A decade later, are Hezbollah and Israel learning lessons?
Yossi Mekelberg/Al Arabiya/15 June/16
Last week’s 10th anniversary of the 2006 outbreak of war between Israel and the Hezbollah was a relatively subdued one. Putting aside verbal aggression, both sides have little interest in facing each other directly in the battlefield. They are both fully aware that the consequences might be more destructive and bloodier than the one a decade ago, which is still as inconclusive in its outcome.
A lasting memory of the horrendous consequences of the last round of hostilities, combined with both sides’ new and enhanced capabilities and changing of regional political circumstances, serve, for now, as deterrence from a new and widespread military clash.
Most strikingly is the fact that the deadly violence of June 2006 was unplanned and miscalculated. In response to Hezbollah’s killing of eight Israeli soldiers and the abduction of two others, Israel unleashed not only disproportionate force on the Hezbollah, but also on the people and infrastructure of Lebanon. For the Hezbollah it was a painful and foolish miscalculation that cost the lives of hundreds of its combatants, the destruction of considerable part of its military capabilities and deepened the rifts within the Lebanese society.
Yet, its ability to maintain the firing rockets into Israel until the very end of the 34-day war, left them as a credible force to be reckoned with, despite the fact that their leader Hassan Nasrallah spends most of his time in hiding fearing for his life since then. For the Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert at the time, the rushed decision to unleash the might of the Israeli air force and later send in ground troops, proved to be one of the catalysts that brought down his government and abruptly ended his premiership.
An official commission, appointed to investigate the Israeli failure in achieving a conclusive victory, wrote a scathing report that accused the government and the military for a deficiency of strategic thinking and operational shortcomings, including a lack of preparedness. I would hasten to say that the commission itself fell into a perceptual trap by expressing their surprise that, “A semi-military organization of a few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the Middle East, which enjoyed full air superiority and size and technology advantages.”
If, when and how a future war with the Hezbollah were to take place, would also depend to a large extent on how it feeds into the Iranian-Israeli rivalry, especially as Iran’s presence is edging closer to the Israeli borders
Understanding of warfare
A deeper historical understanding of modern warfare, and not so modern, would have driven the message home that military superiority in manpower or technology does not guarantee either military victory or the attainment of political objectives. More alarming in the case of Israeli Defense Force (IDF), was its inability to provide an adequate response to the barrage of rockets aimed at civilians in the north of the country and consequently being able to prevent the severe disruption to daily life there.
Since 2006 Israel has found by and large an answer for rocket and missile attacks through its new and sophisticated air defense systems. Nevertheless, its flawed strategic outlook of mainly relying on its military might has not changed. In three rounds of hostilities with the Hamas in Gaza, since the end of the war in Lebanon in July 2006, a very similar approach was adopted. In both cases force was used with little or no regard to civilians’ lives.
Admittedly, both the Hezbollah and Hamas were targeting civilians, but this surely cannot serve as an excuse. A state cannot afford and should not imitate the behavior of non-state organizations, which are legally considered terrorist by large parts of the international community. Harming civilians and infrastructure in hope that the population will turn against these organizations and blame them for the pain caused by the Israelis, is unrealistic, immoral and usually achieves the exact opposite.
Increasing military capabilities on both sides, in the decade that has elapsed since the end of the war, assists in maintaining a high level of mutual deterrence, in which they are content with clashing verbally and exchange threats, but careful to prevent another all-out conflict. It is estimated that the Hezbollah possess up to 100,000 rockets and missiles, however, its embroilment in the civil war in Syria limits its capacity to provoke Israel into another war.
The Syria front
In Syria itself confrontation between the two is demarcated with very clear boundaries. Israel has reportedly assassinated a number of Hezbollah’s senior military personnel and attacked convoys of weapons intended for the organization in Lebanon, yet the organization’s response was sure to avoid escalation. The Shiite organization is building its forces both in Lebanon and along the border with Israel in the Golan Heights, but was hesitant to attack Israel, even in cases such as the killing of Samir Kuntar in December of last year.
Some in Israel attribute this hesitancy to a state of deterrence established with the Hezbollah in the 2006 war. A more feasible explanation would be that the Hezbollah was bogged down for more than five years in supporting Bashar al-Assad in the brutal civil war in Syria, in which the organization suffered an estimated loss of around 1,200 fighters. While it is committed to the conflict in Syria, it cannot afford opening another front with Israel. Israel sees a conflict between the two as inevitable, but is unsure whether it should happen sooner rather than later.
Whatever happens next between Israel and the Hezbollah, the elephant in the room is Iran, which Israel sees as its main strategic challenge. If, when and how a future war with the Hezbollah were to take place, would also depend to a large extent on how it feeds into the Iranian-Israeli rivalry, especially as Iran’s presence is edging closer to the Israeli borders.
However, the sides are better off learning the lesson of 2006 that preferring war over diplomacy rarely ends with any political achievements.
The Saudi-Iranian struggle in Iraq
Abdulrahman al-Rashed/Al Arabiya/15 June/16
What is happening today in Iraq and Syria is due to decades of conflict between two major axes, Iran and the Arabs. It began with the 1979 Iranian revolution, and continued with threats to export the revolution throughout the region, and with the Iran-Iraq war that lasted eight years. Things only calmed down for two years, then Iraq invaded Kuwait, triggering international intervention.
The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq led to the emergence of al-Qaeda and then the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The turmoil will continue as long as regional powers are unable to create a political or military balance via agreements. We must understand the logic and motives behind Tehran’s desire to maintain the struggle in Iraq, the Gulf, Syria and Palestine.
Iran wants to expand. It thinks its western borders are smaller, oil-rich Arab countries. It is aware that the West will not easily accept this as these countries are important energy sources. This is why Tehran has attempted to dominate in different ways, though it has not succeeded much until recently. ISIS undoubtedly serves Iran, which joined the Western and Russian coalition under the flag of fighting terrorism.
Iraq is the most important country for Iran because it is its western gate. The latter will only be able to control the former indirectly. During the administration of US President George W Bush, Iran played different roles to convince Washington that it would be a beneficial partner in Iraq by helping it solidify security. It was the only country, maybe except for Jordan, that cooperated with Washington then.
At the same time, however, Iran resorted to different methods to destabilize Iraq. Along with its ally the Syrian regime, Tehran enabled al-Qaeda and armed Iraqi opposition groups to sneak from Syria into Iraq to sabotage the security and political situations and inflict losses on US troops. When Barack Obama became president, he withdrew all US troops, opening Iraq to Iranian intervention at a time when armed groups began to re-emerge.
Saudi Arabia’s interest matches that of the Iraqi people: an Iraq free from foreign domination and in control of its own water and oil resources
The ISIS excuse
Now, Iran is in Iraq with the excuse of protecting it from ISIS. Tehran supports certain Shiite groups against others. It is behind the establishment of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) militia as a competitor to Iraq’s army to weaken the central government. I believe that Iran is one of the masterminds behind ISIS, but it is difficult to prove that. However, it is the only party benefitting from ISIS, whose threats gave Iran an excuse to enter Iraq.
Tehran brags that if it had not been for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Iraq would have fallen. ISIS is a repetition of al-Qaeda, which surfaced during the US-led occupation. Al-Qaeda back then succeeded in sabotaging the political project, allowing pro-Iran groups to dominate in Baghdad.
Saudi ambassador to Iraq, Thamer al-Sabhan, recently said: “Someone is trying to create a rift in relations between Saudi Arabia and the different components of the Iraqi people.” He means Iran, and this is the first time an official statement reflects the Saudi-Iranian struggle in Iraq. Tehran wants to dominate Iraq and its riches, but Saudi Arabia wants to protect its borders and deter Iran’s expansion.
The Saudi presence in Iraq was delayed for years because Riyadh rejected participating in the U.S.-led occupation and the establishment of the new Iraqi government. Tehran, however, cooperated with the Americans, and in exchange gained influence that resulted in the status quo.
Saudi Arabia’s interest matches that of the Iraqi people: an Iraq free from foreign domination and in control of its own water and oil resources. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries are rich and do not need to control Iraq. They want a regime that does not resemble Saddam Hussein’s, and is not a puppet of Iran.
Gulf countries are now aware that the spread of ISIS and al-Qaeda in Iraq, Syria and Yemen target them first and foremost, and that countries such as Iran benefit from these extremist groups and use them to weaken the region’s powers and interfere in their affairs.
This article was first published in Asharq al-Awsat on Jun. 15, 2016.
