that alienating him does not look like a good idea.
Emotions aside, losing Turkey will complicate everything in Syria and in the
Middle East.
Keeping the dialogue wide opened with Mr. Erdogan is essential to ease Turkey’s
way back to its role as a regional power broker instead of the assertive
powerhouse role it tried unsuccessfully to play in the last few years. It will
also help restart the Turkish-Kurdish peace process. And finally, it will be a
constructive step towards a coherent antiterrorism policy in that region.
Erdogan’s behavior, particularly turning a blind eye to ISIL or worse, is a big
mistake based on bigger mistakes by others, namely the Obama administration. The
moment the US gave up its leadership role in the Middle East was the moment the
regional parties scrambled to develop their own tools in a quest to achieve a
host of contradicting and partial agendas. The scene was that of a group of
countries fighting with each other in total disarray.
The US helped the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan during the cold war and we do not
expect that Mr. Putin would have behaved differently than Mr. Erdogan if there
was a civil war in a country bordering Russia. The absence of a US led Master
Plan gave ample space to a host of conflicting games by regional powers. Mr.
Erdogan has to be kept within the general frame of the Western alliance all the
while addressing his policies in regard to Syria, the People’s Democratic Party
(HDP), domestic policies and regional plans in a candid and critical way. In
order to do that, his concerns regarding Syria and Turkish interests there must
be considered. Incentives and consequences should be firmly explained.
Erdogan is not going to go away any time soon. The composition of the new
Turkish cabinet bears his signature in almost every post. His son has the energy
portfolio. And the results of the last snap elections testifies to his coherent
popular base.
The central point that should be examined now is potential coordination between
Russia and the PKK. This particular issue has gained a central weight after the
Russian jet incident. Turkey needs assurances that the PKK will not use any
gains it achieves in Syria as a platform to attack Turkey. Moscow might see it
proper to assist the PKK to do just that as a step in the escalation with
Turkey. Russia has kept traditionally long and strong relations with the PKK.
Whatever the way to address this issue, the point of start should be bringing
Russian-Turkish escalation under control while encouraging a new start for the
Kurdish-Turkish peace process based on assurances given to the two sides. This
effort should gain urgent importance due to the fact that the PKK can actually
cause substantial damage, through the Turkish window, to any plan to reach
international-regional accommodation to pacify Syria.
But the differences between the US and Turkey concerning both the PKK and ISIL
should be narrowed first. If Turkey’s motives are not understood and reshaped
based on respecting Ankara’s interests and the legitimate aspirations of the
Kurds, there will be no way to go but a continuation of a the previous games of
half-heartedly kept commitments and full-heartedly deception tricks played by
Ankara.
Obviously such an effort to collectively agree on the limits of each side’s
actions in the North of Syria is more likely to fail than to succeed. An
agreement does not yet have enough substance to make it possible. But this
should be tried anyway with the help of EU.
The bottom line that should not be given up is to stand by Turkey. President
Obama correctly did that just after the Russian jet incident. Ankara sees that
Moscow is moving fast to change the strategic environment in Central and West
Asia unfavorably from the Turkish view. These changes are not favorable to NATO
neither. Emphasizing the solidarity of NATO with Turkey seems to be the right
policy at this critical moment.
Turkey is key. It can either cause substantial problems, or play a constructive
role in making any comprehensive plan related to the east Mediterranean
applicable. In order to push Mr. Erdogan gently out of his self-claimed role in
that region, there must be someone else playing this role. Currently, there is
no one.
Playing this role depends on having enough leverage and a game plan that does
not totally contradict Turkey’s views of its own interests, rather it emphasize
the common goals. There are several points in this context. Both the US and
Turkey understand that only Sunni Arab fighters can defeat ISIL and preserve the
territories liberated of its terror. Both the US and Turkey have presence in the
North of Syria. And now, the UK, France and potentially others will send more
Special Forces and other military contributions parallel to the US decision to
send more troops to train the Syrian Sunnis in the North.
How will all this develop?
To answer this question the following points have to be thought of:
* There is no point in involving the Russians in any coalition to fight ISIL as
they seem to have a different strategic agenda. It was clear from day one that
they were not interested only in fighting ISIL. What Russia is invited to do is
to protect the Alawi community, if this community chose so, and to focus on
fighting ISIL. But above all, a Russian role to enact a ceasefire should be
welcomed as a positive contribution.
* Giving up the demand for Assad’s departure would amount to alienating all
Sunni opposition and pushing it closer to ISIL. Furthermore, it will guarantee a
continuation of the war in Syria for a decade or more.
* Turkey and NATO have to reach an agreement that addresses Turkey’s concerns
all the while working to give the Kurds in Syria the rights they earned by their
own blood and sacrifices in their own territories.
* The EU has to move on easing Turkey’s road to full membership in return for
cooperation on a specific plan related to the Middle East. A test period should
be specified to see how far Ankara is willing to cooperate.
* There is an urgent need to resume the Kurdish-Turkish dialogue and cease both
Ankara’s security machine atrocities against the Kurds and PKK terrorist
operations in Turkey.
* Mr. Erdogan does not need any more domestic political gimmicks to enhance his
party’s positions. This should be seen by the US and Europe as an opportunity to
influence Ankara’s orientations in domestic and regional policies.
It is clear that the Syrian crisis is gaining larger dimensions now. NATO
countries have to be present in order to foil any Russian strategic plans. If
Russia is sincere when it says it wants only to fight terrorism, this will be
evident soon and should change positions on Russian participation. If not, the
Russian plan should be countered in every step it takes.
The most likely scenario does not look encouraging. However, what should be done
should be done.
Hollande’s War Plan Under Review in Washington and Moscow
Middle East Briefing/December 05/15
French President Francois Hollande presented a detailed war plan last week, in
his meetings in Washington and Sochi with Presidents Obama and Putin on Nov. 24
and 26. The French President is attempting to exploit the universal support he
has received from world leaders, following the Nov. 13 Paris massacres by
Islamic State-linked jihadists.Hollande is proposing an all-out ground offensive against the Islamic State,
starting in Raqqa in northern Syria. He wants the United States, Russia and
Europe to coordinate bombing campaigns, while indigenous Syrian forces, made up
of the Syrian Army and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and allied non-jihadist rebel
groups, carry out ground operations. This would include a significant role for
Kurdish militias as well. The Hollande proposal, discussed with both Obama and
Putin, does not rule out the possibility of some Arab military forces
participating in the ground campaign, which French military officials estimate
can be achieved with 30,000 well-trained troops. A parallel military campaign
would be launched in Iraq, using the same formula, but relying primarily on the
Iraq Armed Forces to conduct the ground campaign. This is a sticking point,
given the Iraq Army’s poor track record to date in fighting against ISIL.
Hollande is proposing a classic military campaign, with a classic military
objective: Totally crush and defeat the Islamic State in its Syrian and Iraqi
strongholds.
In his meetings in Washington and Sochi, Hollande side-stepped the most
controversial issue: The future status of Syrian President Bashar Assad.
Hollande knows that any viable diplomatic solution will require Assad’s
departure. But he argued that no one is calling for the dismantling of the
Syrian state or the Syrian Army. Therefore, the future status of Assad and his
inner circle is not relevant to the immediate task of thoroughly defeating ISIL
in Syria and Iraq.
Neither President Obama nor President Putin gave a full endorsement to the
French proposal. Both similarly said that they would seriously study the
proposal and provide a response soon. Washington and Moscow are now working on
expanded intelligence sharing, which is an important next step in the limited
deconfliction agreement that was worked out between the U.S. and Russia.
While Hollande is focused on crushing ISIL, in the aftermath of Paris, Obama and
Putin are facing domestic challenges that impel them to move more slowly.
Obama has come under increasing criticism for his go-slow approach to the Syria
war and the emergence of ISIL. For nine months, Pentagon planners urged Obama to
give them the OK to bomb oil refineries and tanker trucks that have provided the
Islamic State with its most lucrative source of revenue. Obama refused those
requests, up until the Paris attacks.
All three of Obama’s former Secretaries of Defense—Robert Gates, Leon Panetta
and Chuck Hagel—have criticized Obama’s indecisiveness and lack of a strategy
for dealing with Syria. Back in 2011, at the outset of the Syrian war, Gates,
along with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman
Gen. Martin Dempsey, and other top Administration national security officials
urged the arming and training of the Syrian rebels. This was before the influx
of foreign fighters, before the migration of Al Qaeda in Iraq across the border
into Syria, and well-before the emergence of the Islamic State. All of those
former Administration officials have blamed Obama’s indecisiveness for the rise
of ISIL. Some have also charged that Obama’s failure to reach a Status of Forces
Agreement with Iraq back in 2011 created a security vacuum that also contributed
to the rise of ISIL.
President Putin is facing an even more challenging domestic dilemma, despite his
enormous popularity. The recent bombings of the power lines into Crimea by the
Right Sector, throwing the peninsula into a near-total blackout, have hurt
Putin’s reputation as a “strongman.” And the two back-to-back attacks—the ISIL
downing of the Metrojet plane over the Sinai, and the Turkish shooting down of
the Su-24—have further tarnished his image and posed a direct challenge to
formulate a measured but strong response.
Putin needs a public apology from Turkey, and President Recip Erdogan cannot
politically afford to do that, given his own diminishing support from the
Turkish population, and the reemergence of the Turkish Armed Forces as a
significant political force in the country, after having been tremendously
weakened by Erdogan’s constant attacks. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu took the occasion of the Su-24 shoot-down to deliver a jab at Erdogan,
announcing publicly in Israel that the Russians had carried out an identical
incursion into Israeli air space, but that Israel had not even contemplated
shooting the Russian plane down. Russia and Israel have the most elaborate
deconfliction agreement, which was personally negotiated by Putin and Netanyahu.
The Israeli comments, combined with behind-the-scenes pressure from almost all
of Turkey’s NATO allies to de-escalate the conflict with Russia, have brought
some results. That pressure includes growing demands to fully seal the
Turkey-Syria border, thus cutting off the main logistical supply lines to Raqqa.
When all of these factors are taken into account, it could strengthen Hollande’s
argument for his war plan. If ISIL can be crushed in Syria in a several
week-long military campaign, using conventional ground and air tactics, world
attention will be refocused on that victory—especially if France, the UK, the
United States and Russia work in a coordinated fashion to lead the air war and
provide combat advisors to the ground forces.
Washington Used Hotline to Moscow after Su-24 Downing
Middle East Briefing/December 05/15/From the moment that U.S. intelligence confirmed that Turkey had shot down a
Russian Su-24 along the Turkish-Syrian border on Nov. 24, top Pentagon and State
Department officials activated their hotlines to Moscow to convince Vladimir
Putin not to launch an immediate military retaliation that could have led to a
broader war and an irreversible breakdown of the Vienna process, aimed at ending
the nearly five year long Syrian war.
Among the messages conveyed through the military-to-military channels was that
the U.S. was caught completely by surprise by the Turkish actions, and had not
been consulted in advance for any kind of tacit green light approval. The
generals reported that U.S. military commanders operating out of the bases in
Turkey were furious at the action taken by the Turkish Air Force. One Turkish
general confirmed to some American friends that the attack on the Russian plane
had been pre-meditated and had been ordered by President Recip Erdogan
personally. That Turkish general later equivocated and merely confirmed that the
order had come from “the top,” meaning either Erdogan or top Turkish military
officials.
U.S. intelligence officials are trying to get to the bottom of who issued the
orders, because there are dramatically different conclusions to be drawn, based
on whether or not the order came directly from the Turkish President.
The early communications between U.S. and Russian military commanders and
diplomats were successful. President Putin conveyed that Russia would not
retaliate militarily, and that there would be a thorough investigation to get
all of the facts. Despite the Putin pledge not to escalate the military
confrontation with Turkey, a NATO member, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
did convey to Secretary of State John Kerry that Russia would extract a price
for the Turkish actions. And, within hours of the shoot-down of the Su-24,
Russia escalated the bombing of the area along the Turkish-Syrian border where
the plane had been shot down. The main rebel forces in that area are Turkmen
fighters, who have been armed and supported by Turkey since the very start of
the Syria fighting in 2011.
While Putin at one point told reporters that Russia had provided the United
States with the flight plans of the Su-24, as part of the deconfliction
agreements reached between Russia and the U.S.-led coalition, Pentagon
officials, after careful review, have said that they did not have specific
information on the Su-24 flight plan. The only time that the Russians provided
precise information on their sorties was during a major bombing run against
Raqqa, the Islamic State’s “capital” in northern Syria. Otherwise, the Russians
have indicated general corridors where Russian planes will be carrying out
bombing runs, but no more precise information.
The day of the shoot-down of the Russian plane, President Obama was meeting with
French President Hollande in Washington. During that meeting, Obama pressed
Hollande to get Putin to agree to limit Russian bombing targets to the Islamic
State and Nusra Front only, and abandon the claim that all rebels fighting the
Assad government are “terrorists.” Hollande met with Putin in Sochi on Nov. 26,
and the Russian President agreed to avoid bombing the non-IS and non-Nusra
opposition groups.
Russia Devouring the Eastern Mediterranean?
Burak Bekdil/ Gatestone Institute/December 05/15
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7007/russia-eastern-mediterranean
Turkey shot down a Russian jet. No gain, but plenty of damage to its economy.
Russia gave up one jet to Turkey and has made its military presence in Syria and
the strategic eastern Mediterranean permanent.
Turkey can no longer speak to Russia about the possibility of ousting Assad.
Putin seems to be making sure that NATO will do nothing.
At this year's G-20 summit in Antalya, Turkey, Russian President, Vladimir
Putin, said that the radical jihadist Islamic State (IS) was being financed by
donors from at least 40 countries, including some G-20 member states -- clearly
pointing his finger, without naming names, at Saudi Arabia and Turkey. A few
days later, two Turkish F-16 jets shot down a Russian SU-24 warplane, and
claimed that the Russian jet had violated Turkish airspace for 17 seconds on the
country's Syrian border -- a violation Russia denies. This was the first time a
Soviet or Russian military aircraft was shot down by a NATO air force since the
end of WWII.
Turkey and Russia have long been in a proxy war in Syria: Russia, together with
its quieter partner, China, supports the Shi'ite Iran-backed Syrian regime of
President Bashar al-Assad; and Turkey explicitly supports Assad's Sunni
opponents ["moderate" jihadists] -- apparently in the hope of building a Muslim
Brotherhood/Hamas-type of regime in Damascus that would be friendly to its own
Islamist government. After the downing of the Russian jet, the Turco-Russian
proxy war has become less proxy.
No more Mr. Nice Guy.
Russian President Vladimir Putin twice refused to meet with Turkish President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the sidelines of the Paris Climate Summit this week.
Pictured: President Putin with then Prime Minister Erdogan, meeting in Istanbul
on December 3, 2012. (Image source:kremlin.ru)
An angry Putin called the incident "a stab in the back." He declined Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's requests to discuss the issue. He twice refused
to meet Erdogan on the sidelines of the Paris Climate Summit.
Russia's foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, quickly cancelled his official visit
to Turkey -- a visit that had been scheduled for the day after the downing of
the Russian jet. At the outset, NATO member Turkey had taught Russia a good
lesson. In reality, judging from the consequences, it all looks like a Russian
gambit, with Turkey shooting itself in the foot and risking a new NATO-Russia
conflict.
Russia's ire seemingly is being expressed in economic terms:
Moscow said it will introduce visa restrictions for Turkish citizens, beginning
Jan. 1, 2016.
Russian authorities detained a group of Turkish businessmen on charges of "false
statements about their trip to the country."
Press reports noted that Russia was considering limiting or excluding Turkish
construction companies from the country, a potentially multi-billion dollar loss
for the Turkish economy.
Moscow warned its citizens against visiting Turkey -- a ban that could deal a
big blow to Turkey's lucrative tourism industry. Last year 4.5 million Russians
visited Turkey, mostly its Mediterranean coast. Russian tour operators were
warned to suspend business with Turkey.
The fate of two huge Turco-Russian energy projects remains unknown, as Russia's
energy minister, Alexei Ulyukayev, did not rule out sanctions hitting the
Turkish Stream gas pipeline and a planned Russian nuclear energy plant in
Turkey. Turkey buys about 55% of its natural gas from Russia. Its second largest
gas supplier is Iran, Russia's ally -- and Turkey's rival -- in Syria.
Russia's Minister of Agriculture, Alexander Tkachev, said that Russia would be
replacing Turkish food imports with goods from Iran, Israel and Morocco.
Shipments of wheat to Turkey from key Russian ports were put on hold.
The Kremlin officially announced a wide range of sanctions on Turkey, including
a ban on Turkish workers (with estimates that 90,000 will be fired by Jan. 1,
2016), restrictions on imported goods and services from Turkey and calls for
"strengthening of port control and monitoring to ensure transport safety."
Around 1,250 trucks carrying Turkish exports were blocked from entering Russia
on Nov. 30 and were stranded at border posts, awaiting clearance.
Russian soccer clubs will be banned from signing Turkish players during the
upcoming winter break.
All of that is commercially punitive. There is a more serious side of the
Turco-Russian conflict that concerns NATO and western interests in the Middle
East.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced on Nov. 25 that Russia would
deploy S-400 surface-to-air missile systems in its Hmeymim air base in Syria.
Turkey shot down a Russian jet. No gain, but plenty of damage to its economy.
Russia gave up one jet and has made its military presence in Syria and the
strategic eastern Mediterranean permanent. It has reinforced its bases in Syria
and intends to build a new military base there. Turkey can no longer speak to
Russia about the possibility of ousting Assad.
In a further move to escalate tensions, the Russian General Staff deployed one
of its largest air defense ships at the edge of Turkish territorial waters in
the Mediterranean. Russian military spokesman General Sergei Rudskoi said that
Russian bomber aircraft would be "supported by chasers, and any kinds of threats
will be responded to instantly." Accordingly, The Moscow, one of the Russian
Navy's two largest warships and the flagship of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, will
be deployed where Turkey-Syria territorial waters connect.
In addition, Putin issued orders to deploy nearly 7,000 troops, plus
anti-aircraft missiles, rocket launchers, and artillery to the Turkish border,
and asked them to be in readiness for full combat.
There have been other military repercussions, too. Since the shooting down of
the Russian jet, the Russian military has been regularly pounding the Syrian
villages near the Turkish border that populated by the Turkmen, a Turkish
ethnicity that supports jihadists in Syria -- and is supported by Ankara. The
Russians also have been hitting Turkish aid convoys bound for Turkmen villages.
More than 500 Turks and Turkmen have been killed in Russian airstrikes.
Meanwhile, the U.S.-led allied air strikes against IS have come to a halt.
Neither Washington nor Ankara is keen for another conflict with Russia. So, IS
and Russia keep on flourishing.
The Russian military has scrapped all contacts with the Turkish military,
possibly waiting for the first Turkish military aircraft that violates foreign
airspace to shoot.
Turkey has every liberty to challenge Russia and, inevitably, become the victim.
But with its geostrategic, Islamist ambitions, it is exposing NATO allies to the
risk of a fresh conflict with Russia -- and at a time when the wounds of
previous conflicts remain unhealed.
Putin has accused Turkey's leaders of encouraging the Islamization of the
Turkish society, which he said was a "problem." He was not wrong. In fact,
Islamism and neo-Ottoman ambitions are the source of Turkey's (not-so) proxy war
with Russia in the Syrian theater. Although Turkey, officially, is a NATO member
and part of the allied campaign against IS, its Sunni Islamist ambitions over
Syria hinder the global fight against jihadists. A Turco-Russian conflict is
weakening the fight.
Putin seems to be making sure that NATO will do nothing.
***Burak Bekdil, based in Ankara, is a Turkish columnist for the Hürriyet Daily
and a Fellow at the Middle East Forum.
Why is the dollar surging in Iran?
Mohammad Ali Shabani/Al-Monitor/December 05/15
In Iran, the value of the national currency is not only seen as a function of
Central Bank policy, trade balance and inflation. In the absence of reliable
consumer and business confidence indices, it has been perceived as a key
indicator of the general state of the economy, and more broadly, the country’s
international standing. Indeed, it is virtually impossible to engage in any
private discussion in Tehran about the national currency without a mention of
how the greenback once traded for 70 rial. This has been particularly the case
in the past few years, when successive devaluations have been triggered by
Western sanctions.
In 2002, Iran introduced a single exchange rate after years of maintaining a
multi-tiered currency market, which among other adverse effects facilitated
immense revenues for those able to take advantage of the arbitrage. Over the
following decade, the Iranian currency maintained relative stability and kept
being overvalued, thanks to Central Bank intervention. This system collapsed in
2012, when hard-hitting financial, economic and oil sanctions were imposed by
the European Union and the United States. As a result, the multi-tiered exchange
market re-emerged. Between 2012 and 2013, the divergence between the official
and open market rates reached as high as 300%. This collapse in confidence
triggered a rush for foreign exchange, precious metals and property, aided by
low rial bank deposit rates amid high inflation.
In his 2013 campaign, incumbent President Hassan Rouhani thus made the economy a
top priority, arguing that “it is important for the centrifuges to spin, but
people's lives should run too.” Indeed, under Rouhani, Iran has exited a deep
recession, while the inflation rate — which reached almost 40% when he was
elected — has been drastically cut. With the signing of the July 14, 2015, Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), many ordinary Iranians anticipated an
immediate economic boost, fueled by the administration’s poor expectation
management. However, as most of Iran’s centrifuges have stopped spinning under
the JCPOA, so has the growth of its economy.
The monetary and fiscal measures that have been taken to stop galloping
inflation are paradoxically what have greatly slowed down the economy, recently
forcing Rouhani to do a U-turn and adopt a stimulus package. Yet, as some
analysts have argued, “the expanded money supply and other efforts aimed at
encouraging the private sector to borrow for projects are likely too little to
stimulate the economy — but large enough to ignite inflation expectations.”
Indeed, one indication of popular expectations of Rouhani and his promises about
the economy and the impact of the JCPOA is how consumers and businesses alike
have been delaying major purchases on the back of anticipations of a cheaper
greenback as Western financial, economic and oil sanctions are set to be lifted.
Again, paradoxically, these expectations of an improved economy are in effect
helping cause the exact opposite. Amid this Catch 22 for the Rouhani
administration and the Central Bank, the dollar has in past months jumped
against the rial, undermining confidence among consumers. The key questions here
are thus: Why has the dollar rate been surging in past months, contrary to
popular expectations of the exact opposite? What can Rouhani and the Central
Bank do about this matter? More importantly, do they, and should they, even want
to do something to address the dollar surge?
On the day before Rouhani’s election on June 14, 2013, the dollar traded for
36,450 rial on the open market. Today, even following the surge in the dollar
rate over the past months, the dollar is trading for almost exactly the same —
36,500 rials on the open market — while the official rate has nudged just over
30,000 for the first time. Mindful of annual inflation of 34.7% in the Iranian
solar calendar year 1392 (March 2013-March 2014) and 15.5% the following year,
it is evident that the Central Bank has more than maintained stability in the
foreign exchange market. Moreover, the popular impression of a significant
weakening of the rial in the aftermath of the JCPOA only makes sense if the
dollar rate is seen in isolation. A cursory review of the performance of the
rial against other major currencies over the past two years makes it evident
that the perhaps primary reason for the recent surge in the dollar rate has
little to do with the Rouhani administration or the Central Bank. Indeed, a
review of the dollar and euro rates against the rial since before Rouhani’s
election makes it clear that, while the dollar has remained constant in value,
the euro is over 10% cheaper.
Indeed, the issue is less that of the rial weakening and more about the dollar
strengthening. In June 2013, the dollar index — a measure of the strength of the
greenback relative to other major currencies, and primarily the euro — stood at
83.2. Today, it stands at just over 98, which is the highest level since late
2003. The impact of this 17.8% increase in the dollar index, which has
accelerated in recent months amid anticipation of the US Federal Reserve raising
interest rates for the first time in years, should not be underestimated.
The Rouhani administration has embraced Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s
call for a “resistance economy,” which emphasizes a focus on increasing domestic
production, boosting non-oil exports, stepping up privatization of the economy
and encouraging private sector-led growth. All of the aforementioned is
undermined by an overvalued national currency. Even though popular perceptions
of a weakened rial may undercut the Rouhani administration, the reality, as
prominent Iranian economist Djavad Salehi-Isfahani has argued, is that the rial
has greatly been strengthened, and that “to bring the exchange rate close to
what it was in early 2013 in real terms, the rial would have to devalue by close
to 50%.” Thus, stepping in to counter the recent surge in the value of the
dollar would only serve short-term political purposes rather than address key
underlying economic issues. In this vein, it appears that the Rouhani
administration is choosing to stay on course with a continued focus on
reintroducing a single exchange rate that somewhat reflects the rial’s real
value.
Indeed, on Nov. 18, Central Bank Governor Valiollah Seif stated, “To proceed
toward a unified exchange rate requires accelerating the country’s access to
foreign currency. It can happen once the nuclear deal is implemented, maximum
six months after that.” Seif also signaled a changed role for the Central Bank,
saying that it should “smoothen fluctuations of exchange rates,” and that “if we
allow the rate to be defined by the economic realities and decided by the
market, the bank’s only role will be to prevent shocks.”Mindful of the widespread perceptions of the dollar rate as a reflection of the
general condition of the economy as well as business and consumer confidence,
the perceived state of the rial could potentially undermine the president and
his allies at a crucial time, as Iran is headed for hotly contested
parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections in February. The administration
certainly has its work cut out for it in terms of addressing Iran’s myriad
economic problems. Challenging and changing popular perceptions of what the
dollar rate signifies may prove equally difficult. To achieve both of these
objectives and also address misguided popular perceptions that may turn fears
into self-fulfilling prophecies, Rouhani and Seif should take greater measures
to better inform and engage with the public. If not, they may end up paying
dearly for something they have worked effectively to avoid.
Turkey takes a hit from the Russian hammer
Cengiz Çandar/Al-Monitor/December 05/15
The conflict between Russia and Turkey that was sparked by Turkey’s downing of a
Russian fighter jet on Nov. 24 is too serious to be treated in any sense of
sarcasm and with emotional outbursts.On Dec. 3, delivering his state of the
nation address, Vladimir Putin voiced his anger and accused his Turkish
counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Turkish leadership.
"Allah only knows, I suppose, why they did it. And probably, Allah has decided
to punish the ruling clique in Turkey by taking their mind and reason,” Putin
said.
Yet it seems that he did not want to leave the “punishment” to Allah. He implied
that Russia will take it on.
“But, if they expected a nervous or hysterical reaction from us, if they wanted
to see us become a danger to ourselves as much as to the world, they won’t get
it. … We are not going to rattle the sabre. But, if someone thinks they can
commit a heinous war crime, kill our people and get away with it, suffering
nothing but a ban on tomato imports, or a few restrictions in construction or
other industries, they’re delusional. We’ll remind them of what they did, more
than once. They’ll regret it. We know what to do,” the Russian leader said in a
menacing tone.
The Russian autocrat implied unequivocally that the escalation between Russia
and Turkey will not be confined to Moscow’s economic sanctions or trade embargo
imposed upon Turkey. Short of a war, it could be in any form that will increase
tensions in an already volatile geopolitical arena. It might prove to be
difficult to prevent it from reaching undesirable and unintended consequences.
It is perhaps harboring the most serious seeds of conflict between the West and
a resurgent Russia in the post-Cold War period.
In irate Russian public reaction against Turkey, relatively sober analyses
rarely find their way to the Russian press. The following lines from a Moscow
Times article reflect such a rarity:
“Putin should think thrice before striking once. The chances of his strategy
becoming clear in the end are great and this would anger Ankara and worry the
West. Besides, Turkey is no soft target, Erdogan doubly so. The irony is that
Turkey is in many ways similar to Russia, from its revisionist plans and the
aggressiveness of its intelligence agencies, to the character of its ambitious
autocrat-presidents. It may lack the excitement of a war in the shadows, but
ultimately Putin would be best served sticking to the humdrum world of the
boycott and the diplomatic rebuke.”The psychological war seemed to be an important component of Russia’s escalation
of the conflict with Turkey. In this, the Russian Defense Ministry also took
part and alleged that Turkey and its president’s family are involved in illicit
oil trafficking with the Islamic State (IS). Russia’s defense ministry had
called journalists to a briefing at its command center on Dec. 2 to show slides
and satellite imagery allegedly depicting proof that Turkey was profiting from
the trade in IS oil.
“A unified team of bandits and Turkish elites operates in the region to steal
oil from their neighbors [Iraq and Syria],” Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly
Antonov said.
President Erdogan was quick to retort. From Qatar, he dismissed the Russian
accusations, labeling them as “slander.”
Earlier, when Putin made similar allegations, Erdogan had promised “to vacate
his post of Turkey’s presidency if the claims are substantiated by concrete
evidence.”
It was bizarre that Erdogan, who was venomous and furious at such claims when
put forward domestically, had never pronounced the word “resignation,” but
whenever such a claim is voiced by Putin, he could bet on his head.
Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, on his way to Azerbaijan, recalled the Soviet
era of Russia, and said, "Nobody attaches any value to the lies of this
Soviet-style propaganda machine,"
As a matter of fact, Turkey’s American friends were not eager to buy the Russian
allegations. Spokesmen from the US Department of Defense and Department of State
rejected the allegations put forward by the deputy defense minister of Russia.Since Nov. 24, US President Barack Obama has said that Turkey has the right to
self-defense. He has pressed Russia to hit IS targets in Syria rather than
trying to shore up the regime of Bashar al-Assad. He also sent clear signals
that the United States has no intentions to let Turkey down against an
increasingly nervous Russia.
However, as “there is no free lunch” in Washington, the American support to
Turkey could only come against Russia if Turkey remains in line with the rest of
its NATO allies and the United States in the fight against IS.
Turkey is widely believed to have dragged its feet in fighting with its
coalition partners against IS and has, most of the time, not seen eye to eye
with its Western allies in its Syria policy.
Ash Carter, the US Secretary of Defense, in a tacitly critical tone, said
recently that Turkey should do more in its capacity in the fight against IS.
“France has been galvanized by the attacks in its capital, Britain is debating
expanded airstrikes, Italy has made important contributions in Iraq, and Germany
is making more contributions,” he noted. “All countries, including the United
States, must do more. Turkey must do more to control its border.”Ottoman Turkey, the predecessor of the Republic of Turkey, had a reputation of
perennial confrontation with its mighty neighbor Russia. Both empires fought
around 13 wars between the 17th and 20th centuries. Apart from the Crimean War
of 1853-1856 that was fought in alliance with Great Britain and France, the
Ottomans never won a war against the Russians.
Turkey’s fate in the 20th century was also sealed through its relations with
Russia. Its entry to World War I, which brought the end of the Ottoman Empire,
was prompted by the bombardment of the Russian Black Sea ports by the two German
warships that had taken refuge in Bosphorus and then joined the Ottoman navy.
The aftermath of World War II saw the threats of Stalin that led to Turkey’s
application to NATO with Western shelter for its survival.
The latest conflict with Russia deprives Erdogan of the autonomy in foreign and
security policy he was seeking against Turkey’s Western allies.
In 2014, Erdogan had gone the extra mile during the G-20 summit at St.
Petersburg and had asked Putin in their joint press conference, “Why don’t you
let us in to the Shanghai Group, so we could be liberated from our ties to the
European Union?”There were enough signs that he had wanted to emerge as the leader and spokesman
of the Islamic world, a position that would not be compatible by being a
faithful and regular member of the West.
Downing the Russian fighter jet put such ambitious objectives of Erdogan in
jeopardy, if not made them impossible to realize.
Turkey once again finds itself under the Russian hammer while, this time,
resting on the Western anvil.
Russian allegations of Turkish leadership’s transactions with IS will continue.
The rejection of Turkey’s Western partners and primarily of Washington will have
credence only if Erdogan contributes to the anti-IS fight much more than he has
done and also if he toes the line with the Western coalition partners on many
fields.
Such a trajectory, most probably, was not what Erdogan had envisaged in his term
as Turkey’s president.
Analysis: The end of the post-World War II order
JOHN LLOYD, REUTERS/J.Post/12/06/2015
After World War Two, having crushed evil, Western politicians unleashed a deluge
of good. Welfare states were created, with healthcare, education, pensions and
social services extended to entire populations. The European imperialists, under
the not-so-gentle prodding of the no-longer-imperialist United States, began to
pull down their union jacks and tricolors - a process which was both bloody and
protracted, but which ushered in, year after year, new states free to rule
themselves. A small group of highly motivated men lobbied for an extraordinary
dream to be given substance: a union of the European states, ultimately a
federal Europe - and, framing it as a medium for ending Europe’s centuries of
war, they won part of their point (a union, but not a federal one). These
changes seemed to be the will of the people. In Britain, Winston Churchill was
beaten in the post-war election by his loyal and unassuming deputy in the
wartime coalition, Clement Attlee. Churchill, in a graceless put-down, said that
the Labor leader was a modest man who “had much to be modest about” - who then
modestly pioneered huge social change. Everywhere, including in the United
States, trade unions flourished, and were brought in to help to determine much
of economic policy.
The push came mainly from the left, but the reforms got a large consensus with
the center right - especially with the Christian Democratic parties in
continental Europe, infused with Catholic social teaching. These reforms were
what are called today “top down”: framed and run by governments and large state
institutions staffed by technocrats. When a member of Attlee’s government,
Douglas Jay, wrote that “the gentleman in Whitehall (the government bureaucracy)
really does know better than the people themselves what is good for them,” there
were no calls for his resignation. That was what politicians and bureaucrats
were for: to give people what they needed, to make life fuller, less risky. At a
conference at the Flemish Academy in Brussels this past week, the writer Ian
Buruma, the Academy’s “thinker in residence,” argued that “postwar” was over. By
that he means that the consensus that more or less held between center-left and
center-right over social provision, strong states and, in Europe, a movement to
closer integration, holds no more.
The “rot began in the 1980s,” Buruma believes, with the administrations of
Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the UK. It was
deepened as the collapse of communism spurred the anti-collectivist mood; and
now breaks down entirely, as “Neoliberalism filled the vacuum, creating vast
wealth for some people, but at the expense of the ideal of equality” and “the
rise of right-wing populism reflects revived yearnings for pure national
communities, that keep immigrants and minorities out.”I think that
“neoliberalism” isn’t much help in understanding what’s happening to Western
economies, which, even with some cuts, still spend hugely on socialized
medicine, education, pensions and social care. In the case of the United States,
spending on socialized medicine (Obamacare) has meant a rise in state spending
on health. In the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
countries, spending on health between 2010 and 2014 - the austerity period - has
grown in richer countries, albeit by a measly 1 percent. Isn’t neo-liberalism
supposed to mean slashing state budgets? It’s true, though, that quite a lot of
the state spending passes through the public health and education bureaucracies
to private contractors. For a variety of reasons, there’s still a predisposition
to think private enterprise is more efficient. It’s certainly true that the
collectivist assumption that organized labor was good for society as well as the
workers has shrunk, as unions have. And it’s even truer that the European Union
is in real trouble. Its economy is still weak, its borders, opened under the
Schengen Area Agreement of 1995, are closing under the pressure of desperate
migrants.
This is the time when gentlemen (and ladies) in governments everywhere don’t
just not dare to know better, but really don’t know what’s happening to them.
This is the time when populism thrives - in the United States, on the right,
where a blowhard real estate mogul leads the Republican nomination race, but
also, in a different way, in Europe. The European populist right is doing well
in many states. The National Front in France is now ahead of all other parties
in all polls for regional elections happening Sunday. In the Netherlands, the
strongly anti-Muslim Freedom Party also tops the polls. In Italy, two populist
parties - the Five Star Movement of Beppe Grillo and the Liga - are first and
third in the polls. Both are opposed to more immigration. And in Poland, which
of all the post-Communist states has done best, its income per head doubling
over the quarter of a century, a populist party runs the government, holding up
both Russia and the EU as enemies of the true Poland.
The post-war push to slough off imperialism assumed that new, independent
countries would produce governments responsive to the will of their peoples.
That they would be pushed by newly enfranchised citizens to raise living
standards and run more or less efficient and honest governments.
Instead, throughout Africa and the Middle East, governments are bywords for
authoritarian rule or corruption or more often both. The resulting poverty and
frequent wars power the migrant flows to Europe. The Dutch economist Erik
Schlokkaert, who spoke at the Postwar Conference in Brussels, said that “nobody
believes that the migration pressure will stop. It is impossible to keep Europe
as an island of prosperity in a sea of misery.”
What is to be done?
Actually, a lot.
We can begin by taking climate change seriously and putting pressure on those
who pollute. We must work to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction;
combat violent jihadism; revitalize civil societies; assist developing countries
in keeping their citizens by cleaning up government and reforming their
economies; seek agreements with Russia on Syria and Ukraine; encourage citizens
everywhere to hold, not just governments, but themselves to account for their
choices and public actions. On these, people of the left and right could again
find a post-post war consensus. On these, political movements can again find
causes and the need for renewed energy. It’s a tall order: and it’s not true
that we have nothing to fear but fear itself, for we have a lot to be fearful
about. But we can do nothing other than try to shape up, and tackle the
challenges the 21st century throws at us so generously. John Lloyd co-founded
the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at the University of Oxford,
where he is Senior Research Fellow. Lloyd has written several books, including
"What the Media Are Doing to Our Politics" (2004). He is also a contributing
editor at FT and the founder of FT Magazine.
Ethnic Cleansing Threatens Syria's Unity
Fabrice Balanche/Washington Institute/December 05/15
The escalating conflict remains a sectarian war, and deliberate ethnic cleansing
by various actors is drawing new internal borders that will be difficult to
erase.
Between refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), more than half of the
Syrian population has left their homes since the war began in 2011. To
understand why this has happened and what can be done to reverse it, one must
examine the country's demographics in detail.
POPULATION SHORTFALL
Syria currently has around 16 million residents -- a far cry from the 2010 UN
projection that the population would reach 22.6 million by the end of 2015. The
birth deficit and excess mortality (violent and natural) have reduced the
natural population growth by half since 2011. Even if refugees are added to the
current population figure, the total would be only 21.3 million, or 1.3 million
less than the prewar projection. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) has registered 4.2 million Syrians thus far, but that figure
undervalues the actual number of refugees by at least 20%. Some refugees refuse
to register for fear of being arrested and taken back to Syria (as is happening
in Lebanon), while many wealthy refugees do not see the point of registering. So
a more realistic estimate of total refugees is 5.3 million.
That number is expected to increase sharply. In Aleppo province alone,
escalating hostilities have spurred another 200,000 people to leave their homes
in the past two months. The Russian offensive and the lack of short-term hope
for peace have convinced many living in relatively calm areas to leave as well,
and more may follow suit if the recent German-led plan to welcome more refugees
is implemented.
AREAS OF CONTROL
Although it is difficult to give an exact number for IDPs, the available data
suggests that 6.5 million Syrians have fled violent areas for safer areas of the
country. This includes about 2 million who have fled to the current
government-controlled zone from areas controlled by other factions, as well as
millions of others who fled one regime-controlled area for another due to
intense fighting.
The areas held by rebels (the northwest, the south, and other small pockets such
as Ghouta) have lost the most people because they are the least secure --
Russian and regime airstrikes impede normal life there, and the presence of
numerous different rebel factions creates persistent insecurity. The area held
by the self-styled Islamic State (IS) seems safer, in part because it has a
central authority. Although religious minorities and secular Sunnis fled Raqqa
and Deir al-Zour, they were replaced by foreign jihadists and Syrians displaced
from Aleppo. In general, people tend to seek refuge where they have relatives,
and where there is no fighting; the identity of the faction that controls the
area does not necessarily matter to them as much. The Kurdish area attracts
displaced Kurds but few Arabs -- no surprise given that the faction in control,
the Democratic Union Party (PYD), aims to make the area ethnically homogeneous.
Mainstream media reports often highlight the fact that the Syrian army controls
less than 17% of the country, and IS over 50%. Yet these seemingly shocking
figures do not factor in Syria's geography -- namely that 47% of the country is
sparsely inhabited steppes. Of course, extending control over some of the
steppes may hold strategic interest for IS; Palmyra is a traffic hub with
important gas and oil resources, for example, and it borders Iraq and Jordan. In
any case, the Assad regime controls the largest share of Syria's residential
areas, and also the most populated area. Around 10.1 million inhabitants live in
the government zone, or 63% of the total resident population. The areas
controlled by the other three main factions (Kurds, IS, and rebels) are roughly
equal, with about 2 million each. In short, the regime has gone from controlling
about 20 million Syrians prewar to about 10 million now.
LOCAL ETHNIC CLEANSING
The large-scale population movements have not been a simple byproduct of war.
Rather, they represent conscious strategies of ethnic cleansing by each faction.
To be sure, the ethno-sectarian composition of the country as a whole has not
changed much, despite the departure of disproportionately Christian and Sunni
Arab refugees. Christians have traditionally been scattered throughout the
country and do not have their own area of refuge like the Alawites and Druze,
spurring many of them to flee abroad. As for Sunni Arabs, because the insurgency
took root in their ranks, they have been the first target of regime repression
and airstrikes (though some Sunni clans support Bashar al-Assad and have
remained safe in the government zone). Overall, Syria's current population is
22% religious minorities, 16% Kurds, and 61% Sunni Arabs -- in other words, not
that different from the prewar composition.
These figures could change in the coming months, of course, particularly if the
PYD creates a continuous zone of Kurdish control along the border with Turkey by
seizing territories between Azaz and Jarabulus. Any such move to connect the
northwestern Kurdish enclave of Afrin with the rest of the PYD's territory in
the northeast (known as Rojava) could spur hundreds of thousands of Sunni Arabs
to flee. Meanwhile, expanded efforts to eliminate IS will likely produce an
internal Sunni war between tribes supporting the terrorist group and other
factions, creating further refugee flows.
For now, Syria's overall population figures hide the rampant ethnic separation
already occurring within territories controlled by each faction. Acutely aware
that its Alawite base is a shrinking minority, the regime has created a zone of
control with 41% religious minorities, compared to the national figure of 22%.
The army consistently prioritizes asserting its grip over Christian, Alawite,
Druze, Ismaili, and Shiite localities.
In contrast, rebel victories often spur local religious and ethnic minorities to
depart. Only the Druze area of Jabal al-Summaq in northwestern Idlib province
remains in the rebel zone, enjoying special Saudi protection in connection with
Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt -- it is the fragile exception that proves
the rule. Rebel groups dominate a Sunni Arab territory; the main minority there
is Sunni Turkmen, which is probably the most anti-Assad group.
Similarly, all religious minorities tend to flee IS-held areas. Some Kurds have
remained behind; IS does not seem to distinguish them from local Sunni Arabs,
probably because they are Sunni believers as well. That said, many secular Kurds
have fled to PYD territory.
In the Kurdish zone of Rojava, Arabs must agree to live as minorities -- as the
Kurds did during centuries under Arab rule -- or leave. This reversal of power
is intolerable for many Sunni Arabs accustomed to dominating the northeast,
leading some to support IS.
The fact that the regime-controlled zone is the most diverse does not mean that
Assad is more benevolent than the rebels, Kurds, or IS. Rather, it reflects his
political strategy. He knows he must expel millions of Sunni Arabs to make the
balance of power more favorable to minorities who support him. He also needs to
divide the Sunnis by redistributing land and housing that belonged to refugees,
making loyalist Sunnis who remain behind even more beholden to him and pitting
them against any who decide to return.
In sum, the Syrian conflict is a sectarian war, and ethnic cleansing is an
integral part of the strategy used by various actors, even if they claim
otherwise.
WHAT ETHNIC CLEANSING MEANS FOR SYRIA'S FUTURE
Although many refugees and IDPs will want to return home once peace is
established, they will be unable to do so because of their ethnicity and/or
political affiliation. Resettling displaced people will become a strategic
question for each player. Their efforts at local ethnic cleansing are already
making Syria's de facto partition more and more irremediable. Sectarian
diversity is disappearing in many areas of the country, and this process of
regional homogenization is drawing internal borders. Yet formal partition is not
necessarily a good solution. It could generate new conflicts, as seen when Sudan
split and then the new country of South Sudan dissolved into civil war.
Therefore, the international community may need to work toward a Syrian
agreement that lies somewhere between the Taif Accord, which imposed a kind of
unity on Lebanon, and the Dayton Agreement, which imposed a difficult partition
on Bosnia under intense foreign supervision. Syria's various communities will
accept living in a new, united Syrian Republic, but not the Syrian Arab Republic
as it existed prewar. A federal system would be the best political regime
because the previous centralization cannot be reestablished, whatever the ruling
group.
**Fabrice Balanche, an associate professor and research director at the
University of Lyon 2, is a visiting fellow at The Washington Institute.
Tehran’s plan for the Arabs: the quota system
Abdulrahman al-Rashed/Al Arabiya/December 05/15
You will hear it a lot during the coming days: “the quota system is the
solution” for Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. Iran has begun to promote the idea of
this controversial political sectarian regime, so that it can pave the way for
its interventions and influence on the decisions of these countries within its
project to dominate the region. It is not a new idea – it is a duplicate of the
Lebanese and Iraqi models that Iran dominates today. Many Iranian officials
tackled this issue; I even heard one of them giving more details about it. He
said: “You want a solution in Syria? Why don’t we give all the communities and
parties in Syria fixed quotas in governance; Sunnis, Alawites, Druze,
Christians, Shiites, Kurds and Turkmen, and thus Sunnis will have the
parliamentary majority? We have to do the same thing in Yemen, and other
countries in the region.” One of those who were sitting next to me hummed: “Ah,
he means Bahrain”. Of course, we all know that he indirectly pointed to Bahrain,
although we know that there is no war over the rule like in Yemen, Syria and
Iraq, but there are hubs of protest in Bahrain that can emerge in any other
country, including Iran itself. After decades of practice, it is now obvious
that the quota system is a lousy model of governance.As for the reason why we
rush to reject the idea as long as it satisfies the majority of the troubled
countries, it is because sectarian quotas are the basis and essence of chaos,
although the case does not apply to Malaysia and the Netherlands because they
live in different regional conditions.
The Taif Agreement
Some may argue and say that the Taif Agreement, which was signed in Saudi Arabia
to end the Civil War in Lebanon, is the mother of quota systems. That gave the
presidency of the republic to the Christians, the premiership to the Sunnis and
the parliament presidency to the Shiites.
While the agreement was signed in the Saudi city of Taif, it was the outcome of
a collective dialogue between the belligerent parties and was not a Saudi
decision. Moreover, the quota system had always existed in the Lebanese regime
that was present 50 years before the Taif Agreement, with the same presidencies’
restructuring but with different parliament seat quotas. We should not forget
that Taif was just a temporary project to stop the bleeding, and a passage to
move to a better permanent regime. Hafez al-Assad’s regime disrupted the
development of the Lebanese governance project: He oppressed the Lebanese state
and controlled it through his local intelligence agents; he killed and
marginalized all those whom dared to challenge him and thought of changing the
political system.
A lousy model
After decades of practice, it is now obvious that the quota system is a lousy
model of governance and should be avoided. If it were to be applied in Yemen
tomorrow, it would divide Yemeni people forever, and external forces like Iran
will use it to influence and mess up from the outside and will try to guide the
decisions of Yemen. What is the interest of Yemenis in the sharing of seats
according to their religious belonging? Actually, there is none. The first idea
on which was built the reconciliation, after the uprising of the Yemeni street,
was that Yemenis decide whom shall govern them through the ballot box, but the
amendments continued under the Houthis’ threats to be granted quotas in the
government. If we look at the quota system in Iraq, we find that the latter has
become like Lebanon; the president of the republic is merely a decor. The three
vice-presidents and three vice-prime ministers are also accessories claiming to
represent the country’s ethnic and sectarian components. Even the prime
minister, the first executive position, has become hostage of Iranian influence
through the quota system tools. Similarly to the Lebanese Hezbollah, an Iraqi
political team decided to build the ‘Popular Mobilization Forces’, a militia
that controls the country, with the army a mere subdivision of it. This is what
Iran has sought to do in Yemen when it backed the ‘Ansar Allah’ Houthi militias,
which took over the army weapon stores, and tried to amend the constitution
granting itself fixed shares in the government, and for this purpose, it took
President Hadi as a hostage in his home in Sanaa. This comedy stopped only when
Saudi Arabia launched its war there. According to the Iranian plan to manage
several troubled Arab countries, the quota system was not supposed to pass under
the pretext of being an alternative to the chaos, because it will lay the
foundations of confusion for decades. It will fertilize the soil for long-term
tensions and civil wars. There are alternative options, such as the adoption of
a federal system, and the reduction of the central government without resorting
to dividing society into sectarian and ethnic groups.
Swords are mightier than words in the war on ISIS
Hisham Melhem/Al Arabiya/December 05/15
In wars, generals deploy their phalanxes to defeat their enemies and control
physical space, while political leaders invoke ideas, ideals, and excuses to
legitimize and explain a state’s use of force. Battles are won, and wars are
decided by the clanging of the swords, not the exchange of words. Proponents of
“wars of ideas” claim that the West won the Cold War by the sheer power of its
values and liberal ideology. They tend to forget that during the Cold War,
bloody wars were fought between the U.S. and Soviet Union through their proxies,
and that the Soviet Empire collapsed because of its military overreach, and
relative primitiveness of its economy. Of course wars of ideas and ideological
and cultural competitions are an integral part of the history of warfare, but
given the revolutionary changes brought about by social media, the internet and
an increasingly networked and globalized world, some are tempted to make the
false claim that the war of ideas is as – or even more – important as the war of
arms.
Marketing a brand
For more than a year now an intense debate has ensued among scholars, historians
and politicians concerning the role and efficacy of ideas in the current wars of
arms against ISIS, particularly the limited campaign that the United States and
its allies have been waging against the fake caliphate.
It is very doubtful that the U.S. and its allies can mount an effective strategy
to undermine ISIS’s narrative and reputation, without a simultaneous limited
land campaign. Since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the U.S. has invested large sums
of money, exerted huge efforts and established special bodies to wage a war of
ideas against al-Qaeda and its branches and tentacles, to discredit the group’s
ideological appeal, to ‘sell’ the U.S. and its liberal democracy as an antidote
to al-Qaeda, and to cut it down to size and humiliate it, as a first step to
denying it volunteers and funds. It was awkward, not to say painful in those
days to watch otherwise intelligent U.S. officials bandying and marketing the
United States to the Muslim world as a ‘brand’, with the support of slick
Madison Avenue experts. Needless to say, the ‘brand’ remained on the shelves,
and did not sell well.
Marketing a utopia
In the war of ideas with ISIS, the United States has established the Center for
Strategic Counterterrorism Communications to engage the sophisticated
‘electronic brigades’ that ISIS employs. Battles are raging in the virtual world
between ISIS and its thousands of online volunteers on one side, and the United
States, Google and Twitter on the other, for the hearts and minds of the Jihadi
‘fence-sitters’.The results so far have been limited at best. In their book
‘ISIS, the State of Terror’, Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger give a gripping
account of a movement that is “rewriting the playbook of extremism” through “a
daring experiment in the power of horror, but also in the marketing of
utopia”.Stern and Berger have written the definitive analysis of ISIS’ creative
cutting-edge propaganda, and unprecedented manipulation of social media. They
devoted almost a third of their book to the epic struggle between ISIS and the
U.S. and its allies for primacy in the virtual world. Every time an ISIS Twitter
account is suspended others spring up; the authors estimated that “at least
45,000 pro-ISIS accounts were online between September and November 2014, along
with thousands more pro-ISIS bot and spam accounts”.
There are limits to what the United States Government can do to “un-sell” ISIS
to those young impressionistic would-be Muslim volunteers in the West who are
convinced by the slick propaganda of ISIS, and the idea that waging Jihad is an
act of cleansing one’s sins, or an act of rebellion – against one’s status quo,
family and society – and to seek a ‘winning’ identity. Conversely, the hardened
Islamists in ISIS who come from Western countries – some of them misfits, petty
criminals and former prisoners – are immune to U.S. entreaties. If an effective
counter narrative is to be developed against ISIS, it should be Arab or Muslim.
It is very doubtful that the U.S. and its allies can mount an effective strategy
to undermine ISIS’s narrative and reputation, without a simultaneous limited
land campaign. Muslim history is replete with pretend Caliphs, fake Mahdis and
false Prophets; some of them were dismissed out of hand, but others acted on
their dangerous visions. Their actions and narratives were not challenged by
counter narratives, but by crushing military force. ISIS is bound to face a
similar fate.
Vital steps to eradicate violence against women
Yara al-Wazir/Al Arabiya/December 05/15
Women in the Middle East and North Africa are more likely to experience violence
by an intimate partner than any of their international counterparts, according
to the World Health Organisation. The United Nations on Nov. 25 marked the
International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, beginning a
16-day campaign that continues into next week. What is disappointing is that 20
years after the U.N. General Assembly declared a framework to end violence
against women, it is still forecasted that 70 percent of women will experience
some form of violence in their lifetime. And this region has a lot of work to do
in ending the problem.
In war and peace, violence persists
Violence against women is not limited to the domestic sphere. The number of wars
in the Middle East make developing a framework to end violence against women in
the region ever more difficult. One of the first steps to combating violence
against women in the region is implementing legislation that protects their
rights. Throughout history, violence against women has been a systematic during
war. Syria is no exception; the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network has
published a report highlighting how women have been subjected to violence
throughout the Syrian war; the report includes stories of women being used as
bargaining chips during hostage exchanges, and tells tales of sexual violence,
rape, torture, and deprivation of basic sanitation and medical care when in
detention. The report highlights grave human rights abuses and violations
against women. The actual number of women subjected to abuse during war is
unknown due to limited data. The social stigma associated with confessing abuse
is still prominent. A study by AWRAD showed that 77 per cent of Palestinian
women are not even aware of any organisations that directly supports abused
women.
Fear of police action
Another reason that women don’t go to the authorities to report violence is fear
of what may happen while at the police station, or a lack of action by police in
some cases. In Egypt, studies show that 93.4 per cent of Egyptian women fail to
report violence to the police authorities. The reason is blatant: 93 per cent of
those who had the courage to go to the police stated that their questions and
requests for help went unanswered. Additionally, there is the issue of
police-instigated violence against women, including virginity tests, which was
documented by Amnesty International in 2014. In admitting abuse or violence,
there is an element of humiliation, and that is natural human instinct.
Inevitably, there may be an element of self-blame. The lack of police action
against abusers means that reporting such crimes often entails pointless
humiliation. Legislation without implementation is pointless
One of the first steps to combating violence against women in the region is
implementing legislation that protects their rights and offers them safety and
security when they come forward. It is alarming that women in the region are
more likely to be abused by a member of their family or an intimate partner,
than they are by a stranger. That’s when the need for safety comes in.
Legislation has been trickling into the region, notably in Lebanon and Jordan.
However, it is important that significant efforts are made to implement this
legislation. Additionally, there is a dire need for effective policing. Every
member of the police force must be trained to deal with issues of violence
against women. Egypt’s tactic of employing special units compromised of female
officers is insufficient given the size of the population. The police force
needs to be transparent in the way it deals with complaints and adamant about
prosecuting the attackers. Legislation, implementation, and safety make up the
holy triangle to combating violence against women in the Middle East. Once this
triangle is formed, the region can begin to stabilize and successfully end
violence.