LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN

July 07/16

 Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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http://www.eliasbejjaninews.com/newsbulletin16/english.july07.16.htm

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Bible Quotations For Today

Ask, and it will be given to you; search, and you will find; knock, and the door will be opened for you.
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Luke 11/09-13:"‘So I say to you, Ask, and it will be given to you; search, and you will find; knock, and the door will be opened for you. For everyone who asks receives, and everyone who searches finds, and for everyone who knocks, the door will be opened. Is there anyone among you who, if your child asks for a fish, will give a snake instead of a fish?Or if the child asks for an egg, will give a scorpion? If you then, who are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will the heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to those who ask him!’

Believe in the Lord Jesus, and you will be saved, you and your household.
Acts of the Apostles 16/25-34:"About midnight Paul and Silas were praying and singing hymns to God, and the prisoners were listening to them. Suddenly there was an earthquake, so violent that the foundations of the prison were shaken; and immediately all the doors were opened and everyone’s chains were unfastened. When the jailer woke up and saw the prison doors wide open, he drew his sword and was about to kill himself, since he supposed that the prisoners had escaped. But Paul shouted in a loud voice, ‘Do not harm yourself, for we are all here.’ The jailer called for lights, and rushing in, he fell down trembling before Paul and Silas. Then he brought them outside and said, ‘Sirs, what must I do to be saved?’ They answered, ‘Believe on the Lord Jesus, and you will be saved, you and your household.’They spoke the word of the Lord to him and to all who were in his house. At the same hour of the night he took them and washed their wounds; then he and his entire family were baptized without delay. He brought them up into the house and set food before them; and he and his entire household rejoiced that he had become a believer in God."

Pope Francis's Tweet For Today
Let’s join forces, at all levels, to ensure that peace in beloved Syria is possible!
Unissons nos forces, à tous les niveaux, afin que la paix soit possible dans la bien-aimée Syrie.
لنوحّد القوى على جميع الأصعدة كي يصبح السلام ممكنًا في سوريا الحبيبة!

Titles For Latest LCCC Bulletin analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on July 06-07/16

Funding Hezbollah bothers Iranians/Diana Moukalled/Al Arabiya/July 06/16
U.S. Bankrolling Hezbollah/Majid Rafizadeh/Gatestone Institute/July 06/16
MECHRIC Condemns Ongoing Genocide of Christians - From Middle East to Europe
Will IS attacks bring about change in Saudi foreign policy/Giorgio Cafiero/Al-Monitor/July 06/15
What wave of suicide attacks means for Riyadh's anti-terror efforts/Bruce Riedel/Al-Monitor/July 06/15
How new alliance among Iraq's Kurds might actually deepen divisions/Mohammed A. Salih/Al-Monitor/July 06/15
Can the Palestinians Hold Free and Fair Elections/Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/July 06/16
Is AIPAC a Toothless Tiger After Iran Deal Supporters Survive Unscathed/Nathan Guttman/Forward/July 06/16
MEMRI President Yigal Carmon's Testimony To House Committee On Foreign Affairs, July 6, 2016: Palestinian Authority Support For Imprisoned, Released, And Wounded Terrorists And Families Of 'Martyrs/Yigal Carmon/MEMRI/July 06/16
MEMRI Vice President Alberto Fernandez's Testimony To Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, July 6, 2016 – ISIS Online: Countering Terrorist Radicalization And Recruitment On The Internet And Social Media/By: Alberto M. Fernandez/MEMRI/July 06/16
Why Islamists (Occasionally) Desecrate Islamic Holy Sites
Tarek Fatah/The Toronto Sun/July 06/16
Religious Intolerance in the Gulf States/Hilal Khashan/Middle East Forum/July 06/16
Why do they attack the permissible in Sharia/Turki Aldakhil/Al Arabiya/July 06/16
Attacking the Prophet’s Mosque in Madinah: significance and consequences/Faisal J. Abbas/Al Arabiya/July 06/16
Which of Saudi’s enemies orchestrated the triple bombing/Khalaf Ahmad Al Habtoor/Al Arabiya/July 06/16
Why referendums are bad for democracy/Dr. Azeem Ibrahim/Al Arabiya/July 06/16

Titles For Latest Lebanese Related News published on July 06-07/16

Grand Mufti Daryan Rejects 'Self-Security', Slams 'Some MPs' for Blocking President Election
Rahi from Orange County: No to implantation of Palestinians and Syrians in Lebanon
Salam Performs Eid Prayer alongside Saudi King in Mecca
Berri meets Aoun, calls Gemayel
Aoun contacts Assiri condemning terrorist bombings in Saudi Arabia
Aoun Calls Saudi Ambassador after Visiting Berri, Daryan
Aoun after meeting with Deryan: We are in constant contact with Hariri despite some differences.
Jumblatt condemns bombings in Saudi Arabia: Kingdom's stability remains absolutely necessary
Mikati: Loyal cooperation helps in solving all problems
Squabble with sticks, gunfire in Akkar outskirts on backdrop of municipal elections
Israeli combing operations along borderline west of Shebaa
Member of al-Hujeiri Family Killed in Arsal Armed Attack
Analysts: Hizbullah Angered after Bank Crackdown Targeted Popular Base
Term Extension or Package Deal? Controversy Expected over Army Chief Post
Funding Hezbollah bothers Iranians
Aoun, Berri in rare meet days after oil agreement
Iranian News Outlet: Israel Sent Message to Hezbollah Offering Prisoner-Swap Negotiations
U.S. Bankrolling Hezbollah
 

Titles For Latest LCCC Bulletin For Miscellaneous Reports And News published on July 06-07/16
Al-Quds Day speaker in Toronto calls for Israelis to be shot
Putin and Obama say ready to increase Syria coordination: Kremlin
Syrian army, rebels agree 72-hour Eid truce
ISIS tightens grip on women held as sex slaves
Thousands gather to mourn victims of Baghdad blast
‘I believe in Hillary Clinton,’ Obama tells voters
Turkey launches manhunt for airport attack suspects near Syria
Iraq PM accepts interior minister's resignation
US condemns Israel’s planned new settler homes
US to keep 8,400 troops in Afghanistan into 2017: Obama
Egypt considers retaliating for Italy’s decision to cut military supplies

Links From Jihad Watch Site for July 06-07/16
Minnesota: Muslim ‘refugees’ threaten community with rape, mainstream media covers up incident
North Carolina: Two Muslims imprisoned for plotting to go to Syria or Yemen to murder non-Muslims
Six Canadian cities sign a charter against “Islamophobia”
Robert Spencer: Muslims wouldn’t bomb Muhammad’s city, would they? Sure they would.
Obama whistleblower: Terror-linked Muslim groups helping set policy, costing lives
T&T President: Quran “not a handbook of violence but a repository of peace, harmony and reformative knowledge”
Huffington Post tries to discredit report of Muslim Congressmen’s ties to Muslim Brotherhood; real story is much worse
Hugh Fitzgerald: Was the Medina Attack an “Assault on Islam Itself”?
YouTube bans video on Muslim Brotherhood, Sharia and Civilization Jihad as “hate speech”
Video: Robert Spencer on the Muslim Brotherhood’s persecution of Christians
Germany: Leftist pol raped by Muslim migrants, lied to police to avoid encouraging racism
Muslim former National Guardsman plotted jihad massacre for Islamic State

Latest Lebanese Related News published on July 06-07/16

Grand Mufti Daryan Rejects 'Self-Security', Slams 'Some MPs' for Blocking President Election
Naharnet/July 06/16/Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Latif Daryan stressed Wednesday that only state institutions can protect the Lebanese against terrorism, not the formation of vigilante groups, as he criticized “some MPs” who are boycotting the presidential vote sessions. “The regional blaze must prompt us to create an insulating wall through establishing a strong State and supporting the army and the security forces,” said Daryan during his Eid al-Fitr sermon at the Mohammed al-Amin Mosque in downtown Beirut. Citing the latest suicide bombings in the Christian border town of al-Qaa, Daryan added: “A lot of people are lately talking about the Christians' fear for their fate and we all actually have the right to be concerned.” “The disintegration of state institutions is leaving us all without a protecting umbrella, but it seems that the only ones who do not share us our fear are some of our dear MPs and politicians, who are not keen enough on the country and the State to head to parliament and elect a president in order to restore regularity at state institutions,” the mufti said. Lebanon has been without a president since the term of Michel Suleiman ended in May 2014 and Hizbullah, the Free Patriotic Movement and some of their allies have been boycotting the electoral sessions at parliament, demanding a prior agreement on the identity of the president. “We must realize that security stability and political understanding would strengthen the net of safety that can preserve the country, and that the confrontation of any impending threat is the responsibility of the State,” Daryan stressed. “There cannot be self-security in our country or else the law of the jungle will govern us,” he warned. Daryan also took a swipe at Hizbullah over its involvement in the Syrian conflict, noting that “this interference in the burning neighborhood has brought the fire to us instead of combating it.”Al-Qaa and the nearby Ras Baalbek are the only two towns with a Christian majority in the predominantly Shiite Hermel region, where Hizbullah holds sway. The group has sent thousands of its fighters to Syria to bolster President Bashar Assad's forces against rebels and jihadist extremists trying to topple him. Several deadly bombings have targeted Hizbullah's strongholds in the eastern Bekaa region and Beirut's southern suburbs since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011. Most of the attacks were claimed by extremist groups such as al-Qaida and the Islamic State.
The attacks killed scores of civilians and wounded hundreds.

Rahi from Orange County: No to implantation of Palestinians and Syrians in Lebanon
Wed 06 Jul 2016/NNA - Maronite Patriarch, Cardinal Bechara Rahi, reiterated from the United States his rejection of the resettlement of Palestinian and Syrian refugees in Lebanon, noting that Lebanon has suffered enough from the impact of wars and neighboring crises. "The refugee case is of primary importance, especially with fears about their resettlement in Lebanon. We categorically reject this, and this is also the official position of Lebanon!" said Rahi while on a visit to Orange County, California. "We also refuse what is said about the voluntary return of refugees to their homes, because this return may be mandatory and we have officially informed the UN Secretary General and the presidents of several countries about it. Lebanon has suffered enough from the impact of wars and crises in the region," said the Cardinal, stressing that there were various safe areas in Syria for the refugees to go back to and live in dignity. The Patriarch assured that he understood the suffering of refugees, but the difficulties that they face could well be exploited by terrorist organizations in their recruitment of new members. "We fear that this is what happened in Qaa and we urge the international community to meet its commitments towards Lebanon," he noted, stating that the international community has applauded Lebanon's hospitality enough, and now it was time for action. The Patriarch, who arrived in the parish of Saint John Maroun in Orange County, California on Saturday, July 2, further regretted that justice, peace and security were absent from the Middle East, calling on the international community to "work for the establishment of real and lasting peace, justice and social growth in this part of the world."Rahi also encouraged expatriates to focus on their Lebanese nationality, to invest in their country of origin and to help their families financially "so that they may remain in Lebanon.""It is vital that Christians in Lebanon and the Middle East remain in their country," he stated, "the Muslim-Christian unity is a guarantee for the salvation of Lebanon."The Patriarch once more urged the US administration to take action to keep Lebanon away from regional conflicts.

Salam Performs Eid Prayer alongside Saudi King in Mecca
Naharnet/July 06/16/Prime Minister Tammam Salam on Wednesday performed the Eid al-Fitr prayer at the Sacred Mosque in Mecca alongside Saudi King Salman bin Abdul Aziz and and members of the royal family, Lebanon's National News Agency reported. The premier then attended a breakfast banquet that was thrown by the Saudi monarch, during which he "offered his condolences over the victims of the latest terrorist attacks that struck the Saudi cities of Medina, Jeddah and Qatif, NNA said. "Lebanon stands by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in its battle against terrorism," announced Salam, adding that terrorism "has no respect to the sanctity of any place or innocent lives and has nothing to do with Islam." Salam also voiced certainty that the kingdom would prevail in its fight against fanaticism.

Berri meets Aoun, calls Gemayel
Wed 06 Jul 2016/NNA - House Speaker, Nabih Berri, met at his Ayn Teenh residence on Wednesday with head of Change and Reform Bloc, MP Michel Aoun, and discussed current developments. Aoun also felicitated Berri on Eid Fitr. Berri received numerous calls and cables on the occasion of Eid Fitr, namely from former President Michel Sleiman, former PMs Foad Siniora, Najib Mikati and Saad Hariri, head of the Democratic Gathering MP Walid Jumblatt, head of Marada MP Sleiman Frangiyeh, MP Michel Murr, and Ministers Boutros Harb and Gibran Bassil. Separately, Berri telephoned former President Amine Gemayel to check on his health.

Aoun contacts Assiri condemning terrorist bombings in Saudi Arabia
Wed 06 Jul 2016/NNA - Change and Reform Parliamentary Bloc Head, General Michel Aoun, contacted on Wednesday Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon, Ali Awad Assiri, denouncing the recent terrorist blasts that hit the Saudi Kingdom.Aoun also expressed his well-wishes on the Fitr Feast occasion.

Aoun Calls Saudi Ambassador after Visiting Berri, Daryan
Naharnet/July 06/16/Free Patriotic Movement founder MP Michel Aoun visited Wednesday Speaker Nabih Berri and Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Latif Daryan in Beirut to offer them Eid al-Fitr greetings. The meeting with Berri “was an occasion to discuss the current developments,” state-run National News Agency said. After talks with Daryan earlier in the day, Aoun announced that “communication with al-Mustaqbal Movement is still ongoing,” stressing the importance of “reaching an understanding among the various Lebanese political forces over all issues.”Later in the day, NNA said Aoun telephoned Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Ali Awadh Asiri to offer Eid greetings and extend condolences over the suicide bombings that hit Saudi Arabia. Aoun's meeting with Berri comes several days after FPM chief Jebran Bassil met with the speaker and Ain al-Tineh in the presence of Finance Minister Ali Hassan Khalil. The two parties announced after the talks that they had resolved all their disagreements over the issue of offshore oil and gas exploration. There has been speculation, however, that the rapprochement between the two parties could lead to an agreement over the stalled presidential election or the parliamentary polls. Lebanon has been without a president since the term of Michel Suleiman ended in May 2014 and Hizbullah, the FPM and some of their allies have been boycotting the electoral sessions at parliament, stripping them of the needed quorum. Mustaqbal leader ex-PM Saad Hariri, who is close to Saudi Arabia, launched an initiative in late 2015 to nominate Marada Movement chief MP Suleiman Franjieh for the presidency but his proposal was met with reservations from the country's main Christian parties as well as Hizbullah.The supporters of Aoun's presidential bid argue that he is more eligible than Franjieh to become president due to the size of his parliamentary bloc and his bigger influence in the Christian community.
 

Aoun after meeting with Deryan: We are in constant contact with Hariri despite some differences.

Wed 06 Jul 2016/NNA - "We are in constant contact with Saad Hariri despite some political differences; however, our relationship remained healthy on the social and humanitarian level," Head of Change and Reform Bloc, MP Michel Aoun, said after paying a visit to Grand Mufti of the Republic, Abdullatif Deryan, to felicitate him on Eid Fitr at Dar el-Fatwa. Asked about his relationship with Speaker Nabih Berri, Aoun said "we are also in contact with Speaker Berri," and "yesterday Foreign Affairs minister, Gibran Bassil, visited Ain Teeneh and they both agreed on several issues that could pave the way in the future for further understandings on various issues, such as presidential elections," Aoun noted. Commenting on his expectation of presidential elections taking place in the nearest future, Aoun concluded by saying, "Inshallah."

Jumblatt condemns bombings in Saudi Arabia: Kingdom's stability remains absolutely necessary
Wed 06 Jul 2016/NNA - "Democratic Gathering" Head, MP Walid Jumblatt, denounced in an issued statement on Wednesday the recent terrorist blasts that targeted Saudi Arabia, stressing that "the Kingdom's stability remains absolutely necessary, especially in light of the overall political and security deterioration witnessed in the Arab and Islamic region as a whole."He added: "Terrorism attacks continue all over the world, from Bangladesh to Iraq to Saudi Arabia, unabated and without any regard for religious sanctities or days of the Eid with the end of the holy month of Ramadan, which reflects the criminal, destructive motives of terrorists."Jumblatt expressed his sincerest condolences to the Saudi Kingdom, its people and to the families of the fallen martyrs.

Mikati: Loyal cooperation helps in solving all problems
Wed 06 Jul 2016/NNA - Former Prime Minister, Najib Mikati, told Eid well-wishers who visited him in Tripoli on Wednesday that "despite the difficult circumstances facing the country, our bets are still pinned on the cooperation of all loyal sides, which aids in solving all political and economic problems at stake."Mikati expressed his optimism regarding the active market scene in Tripoli on the occasion of the Fitr Feast, which reflects the people's strong will of life in spite of all difficulties.

Squabble with sticks, gunfire in Akkar outskirts on backdrop of municipal elections
Wed 06 Jul 2016/NNA - A row erupted between different culprits who used bats and firearms in Akkar outskirts on the backdrop of municipal elections, which resulted in the destruction of a number of cars, National News Agency correspondent said on Wednesday. The Lebanese Armed Forces intervened and patrolled the town to restore calm, and arrested a number of suspects, the same reporter concluded.

Israeli combing operations along borderline west of Shebaa
Wed 06 Jul 2016/NNA - Israeli forces carried out combing operations along the borderline over Sedaneh Hilltops west of Shebaa, which coupled with an enemy pilotless reconnaissance drone circling over occupied Shebaa Farms, NNA correspondent in Hasbaya reported Wednesday evening.

Member of al-Hujeiri Family Killed in Arsal Armed Attack
Naharnet/July 06/16/A man from the al-Hujeiri family was killed Wednesday in the restive northeastern border town of Arsal, state-run National News Agency reported. “Gunmen riding a Kia Rio car opened fire in the town of Arsal at Lebanese citizen Qutaiba al-Hujeiri, aka Qutaiba al-Ostaz, which resulted in his death,” NNA said. “His body was transferred to the Mustafa al-Hujeiri Hospital,” the agency added.Such incidents have become frequent in the Arsal region in recent years. Militants from the Islamic State extremist group and the Qaida-linked al-Nusra Front are entrenched in the town's outskirts and in 2014 they briefly overran the town before being ousted by the army.

Analysts: Hizbullah Angered after Bank Crackdown Targeted Popular Base
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/July 06/16/A bank crackdown on hundreds of accounts linked with Hizbullah raised tensions between the party and the banking sector due to the measures' perceived impact on Hizbullah's “popular base,” analysts say. The move follows the adoption late last year of a US law imposing sanctions on financial institutions that facilitate significant transactions associated with Hizbullah, classified by Washington as a "terrorist group." Lebanese banks -- keen to maintain the country's role as a regional financial hub -- have been working to comply with the law since May. But Hizbullah has warned that it considers the account closures an "attack" on its supporters. On June 12, an explosion hit the Beirut headquarters of one of the country's largest banks, BLOM Bank, leaving one person with minor injuries. Hizbullah was not linked directly to the blast, but several Lebanese newspapers said the attack was intended as a message to the banking industry. "Hizbullah is angry because the pressure is hitting its popular base and the responsibility will fall on the group's own shoulders," said Lebanese economics expert Ghazi Wazni.Under the US Hizbullah International Financing Prevention Act passed in December, sanctions can be avoided if a bank "has taken and is continuing to take significant verifiable steps" towards ending the financial activities.
Hundreds of accounts shut
Hizbullah runs an extensive social services network in Lebanon -- complete with schools, hospitals and a wide range of charity organizations. Pro-Hizbullah daily newspaper al-Akhbar reported in early June that in response to the law "hundreds, if not thousands" of accounts held by several major charities and hospitals "directly affiliated with Hizbullah" had been shut. Wazni said if the banks pursue their "hardline" approach towards Hizbullah-linked accounts, some 10,000 accounts could be shut down. Following the June bombing, the Association of Lebanese Banks held an emergency meeting and warned that the blast threatened to "rattle economic stability."Contacted by Agence France-Presse, the association's secretary general Makram Sader would not elaborate on how accounts were being shut, saying only that banks "follow decrees issued by the Central Bank and the implementation mechanisms decided by monitoring bodies."Hizbullah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah railed against the account closures in a speech last month, saying he considered them an "attack... against our people, our constituency, and our families."He also downplayed the potential consequences, saying: "As long as Iran has money, we have money.""Just as we receive the rockets that we use to threaten Israel, we are receiving our money. No law will prevent us from receiving it," Nasrallah said.
'War economy'
Steps have been taken to ease tensions. Hassan Moukalled, the editor-in-chief of Construction & Economy magazine, said he had acted as an intermediary in indirect negotiations between the Central Bank and Hizbullah. The Central Bank has now requested that some accounts belonging to Hizbullah-affiliated parliamentarians be reopened, Moukalled said, on the basis that they receive regular government salaries.
"If there is regular account activity within a certain margin, where between $5,000 and $10,000 is deposited on a regular basis, there is no problem. But if all of a sudden $50,000 enters that account, it will be investigated," he said. Moukalled said the moves by the banks were likely to have more effect on those loosely affiliated with Hizbullah than on the movement itself. Hizbullah's "budget doesn't run through the formal banking mechanism -- it's like a war economy," he said. But Wazni said the account closures would still put pressure on Hizbullah. "It will have to bear responsibility for the closing of accounts of people who may be just the sons or brothers of Hizbullah officials, as well as accounts held by charities, and the effect this will have on employees," he said. One employee at a Hizbullah-owned institution, speaking on condition of anonymity, told AFP that staff "began receiving their salaries in cash about four months ago, while before we used to get paid in checks that we could cash at the bank."

Term Extension or Package Deal? Controversy Expected over Army Chief Post
Naharnet/July 06/16/The issue of appointing a successor to Army Commander General Jean Qahwaji is expected to be the subject of political bickering after the Eid al-Fitr holiday, a media report said on Wednesday. “The extension of the army chief's term will inevitably happen should the presidential void continue and this situation can only be changed through the election of a new president,” informed sources told An Nahar newspaper. “A new president would seek a reshuffle in all security agencies in line with his plan of action for the next six years,” the sources noted. Military sources declined to comment on the issue, saying “it is premature to discuss the topic, especially that there are efforts to agree on a package deal.” “It is better not to tackle the issue in the media because it might affect the morale of the soldiers who are facing major challenges in a region that is witnessing a bloodbath,” the sources told An Nahar. Free Patriotic Movement sources meanwhile said that nothing justifies another extension for Qahwaji's term, stressing that appointing a new army commander is “possible.” The FPM sources also expressed concerns that the Cabinet “might postpone discussing the issue until the final hours in order to force us to accept a de facto situation.”The issue of appointing a new army chief was “the reason behind the visit that Defense Minister Samir Moqbel paid to Change and Reform bloc chief MP Michel Aoun several days ago,” al-Akhbar newspaper reported on Tuesday. Quoting sources involved in the deliberations, the daily said Moqbel told Aoun that he is “mulling the appointment of a successor to Qahwaji.”“Aoun responded by stressing that he also wants the appointment of a new commander,” the sources added. Moqbel had in August last year postponed the retirement of Qahwaji, Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Walid Salman and Higher Defense Council chief Maj. Gen. Mohammed Kheir, extending their terms by one year, after the political forces failed to reach an agreement on security and military appointments. Qahwaji's tenure expires in September while that of Salman will end on August 7. The army chief's term has been extended twice since 2013 despite political objections, especially from the FPM, which says it rejects term extensions for any military or security official. Aoun had been reportedly seeking the appointment of former Commando Regiment chief Chamel Roukoz, his son-in-law, as a successor to Qahwaji.

Funding Hezbollah bothers Iranians
Diana Moukalled/Al Arabiya/July 06/16
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s recent statements about Iran’s funding of his party remind me of the slogans chanted in Tehran seven years ago. In 2009, Iranians not only chanted “death to the dictator” during their protests, but also slogans about freedom and living in dignity, including: “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon. I sacrifice my life for Iran.” These protests marked Iranians’ first public rejection of their regime’s financial and military support of Hezbollah and Hamas. It is said that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was angered by these slogans. The protests were suppressed and many were killed, hundreds arrested and dozens executed. Social media networks were banned and journalism, particularly online, was strictly supervised.
Economic woes
Nasrallah’s recent statement that “as long as Iran has money, we have money” reminds us of these protests. The issue of Iran’s generous funding of Hezbollah and other armed groups such as Hamas and those in Syria comes at a time when Iranians are suffering economically, and amid public fury over government officials’ huge salaries. It is difficult to place Nasrallah’s statements about massive Iranian funding outside that context. The issue of Iran’s generous funding of Hezbollah and other armed groups such as Hamas and those in Syria comes at a time when Iranians are suffering economically. Opposition figures inside and outside Iran have commented on the matter, as some have managed to bypass the ban on social networking sites. At this point, Nasrallah should stop bragging about Iranian generosity, particularly in light of the meager economic results so far from the nuclear deal. Global companies have not headed to Tehran, and the world is still cautious about an economy controlled by security officials, and whose earnings are distributed among groups such as Hezbollah. Funding the party will keep Iran’s economy outside the natural economic cycle. Tehran will not be able to suppress protests against this, no matter how much the media is suffocated.
**This article was first published in Asharq al-Awsat on July. 4, 2016
 

Aoun, Berri in rare meet days after oil agreement
The Daily Star/July 06/15/BEIRUT: Change and Reform bloc leader Michel Aoun paid a rare visit to Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri Wednesday, days after their representatives announced a deal to end years of dispute over the country's offshore oil and gas reserves. Media said Aoun visited Berri to wish him a happy Eid al-Fitr, which marks the end of the Islamic month of Ramadan. The meeting took place at Berri’s Beirut residence in Ain al-Tineh. MTV Lebanon reported that the meeting was 45 minutes long, where the presidential crisis was discussed. The report said the meeting was a "positive indication" that the two are close to solving pressing issues. Speaking to reporters later from Dar al-Fatwa where he met with Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdel Latif Derian, Aoun said the agreement reached over Lebanon's oil and gas helps pave the way to solve other crises. Earlier this week, the Free Patriotic Movement leader Gebran Bassil and Finance Minister Ali Hasan Khalil announced that they had settled their dispute over Lebanon’s offshore oil and gas reserves, which has hindered any agreement on energy extraction for years.Bassil represents Aoun and Khalil represents Berri. Both Aoun and Berri are known for having unsteady ties despite being from or affiliated to the March 8 political camp.

Iranian News Outlet: Israel Sent Message to Hezbollah Offering Prisoner-Swap Negotiations
Algemeiner/Ruthie Blum/July 5, 2016 /Israel has sent a message to Hezbollah offering to negotiate a prisoner swap, a senior Iranian official announced to the parliament, Iran‘s semi-official state news agency Fars claimed on Tuesday. According to the “exclusive” report, National Security and Foreign Policy Commission member Javad Karimi Qoddousi told the Iranian Parliament on Tuesday that Israel was referring to a potential exchange of Iranian diplomats allegedly abducted during the 1982 War in Lebanon for “prisoners of war with European nationalities” fighting in Syria on the side of the anti-Assad rebels, held by Hezbollah. It is on this basis, said Qoddousi, that “we suppose the Zionists have opened up for negotiations.”The Iranian diplomats in question, according to the report, are: Seyed Mohsen Mousavi, then-charge d’affaires of the Iranian Embassy in Beirut; military attaché General Ahmad Motevaselian; embassy technician Taghi Rastegar Moghadam; and Islamic Republic News Agency journalist Kazzem Akhavan. Fars said that the four men “were kidnapped by the Lebanese mercenary army — also known as the Falangists — at gunpoint in Northern Lebanon in 1982 and were later handed over to Israeli army.”Qoddousi pointed to Motevaselian, saying, “The enemy [Israel] is trying to work out a big deal over this big trophy that it has taken from us.” He also claimed that Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah has vowed to handle the general’s case himself. On Monday, according to Fars, Iranian Ambassador to Beirut Mohammad Fathali was quoted by Syrian Muslim Brotherhood publication Al-Ahd saying, “Many existing evidence and reasons show that these diplomats have been abducted by the Zionist regime’s mercenaries and have been transferred to the occupied Palestinian territories.” Fathali said that Iran is urging UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the Red Cross and other human rights bodies to intervene and pressure Israel into extraditing them to Iran. On Sunday, Fars reported, Seyed Mohsen Mousavi, the son of one of the diplomats also said that there is evidence to suggest that all four are still alive and imprisoned in Israel. Israel has confirmed neither the holding of the Iranian diplomats nor the claim that it offered to make a deal with Hezbollah for their release.

U.S. Bankrolling Hezbollah
Majid Rafizadeh/Gatestone Institute/July 06/16
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8405/us-bankrolling-hezbollah
Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's leader, said that U.S. sanctions would have no impact on the organization, as it already obtains complete financial and weaponry assistance from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
After the flimsy and uncompleted nuclear agreement, the Obama Administration immediately began transferring billions of dollars to Iran's Central Bank. One of the payments included $1.7 billion transferred in January 2016. $1.4 billion of this sum came from American taxpayers.
Thanks to President Obama and the continuing lifting of sanctions, the money that Iran is receiving from the U.S., from international trade, and from increased oil sales is most likely being directed toward Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guards, Iran's major beneficiaries, which keep attempting to scuttle U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region.
Nearly 34 years after its inception, Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shiite militant group, has publicly admitted that it is fully receiving its money and arms from the Iranian government.
Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, ridiculed the recent U.S. sanctions targeting Hezbollah. His speech was broadcast by the Al-Manar, the Shiite party's TV station, which is funded by the Iranian government. Nasrallah said that the U.S. sanctions would have no impact on the organization, as his group already obtains complete financial and weaponry assistance from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The Shiite leader pointed out that "We do not have any business projects or investments via banks..." He added that Hezbollah's survival depends on Iran: "We are open about the fact that Hezbollah's budget, its income, its expenses, everything it eats and drinks, its weapons and rockets, come from the Islamic Republic of Iran," he said, and pressed the notion that his group "will not be affected" by any type of sanctions.
Nasrallah's recent speech was also part of a ceremony that marked 40 days after the death of a high level Hezbollah commander, Mustafah Bedreddine, in the Syrian capital of Damascus. Nasrallah has recently vowed to increase Hezbollah's military presence in Syria, and assist Bashar Al Assad's forces, although Hezbollah has suffered significant losses in the latest fighting in Aleppo, Syria.
Nasrallah stated on Al Manar television: "We are facing a new wave... of projects in our war against Syria. They are being waged in northern Syria, particularly in the Aleppo region... The defense of Aleppo is the defense of the rest of Syria, it is the defense of Damascus, it is also the defense of Lebanon, and of Iraq....We will increase our presence in Aleppo. Retreat is not permissible."
Iran maintains that Hezbollah is a legitimate social, political and religious organization. Iran fostered the birth of Hezbollah and transformed it into one of its militant proxies in the region. Iran also helped Hezbollah become part of Lebanon's political system.
The United States and several other countries, including Canada, France, Australia, the Netherlands, and even the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), have long listed Hezbollah as a global terrorist group.
Hezbollah has been accused of terrorist attacks, including the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marines barracks in Beirut, in which 241 U.S. Marines were killed, the 1983 U.S. Embassy bombing in Beirut; the 2009 Hezbollah plot in Egypt; the 1984 United States Embassy annex bombing in Beirut; the 2012 bus bombing in Burgas, Bulgaria, as well as the 9/11 attacks in the United States, in which federal courts ordered Iran to pay $7.5 billion to the victims' families. Hezbollah and Iran were also reportedly behind the 1992 attack on Israel's Embassy in Buenos Aires in which 29 were killed.
U.S. President Barack Obama gave hope that the nuclear agreement (which is still unsigned by Iran), the lifting of sanctions against Iran, and engagement with Tehran will possibly help to change Iran's behavior towards the moderates in Iran, and diminish Iran's antagonistic, anti-Semitic stance towards Israel. He pointed out that as a result of the nuclear agreement,
"Iran being able to recognize that what's happening in Syria for example is leading to extremism that threatens their own state and not just the United States; that some convergence of interests begins to lead to conversations between, for example, Saudi Arabia and Iran; that Iran starts making different decisions that are less offensive to its neighbors; that it tones down the rhetoric in terms of its virulent opposition to Israel. And, you know, that's something that we should welcome."
Instead, the rhetoric of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his proxy, Hezbollah, appear to have grown harsher against Israel and the US. As Nasrallah emphasized, "As long as Iran has money, we have money... Just as we receive the rockets that we use to threaten Israel, we are receiving our money. No law will prevent us from receiving it..."
In December 2015, the U.S. Congress voted to impose fresh sanctions on Hezbollah, through the Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act, by targeting those banks that are "knowingly facilitating a significant transaction or transactions for" Hezbollah and those financial institutions that "knowingly facilitating a significant transaction or transactions of a person identified on the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked persons."
Nasrallah lashed out at the U.S.: "We totally reject this law until the Day of Judgment. ... Even if the law is applied, we as a party and an organizational and jihadi movement, will not be hurt or affected." He added: "We have no money in Lebanese banks, either in the past or now. ... We don't transfer our money through the Lebanese banking system."
The Congressional bill does pose some minor challenges to Hezbollah's financial logistics, but it will not prevent its military operations, terrorist attacks and expansion in any significant way -- due to the Obama administration's grand policy towards Iran and Hezbollah.
After the flimsy and uncompleted nuclear agreement, the Obama Administration immediately began transferring billions of dollars to Iran's Central Bank. One of the payments included $1.7 billion transferred in January 2016. $1.4 billion of this sum came from American taxpayers.
Iran immediately increased its military budget by $1.5 billion from $15.6 billion to $17.1 billion.
Iran also began witnessing the flow of money due to the lifting of international sanctions.
The major primary beneficiaries of the sanctions relief and flow of money are Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Previously, when sanctions were imposed on Iran, Tehran had to reduce funding to Hezbollah and the its television station, Al-Manar, from approximately $200 million a year. However, thanks to President Obama and the continuing lifting of sanctions, the money that Iran is receiving from the U.S., from international trade, and from increased oil sales is most likely being directed toward Hezbollah and IRGC, Iran's major beneficiaries, which keep attempting to scuttle U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region.
**Dr. Majid Rafizadeh, political scientists and Harvard University scholar is president of the International American Council on the Middle East. He can be reached at Dr.rafizadeh@post.harvard.edu
© 2016 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.

Latest LCCC Bulletin For Miscellaneous Reports And News published on July 06-07/16

Al-Quds Day speaker in Toronto calls for Israelis to be shot
July 5, 2016/Christine Williams/Jihad Watch
https://www.jihadwatch.org/2016/07/al-quds-day-speaker-in-toronto-calls-for-israelis-to-be-shot
Al-Quds Day speaker Ali Mallah issued an open call in Toronto, Canada for Israelis to be shot, after stating that Palestinians have the right to resist their occupation by any means necessary. Al-Quds Day is an annual event held on the last Friday of Ramadan; it was initiated by Iran during its 1979 revolution to express support for Palestinians and opposition to Zionism. It has since blown up to be an international hate fest against Israel, with incitements to violence at al-Quds Day rallies. Mallah stated at the Toronto rally that Palestinians “have the right to resist their occupation by any means necessary”, and he gave an example in which he incites the shooting of Israelis: “In the United States, if somebody makes a mistake and walks into somebody’s home, he will be shot, right? Here in Canada, if somebody attacks us we will attack and shoot them, all right? So why is it okay then to occupy Palestinian land and oppress Palestinian people?” B’nai Brith Canada is launching a campaign to shut down the al-Quds Day display of hate speech and incitement of violence. The organization’s CEO, Michael Mostyn, pointed out that he believed that Palestinian jihadist Muhammed Nasser Taraiyre, who killed 13-year-old Hallel Yaffe Ariel as she slept in her bed, was acting out orders from a Palestinian official who stated three days earlier that “wherever you see an Israeli, slit his throat.

Putin and Obama say ready to increase Syria coordination: Kremlin
Reuters, Moscow Thursday, 7 July 2016/Russia said on Wednesday that President Vladimir Putin and US President Barack Obama confirmed in a phone call that both countries were ready to increase coordination of military action in Syria. Relations between Russia and the United States have been strained by disagreements over the conflict in Syria, where Moscow and Washington are backing opposing sides in the civil war. The Kremlin said in a statement that Putin had used the call to urge Obama to aid the separation of the "moderate" opposition in Syria from the Nusra Front and other "extremist" groups. It said the phone call took place on the initiative of Russia and that both sides had also stressed the importance of United Nations-brokered peace talks restarting.Aside from Syria, the Kremlin statement said Putin and Obama discussed the Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine conflicts. Putin reiterated the Minsk peace agreements on Ukraine must be fulfilled by Kiev and said Russia wanted a peace process over Nagorno-Karabakh to progress. There was no immediate comment from Washington on the Putin-Obama phone call.

Syrian army, rebels agree 72-hour Eid truce
Reuters Wednesday, 6 July 2016/A Syrian rebel alliance agreed to a three-day country-wide ceasefire announced by the Syrian army on Wednesday and, although fighting and air attacks continued, US Secretary of State John Kerry expressed hope a more significant truce could be achieved.The truce is the first to be declared across the whole country since the one brokered by foreign powers in February to facilitate talks to end the five-year-old civil war. This has mostly unravelled. Wednesday's ceasefire covers the three-day Eid al-Fitr holiday celebrated by Muslims to mark the end of the fasting month of Ramadan. But a rebel group and a war monitor said little had actually changed on the ground. Syria's military high command said in a statement that "a regime of calm will be implemented across all territory of the Syrian Arab Republic for a period of 72 hours from 1 a.m. on July 6 until 2400 on July 8, 2016". The Syrian government uses the term "regime of calm" to denote a temporary ceasefire. The Free Syrian Army rebel alliance later said it would respect an Eid holiday ceasefire, but only if government forces also abided by it. "We, the armed revolutionary groups in Syria, welcome any effort towards a ceasefire for the happy Eid al-Fitr period. We declare we will abide by it so long as the other side does the same," said the statement, posted on the Twitter account of Mohammed Alloush, the former chief peace negotiator for Syria's mainstream opposition. "Until now, (the government) has not abided by what it has announced, in that it has launched a number of attacks in various areas today," the statement said. Alloush is also the representative of the powerful Jaish al Islam rebel faction in the opposition High Negotiations Committee (HNC). The statement said the rebel alliance welcomed international efforts that had led to the announcement from the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, but that attacks had not ceased as a result. Jaish al Islam spokesman Islam Alloush said: "The regime has made this announcement purely to escape international pressure. On the ground, I don't think anything has changed." Jaish al Islam said in a separate statement that, despite the announced truce, government and allied forces had attacked the town of Maydaa, in the Eastern Ghouta area east of Damascus. Maydaa has been held by Jaish al Islam. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said on Wednesday that government and allied forces had taken almost complete control of Maydaa and that fighting continued. Syrian state media said the army and its allies had taken ground from "terrorists" in the area. The Syrian government describes all groups fighting against it as terrorists. The Britain-based Observatory, which monitors the Syrian conflict, also said there had been rebel and government shelling in areas around the northern Syrian city of Aleppo, and air strikes had hit towns in the northern Aleppo countryside on Wednesday. Syrian state media also reported army operations against ISIS militants across the country on Wednesday.
US Secretary of State John Kerry welcomed the Syrian army's announcement, adding that discussions were under way to try to extend the truce. "We are trying very hard to grow these current discussions into a longer-lasting ... enforceable, accountable cessation of hostilities that could change the dynamics on the ground," Kerry told a news conference in Tbilisi, Georgia. The open-ended February "cessation of hostilities" truce, which was intended to facilitate talks to end the five-year-old civil war, was agreed with many opposition militias, but did not include the al-Qaeda affiliated Nusra Front or ISIS.
But the truce has mostly collapsed since then and the Syrian army and the Russian military, which supports Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, have announced a number of temporary local truces in areas of intense fighting, for example in the city of Aleppo or near the capital Damascus. But air strikes and fighting have often continued in spite of the declarations.

ISIS tightens grip on women held as sex slaves
The Associated Press, Khanke, Iraq Wednesday, 6 July 2016/The posting in Arabic is chilling. A girl for sale: “Virgin. Beautiful. 12 years old.... Her price has reached $12,500 and she will be sold soon.” The advertisement, along with others for kittens, tactical gear and weapons, appeared on an encrypted Telegram app and was shared with The Associated Press by an activist with Iraq’s persecuted Yazidi community, which is trying to free an estimated 3,000 women and girls still held as sex slaves by ISIS extremists. As ISIS loses control of one city after another in its self-styled caliphate, it is tightening its grip on its captives, taking the Yazidis deeper into its territory and selling them as chattel on popular encrypted apps such as Telegram and WhatsApp, The Associated Press has found. The extremists are targeting smugglers who rescue captives for assassination and are deploying a slave database with captives’ photos and owners’ names to prevent escape through checkpoints. Thousands of Kurdish-speaking Yazidis were taken prisoner and thousands more were massacred when ISIS fighters overran their northern Iraqi villages in August 2014. Since then, as the Yazidi captives have been conscripted into sexual slavery, smugglers have managed to free 2,554 women and girls. But by May, an ISIS crackdown reduced those numbers to just 39 in the last six weeks, according to figures provided by the Kurdistan regional government. On a chat on the WhatsApp app, an ISIS militant offers a woman and her children for sale, in this May 22, 2016, photo taken in northern Iraq. "If you know one of the brothers who has a slave for sale, please let me know," it reads in Arabic. "She wants her owner to sell her. He wants a price of $3,700 for her. She has two daughters, one 3 years old, the other 7 months." ISIS is believed to be holding some 3,000 Yazidi women and girls as sex slaves, and as it loses territory, it has tightened its grip on them to prevent their escape. (AP)
The AP has obtained a batch of 48 head shots of the captives, smuggled out by an escapee. The portraits appear to be the same as those used in a database to prevent the captives from slipping past checkpoints, or for barter and sale on popular apps. Mirza Danai, founder of the German-Iraqi aid organization Luftbrucke Irak, said the slave database documents the captives as if they were property.“They register every slave, every person under their owner, and therefore if she escapes, every Daesh control or checkpoint, or security force - they know that this girl ... has escaped from this owner,” said Danai, using a common acronym to refer to ISIS. One of those girls is Lamiya Aji Bashar, who in March made her fifth attempt at escape, running to the border with ISIS fighters in pursuit. A land mine exploded, and two Yazidi girls who were accompanying her were killed. The bomb left Lamiya blind in her right eye, her face scarred by melted skin.
Speaking from a bed at her uncle’s home in the northern Iraqi town of Baadre, the 18-year-told AP that despite being disfigured, she did not regret her perilous escape from her jailers. “Even if I had lost both eyes, it would have been worth it,” she said, “because I have survived them.” The Yazidis have been targeted by IS because they practice an ancient faith combining elements of Islam, Christianity and Zoroastrianism, and the Sunni extremists view them as infidels. The Yazidis’ pre-war population in Iraq was estimated at 500,000. Their number today is unknown. US State Department spokesman John Kirby told the AP that the US continues “to be appalled by credible reports that Daesh is trafficking in human beings, and sex slavery in particular.”
“This depravity not only speaks to the degree to which Daesh cheapens life and repudiates the Islamic faith, it also strengthens our resolve to defeat them,” he said. tos obtained by AP depict girls dressed in finery, some in heavy makeup. They stare somberly at the camera. Some are barely teenagers. Not one looks older than 30. Nazdar Murat is among them. She was about 16 when she was abducted along with more than two dozen girls and women who fled their home in Iraq’s Sinjar area when ISIS took over. Inside an immaculate tent outside Dahuk, Nouri Murat, Nazdar’s mother, said her daughter managed to call once, six months ago for a few seconds. “We spoke for a few seconds. She said she was in Mosul,” said Murat, referring to Iraq’s second-largest city. “Every time someone comes back, we ask them what happened to her and no one recognizes her. Some people told me she committed suicide.”
She is not sure whether to believe them.
Hussein Koro al-Qaidi, head of the Yazidi assistance committee in the northern Iraqi city of Dahuk, said no one has stepped up on the Yazidis’ behalf. And money to pay for smugglers or ransoms is now running out, according to the Kurdish government and organizations working to save the women and children.
“Neither the Iraqi government, nor the international charities or other countries are helping us to save the Yazidi girls,” said al-Qaidi. Contraband photos of captives offer families a thread of hope that they might see them again. But they are also used by ISIS to sell them on Telegram and, to a lesser degree, WhatsApp and Facebook, according to an activist who asked to remain unnamed for fear of his safety. The activist, showed AP negotiations for the captives in real time on WhatsApp and Telegram, in private chats that cannot be read by outside eyes.
Facebook-owned WhatsApp and Telegram use end-to-end encryption to protect users’ privacy. Both have said they consider protecting private conversations and data paramount, and that they cannot access users’ content. Telegram says it will remove illegal public content “when deemed appropriate.” WhatsApp can, under its terms of service, ban a phone number if it believes the user has submitted illegal content. “Telegram is extremely popular in the Middle East, among other regions,” said Telegram spokesman Markus Ra when asked about ISIS use of its app. “This, unfortunately, includes the more marginal elements and the broadest law-abiding masses alike.” He said the company is committed to prevent abuse and routinely removes public channels used by ISIS that have been reported by users. Mark Steinfeld, a spokesman for WhatsApp, said, “We have zero tolerance for this type of behavior and disable accounts when provided with evidence of activity that violates our terms. We encourage people to use our reporting tools if they encounter this type of behavior.”The captives’ odds of rescue grow slimmer each day. Even when ISIS retreat from towns like Ramadi or Fallujah, the missing girls are nowhere to be found among the thousands of newly liberated civilians. Kurdistan’s besieged regional government has slowed reimbursement to families who have paid off smugglers or ransom demands, Andrew Slater of the Yazidi advocacy group Yazda said. “Rescues are slowing, they’re going to stop. People are running out of money, I have dozens of families who are tens of thousands of dollars in debt,” Slater said. “There are still thousands of women and kids in captivity but it’s getting harder and harder to get them out.”

Thousands gather to mourn victims of Baghdad blast
By AFP Baghdad Wednesday, 6 July 2016/Thousands of Iraqis gathered Wednesday at the site of a Baghdad bombing that killed at least 250 people to mourn the dead and express solidarity with those stricken by the blast. A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-rigged vehicle in Baghdad's Karrada district early Sunday as it teemed with shoppers ahead of the holiday marking the end of the holy Muslim fasting month of Ramadan, sparking infernos in nearby buildings. The street running between the charred remains of buildings burned in the attack claimed by the ISIS militant group was packed with people on Wednesday, some carrying Iraqi flags, others holding candles. Many wept and beat their chests in mourning for the dead. "We came from all the areas of Baghdad to stand in solidarity with the people of Karrada and the martyrs of Karrada," said Haider Mohammed Hassan, one of those gathered at the bomb site. "The Christian community in Iraq, especially in Baghdad, gathered to visit this sorrowful site," Adel Kanna said. "I ask God to give patience and fortitude to the families of the martyrs," he said. Some Christians held pictures of the Virgin Mary, while uniformed members of Asaib Ahl al-Haq carried flags of the Shiite militia force. Health Minister Adila Hamoud told AFP that the bombing killed 250 people and wounded 200. A police colonel and an interior ministry official both gave even higher death tolls for the attack.Hamoud said that DNA testing would be required to identify more than half of the bodies and that the process was expected to take from 15 to 45 days, meaning that relatives of the missing may have to wait weeks to learn the fates of their loved ones. The blast sparked widespread anger among Iraqis, some of whom have accused the government of not doing enough to protect them. And it has overshadowed what would normally be a joyful holiday, instead turning it into a time of mourning and sadness. ISIS overran large areas north and west of Baghdad in 2014, but Iraqi forces have since regained significant territory from the militants.In response to the battlefield setbacks, the group has hit back against civilians, and experts have warned there may be more bombings as the militants continue to lose ground.

‘I believe in Hillary Clinton,’ Obama tells voters
AFP, Charlotte Wednesday, 6 July 2016/Barack Obama delivered a forceful plea for Hillary Clinton to succeed him as president, praising the character of his former secretary of state whose horizon brightened after the FBI recommended no charges be filed over her email scandal. Obama, returning to a swing state that helped elect him in 2008, laid out a passionate, compelling case declaring he is "ready to pass the baton" to Clinton and urging voters to make her the nation's first female commander in chief. "I'm here today because I believe in Hillary Clinton," Obama told a fired-up crowd at a rally in Charlotte, North Carolina, pumping his fist and leading chants of "Hillary! Hillary!""There has never been any man or woman more qualified for this office. Ever!" But Obama's debut appearance on the 2016 campaign trail, while it showcased his trademark oratory and communication skills, was overshadowed by the extraordinary announcement hours earlier in Washington. The FBI's assessment, which found that Clinton was "extremely careless" in sending classified information via her personal email account, was far from the complete exoneration she had hoped for as she rallied Democrats in her showdown with Republican Donald Trump. Clinton and Obama flew together to North Carolina aboard Air Force One for the first in a series of high-profile rallies that the candidate hopes will energize voters -- particularly minorities who remain enamored with the outgoing president, in crucial battleground states where the November election will be decided. Neither made any mention of the FBI's bombshell decision to recommend that Justice Department prosecutors file no criminal charges in the Clinton email investigation. FBI Director James Comey said that after an exhaustive probe, carried out with no political agenda, investigators found no evidence of "intentional misconduct" by Clinton or her close aides.Clinton spokesman Brian Fallon said the campaign was "pleased" by the FBI's recommendation. But in a damaging rebuke to the former top diplomat, Comey said the FBI found that Clinton and her team "were extremely careless in their handling of very sensitive, highly classified information."
'She was guilty'
Comey's conclusion that Clinton sent and receive information that was deemed classified, and in some cases top secret, contradicts her repeated assertion that she never sent classified information through her personal email account or homebrew server. While not as legally damaging as prosecution would be, Comey's judgment is far from the all-clear that the Clinton team would have hoped for. And the FBI accusations of carelessness fueled Trump's narrative that the Clintons have operated above the law for years. "She was guilty, and it turned out that we're not going to press charges. It's really amazing," Trump said in North Carolina, where he held a competing rally in Raleigh. "Today is the best evidence ever that we've seen that our system is absolutely, totally rigged," he said, adding that Clinton "is laughing at the stupidity of our system."The billionaire reality TV star said the former top US diplomat should not be eligible to seek high office due to her handling of work emails while at the State Department's helm. "This, again, disqualifies her from service. And just think of it. I mean, how can you have this?" Trump asked. "We know now that these deletions include emails that were work related and one big, fat, beautiful lie by crooked Hillary. Any government employee who engaged in this kind of behavior would be barred from handling classified information," Trump argued. With just three weeks until the Democratic convention formally anoints Clinton as the party nominee, other Republicans have also seized on the email case to highlight her perceived lack of trustworthiness among voters. House Speaker Paul Ryan slammed Clinton for "recklessly mishandling" classified information and saying Comey's announcement defies explanation."Based upon the director's own statement, it appears damage is being done to the rule of law," warned the top Republican.
'Couldn't be prouder'
The former first lady already came under recent fire after it emerged that her husband Bill met briefly with Attorney General Loretta Lynch at an airport in Arizona last week -- prompting Republicans to cry foul over possible government interference with the probe.
Clinton meanwhile sought to reset her campaign with her joint appearance with Obama and move on from the controversy. The president is at his highest approval rating in years and can still rally the Democratic base, crucial for Clinton whose popularity is deep in the red, as is Trump's. Obama proved her all-too-capable attack dog, tearing into Trump and labelling the provocative billionaire as an untested, impatient blowhard without the temperament for the Oval Office. "Everybody can tweet, but nobody actually knows what it takes to do the job until you sit behind the desk," Obama said in a swipe at Trump's propensity to fire out his reactions on Twitter. Appealing to working American families, the president warned: "The other side's got nothing to offer you."Trump hit back, calling Obama's return to the campaign trail "a carnival act" and derided him as a president "who doesn't know what the hell he's doing."But Obama, looking relaxed and confident on stage, insisted Clinton was the way forward. "The bottom line is, I know Hillary can do the job," he said. "I couldn't be prouder of the things we've done together, but I'm ready to pass the baton," Obama said. "And I know that Hillary Clinton is going to take it."

Turkey launches manhunt for airport attack suspects near Syria
By Reuters Istanbul Wednesday, 6 July 2016
Turkish authorities are seeking two suspected ISIS militants thought to be linked to last week’s Istanbul airport attack and believed to be in hiding near the border with Syria, a Turkish newspaper said on Wednesday. Turkey has jailed a total 30 suspects pending trial over the triple suicide bombing at Ataturk Airport, which killed 45 people and wounded hundreds, the deadliest in a series of bombings this year in Turkey. Turkish officials are not commenting on reports about the investigation, although one government official has said the attackers were Russian, Uzbek and Kyrgyz nationals. President Tayyip Erdogan has said Islamic State militants from the former Soviet Union were behind the attack.On Tuesday he described the Sunni hardline group as a “dagger plunged into the chest of Muslims”. The pro-government Yeni Safak newspaper said two ISIS suspects were believed to be hiding in woodland in the Yayladagi area of Turkey’s southern Hatay province and could be planning to change their appearance and joint rebel groups in Syria. It said they were from Dagestan, a mainly Muslim province of Russia’s North Caucasus region. The paper did not identify its sources for the story. “Security and intelligence units have taken top level measures in the area to capture the terrorists given the possibility that they could cross into Syria,” it said. Other members of the same ISIS team had fled to the Kilis and Gaziantep areas further east and were hiding there, while militants from the Caucasus were using fake identity papers and were receiving support from ISIS cells, it said.
Eid Al-Fitr attacks
The Istanbul bombing was followed by major attacks in Bangladesh, Iraq and Saudi Arabia in the past week, all apparently timed for the run-up to Eid al-Fitr, the holiday marking the end of the Ramadan holy fasting month. “Using sacred Islam's name, exploiting it, this terrorist group which spills Muslim blood has gone as far as attacking the town where the mosque and blessed remains of our Prophet are located,” Erdogan said in a speech on Tuesday. “Daesh is a dagger plunged into the chest of Muslims. Whoever gives support to this group, whether out of sectarian fanaticism or another motive, commits the same sin,” he said, using an Arabic acronym for ISIS. Interior Minister Efkan Ala said on Tuesday that 15 of 30 people remanded in custody were foreigners from various countries. Yeni Safak said all 11 of the foreign suspects jailed on Tuesday were Russian nationals, while four of the 13 suspects remanded in custody on Sunday were foreigners. In last week’s attack, three bombers opened fire to create panic outside the airport before two of them got inside and blew themselves up. The third militant detonated his explosives outside at the entrance to the international arrivals terminal. The Kremlin said on Wednesday it believed the Istanbul airport attack could be a result of Turkish and European security services ignoring Moscow's signals about suspected terrorists hiding in Turkey and Europe. “Over the past many years, the Russian side... has informed our Turkish and European colleagues that persons suspected of being linked to terrorism... find shelter both in Turkey and in a number of other European countries,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters. “In most cases such signals from the Russian side have not been given proper attention or any reaction by our colleagues. To our regret, these (Istanbul attacks) can be a consequence of such disregard.” Moscow says that thousands of Russian citizens and citizens of other former Soviet states have joined ISIS, travelling through Turkey to reach Syria. Russia fought two wars against Chechen separatists in the North Causcasus in the 1990s, and more recently has fought Islamist insurgents in Dagestan. Russia and Turkey have been at odds over Moscow’s support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Turkey’s backing of rebels opposed to him, especially since last year when Turkey shot down a Russian warplane near the border.
But recent weeks have seen a thaw in relations between the two countries, with both citing a need to bury their differences to fight the common ISIS foe.

Iraq PM accepts interior minister's resignation
AFP, Baghdad Wednesday, 6 July 2016/Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has accepted the interior minister's resignation, which he tendered following a Baghdad bombing that killed at least 250, an official in the premier's office said Wednesday.
Interior Minister Mohammed Ghabban criticized the security system as fundamentally flawed and said he could no longer accept responsibility for the consequences, calling for a series of changes that would ultimately increase the ministry's power. An official in Abadi's office, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told AFP that the premier had accepted Ghabban's resignation. Iraqi media also reported that Abadi had accepted the resignation, but the premier did not issue an official statement on the matter. A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-rigged vehicle in Baghdad's Karrada district early on Sunday as it teemed with shoppers ahead of the holiday marking the end of the holy Muslim fasting month of Ramadan, sparking infernos in nearby buildings. The attack, which was claimed by the ISIS jihadist group, was one of the deadliest ever carried out in the country. ISIS overran large areas north and west of Baghdad in 2014, but Iraqi forces have since regained significant territory from the jihadists. In response to the battlefield setbacks, the group has hit back against civilians, and experts have warned there may be more bombings as the jihadists continue to lose ground.

US condemns Israel’s planned new settler homes
AFP, Washington Wednesday, 6 July 2016/The United States on Tuesday criticized Israel’s plans to build 560 new settler homes in the West Bank, warning that they would be part of “systematic” land seizures undermining chances for peace. Israel’s green light for the homes came days after a key report from the diplomatic Quartet - the United States, European Union, United Nations and Russia - warned that Israel’s settlement expansion and confiscation of Palestinian land were eroding the possibility of a two-state peace settlement. Completion of the homes would “be the latest step in what seems to be a systematic process of land seizures, settlement expansions and legalization of outposts that is fundamentally undermining the prospects for a two-state solution,” State Department spokesman John Kirby said. “We oppose steps like these, which we believe are counterproductive to the cause of peace in general,” he told a briefing. Under new approval granted by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman, planning for 560 new Jewish homes in the large Maale Adumim settlement east of Jerusalem will be allowed to move forward. The settlement, founded in 1975, already has a population of more than 37,000.The approval follows calls inside Israel for a harsh response to the latest spate of Palestinian attacks. On Thursday, 13-year-old Israeli-American Hallel Yaffa Ariel was fatally stabbed in Kiryat Arba settlement on the outskirts of the flashpoint West Bank city of Hebron. Her 19-year-old Palestinian assailant was then shot dead by a security guard. A day later, Sarah Tarayra, 27, was shot dead after drawing a knife on Israeli forces in Hebron. She was a relative of the Kiryat Arba attacker.The Quartet report also called on Palestinians to halt attacks and incitement to violence. Peace talks have been at a complete standstill since a US-led initiative collapsed in April 2014.

US to keep 8,400 troops in Afghanistan into 2017: Obama
AFP, Washington Wednesday, 6 July 2016/President Barack Obama announced Wednesday that 8,400 US troops will remain in Afghanistan into 2017 in light of the still "precarious" security situation in the war-ravaged country. "Instead of going down to 5,500 troops by the end of this year, the United States will maintain approximately 8,400 troops in Afghanistan into next year through the end of my administration," Obama told a news conference. "The decision I'm making today ensures my successor has a solid foundation for continued progress in Afghanistan, as well as the flexibility to address the threat of terrorism as it evolves," he said. The current number of US troops in Afghanistan is 9,800. Obama's announcement is further acknowledgement that Afghan security forces, who took charge of the country's security in 2015, are still not ready to go it alone. They have suffered a devastating string of setbacks at the hands of the Taliban, including the temporary loss of the city of Kunduz, and more than 5,000 Afghan troops were killed last year alone. Other organizations, including the ISIS group, have also stepped up activity. "The security situation in Afghanistan remains precarious," Obama said. "Even as they improve, Afghan security forces are still not as strong as they need to be. With our help, they're still working to improve critical capabilities, such as intelligence, logistics, aviation and command and control." Obama's decision comes after General John Nicholson, the new commander of the US-led NATO mission in Afghanistan, this year conducted a review of the security situation. Republican Senator John McCain, a longtime critic of Obama's military policies, praised the move, but said the president should have kept the entire 9,800 US troops in country. Still, he said, "the decision to retain 8,400 US troops in Afghanistan into next year is certainly preferable to cutting those forces by nearly half."

Egypt considers retaliating for Italy’s decision to cut military supplies
By Reuters Cairo Thursday, 7 July 2016/Egypt said on Wednesday it was considering retaliating against Italy for halting military supplies to protest the killing of an Italian student earlier this year. Italy’s Senate voted last week to halt supplies to Egypt of spare parts for F16 warplanes, the first commercial steps taken against Cairo since the death of Giulio Regeni. Regeni, who was doing postgraduate research on Egyptian trade unions, was last seen by his friends on Jan. 25. His body, which showed signs of torture, was found in a roadside ditch on the outskirts of Cairo on Feb. 3. Italy has repeatedly complained that Egyptian authorities have not cooperated to find those responsible for the 28-year-old student's death. In April, it withdrew its ambassador to Egypt for consultations. Egypt’s foreign ministry said the senate vote would hurt cooperation between the two countries. “We regret the decision and are considering taking similar measures that affect areas of cooperation with Italy,” a foreign ministry statement said. The statement did not specify the exact measures, but it said they would “affect bilateral, regional and international cooperation between Italy and Egypt”. That would include “a review of ongoing cooperation in combatting illegal immigration in the Mediterranean and dealing with the situation in Libya.”Italy was Egypt’s fourth-largest trade partner in terms of both imports and exports in 2015, according to Egypt’s official statistics agency, CAMPAS.

Latest LCCC Bulletin analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on July 06-07/16

MECHRIC Condemns Ongoing Genocide of Christians - From Middle East to Europe
2200 Pennsylvania Av. NW
4th Floor East
Washington D.C. 20037
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/2016/07/06/42768/
WASHINGTON DC - On June 27th, the Christian town of Al Qaa in northeastern Lebanon, a few miles from the Syrian border, was the target of eight suicide bombers. This attack resulted in the killing of at least five people and wounding eleven. The population of Al Qaa consists of an estimated 12,000 Christians from the Melkite (Greek) Catholic Church.
Since the beginning of the civil war in Syria, many have fled to Lebanon. After the attacks, several towns near Al Qaa announced curfews for Syrian refugees out of fear that militants could be hiding among them.
Europe now faces increasing threats from Islamists who disguise themselves as refugees, and await opportunities to carry out terrorist actions.
In order to prevent further growth of terrorism in modern and democratic societies, terrorism has to be fought at its source. If we cannot end terrorism in the Middle East, terrorism will not be beaten. Local moderate forces and local moderate people, such as Middle Eastern Christians, have to be empowered to assist in defeating terrorism. Without multi-ethnic and multi-religious policies,discrimination, persecution and genocidal massacres against religious minorities will continue to plague the region.
On June 30th, a Coptic Priest, Father Paul Halim was killed outside the Church of the Martyr of St. George in Sinai, Egypt. Father Paul Halim was shot dead while returning from prayers.
Since the Arab Spring in 2011, the Coptic Christian community in Egypt has become a target for Islamist groups. From 2011 to-date , and in addition to 70 churches and over 1,000 Christian homes attacked and burnt in August 2013, at least 50 churches have been closed in Egypt due to attacks or threats from Islamists. Copts also suffered the most barbaric killing of 20 Egyptian Copts and the 1 Ghanaian captured with them who were beheaded on a Libyan beach last year by the Islamic State. Attacks by Islamist mobs on Copts, under the complacent watch of the Egyptian authorities, are becoming more routine.
We the undersigned members of Middle East Christian Committee (MECHRIC) are concerned about the plight of Christians in the Middle East. Christians have been deeply troubled by the anarchic crisis caused by the invasion and occupation of Mosul and the Nineveh Plain in Iraq, in addition to the Khabur Valley, Al-Quaryatayn, Saddad and other Christian cities in Syria by the Islamic State (IS).
We call on the International Community, US Administration, European Union and Russian Federation to mount an immediate and decisive response to the need for self-defense and self-administration of Christian in the Middle East.
The current situation in Middle Eastern countries has become tragic for the Christians as they face the risk of extinction in the land which is the cradle of civilization. If the Western World desires that Christians be part of the Middle East community in the future, those powers must act now to save them.
The World Maronite Union
Coptic Solidarity International
American Mesopotamian Organization (AMO)
American Melkite Committee
Bethnahrin Patriotic Union Iraq
Syriac National Council of Syria
Federation of Syriac Associations in Turkey
Universal Syriac Union Party Lebanon
European Syriac Union
Bethnahrin Women Union
Suryoyo American Association
For more information, please contact:
Tom Harb : Contactmechric@gmail.com
 

Will IS attacks bring about change in Saudi foreign policy?
Giorgio Cafiero/Al-Monitor/July 06/15
Throughout the holy month of Ramadan, the Islamic State (IS) and its worldwide followers were especially deadly. The recent attacks in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Jordan, Malaysia, Turkey and Yemen signal shifts in IS’ strategy toward an accelerated global campaign following the group’s loss of Fallujah last month and the ongoing battle over Sirte.IS’ campaign to wreak havoc in Saudi Arabia likely reached a new level July 4. IS is suspected of carrying out three separate suicide attacks across the kingdom within 24 hours, including one next to the al-Masjid an-Nabawi (the Prophet’s Mosque) in Medina following the earlier attacks in Qatif and Jeddah. In total, the explosions killed four (excluding the suicide bombers) — a relatively low death toll compared with the 200 dead from IS’ July 3 blast in Baghdad. Nonetheless, the coordinated strikes demonstrated IS’ ability to outsmart Riyadh’s vigilant security apparatus despite the 2,500 alleged IS members arrested in the kingdom since 2014.
Of course, IS has had its eyes set on Saudi Arabia since an early point in the group’s rise to power. In November 2014, IS’ leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared war on the kingdom in a statement released by al-Furqan Media Foundation. The IS leader called for expanding the “caliphate” to Saudi Arabia to topple the Al Saud rulers (whom he called “the serpent’s head”) of the “lands of al-Haramain” (two holy places). For nearly two years, IS has been waging terror across Saudi Arabia via networks of local militants operating a network of terror cells. From November 2014 to June 2016, the group’s affiliates have carried out 26 terrorist attacks in the kingdom, according to the Saudi Interior Ministry.
Yet the July 4 attacks represent unique and especially grave threats to the kingdom for several important reasons. First, the ruling family’s religious legitimacy is based on the Saudi rulers’ service as a responsible and competent “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques” (every Saudi monarch’s official title since 1986). There is a widely held perception throughout the Muslim world that since the historic Grand Mosque seizure of 1979, the scores of fires, stampedes, demonstrations and one bombing (1989) have proven that the Al Sauds are unfit to uphold their responsibility. The July 4 suicide blast outside the al-Masjid an-Nabawi in Medina is deeply unsettling for Muslims worldwide who travel by the millions to the holy site each year, and it is damaging to the kingdom’s prestige. Unquestionably, the explosion in Medina, an offense to Sunni and Shiite Muslims, will add to this narrative told by many of Al Saud’s enemies.
It will be important to monitor the Iranian response. Since last year’s tragic hajj stampede, in which 464 Iranian pilgrims died (according to Iranian sources), officials in the Islamic Republic have seized opportunities to challenge the Al Saud rulers’ legitimacy as Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, alleging negligence on the part of Saudi authorities. A growing number of Iranian politicians and religious authorities are calling for the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to manage the hajj. After news of last year’s stampede reached Iran, Ayatollah Mohammad Emami Kashani declared, “Hajj is not only related to Saudi Arabia, but is connected to all countries. The ones now who have been martyred are from all Islamic countries, not only from Saudi Arabia.”
Second, the failure of Saudi security to thwart IS’ July 4 attacks is costly to Deputy Crown Prince and Defense Minister Mohammed bin Salman and his Vision 2030. On the heels of Mohammed’s visits to Washington, California, New York and Paris, in which the young deputy crown prince sought to attract American and French support for his ambitious plans to diversify the Saudi economy away from oil, foreign investors will raise serious questions about security risks of doing business in the kingdom. As Vision 2030 seeks to expand Saudi Arabia’s tourism sector, the kingdom must sell itself as stable to attract a greater number of foreign visitors. The security apparatuses’ failure to prevent IS from continuing its campaign of terror in Saudi Arabia will dim such prospects.
Third, IS’ orchestration of three coordinated attacks across the kingdom within 24 hours is a setback to Crown Prince and Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef. Since last year, the “Prince of Counterterrorism” has been busy leading Saudi Arabia’s anti-terrorism crackdown public relations campaign. Although the Saudi media has highlighted numerous instances in which security forces foiled IS terror plots and made a major production out of the mass execution of dozens of alleged al-Qaeda members in early January, Nayef must address holes in the kingdom’s counterterrorism campaign and pursue new strategies.
The Saudis go to great pains to provide airtight security around the holy sites, having invested billions of dollars in state-of-the-art surveillance. Although the Saudi press heralded the security forces for preventing the suicide bomber from attacking the Prophet’s Tomb, the mere fact that an IS militant with explosives got so close to al-Masjid an-Nabawi, Islam’s second-holiest site, is a wake-up call about inefficiencies in security.
It will be interesting to observe any changes in King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud’s foreign policy priorities. Will Riyadh shift focus from its war against Yemen’s Houthi rebels and loyalists of former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to the battle against Sunni Islamist extremists in the Levant and Libya? Although Saudi officials have vowed to deploy ground forces to fight IS in Syria if backed by Washington, would more attacks by the extremist group targeting the kingdom’s holy sites prompt Riyadh to engage in direct military action against IS in Raqqa without US support?
The reaction from the kingdom’s religious establishment will be an important indicator of how Saudi Arabia addresses the IS threat. As most of the group’s previous attacks in the kingdom targeted security in Saudi Arabia’s central region of Najd and Shiite gatherings in the Eastern Province, the first IS strike at a holy site carried much symbolism. The Council of Senior Ulema issued a statement declaring that the culprits behind the explosion outside the second mosque built in the history of Islam “have no respect for any sanctity and they have no religion or conscience.”
Indeed, within the context of Saudi Arabia’s history of jihadi terrorism, which beset the kingdom from 2003 to 2006, the killing of four security guards and no civilians is a relatively low death toll. Nonetheless, it would be difficult to exaggerate the symbolic significance of the July 4 attack in three Saudi cities. IS is trying to damage the Al Saud rulers’ capacity to govern the kingdom and the family’s religious legitimacy throughout the Muslim world.
The violence illustrates a disturbing reality for the Saudi leadership. Despite the efforts of officials in Riyadh to thwart extremist groups from waging acts of terrorism within the kingdom, IS has further demonstrated its capacity to evade the Saudi security apparatus’ radar. Dark memories of al-Qaeda’s campaign of terror in the mid-2000s remain vivid in the minds of many Saudis. A decade later, justifiable concerns about another potential onslaught of jihadi attacks wreaking havoc across Saudi Arabia are growing.

What wave of suicide attacks means for Riyadh's anti-terror efforts
Bruce Riedel/Al-Monitor/July 06/15
King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud has a long-established record of leading popular campaigns to raise funds for Islamic causes. Saudi Arabia has been accused of poor oversight of such funding with some money ending up in terrorist hands. It has made considerable progress on this issue, but more still needs to be done. The three bomb attacks July 4 should encourage the king to take tougher measures to combat terrorism funding at home.In December 1967, King Faisal created the Popular Committee for Support of Martyrs, Families and Mujahedeen in Palestine in the aftermath of the Six-Day War. He choose his half-brother, Prince Salman, who was already the governor of Riyadh, to chair the committee. At first, the committee raised a modest $5 million a year, but by 1978, that had doubled to $10 million. In 1982, during the civil war in Lebanon, it spiked to $45 million. The king remains the committee chairman today and has contributed considerable funds himself, including a check for $100,000 in 2001 for the family of Muhammad al-Durrah, the 12-year-old whose death in the second intifada sparked outrage in the Arab world.
In 1980, King Khalid turned to Prince Salman to chair fundraising for the Afghan mujahedeen fighting the Russians. In the early years of the Afghan war, Salman's fundraising exceeded the government funding covertly coming from the CIA and Saudi intelligence. Without the private Saudi money, the mujahedeen might have been contained by Moscow before Washington and Riyadh upped their official but secret financial help. Salman raised as much as $25 million a month. Three American presidents — Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush — encouraged the Saudi financial support.
In the 1990s, Prince Salman was deeply involved in raising funds for Bosnia and its struggle with Serbia. In 1996, Salman visited Bosnia and Herzegovina to distribute money raised for the Muslims and raise awareness for their cause in the kingdom.
The 911 Commission criticized Saudi Arabia for tolerating fundraising for terrorists. While it reported finding no evidence of any official Saudi support for al-Qaeda nor evidence that "senior Saudi officials" funded al-Qaeda, it did conclude that "al-Qaeda found fertile fund-raising ground in Saudi Arabia where extreme religious views are common and charitable giving was both essential to the culture and subject to very little oversight." The report found similar issues in the other Gulf states.
Since 2003, when al-Qaeda began attacking targets inside Saudi Arabia and called for the overthrow of the monarchy, oversight on charitable contributions has much improved. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef deserves much of the credit for this. The US Treasury Department has commended the Saudis for doing a tougher job of ensuring money doesn't get to terrorist organizations. Last year, for example, the Treasury and the Saudis moved jointly against an organization, al-Furqan, in the kingdom that had a long history of funding al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba. This year, more groups were added to the list of proscribed fundraisers. Nonetheless, Hillary Clinton is right to call for even more stringent measures by the Gulf states to ensure charitable contributions don't wind up in the wrong hands. Her statements have brought predictable complaints from Saudi Arabia, but she is wise to keep up the momentum.
The attacks in Jeddah, Qatif and Medina on July 4 add to the urgency of financial controls. The attack at the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina is especially provocative. It is a direct assault on the king’s claim to be the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, a key source of his legitimacy. Coming on the eve of Eid, it is a declaration of war. Osama bin Laden refrained from attacking the holy sites during the insurrection he ordered a decade ago. The other two attacks — on the US Consulate in Jeddah and a Shiite mosque in Qatif — have been done before. Still, staging multiple attacks across the Arabian Peninsula on one day is impressive. While thankfully the casualties were relatively low, this is the worst wave of violence against the kingdom at home in a decade. It suggests an infrastructure has developed inside the country despite Nayef’s years of tough counterterrorism measures. Washington should put all its resources available behind the fight against terror in Saudi Arabia, but it should also put renewed emphasis on financial oversight.

How new alliance among Iraq's Kurds might actually deepen divisions
Mohammed A. Salih/Al-Monitor/July 06/15
ERBIL, Iraq — Often touted as the main beneficiaries of Iraq's post-Saddam Hussein order, the Kurds obtained political recognition for their autonomous region in the country's 2005 constitution and have played what sometimes appears to be an outsized role in Iraqi politics. In key elections in 2005 and 2010, the Kurds' unity landed them the role of kingmakers, deciding who would get to sit in the coveted prime minister's office. Today, however, that unity appears to be history. The Kurds are now so fragmented that they apparently cannot agree on how to deal with the Baghdad government, jeopardizing their stature and position in the country.An alliance formed in mid-May by two of Iraqi Kurdistan's main parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran, has had the ironic effect of bringing Kurdish differences to the surface. The rifts among the Kurdish groups originally stemmed primarily from disagreement over governance in Kurdistan and the failure to devise a viable power-sharing arrangement. Disappointed by what they viewed as unilateralism on the part of the hitherto dominant Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the PUK and Gorran signed a deal to join forces and form an alliance to be reckoned with in Kurdistan and in Baghdad. The PUK-Gorran bloc, with 30 seats in the Iraqi parliament, is larger than the KDP's, which has 28 parliamentarians — 3 of whom represent (Christian and Shabak) minorities.
The growing state of Kurdish division has now given birth to the PUK and Gorran perhaps seeking to assert themselves and their preferences not only in Kurdistan, but also in Kurdish relations with Baghdad. With regard to the latter, the PUK and Gorran are in favor of a more reconciliatory approach, while the KDP — whose leader, Massoud Barzani, is the de facto president of the Kurdish region — insists that Kurdish-Baghdad relations are at a dead end and the Kurds should part ways with Iraq.
“We favor dialogue to resolve the disputes with Baghdad,” Shwan Dawudi, a PUK member of the Iraqi parliament, told Al-Monitor. “We [and Gorran] will, from now on, work as one bloc. [We] want to move things forward and play a positive role in settling the disputes.”
The PUK-Gorran agreement was facilitated by the KDP's humiliating treatment of Gorran. In October 2015, after KDP offices came under attack by protesters in Sulaimaniyah, Gorran's stronghold, the KDP prevented Gorran's Yousif Mohammed Sadiq, speaker of the Kurdistan parliament, from entering Erbil, the Kurdish capital, to carry out his duties. That same month, the KDP also dismissed five Gorran ministers in a Cabinet shuffle.
Furious about the changed circumstances, Gorran negotiated a deal with the PUK, a once-powerful partner in the Kurdistan government and KDP ally. The PUK's popularity had suffered considerably after a group of its leaders split from the party, supposedly because of disagreements over how the PUK was run, to form Gorran in 2009. Now the PUK hopes to regain its past influence by allying with Gorran.
Although fissures in Kurdish ranks are nothing new and the Kurdish parties have had disagreements in recent years over various issues — such as dealing with the Syrian crisis, Baghdad and local governance — handling Kurdish relations with Baghdad had until recently largely been the domain of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which the KDP dominates. The KRG and Baghdad have been engaged in a longstanding disagreement over the KRG's handling of energy resources and disputed territories scattered over Kirkuk and Ninevah provinces.
“Now the KRG is semi-paralyzed, and there is no institution to monitor it after the parliament was rendered dysfunctional by the KDP. Its decisions represent the KDP, and its relations with Baghdad are according to the KDP's interests and preferences,” Kawa Mohammed, a prominent Gorran member of the Iraqi parliament, told Al-Monitor. “The KDP needs to act wisely and step forward so that Kurdish parties can agree on how to deal with crucial issues, including relations with Baghdad.” In addition, given that the International Monetary Fund is expected to give a $5.4 billion loan to Iraq, Mohammed said, the KRG should mend ties with Baghdad so it can receive a portion of the funds to help address its severe budget deficit.
In recent weeks in Kurdistan, however, events took a dramatic turn when Gorran rejected a June 23 call by Barzani for a meeting of all Kurdish parties to discuss preparations for a referendum on Kurdish independence from Iraq. Gorran claims no longer to recognize Barzani as KRG president following the controversial extension of his tenure in August 2015. Meanwhile, the KDP refuses to acknowledge the Gorran-PUK alliance, which it sees as a threat as the largest political bloc in Kurdistan. The KDP has repeatedly said it is willing to sit down with Gorran and the PUK separately, but not a joint delegation.
Trying to assert their newfound weight, members of a Gorran-PUK delegation met with senior Iraqi officials June 25 in Baghdad. The KDP used the opportunity to attack the two parties in the media, accusing them of deviating from the Kurdish position toward Baghdad.
“Iraq is in no better shape than us. What would encourage us to go back to Baghdad to seek their assistance?” Renas Jano, a KDP member of the Iraqi parliament, said to Al-Monitor. Jano believes internal Kurdish divisions do not justify returning to Baghdad, citing historical examples of previous deals between Kurds and Baghdad that have collapsed.
Acknowledging the current deadlock in Iraqi Kurdistan's politics, Jano believes the KDP should use the Gorran-PUK alliance as an opportunity “to work out a new agreement” on how to handle various challenges. If the new alliance insists on approaching Baghdad outside KRG official policy, it would effectively split Kurdish decision-making and undermine the Kurds' position vis-a-vis the national government.
As a result of a Kurdish civil war, Iraqi Kurdistan was divided into two separate zones from the mid-1990s to mid-2000s. Thus, the chances of a physical separation cannot be dismissed if the PUK-Gorran alliance and the KDP continue to pull away from each other.
With the Islamic State (IS) on a downward trajectory in Iraq, various actors are vying for influence in the post-IS order. While the Kurds' unity ensured their remarkable gains after the collapse of Saddam's regime, their current fragmentation might adversely affect their standing and gains in post-IS Iraq.
“Unless Kurdish leaders set aside their personal egos and rivalries for the sake of a greater Kurdish cause, the post-IS era could be disastrous for the Kurds on the national and international levels, [as] the international community will lose the current level of interest in the Kurdistan Region once IS is gone,” Yerevan Saeed, a Kurdish affairs analyst, told Al-Monitor. “The Sunnis are crushed in Iraq, and you have powerful [predominantly Shiite] Popular Mobilization Units backed by Iran, and the Iraqi government backed by both Iran and the United States, and they will pose serious threats to the current status of riginals/2016/07/iraq-kurdistan-division-puk-gorran-deal-kdp.html#ixzz4Df2LvdbS

Can the Palestinians Hold Free and Fair Elections?
Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/July 06/16
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8365/palestinians-free-fair-elections
Even as Hamas continues to resist Fatah demands to relinquish control over the Gaza Strip, Hamas representatives could easily win elections in several West Bank cities and villages, especially in the Hebron area, where the Islamist movement is considered more popular than the Fatah faction. Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah have yet to recover from their recent defeat by Hamas at Bir Zeit University's student council election in April.
The decision to hold the municipal elections was announced at a time when the West Bank is witnessing increasing lawlessness among Palestinians, and Palestinian Authority security forces seem to be losing control.
Holding elections without Hamas's participation, will risk further consolidating the split between the West Bank and Gaza Strip -- and reinforcing the reality that the Palestinians already have two separate mini-states.
The current mayhem plaguing West Bank cities, villages and refugee camps will not help in holding any free and fair elections.
The Palestinian Authority's recent decision to hold municipal elections on October 8 has sparked fear among Palestinians that the move will lead to even more security chaos and anarchy, especially in the West Bank. The word on the Palestinian street is that the elections will be anything but fair and free.
The decision to hold new elections was taken during a meeting of the Palestinian Authority (PA) government, headed by Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah, on June 21 in Ramallah. The elections are slated to take place in 407 municipalities -- 382 in the West Bank and 25 in the Gaza Strip.
The last Palestinian local elections were held in 2012, but only in the West Bank. Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, did not participate in those elections. The elections were supposed to be held in 2010, but were delayed for two years because of the continued power struggle between Hamas and Fatah, the ruling faction that dominates the PA in the West Bank.
Hamas has not yet announced its position on the October 8 municipal elections. The Islamic movement's leaders in the Gaza Strip said this week that they were still debating amongst themselves, and consulting with other Palestinian factions concerning the local elections.
In the past, Hamas justified its decision to boycott the elections by citing the Palestinian Authority's ongoing crackdown on Hamas supporters and representatives in the West Bank. This security crackdown, Hamas explained, guaranteed that the elections would not be held in a fair and free climate. "How can any Hamas representative run in the elections when the Palestinian Authority is arresting our men every day in the West Bank," complained a senior Hamas official in the Gaza Strip.
The mounting tensions between the two rival Palestinian parties and the continued PA crackdown on Hamas supporters in the West Bank make it unlikely that the Islamist movement would agree to take part in the October 8 vote.
Following the Palestinian Authority government's announcement that the elections will be held in October, Hamas said that while it favors the idea, it still has many questions regarding the vote. Hamas spokesmen said that their representatives plan to hold further consultations with leaders of various Palestinian factions, including Fatah, "to ensure the success of the elections and to make sure that they constitute a first step towards ending, and not deepening, the crisis between Hamas and Fatah.
The decade-long dispute between Hamas and Fatah is alive and well. The latest attempt to end the war between the two parties, which took place in Qatar earlier this month, ended in complete failure. The two sides have since been trading allegations, holding each other responsible for the collapse of the "reconciliation" talks. The Palestinian public, meanwhile, appears to have lost confidence in both Fatah and Hamas, particularly in wake of previous failed efforts by the Saudis, Egyptians and Qataris to end the power struggle between the two rival parties.
Palestinian political analysts say that the gap between the two sides remains as wide as ever, given that Hamas continues to resist Fatah demands to relinquish control over the Gaza Strip. Moreover, Hamas continues to demand that its employees in the Gaza Strip be added to the Palestinian Authority's payroll. Hamas's refusal to recognize the Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO is also another stumbling block on the way to achieving "reconciliation" between the two sides. The PA insists that if Hamas wants to join a Palestinian unity government, it must honor all agreements signed between the Palestinians and Israel, including the Oslo Accords.
Some Palestinians are convinced that Hamas is anyway not interested in holding new elections, because it does not want to see a democratic process take place in the Gaza Strip.
Ramzi Rabah, a senior member of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), said that he would not be surprised at all if Hamas decides to boycott this year's elections. "Hamas has been hindering the elections for the past nine years," he charged.
"Hamas wants to corrupt the political and democratic process in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is not interested in any elections. The local councils are there to serve the people. Hamas prefers appointments and control by force and this does not serve the interest of the Palestinians."
For the PA, the decision to hold new municipal elections is a gigantic gamble.
First, if Hamas does decide to participate in the election, its representatives could easily win in several Palestinian cities and villages, especially in the Hebron area in the southern West Bank, where Hamas has a wide following and is considered more popular than the Palestinian Authority and its Fatah faction. So the PA can only hope that Hamas will decide to avoid the vote. A defeat for Fatah in the municipal elections would have repercussions on future elections for the Palestinian parliament and presidency. The last thing that PA President Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah want is a repeat of the Hamas victory in the 2006 parliamentary election.
One man, one vote, one time? Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh (left) and Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas (also president of the Palestinian Authority) are pictured voting in the last election for the Palestinian Legislative Council, which took place in 2006.
Abbas and Fatah have yet to recover from their recent defeat by Hamas in the student council election at Bir Zeit University in the West Bank, in April of this year. Hamas supporters won 25 of the student council seats, as opposed to 21 seats for Fatah. The remaining five seats went to other student groups that are also opposed to Fatah.
Second, the decision to hold the municipal elections was announced at a time when the West Bank is witnessing more and more lawlessness among Palestinians. It seems to some Palestinians that the Palestinian Authority security forces are losing control. Many are worried that the security free-for-all will only increase ahead of the elections, due to heated campaigns and rivalries between different clans and political factions.
The Palestinian territories are filled with weapons; most are being used to settle scores and in family feuds. In one recent violent incident, two Palestinian security officers were gunned down by unidentified assailants in Nablus on June 30. Hours earlier, in a melee that erupted in the town of Ya'bad in the northern West Bank, at least four Palestinians were killed and 15 wounded, seven of them seriously.
After the incidents, Adnan Damiri, spokesman for the PA security forces, admitted that the spread of weapons in the hands of too many Palestinians was helping to drive the security disaster in the West Bank.
A top Fatah official said that the pandemonium in the West Bank signaled the growing weakness of the Palestinian Authority. "How can we talk about free and fair elections when everyone is carrying a pistol and a rifle?" he asked. "The situation has become very dangerous."
Third, Fatah itself is facing severe infighting. Ghassan Shaka'a, the former mayor of Nablus who belongs to one of the city's largest and most influential clans, has accused Fatah members of trying to prevent him from running again in the October elections. Shaka'a's allegations came shortly after unidentified gunmen fired several shots at his home in Nablus. He said that the attempt on his life was in the context of internecine fighting within Fatah. Shaka'a, who is also a senior PLO official, said that the shooting attack on his home would not deter him from running for mayor once again.
The not-so-simmering tensions in Fatah are likely to explode in the weeks before the October elections, as disgruntled young members of the faction say they are considering running as independent candidates. This situation would be a serious challenge to Fatah's official candidates in the election and pave the way for deepening divisions between the old guard and young guard. That is precisely how Hamas won the parliamentary elections in 2006: Fatah members ran as independent candidates, playing directly into the hands of Hamas, which ran as a bloc.
Fourth, by holding the elections without Hamas's participation, the Palestinian Authority will risk further consolidating the split between the West Bank and Gaza Strip -- and reinforcing the reality that the Palestinians already have two separate mini states. "It is inappropriate to hold elections before ending the tragic state of division (between the West Bank and Gaza Strip)," said Nash'at al-Aqtash, who teaches political science at Bir Zeit University. "This will only solidify and legitimize the division."
Noting that no candidate would any dare run as a Hamas representative in the West Bank elections, al-Aqtash also pointed out that Fatah was suffering from divisions that could have "catastrophic repercussions" on its performance. "There are various Fatah groups and camps -- some that support President Abbas and others that support (ousted Fatah official) Mohamed Dahlan," he explained. "Then there are other Fatah groups that are acting independently."
Perhaps, say some Palestinians, this mess, which is the fault of the Palestinian Authority regime, will force its leaders to indefinitely postpone the elections. Regardless of the particular outcome, the PA's dispute with Hamas is only headed towards further escalation. And clearly, the current mayhem plaguing the West Bank cities, villages and refugee camps will not help in holding any free and fair elections -- not for municipalities, parliament or the presidency.
Finally, even if the Palestinian Authority beats the odds and its own history and does hold the elections, the Palestinian street is convinced that its leaders will in any event steal the vote and install their loyalists. What else, they say, would a proper mafia do?
*Khaled Abu Toameh, an award-winning journalist, is based in Jerusalem.
© 2016 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.
 

Is AIPAC a Toothless Tiger After Iran Deal Supporters Survive Unscathed?
Nathan Guttman/Forward/July 06/16
AIPAC never spelled the threat out. But last summer, Congress got the message. Politicians had to decide whether they would vote yay or nay on President Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran, which lifted economic sanctions in exchange for reductions to the country’s nuclear program.
A vote in favor, pro-Israel activists indicated, would be viewed negatively by the lobbying powerhouse.
One year on, the evidence for pro-Israel individuals and groups’ power to wreak revenge is scant.
“Those who argued that support for the Iran deal would harm members of Congress politically miscalculated the mindset of the Democratic base,” said Joel Rubin, who when serving as deputy assistant secretary of state for House affairs worked to win support for the nuclear deal. The Democratic base, he argued, which is the group that actually turns out on primary election day, “is very supportive of diplomacy.”
The pro-Israel lobby enjoys a reputation for considerable power in American politics. Although it does not endorse politicians or fundraise for them, the group’s leadership is made up of major donors who enjoy access to congressional offices and who maintain long-lasting ties with elected officials.
The lobby let politicians know it was watching them by running advertisements in states of key members who could swing the vote, mobilizing donors in “fly ins” to Washington to meet with their representatives, and showering praise on those who opposed the bill, such as New York Sen. Chuck Schumer.
Indeed, as the general election approaches, the deal’s supporters seem to have faced very little political pushback in primary races or in fundraising.
Even Jerry Nadler, who represents the most heavily Jewish district in the country, sailed through a recent primary unscathed.
Nadler’s decision to back the deal came after weeks of pressure from pro-Israel activists to join other Jewish New York politicians, including Schumer and Reps. Steve Israel and Nita Lowey, in opposing the agreement. His primary challenger, Oliver Rosenberg, did his best to cast the race as a showdown over Nadler’s decision.
But Nadler won easily, with nearly nine of 10 voters choosing to keep him as the Democratic candidate. True, Nadler fared poorly among ultra-Orthodox voters in his district, in part because of his Iran vote, but the backlash was not even close to putting a dent in the congressman’s re-election bid.
“For all the talk about this brand of diplomacy being a political third rail, we have not seen any signs of that nationally,” said Ben Shnider, political director of J Street, the left-leaning, pro-Israel lobby that supported the deal. The unsuccessful attempt to play the Iran card in Nadler’s race is “pretty indicative to what we will see in other places,” he added.
Unlike J Street, which has a political action committee, or fundraising arm, that endorses candidates, AIPAC does not endorse or rate candidates for office. A spokesman for AIPAC declined to comment on issues relating to the political future of members who had supported the Iran deal.
As Nadler did, longtime incumbent Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz, the Democratic National Committee chair who decided to back the Iran deal after months of deliberations, is facing the issue in her primary campaign.
Her challenger, Tim Canova, has raised it to try to flip supporters in her heavily Jewish southern Florida district: “She voted for the Iran deal and I’m against the agreement,” Canova told the Forward.
Their primary is August 30; Wasserman Schultz is considered the favorite to win by local commentators.
In Wisconsin, opponents of Democratic challenger Russ Feingold, a Jewish former senator who’s trying to get his seat back, are trying to use his support for the deal against him, even though he wasn’t in office at the time.
Incumbent Ron Johnson is a fierce opponent of the nuclear agreement; Feingold supports it.
“Russ Feingold: wrong on national security,” a Republican TV ad intones after mentioning several of President Obama’s foreign policy failings, including the Iran deal.
Yet polls suggest that Feingold’s support for the deal has not dented support for him; he enjoys a small lead over his Republican rival in a battle that could determine the future control of the Senate. He has also received some big money. thanks, in part, to his position on Iran. JStreetPAC has endorsed Feingold and raised $250,000 for his campaign.
J Street is also raising money for Catherine Cortez Masto, who’s running for Senate from Nevada. The National Republican Senatorial Committee is running ads criticizing her for supporting the agreement. Yet she received a campaign contribution from AIPAC board member Norman Brownstein, despite her position.
The Iran deal, however, could become more important once primary season turns into the general election.
”The nuclear Iran deal remains a pox on incumbent Democrats’ house with the electorate as a whole, but especially in the pro-Israel Jewish community,” said Mark McNulty, spokesman for the Republican Jewish Coalition. The group, he said, “will continue to do what it takes to highlight the extreme mistake of supporting this deal in any way that we believe will make a difference.”
New Hampshire governor Maggie Hassan, who is running as a Democrat for Senate, has already been criticized by supporters of Republican incumbent Kelly Ayotte who opposed the deal. It is also shaping up as a campaign issue in Illinois’s tight Senate race, where incumbent Republican Mark Kirk, one of the strongest opponents of the deal, is facing Democrat Tammy Duckworth, who backed the agreement.
And even if AIPAC couldn’t make examples of any politicians who supported the Iran deal, the lobby still has real power. It has a network of powerful board members, and major donors who maintain close ties with elected officials. Most politicians still turn to them first with questions about Israel, and many pro-Israel donors still try to gauge who’s in favor at AIPAC before they write a check. AIPAC has extensive ties on Capitol Hill and inside every administration.
http://forward.com/news/344143/is-aipac-a-toothless-tiger-after-iran-deal-supporters-survive-unscathed/?utm_content=daily_Newsletter_MainList_Title_Position-1&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Daily%202016-07-06&utm_term=The%20Forward%20Today%

20Monday-Friday
Contact Nathan Guttman at guttman@forward.com or on Twitter, @nathanguttman

MEMRI President Yigal Carmon's Testimony To House Committee On Foreign Affairs, July 6, 2016: Palestinian Authority Support For Imprisoned, Released, And Wounded Terrorists And Families Of 'Martyrs'
Yigal Carmon/MEMRI/July 06/16/Daily Brief No.97
The following is written testimony submitted to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 6, 2016, by Yigal Carmon, President and Founder, The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Washington, D.C.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Members, and Members of the Committee,
My testimony today is dedicated to a persistent problem: the financial and other support given by the Palestinian Authority (PA) to those who have continued their terrorist activities after the Oslo Accords, in which Yasser Arafat made a commitment, on behalf of the Palestinian people, to stop all terrorist activity.
By providing this support, the PA is encouraging terrorism in violation of its Oslo commitment.
Furthermore, the PA has been using money granted by donor countries for this purpose, and by doing so, has made them complicit in encouraging terrorism as well.
The details of this support, which I will cite in my testimony, may sound somewhat tedious, and I apologize for this in advance. They are taken both from the Palestinian media and from official PA records, available online.
MEMRI, as you may know, has been monitoring and analyzing the Middle East media for nearly 20 years. My testimony today is based not only on an analysis of the PA 2016 budget, but on years of research.
Details of the PA Support for Terrorists
The PA transfers the funds through two PLO organizations:
· The National Palestinian Fund, which transfers moneys for the prisoners and released prisoners (further to be disbursed by the Commission for Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs)
· The Institute for Care for the Families of Martyrs, which transfers moneys for the families of martyrs.
This financial support for prisoners is anchored in a series of laws and government decrees, chiefly Laws No. 14 and No. 19 of 2004, and Law No. 1 of 2013. [1] The prisoners are described as "a fighting sector and an integral part of the weave of Arab Palestinian society" and it is stated that "the financial rights of the prisoner and his family" must be assured. It is also stated that the PA will provide the allowance to "every prisoner, without discrimination."
According to the laws, the PA must provide prisoners with a monthly allowance during their incarceration and salaries or jobs upon their release. They are also entitled to exemptions from payments for education, health care, and professional training. Their years of imprisonment are calculated as years of seniority of service in PA institutions. It should be noted that whoever was imprisoned for five years or more is entitled to a job in a PA institution. Thus, the PA gives priority in job placement to people who were involved in terrorist activity.
Palestinian President Mahmoud 'Abbas has stressed more than once that "the prisoners are top priority."[2] As a result of this commitment, the PA invests significant sums in underwriting the expenses of the prisoners and their families - $137.8 million according to the PA's 2016 budget (about 7% of which is for officials' salaries and operating expenses) (see Appendix, Figure 1).[3] Over the years, the Palestinian government has taken a series of decisions implementing the laws.[4]
The allowances are currently paid based on PA Government Decision No. 23 of 2010, which specifies the prisoners' monthly allowance according to length of sentence. It ranges from $364 a month for up to three years imprisonment to $3,120 for 30 years and more. There is a $78 supplement for terrorists from Jerusalem and a $130 supplement for Arab Israeli terrorists. (For the full chart, see Appendix, Figure 2):[5]
The PA also provides prisoners with a monthly allowance for canteen expenses, totaling $780,000 per month.[6]
Although the law states that prisoners should be given allowances "without discrimination,"[7] sometimes the PA has cut allowances for political reasons. For example, in December 2015, allowances were cut from $338 to $208 for released prisoners who are members of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, and, recently, for members of the PFLP as well, following political tension between these organizations and the PA.[8]
This political decision aroused the protest of the director of the Commission for Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs, 'Issa Qaraqe', who said that "it is unacceptable for the Ministry of Finance to cut a prisoner's salary."[9] His statement proves two things: that it is the PA that is funding these allowances and that the PA can and does cut allowances to prisoners when it wishes.
In May 2014, An Administrative Change Took Place
'Abbas issued a presidential order according to which the payments to prisoners would no longer be made by the PA's Ministry of Prisoners' Affairs. Instead, they would be disbursed by a PLO Commission for Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs.
The aim of this deliberately misleading move was to alleviate pressure on the PA by donor countries that do not wish their money to be channeled to support terrorism. However, the offices remained the same and the official in charge remained the same under a new job title. The source of the money remains the PA, which receives them from donor countries, and the overseeing body remains none other than the PA.
Several High-Ranking Palestinian Officials Have Addressed This Change:
In June 2014, the former Deputy Minister for Prisoners' Affairs, Ziyad Abu 'Ayn, explained that "the national interest requires" this change because the donor countries "have established dozens of investigative committees focusing on the issue of [their] funds that are transferred from the PA to the prisoners."[10]
PA officials have admitted that the PA remains the financer and the decision-maker in all things pertaining to support for the prisoners and the martyrs' families.
For example, in September 2014, the director for detainees and ex-detainees affairs in Hebron, Ibrahim Najajra, said that the change of status from ministry to commission "would not detract from the prisoners' value or from their legal, moral, or political status, since the services extended to them are anchored in law." He added that the commission would be under the direct supervision of the Palestinian presidency, and that the payments would be made directly by the PLO's National Palestinian Fund.[11]
In December 2015, PA Cabinet Secretary 'Ali Abu Diyak announced that the PA government was committed to continuing to pay allowances to fighters imprisoned for their national struggle and to the families of the martyrs, the wounded, and the prisoners.[12]
Let Me Move To The PA Support For Families Of "Martyrs"
The 2016 budget describes the PLO's Institute for Care for the Families of Martyrs as the body "responsible for ensuring a dignified life to the families of all those martyred and wounded as a result of being participants or bystanders in the revolution."
It is allocated just under $173 million ($172,534,733) for families of martyrs and the wounded within the homeland and outside it. The Institute's operating expenses comes to about $1.5 million. (See Appendix, Figure 3).
The budget also states that the Institute provides allowances "without discrimination" – in other words, also from Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and so on.[13]
Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah said recently, on June 17, 2016, that "the government will continue to act together with the PLO institutions to improve the allowances of the families of the martyrs as soon as possible."[14]
What Are The Details Of The Payments To The Families Of The Martyrs?
According to reports from 2011 in the Palestinian media, the family of every "martyr" receives a one-time payment of $1,560, as well as a monthly allowance of $364. There are also additional payments based on various criteria, including family status – the family of a married martyr receives an additional $104, and if he has children, the family receives $52 per child[15] – whether the martyr was a civilian or a member of the PA military force, and on his or her rank. (For some of the criteria, see Appendix, Figures 4, 5).
In Conclusion
Let me stress again that as in the case of the support for prisoners, support for the families of martyrs who committed their acts prior to the signing of the Oslo Accords and the PLO commitment to end all forms of terrorism could perhaps be understandable in the context of an overall reconciliation process.
However, the fact that such payments are also given to families of people from various organizations who continue to commit acts of terrorism in violation of the peace accord constitutes deliberate encouragement of terrorism. Consequently, money that originates from donor countries and is used for this purpose makes these countries complicit in the encouragement of terrorism.
*Yigal Carmon is President and Founder of MEMRI.
Appendix
Fig. 1: PA payments to prisoners (in NIS) – 2016 Budget[16]
Fig. 2: Monthly allowances for prisoners (in NIS) – PA Government Decision No. 23, 2010[17]
Fig. 3: Budget of the Institute for Care for the Families of Martyrs for 2016 (in NIS)[18]
Fig. 4: Allowance for families of martyrs, by family status (in NIS) [19]
Fig. 5: Allowance for families of martyrs, by military rank (in NIS)[20]
Endnotes:
[1] For Law No. 14 of 2004, see: Muqtafi.birzeit.edu/pg/getleg.asp?id=14741; for Law No. 19 of 2004, see: Muqtafi.birzeit.edu/pg/getleg.asp?id=14777; for Law No. 1 of 2013, see Muqtafi.birzeit.edu/pg/getleg.asp?id=16458.
[2] See for example Wafa.ps, February 21, 2005; Al-Rai (Jordan), April 28, 2013; Shasha.ps, April 27, 2013.
[3] For the budget, see: Pmof.ps/documents/10192/654283/BUDGET+BOOK+2016.06.22.pdf/1b8b37ef-fe73-4ea8-80b3-2ab3bd8c3c68, pp. 753-760.
[4] See for example Government Decision No. 19 of 2010, Muqtafi.birzeit.edu/pg/getleg.asp?id=16255; Government Decision No. 21 of 2010, Muqtafi.birzeit.edu/pg/getleg.asp?id=16257; Government Decision No. 22 of 2010, Muqtafi.birzeit.edu/pg/getleg.asp?id=16258; Government Decision No. 23 of 2010, Muqtafi.birzeit.edu/pg/getleg.asp?id=16259; Government Decision No. 15 of 2013, Muqtafi.birzeit.edu/pg/getleg.asp?id=16556.
[5] Al-Waqi' Al-Filastiniyya, Issue No. 90, March 30, 2011, p. 106.
[6] Maannews.net, September 9, 2014.
[7] Let me give just two examples: The perpetrators of the August 9, 2001 attack on the Sbarro café in downtown Jerusalem, that killed 15, including seven children, and wounded 130, and of the July 31, 2002 attack on the cafeteria of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, that killed nine, four of whom were U.S. citizens. The imprisoned attackers are Hamas members and they receive these allowances. I am holding in my hand an original document that was introduced by a U.S. court in New York City; it is from the PA/Ministry of Detainees Affairs, and it sets out in detail the payments to one of the members of the Hamas cell that carried out the Hebrew University attack. Thus, the PA is paying Hamas members who killed U.S. citizens nine years after the Oslo Accords – and the funds for this come from the donor countries, including the U.S.
[8] Al-Resala (Gaza) December 15, 2015, Pnn.ps, April 14, 2016.
[9] Paltimes.net, December 9, 2015.
[10] Eqtesadia.ps, June 4, 2014.
[11] Hr.ps/ar, September 1, 2014.
[12] Feneeqnews.com, December 9, 2015. For the budget, see: Pmof.ps/documents/10192/654283/BUDGET+BOOK+2016.06.22.pdf/1b8b37ef-fe73-4ea8-80b3-2ab3bd8c3c68.
[13] Pmof.ps/documents/10192/654283/BUDGET+BOOK+2016.06.22.pdf/1b8b37ef-fe73-4ea8-80b3-2ab3bd8c3c68, pp. 729-736.
[14] Palestinecabinet.gov.ps/WebSite/AR/ViewDetails?ID=37799.
[15] Lajeen-db.ps, August 9, 2011.
[16] Pmof.ps/documents/10192/654283/BUDGET+BOOK+2016.06.22.pdf/1b8b37ef-fe73-4ea8-80b3-2ab3bd8c3c68, p. 760.
[17] Al-Waqi' Al-Filastiniyya, Issue No. 90, March 30, 2011, p. 106.
[18] Pmof.ps/documents/10192/654283/BUDGET+BOOK+2016.06.22.pdf/1b8b37ef-fe73-4ea8-80b3-2ab3bd8c3c68, p. 735.
[19] Aman-palestine.org/data/itemfiles/b3dd98a029db76be614d1a64dd10604e.pdf, p. 16.
[20] Aman-palestine.org/data/itemfiles/b3dd98a029db76be614d1a64dd10604e.pdf, p. 17.
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MEMRI Vice President Alberto Fernandez's Testimony To Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, July 6, 2016 – ISIS Online: Countering Terrorist Radicalization And Recruitment On The Internet And Social Media
By: Alberto M. Fernandez/MEMRI/July 06/16
THE FOLLOWING IS WRITTEN TESTIMONY SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE COMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURTY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, JULY 6, 2016 BY THE HONORABLE ALBERTO M. FERNANDEZ, VICE-PRESIDENT, MIDDLE EAST MEDIA RESEARCH INSTITUTE (MEMRI), WASHINGTON, D.C.
It is particularly fitting to be holding this hearing almost exactly two years from when the Islamic State burst into the global psyche in a spectacular way. An organization that changed its name and altered its focus in 2006 and that has immediate roots going back into Jordan in the 1990s, it is in June 2014, with the double blow of the fall of Mosul and the declaration of the Caliphate that the "State of the Islamic Caliphate" either galvanized or horrified much of the world.
And while June 2014 serves as an appropriate political marker, it also is a key milestone in the evolution of ISIS propaganda. The media output of the Islamic State began to change in 2013, as ISIS moved into Syria and it began to produce better, more multifaceted, multi-language and sophisticated material than it had when it confined its efforts to the struggle in Iraq. But it is in the summer of 2014 that ISIS launches the Al-Hayat Media Center (HMC), focusing on non-Arabic speaking audiences, and that the first issue of their online magazine Dabiq appears. Indeed, ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad Al-Adnani's statement announcing the return of the Caliphate was released in June 2014 in Arabic and in English, Russian, French and German by the HMC.
In addition to evocative material on Mosul and on the Caliphate, June 2014 saw the release of emblematic, high quality productions with original material, including two effective videos on erasing the borders between Syria and Iraq and two music videos (German-English and English-Arabic) combining male acapella singing and the sounds of the battlefield. Also released in June was the recruitment video "There is No Life Without Jihad" featuring British and Australian ISIS members, with the memorable line that the "cure for (Western lifestyle-induced) depression is Jihad." This English language production was, not surprisingly, heavily covered in the Western media.
All this material was aggressively pushed out across all social media platforms, but especially on Twitter, with hashtags such as #AllEyesonISIS. Amazingly, none of this material, nor the diffuse online networks amplifying and embroidering on the material, were taken down at the time, with social media companies, government and law enforcement deciding – for different reasons – not to do so. At the time, individual supporters of the Islamic State, including in the West, openly proclaimed their allegiance, churned out tens of thousands of tweets, and aggressively promoted ISIS materials without negative consequences.
I remember, as then-Coordinator of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), surveying this landscape in June 2014 and asking colleagues, "How do you counter the fall of Mosul and declaration of a Caliphate with a video or a tweet?" Creativity and our rough and ready guerilla attitude so at variance with the way government usually worked could only go so far. The sense of being heavily outgunned and outnumbered was palpable, both in terms of our own resources and in what everyone else was doing against this adversary worldwide. This was especially true given that the sense in much of Washington – both official Washington and the punditocracy – since the death of bin Laden in 2011 and until the fall of Mosul – was that the global Salafi-jihadi threat was ebbing, and that Al-Qaeda and its franchises (which at the time would have included the Islamic State of Iraq) were contained and on a downward trend, with the threat becoming more localized, inward looking, and fractured.
Two years later, what has changed? As pioneers in the field, we at the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) have closely monitored and minutely analyzed jihadi propaganda for years, long before ISIS became fashionable, and so we have been well positioned to track subtle changes over time in the jihadosphere and in the content, style, and delivery of ISIS material.
First, a quick review of ISIS propaganda in June 2016 shows the dimensions of the ongoing challenge. As a graphic example of their continued potency, the Islamic State released 29 separate videos during the month. Interestingly enough, the rival Al-Qaeda-aligned Jabhat Al-Nusra (JN) alone in Syria was almost as prolific as ISIS in its video production during this particular month, with all of its material being very Syria-centric and localized. So the overall jihadi media "pie" has grown, and ISIS and Al-Qaeda struggle for dominion. Both JN's production and that of ISIS were overwhelmingly in Arabic. ISIS releases that month included videos produced by ISIS wilayat (provinces) in Aleppo, Raqqa, Ninawa, Dijla, Al-Furat, Al-Khayr, Salah Al-Din, Al-Jazira, Fallujah, Anbar, Homs, and Khurasan.
Videos included the bloody execution of "spies" and journalists, praise for the Orlando terrorist attack, repeated calls to attack the West, the announcing of a new ISIS wilaya in the Philippines, the second anniversary of the declaration of the "Caliphate," and, of course, footage on daily life in ISIS territory, on Ramadan, and of combat operations. While the production was prodigious and of high quality, a considerable amount of the footage was recycled stock image previously used in other products. There were no real videos of military victory because the Islamic State had none to claim.
Given the intimate connection between the political-military reality in the region and its projection onto the virtual world, the biggest change from two years ago is the continuation of a series of increasingly important military reverses on the ground, which began with the retaking of the Mosul Dam in August 2014 and are ongoing with recent key milestones such as the taking of Fallujah and Manbij by local forces working with the international coalition. Slowly, all too slowly perhaps, the Islamic State "victory narrative" is being deflated, although ISIS propagandists have ably sought to obscure this to date by highlighting other events, such as the work of international franchises, spectacular overseas terrorist operations, and topics related to the implementation of Islamic governance in the territory that it still controls. Despite Al-Adnani's important May 23, 2016 remarks preparing the ground for the possibility of future reverses, the overall impression Islamic State propaganda still projects is, not surprisingly, one of assured confidence in victory and in their steadfastness. An important fact for us to deal with is that they are still doing a better job at projecting strength while slowly retreating than ISIS's enemies have done while slowly advancing.
The recent military successes in Manbij and Fallujah underscore the challenge that our allies have in even reporting good news. The technical quality of material released by both the Syrian Defense Forces and the Iraqi military still does not match that of the basic ISIS video – but more concerning is the overall context. Both events, but especially the Fallujah operation, occurred within the context of heightened sectarian and ethnic discourse in both social and broadcast Arabic-language media.
This is an example of where the broader sectarian (Sunni-Shia) conflict raging in the Middle East reinforces the overall ISIS narrative. It wasn't so much the Islamic State pushing that narrative on Fallujah (ISIS supporters certainly did do that), but media outlets and voices ostensibly opposed to and independent of ISIS that did so.
Rather than being portrayed as a success for a united Iraq and an Iraqi Security Force liberating everyone against ISIS brutality, the narrative on pan-Arab media, especially, and incessantly on Al-Jazeera, was about the sectarian nature of the siege, and the suffering of Fallujah's Sunni Arab Muslim civilians even after the fall of the town. By one account, if you followed only Al-Jazeera for your news, you would have thought that Iraqi Security Forces had suffered more than 1,400 dead in the battle for Fallujah, while ISIS was reported as suffering less than 40 dead.
And while Al-Jazeera tends to be particularly sectarian – and has a long, controversial track record on Fallujah – it must be said in its defense that many in the Western media made very similar points, at least about civilians. The graphic language and sectarian imagery used by some PMU militias before and during the taking of the city provided ample ammunition for the critics.
Even what should have been an unalloyed propaganda bounty can be muted by confusion. The destruction of an ISIS convoy fleeing Fallujah in the last few days did just that, with U.S. spokesmen speaking of the destruction by American and Iraqi aircraft of over 175 vehicles in two convoys, while the head of the Iraqi Air Force spoke of over 700 vehicles. Some of the coverage suggested that there may have been at least a few civilians mixed in with fighters, a fact acknowledged by Americans and denied by Iraqi military spokesmen.
This is not to deny the overall success of taking Fallujah from ISIS, nor its real propaganda value. An ISIS defeat is a defeat even if not handled perfectly. And even with the overblown rhetoric, the very real concerns about human rights abuses of Fallujah's civilian population and the skewed regional coverage, showing ISIS losing is a key element in the propaganda battle. But at the very least, this is a victory which could have been more complete and convincing in influencing the basic ISIS demographic of Sunni Arab Muslims inside and out of Iraq. A more successful example of quality media coverage that was both convincing and riveting was Vice News embedding with the Iraqi Golden Division's Special Forces on the "Road to Fallujah" in June 2016.[1] This news product captured some of the edginess and immediacy of ISIS videos and also portrayed a picture of Iraqi government forces that was nuanced but mostly positive.
The equally important but more modest operation in the taking of Manbij was better handled as far as overall spin is concerned. Manbij was a far less sectarian issue than Fallujah, of course (with less overheated regional media rhetoric), and the Syrian Democratic Forces/YPG use of the "Manbij Military Council" was a smart move to at least give a stronger impression of Sunni Arab and other non-Kurdish involvement and highlighting the positive voices of liberated local people.[2] Again, one would have liked to have seen greater technical quality, more volume, and more compelling stories and packaging, but Manbij was an ISIS safe haven much used by foreign fighters, including a strong contingent from Western Europe, so a strong message has been sent by the inability of the Islamic State to hold on to it.
So two years later, ISIS propaganda is still being extensively produced. The continued pummeling of the Islamic State territory in Syria, Iraq and Libya should eventually puncture the ISIS victory narrative and weaken some of its appeal. Still another positive factor has been the shrinking of the ISIS online presence in social media. An unprecedented terrorist media success like the Islamic State still has a considerable footprint, still gets its message out and still influences, but today ISIS publicists online are more contested, more frequently shut down than ever before. They stay on for shorter periods, and their ability to build large stable online networks has been interdicted.
J.M. Berger has estimated recently that the median follower count of a typical ISIS support twitter account is down about 90% from 2014. The Twitter hashtags for the delivery of Adnani's May 2016 speech were rapidly interrupted and the material removed or feed corrupted. It is a far cry from the halcyon days of 2014 when ISIS supporters felt themselves invincible and numerous. MEMRI has tracked this over the past year, as the decline of the ISIS presence on Twitter has been coupled with rapid rise of Telegram as an alternate platform. Since October of 2015, 35% of our material comes from Telegram, 34% from Twitter, 10% from Internet Archive, 7% from YouTube, and 10% from jihadi forums. Facebook as a source declined from 25% to 2%.
Telegram today is probably the single most important online safe haven for ISIS. In a recent discussion by ISIS supporters that we at MEMRI monitored, one infamous ISIS fanboy described Telegram as his "hideout" and lamented that he wasn't able to keep up with the many suspensions on Twitter. "Remember Twitter back in 2014 when we hijacked hashtags and spread the news for the entire world," he noted wistfully. So the efforts of social media companies, of government agencies, and of people of good will everywhere to take down ISIS material, to challenge it, and to mock it is having some effect in terms of the viability of their stable presence online.
But this success is not permanent. Only two days ago, on July 4, the Al-Wafa Foundation, a pro-ISIS media outlet, produced an article calling on ISIS supporters to return to Twitter and Facebook and not limit themselves to Telegram. The author praised the advantages of Telegram, especially its policy of avoiding the mass suspension of Jihadist accounts but lamented that it is not as conducive as other platforms for rapidly and broadly spreading ISIS content.
We are also seeing a growing ISIS member/supporter presence on Instagram even after some are suspended. This community seems to include militants and friends from places as diverse as Malaysia, Indonesia, Chechnya, and Turkey. Instagram is a valuable secondary tool for these extremists, because of the power of its visuals and accessibility. There is also a real extremist presence on Snapchat, and we recently documented an English-language blog on Tumblr run by ISIS medical personnel with the purpose of encouraging doctors to flee to the Islamic State and providing them with practical information on how to prepare to do so.
But while jamming ISIS hashtags with rainbow flags and porn or generating disinformation about the fate of Al-Baghdadi through bogus Amaq News Agency accounts are perfectly legitimate, even better is disseminating content that actually adds something to the anti-extremist discussion. Content that does not just distract or confuse but inform is also key. In this field, the establishment of initiatives such as the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (icsve.org/) in July 2015 which documents the voices and stories of ISIS defectors and recanters is worthy of continued support by both public and private partners. It is particularly effective to have such material tracked and disseminated by the private sector and by independent media rather than directly by governments.
Despite the progress made in this area over the past year, there are still more unheard stories of the ISIS disaffected that need to be captured, as well as those of the many Sunni Arab Muslim victims of ISIS brutality. Obviously all victims of terrorism are worthy of respect and solidarity, but we are talking here about the use of victim narratives in a way that could influence the key demographic from which ISIS draws support and which are of greatest concern to us: Sunni Arab Muslims and members of Muslim diaspora communities in the West.
How many Western Muslims, for example, are familiar with the dramatic/horrific stories of Syrian and Iraqi Sunni Muslim tribal resistance to the Islamic State? How many know of the hundreds of Iraqi Sunni clerics killed at its hands over the past decade? How many know of the lives and deaths of young men from the Shaitaat or Albunimr tribes told in their own voices and made available in English or French or German?
There is no one silver bullet or kryptonite in the fight against ISIS propaganda. There is no substitute for the continued steady working away on a variety of political, military, social, economic and ideological fronts. The situation we are in is the result of actions taken, and not taken, over decades by both Western governments and Middle Eastern ones. If progress has been made on the battlefield and in the realm of cyberspace and in the stories of defectors, what then are the great lacunae, the things we are still missing?
We must recognize that while the physical Islamic State in Syria and Iraq may be on a slow slope towards eventual decline it has also, in a very important way, already succeeded. It has succeeded in creating – for a small, but not inconsiderable, zealous and deadly clique – a sturdy and mature revolutionary brand that still endures and inspires. Of particular concern to our own homeland security, ISIS and its fans, as a lively and defiant English-language subculture, is still here and still largely impervious to obvious subverting. These are not going to be deterred by rainbow flag spamming.
MEMRI recently documented the creation of an ISIS supporters' matrimony group on Telegram in June 2016. Initially the group was called "Baqiya Matrimony" but was soon changed to the less conspicuous "Love Fillah." While some commentators initially reacted angrily that this must be some sort of Western plot, the organizers reassured that this was not the case and posted a sarcastic meme related to security with a young Muslim man saying "Salaams, beautiful sister. I'm planning to join ISIS soon. Do you love me?" To which the answer comes, "Yes, I do love you coz I'm an FBI agent and you are going to jail."
"Baqiya Matrimony" is just one small brick in a larger Baqiya Family edifice that is a lasting result of all those intensive ISIS mobilization efforts of the past years. Some of it may seem ridiculous and some may be deadly, but this is now a brand which has to a large extent already been internalized. The commitment, identity, distinctiveness and autonomy of this ISIS subculture (whether online or not) is intimately tied to an innate understanding of the ISIS brand and the broader ideology that undergirds it. It is often fully understood and does not necessarily require a new video or new conversation with extremists to be maintained. French ISIS killer Larossi Abballa, who livestreamed the killing of a Paris police officer and his wife in June 2016, put it this way: "Allah said that if you follow the majority of people on earth, they will lead you away from the path of Allah. Through this verse, Allah tells us that there will be only a minority on the right path, thank him and bow to his greatness. Yes, Allah has chosen you and not all the other billions of people."
Whether in the form of mere identity groups and propagandists or as actual DIY terrorists in places like San Bernardino and Orlando, the ISIS brand can be all things to all extremists, a rallying cry to rebellion clothed in the language of righteous violence. It makes everything "better" and more purposeful, making what might have just been the seamy and sad violence of a lost soul into something transcendent, translating what would purely be the local and the personal into part of a larger whole that is global and ideological. This shouldn't come as much of a surprise: the ranks of the Islamic State today are full of former petty criminals and troubled people who have finally found purpose in life. And no one epitomized this more than Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi himself, the godfather of what became the Islamic State shortly after his death in 2006.
The neutralization of this pro-ISIS sub-culture is still extremely difficult, except when individuals clearly overstep legal bounds and come to the notice of law enforcement. But aside from that type of preventive action, the ideological building blocks of the ISIS of tomorrow, of the Salafi-jihadi threat 2.0 to come, are still there, fully intact and ready to be redeployed.
As an experiment, I went to YouTube a few days ago and entered in English the name of key themes that are an essential part of the worldview of the Islamic State and other Salafi Jihadist groups. These are Islamic Arabic terms with a rich, nuanced and complicated history over centuries, but which extremists have simplified and weaponized and wield with great effectiveness to brainwash the young, zealous, and untutored recruit. They are Kufr (unbelief), Shirk (polytheism or ascribing partners to God), Al-Wala wal-Bara (loyalty and disavowal), Taghut (tyranny), Rafidah (rejectionists, a pejorative term for Shia Muslims) and Tawhid (oneness or strict monotheism of God). Except for Tawhid, which is the key Islamic doctrine not limited to Salafis, all searches returned results of English-language voices reinforcing the underlying bases of the Islamic State narrative even though none of the voices were of actual ISIS members or supporters. The top entry for al-wala wal-bara – the key concept of actively hating non-Muslims and giving loyalty to the (right) Muslims – was by none other than the late Anwar Al-Awlaki.
Shiraz Maher, in his magisterial new book (Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea, 2016) notes about this key element in the ISIS/Al-Qa'ida discourse that "all of this was ultimately shaped to create alternative structures of legitimacy and authority for Salafi-jihadi actors who typically operate beyond the framework of the state. It allowed them to delegitimize their opponents for not having displayed adequate levels of al-wala wal-bara, while presenting themselves as the custodians of a pure, unadulterated form of Islam."
So while we fight on the battlefield, and in cyberspace, while we seek to find personal stories that can be useful to the anti-ISIS fight, there is still a larger ideological challenge that needs to be fought more effectively. This is something that most fragile and conflicted regimes in the Middle East are loathe to take on themselves even though the ideological challenge is a direct threat to their survival.
Wouldn't it be amazing if a YouTube search on these incendiary topics brought back returns which did NOT fit in so well with the ISIS narrative? So that the young, searching American youth, struggling with identity issues and conflicting emotions and driven to look for knowledge in this most modern and personal of ways might have a better chance?
A potential project worth funding would be to find some smart, tech-savvy American Muslim civil society group that can come up with better, more tolerant, and more convincing answers for those searching for these terms, and can make sure that the algorithm is in place for them to be easily accessed.
One can, and should, be cautiously heartened by much of the work the Federal Government, our allies, the private sector, and community organizations have done over the past couple of years, once reality hit them on the forehead in 2014, in the fight against ISIS, including in the key field of online communications used to radicalize and recruit individuals. Progress has been made in removing content, in contesting or crowding the space, and in kinetic operations. But that is not enough.
Much of the information surrounding the new inter-agency Global Engagement Center (GEC), the newest iteration of the old CSCC I headed, seems to be White House spin directed at a gullible public by repackaging old duties and mandates in new verbiage. There is also perhaps entirely too much emphasis on transitory GEC events, such as hackathons and coordination meetings, which add too little to the fight and not enough on building a permanent and professional organization dedicated to what is clearly going to be a generational fight.
One question evidently not clarified by the new March 2016 Executive Order creating GEC is whether this is actually an organization with a dedicated, line item budget appropriation or whether it is – as was the case until 2015 – an organization funded entirely out of the discretionary budget of the State Department's Under-Secretary for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy ("R" in State Department parlance) and emergency funds of other organizations.
I am encouraged, however, by some of GEC's work, especially in promoting voices of defectors and discrete funding of proxies but wonder if its long-term mission would be better served as part of the more integrated Counter-Terrorism Bureau (CT) at State rather than under R, traditionally a weak performer in the Department's leadership. Such a move could also shield GEC somewhat from the temptation of micro-managing from aspiring White House communications czars.
While ISIS may have peaked as a formal organization in its Syrian-Iraqi heartland, the ISIS style, especially its style of violence, has not yet done so and still shows great potency and staying power. It is incumbent on us, at the very least, to keep the pressure on social media and to try to shrink and hem in its presence there as much as possible while trying to change facts on the ground in the region – particularly the very public destruction of the ISIS "Caliphate" – and to come up with better answers to its powerful toxic narrative of empowerment, grievance and faith. This is, after all, a narrative largely shared by its bitter rivals in Al-Qaeda.
While I have dwelt at length on the ideological challenge of the Islamic State, a cocktail strong enough to have inspired well-educated, upper-class boys in Dhaka to stab total strangers to death a few days ago, this challenge is, of course, expressed powerfully through narratives. And what is a narrative but a story? As Hassan Hassan relates in his recent seminal work on ISIS's hybrid ideology, "The Islamic State relies heavily on stories and events from Islamic history, because they can be more powerful than the citation of Islamic principles, especially if the stories and events support Quranic verses or hadiths. The group makes the most of any example it can find, and borrows from what Muslim clerics consider isolated incidents that should not be followed as rules. It uses stories not always to argue a religious idea: they may be offered to help Islamic State members who struggle with committing acts of extreme violence."
In 2014, ISIS used the slaughter of the supposedly rebellious Jewish Beni Qurayza tribe in Medina, exterminated at the time of the Prophet Muhammad, to justify the slaughter of the rebellious Syrian Sunni Muslim Shaitaat tribe. As George Orwell wrote, "He who controls the past controls the future. He who controls the present controls the past."
We are doing much to fight the Islamic State, but little is being done to reclaim Islamic history and its telling from them. While this is a task best left to Arab Muslim regimes and individuals (despite its affiliates and worldwide supporter, ISIS is overwhelming an Arab Muslim organization influenced by that society), the great and deadly unwinding of existing Arab regimes, the ongoing crisis of authority happening in the region means that these governments may not be capable enough to pull this reclaiming of the narrative off.
One last word about narratives. The ISIS narrative is indeed a powerful, revolutionary one, but we must never forget that one of the blessings of the United States of America is that we have our own powerful narrative. In this we are fortunate indeed compared to some Western countries in the world struggling for meaning in a seemingly untethered, post-modern world.
As an immigrant and a refugee myself, I tell you that the American identity, pride in our country, in its past and in its future, identification with its propositions and in its symbols, its inclusiveness and its power for good in the world, is something to be nurtured, to be supported and promoted as an important ideological safeguard for both native born and immigrant Americans. Such a patrimony is something of value in the world today. And that unity of purpose, patriotism, and social harmony is of great importance to us and to the world in this ongoing bitter struggle that has some years yet to run.
*Alberto M. Fernandez is Vice President of MEMRI
Endnotes:
[1] News.vice.com/video/fighting-the-islamic-state-with-iraqs-golden-division-the-road-to-fallujah.
[2] Youtube.com/watch?v=k5ChxobTh8o&index=2&list=PLNxwX7r4A554rJNXnTIO5_7rAPGqVNol0.

Why Islamists (Occasionally) Desecrate Islamic Holy Sites
Tarek Fatah/The Toronto Sun/July 5, 2016
Originally published under the title "The Historical Roots of Islamist Terrorism."
People stand by the site of a suicide bombing in Medina, Saudi Arabia, on July 4.
Monday's suicide bombing outside the tomb of Prophet Muhammad in Medina, Saudi Arabia, sent shock waves throughout the Islamic world. The fact a Muslim carried out this act of terror during the holy month of Ramadan has left many followers of the Islamic faith in disbelief.
Too many Muslims have fallen for the common refrain, trumpeted by Islamists, that no Muslim could carry out such an act and hence neither Islam nor Muslims can be held accountable for it in any way.
These arguments have been used every time Islamist terrorists engage in mass killings, from 9/11 in New York to the massacre in Dhaka, Bangladesh, last week. But the facts tell us a different story regarding the turbulent history of Islam and the roles played by Muslims within it.
Academics and scholars are reluctant to discuss these historical facts for fear of being accused of bigotry and racism. Thus ordinary Muslims, to say nothing of non-Muslims, do not commonly know them.
The result is a Muslim community unaware of its own often bloody history, going back centuries, when both our holy cities -- Mecca and Medina -- were attacked, ransacked and destroyed, not by the "kufaar" (non-Muslims), but by Muslim leaders.
Militant Islamists have seldom hesitated to desecrate Islamic holy sites.
They fought for power, using Islam as a tool to enhance or entrench their political hold on the states they created.
Fanatical, politically motivated, and radicalized Muslims have never hesitated to desecrate Islam's holy sites.
As early as October, 683 AD, the Umayyad caliph of Damascus invaded Mecca, then under the control of a rival caliph, and bombarded the ancient shrine of Black Kaaba, the holiest site in Islam.
The Kaaba, where Muhammad preached, was destroyed in the fighting. A new one was constructed.
Skipping over the centuries, we have the 1805 invasion of the Prophet's city, Medina, by the first Saudi state.
Imbibed with a fierce zealotry, the Wahhabi warriors of Muhammad Ibn Saud overran Medina and started to destroy Islamic shrines. They even tried to destroy the magnificent dome structure over the tomb of Prophet Muhammad, removed all precious objects from his gravesite and looted the treasury of the mosque itself.
After occupying Medina these Muslims, who came from the neighbouring region of Nejd, systematically leveled the "Jannat al-Baqi" cemetery, the vast burial site adjacent to the Prophet's mosque that housed the remains of many of the members of Muhammad's family, close companions and central figures of early Islam, including his beloved daughter, Fatima.
These acts of sacrilege were re-enacted by a new generation of Wahabbi zealots led by Abdel-Aziz Ibn Saud during the second Saudi state, a century later.
Juhayman al-Otaybi after his capture.
On April 21, 1925 the rebuilt tombs and domes in Medina were once again bulldozed. Had it not been for intervention and diplomacy by then Prince Faisal (later King), who was in command of the regular Saudi army, the Wahabbis would have destroyed Prophet Muhammad's tomb as well.
As recently as November 1979, radicalized Muslims from around the world, including the U.S., Pakistan and Egypt, led by Saudi fanatic Juhayman al-Otaybi, took over the Holy Kaaba and killed many people during a two-week siege.
The moral of the story is that no matter how often Muslims refuse to acknowledge our history, it will not hide the mess we have created that we now refuse to cleanse.
Let us own up to it and stop blaming others for it.
**Tarek Fatah, a founder of the Muslim Canadian Congress and columnist at the Toronto Sun, is a Robert J. and Abby B. Levine Fellow at the Middle East Forum.

Religious Intolerance in the Gulf States
Dateline
Hilal Khashan/Middle East Forum/July 06/16
Middle East Quarterly
There are now more than three and a half million expatriate Christians working in the six Gulf Cooperation Council states, mostly Catholics from the Philippines, India, and Pakistan.
Interest in the state of Middle East Christians has largely focused on the quality of their lives in the Levant, Egypt, and Southern Sudan, predominantly Christian areas before the rise of Islam that still contain sizeable Christian minorities. By contrast, little attention has been paid to Christians in the Arabian Peninsula, which had no indigenous Christian presence in Islamic times.
However, the oil boom of the 1970s created a tremendous demand for foreign labor in the Persian Gulf rentier states. Unsurprisingly, the number of workers needed to drive the emerging economies of the Gulf states was bound to include significant numbers of Christians. There are now more than three and a half million expatriate Christians working in the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, mostly Catholics from the Philippines, India, and Pakistan. As their numbers increased, the question of how—or whether—to allow them to openly practice their faith became a significant issue.
The Current Status of Arabian Christianity
In the West, the freedom to worship in any way one chooses has been a bedrock value at least since the late eighteenth century.
Lingering anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish restrictions in Europe or North America notwithstanding, the general trajectory has been one of growing tolerance for the modalities of faith. Perhaps the most notable example of this is also one of the earliest: the First Amendment to the U.S. constitution, which made illegal "prohibiting the free exercise" of any religion by the federal government.
Rev. Andrew Thompson ,the senior pastor of Abu Dhabi's St. Andrew's Church, astonishingly told a local newspaper that it is "easier being a Christian here [in Abu Dhabi] than it is back in the United Kingdom."
Because of its deep-rooted nature within their societies, Westerners tend to frown on other societies that do not share the same ethic. Yet given the Middle East's importance to their strategic and economic interests in the post-World War II era, Western chancelleries turned a blind eye to the glaring gap between believing in freedom of religion and interacting with those who flagrantly violated this principle. It was only after the 9/11 attacks and the attendant "war on terror" that Muslim intolerance of other faiths began to come under greater scrutiny.
Thus, an editorial in a British news-paper laments that Christians in the countries of the GCC are virtually "servants, abominably treated. Their religion must be practiced in secret, with converts threatened with death."[1] Another writer went on to explain the emotional significance of this denial of a basic human right:
Most of the Christians who have come here have done so in order to find work in the Arab lands, and as a result, the majority live alone, having left their spouses and families back in their home country. As a result the parish, and also their Catholic faith, is like a piece of home for them."[2]
The welfare of Christians in Saudi Arabia is particularly pressing because the government bans all non-Islamic religious practice alongside an aversion to non-Wahhabi Islamic creeds.
Yet the severity of the lack of Christians' right to unencumbered religious freedom is all too often camouflaged by their own clerics who fear antagonizing the Gulf authorities. Rev. Andrew Thompson, the senior pastor of Abu Dhabi's St. Andrew's Church, astonishingly told a local newspaper that it is "easier being a Christian here [in Abu Dhabi] than it is back in the United Kingdom."[3] According to Bill Schwartz, canon of the Anglican Church of the Epiphany in Doha: "In the Gulf, excluding Saudi Arabia, government attitudes are more [ones of] religious tolerance than religious freedom."[4]
Spreading the Gospels through missionary activity is also severely curtailed among the member states of the GCC. Roy Verrips, the South African administrator of the Evangelical United Christian Church of Dubai, addressed this in diplomatic terms: "We respect and work within the boundaries they set for us" noting that his church had no issue with its members talking to others about Christianity in a private capacity.[5] In Bahrain, the authorities allow priests to spend time with Christian workers living on work sites and to join together in worship. However, "any form of mission among Muslims is forbidden everywhere [in the GCC states]."[6]
The first church in Kuwait was built in 1931, known as the "National Evangelical Church," but there remains an acute lack of churches in the country. Every Friday in Kuwait City, 2,000 Christians cram into the 600-seat Holy Family church or listen outside to the mass, prompting the Catholic bishop to worry about a stampede.
The acute lack of churches to accommodate the spiritual needs of the numerous Christian denominations in the GCC states is another serious matter. While the church space problem is ubiquitous in the Gulf region, the following example indicates its magnitude. Every Friday in Kuwait City, 2,000 Christians cram into the 600-seat Holy Family church or listen outside to the mass relayed on loudspeakers, prompting their Catholic bishop, Camillo Ballin, to worry about a stampede: "If a panic happens, it will be a catastrophe ... it is a miracle that nothing has happened."[7]
Limits on the number of allowed churches and entry restrictions on Christian clerics hinder the ability of priests to serve their congregations adequately since each one of them
has to celebrate several masses at the weekend, and many parishes also have very distant outstations. The work of the priest is taken above all in this sacramental service, for in addition to the celebration of Mass, there are also baptisms, marriages, and funerals.[8]
Bishop Paul Hinder, who oversees Catholic churches in the GCC states and Yemen, noted the role of lay volunteers in keeping the church going: "It is a Church resting on the shoulders of the laity."[9]
Islamic Notions of Religious Tolerance
What are then the underlying causes of this predicament?
For Muslims there is no deity but God. This is the lens through which they interpret all other religions, and this view explains why many Muslims do not understand Christianity. For them, the Qur'an is the final word of God. By and large, Muslims may tolerate some latitude in the ability of Christians to exercise their religious duties within the frame-work of the legally and institutionally inferior "protected communities" (or dhimmis), but the Christian faith must not be given the chance to flourish.
The Christianity of the Qur'an was embroiled in a debate about the nature of Christ, leaving the impression that its followers disagreed about what their faith actually consisted of. As a consequence, early Muslims considered Christianity a blasphemous interpretation of the nature of Jesus, who is presented in the Qur'an as a prophet but not the son of God. This perception persists and has lost none of its intensity.
Limited religious forbearance is the best that Christians can hope for in Gulf region countries.
Religious pluralism as understood in the West does not exist anywhere in the Gulf region, and limited forbearance is probably the best that Christians can hope for in these deeply conservative countries. However, on paper, the GCC states do practice religious tolerance. Thus, the sultanate of Oman has been seen as one of the most tolerant in the peninsula. Christian worship is protected through that country's Basic Law, which prohibits discrimination based on religion and considers it a criminal offense to defame any faith. Similarly, the Kuwaiti constitution theoretically provides for religious freedom. But reality tells a different story. In 2014, according to the official figures, locals accounted for some 1.2 million of Kuwait's 4-million-strong population while expatriate Muslims totaled another 1.8 million and expatriate Christians about 700,000 (the remaining residents belonged to polytheistic religions).[10] Yet the emirate has over 1,000 mosques and only seven churches; also, the government imposes quotas on the number of clerics and staff in legally authorized churches and pressures Kuwaitis to refrain from renting apartments or villas for use as unofficial churches.[11]
Likewise, Article 32 of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) constitution guarantees the "freedom to exercise religious worship ... in accordance with established customs and provided it does not conflict with public policy or violate public morals."[12] That final caveat—"provided it does not conflict with public policy or violate public morals"—is the crucial stipulation; however, it flips constitutional provisions on their heads. Even in states run by autocrats—or perhaps precisely because they are run by autocrats—public opinion in these matters counts for a great deal. In the UAE and other GCC states, government capacity to grant true religious freedom to Christians is highly restricted because their devout publics are still not at ease with such freedoms. Indeed, while Saudi Arabia stands out as the single GCC state that openly does not tolerate religious diversity, last year's gesture of the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, the country's effective ruler, to grant the land for a Hindu temple is a singular manifestation of pragmatism that does not necessarily demonstrate public approval.
Indigenous and Imported Christian Denominations
Another important factor explaining the GCC attitude toward religious pluralism in the peninsula is that until relatively recently, there were few non-Muslims for the inhabitants to encounter. Muslim tradition holds that, shortly before his death, the Prophet Muhammad expressed the view that in Arabia there should be only one religion, namely Islam. While a few pockets of non-Muslims held out for a period of time—the Jews of Khyber and the Christians of Najran, near Yemen[13]—shortly after Muhammad's death one of his immediate successors, the caliph Umar, is said to have finished the job. Whether the eradication of non-Muslims from Arabia took place in precisely this fashion is less relevant than the reality, which is that there are few native Christians in the Persian Gulf states apart perhaps from several hundred in Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain.[14]
There are few native Christians in the Persian Gulf. The Protestant Church in Oman, above, is a branch of the Reformed Church of America, which began work in Oman in 1893. The church ministers to more than one thousand believers from sixty countries.
The modern history of Christianity in the Persian Gulf goes back to 1893 when a group of Christians arrived in Oman and bought a large building with a plot of land that they obtained as a gift from the sultan. This group, members of the Reformed Church of America, came for missionary purposes. A Catholic church, St. Peter and Paul, was founded there only in 1977, followed by an Orthodox, a Syriac Orthodox, and a Coptic church.
Bahrain claims to have the oldest church building in the Gulf region. Known as the National Evangelical Church, it was erected in 1906 by an American evangelical missionary of the Reformed Church in America.
In Kuwait, the establishment of the National Evangelical Church dates back to 1931. A Coptic church was built in 1958, later followed by an Armenian one. Even this limited Christian presence has for some years been the object of fierce political battles between the Kuwaiti emir and the Islamists. Wahhabi Salafism established itself in Kuwait following the Kuwait-Najd war of 1919-20; and while it is a minority movement, it wields enough influence to slow down the spread of religious tolerance in Kuwait.
At least two-thirds of the Christians in the GCC work in Saudi Arabia where they are completely cut off from contact with the church or clerical representatives. Unconfirmed reports claim that there are thousands of converts to Christianity in the desert kingdom who cannot profess their new faith because renouncing Islam is punishable by death.[15]
Effects on Foreign Communities
Although there is no clear-cut tie in the Gulf region between religious intolerance and the abuse of migrant workers, the fact that so many foreigners in the region are non-Muslims and from the lowest socioeconomic rungs likely plays a role in the attitude of the authorities toward notions of religious pluralism.[16] Abuse of non-citizen workers is wide-spread in the GCC states, as in many other countries around the world. In the Gulf states, abuse is not religion-specific even though it may overlap with religious intolerance at times.
Kenyan domestic workers in Saudi Arabia have reported mistreatment ranging from food and sleep deprivation to corporal abuse and molestation. In February 2015, family members of a Kenyan woman accused the woman's Saudi employer of beating and torturing her to death. Above, family and friends carry her casket.
In truth, it is perhaps much easier to demand greater freedom of worship for Christians in the Gulf states than to curtail the abuse of foreign workers, irrespective of their faith, because such behavior is culturally embedded in the Arabian legacy of slavery. During its imperial moment in the Persian Gulf, the British government, torn between liberal politics and economic interests "generally tended to tolerate the institution of slavery in eastern Arabia."[17] And while slavery was eventually abolished in most Gulf states, it persisted until 1964 in Saudi Arabia and 1970 in Oman, and the culture of slavery continues to pervade the region, especially in Saudi Arabia where it is "woven into the fabric of the psyche of the kingdom."[18] In one of the countless episodes of abuse, Kenyan domestic workers in Saudi Arabia told disturbing stories of their abuse that ranged from food and sleep deprivation to corporal abuse and molestation.[19]
GCC officials persistently deny charges of abuse and dismiss them as cheap propaganda, but given the tight government censorship in the GCC states, which has long stymied local press outlets and journalists, there is little doubt that the full extent of abuse there is well under wraps.[20] That migrant workers continue to flood the labor market in the Gulf states helps defuse the pressure on the GCC states to deal with the issue.
Nevertheless, Gulf officials are keen on avoiding conflicts with the West over issues of abuse as well as religious freedom. Despite certain signs of displeasure among the locals, the Qatari leadership has tried over the last few years to promote the image of a modern state, building the Education City by Qatar (in 1997) and sponsoring major sport events in a drive for carving out a niche for itself on the world map. Thus, when Qatar opened the Church of Our Lady the Rosary in 2008, a government official expressed the hope that it would "send a positive message to the world."[21] This, to be sure, does not prevent the emirate from closely monitoring the activities of Christian congregations, prohibiting them from advertising religious services but not banning them outright. In a similar step toward normalization and modernization, the UAE established diplomatic relations with the Holy See in 2007. According to Christian leaders, the Gulf governments struggle to strike a balance between the needs of their ever-growing foreign communities and the demands of their more conservative subjects.[22]
In 2012, the Saudi grand mufti called for the destructionof all churches inthe Arabian Peninsula.
A striking example of this struggle can be seen in a highly controversial fatwa issued in 2012 by the Saudi grand mufti, Sheikh Abdulaziz al-Sheikh, calling for the destruction of all churches in the Arabian Peninsula. Except for scant condemnation from Iraqi, Lebanese, and Egyptian Christians, Arab officials kept silent on such a serious issue. "How could the grand mufti issue a statement of such importance behind the back of his king?" was the naïve response by Christian bishops in Germany, Austria, and Russia.[23] The answer is that the Saudi royal family invariably appeases the country's powerful religious establishment because Wahhabi clerics provide it with the religious legitimacy it needs to rule.
But opposition to building churches and Christian schools is also linked to conspiracy theories. Building churches in the name of freedom of worship is viewed with suspicion as it is frequently asserted that Westerners aspire to alienate Muslims from Islam by opening missionary schools in their countries. Opponents fear that church building will strengthen the hand of Christian missionaries and thereby prevent the spread of Islam among foreign workers while simultaneously sowing confusion and doubt in the minds of the Gulf population about Islamic norms and values.[24]
Conclusion
The GCC states go to great lengths to enhance their religiously-based popular culture and heritage as a means of asserting both sovereignty and political legitimacy. The UAE, for example, grounds its political authority in a deeply-rooted social contract that cements the ties between leaders and the citizenry with authentic traditions and norms.[25] These refer to the preservation of time-honored customs and values that are based on ethnic purity and religious uniformity. Saudi Arabia has taken this religious legitimization one step further by claiming a form of pan-Islamic leadership centered around its guardianship of Islam's two holiest sites.[26]
The influx of foreign workers into the Gulf states—ranging between 50-90 percent of the total populations—poses a serious threat to the future of the indigenous social order by eroding the traditional values that provide the main pillar of regime legitimacy.[27] Riyadh claims foreign workers to be less than a third of the population; however, Saudi statistical yearbooks are misleading. The most recent population figure places the country's total population at 30.8 million people, including 33 percent expatriate workers.[28] Saudi population estimates make no reference to the dependents of the expatriates or illegal workers. Saudi economic expansion relies "exclusively on the efforts of foreign workers, which official statistics tend to grossly underestimate."[29] It is unlikely to have occurred to the GCC leaders that the foreign workforce would become a permanent feature, albeit at the bottom, of their demographic mosaic.[30]
The truth is that, notwithstanding the odd allusion to citizenship extension to expatriates, there is no intention whatsoever to integrate them, let alone any Christians into the fabric of GCC societies. Nor is there practically any chance that Saudi Arabia will allow the building of churches in the kingdom because it carries the risk of undermining the Saud dynasty's traditional, religiously-grounded legitimacy, one that is already showing signs of erosion.[31]
Furthermore, as long as local Christian leadership maintains its timorous approach, lack of external pressure will just keep the status quo in place. This approach is best exemplified by Camillo Ballin's response to a Kuwaiti parliamentarian's call for the destruction of existing churches: "You have nothing to fear from us. We are partners in life. We respect your laws and your traditions."[32] Elsewhere in the GCC states, the ruling elites will continue to extend calibrated gestures of goodwill to non-Muslims, yet it would be delusional to expect them to transcend their traditional perception of Christians as dhimmis and grant them unfettered freedom of religion, let alone fully fledged political rights and equality.[33]
**Hilal Khashan is a professor of political science at the American University of Beirut.
[1] The Guardian (London), Dec. 25, 2014. The GCC comprises the monarchies of Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
[2] Stefan Stein, "Christians in the Persian Gulf: 'Our Faith is a piece of home,'" Aid to the Church in Need News (Aus.), Mar. 3, 2014.
[3] The Gulf News (Abu Dhabi), May 9, 2014.
[4] Reuters, Oct. 8, 2010.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Stein, "Christians in the Persian Gulf."
[7] Reuters, Oct. 8, 2010.
[8] Stein, "Christians in the Persian Gulf."
[9] Ibid.
[10] Kuwait Demographics Profile 2014, IndexMundi, accessed May 4, 2016.
[11] Al-Rai (Kuwait), Oct. 17, 2015.
[12] Gulf News (Abu Dhabi), May 9, 2014.
[13] The survival of Jewish communities in Yemen and to a lesser extent Bahrain is largely attributable to the former's rugged mountains and the latter's insular island.
[14] Jean-Loup Samaan, "The Evolving Condition of Christians in the Gulf," Italian Atlantic Committee, Rome, Jan. 13, 2014.
[15] The Voice of Martyrs (Streetsville, Ont.), accessed May 2, 2016.
[16] Western Christians in the Gulf states, who represent a mere fraction of Christian expatriates, are mostly highly paid professionals who are less affected by religious restrictions or abuse since they can congregate on private property.
[17] Matthew S. Hopper, "Slavery, Family Life, and the African Diaspora in the Arabian Gulf," Itinerario, 3 (2006): 77.
[18] Graham Peebles, "Killed Beaten Raped: Migrant Workers in Saudi Arabia," Countercurrents.org, Kerala, India, Dec. 8, 2013.
[19] BBC News (London), Sept. 1, 2015; Daniel Pipes, "Saudis Import Slaves to America," The New York Sun, June 16, 2005.
[20] Muftah (Doha), Feb. 5, 2015.
[21] Al-Jazeera TV (Doha), June 20, 2008.
[22] Reuters, Oct. 8, 2010
[23] Ibid., Mar. 23, 2012.
[24] Abdulaziz bin Ibrahim al-Askar, al-Tansir fi-l-Khalij al-Arabi (Riyadh: Dar al-Arabiya li-l-Mawsu'at, 2007), pp. 29, 102.
[25] Al-Ittihad (Abu Dhabi), Aug. 6, 2012.
[26] Al-Riyadh, Nov. 25, 2015.
[27] Ibid., Jan. 24, 2014.
[28] Arab News (Jeddah), Jan. 31, 2015.
[29] Hilal Khashan, Arabs at the Crossroads: Political Identity and Nationalism (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), p. 76.
[30] Al-Jazeera TV, Feb. 7, 2008.
[31] Daniel Pipes, "Churches in Saudi Arabia?" DanielPipes.org, updated Mar. 24, 2008.
[32] Al-Qabas (Kuwait City), Aug. 17, 2012.
[33] Daniel Pipes, "The Vatican Confronts Islam," The Jerusalem Post, July 5, 2006.
Related Topics: Anti-Christianism, Kuwait, Persian Gulf & Yemen, Saudi Arabia | Hilal Khashan | Summer 2016 MEQ receive the latest by email: subscribe to the free mef mailing list This text may be reposted or forwarded so long as it is presented as an integral whole with complete and accurate information provided about its author, date, place of publication, and original URL.

Why do they attack the permissible in Sharia?
Turki Aldakhil/Al Arabiya/July 06/16
Part of the huge ideological problem we are suffering from today is the war on the permissible. It has resulted in existential exhaustion, which the young generation suffers from. Judgment interfered in everything, although the permissible is not an issue of questioning - it is simply available, and is viewed within “the pardoned zone,” as described by religious scholars. Sharia warns of asking about the permissible. The prophet always reminded his companions that God did not discuss certain things out of mercy over those who worship him, and not out of forgetfulness. Therefore, the expansion of the prohibited at the expense of the permissible, which is originally present in worldly matters, poses an ideological threat to Islamic societies. The origin of worldly matters is permitting. Everything you see before you is permitted unless texts prohibit it. The latter are the exception, and very few. However, acts of worship are based on prohibitions except for what is permitted. This is a basic rule that students of jurisprudence study at college, but I do not know why it is not being taught to current generations.
Historical context
Neglecting the permissible has not been limited to our current times. This matter has worried many, including Islamic scholar Al-Shatibi, who wrote “The Reconciliation of the Fundamentals of Islamic Law,” and developed the field of purposes of law. He granted special attention to the permissible from among other rulings, such as the prohibited and the detestable. Thinker Abdelmajid al-Saghir said in his book “Fundamentalist Thought and the Problem of Scientific Authority in Islam” that Shatibi’s interest in the permissible was due to the mystery surrounding the permissible when it comes to knowledge, whether in books about jurisprudence or in everyday life. Saghir added that this mystery is what made many things somewhere between what falls within the contexts of duty or of the prohibited and detestable. He then addresses the confusion that the permissible confronted. The permissible, as Shatibi defines it, includes entities from which humans choose what they wish, without commending or condemning, and without encouraging doing it or leaving it. Shatibi’s work was distinguished for its rich efforts in this field, as he realized that laziness had struck the Muslim people and that deadlock delayed their activity.
Without understanding the origin of the permissible in worldly activities, there will be worry, fear and horror. These are the bases for the growth of extremist intellect. Some through their fears imply that the basis of daily practices is prohibitions where you cannot do anything, such as eat or drink, without asking about it.
In Sharia, the basis of things is permitting them. Live and let live. Religious obsessions are the root of extremism. Shatibi said committing to rulings of Sharia includes a reasonable meaning between acts and what is legitimate among them, and an explanation of how they corrupt or benefit. “What Sharia strictly commanded is a basis of religion, while what it did not strictly command is considered a branch of the latter,” he said. “What Sharia strictly forbade is a sin, while what wasn’t very strictly forbidden is a minor sin. It all depends on the extent of its harmfulness and benefit.”This logical definition the meanings of issues related to Sharia is necessary to understand when it comes to the generations that circulate religious edicts without understanding why they are as such, and without understanding methods of inference and proof, and how texts are read. Extremism has spread due to crushing the concept of the permissible, and cancelling and marginalizing it in the religious rhetoric that is present in all media outlets as if the permissible does not fall within the interest of Sharia concerns. In Sharia, the basis of things is permitting them. Live and let live. Religious obsessions are the root of extremism, while marginalizing logic on the level of inference is why less cultured and knowledgeable people dominate the scene. Will we be fair to the permissible after we have drowned in invented prohibitions?
This article was first published in al-Bayan on July 6, 2016.

Attacking the Prophet’s Mosque in Madinah: significance and consequences
Faisal J. Abbas/Al Arabiya/July 06/16
Just when you thought ISIS militants couldn’t add anything more gruesome to their image, they proved us all wrong again on Tuesday when they targeted Prophet Mohammad’s Mosque in Madinah. The Mosque (known in Arabic as al-Masjid al-Nabawi) is one of two holy shrines the kingdom hosts, and was one of three locations in Saudi Arabia targeted by terrorists on the same day. Internal investigations are underway to reveal the identity of perpetrators and whether or not the attacks were coordinated. Until then, it is safe to say that all three cases carry ISIS-like fingerprints, both in terms of execution and motives.
More importantly, and contrary to what some may think, ISIS does declare the kingdom an enemy, and only a few weeks ago, an ISIS leader called upon his horrid clan worldwide to launch attacks against their foes throughout Ramadan (the Muslim holy month of fasting which concluded yesterday).
ISIS declares the kingdom an enemy, and only a few weeks ago, an ISIS leader called upon his horrid clan worldwide to launch attacks against their foes throughout Ramadan. The first attack, which occurred near the American Consulate in the coastal city of Jeddah, may have not only been meant as a jab at the West; but had it not been prevented it would have definitely ‘poisoned the water’ between Saudi Arabia and the United States. The second attack targeted two Shiite mosques in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia. The Shiite sect are a minority in the kingdom and have previously had their own issues with the government. However, they (Shiites) are also a declared enemy of ISIS. As such, had this attack been successful it would have also managed achieve two things: kill Shiites while also creating tension between this minority and the government by making it seem as if they weren’t properly protected by the kingdom’s security forces.
A horrific scenario
Yet, the most significant of all three attacks was definitely the attempt on the Prophet’s Mosque in Madinah. There are no words that could describe the horrific impact this attack – had it been successful – both in terms of symbolic significance and the potential number of casualties. So far, media reports have carried the following scenario: the bomber arrived to the mosque from the southern side during the sunset prayers (the time of breaking the Muslim fast). He was then stopped by Saudi security forces who informed him that he was attempting to enter a restricted area which is only meant to be used as an exit passage for the people praying inside the mosque. Assuming that he (the bomber) was there to pray and break his fast, the officers offered him to join them for iftar. However, the bomber ran towards the mosque before he was stopped by the guards. Surrounded with nowhere to run, the terrorist detonated the bomb killing himself and the officers whose bravery and sacrifice prevented the attack from harming tens of thousands of innocent worshipers.
Condemnation is not enough
As expected, the Madinah attack resulted in a wave of solidarity and condemnation across the globe. However, just because it was foiled, we shouldn’t simply move on or ignore its significance. Indeed, this is an attack that – literally – targeted the heart of Islam itself. As such, it must serve as an eye-opener to any remaining ISIS sympathizers among us who may still believe that their evil creed has anything to do with humanity, let alone Islam. If this horrid attack doesn’t stir unprecedented worldwide protests, then we – Muslims - deserve to be called nothing less than ‘hypocritical’ And to those who are not ISIS sympathizers, but remain silent or indifferent… now is the time to speak up. Most definitely, if this horrid attack doesn’t stir unprecedented worldwide protests, then we – Muslims - deserve to be called nothing less than ‘hypocritical’. Why do protests only occur only when ‘the West’ is perceived to have humiliated Islam with, for example, a Danish cartoon or by something as trivial a British school teacher innocently agreeing that her Muslim students call their teddy bear Mohammad? Isn’t an attack on a holy mosque which contains the prophet’s resting place a far bigger insult to Islam? Or does an insult become acceptable if it the perpetrator was “one of us?” (Obviously, the answer is ‘no’) However, it could also be argued that what is needed now is not anger nor protests. All we need is to apply and accept common sense; after all, it wouldn’t be logical to believe that someone would attack the prophet… in the name of this same prophet!

Which of Saudi’s enemies orchestrated the triple bombing?
Khalaf Ahmad Al Habtoor/Al Arabiya/July 06/16
The enemy is not at our door; it is inside our homelands, plotting to spill our blood and pit Muslim against Muslim with the aim of occupying our cities. There is nowhere 100 percent safe, because this will to kill is more infectious than Ebola and much harder to detect. There is no brain scan, blood work or DNA test able to predict evil intent.In recent weeks, Istanbul, Baghdad and Dhaka have been victims of this virulent, hate-laced pandemic that has so cruelly ripped the life out of hundreds of innocent travellers, diners and shoppers. These were all politically motivated terrorist acts carried out under the false banner of religion, designed to strike fear in the hearts of populations in the hope they will turn against their governments. I am always deeply saddened by such incidents, but never more when hearing the terrible news on Monday that our Islamic holy sites have now become targets. Words cannot express my horror and outrage that Muslims (if that is what they deserve to be called) would attempt to eviscerate mosques, especially Islam’s second-holiest site in Madinah, the resting place of the Prophet Mohammad. This single act - which, if it had succeeded, would have sent the entire Muslim world into inconsolable mourning and fury - raises questions when no terrorist group has so far claimed responsibility. I doubt that any will, since attacks on Islam will hardly assist terrorist recruiting drives. How many impressionable young Muslim men would be open to being groomed on the internet, or likely to be radicalized if they were contacted by a member of an organization out to destroy the prophet’s burial place? We do know that Abdullah Khan, a 34-year-old Pakistani driver, blew himself up close to the U.S. consulate in the port city of Jeddah. The identities of the other two are as yet unknown, but I suspect these murderers were mere idiot foot soldiers, and it may be they permitted their strings to be pulled in return for cash payments to their families.
ISIS
All three attacks were coordinated in the style of Al-Qaeda and its offshoot, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), but unlike their usual operations, these would be viewed as failures from their perspectives. In all instances, the suicide belts were exploded outside the apparently targeted buildings, and the death count from all three is lower than we have witnessed in the past. I smell a false-flag operation here. There is another foe of Saudi Arabia, and like ISIS, it has ambitions to dominate the region and become the guardian of the holy sites in Makkah and Madinah. No one died in Jeddah apart from Khan. Two were killed by the explosion outside a mosque in Qatif, and four security guards died in the parking lot close to the Prophet’s Mosque. Are we therefore to believe that the merchants of terror who have killed tens of thousands in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt, Afghanistan, Paris and Belgium have lost the plot? I do not think so.Media fingers may be pointing towards ISIS as the likely perpetrator of these heinous crimes, and indeed it considers the kingdom an enemy. However, for the group to explode the Prophet’s Mosque would be a contradiction in terms. It would be obliged to consider a name change.
Another culprit?
I smell a false-flag operation here. There is another foe of Saudi Arabia, and like ISIS, it has ambitions to dominate the region and become the guardian of the holy sites in Makkah and Madinah. This is a wealthy rogue state whose leadership is working to advance the Day of Judgment, as evidenced by videos it disseminates to that effect. Its relationship with Saudi Arabia has been seriously strained recently, and it has made no secret of its wish to see the ruling family overthrown. Neither it nor its armed emissaries can take responsibility, however, because doing so would incur repercussions from its Western allies and risk all-out war with neighboring states. Khan’s associates and family will be interrogated, as will those of the other two suicide bombers once their identities have been established. However, I am betting since the three were considered expendables by their masters, the investigations will not bear fruit. If a state is behind this, it would have put its plan into effect using a complex chain of intermediaries acting from within isolated cells. CNN’s national security analyst Peter Bergen says the attack on the mosque in Madinah was meant to be an embarrassment for the “protectors of the two holy places [Makkah and Madinah].”
He is also veering toward ISIS as being culpable, but I found it interesting that he characterized the suicide attack at a revered Muslim location in Madinah during Ramadan as “counterproductive” and “senseless,” and which would be met with “strong condemnation and puzzlement” by Muslims. “Puzzlement” is the operative word here. The experts can ponder on ISIS as much as they like, but unless the group begins boasting about it, as it usually does on social media or in its magazine, I am not buying it. I do not have the answers, but I would urge investigating authorities to look closely at all options rather than jump to conclusions. Consider who stands to benefit from destabilizing Saudi Arabia. Evaluate the motives and capabilities of all the groups and states out to harm the kingdom, and follow the money. No devout Muslim would have consented to bomb Islam’s second-holiest site, so there is likely to be a paperless hawala cash trail. This aggression on Madinah should be seen as loud wake-up call for all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states. An attack on Saudi is an attack on us all. We must untie our hands to fight fire with fire. We must move from defense into attack mode, and acknowledge that we are not only facing a threat to our very existence, but must be prepared to defend our faith from the heartless and soulless.

Why referendums are bad for democracy
Dr. Azeem Ibrahim/Al Arabiya/July 06/16
This country has come very close to breaking apart in the 2014 Scottish Independence referendum. And it is even closer to coming apart now, after the EU membership referendum. This begs the question: why do we have referendums at all? Single issue referenda like the ones we have had in the last couple of years, and like the one in 2011 on the Alternative Vote system for electing MPs, are held up as the purest examples of people power made manifest – the highest example of democratic practice we see in our complex Western societies in modern times. But are they? Sometimes such plebiscites may be unavoidable. Sometimes, there may be no precedents for a specific political course of action, and the elected representatives of the people may be judged to not have the required authority to make the decision by themselves. The Scottish Independence referendum was perhaps one such case, after the Scottish National Party was elected with a majority at Holyrood on a platform of having such a referendum. But the EU referendum was most certainly not required: it was a political choice made by a Prime Minister pursuing party interest, on the assumption that he would win it easily and could pacify a certain wing of his party and a certain demographic in the country. That assumption has been confounded, and the referendum has ended up being the most momentous political moment in our lifetimes.
‘Clever’ political gambit
Yet the risk of making just this kind of stupid miscalculation in some “clever” political gambit is not nearly the worst aspect of having referenda, or the most damaging to democracy. Rather, the most concerning aspect, especially when the referenda are on issues that relate to political and national identity as has been the case in the Scottish Independence and the Brexit referenda, is the polarising and dividing effect they have on society. The EU referendum was most certainly not required: it was a political choice made by a Prime Minister pursuing party interest. I have been involved in two referenda now, the Scottish and the EU ones, and both I believe have been hugely damaging to the social fabric of society. In Scotland it brought out the worst amongst some of the nationalists. Much has been made of the so-called ‘civic nationalism’ espoused by many of the leading proponent of Independence. Not much covered was the other side: the raging and raving ‘Celtic’ ethnocentrism heavily prominent in the art and music of the campaign, and the anti-English xenophobia. I have seen nationalism all over the world. It is ugly in every form. And no matter how high-minded educated political leaders try to make it sound, their groundswell of popular backing will always find cause for bitter identity politics which can easily overflow into ethnic conflict. There have been relatively few concerning incidents following the Scottish referendum, but the same cannot be said of what has happened since the Brexit referendum – not least because the nationalist vote has won. And with that victory, no matter the fact that the majority of Leave voters would not have been motivated by xenophobia, the significant minority of racists have felt emboldened to come out from their caves and cause an upsurge in ‘celebratory’ racist incidents and attacks against anyone remotely ‘foreign’: European nationals, non-European foreigners, and even British-born non-White people. But the divisions run much deeper than that. The uptick in racist incidents can safely be attributed to a minority of idiots. What is much more wide-spread, and much more concerning, is the way in which the polarisation of the democratic debate between ‘patriots’ and ‘traitors’, between ‘elites’ and ‘ordinary, decent people’ means that we now live in a society where one half is refusing to engage with the other. A society where neither half is willing to assume that it shares a community of interest with the other half. In other words, we find ourselves in two countries. Will these halves come back together again? Will we ever be a country where we can have a democratic conversation with each other in good faith and with an understanding that we need to work together if we are to succeed? At the moment, there is little to be optimistic about: if the lessons of the United States are anything to go by, once one half of the country refuses to talk to the other, all we can look forward to is political dysfunction and social strife.