Total recall
Michael Young/Now Lebanon/April 08/16
What are Hezbollah’s objectives in maintaining a vacuum in the presidency? This question has preoccupied analysts for almost two years now, but none of the answers are entirely convincing. The first is that the party is seeking leverage to fundamentally transform the Lebanese political and constitutional system. Its ultimate aim, the argument goes, is to expand Shiite representation, protect Hezbollah’s weapons and ensure a structural majority that keeps Sunnis at a disadvantage. However, amending the constitution is no easy task in Lebanon, and in the absence of a consensus it is virtually impossible. So, while Hezbollah may ultimately wish to modify the constitution, it is unrealistic to imagine this today, at a moment of sharp sectarian polarization in the region. That means falling back on a more modest interpretation of what the party hopes to achieve. To many observers this centers around the objectives of bringing in a friendly president and putting in place an election law that weakens two problematic politicians, Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt, while sparing Hezbollah. This means, by most accounts, scrapping the 1960 law and enacting one based on proportional representation.
Hezbollah can plainly see that the vacuum has done damage to Lebanon, increasing its own leverage over outcomes. With the situation in Syria apparently turning to its advantage, the party may be in a position to bring in a president on its own terms. With Hariri and Samir Geagea having, each, endorsed presidential candidates close to March 8, Hezbollah has no reason to feel that this is unachievable. n this regard Sleiman Franjieh remains an ideal candidate. What disturbed Hezbollah about Hariri’s support for him was that it came with an implicit package deal that would have seen Hariri return as prime minister. The party will only bring Franjieh in on its own conditions, and one of these will be that Hariri not lead a government. Hezbollah can see that the former prime minister is struggling financially and that his Saudi sponsors are taking positions that, effectively, are undermining his status. Their desire is to sideline him permanently.
How realistic are the party’s objectives? Certainly the election of a friendly president is feasible. Not only have Hariri and Geagea implicitly acknowledged this, but March 14 never took Geagea’s candidacy seriously, understanding that it was a red line for Hezbollah. And if Franjieh or Aoun are now palatable, so too are all others—at least with regard to the deeper divide between what remains of March 8 and March 14. What about a proportional election law? This is more complicated as it goes to the heart of the system of political leadership and patronage in Lebanon. Proportionality means that the traditional political leaders must accept that candidates from outside the lists they lead or sponsor can enter parliament, in proportion to their share of the vote. This neutralizes the politicians’ main instrument of control over their areas.
It would mean, for instance, that Hariri in Beirut and Jumblatt in the Shouf and Aley would likely lose representation, because there are sizable electorates in all three that will not vote for their candidates. On the other hand, Hezbollah’s and Amal’s domination of the Shiites is so complete that any Shiite “third way” would struggle to win even a seat in most constituencies. But if Hariri and Jumblatt, both of whom represent major parliamentary blocs, refuse to go along with a proportional law, how might it pass? When one does the math, Hezbollah, Amal and the Aounists alone don’t have a majority to approve a proportional law. However, if all the smaller pro-Syrian and pro-Hezbollah parliamentarians are counted, as well as Tashnag and some independents who might see an advantage in such a law, plus (and this is a key factor) the Lebanese Forces bloc, there may be just enough votes for an absolute majority.
But even if that were to work in theory uncertainty prevails. For instance, now that the Aounists and the Lebanese Forces represent a potentially powerful alliance in Christian districts, they would have no incentive to back a proportional law that eats into their domination. In other words if Hezbollah regards a proportional law as a way of undercutting its rivals, there is no guarantee that such a law would win majority support. If so then what does the party want? If Hezbollah has maintained a debilitating two-year void merely to introduce a friendly president, with no certainty as to whether it can fulfill its other ambitions, then we’re talking about paltry returns.
The most likely explanation is that the party is taking a broader view of the situation. Prevailing in Syria and the nuclear deal with Iran have allowed Hezbollah to imagine a different future in which it can advance a number of key pieces in the Lebanese power game. It already has a veto power on most policies with which it disagrees. It seeks national validation of its independent weapons arsenal. It wants a friendly president who, with the friendly speaker of parliament, would allow it to control a majority in the ruling triumvirate, giving it a decisive say over future legislation. In effect the party may, quite simply, fantasize about re-creating what the Syrians enjoyed after 1990, namely total hegemony over the Lebanese system.
Can it work? Given the incompetence of the foes of such a project, yes. A foundation of Hezbollah’s strategy has long been to discredit the Lebanese state. With all the corruption taking place today, that’s not difficult. People are disgusted with a political class that is all gangrene. Any changes to the system may not meet much popular resistance. Hezbollah, alas, may be thinking big, while those opposed to it remain very small.
**Michael Young is a writer and editor in Beirut. He tweets @BeirutCalling.
