llLCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
June 03/16
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
http://www.eliasbejjaninews.com/newsbulletin16/english.june03.16.htm
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Click Here to go to the LCCC Daily English/Arabic News Buletins Archieves Since 2006
Bible Quotations For Today
‘Go into all
the world and proclaim the good news to the whole creation. The one who believes
and is baptized will be saved; but the one who does not believe will be
condemned.
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Mark 16/15-20:"‘Go into all the
world and proclaim the good news to the whole creation. The one who believes and
is baptized will be saved; but the one who does not believe will be condemned.
And these signs will accompany those who believe: by using my name they will
cast out demons; they will speak in new tongues; they will pick up snakes in
their hands, and if they drink any deadly thing, it will not hurt them; they
will lay their hands on the sick, and they will recover.’ So then the Lord
Jesus, after he had spoken to them, was taken up into heaven and sat down at the
right hand of God. And they went out and proclaimed the good news everywhere,
while the Lord worked with them and confirmed the message by the signs that
accompanied it.
We speak, not to please
mortals, but to please God who tests our hearts.
First Letter to the Thessalonians 02/01-08:"You yourselves know, brothers and
sisters, that our coming to you was not in vain, but though we had already
suffered and been shamefully maltreated at Philippi, as you know, we had courage
in our God to declare to you the gospel of God in spite of great opposition. For
our appeal does not spring from deceit or impure motives or trickery, but just
as we have been approved by God to be entrusted with the message of the gospel,
even so we speak, not to please mortals, but to please God who tests our hearts.
As you know and as God is our witness, we never came with words of flattery or
with a pretext for greed; nor did we seek praise from mortals, whether from you
or from others, though we might have made demands as apostles of Christ. But we
were gentle among you, like a nurse tenderly caring for her own children. So
deeply do we care for you that we are determined to share with you not only the
gospel of God but also our own selves, because you have become very dear to us.
Pope Francis's Tweet For
Today
Let us pray together for the Jubilee for Priests from 1-3 June.
Visit
Prions ensemble pour le Jubilé des prêtres du 1er au 3 juin, visitez
لنصلِّ معًا من أجل يوبيل الكهنة من 1 إلى 3 حزيران
Titles For Latest LCCC Bulletin analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on June 02-03/16
Minister Nouhad Machnouk versus General Ashraf Refi/Elias Bejjani/June 02/16
After Tripoli...What’s next for a chastened Saad Hariri/Michael
Young/Now Lebanon.June 02/16
Saudi
Daily, 'Okaz: IRGC Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani Is 'The Great Terrorist
Satan'/MEMRI//June 02/16
Two ways to achieve federalism in the Near East/Eyad Abu Shakra/Al Arabiya/June
02/16
When they scare us from the cinema/Turki Al-Dakhil/Al Arabiya/June 02/16
What after the Fallujah campaign/Mshari Al Thaydi/Al Arabiya/June 02/16
Defeating ISIS solves nothing without a political solution/Dr. John C. Hulsman/Al
Arabiya/June 02/16
Europe Braces for More Jihadist Attacks/"Another attempted attack is almost
certain./Soeren Kern/Gatestone Institute/June 02/16
Bahrain's Game of Detainee Diplomacy With Washington/Simon Henderson/The
Washington Institute/June 02/16
Britain's National Students Union in Crisis/Robbie Travers/Gatestone
Institute/June 02/16
A Self-Profile Of The Islamic State: The Creedal Document/Prof. Ella Landau-Tasseron/MEMRI/June
02/16
Titles For Latest Lebanese Related News published on
June 02-03/16
Minister Nouhad Machnouk versus General Ashraf Refi
Interior Minister Nouhad al-Mashnouq
Says Franjieh Nomination was 'UK-U.S.-Saudi' Idea, Urges Rifi to Stop Mentioning
'Martyrs'
Lebanese Cabinet Debate on Janna Dam Drags On as Ministers Trade Jabs
Hand Grenades Found near Church in Jezzine District
Boutous Harb Says Presidential Polls First, People Want to Practice Democratic
Rights
General Security Arrests Syrian Involved with Terror Group
Hariri Tribunal Continues Trial of 'Slain' Hizbullah Commander
War of Words Erupts between Geagea and Hariri
Sami Gemayel Rejects 1960 Law, Says Municipal Vote Not for 'Settling Political
Scores'
Lebanese Army Clamps Down on IS Terror Cell and Kills a Militant
Rifi Says he Adheres to Political Path of Late PM Rafik Hariri
Luis Figo Wants Messi, Ronaldo in Lebanon for Sep 10 'Game of Legends'
After Tripoli...What’s next for a chastened Saad Hariri?
Rifi: We may call for recount of votes in Tripoli
De Freige: We treated 43% of trash via plants funded by EU
UNIFIL confirms work within AO
EU Commission marks 11th commemration of Samir Kassir assassination
rchbishop Bustros confers upon Salameh high citation as token of appreciation
Titles For Latest LCCC Bulletin For
Miscellaneous Reports And News published on
June 02-03/16
Nigeria: Muslims murder four, burn
church in “blasphemy” riot
Germany recognizes Armenian ‘genocide,’ angering Turkey
Syrian state TV: deadly blast at Latakia mosque
Bomb near Mosque in Syria's Latakia Causes Deaths, Injuries
Offensive in Syria Aimed at Cutting off IS Supply Route
Israel Minister Says Turkey Deal near Completion
Erdogan: US-backed Syrian force mostly Arab
Canadian soldiers might ‘take off’ Kurdish flag on their uniforms
Israel foreign ministry says French Mideast drive ‘will fail’
Yemen truce boosts aid access: UN
Saudi Arabia approves governing framework for Vision 2030
Tajikistan jails 13 leaders of Islamist party for up to life: officials
British lawmaker Lord Alton: Latest crackdowns in Iran only show that dissent is
alive and well
NCRI Foreign Affairs Committee chair commends UN human rights chief for
condemning abuses in Iran
NCRI Representative in Germany welcomes trial for Iranian regime’s spies in
Germany
Links From Jihad Watch Site for
June 02-03/16
Georgia: Muslim woman in burqa attacks family with American flag
Nigeria: Muslims murder four, burn church in “blasphemy” riot
Nigeria: Muslims murder three Christians, attack a fourth with machetes
Germany: “Refugees Welcome” activist raped by Muslim refugee
Germany: 3 Muslims arrested for Islamic State jihad suicide plot
It begins: Facebook deletes page of critic of Muslim migrant invasion
BBC religion chief states “uncomfortable truth”: ISIS driven by “Islamic
doctrine”
Muslim ‘war criminal’ now working security at Dulles International Airport
Latest Lebanese Related News published on
June 01-02/16
Minister Nouhad Machnouk versus
General Ashraf Refiشتان ما بين ريفي والمشنوق
Elias Bejjani/June 02/16
Listening attentively today to MP, and
Interior Minister, Nouhad Machnouk via his lengthy and boring interview with
LBCI’s Marcel Khanem, “Kalam El Nas” Talk Show, one could not but feel and sense
the apparent hostility and jealousy that he deeply holds against General Ashraf
Refi.
Meanwhile, in reality and practicality, there is no doubt that in the Lebanese
political Sunni leadership arena, Minister Nouhad Al Machnouk is the prime loser
and definitely the most envious, angry and frustrated politician from the
brilliant emergence of General Refi as a great winner in the Tripoli municipal
elections.
Machnouck, on MP, Micheal Aoun’s delusional path, he has been fantasizing and
day dreaming to be crowned as Lebanon’s coming Prime Minister.
In this dreaming context he openly subdued to the terrorist Hezbollah as a
Interior Minister and did his best to appease and cajole its leadership…While
Refi stood tall in his anti-Hezbollah stances as our Holy Cedars.
In our modest opinion both men, Machnouck and Refi have no resemblance at all in
any domain as far as character, potentials, personalities, patriotism,
consistency and leadership traits are considered.
One is patriotic, courageous with sold stances, and the other a mere follower.
Sadly, the kind of cheap and below the belt verbal attacks that Machnouch waged
against Refi during the LBCI interview were totally embedded with lack of
reasoning, overt ethical deviations and silly fabrications.
Minister Machnouck tried hard but in vain to belittle, marginalize and demonize
the stunning Refi’s victory and accordingly resorted to many defaming
unsuccessful means and ways.
In conclusion, General Refi worked hard to be where he is now, and according his
Tripoli citizens appreciated his efforts and elected him to be their actual
representative because they see themselves in his honesty, patriotism, courage
and devotion.
Occupied Lebanon is in bad need for politicians like Ashraf Refi.
From Diaspora, we extend our heartily felt and genuine congratulations for both
General Refi and the courageous oppressed and impoverished people Of Tripoli.
Long Live Lebanon
Interior Minister Nouhad al-Mashnouq
Says Franjieh Nomination was 'UK-U.S.-Saudi' Idea, Urges Rifi to Stop Mentioning
'Martyrs'
Naharnet/June 02/16/Interior Minister Nouhad al-Mashnouq on Thursday defended
al-Mustaqbal movement's policies in the past few years, as he criticized the
recent political rhetoric of resigned Justice Minister Ashraf Rifi.Describing
Rifi as a “friend,” Mashnouq congratulated the minister on his stunning
municipal victory in the northern city of Tripoli but urged him to stop
mentioning slain ex-PM Rafik Hariri and other assassinated figures in his daily
political rhetoric. “It's about time we stopped
mentioning the martyrs. Minister Rifi knows very well that we have not forgotten
the martyrs, but the issue of martyrs must not become a daily rhetoric,”
Mashnouq added in an interview on LBCI television. A
list backed by Rifi achieved a surprising victory in Sunday's polls in Tripoli
against a list backed by Hariri, ex-PM Najib Miqati, former ministers Faisal
Karami and Mohammed al-Safadi, Jamaa Islamiya, al-Ahbash and the Arab Democratic
Party. The Rifi-backed list clinched 16 seats on the municipal council as the
broad coalition's list won eight. Reminiscing Saad
Hariri's visit to Damascus in 2009 and his meeting with Syrian President Bashar
Assad, the minister noted that it happened at the request of Saudi Arabia.
“The previous Saudi policy is what forced us to go to Damascus to seek
pacification with the Syrian regime and it was behind the stances that al-Mustaqbal
movement took,” Mashnouq added. He also revealed that the decision to nominate
Marada Movement chief MP Suleiman Franjieh for the presidency was not ex-PM
Hariri's idea. “Suleiman Franjieh's nomination did not
come from Saad Hariri but rather from the British foreign ministry and later the
Americans and Saudi Arabia,” Mashnouq disclosed. He
noted that the move was an international decision based on the viewpoint that
Hizbullah will sooner or later “return defeated from Syria.”Considering the
possibility that Hizbullah might then act “like an elephant in a china shop,”
world powers suggested offering the party “a guarantee president rather than a
guarantee political system,” Mashnouq said. “This is what the West thought and
that's why it supported Franjieh's nomination,” the minister explained. He noted
however that the election of a new president “is not imminent due to the known
reasons.”Lebanon has been without a president since May 2014 due to the rival
parties' failure to agree on a candidate and Hariri launched late in 2015 a
proposal to nominate Franjieh for the country's top Christian post.
His initiative was however met with rejection and reservations from the
country's main Christian parties as well as Hizbullah, which is clinging to the
nomination of Change and Reform bloc chief MP Michel Aoun. Change and Reform and
Hizbullah, as well as March 14's Lebanese Forces, argue that Aoun is more
eligible than Franjieh to become president given the size of his parliamentary
bloc and his bigger influence in the Christian community.
Lebanese Cabinet Debate on
Janna Dam Drags On as Ministers Trade Jabs
Naharnet/June 02/16/The thorny issue of the Janna dam consumed most of the time
of the cabinet session on Thursday as rival ministers traded jabs over the
project. “Discussions tackled Environment Minister
Mohammed al-Mashnouq's request to halt works at the Janna dam for environmental
reasons and the cabinet has not concluded its discussions,” acting information
minister Rashid Derbas announced after the session.
“All ministers stressed that Lebanon needs dams but called for patience pending
the confirmation of the technical aspects,” he said. Speaking after the session,
Foreign Minister and Free Patriotic Movement chief Jebran Bassil emphasized that
“no one will be able to stand in the way of the Janna dam and the project is
underway.”But State Minister for Administrative Development Nabil de Freij, who
is close to al-Mustaqbal movement, underlined that “construction works at the
Janna dam will not continue due to the presence of a previous resolution to halt
them.”“The discussions were political and had they been technical, we would have
concluded them in 15 minutes. The energy minister is relying on a study whose
outcome was negative,” De Freij added. Prior to the session, the minister had
announced that “the issue of the Janna dam will not be resolved should the
discussions take a political and sectarian form.”“The cabinet has not reached a
decision on the Janna dam and the government drowned in the dam's details and it
does not know how to swim,” Telecommunications Minister Butros Harb said as he
left the session. “I'm sure that there are hidden deals behind the project,” he
added. “The Janna dam was moved from one location to another and the ex-energy
minister (Bassil) did not say why as the incumbent minister (Arthur Nazarian)
said that he only learned of this today,” Harb went on to say. He had said ahead
of the session that the Janna dam “will drive us crazy” and that “it was set up
in order to siphon off money.”Education Minister Elias Bou Saab hit back at Harb,
noting that “the decision to move the location of the Janna dam was taken before
Bassil became energy minister and there is no decision to halt the
project.”Prime Minister Tammam Salam “asked that it be kept away from the media
spotlight,” Bou Saab added. “The problem is not in the Janna dam and Minister
Harb is trying to take advantage of the file to conceal the telecom ministry
scandal,” Bou Saab said prior to the session. Al-Jadeed television said Mashnouq
demanded the halt of the project, drawing responses from Bassil and Bou Saab.
Culture Minister Rony Araiji of the Marada Movement announced ahead of
the session that “the Janna dam is a vital and important project that must be
tackled technically and without political bickering.” For his part, Agriculture
Minister Akram Shehayyeb of the Progressive Socialist Party noted that “the
Janna dam will provide water and electricity” and “the issue is not
political.”“The project is developmental and economic and the country needs it,”
Shehayyeb added. Meanwhile, Finance Minister Ali Hassan Khalil of the AMAL
Movement said: “To me, the issue of the Janna dam is purely technical and it
should not be discussed in cabinet.” “We support the principle of establishing
dams amid the scarcity of water, rains and snow and if there are technical
remarks we can discuss them,” Industry Minister Hussein al-Hajj Hassan of
Hizbullah said. Several officials of the al-Mustaqbal movement have said that
they are opposed to the project over environmental concerns. The Free Patriotic
Movement has meanwhile rejected the environmental arguments, accusing Mustaqbal
of obstructing the project due to political motives.
Hand Grenades Found near
Church in Jezzine District
Naharnet/June 02/16/Two hand grenades were found Thursday evening outside the
Mar Jerjes Church in the Jezzine district town of Roum, state-run National News
Agency reported. “A General Security intelligence force cordoned off the area
around the Mar Jerjes Church after two hand grenades were discovered outside
it,” NNA said. A bomb technician was called in to remove the grenades from the
location, the agency added. LBCI television meanwhile said that the grenades
“turned out to be leftovers from the Israeli occupation.”MTV for its part said
the two grenades “were not set for detonation.”
Boutous Harb Says Presidential Polls First, People
Want to Practice Democratic Rights
Naharnet/June 02/16/Telecommunications Minister Butros Harb said on Thursday
that the municipal elections have shown the people's yearning to practice their
democratic right through elections and warned against staging the parliamentary
elections before the election of a president. “Staging the parliamentary
elections before the presidential ones will push Lebanon towards an undefined
adventure,” said Harb in a press conference. “Beholders of a theory to hold the
parliamentary elections before the presidential ones must be careful of
implicating the country in a project that destroys its constitution,” he added.
Lebanon has been without a president since the term of President Michel Suleiman
ended in May 2014. Speaker Nabih Berri had launched an initiative recently aimed
at ending Lebanon's impasse. He called for shortening the term of parliament and
that the elections be held based on the 1960 law should political forces fail to
agree on a new electoral one. He also called for staging the presidential
elections after the parliamentary ones and forming a national unity government.
On the outcome of the municipal elections where Harb won the polls in the
northern village of Tannourine, his native town, against a list backed by the
Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement, he said: “Everyone must accept
the rules of democratic competition based on elections. “Attempts of political
parties to confiscate the will of Lebanese have fallen,” he said and added that
the parties are divided by national and democratic principles and accused them
of forming alliances and uniting temporarily under electoral circumstances.
Lebanon staged its municipal elections over a four-stage during the month of
May.
General Security Arrests Syrian
Involved with Terror Group
Naharnet/June 02/16/The General Security announced on Thursday the arrest of a
Syrian national on charges of belonging to a terror group after providing his
accomplices with arms and logistical support. “Based on the General Prosecutor's
request, and within the framework of follow-up activities of terror groups and
their sleeper cells, the General Security arrested Syrian M.M. for his
affiliation to a terror group,” said the the General Security Directorate in a
statement. “The detainee confessed during interrogations that he had contacts
with his Syrian leader N.A. also known as Abou Iskandar, for the purpose of
providing logistical support and supplying weapons and ammo and facilitate the
movement of fugitive militants so they won't be caught by the police,” added the
statement. He was referred to the related authorities. Efforts continue to
arrest the individuals involved.
Hariri Tribunal Continues Trial of
'Slain' Hizbullah Commander
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/June 02/16/A U.N.-backed tribunal to try the
killers of Lebanese premier Rafik Hariri said Wednesday it would continue its
trial in absentia of Hizbullah military chief Mustafa Badreddine, said to have
been killed in May. Judges at The Hague-based court said they had not yet seen
"sufficient evidence" to confirm the death of Badreddine, whose funeral in
Beirut drew thousands of mourners. The trial "will continue pending the receipt
of further information from the government of Lebanon," they said in a
statement. Hizbullah said Badreddine, who was on a U.S. terror sanctions
blacklist and wanted by Israel, was killed in an explosion on May 12 near
Damascus international airport, in circumstances that are still shrouded in
mystery. Hizbullah has deployed thousands of fighters in Syria where Badreddine
had led its intervention in support of President Bashar Assad's forces, which
are also backed by Russia and Iran. Hizbullah has accused Islamist extremists of
killing Badreddine, but it has given little information about his death. The
Special Tribunal for Lebanon launched proceedings against Badreddine and four
other Hizbullah suspects in January 2014. They have never appeared in court.
Badredinne stands accused of masterminding the 2005 bombing that killed
Lebanon's ex-premier Hariri, which sparked mass protests. The Special Tribunal
for Lebanon was set up in 2007, and is the only international ad-hoc tribunal
with the jurisdiction to try an act of terror. It is specifically trying
suspects charged with the murder of Hariri, who was killed along with more than
20 others in a massive suicide car bombing on the Beirut waterfront.
War of Words Erupts between Geagea
and Hariri
Naharnet/June 02/16/Al-Mustaqbal Movement chief MP Saad Hariri replied to the
statements of Lebanese Forces chief Samir Geagea, stating that the latter and
Hizbullah have obstructed his initiative to end the presidential vacuum. “Just a
reminder. The first person to nominate you for the presidential post was I,”
said Hariri via Twitter addressing Geagea who made the statements in an
interview on MTV on Wednesday. “The country is more important than you and I.
The parties that obstructed my initiative to end the presidential impasse were
you and Hizbullah,” added the ex-PM referring to his nomination of Marada chief
MP Suleiman Franjieh for the top state post. “We (al-Mustaqbal) are not against
the alliance (between the LF and the Free Patriotic Movement), but we have the
right to stand by the people who have backed us since 2005 including Dori
Chamoun, Sami Gemayel, Butros Harb, Elias el-Murr, Hadi Hobesih , Farid Makari
and the list goes on,” remarked Hariri. The MP concluded: “The only agenda that
motivates me is a national and not a sectarian one. I am not waiting for
personal gains...the most important thing for me is for the country to win and
for the people to live.”Geagea announced in his interview that the LF and the
FPM faced a “major war” from all parties in the latest municipal polls, noting
that both al-Mustaqbal movement and Hizbullah are against the LF-FPM
rapprochement.
Sami Gemayel Rejects 1960 Law, Says
Municipal Vote Not for 'Settling Political Scores'
Naharnet/June 02/16/Kataeb Party chief MP Sami Gemayel announced Thursday that
he refuses a return to the 1960 electoral law under which the 2009 parliamentary
polls were held, while stressing that Kataeb did not seek to “score points
against others” in the municipal elections that were held last month. “I call on
Speaker Nabih Berri not to risk a return to the 1960 law and to pledge that a
session would be held to vote on all the proposed laws, even if we don't reach a
prior agreement on a certain electoral law,” said Gemayel at a press conference.
The 1960 law is based on 26 districts and the winner-takes-all system while the
parliament is currently mulling a law based on proportional representation and a
hybrid one that mixes the two systems. Turning to the latest municipal
elections, Gemayel noted that “all those who participated in the electoral
process have contributed to reviving the democratic life.” “Kataeb decided to
implement the principle of decentralization in the elections and the decisions
in the municipal polls were based on local considerations. Kataeb's members
chose the alliances in their towns and we didn't impose anything on anyone,” he
pointed out. “In these elections, Kataeb considered that the objective of the
polls is development in the various regions, not scoring points against others
and settling political scores,” Gemayel stressed. He added: “The elections
proved that the Lebanese are free and that the Lebanese society managed to say
'No' when it wants and 'Yes' when it wants. The Lebanese proved that their will
cannot be usurped in elections after citizens felt like the political parties
were dealing with them as commodities.”“We drew another lesson from the
municipal polls, which taught us that the Lebanese people have the ability to
change things,” Gemayel said. And noting that the results of the municipal
elections will oblige all parties to “reevaluate their calculations,” Gemayel
underlined that “a democracy that is not based on accountability is not a
democracy.”“I call on the civil society to engage with us in an open dialogue
for the sake of change in Lebanon and we in Kataeb are ready for such a move,”
he added.
Lebanese Army Clamps Down on IS
Terror Cell and Kills a Militant
Naharnet/June 02/16/The Lebanese army killed an Islamic State group militant and
arrested three others in Khirbet Daoud in Akkar, media reports said on Thursday.
The army carried out raids in the Akkar town and was able to kill an IS militant
and arrest three others, all Lebanese nationals. Reports said that the detainees
are responsible for the killing of three soldiers who where on duty earlier in
the towns of al-Bireh and al-Rayhaniyeh, and wounding an Information Branch
first adjutant. The Voice of Lebanon radio VDL (93.3) said later during the day
that the army killed Khaled Saadeddine and arrested Zaher, Samir and Jassem
Saadeddine, all of who belong to the Islamic State group.
Rifi Says he Adheres to Political
Path of Late PM Rafik Hariri
Naharnet/June 02/16/Resigned Justice Minister Ashraf Rifi stated on Thursday
that he is no longer in the al-Mustaqbal movement but that he will continue to
defend the political path of late PM Rafik Hariri. “I am not in the al-Mustaqbal
movement, but I am a fierce fighter in defense of the political Harirism,” said
Rifi in reference to the political path of late PM Rafik Hariri. Rifi's comments
came after a visit to Grand Mufti of the Republic Abdul Latif Deryan at Dar
el-Fatwa. “I do not resemble this government and I will never withdraw my
resignation,” he added. Rifi resigned in February from the government in wake of
the release of former Minister Michel Samaha from jail and at Hizbullah's verbal
attacks against Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.
Luis Figo Wants Messi, Ronaldo in
Lebanon for Sep 10 'Game of Legends'
Naharnet/June 02/16/Somewhere, out there,
there is still someone who believes that Lebanon deserves a better shot or at
least some exposure in the world of sports -- specifically football. Luis Figo
seems to be very excited about the “Game of the Legends” that will be held at
the Fouad Chehab Stadium in Jounieh on September 10, 2016. The retired
Portuguese football star said: “It will be a great opportunity for me to visit
Lebanon for the first time. I am excited to see how passionate the Lebanese are
for football!”“It is a great event to promote football in this country, and in
the presence of legends of football, a large number of young Lebanese
footballers will be motivated to move forward and to follow their dreams,” Figo
added. He hoped the organizers will be able to invite the Argentinian Leonel
Messi and the Portuguese Cristiano Ronaldo to complete the confirmed lineup
which will comprise Brazil's Roberto Carlos, Spain's Carles Puyol, England's
Paul Scholes, Germany's Jens Lehmann and Spain's Michel Salgado. The Lebanese
squad will be led by the superstar Rida Antar. “It is a great opportunity for us
to play together, especially that we are the opponents of the past. It will
reveal a lot of memories from our past games, we will surely have a great time
playing this game,” added Figo. Addressing the Lebanese people, he added: “Come
watch and enjoy the game! The atmosphere will be great and different from what
you used to watch on television.”The event is sponsored by the Ministry of
Tourism in Lebanon and organized by Arabica Sport, which is a part of Arabica
Group TV network, and the official representative of Real Madrid Camps in the
MENA region.
Tickets can be bought at https://ihjoz.com/events/1680
After Tripoli...What’s next for a
chastened Saad Hariri?
Michael Young/Now
Lebanon.June 02/16
Among many people the assessment has been that Saad Hariri, after his startling
loss in the Tripoli municipal elections, is politically finished. This is surely
an exaggeration, but the former prime minister is definitely at a nadir in his
political career, with no obvious path out of this predicament.
A few weeks ago, we were arguing that Hariri, seemingly abandoned by his
longtime Saudi patrons, had no real choice but to become his own man. Today, the
picture appears grimmer, with the former prime minister’s halting efforts to
carve out his own path leading to a major setback in a city that should have
revealed his strengths. Perhaps the problem is that Hariri has misread the past
five years since he left Lebanon for self-imposed exile. Where he reportedly
felt that his absence would not affect his political fortunes, it actually has
had a devastating effect on his popular appeal. Recall how Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir
had pitilessly criticized Hariri several years ago, saying that a commander
should not abandon his troops in the heat of the battle. It remains unclear
whether Hariri’s long period away was imposed by the Saudis or was a decision
taken by the former prime minister himself. If it was the former, Hariri will
probably have learned by now that the Saudis can often push in a particular
direction, only to later blame those who listened to them when things turn sour.
For instance, Hariri’s decision to reconcile with prominent Sunni rivals such as
Najib Mikati, Abdelrahim Mrad, Fouad Makhzoumi, and Ahmad Karami followed a
Saudi directive. The former prime minister, otherwise, had no incentive to mend
fences with individuals whose presence merely reaffirmed that Hariri had become
a first among equals in Saudi eyes.
Yet this proved a disaster in Tripoli, when associated with Hariri’s intention
to cut Ashraf Rifi down to size for having resigned from the government without
his permission. Hariri was seen as making peace with Syria’s most prominent
allies in the city. As for Rifi, politicians often impose discipline, but in
this case he was doing so against a man who had been at the forefront of
preserving March 14 objectives after 2005--from the investigation of Rafik
Hariri’s assassination, to protecting March 14 parliamentarians, to defending
against Hezbollah.
And on the matter of Michel Samaha Rifi was right. The former minister’s release
was a scandal. The justice minister was never going to remain silent on a man
who intended to set off bombs in northern Lebanon, effectively Rifi’s own back
yard.
The pointless row with Rifi came right after Hariri had declared his support for
Suleiman Franjieh as president. Hariri has stubbornly stuck to this plan, even
though at this point it is all but dead. This has lost him support among his own
sympathizers, who have great trouble understanding why Hariri abandoned a
staunch ally like Samir Geagea with alacrity, for a man who is one of Bashar
al-Assad’s closest comrades.
It also makes no sense in that the Saudis have their own doubts about Franjieh.
This was made clear in March when the ambassador in Lebanon, Ali Awwad al-Asiri,
explained to Al-Araby al-Jadeed that the kingdom had supported a Franjieh
candidacy, but only as an initiative around which there could be consensus.
However, the ambassador added, “we did not see this consensus.” Asiri made the
remarks just as Hariri was on his way to Moscow to discuss the presidential
election--in other words, intentionally or not, the ambassador undermined him.
What the Tripoli vote did was further restrict Hariri’s margin of maneuver on
the presidential front. Last weekend, Franjieh told the former prime minister
that he would have no problems if Hariri voted for Michel Aoun in the
presidential election. This seemed to create an opening (in theory at least) for
Hariri to end the presidential vacuum by rallying behind Aoun--a move that would
undoubtedly force Hezbollah’s hand. However, now that
the electorate in Tripoli has punished Hariri for having allegedly abandoned the
principles of March 14 through his alliances in the city, switching to Aoun is
no longer an option. Not that Hariri would have seriously considered doing so,
but if his aim was to fill the presidential vacuum (in the hope, perhaps, that
it would end his own marginalization), he now finds himself in a position where
this is impossible.
So where does Hariri go from here? Soundly defeated in Tripoli, unconvincing in
Beirut, on the losing side in Zahleh, the former prime minister has much work to
do—both within his Sunni community and in reconciling with his former allies.
The fear is that Hariri may conclude that the only way out of his impasse is to
adopt more sectarian rhetoric. However, this would only damage his image as a
moderate Sunni unifier. The problem is that today many people are delighting in
Hariri’s humiliation. That’s never a good sign for a politician. If he wants to
survive politically, Hariri has to remember why people supported him in the
first place. The feeling among many onetime followers that Hariri stands for
nothing is eroding what remains of his appeal. He loses by appearing adrift.
**Michael Young is a writer and editor in Beirut. He tweets @BeirutCalling.
Rifi: We may call for recount
of votes in Tripoli
Thu 02 Jun 2016 /NNA - Resigned Justice Minister Ashraf Rifi on Thursday said
"We might call for a recount of the votes as I believe that my group actually
reaped even more votes in the polls.""All the Lebanese know, we have been
following up on the count of the votes, and in a certain stage we had been
informed that the counts of votes have reached 22 against two, and suddenly it
had decreased to 16 versus eight. So we may ask for a recount because we have
doubt in a particular place," he asserted during his visit to Dar el Fatwa."This
victory was given as gift to the spirit of the martyr Rafik Hariri and all the
other martyrs who have fallen in defense of Lebanon," he added, stressing that
"we share this issue with Prime Minister Saad Hariri, the Muslims, and
Lebanese."He confirmed that he is not a member in Future bloc but he enjoyed and
will always enjoy the principles of Martyr Rafik Hariri.His relationship with
Hariri began to deteriorate after the latter officially nominated Rifi's
political rival, Marada Movement leader Sleiman Frangieh, for the presidency in
February.
De Freige: We treated 43% of
trash via plants funded by EU
Thu 02 Jun 2016/NNA - State Minister for Administrative Development Affairs,
Nabil de Freige, said, "We treated 43% of wastes through setting up plants
financed by the European Union."De Freige's words came Thursday in the context
of a conference on solid wastes treatment in BIEL.
UNIFIL confirms work within AO
Thu 02 Jun 2016/NNA - UNIFIL spokesperson Andrea Tenenti maintained, in a
statement on Thursday, that peacekeepers were carrying on work within their area
of operations, in coordination of the Lebanese Armed Forces. "The security and
safety of UNIFIL personnel are key," he said.
EU Commission marks 11th
commemration of Samir Kassir assassination
Thu 02 Jun 2016 /NNA - The European Union Commission in Lebanon marked the 11th
commemoration of the assassination of Samir Kassir, at an event in Sursok
Gardens in Ashrafieh, which included the distrbition of Samir Kassir Award for
Freedom of the Press 2016.In a word delivered on the occasion, EU Ambassador to
Lebanon, Christina Lassen said: "Eleven years ago, on a Thursday just like
today, the 2nd of June 2005, Samir Kassir's voice was silenced.Today, and every
2nd of June, in commemoration of the loss of Samir Kassir we remind ourselves of
all the reasons and the necessity to carry on his battle, to salute his
unshakable belief in the value of free speech and his fierceness telling and
unfolding the truth. I am today particularly touched
to attend this ceremony for the first time since I have become the EU Ambassador
to Lebanon.
Allow me here to take this opportunity and to extend a particular warm welcome
to Mrs. Gisele Kassir, to the family of Samir Kassir, and to the members and
team of the Samir Kassir Foundation."She added: "It is the freedom of speech and
particularly the freedom of press that was dear to the heart of Samir Kassir, as
it is cherished in the values and principles of the European Union.
For the world to move, flourish and improve, we need the brilliance of
informed, professional and brave journalism, whether expressed through written
words, photographs or videos. The freedom of press is closely linked to our own
freedom of speech and to our freedom as nations, individuals and citizens.
The challenges are huge: Being a journalist is becoming ever more dangerous.
There are attacks, hostage takings, arrests, and killings. The number of
dangerous zones is increasing all across the globe and particularly in this
region. Last year, the United Nations Security Council acknowledged this growing
threat and adopted, for the first time ever, a resolution aiming to protect
media professionals in war zones." She continued:
"There are also growing concerns around this region about de facto government
restrictions on freedom of press and freedom of expression. The alibis used to
explain these repressive practices are usually linked to the need to ensure
security in a world faced with the scourge of terrorism.
Yet, we must always remind ourselves that terrorists win when those whom they
target resort to repressive security measures. Prudence should be the guide here
coupled with observance of the rule of law.Last year, the United Nations adopted
new Sustainable Development Goals and one of them focuses exactly on this:
"Public Access to Information and Fundamental Freedoms". The European Union very
much supports this goal, which reminds all governments that they should respond
to citizens' demands inquiries for information also to ensure higher quality
journalism. Unfortunately, often the opposite is often the case, at times even
leading to self-censorship by journalists who sometimes shy away from touching
on government sensitive issues for fear of persecution."
She said: "Samir Kassir, who was writing his critical pieces during the
very difficult time of occupation in Lebanon, himself was an optimist. He said
once in an interview that while "the values and the procedures of the Republic
have been thrown off track" it did not "diminish Lebanon's worth" with resilient
civil society and the freedom that he and other intellectuals enjoyed in their
writing. Sadly, his assassination marred that optimism
and serves as a reminder to the whole region and the world that those wielding
power should use it for protecting even those whom they disagree with. Yet at
the same time, it is exactly through his witness that Lebanon - not anymore "a
laboratory of violence", to use Samir Kassir's words again - can now serve as a
powerful symbol of that fundamental truth."She concluded: "The 11th edition of
the Samir Kassir Award is dedicated to all the journalists who are carrying out
courageous and brilliant work in the Middle East, in North Africa and the Gulf -
sometimes putting their lives on the line doing their job.
This year, we have received a total of 259 applications from 14
countries, over 100 more than last year. This is a true testimony to the
increasing prestige and popularity of the Samir Kassir Award. The largest number
of submissions this year came from Egypt (90), followed by Syria (51) and
Lebanon (36). As usual, after thorough deliberations by the outstanding members
of the jury, we will award three journalists who excelled in the three
categories: Opinion Article, Investigative Article, and Audiovisual report.
Let me finish by congratulating once again the Samir Kassir Foundation
and its staff members for their work. They have put all their heart and
dedication into making this event a dignified commemoration of a courageous
journalist."
Archbishop Bustros confers
upon Salameh high citation as token of appreciation
Thu 02 Jun 2016/NNA - Archbishop of the Melkite Greek Catholic Archeparchy of
Beirut and Byblos Cyril Salim Bustros on Thursday conferred upon Central Bank
Governor, Riad Salameh, the Order of the Archdiocese of Beirut Sect, during a
luncheon hosted in his honor at the Diocese, as a token of appreciation of his
praiseworthy role in maintaining the stability of Lebanon's financial situation.
The ceremony took place in the presence of Tourism Minister, Michel Pharoun,
Papal Nuncio Gabriel Caccia,MPs Neemeh Tohme and Tony Abu Khater, and Beirut
Commissioner Judge Ziad Shbib, as well as scores of political, social, media and
military dignitaries. In his delivered word, Archbishop Bustros heaped praises
on Governor Salameh's undertaken immense efforts and diverse initiatives which
contributed to the encouragement of investments in Lebanon, and the polarization
of local and foreign investors. "This in addition to your {Salameh's] support of
financial laws and regulations that maintained Lebanon's involvement in
financial globalization," Bustros added, hailing Salameh's endeavors in bracing
small and medium-sized enterprises which efficiently helped in creating job
opportunities. Governor Salameh, for his part, deemed today's honoring the
Central Bank via his person as "an act of trust and belief in Lebanon and its
future, as well as adherence to the Lebanese state and its institutions."
Salameh also expressed entrenched trust in Lebanon's financial and banking
system which demonstrated a great immunity and capability in confronting
challenges and crises. "Our monetary and financial situation is strong and
cohesive, and our banking sector is in a solid and proper situation."
Latest LCCC Bulletin For Miscellaneous Reports And News published on June 02-03/16
Nigeria: Muslims murder four, burn
church in “blasphemy” riot
June 2, 2016/Robert Spencer/Jihad Watch
A busy day for the jihad in Nigeria. This is a different incident from the one
posted here.
“4 killed, church, shop burnt in Niger State’s ‘blasphemy’ riot,” The News
Nigeria, May 31, 2016 (thanks to The Religion of Peace):
Four persons have so far lost their lives while at least one house, a church and
a shop have been burnt in a riot sparked by alleged posting of a blasphemous
statement about Prophet Muhammad on the social media in Pandogari town, Niger
State last Sunday, according to Nigerian military authorities.
In a statement released on Tuesday morning, the military announced imposition of
curfew on the town to curb the raging violence in which it said has also led to
looting of 25 shops.
Major N. C Agwu, Assistant Director Army Public Relations, in the statement
released on Tuesday morning said the religious riot began at about 6 pm on
Sunday when one Mr Methodus Chimaije Emmanuel, a 24 year old trader based in
Pandogari, Rafi LGA of Niger State was attacked and killed by a mob in the town
on allegation of posting a blasphemous statement about Prophet Muhammad on the
social media.
He added that troops of 31 Artillery Brigade of 1 Division, Nigerian Army on
operation MESA quickly intervened and restored law and order while a dusk to
dawn curfew was imposed in the town.
However, the rioters embarked on further violence on Monday morning , looting
shops and blocking the Lagos – Kaduna Road, a major artery connecting the
northern and southern parts of the country.
Again, according to Major Agwu, military personnel in conjunction with the
operatives of Nigeria Police and Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps(NSCDC)
took control of the situation to forestall escalation of violence.
He however said despite the intervention, one church, one house and a shop were
burnt while 25 other shops were looted.
“Three other persons including a personnel of the NSCDC also lost their lives.
Some arrests have been made in connection with the violence and the suspects
handed over to the police….
Germany recognizes Armenian
‘genocide,’ angering Turkey
By Staff writer, Al Arabiya English Thursday, 2 June 2016/German lawmakers
passed a resolution Thursday recognizing the World War I massacre of Armenians
by Ottoman forces as genocide, defying Turkey’s warnings that the vote could
hurt ties. Only one MP voted against and another abstained, as parliament
approved overwhelmingly by a show of hands the resolution entitled “Remembrance
and commemoration of the genocide of Armenians and other Christian minorities in
1915 and 1916.” Soon after the vote, Turkey recalled its ambassador to Germany.
The vote heightened tensions between Germany and Turkey at a time when Ankara is
playing a key role in stemming the flow of migrants to Europe. Turkish President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that “this decision will seriously impact
Turkish-German relations.”Speaking during a visit to Kenya, Erdogan said
recalling the ambassador for consultations was a “first step” and that the
Turkish government would consider further steps to be taken in response to the
vote. Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim called the German decision a
“historic error.” Yildirim said that Turkish people take pride in in their past
and that “there is no event in our past that would cause us to bow down our
heads in embarrassment.”
Yerevan welcomes vote
Armenia on Thursday welcomed the German parliament’s resolution recognizing the
genocide. “Armenia welcomes the adoption of the resolution by the Bundestag,”
Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian said in a statement.He praised the
recognition as “Germany’s valuable contribution not only to the international
recognition and condemnation of the Armenian Genocide, but also to the universal
fight for the prevention of genocides, crimes against humanity.”Yerevan has long
sought international recognition of the genocide, but Ankara rejects the term to
describe the killings more than a century ago and argues that it was a
collective tragedy in which equal numbers of Turks and Armenians died. On
Wednesday, Yıldırım urged Germany to exercise “common sense,” saying that the
killings were “ordinary” events that took place in wartime conditions.“This vote
is a ridiculous vote,” Yıldırım told reporters.
(With AFP, AP)
Syrian state TV: deadly blast at
Latakia mosque
AP, Beirut Thursday, 2 June 2016/Syrian state TV is reporting that an explosion
has struck outside a mosque in the coastal government stronghold of Latakia
inflicting casualties. The TV says the blast occurred Thursday as people were
leaving the Khulafa Rashideen mosque following afternoon prayers. State TV says
the blast killed and wounded several people, but did not give numbers. The
explosion came a week after a series of coordinated bombings struck the coastal
city of Tartus and the town of Jableh on the Syrian coast, killing some 160
people. The coastal provinces of Latakia and Tartus have been a government
stronghold since the country’s conflict began in 2011.
Bomb near Mosque in Syria's Latakia
Causes Deaths, Injuries
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/June
02/16/A bomb exploded near a mosque in the Syrian regime stronghold of Latakia
on Thursday, leaving several people dead and wounded, state television said. "A
terrorist attack hit near the Khulafa al-Rashideen mosque in the Daatur district
of Latakia as people emerged from afternoon prayers," state television said,
adding there were casualties. Official news agency SANA said a motorcycle bomb
was behind the attack in the coastal city.
Offensive in Syria Aimed at
Cutting off IS Supply Route
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/June 02/16/The US-led coalition fighting the
Islamic State group in Syria is trying to strangle it by cutting off a key
supply route from Turkey. The Syrian Democratic Forces, a Kurdish-led alliance,
has just launched an offensive to capture the strategic northern town of Manbij
with the help of coalition air strikes, 18 of them in the past 24 hours. Manbij
is on the north-south axis between Jarablus, a town on the border with Turkey
and controlled by IS fighters, and Raqa, the Islamic State group's self
proclaimed capital in Syria. That axis is the main supply route to Raqa, said
Jennifer Cafarella, Syria analyst for the Institute for the Study of War, a
Washington think tank. If anti-IS fighters take Manbij and then Jarablus, that
would sever this axis and leave the jihadist group with just a few rural areas
further to the west as a way to maintain a link with Turkey, Cafarella said.
"Recapturing Manbij and ultimately advancing to Jarablus would disrupt but not
eliminate ISIS's ability to resupply," she said. The US-led coalition has long
had its eye on the so-called Manbij pocket. But an offensive on this mainly Arab
region has run into opposition from Turkey, a key partner in the alliance.
Washington sees the Syrian Democratic Forces -- which is dominated by the
Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) -- as the most effective ground force
against IS in Syria. But Ankara regards the YPG as a branch of the rebel
Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), which has fought a three-decade insurgency
against the Turkish state. - Kurdish blood -Turkey does not want to see the YPG,
which already controls much of the Turkish-Syrian border, take over the last bit
of the frontier that it did not already hold. On Wednesday Pentagon officials
stressed that the attack on Manbij was being led by the Arab component of the
Syrian Democratic Forces. Kurds represent less than 20 percent of the forces on
the ground, a US official said. And they will leave after the battle and cede
control to their Arab partners, the official said. But some are skeptical of the
Pentagon's assurances. They suspect that despite Washington's touting the role
of the Arabs, it is the Kurds who will ultimately retain control. "I doubt that
they are in command and they are going to have control over this territory once
Kurds will have spent their blood," said Joshua Landis, director of the Center
for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma. The Pentagon has deployed
more than 200 special forces troops alongside the Syrian Democratic Forces. Last
week, Agence France Presse photos of US special forces wearing YPG patches on
their uniforms angered Turkey. The United States responded by telling these
forces to stop wearing the badge, but insisted that US troops would continue to
help the Kurdish fighters, saying they were taking on IS militants efficiently.
Over the past 10 days the Syrian Democratic Forces have also launched an
offensive to retake Raqa, the main IS stronghold in Syria.
Israel Minister Says Turkey
Deal near Completion
Naharnet/June 02/16/An Israeli minister close to Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu said Thursday that nearly all outstanding issues for a reconciliation
agreement with Turkey had been finalized by both sides. "I'd say we've
successfully finished dealing with 90 percent of the topics," Energy Minister
Yuval Steinitz said in a radio interview. Steinitz's remarks were the latest in
a long series of iterations from both sides implying a deal was imminent to end
the rift between the former allies. Turkey was a key regional backer of Israel
until the two countries cut ties in 2010 over the deadly storming by Israeli
commandos of a Turkish aid ship bound for Gaza, which left 10 Turkish activists
dead. Israel apologized to Turkey in 2013, in what many thought would trigger a
warming in ties, but tensions soared again the following year when Israel
launched a military offensive in Gaza. After years of bitter accusations and
inflammatory rhetoric, the two sides held secret talks in December to seek a
rapprochement, with another round taking place in February in Geneva. Pressed by
103FM radio to say when he thought a deal might be completed, Steinitz said he
hoped "in the coming weeks.""There is a huge interest on both sides -- a
strategic interest and an energy-related and economic one," he said. The
minister added that the passing in Israel of a long-debated agreement aimed at
enabling the export of some of the country's natural gas to Turkey and Europe
would help speed up a deal. On Tuesday, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan
said that they had "made some proposals" on ways to ease the shortage of
electricity and water in Gaza. "The developments look like they are going
positively," he said. Turkey has repeatedly insisted on three conditions for
normalization: the lifting of the Gaza blockade, compensation for the aid ship
victims and an apology for the incident. Israel has already apologized and
negotiations appear to have made progress on compensation for the victims of the
raid. The Gaza blockade has been the main hurdle.
Erdogan: US-backed Syrian
force mostly Arab
Reuters, Nairobi Thursday, 2 June 2016/Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan said on
Thursday a US-backed offensive against ISIS in northern Syria was largely being
carried out by Arab rather than Kurdish fighters, in a sign of tacit approval
for the operation near Turkey’s borders. The Syria Democratic Forces (SDF)
alliance, including the Kurdish YPG militia, thrust into ISIS-held territory
around the city of Manbij this week, backed by US-led air strikes and US special
forces on the ground. Turkey views the YPG as a terrorist organization and an
extension of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) militant group, which has waged a
three-decade insurgency for Kurdish autonomy in Turkey’s own southeast. It
resents US support for the YPG. Ankara, bent on preventing territorial gains by
the Kurdish militia near its borders, has previously said it would not tolerate
the YPG crossing west of the Euphrates River, into the area where the
U.S.-backed operation is now underway. “What we have been told is that the YPG
will predominantly act as a logistical force here and the main force will be
Arabs,” Erdogan told a news conference during a trip to Kenya. “We are
monitoring what is being done in this process through our own intelligence
network and command chain. We will see,” he said, when asked about the YPG’s
role. Erdogan said that, based on discussions he had held with US President
Barack Obama about the offensive, the forces included around 2,500 Syrian Arab
fighters and only 450 YPG members. A Turkish military source said on Wednesday
that Washington had informed Ankara of the operation but that Turkey would not
play a direct role as it was beyond the range of Turkish artillery and Ankara
would not back action involving the YPG. Turkey, a member of the NATO military
alliance, has been carrying out cross-border shelling of ISIS positions in Syria
in recent months but that action has been further west around the Syrian town of
Azaz. Turkey has shot back in response to rocket fire from ISIS territory which
has repeatedly hit the border town of Kilis. Military sources said five ISIS
militants were killed and a weapons depot destroyed in the latest salvo on
Wednesday.
Canadian soldiers might ‘take off’
Kurdish flag on their uniforms
Staff writer, Al Arabiya English Thursday, 2 June 2016/Canada is “re-examining”
to stop having its soldiers in northern Iraq wearing a Kurdish flag on their
uniforms, a top commander told a local television station in an interview
published Wednesday. Maj.-Gen. Mike Rouleau, commander of the special forces in
Iraq, told CTV that Canada is rethinking of ending this custom following the
same measure taken by US troops, who were recently ordered to stop wearing a
Kurdish flag. “We’ll re-examine that and we may well take them off too,” Rouleau
said. He added: “Whether we have them on or off, it’s not going to change
anything about the level of commitment and closeness that we have with the
people who we’re sent there to support.” Canadian soldiers, who are currently in
northern Iraq to train and advise the Kurds, started wearing a Kurdish flag in a
sign of respect, according to CTV.
CTV explained that it is a tradition to wear the patch of a military partner but
the secessionist Kurds do not have a nation state. Last week, Turkey expressed
its anger over US special forces troops in Syria wearing the Kurdish People’s
Protection Unit (YPG) patches on their uniforms. YPG is an armed wing of the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which both Turkey and the US have labeled as a
terrorist organization. But the Kurds have earned a reputation of being
hard-hitting at their ISIS enemy, making them a suitable ally for the US in its
operation against the militant group. “Our advice for the U.S. is that they
should wear DAESH, al-Nusra, and al-Qaeda insignias when they go to other places
in Syria and should wear Boko Haram insignias in Africa,” Turkish Foreign
Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said, adding that US troops are wearing “the insignia
of a terrorist organization, which is responsible for the last two terrorist
attacks in Ankara.”On Thursday, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan said the
alliance of the US-backed Syrian militias pressing an offensive against ISIS in
northern Syria is predominantly composed of Syrian Arabs with Kurdish forces
lending logistical support. Erdogan said the forces included around 2,500 Syrian
Arab fighters and only 450 members of the YPG. Military sources have said Turkey
is not taking a direct role in the offensive around Manbij, close to Syria’s
border with Turkey, because it cannot support an operation involving the Kurdish
YPG militia, which it sees as a terrorist group. (With Reuters)
Israel foreign ministry says
French Mideast drive ‘will fail’
AFP, Jerusalem Thursday, 2 June 2016/The head of Israel’s foreign ministry said
Thursday that France's bid to revive Israel-Palestinian peace talks was doomed
to failure, like a 1916 colonial effort to carve up the Middle East. “This
effort utterly failed then and will completely fail today,” Dore Gold told
journalists on the eve of an international meeting in Paris, referring to the
Sykes-Picot agreement to draw up the region’s borders.
Yemen truce boosts aid
access: UN
AFP, Geneva Thursday, 2 June 2016/Yemen’s nearly two-month-old ceasefire has
improved humanitarian access but civilians are still facing an “immeasurable”
crisis, the United Nations said Thursday. The fragile truce was declared on
April 11, 10 days before Houthi Shiite rebels and the government of President
Abedrabbo Mansour Hadi began UN-brokered peace talks in Kuwait. “The ceasefire
has provided us an opportunity to get to areas we haven't been able to get
before,” the UN humanitarian chief in the country, Jamie McGoldrick, told AFP.
He said that while no part of Yemen had been besieged, a number of areas have
proved extremely hard to reach since the conflict escalated in March last year,
when a Saudi-led Arab coalition began air strikes in support of Yemeni forces
resisting the Houthis. McGoldrick said it was difficult to estimate the number
of civilians reached with aid since the ceasefire came into force. The UN was
trying to assess the needs nationwide during the lull in violence, he added.
Fighting has also continued despite the truce. McGoldrick called Yemen’s war “an
invisible crisis,” voicing regret at the lack of global concern given to the
country, for instance compared to Syria. “The scale of the emergency is
tremendous. The scale of the need is massive and the depth of the crisis is
immeasurable,” he told reporters. Government services and the health system were
hardly functioning before the conflict and “the war has all but broken them
completely,” McGoldrick said. More than 6,400 people have been killed in Yemen
since the coalition began its campaign against the rebels who have controlled
the capital Sanaa since September 2014.
Saudi Arabia approves
governing framework for Vision 2030
Saudi Gazette, Jeddah Thursday, 2 June 2016/Saudi Arabia’s Council of Economic
and Development Affairs (CEDA) has approved the governing framework for
implementing the Kingdom’s Vision 2030. The CEDA’s session was chaired by Saudi
Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman, second deputy premier and minister of
defense, the Saudi Press Agency reported. The framework specifically explains
the roles and responsibilities of the concerned government agencies in realizing
the Vision and the mechanism to be adopted to remove the hurdles that stand in
the way of achieving its goals. In this respect, a strategic committee, headed
the deputy crown prince, who is also chairman of CEDA, has been constituted. The
committee will follow up materializing the Vision and translating it into
detailed strategies and executive programs associated with its targets within
the designated period of time. CEDA also approved setting up of an office,
affiliated to the committee, in order to manage the strategy. Necessary human
resources will be supplied to the office so that it can follow up implementing
the Vision, as well as to pinpoint the gaps, propose launching of executive
programs, and present periodic reports on how far the executive programs are
being realized in line with its set goals. This framework has been designed in a
way applying the best global practices in implementing strategies. It also
strengthens the principles of transparency and accountability through launching
electronic signboards to follow up performance appraisal indexes to ensure the
best possible implementation of the Vision. This article first appeared in the
Saudi Gazette on June 02, 2016.
Last Update: Thursday, 2 June 2016 KSA 08:32 - GMT 05:32
Tajikistan jails 13 leaders
of Islamist party for up to life: officials
AFP | Dushanbe (Tajikistan)
Thursday, 2 June 2016/Tajikistan on Thursday jailed 13 leading members of a
banned moderate Islamist opposition party for up to life, officials told Agence
France-Presse. The ex-Soviet Central Asian country handed life sentences to two
leading figures in the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) while 11
others received up to 28 years, officials in Dushanbe said, speaking on
condition of anonymity. Tajikistan has not yet released an official statement on
the outcome of the closed trial at the supreme court. Savrinisso Dzhurabekova,
wife of one of the jailed men, confirmed to AFP that “two have been sentenced to
life” including her husband Makhmadali Khait, the deputy head of the party. The
convicts’ ages range from 41 to 70. Khait is known for “his vocal support for
human rights, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion,” Steve Swerdlow,
Central Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch, said last month. The high-profile
trial of the formal opposition to Tajikistan’s strongman President Emomali
Rakhmon has prompted the United States, the European Union and the United
Nations to issue statements of concern. In April, the US State Department
labelled Tajikistan a “country of particular concern” over the growing crackdown
on Islam in the majority-Muslim country. The men who were arrested in October
last year and went on trial in February, were accused of attempting to seize
power by force and “terrorism” over deadly clashes last September. More than 50
people were killed in nearly two weeks of clashes between security forces and
followers of a renegade deputy defense minister. Afterwards, Tajikistan banned
the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan as an “extremist terrorist
organisation,” although the party has denied any involvement in the violence.
The party was widely viewed as moderate and was legally registered until the
ban. It was seen as one of the few potential sources of genuine opposition to
President Rakhmon’s two-decade rule. Critics have called the high-profile trial
part of attempts by the government to eradicate Islam from public life.
British lawmaker Lord Alton:
Latest crackdowns in Iran only show that dissent is alive and well
National Council of Resistance of Iran/Thursday, 02 June 2016
British lawmaker Lord Alton of Liverpool says activists in Iran continue to be
in "extreme danger," but will not be defeated by the regime's violence.
Lord Alton, a cross-bench member of the United Kingdom's House of Lords, wrote
on Wednesday on PoliticsHome:
"Recently, a representative of the Iranian cybercrimes police took to the
country’s state media to boast of the regime’s successes in disrupting peaceful
networks on Instagram and other social media. This brought Western media
attention to a series of arrests that had taken place in March as part of a
sting operation called 'Spider II.' The Iranian internet has turned into a
cultural battleground where secular, pro-democratic ideas are aggressively
battled by the Iranian regime."
"Eight models were arrested as part of this crackdown, for the crime of posting
images of themselves without their legally mandated head scarves. Another 21
individuals have criminal cases pending against them as a result of the same
sting operation."
"While it’s difficult to confirm the Iranian government’s claims about the
extent of the crackdown, the rhetoric surrounding it is alone sufficient to
raise the spectre of arrest and persecution for anyone who was involved in
similar activities on Instagram or on the internet in general. These activities
include not only modelling, but also photography, fashion design, make-up
artistry, and blogging. Persons from each of these professions were noted to
have been swept up in Spider II."
"The danger of arrest is omnipresent in the Islamic Republic of Iran if one’s
professional or personal activities are out of step with the fundamentalist
zealous ideology that the regime mandates for all of its people. But that danger
grows tremendously once a person has been identified by government agents. The
regime has a penchant for repeated arrests of activists, and also of other
political prisoners who have been arrested in the past for expressing dissent,
speak up against the apparent injustice or for indicating secular leanings."
"The danger now posed to Instagram models and their supporters is a serious one.
Iranian citizens have been given extremely long prison sentences for much less.
In 2014, the young cartoonist Atena Farghadani was arrested and subsequently
sentenced to 12 years in prison for the crime of posting a single cartoon to
Facebook depicting Iranian officials as animals and protesting laws and policies
restricting women’s rights. Although her sentence was recently commuted to 18
months, in light of Tehran’s track record for repeat arrests, it is for sure
that Farghadani will now be looking over her shoulder for the rest of her life
or until the theocratic regime comes to an end."
Lord Alton pointed out that Dr. Ahmed Shaheed, the UN Special Rapporteur on the
Situation of Human Rights in Iran, told the UN Human Rights Council on March 14,
2016: “At least 966 persons — the highest rate in over two decades — were
executed in 2015. At least 73 juvenile offenders were reportedly executed
between 2005 and 2015. In the past two years alone, 16 juvenile offenders were
executed. At present, at least 160 others are awaiting the same fate on death
row.”
Yet that is not as bad as it gets, Lord Alton argued.
"About two months prior to Farghadani’s arrest, another activist named
Gholamreza Khosravi was hanged in Rajai Shahr prison for the crime of 'enmity
against God'. His conviction on this charge stemmed solely from his contributing
money to a satellite television sympathetic to the Iranian opposition movement,
the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK)."
"While the PMOI still maintains an extensive activist and intelligence network
inside Iran, its overall experience is indicative of the extreme danger posed by
such activists. Some 120,000 of PMOI activists and supporters have been executed
or assassinated since the inception of the Islamic Republic in 1979. And the
constant pressure exerted on others and on their families has caused a great
many to flee to Western Europe, North America, and elsewhere. The PMOI makes up
the largest constituent group of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI),
led by a Muslim woman, Maryam Rajavi."
"But it is important that readers not mistake any of the above accounts for
accounts of the defeat of activism inside of Iran. Although much of the
country’s progressive youth was forced underground in the wake of the repression
of the uprisings in 2009, the latest cyberspace crackdown goes to show that such
repression has by no means stopped people from voicing their opposition to the
regime’s restrictive ideology."
In addition to labor rights protests and gatherings outside of prisons by the
families and friends of the regime’s many political prisoners, there are other
acts of dissent taking place outside of the country, which strive to put greater
pressure on the regime by speaking out from beyond the reach of its domestic
repression, he wrote.
"These include the protests that were organised in part by the NCRI to coincide
with recent Iranian state visits with prospective European trading partners. In
one case, the mere plans for this protest compelled the Iranian President Hassan
Rouhani to cancel a planned trip to Vienna, lest it face the embarrassment of
public exposure for the persistence of human rights abuses," Lord Alton wrote.
"And on July 9, the NCRI will be holding a major gathering of Iranian
expatriates and political supporters in Paris called 'Free Iran'. Last year’s
event drew a crowd of approximately 100,000 people, and this year’s is expected
to exceed that figures, thus signifying the persistence of Iranian activism."
"There should be little doubt that we will see more indicators of the same
perseverance in the run-up to this event. By the same token, we will surely see
more crackdowns similar to the arrest of the Instagram models, as well as more
of the regime’s boasting about that repression. But such boasting is hollow. The
regime’s need to keep returning to the same repressive tactics only goes to show
that every instance of repression has led to renewed push-back from an
increasingly restive population. The persistence of both activism and repression
indicates that there is no end in sight for the conflict between the Iranian
people and the clerical regime that struggles every day to make them submit to
its fundamentalist ideology," Lord Alton added.
**David Alton is a long-time member of the British Parliamentary Committee for
Iran Freedom.
NCRI Foreign Affairs
Committee chair commends UN human rights chief for condemning abuses in Iran
Thursday, 02 June 2016/NCRI - Mohammad Mohaddessin, Chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), on
Thursday welcomed the latest position by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights in condemning the recent incidents of flogging by the Iranian
regime. The clerical regime has carried out several instances of flogging as a
form of punishment in recent days.The United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights condemned on May 31 the "outrageous flogging" of dozens of young Iranians
last week in Qazvin, north-west of Tehran. "We condemn the outrageous flogging
of up to 35 young men and women in Iran last week, after they were caught
holding a graduation party together in Qazvin, north of Tehran," said a
spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein. "Flogging is
prohibited under international human rights law, in particular the Convention
against Torture. The UN Committee against Torture, the Human Rights Committee
and UN Special Rapporteurs have repeatedly voiced serious concerns about States’
use of flogging, highlighting in particular its use against women, and have
called for its abolition. For the authorities to have meted out this cruel,
inhuman and degrading punishment – which could amount to torture – is completely
disproportionate and abhorrent," it said. Ismaeil Sadeqi Niaraki, a notorious
mullah who is the regime's Prosecutor in Qazvin, said last Thursday that a
special court session was held after all the young men and women at the party
were rounded up. "After we received information that a large number of men and
women were mingling in a villa in the suburbs of Qazvin ... all the participants
at the party were arrested," he said. Niaraki added that the following morning
every one of those detained received 99 lashes as punishment by the so-called
'Morality Police.' "Thanks God that the police questioning, investigation, court
hearing, verdict and implementation of the punishment all took place in less
than 24 hours," Niaraki added. The Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights said: "In another case, 17 mine workers were reportedly flogged in
Western Azerbaijan province in Iran this month for protesting the dismissal of
350 workers from the Agh Dara gold mine.""While we do not have a reliable
estimate on the use of flogging in the country, reports suggest that it is used
regularly for a wide range of perceived offences.""We urge the Iranian
authorities to cease the use of this cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment,"
the UN human rights body added.
NCRI Representative in
Germany welcomes trial for Iranian regime’s spies in Germany
Thursday, 02 June 2016/Mullahs’ Intelligence Minister is the real mastermind of
espionage against the opposition and should be brought to justice
Dr. Massoumeh Bolourchi, the Representative of the National Council of
Resistance of Iran (NCRI) in Germany, welcomed the trial for members of the
Iranian regime’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) who were spying on
the NCRI and the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran. She said what has been
exposed so far is only the tip of the iceberg of the MOIS campaign to organize
an extensive espionage network in Europe and in particular Germany. Such actions
manifest the Iranian regime’s hysteria regarding the legitimate and legal
activities of the NCRI as this regime’s democratic alternative.
She urged the Government of Germany and pertinent organizations to reveal all
the details of the Iranian regime's espionage network and illegal activities
against the Resistance and Iranian refugees in Germany and set the stage for the
trial and punishment of those implicated. The Iranian regime’s espionage network
is under the control of the MOIS in Tehran. This has been confirmed by the
German Prosecutor's Office and Federal Office for the Protection of the
Constitution (BVF, Bundesmat fur Verfassungsschutz). Dr. Bolourchi underscored
that Mahmoud Alavi, Rouhani’s Minister of Intelligence, oversees this network
and should be brought to justice. During his tenure, these illegal activities
have been intensified. Any political or diplomatic consideration to overlook his
role as the real mastermind of this case and failure to summon him to the court
will embolden the Iranian regime in establishing espionage networks in Europe.
These networks can be utilized in future possible terrorist activities. The
Iranian Resistance announced on October 28, 2015 that Maysam Panahi and his
accomplices were expelled from Camp Liberty, where PMOI members reside in Iraq,
in April 2012. They subsequently went to Mohajer Hotel in Baghdad, which is
under the control of the Iranian regime’s MOIS. They were organized and briefed
for their assignments by an individual called Kianmehr, a senior officer of the
MOIS who uses the pseudonym Sajjad. Sajjad is the same MOIS officer who
recruited Massud Dalili who went to Hotel Mohajer after leaving Camp Ashraf.
Dalili was the guide for the Iraqi assailants who attacked Camp Ashraf on
September 1, 2013. In that massacre, 52 residents of Ashraf were murdered while
they were handcuffed. According to a 2014 report by the BVF branch in Germany’s
state of Nordrhein-Westfalen “the activities of the Iranian intelligence
apparatus is focused on monitoring and confronting the Iranian opposition,
inside and outside of Iran. To this effect, scores of members of the PMOI who
were accepted by Germany on humanitarian grounds and came to Germany from Iraq
in 2013 were intensely spied on. The MOIS activities in this state is focused on
obtaining information on changes of personnel and structure of the PMOI and NCRI.
In addition, the Iranian secret service continues its strategy of directed
propaganda to discredit and tarnish the image of the PMOI.”Representative Office
of National Council of Resistance of Iran - Germany/June 2, 2016
Latest LCCC Bulletin analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources
published on
June 02-03/16
Saudi Daily, 'Okaz: IRGC Qods
Force Commander Qassem Soleimani Is 'The Great Terrorist Satan'
MEMRI/Special Dispatch No.645/June 02/16
On May 30, 2016, the official Saudi daily 'Okaz published a scathing article
attacking Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Qods Force of Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), branding him "a war criminal" and "the No. 1
murderer" who is today conducting a war against the Sunni residents of the
Islamic-State-controlled city of Fallujah in Iraq. The article, titled "Soleimani
– The Arch-Terrorist Satan" and accompanied by an illustration of Soleimani atop
a pile of human skulls, also criticized the International Criminal Court (ICC)
and the U.S. for, it said, not acting to deter him and allowing him to persevere
in his crimes.
"Qassem Soleimani -- War Criminal"
The article was apparently triggered by Soleimani's visit last week to the
predominantly Shi'ite and Iran-supported Al-Hashd Al-Sha'abi forces in Fallujah,
prior to the launch of the combined attack on the city; it also came amidst
Saudi fears that these forces would take over the largely Sunni city.
Following are translated excerpts from the article:[1]
"He was the No. 1 murderer in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, and even in Afghanistan,
Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan. He committed the most horrendous crimes against the
Sunni Muslim residents of these regions, meting out to them the harshest of
punishments in order to actualize his despicable sectarian perception.
"The world is aware of the grave danger posed by [Qassem] Soleimani, whose hands
are bloodstained – but what stands out is that the International Criminal Court,
which indicted [Serbian president Slobodan] Milosevic and [Serbian leader
Radovan] Karadzic for war crimes, still allows the greatest murderer to remain
free. [It does so although] he [Soleimani] is overseeing the aiming of terrorism
and the shaking of stability, peace, and security in the region and globally,
and commits crimes against humanity in the name of sectarianism again and again.
"The U.S. has accused him of interfering in Iraq and undermining stability
there, but has done nothing to deter him. He is a direct subordinate of the
supreme commander of the IRGC [Iranian Supreme Leader] Ali Khamenei, of whom it
is said that he has called Soleimani 'the living martyr of the Iranian
Revolution'..."
The article then provided a brief summary of Soleimani's life, stressed that he
had participated in the 1979-80 suppression of the armed Kurdish revolt in the
northwestern Iranian city of Mahabad, and concluded: "The greatest sectarian
Satan is [today] waging war against the residents of Fallujah, in order to
divide Iraq and transform it into a submissive sectarian state."
Endnote:
[1] 'Okaz (Saudi Arabia), May 30, 2016.
Two ways to achieve
federalism in the Near East
Eyad Abu Shakra/Al Arabiya/June 02/16
These have been difficult hours in the process of “liberating” the Iraqi city of
Fallujah after its long suffering under the occupation of ISIS. The Syrian city
of Raqqa, which ISIS has declared as its “capital” is expecting a similar fate
within hours or days if we are to believe what we hear.
Indeed, there is no problem with liberating the two cities and saving their long
suffering populations from the abuse of an extremist group that has incessantly
distorted Islam and harmed it by pitting it in bloody and destructive
confrontation against the whole world.
There is no problem with normal life returning to the two long enduring cities
along with their environs, and beyond them, the whole of Iraq and Syria; two
Arab countries that boast being cradles of world civilization for thousands of
years and bastions of Arabism and Islam for more than 1300 years.
However, it is well known that what is being promoted by the international
community as regards the military operations – as necessary as they really are –
is not the overall picture of what is taking place. If one looks deeper into the
political details and backgrounds of the current military campaign the least one
can say is that the situation is worrying.
While it may be excessive to compare the weak Iraqi regime to its murderous
Syrian counterpart, neither is worth entrusting with safeguarding a healthy
civil society, whereby the weak are protected and the ambitions of the strong
majority and foreign meddling are kept in check.
Frankly, the Haider Al-Abadi government in Iraq is too weak to defend the Iraqi
Sunni Arabs against the projects of Iran and its regional “military commissar”
Qasem Soleimani. Neither this government nor the fragile ‘compromise’ formula
that maintains are capable of curbing Iran’s voracious appetite or persuade the
Kurds of northern Iraq to respect Iraq’s national unity and territorial
integrity under a proper federal system. Iran is really working for absolute
hegemony over Iraqi territories up to the Kurdish ‘borders’ recognized and
protected by the USA and the West.
As for the Kurdish leaderships, despite their polite and skillful diplomacy,
they aspire for full secession en route to establishing ‘Greater Kurdistan’
extending from the Mediterranean to the lands beyond the Zagros and Taurus
mountain ranges in Iran and Turkey, respectively.
The al-Assad regime, on the other hand, despite its pan-Arabist slogans, has
uncovered throughout the past five years its ugly reality. It is now seen for
what it is; a fascist, sectarian, clannish and clientelist regime that has
nothing to do pan-Arabism, Socialism, “rejectionism” (of American policies) and
“confrontationism” (against Israeli occupation). After killing hundreds of
thousands and turning millions of Syrians into refugees, this regime has been
kept in power by a “quadrilateral safety net” provided by Iran, Russia, the USA
and Israel.
The whole Middle East is facing an unclear future, carving out is underway,
religious and racial extremism is ripe in Iran and Israel is threatening to
destroy the present Arab entities with international collusion
Partition maps?
As regards to its fake expansive pan-Arabist “unionism”, it has now shrunk to
merely bolstering “Useful Syria” and bargaining with secessionist Kurds on an
ever expanding entity under dubious international sponsorship which gives
credence to talks of “partition maps” being drawn. Thus, if these maps in their
Kurdish dimension adversely affect Turkey, they surely draw a big question mark
on as what may be in store for other entities, presumably less immune than Iraq
and Syria, such as Lebanon, Jordan and – of course – what remains of Palestine.
At the moment, futile debate continues about election reform in Lebanon,
occupied by the forces of the status quo and subjugated by the de facto
authority of Hezbollah. Hezbollah – and subsequently Iran – insists on
“proportional representation” while keeping its weapons and security network and
institution outside state jurisdictions.
However, the Aounist “Free Patriotic Movement” which is Hezbollah and Iran’s
“Christian cover” prefers a stark sectarian system whereby each religious sect
elects its own members of parliament. Between this huge and strange gap
separating the positions of the two erstwhile ‘allies’, different Lebanese
parties and blocs have different preferences, such as “single constituency” (one
man, one vote) and ‘mixed system’ that combines PR and direct votes.
Worth discussing here is that before the “partition” wars in Iraq and Syria
broke out, the Taif Agreement which helped end the Lebanese War (1975-1990)
included two important points: the adoption of wide-powered administrative
decentralization, and the founding of a senate elected along sectarian lines.
Had the Lebanese implemented these two points, or were allowed to do so by the
then Syrian “occupation authority”, Lebanon might have moved halfway toward a
fair, viable, truly institutional and consensual electoral system.
“Arabist Ba’thism”
Furthermore, such a system could have been prescribed to both Iraq and Syria
where non-sectarian and non-racial “Arabist Ba’thism” evolved to create two
clan-based sectarian regimes; the first brought down by global interests in 2003
only to be replaced by foreign occupation, bloodbaths and a more sectarian
alternative; while the second is being kept by these interests on the remains of
nationhood and dreams of citizenship.
The Lebanese, stubbornly overlooking genuine federalism that recognizes the
rights of the majority and reassures the minorities, can clearly see the other
version of federalism; bloodshed and uprooting in Iraq and Syria, yet they still
refuse to learn their lesson.
They can see what crimes “The People’s Mobilization” (Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi)
militia is committing in Fallujah after what it had perpetrated in Tikrit and
Al-Muqdadyiah. They are also following what the Kurdish militias are ‘promising’
Raqqa, Tell Abyad and the Aleppo countryside after the atrocities of the Assad
‘shabbiha’ militias, their ‘allies’, as well as what their ‘masters’ have
committed and continue to commit in al-Qussayr, al-Huleh, Darayya and Eastern
Ghouta, but still they do not seem to be brave enough to take the right
decision.
Today the Lebanese, unlike their Iraqi and Syrian brethren, have a unique chance
to agree on a civilized federal system that could spare them a revisit to the
devastating sectarian conflict and the ensuing suicidal calls for outside help
which resulted in more than 150,000 people being killed during 15 years of war.
The whole Middle East is facing an unclear future, carving out is underway,
religious and racial extremism is ripe in Iran and Israel is threatening to
destroy the present Arab entities with international collusion.
When are we going to wake up?
When they scare us from the
cinema
Turki Al-Dakhil/Al Arabiya/June 02/16
The Arabic language is rich and full of synonyms. The name of a device or tool
plays a role in getting rid of fears. Take the cinema as an example. When you
are on a plane, a screen plays movies in front of you. At home, a receiver
allows you to enjoy TV channels that play Arabic, American and other movies. For
a few dollars, you can subscribe to apps on your handheld device, such as to
Netflix, and gain access to hundreds of movies and series. It is like you are in
a movie theater while on your own couch. The cinema is somehow ubiquitous.
Ordinary
No one is afraid of YouTube, though it is full of movies. Everyone uses the app.
However, everyone freaks out when we talk about the cinema and describe it as a
part of reality and an ordinary tool for entertainment. In the cinema, you will
watch the same movies you watch at home, on the airplane and on your handheld
device. The only difference is that you watch newer movies at the cinema, where
censorship of improper scenes is easier than when you watch on your handheld
device. No one is afraid of YouTube, though it is full of movies. Everyone uses
the app. However, everyone freaks out when we talk about the cinema
It is all about what it is named. If the cinema is called the big screen, the
show platform or the theatrical TV, the story will all be over. Fear comes from
one’s own mind - it is all illusions and wicked thoughts.
This article was first published in Okaz on June 2, 2016.
What after the Fallujah
campaign?
Mshari Al Thaydi/Al Arabiya/June 02/16
There is ongoing controversy about the transparency and motives of the military
campaign in Fallujah, particularly given the sectarianism and barbarity of
Shiite militias. Their hateful crimes are documented on videos available on
YouTube. The mere presence of Qassem Soleimani, head of Iran’s elite Quds Force,
within this military campaign is a recipe for strife and tension. However, all
this does not negate the fact that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
has occupied Fallujah for some time now, and that it is the Iraqi state’s duty
to liberate it and all Iraqi cities from this evil organization.
Support
The government’s efforts to spread state sovereignty and impose the law on the
whole country must be supported. Saudi ambassador to Iraq, Thamer al-Sabhan, did
well when he revealed his country’s support for liberating Fallujah. Saudi
Arabia’s biggest battle is against ISIS and al-Qaeda, inside and outside the
kingdom. Bad management following the campaign, in light of the Shiite militias,
will bring ISIS and perhaps even worse than ISIS back to Fallujah and other
cities. The Fallujah campaign will most probably succeed, especially with air
cover from the international coalition. However, bad management following the
campaign, in light of the Shiite militias, will bring ISIS and perhaps even
worse than ISIS back to Fallujah and other cities. This is not just the opinion
of a Saudi writer whose country is at loggerheads with Iran. It is the opinion
of Makram Mohammad Ahmad, a prominent Egyptian writer and former chairman of the
Egyptian Journalists’ Syndicate. Ahmad wrote in Al-Ahram newspaper: “The
operation to liberate Fallujah must be a chance to mend Iraq’s wounds. The Sunni
tribes of Fallujah… resisted Al-Qaeda and succeeded in expelling it from all
Sunni provinces. Instead of rewarding the Sunnis of Fallujah, former Iraqi Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki marginalized all Sunni interests due to his sectarian
prejudices.”Everyone expects Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi to support the
logic of the state rather than that of sects and partisanship. We will follow up
on developments, because what comes after the Fallujah campaign matters
most.**This article was first published in Asharq al-Awsat on May 31, 2016.
Why the Middle East needs
Russian-Gulf cooperation
Maria Dubovikova/Al Arabiya/June 02/16
Russia is claiming back its position in the Middle East that it lost after the
Soviet Union collapsed. It is an expensive and tricky adventure that Moscow has
decided to accept. Its voice has been at the forefront of the Syrian conflict
from the start. One can agree or disagree with it, but cannot ignore it. Amid
its regional power-projection, Moscow is sowing the seeds of cooperation. The
Russia-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit and high-level dialogue was
established five years ago. Current circumstances give it new meaning and
purpose, but talks have been mostly stalled due to widely diverging views on
Syria. These divergences are hard to put aside, and they prevent the sides from
a breakthrough in relations. Besides differences in national interests and
approaches, there is deep misunderstanding and a dangerous inclination to
simplify each other’s intentions and interests. The GCC simplifies its
understanding of Russia’s intervention and goals in Syria to supporting the
regime, but the real goals and reasons are more complex. Better understanding
each other’s intentions would give both sides more room for talks and
compromise, contributing to resolving the conflict. Moscow can be a neutral and
necessary mediator between the GCC and Iran, whose strained ties negatively
influence sectarian regional problems
Common ground
Besides the sensitive topic of Syria, another topic that has dominated talks -
and is important for both the GCC and Russia - is the war on terror. Moscow can
be a neutral and necessary mediator between the GCC and Iran, whose strained
ties negatively influence sectarian regional problems. However, there is no
guarantee that mediation would achieve anything, because whoever the negotiator
is, the two sides need the political will to overcome their differences. The
potential for Russian-GCC cooperation is huge. Dependent on oil and gas exports
in an era of cheap hydrocarbons, they have to rethink their economies. Together,
they can achieve a lot. Russia’s scientific capacity is significant, even if
governmental and business support for science is miserable. Investments in
science, and the inauguration of joint projects in the fields of science and
technology, could be mutually beneficial. Russia is a suitable partner for the
GCC because Moscow never puts preconditions to building bilateral ties.
Cooperation could decrease regional tensions, diversify the GCC’s alliances, and
decrease its dependence on old allies. The Russia-GCC summits can foster strong
cooperation on different levels.
Defeating ISIS solves nothing
without a political solution
Dr. John C. Hulsman/Al Arabiya/June 02/16
Conventional wisdom would have you believe that things are looking up in the
battle against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). As of the end of May,
the caliphate has lost 46 percent of its territory in Iraq and 16 percent in
Syria, according to the Pentagon - a faster collapse than American officials had
thought possible. The battle to retake Fallujah is underway, and even the
regional capital Mosul and the overall ISIS capital Raqqa are under threat.
Surely this is cause for celebration? As ever in the Middle East, if only it was
that easy. When it comes to the seemingly intractable crisis in Iraq especially,
a comforting but wholly untrue Western narrative has taken hold: the chaos that
has laid low this plucky but overmatched state is entirely the fault of the
world’s most obvious Bond villain - ISIS. This fairy tale has things back to
front. ISIS is a disease, a symptom that feeds on the inherent weaknesses of
both Iraq and Syria, but it is not the cause of the dysfunction. In the case of
Iraq, the snake in the garden is the inherently unstable nature of the state
itself, an artificial construct brought into being to suit short-sighted British
imperial interests in the 1920s. Until then, the Ottomans had sensibly enough
divided the area into three provinces: a Kurdish-dominated north, a Sunni
province in Baghdad, and a Shiite province in Basra. This roughly corresponded
to political legitimacy on the ground, and worked well enough. The British, in
forcing into a single country three groups with no historical record of
coexisting, created the unworkable mess the rest of us have been dealing with
ever since.ISIS is a disease, a symptom that feeds on the inherent weaknesses of
both Iraq and Syria, but it is not the cause of the dysfunction
Leadership failure
The well-meaning current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has so far utterly
failed to bring the long-suffering Sunnis in from the political cold. While
promising in Feb. 2015 that the Sunni militias fighting their coreligionists in
ISIS would be integrated into the country’s military, Iraq’s Shiite-dominated
parliament has opposed this and the arming of Sunni fighters, so nothing has
actually happened. Even if ISIS is eradicated, Iraq will not exist as a real
country, and Sunni radicalism will not be quelled, until the Shiite leadership
in Baghdad makes real policy moves to confederalize the country to fit the
ethnoreligious political realities on the ground. There is no sign of this
happening, as Abadi is unable to even pass largely technocratic reforms designed
to limit the scourge of corruption, a policy that ought to be a no-brainer. To
confederalize the country, to follow the seemingly counter-intuitive policy of
giving up real power at the center in order to strengthen and save Iraq as a
functioning entity, seems a task and a level of political imagination well
beyond its present leaders. If this proves to be the case, defeating ISIS does
not matter strategically at all. The weakness of the Iraqi state, coupled with
its Shiite chauvinist tendencies, doom the region to further radicalization of
Iraqi Sunnis. As happened after the ‘destruction’ of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS will
merely reappear, perhaps in an even more virulent form. This is a recipe for
endless regional chaos. Only by getting the politics right does the military
defeat of ISIS mean anything.
Ultimately, this is a fight that is primarily up to the Iraqi people. No amount
of outside help, training, aid, trade, loans, guns, advice, or even the
destruction of ISIS changes the uncomfortable reality that unless the Shiite
leadership remakes the politics of the country along sustainable lines, the rest
of us are all largely wasting our time.No one doubts that ISIS has acted
diabolically, but that is not the point. Analysts have failed to look at why
Iraq and Syria were so ripe to be taken advantage of in the first place. These
endemic, intractable problems - not the presence of aggressive forces in the
world - is what will doom them to weakness at best, and chaos at worst, even if
ISIS disappears. We must be careful not to support countries that have no desire
to help themselves.
Europe Braces
for More Jihadist Attacks/"Another attempted attack is almost certain."
Soeren Kern/Gatestone Institute/June 02/16
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8185/europe-jihadist-attacks
Sports stadiums and
big music events are especially vulnerable: "This is where you put a small town
into a small area for a couple of hours." — Neil Basu, deputy assistant
commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, London.
"We know that the Islamic State has the European Championship in its sights." —
Hans-Georg Maaßen, head of Germany's domestic intelligence agency.
According to Patrick Calvar, head of the France's domestic intelligence agency,
at least 645 French nationals or residents, including 245 women, are currently
with the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Another 200 individuals are "in
transit," either on their way to Syria or returning to France. Around 244
jihadists have already returned to France.
British police chiefs are struggling to recruit enough officers who are willing
to carry a firearm, because many fear they will be treated as criminal suspects
if they use their weapon in the line of duty.
European security officials are bracing for potential jihadist attacks at public
venues across Europe this summer.
In France, officials are preparing for possible attacks against the European
Football Championships. The games, which start on June 10, comprise 51 matches
involving 24 teams playing in 10 host cities across the country.
Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve said that more than 90,000 security
personnel will be on hand to protect the 2.5 million spectators expected to
attend the games, as well as the hundreds of thousands more who will watch the
matches on big screens in so-called "fan zones" in major cities.
Patrick Calvar, the head of the France's domestic intelligence agency (Direction
générale de la sécurité intérieure, DGSI), warned: "We know that the Islamic
State is planning new attacks in France." He added:
"We risk being confronted with a new form of attack: a terrorist campaign
characterized by placing explosive devices in places where large crowds are
gathered, and repeating this type of action to create a climate of panic."
According to Calvar, at least 645 French nationals or residents, including 245
women, are currently with the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq. Another
200 individuals are "in transit," either on their way to the Middle East or
returning to France. Around 244 jihadists have already returned to France, and
another 818 people have "demonstrated their intention to go to Syria."
The Stade de France, located in a Paris suburb, was attacked by three Islamic
State suicide bombers in November 2015. The stadium will be hosting games during
the UEFA Euro 2016 football championships (June 10 - July 10, 2016), and French
officials are preparing for possible jihadist attacks. (Image source: Wikimedia
Commons/Liondartois)
Calvar's concerns have been echoed by Hans-Georg Maaßen, the head of Germany's
domestic intelligence agency (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV). In an
interview with Rheinische Post, Maaßen said: "We know that the Islamic State has
the European Championship in its sights."
On May 29, British media quoted Belgian security sources as saying they had
discovered an Islamic State plot to attack British football fans in the southern
French city of Marseille when England plays Russia on June 11. The plans were
reportedly discovered on a laptop used by Salah Abdeslam, a Belgian-born French
national of Moroccan descent who is thought to be the mastermind of the November
2015 terrorist attacks on Paris which left 130 dead.
The laptop is said to have contained information about a plot to kill large
numbers of British fans using assault rifles, suicide bombers and possibly even
drones armed with chemical weapons. The laptop contained photos and references
to Marseille's historic Old Port, where tens of thousands of football fans are
expected to gather at the many bars and restaurants in the area.
Meanwhile, French Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve also announced that more
than 23,000 police will be deployed to protect the Tour de France, the world's
premier bicycle race, which takes place from July 2 to 24.
Teams of special operations forces (Groupe d'intervention de la Gendarmerie
Nationale, GIGN) will guard riders and an estimated 12 million spectators along
a route that covers 3,500 kilometers (2,180 miles). "Everyone understands that
this year the Tour de France is taking place in a particular context," Cazeneuve
said. He added: "The terrorist threat remains very high."
In Poland, officials are preparing for possible jihadist attacks against the
Catholic Church's World Youth Day, which is expected to draw 2.5 million to
Krakow from July 26 to 31. Poland will impose border controls at all of its
national borders from July 4 to August 2.
In Britain, music festivals, big sports venues and nightclubs have been placed
on "high alert" for potential jihadist attacks, according to a senior
anti-terrorism officer interviewed by the Sunday Times.
Neil Basu, the deputy assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, said
that crowded places — including Glastonbury, billed as the world's largest music
festival, which will draw 135,000 people to Somerset from June 22 to 26 — are a
major concern for police this summer. Basu warned:
"These people are perfectly happy to target civilians with the maximum terror
impact. Crowded places were always a concern for us, but now they are right at
the top of the agenda."
Basu said that sports stadiums and big music events are especially vulnerable:
"This is where you put a small town into a small area for a couple of hours."
Police in rural communities in Britain that host large summer festivals are
warning that they could be "sitting ducks" in the face of a jihadist attack as
they wait for armed backup to arrive from many miles away.
In an interview with the BBC, John Apter, the head of the Hampshire and Isle of
Wight Police Federation, said:
"Being realistic, if a firearms unit was coming from the middle of the county
you are still talking about 30 miles away — you are not talking about a few
minutes. There would be an understandable delay. If a firearms unit is the other
side of the county they could be 70 miles away so you are talking a significant
distance. So the only officers that you have available are unarmed and
vulnerable officers and they are the officers that are saying to me that in a
terrorist situation they would be sitting ducks."
Most police in Britain are unarmed. According to Deputy Chief Constable Simon
Chesterman, the UK's top firearms officer, British police chiefs are struggling
to recruit enough officers who are willing to carry a firearm, because many fear
they will be treated as criminal suspects if they use their weapon in the line
of duty.
Senior British security officials estimate that the UK needs an extra 1,500
armed officers to tackle jihadist attacks such as those carried out in Paris.
Because half of the recruits will not make it through the rigorous training,
however, 3,000 volunteers are needed to come forward.
Che Donald of the Police Federation — which represents the 5,647 officers
throughout Britain who currently carry firearms — told the Guardian that while
major cities such as London are sufficiently protected, other large towns and
cities are not: "Currently there are not enough firearms officers who could deal
with an incident in quite a lot of areas of Britain."
In Brussels, Manuel Navarrete Paniagua, the head of the European Counter
Terrorism Centre at the European police agency Europol, warned Members of the
European Parliament that terrorist cells in Europe are stockpiling weapons and
explosives for future attacks:
"We have some information reported by the member states that terrorists groups
are trying to establish large clandestine stockpiles of explosives in the
European Union to be used eventually in large scale home attacks."
Paniagua added that police had foiled more than 200 terrorist attacks in the EU
in 2015. A total of 151 people were killed and more than 360 injured during
terrorist attacks in the EU in 2015. More than 1,000 people were arrested for
terrorist-related crimes.
In an interview with Time magazine, Europol director Rob Wainwright revealed
that "several hundred" battle-trained European jihadists are probably plotting
new attacks. He said that his agency is working on 50 ongoing terrorist
investigations:
"This is the highest terrorist threat we have faced in Europe since the days of
9/11. We have 5,000 Europeans who have been radicalized by the Islamic State and
have traveled to Syria and Iraq and engaged in conflict experience. We suspect
that about one-third of them have come back: That is our best guess. We don't
know for sure...
"Our real concern is that there are other networks, either in Europe already, or
who are being trained in Syria for further action. We know that the Islamic
State last year took a strategic decision to establish an external operations
command, a division to plan exactly the kind of attacks we have now seen. We
think that they are still active and planning to do that. The threat is alive
and current. Another attempted attack is almost certain. Whether it gets through
depends of course. I am concerned about the Islamic State's clearly expressed
desire for the spectacular."
On May 31, the U.S. State Department issued a travel alert for Europe this
summer:
"We are alerting U.S. citizens to the risk of potential terrorist attacks
throughout Europe, targeting major events, tourist sites, restaurants,
commercial centers and transportation. The large number of tourists visiting
Europe in the summer months will present greater targets for terrorists planning
attacks in public locations, especially at large events."
The travel alert urges vigilance when in public places or using mass
transportation, and avoiding crowded places.
*Soeren Kern is a Senior Fellow at the New York-based Gatestone Institute. He is
also Senior Fellow for European Politics at the Madrid-based Grupo de Estudios
Estratégicos / Strategic Studies Group. Follow him on Facebook and on Twitter.
His first book, Global Fire, will be out in 2016.
© 2016 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. No part of the Gatestone
website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without
the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.
Bahrain's Game of Detainee
Diplomacy With Washington
Simon Henderson/The Washington Institute/June 02/16
The government in Manama, the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, blames Iran
for supporting the Shiite opposition and downplays the threat of Sunni extremist
support for the Islamic State.
Apparently responding to U.S. and other international pressure, on May 31, the
Bahraini government released Zainab al-Khawaja, a dual Danish-Bahraini national
who had been sentenced in March to three years in prison for tearing up photos
of the monarch, King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa. The case of Khawaja, the daughter
of a rights activist serving a life sentence, had achieved particular prominence
because she was being detained with her one-year-old son. Her freedom came a day
after the sentence for incitement of an opposition leader, Sheikh Ali Salman,
was more than doubled from four to nine years.
Generally, Washington is caught in a bind, wanting to encourage a political
process in Bahrain, whose majority Shiite population feels excluded by the Sunni
royal family, while maintaining good relations with the government, which allows
a limited democracy. Only in recent months have tensions subsided following
clashes between demonstrators and security forces in 2011. The U.S. base and the
several thousand service personnel stationed there have avoided becoming a
political issue, but the U.S. embassy website continues to show a map with large
tracts of Shiite villages in the island's north as permanently off-limits to
staff who are U.S. citizens, while several other areas can only be visited
during daylight hours.
Whereas Khawaja apparently regards the royal family as the major impediment to
reform in Bahrain, Sheikh Ali is secretary-general of the al-Wefaq political
society, which, until withdrawing in protest at the 2011 clampdown, had eighteen
of the forty seats in the national assembly. Sheikh Ali advocated for a boycott
of the 2014 elections by al-Wefaq, the main Shiite group, because of the
government's failure to deliver on undertakings for fairer districting. He was
arrested last June and originally sentenced in September. Both he and the
government appealed the court's decision. The government wanted a harsher
sentence; Sheikh Ali's lawyers said his remarks were taken out of context. The
government view has prevailed. Sheikh Ali will still be in prison for the next
elections, due in 2018, for which he may, as a turbaned cleric, have been
disqualified anyway because of a new law preventing serving clerics, Sunni or
Shiite, from involvement in politics.
The measures against the Shiite activists have overshadowed legal proceedings
for a plot by Islamic State supporters revealed last October in which eight
suspects were arrested and the hunt continues for sixteen more. The plot
included potential suicide attacks against places of worship, presumably Shiite
mosques. Although Manama persistently blames Iran for instigating trouble in
Bahrain's Shiite community, the island's Sunni radicals pose a similar and
possibly larger threat to the island's stability. Officials say that more than a
hundred Bahrainis are fighting with jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq and around
twenty have died, including several who once served in the island's security
forces. One former Bahrain Defense Force officer, Turki bin Ali, is in the
leadership echelon of the Islamic State and has been designated as a terrorist
by U.S. authorities -- although not yet by the Bahraini government.
The heavy sentence given to Sheikh Ali will likely impede current U.S. attempts
to promote political reform in the kingdom. When Secretary of State John Kerry
visited Bahrain in April, his meetings included a session with opposition
leaders, including two from al-Wefaq, whom he told of an unspecified U.S. "road
map" for the 2018 elections. Washington subsequently asked Crown Prince Salman,
the king's eldest son and a supporter of reform, to fly to Riyadh to meet
President Obama during that month's Gulf Cooperation Council summit. Bahrain's
politics entail both Sunni versus Shiite and hardliners versus reformers, with
Iran and Saudi Arabia each watching closely from the sidelines. Washington needs
to persuade Manama that political progress through greater inclusivity is
necessary to outwit those who seek more open confrontation.
**Simon Henderson, the Baker Fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy
Program at The Washington Institute, is author of the Institute's 2016 study
Bahrain's Stalled Reforms and the Future U.S. Role.
Britain's
National Students Union in Crisis
Robbie Travers/Gatestone Institute/June 02/16
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8178/malia-bouattia
Britain's National Union of Students (NUS) is in crisis. Three major university
student associations -- Newcastle, Lincoln and Hull -- have disaffiliated
themselves from the organization.
Bouattia's role is meant to entail representing the best interests of students
in the UK. How does endorsing and legitimizing terrorist attacks in Israel the
best way to improve conditions for students in the UK? Is Bouattia trying to
radicalise students in the UK?
When students need representation, the voice often heard is that of the NUS. Is
it any wonder that when this voice has a history of endorsing terrorism,
including sharing platforms with convicted terrorists, that students may want a
different voice?
The United Kingdom's National Union of Students (NUS) is in crisis. Three major
university student associations -- Newcastle, Lincoln and Hull -- have
disaffiliated themselves from the organization, and more are set to follow. NUS
is struggling even to retain its previous strongholds, such as Exeter's Student
Association.
The Exeter University campaign to leave the NUS managed to increase the number
of votes to defect from roughly 200 to 2546. This stampede occurred despite the
massive protests by the "stay" campaign, including text messages to thousands of
students and visits to the school by more than 10 senior NUS officials,
including two Vice Presidents-elect and the President-elect.
Why are students from so many British universities fighting to leave the NUS?
Well, take for example statements by its new president-elect, Malia Bouattia.
Bouattia actively promotes violence against Israel. She has argued that,
"To consider that Palestine will be free only by means of fundraising,
non-violent protest and the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement is
problematic... Boycott can be misunderstood as the alternative to resistance by
the Palestinian people."
Presumably, then, Bouattia means that violent "resistance" against Israel is
something she supports -- such as the theocratic group, Hamas, whose policies
include preaching genocide against the Jews, or ISIS, who crucify children and
also believe in murdering Jews.
Malia Bouattia, the president-elect of the UK National Union of Students,
actively promotes terrorist violence against Israelis. (Image source: NUS press
office)
Supporting terrorism against the only free state in the Middle East, according
to Freedom House, is, and should be, deeply concerning. It is to the students'
credit that they seek to distance themselves from Bouattia's views.
Bouattia's role is meant to entail representing the best interests of students
in the UK. How does endorsing and legitimizing terrorist attacks in Israel the
best way to improve conditions for students in the UK? Is Bouattia trying to
radicalise students in the UK? The more Bouattia legitimizes violence, the more
students might decide that violent "resistance" is acceptable.
Of course, statements such as Bouattia's also make Jewish students across the UK
feel even more at risk, especially in the wake of rising anti-Semitism
throughout the UK.
Bouattia's remarks at a Middle East Monitor (MEMO) event included arguing that:
"David Cameron and [Israeli PM] Netanyahu seem to be in competition over who can
deliver the most over-the-top and outlandish sermons on the apparent existential
threat their nation seems to be facing from these invisible 'terrorists."
Invisible? Does Bouattia mean that Israel only imagines it is under threat from
nations such as Iran, which is on the fast track to acquiring nuclear weapons
and which repeats, "Death to Israel"? Or from Hamas, which threatens genocide
not only to Israelis but to all Jews? Or from Hezbollah, a puppet of Iran, which
has 100,000 missiles pointed at northern border of Israel, a country the size of
New Jersey? Or from organizations that openly wish to destroy Israel?
What about the terrorists who murdered Israel's athletes at the Munich Olympics,
in 1972, or who murdered an elderly wheelchair-ridden Jew by throwing him
overboard from a ship in 1985? What about the terrorists who spent years blowing
up cafes, buses, discotheques -- and now the better part of a year in knifing
Israeli Jews and car-ramming attacks? All, of course, are totally invisible.
Bouattia also seems to have missed the nine attacks on Israeli military
personnel and civilians in January 2016, and the 18 attacks in February 2016. A
quick Google search of "list of Palestinian terror attacks" reveals 1,210,000
entries -- that is a lot of invisibility. It seems bizarre, therefore, that
Bouattia would claim such violent terrorism does not exist.
It also seems bizarre that she implies that there is no threat to the UK from
terrorism. A quick Google search of "Terrorism incidents in the United Kingdom"
lists 1,130,000 entries -- so evidently there is nothing to worry about. These
include London's 7/7/2005 transport system attacks, which included among its
victims students such as Atique Sharifi. It also seems odd to state that there
is no threat to the UK from terrorism just as London is "preparing for up to 10
simultaneous terror attacks" in the wake of the Paris attacks of November 13,
2015. Subsequent arrests in Paris and Brussels revealed that attacks on central
London landmarks such as the London Eye were also planned.
Bouattia, it seems, has either concluded that either the organizations preaching
anti-Jewish violence and trying to destroy Israel do not exist -- along with
those targeting London -- or it would appear that she is she is simply not
interested in facts.
Bouattia also argued that "Muslims in the UK find themselves in a situation
where their democratic freedoms have been comprehensively stripped." Really?
Didn't London just elect a Muslim mayor, and isn't the Business Secretary a
Muslim, and haven't there been Muslims in the cabinet and the House of Lords?
Bouattia spoke at an event for the Middle East Monitor, MEMO, an organization
which has claimed that Israelis are "pathological liars from Eastern Europe, who
lie as much as they breathe oxygen." Wouldn't one think that appearing on the
event platform of an organization that promotes negative national stereotypes is
the exact opposite of what an "anti-racist" should be doing? Bouattia claims she
has "always been a strong campaigner against racism and fascism in all its
forms."
MEMO's senior editor, Ibrahim Hewitt, also a Holocaust-denier -- he has referred
to the "so-called Holocaust" -- claims that homosexuals would suffer "severe
punishments" in an Islamic state for their "great sin." How should Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual and Transsexual (LGBT) students feel about their newly elected
president sharing a platform with an organization whose editor calls for "severe
punishments" against homosexuals? The NUS actually campaigns against homophobia
and homophobic attitudes, with slogans such as "Zero tolerance to LGBT
bullying." How does appearing at events organized by those who would like to see
homosexuals "suffer" help to fight homophobia?
On a final note, it is important to ask, what is the purpose of the NUS?
According to the organization's official website, it is to "make a real
difference to the lives of students and its member students' unions." Its
successes include electing new Black student officers who "will help to make
sure that issues such as racism, anonymous marking and a 'no platform policy
against fascists and racists' remain high in the agenda of their students'
unions."
When students need representation, the voice often heard is that of the NUS, and
that is often channelled through its president, Malia Bouattia. Is it any wonder
that when this voice has a history of endorsing terrorism, including sharing
platforms with convicted terrorists, that students may want a different voice?
*Robbie Travers, a political commentator and consultant, is Executive Director
of Agora, former media manager at the Human Security Centre, and a law student
at the University of Edinburgh.
© 2016 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. No part of the Gatestone
website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without
the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.
A Self-Profile
Of The Islamic State: The Creedal Document
By: Prof. Ella Landau-Tasseron/MEMRI/June 02/16
Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No.1253
In 2015, the Islamic State (ISIS) released a document titled "These Are Our
Creeds and Ways." The document is a self-profile of the Islamic State,
presenting the organization's basic theology and political ideology. It deals
with topics that have occupied Muslim minds for generations, yet it also
reflects modern and local conditions and phenomena. An examination of its
contents reveals that ISIS adds nothing new to traditional Islamic dogmas except
for making the return of the caliphate a mandatory article of faith. It is
firmly based on Islamic sources, which it cites often, and much of its content
is identical to Islamic conservative Hanbali and neo-Hanbali doctrines.
The following is the full text of the report.
Introduction
In 2002 Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi established a jihadi group in Iraq called
Monotheism and Jihad. In 2004 he pledged allegiance to Bin Laden and renamed his
group "Al-Qaeda in Iraq," thus apparently merging it with Al-Qaeda. After
Al-Zarqawi was killed in June 2006, his followers renamed the group "The Islamic
State in Iraq," without bin Laden's approval. This ostensive state was not
proclaimed a caliphate, but its leader, Abu 'Umar al-Baghdadi, was referred to
as "The Commander of the Faithful," a term usually applied to the caliph. This
first version of the Islamic State was almost annihilated by 2010. It
recuperated, however, and in June 2014 the group reestablished the state, this
time explicitly declaring it to be it a caliphate. This second version was at
first called The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS; in Arabic: dawlat
al-Islam fi al-Iraq wal-Sham, abbreviated as Daesh, and also translated as The
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, ISIL). Later the name was changed to The
Islamic State (dawlat al-Islam), in accordance with the organization's rejection
of the concept of nation states – though others continue to refer to the
organization as ISIS, ISIL or Daesh (this report will use the name ISIS).
Ibrahim Awwad, then head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, was appointed as the Islamic
State's first caliph. Upon assuming the title he took the name Abu Bakr
Al-Baghdadi Al-Huseini Al-Qurashi.[1]
During the period in which Al-Zarqawi cooperated with Al-Qaeda (October 2004 -
June 2006), his movement posted a short document on its website signed by "The
High Command and the Legal Committee of Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers
(i.e. Iraq)." This document set out the main creeds and doctrines of the
combined Monotheism and Jihad/Al-Qaeda organization.[2]
In 2015 – by which time the political scene in Iraq and Syria had changed
considerably – ISIS republished the document with small modifications under the
title "These Are Our Creeds and Ways." Released by ISIS's publishing house,
Maktabat Al-Himma, it was posted on the Internet and apparently also distributed
in print.[3] One of the online copies is subtitled "Ahl al-sunna wa-jama'a madha
ya'taqidun wa-bi-madha yu'minun?" ("What are the creeds and beliefs of the
People who follow the Prophet's Customs and adhere to the Community?"). The term
ahl al-sunna wa-jama'a has always denoted orthodox Sunni Islam. This subtitle
thus identifies the Islamic State's Islam as the genuine form of the religion.
The following report summarizes and analyzes the 2015 version of the creedal
document, with occasional references to the earlier version. (For the full
Arabic text of the 2015 document, see the Appendix at the end of this paper,
following the Endnotes).
The document comprises 36 paragraphs (unnumbered in the original), appearing in
a somewhat haphazard order. The opening paragraph delineates the boundaries of
the community of believers, as follows: members are those who believe in
absolute monotheism and the mission of the Prophet Muhammad, and meet all the
requirements that ensue from this belief. Whoever fails to fully meet any of
these requirements is an unbeliever, even if they proclaim themselves to be
Muslims.
The next 35 paragraphs define the requirements that one must meet in order to be
considered a Muslim, mostly in the form of mandatory creeds (as opposed to
specific duties that must be performed by the believers). The requirements fall
in two basic categories: theological and political. The first category involves
articles of faith that relate to the concept of monotheism and the divine
message, and to eschatology. The second involves principles relating to sources
of authority, leadership, jihad, internal cohesion, the nature of faith and
conditions for the accusation of unbelief (takfir). This is not to say that the
religious/political distinction is a sharp one. "Politics" in Islam is informed
by religion: the sources of authority are the sacred texts; internal cohesion is
a religious obligation, and so is jihad, and the conditions for takfir define
the transgressors against the religion, who must be fought. Conversely, some of
the theological articles of faith have political implications. For example,
within the category of eschatology the document mentions belief in the return of
the caliphate. This tenet implies that believers owe allegiance to the Islamic
State.
Theology: Monotheism And The Divine Message
Debates about the concept of monotheism have raged among Muslims since the first
centuries of Islam. Rationalists who were later referred to as the Mu'tazila
movement raised several questions pertaining to monotheism. For example, how
should a believer interpret Koranic idioms such as "Allah sees," "Allah's hand,"
etc., which are anthropomorphisms and might therefore be seen as impairing
absolute monotheism? Another problem was presented by the belief, widely-held
among Muslims, that the Koran is uncreated: this belief implies the existence of
an eternal (because uncreated) entity besides Allah. Regarding the first
question, the rationalists concluded that the attributes should not be taken
literally, and regarding the second they concluded that the Koran was created by
Allah. Yet another major issue related to Allah's justice, namely,
predestination versus free will. If Allah decrees everything, this must include
human actions. But then how can He punish humans for committing sins and reward
them for doing good? The rationalists concluded that man is free to choose his
own actions.
The Mu'tazila's opponents rejected these rationalist positions, and some of them
attempted to resolve the conundrums using various intricate formulations.
Regarding the issue of Allah's attributes, for example, it was suggested that at
least some of them must be taken as metaphorical. The traditionalists, however,
insisted on accepting the attributes as real and avoiding any attempt to apply
human understanding to them. This was the position of many renowned medieval
scholars, among them Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1348), the main authority for the neo-Hanbali
school as well as for modern radical Muslims. ISIS adopts Ibn Taymiyya's
position, citing him verbatim (par. 2 of the document). Ibn Taymiyya's formula
alludes to the old controversies by emphasizing that Allah's attributes must be
taken literally, "without allegorical or figurative interpretation and without
voiding them of their content" (min ghayr takyif wa-la tamthil wa-la tawil wa-la
ta'til).[4]
Taking a similar approach to the question of the Koran, Ibn Taymiyya argued that
it, too, is part of Allah's attributes. As quoted in the document (par. 5), he
wrote that the Koran "is Allah's words, part of His attributes, uncreated, both
its letters and its meanings." By avoiding the word "eternal," Ibn Taymiyya's
formula circumvents the implication that there is an eternal entity besides
Allah (the Koran).[5] The angels have been yet another challenge to logic, and
the ISIS document adopts the conservative position, asserting that they exist
and that love for them is a sign of true faith (par. 4). As for predestination
and free will, ISIS adopts a complicated formula that retains both Allah's
omnipotence and omniscience and human free will, without really resolving the
paradox. According to this formula, Allah decrees everything, the will is His
and His alone, He creates all human actions, and humans are free to choose their
course of action if Allah chooses to allow this. In all of this He is just and
compassionate (par. 9).
Being just, Allah has sent His message to humanity from the beginning of time.
The document repeats the essential Muslim creed that Allah sent many prophets,
the first being Adam and the last being Muhammad, whose message must be believed
and obeyed by all humans (par. 3, 6).
Theology: Eschatology
Eschatological texts (i.e., texts discussing the afterlife and the end of days)
in the Koran and Prophetical statements (hadith), and in other works by Muslims,
comprise a vast corpus that allows for many different interpretations. That
said, belief in certain eschatological themes was considered an indication of
genuine faith from the very beginning of Islam. Moreover, the Last Judgment is
presented in the Koran as the major incentive to repent and to believe in Allah
and the Prophet.[6] The tribulations of the grave, the Last Day, the
Resurrection, the Bridge leading to the final gathering place, the portents of
the Hour, the Savior (Mahdi) who will rule justly before the Hour, the return of
Jesus, prophet of Allah, who will break all the crosses and slay the evil false
messiah (dajjal) – all of these and many other elements have been broadly
accepted by Muslims as essential creeds. The view that whoever disbelieves in
them is an unbeliever has been widespread. There are, however, many
eschatological prophecies that did not become creedal, as well as eschatological
elements whose creedal status is still debated.[7]
Muslims have debated the chronology of the eschatological events, as well as
many details – and the reality – of the eschatological descriptions. For
example, what are the respective roles of Jesus and the Mahdi? And is the
resurrection in fact body-and soul? Are the pleasures of Heaven and tortures of
Hell to be understood literally or figuratively? As with the issue of
monotheism, the conservatives tended to understand the descriptions literally,
whereas the rationalists did not.[8] Modern Muslims add new perspectives to the
discussions. Some attempt to provide scientific explanations for apocalyptic
descriptions, whereas others identify modern realities with eschatological
events. The latter phenomenon peaked following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003
and again after the "Arab Spring" in 2011.[9]
The ISIS creedal document avoids alluding to controversies in eschatological
matters. It merely repeats the main Sunni eschatological creeds (pars. 10-14),
with one important addition: "We believe in the return of Jesus who will rule
justly, and we believe in the return of the Righteous Caliphate (al-khilafa al-rashida),
modelled on the practices of the Prophet" (par. 12).
The return of Jesus (and/or the Mahdi), who will rule justly, has long been an
essential dogma; the return of the caliphate, however, has never been one.
Throughout Islamic history, claimants to power, and whole dynasties, identified
themselves with prophecies about the Savior – the Mahdi – in order to gain
legitimacy and win the hearts of the masses. The most famous of these were the
Abbasids (749-1258), the Fatimids (909-1171) and the Almohads (1130-1269) – and
in modern times, the Mahdi of Sudan and Ghulam Ahmad of India. Although they all
propagated apocalyptic ideas, the return of the Righteous Caliphate never became
an article of faith. The modern dream of reestablishing the caliphate apparently
emerged after the demise of the Ottoman Empire (1924),[10] but did not become
dogma. The Islamic State, which claims to have realized this dream, elevated the
status of the caliphate by turning it into dogma.
The Islamic State makes the connection between the caliphate and eschatology not
only in the creedal document but in other texts as well. As part of this, ISIS
scholars occasionally cite an enigmatic prediction attributed to the Prophet,
recorded as early as the 9th century: "There will be after me twelve rulers (or
caliphs), all of them from the tribe of Quraysh."[11] Pre-modern attempts to
explain this prophecy usually applied it to past events, deliberating who the
twelve caliphs might have been (the Rashidun and some of the Umayyads, etc.). In
other words, the explanations of the twelve-ruler tradition mostly involved
retrojection, namely attempts to prove that the Prophet foresaw events that came
after him, such as the decline of the Umayyads and advent of the Abbasids, the
internecine wars, the revolt of the Zanj in Iraq in the 9th century, and so
forth. The idea of a renewed caliphate in the future was marginal in the
explanations of this tradition. By the 10th century, the twelve-ruler tradition
was relegated to the status of "forged" and was rarely cited, whereas the dogma
of the Mahdi who will rule justly retained its status.[12] The fate of the
twelve-ruler tradition changed in modern times, when it received truly
eschatological interpretations.
Even before the Islamic State, jihadists cited the twelve-ruler hadith as
referring to a future caliphate, and also cited other Prophetic predictions
referring to this. However, as a rule, they relegated the renewed caliphate to
some unknown point in the future, seeing it as the culmination of a process of
unification and consolidation of Muslim power. Contemporary Muslim apocalyptic
literature sometimes contends that the Mahdi himself will establish the new
caliphate.[13]
Challenging this view of the caliphate as a distant and perhaps eschatological
vision, the Islamic State announced that the Caliphate has returned in the here
and now, as tangible and present reality.[14] Moreover, ISIS accords the belief
in the caliphate the status of an article of faith, which it never had. In the
creedal document this is expressed by mentioning this belief in conjunction with
a long-established creed, namely, the return of Jesus. The political implication
of this newly-added creed is obvious: Whoever disbelieves in the Caliphate is an
unbeliever on a par with those who disbelieve in basic eschatological events
such as the return of Jesus, the Last Day, the portents of the Hour, etc.
The return of the Righteous Caliphate was already presented as dogma in the
early version of the creedal document, issued by Al-Qaeda in Iraq, namely by
Al-Zarqawi during his period of cooperation with Al-Qaeda (2004-2006). As a
matter of fact, Al-Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda's leaders were divided on the matter of
the caliphate. Al-Zarqawi had aspired to establish a caliphate since his arrival
in Iraq in 2002. Bin Laden and Zawahiri, however, did not make the establishment
of a caliphate a first priority. On the contrary, Al-Qaeda warned against this
at the time, arguing that the conditions were not ripe for a caliphate to be
established. When the "Islamic State in Iraq" was first announced (in October
2006), it was not explicitly called a "caliphate," though its head was referred
to by the regnal title "Commander of the Faithful." Bin Laden and Zawahiri
firmly refused to recognize the state as a caliphate.[15] Accordingly, the
paragraph about the caliphate in the earlier creedal document may be understood
as expressing hopes for establishing a caliphate in the future – thus reflecting
the ambition of Zarqawi and his followers, but also the reservations of Al-Qaeda
about a caliphate in the here and now.
Only the second reincarnation of the Islamic State, established in June 2014 and
headed by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, came fully into the open as a self-proclaimed
caliphate. Interestingly, its creedal document retains the original paragraph
about the caliphate, which presents it as a vision for the future. Apparently
this article is now meant to convey that the current caliphate is the righteous
one promised by apocalyptic traditions. Indeed, the Islamic State goes to great
lengths to prove that it is a "caliphate molded upon the Prophetic rule and
customs." This line of propaganda should be understood in the context of the
criticism and de-legitimation directed against ISIS by the majority of Muslim
circles, including jihadist movements and scholars.[16] In addition, keeping the
caliphate in the realm of eschatological creeds, even though it has been
established in reality, lends the ISIS regime an attractive transcendental aura.
Politics: Sources Of Authority
Traditionally, the sources of authority in Islam are the Koran; the model
presented by the Prophet as embodied in the Hadith literature; the consensus of
the scholars (ijma'); and experts' conclusions derived by deduction (qiyas) and
by considering the public good (maslaha). "Consensus" was understood as the
opinions prevalent within a school of jurisprudence, or the points of agreement
among major early jurists. The validity of qiyas and maslaha was debated and so
was the status of the Hadith. On the one hand the Hadith explained and completed
the Koranic teachings, which were often unclear. On the other, it was known that
much of the Hadith was fabricated. Furthermore, a problem was presented by cases
where the Koran and the Hadith seemed to disagree. Already at the end of the 7th
century CE many scholars solved this problem by contending that "the Sunna (as
embodied in the Hadith) was the judge of the Koran and not vice versa."[17] But
the problem remained how to choose between the differing and sometimes
contradictory hadiths. The Muslims developed mechanisms for distinguishing
between true and false hadiths, but these were far from foolproof. Scholars
continued to disagree on the authenticity of hadiths and therefore also on
matters based on these hadiths.
For ISIS, the Prophet's authenticated practices (sunna) and statements, as
recorded in the Hadith literature, have absolute authority. They consider the
Hadith to be "a second revelation," on a par with the Koran (par. 7). Shari'a
laws must be derived exclusively from the Koran and the Hadith; no place is
accorded by ISIS to the other traditional Islamic sources of law, namely qiyas,
maslaha and ijma'. Admittedly, the first two of these have often been contested,
but ijma' has always had pride of place in Sunni law-derivation.
ISIS thus adopts the standard Salafi formulation, which recognizes as sources of
authority only the Koran and the authenticated hadiths as understood by the
salaf, i.e., the three first generations of Muslims (par. 23). The fact that
Salafis disagree among themselves even on major issues attests to the
problematic nature of this position. The problem stems from the fact that even
authenticated hadiths are debatable: not everyone accepts the validity of the
authentication. In addition, even authenticated hadiths, as well as the
interpretations of the salaf, contain plenty of inconsistencies and
contradictions.
Politics: Leadership
The second basic tenet of Islam (after monotheism) is belief in the mission and
the leadership of Muhammad. He was the last of the prophets, but as the leader
of the community he was succeeded by the caliphs. In line with these tenets, the
document affirms that Muhammad is a universal prophet and that every person must
believe in him, follow his teachings, obey him in everything, love him and
respect him. The Prophet's family must also be loved and respected, though
without exaggeration. As for the Prophet's Companions, they must be respected
without reservation, and their internecine wars must be passed over in silence
(par. 3, 8).
The document states further that, once a leader is nominated, the community must
accept and obey him even if he is known or suspected to be a sinner, or if he is
mastur al-hal ("his condition is unknown"). Only if the leader is known to be an
unbeliever must he be deposed and replaced by a righteous leader (par. 24, 29,
32).
These principles of ISIS are deeply rooted in the Sunni tradition. Love for the
Prophet's family "without exaggeration" has always been a hallmark of Sunni
Islam. Sunnis regard this as a characteristic which differentiates them from the
Shi'a: Sunnis love and respect the family of the Prophet (ahl al-bayt), whereas
Shi'ites revere them excessively. The other side of the same coin is the
attitude towards Muhammad's Companions, the Sahaba. Supporters of the Shi'a
denounce most of the Sahaba on the grounds that they were to blame for usurping
the caliphate from Ali, Muhammad's cousin and son in law.[18] In response,
veneration of the Sahaba became an article of faith for the Sunnis at least as
early as the 9th century. By all accounts, most of the Companions sinned by
participating in the internecine wars after the Prophet's death, and the Shi'a
hold this fact against them; the Sunnis, however, expressly disregard or explain
away this sin.[19] It may be added that the Sunnis had no alternative but to
respect the Companions, because they were the transmitters of Muhammad's legacy
(sunna) to the following generations. The Shi'a did not need the Companions for
this purpose because they relied on the imams, namely the descendants of the
Prophet, for information about Muhammad's legacy.
The requirement to obey a leader even if he is a sinner is a traditional Sunni
principle, inspired by fear of rebellion and of internecine wars.[20] The
classical formulation of this rule (cited verbatim in par. 24) is that one may
perform the ritual prayer behind any imam (leader), be he a righteous person, a
sinner, or an unknown quantity in terms of the sincerity of his belief or his
moral integrity.[21] In the ISIS context, the stipulation regarding "unknown
condition" (mastur al-hal) may also refer to states of uncertainty, as happened
in March 2015 when Al-Baghdadi was reportedly injured in an airstrike and the
believers had no way of knowing the state of his health.
Politics: Internal Cohesion
Internal cohesion has been a religious obligation from the inception of Islam,
as was the prohibition on internecine wars. Accordingly, the document praises
solidarity among Muslims and denounces disunity and disagreement among them
(par. 32). It emphasizes that all the Muslims form one community and that Arabs
and non-Arab Muslims are equal, surpassing one another only in the degree of
their religious devotion. When it comes to the matter of granting protection to
non-Muslims on behalf of the Muslim community (dhimma, or aman), the highest
Muslim official and the lowest-ranking Muslim are equally authorized to do so
(par. 35). The lives, property and dignity of Muslims are inviolable "except as
made licit by Allah and the Prophet" (par. 26). The Muslims must unite under one
banner (par. 34). Issues that may be subject to reasoning (and therefore to
disagreements) must not be the cause of mutual denunciation (par. 32, 33).
Adherents of all religion except Islam are unbelievers whom the Muslims must
fight (par. 36). The establishment of an Islamic caliphate is a communal
obligation incumbent upon all Muslims; obedience to the nominated caliph is
mandatory and rebellion is forbidden, according to the Prophet's statement,
"Whoever dies without having pledged allegiance to a caliph dies as one who has
never converted to Islam" (par. 32).
All the stipulations in this document regarding solidarity, the obligation to
establish a caliphate, the ban on rebellion and the duty to fight the enemies of
Allah derive from classical Sunni jurisprudence. Some expressions in the
document are taken verbatim from Ibn Taymiyya.[22] The purpose of the classical
scholars in making these stipulations was to safeguard the Muslim identity and
avoid chaos. The principle of equality is also taken verbatim from the Koran and
the Hadith.[23] As for the adherents of other religions, classical Islam
tolerated them as submissive-protected communities under Islam (dhimma). In
practice, the Islamic State does too, but the creedal document does not mention
this possibility, labelling all non-Muslims as unbelievers who must be
fought.[24]
The statement that Muslims are inviolable "except as made licit by Allah and the
Prophet" in fact belongs to the issue of takfir (on which see below). It is
vague enough to be subject to various interpretations. This means that the
alleged inviolability of all Muslims may be set aside at the discretion of the
Islamic State leaders and officials, as has in fact been amply proven by ISIS's
actions and practices.[25]
Politics: Jihad
Pre-modern Muslim jurists generally agreed that jihad must be waged in order to
"make Allah's word supreme," that is, in order to make the Shari'a prevail
wherever possible. They also agreed that Jihad must be declared and led only by
a Muslim ruler or his representative, unless it is in defense of the life and
property of Muslims. This pre-modern Sunni consensus on jihad disintegrated
under the impact of modern circumstances and international doctrines and
laws.[26] The result is a heated and ongoing debate among Muslims about the
interpretation of jihad, its necessity, and many details of its implementation.
According to the ISIS creedal document, jihad must be carried out by means of
both propaganda and weapons. War against Allah's enemies is obligatory under all
circumstances: with or without the permission of a nominated leader, and even
single-handedly, especially if Islamic values are under attack. Propagating a
religion other than Islam or insulting Islam are belligerent acts that obligate
fighting the perpetrators (par. 25, 27, 30, 31). However, fighting renegades is
more important than fighting unbelievers (par. 28).
The ISIS document thus blurs all distinctions and calls for a total war not only
against unbelievers but also against non-ISIS Muslims. It does not mention any
of the modern controversies concerning jihad.
Politics: The Nature Of Faith And The Conditions For The Accusation Of Unbelief
(Takfir)
Muslims have debated the nature of faith since the beginning of theological
deliberations in the 8th century CE. Some held that proper Islamic faith
required belief in the heart, declaration with the tongue, and acts with the
limbs, i.e. performance of the religious obligations. They also held that there
were degrees of faith: "faith may increase and decrease," as they put it; that
is, one may be a better or a lesser Muslim – depending on one's obedience or
disobedience to Islamic law. Others held that there were no degrees of faith –
one was either a Muslim or a disbeliever – and that performance of the religious
obligations was not a necessary condition for being considered a Muslim. This
means that belief in the heart and the declaration of faith suffice to make one
a Muslim. In fact, both positions were accepted by classical Sunnism, but the
more fervent and conservative scholars favored the first. Ibn Taymiyya, the main
authority for neo-Hanbalism as well as for modern radical Muslims, argued that
the position which excludes acts from the requirements of faith was in fact
heretical, not Sunni.[27]
ISIS adopts the stricter position. The document states that being a Muslim
requires belief in the heart, speech (that is, a declaration of faith), and
acts, and there are different degrees of faith, depending on how closely a
Muslim obeys the Shari'a. (par. 15)
The other side of the same coin is the conditions for the accusation of
unbelief. In other words, when does one cease to be a Muslim? If one fails to
perform all or some of the religious obligations, or violates Islamic
prohibitions, does one become a renegade?
The matter was and continues to be hotly debated among Muslims because of the
dire consequences of reneging from Islam: renegades must repent or be killed.
Some 7th-8th century extremists (certain parts of the Khawarij movement)
considered Muslim sinners to be unbelievers, but most Muslims have rejected this
attitude and considered these Khawarij to be heretical. Various formulations
were composed that, generally speaking, avoid takfir as far as possible (as
opposed to the position of the abovementioned Khawarij). Even ISIS scholars,
though they are extremist by the standards of the rest of the world (including
Al-Qaeda), explicitly distance themselves from the fanatical Khawarij and from
"extremists" (ghulat, par. 16).
The ISIS document stipulates that a Muslim forfeits the faith and becomes a
renegade only if he or she abandons belief in monotheism and the Prophet, or
fails to perform the ritual prayer, or commits sins while considering these sins
to be licit. Committing sin (without considering it licit) does not in itself
put a Muslim beyond the pale of Islam, nor does the omission of certain
obligations, because the Islamic faith comprises many elements (shu'ba), not all
of which are requisite for being considered a Muslim (par. 15-16).[28] According
to the document, whoever appears to be a Muslim must be treated as one, unless
he or she is involved in something that contradicts Islam (nawaqid al-Islam).
Certain conditions and judicial processes are needed in order to establish an
accusation of unbelief against individual Muslims (takfir al-mu'ayyan) (par. 17,
19). At the same time, the document states that the Shi'a are all unbelievers,
as well as everyone who adheres to a religion other than Islam (par. 18, 20).
Countries governed by infidel governments are "the abode of unbelief" (dar kufr),
but their inhabitants are not necessarily all unbelievers (par. 21).
All of these stipulations concerning takfir are characteristic Hanbali and neo-Hanbali
positions, often cited verbatim in the document.[29] Muhammad bin Abd Al-Wahhab
composed a list of ten nawaqid al-Islam.[30] Ibn Taymiyya in particular promoted
the distinction between unbelief in the abstract sense, that is, the heretical
doctrines themselves, and the proclamation of a specific individual as an
unbeliever (takfir al-mu'ayyan).[31] The latter requires meeting certain
conditions and carrying out a judicial process of proof. Its purported
consequence is that no punitive measures may be taken against a renegade until
his or her status as such has been proven. It should be noted that abandoning
Allah and the Prophet, omitting the act of prayer, and considering sins as licit
are not the only ways to forfeit the faith.[32] Thus, for example, Ibn Taymiyya
considered the widely-practiced custom of venerating saints to be an expression
of unbelief. Accordingly the ISIS document stipulates that whoever is involved
in "anything that contradicts Islam" is an unbeliever (par. 19), and that
"whoever fails to meet all the conditions and requirements [of monotheism] or
infringes upon it in any way" (par. 1) is an unbeliever. However, the document
does not specify precisely what "the conditions and requirements" of monotheism
are, the result being that the statement "whoever pronounces the proclamation of
faith and shows himself to be a Muslim must be treated as one" (par. 19) is
rendered meaningless. Without specific rules regarding the tests of faith, the
criteria employed in a judicial process to establish takfir al-mu'ayyan remain
at the discretion of the Islamic State. Indeed, in the past these tests of faith
were at the discretion of the Muslim scholars. This is precisely why there were
always disagreements about takfir. Furthermore, the document adds modern
ideologies to the category of egregious unbelief, namely, secularism,
nationalism, patriotism, communism and Baathism. It therefore appears that the
distinction between abstract unbelief and specific unbelievers who must be
punished is quite blurry, and the rules for the accusation of takfir are
conveniently vague. It is not surprising that many Sunnis have been killed by
the Islamic State not necessarily because they omitted to perform the ritual
prayer, or disavowed Allah and Muhammad, but because they did not join the
State, or criticized it. Obviously, ISIS's loose criteria of takfir enabled it
to kill those Sunnis as apostates or rebels, even though they proclaimed
themselves to be Muslims.[33]
The stipulation that Muslims under infidel rule are not necessarily infidels
themselves (par.21) harks back to situations in medieval times when frontier
lands, as well as Al-Andalus, all of which were formerly under Muslim rule, fell
back under the control of unbelievers. A famous case in point is that of the
Anatolian town Mardin, which was contested between the Mongols and the Mamluks
in the 13th century CE. Ibn Taymiyya wrote several legal rulings concerning the
status of this town.[34] The legal problem was that many of the Islamic
obligations, such as giving alms (sadaqa), performing jihad, judging according
to the Shari'a and so on, depend on the regime being Islamic. Muslims under an
unbeliever regime cannot perform these obligations, so the question arises
whether they still count as Muslims.
In mentioning this issue in its creedal document (i.e. the status of those
living under non-Muslim rule), ISIS is obviously referring to the citizens of
Arab and Muslim countries, whose regimes it considers to be renegade. It is
noteworthy that the earlier version of the document (the Al-Qaeda version)
explained why the subjects of such renegade Arab and Muslim regimes still count
as Muslims. It stated that these renegade regimes took power in Muslim countries
and there was no Muslim State to deter them. The citizens of these countries,
who were powerless, are therefore blameless and do not forfeit their status as
Muslims. This explanation is omitted in the current ISIS document for obvious
reasons: The Islamic State is now in power and fights the renegade regimes.
Nevertheless, ISIS retained the statement about the inhabitants of the "abode of
unbelief" not necessarily being unbelievers. The reason is probably ISIS's wish
to distinguish itself from "extremists" and to avoid alienating the inhabitants
of these countries. However, this statement does not prevent ISIS from killing
Muslims indiscriminately.
Conclusion
The document "These are our Creeds and Ways" is a self-profile of the Islamic
State, reflecting its basic theology and political ideology. ISIS declares that
it shuns extremism, and in fact it adds nothing new to traditional Islamic
dogmas except for making the return of the caliphate a mandatory article of
faith. The document deals with topics that have occupied Muslim minds for
generations, yet it also reflects modern and local conditions and phenomena. It
is firmly based on Islamic sources, which it cites often, and much of its
content is identical to Islamic conservative Hanbali and neo-Hanbali doctrines.
* Ella Landau-Tasseron is a retired professor at the Department for Islamic and
Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Her research
fields are early Islamic history, the Arabian tribal system, Islamic political
institutions, hadith, Islamic historiography, and jihad. Among her publications
are a series of articles on the tribal society in pre-and early Islamic times,
two monographs on the institution of the Islamic "oath of allegiance," and a
monograph on non-combatants in Islamic thought.
Endnotes:
[1] See William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and
Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State, New York, 2015, 1-22, 31-45, 73-84, 121-6,
135-44 (12-15 on the period of cooperation between al-Zarqawi and al-Qaeda).
[2] "The Pulpit of Monotheism and Jihad" website http://www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_35417.html
(accessed 21 March, 2016).
[3] The document was provided to me by MEMRI. I owe thanks in particular to Rafi
Green and Hagit Migron. The text can be accessed at
https://ia801302.us.archive.org/1/items/3akedatona-1/3Qidatona.pdf and also at
https://archive.org/details/3akedatona-1 (accessed 18 April, 2016). The date of
publication is July 22, 2015 and the compiler is identified as Abu Qudama Al-Muhajir.
[4] This formula concludes Ibn Taymiyya's highly sophisticated discussion of the
subject, see Ibn Taymiyya, Majmu Fatawa Shaykh al-Islam, Medina: Majma' al-Malik
Fahd li-Tiba'at al-Mushaf al-Sharif, 2004, 8/432; idem, Al-Risala al-Tadmuriyya,
Medina: Matabi' al-Madina al-Munawwara, n.d. See also http://www.alagidah.com/vb/showthread.php?t=2238
(accessed March 17, 2016).
[5] See Ibn Taymiyya, Majmu Fatawa , 13/132.
[6] See e.g., Koran 2: 62, 126 177, 4: 39, 162, 6:31, 32:10-12, 70:26, among
others. On the Apocalypse in Islam see J. Idleman Smith and Y. Yazbek Haddad,
The Islamic Understanding of Death and Resurrection, Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1981; D. Cook, Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic, Princeton, New
Jersey: The Darwin Press, 2002 (apocalypse in the Quran: 269-306).
[7] See e.g., http://www.ahlalhdeeth.com/vb/showthread.php?t=231962 (accessed
March 20, 2016). The scholarly works consulted for this paper do not make the
distinction between eschatological themes that became creeds and others that did
not.
[8] Smith and Haddad, The Islamic Understanding, 65, 95, among others.
[9] Smith and Haddad, The Islamic Understanding, 127-46; D. Cook, Contemporary
Muslim Apocalyptic Literature, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2005;
McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, especially 28-29, 99-100, 105-111, 145-7 among
others.
[10] There were a few abortive attempts to reestablish a caliphate, see McCants,
ISIS, 122. See also Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic, 129-32, 225-9.
[11] McCants, ISIS, 114-9, 179-81.
[12] There are several versions of the twelve-ruler hadith, see, Ahmad b.
Muhammad al-Khallal, Al-Sunna, Riyadh: Dar al-Raya lil-Nashr wal-Tawzi',
1410/1489, 431 (no. 652); Ibn Hibban, Sahih Ibn Hibban, ed. Shu'ayb al-Arnauut,
Muassasat al-Risala, 1993, 15/43-45; al-Haythami, Majma al-Zawa'id wa-Manba' al-Fawa'id,
Cairo and Beirut: Dar al-Rayyan lil-Turath and Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi, 1407/
1986, 5/178; Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Musnad Ahmad, Cairo: Muassasat Qurtuba, n.d.
,5/92-99; Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, Fath al-Bari Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari, ed.
Muhammad Fu'ad Abd al-Baqi and Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifa,
1379/1959, 13/213-215. For a discussion of this tradition, as well as the Mahdi
and the return of Jesus, see D. Cook, Studies, especially 34-188, 236-47 (the
twelve rulers on pp. 36-49).
[13] See Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic, 90, 127-32, 157, 198, 226-9;
McCants, ISIS, 134.
[14] Mullah Umar in Afghanistan assumed the Islamic regnal title "Commander of
the Faithful" (amir al-muminin) as early as 1996, but his Emirate was not called
caliphate. See Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic, 172-5.
[15] See McCants, ISIS, 3-20, 39-42, 52-5, 124-5; but cf. 52, 45, 78-9, 129-30.
It should be mentioned that, once the Islamic State in Iraq was declared, bin
Laden did not acknowledge it but he did not openly reject it, either. Apparently
his statements concerning it depended on the contexts in which they were made
and the public addressed.
[16] McCants, ISIS, 126-30; see also Ella Landau-Tasseron, Delegitimizing ISIS
on Islamic Grounds: Criticism Of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi By Muslim Scholars, MEMRI
Inquiry & Analysis No. 1205, November 19, 2015.
[17] See I. Goldziher, Muslim Studies, vol. 2, translated from the German by
C.R. Barber and S.M. Stern, London: George Allen and Unwin ltd. 1971, 31-3.
[18] See Etan Kohlberg, "Some Imami Shi'i views on the Sahaba", Jerusalem
Studies in Arabic and Islam 5 (1984), 143-75.
[19] See e.g., al-Lalika'i, Sharh Usul I'tiqad Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'a, ed.
Ahmad Sa'd Hamdan, Riyadh: Dar Tayba li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi', n.d. 7/1241 ff.
[20] See P. Crone, God's Rule, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, 135-8,
228-37; B. Lewis, Islam in History, Chicago: Open Court, 1993, part VI: History
and Revolution (especially 261-322).
[21] Leading the prayer is one of the functions of the ruler – imam – or his
representative, so that performing the prayer behind the appointed imam is a
sign of obedience. See legal rulings on this topic, Islamweb.net, Markaz
al-Fatwa, at
http://fatwa.islamweb.net/fatwa/index.php?page=showfatwa&Option=FatwaId&Id=120175
(accessed 19 April, 2016); Tariq al-Salaf, Bab al-Salah, at http://www.alsalafway.com/cms/fatwa.php?action=fatwa&id=3192
(accessed 19 April, 2016, cited from Ibn Taymiyya).
[22] Par. 35 – cf. Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya, Majmi' Fatawa, 1/414, 418-22.
[23] Koran 49:13. The hadith "All Muslims are equal in blood, and the lowest of
them may grant protection" is widely circulating, see e.g. Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani,
Talkhis al-Habir, Cairo: Mu'assasat Qurtuba 1995, 4/216.
[24] On ISIS and dhimma see MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No. 1205,
Delegitimizing ISIS on Islamic Grounds: Criticism Of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi By
Muslim Scholars, November 19, 2015;
10-11.
[25] Atrocities committed against Muslims are too well known to be detailed
here.
[26] See R. Peters, Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of jihad in Modern
History, The Hague, Paris and New York: Mouton; Berlin and New York: Walter de
Gruyter Distributor, 1979; Bonner, M. Jihad in Islamic History. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2006; also see MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series
Report No. 1205, Delegitimizing ISIS on Islamic Grounds: Criticism Of Abu Bakr
Al-Baghdadi By Muslim Scholars, November 19, 2015; 7-9.
[27] See a lucid explanation of the matter in Daniel Lav, Radical Islam and the
Revival of Medieval Theology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012, 24-40.
[28] Not all radicals would agree with this. See Lav, Radical Islam, 114-9. Cf.
Ibn Taymiyya, Majmi' Fatawa, 1/420, where he promotes internal cohesion, and
denounces the Khawarij who infringe upon it by accusing other Muslims of
unbelief.
[29] See Lav, Radical Islam, 33-4, 38-40. The notion that faith comprises many
elements is based on a widely circulating hadith cited in the document (par.
15).
[30] For the text, see: http://www.twhed.com/vb/t5427/
[31] Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, Al-Masa'il wa-l-Rasa'il al-Marwiyya 'an al-Imam Ahmad Ibn
Hanbal, ed. Abdallah ibn Salman ibn Salim al-Ahmadi, Riyadh: Dar Tayba, 1991,
1/225-30 (most of the opinions therein are not derived from Ibn Hanbal himself,
although the book was published by al-Ahmadi under Ibn Hanbal's name); Abu
al-'Ala ibn Rashid, Dawabit Takfir al-Mu'ayyan inda Shaykhay al-Islam Ibn
Taymiyya wa-Ibn Abd al-Wahhab wa-Ulama al-Da'wa al-Islahiyya, Riyadh: Maktabat
al-Rushd li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi', 2004.
[32] Lav, Radical Islam, 118.
[33] See examples of ISIS's arbitrary violence in McCants, ISIS, 33-5, 42-4,
136.
[34] See George Grigore, "The Historical Context of Fatwa of Mardin Given by Ibn
Taymiyya," 1st International Symposium of Mardin History Papers, ed. Ibrahim
Ozcosar and Huseyin H Gunes, Istanbul 2006, 345-50.