Living with Hezbollah’s Arms
Hussain Abdul-Hussain/Now Lebanon/April 04/16
For over 12 years now, the UN Security Council and Hezbollah’s Lebanese opponents have failed in disarming the party’s formidable militia. Even Israel and its mighty army have not been able to extract any concessions from the group, thus settling for punishing it by making war prohibitively costly for Hezbollah and its Shiite supporters. Other than harassing Lebanon’s Shiites, world governments have no viable plan for disarming Hezbollah within a reasonable timeframe, say in five to 10 years. And because open-ended policies will make sinking Lebanon sink further, it is time to be innovative and come up with ways on how to coexist with the Hezbollah militia.
Living with Hezbollah’s arms is not an endorsement, but rather the only a realistic way of circumventing the militia and allowing the Lebanese to move on, carry on with their lives and plan for their futures. Living with Hezbollah’s arms is like a patient living with a chronic disease: Unable to cure it but forced to manage it. By now, Hezbollah’s wars are hurting it the most. In Syria, Hezbollah is bruised and reeling. On Israel, the party’s leader Hassan Nasrallah has publicly debated the Dahiyeh Doctrine, suggesting that he is aware that in any future conflict, Tel Aviv will raze down Lebanon’s residential areas wholesale.
But Hezbollah is not hurting alone.
Like all other countries, Lebanon cannot thrive if it remains on a war footing. With its endless wars, Hezbollah has been undermining the country’s security and eroding international trust in the Lebanese state. Throughout the 1990s, Lebanon was engaged in a healthy debate over its economic policies. Which sectors should Beirut grow for its economy to start chugging and creating jobs? At the time, late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and his team endorsed standard international recommendations that mandated liberalization. Thus, Hariri planned to privatize public facilities, which would have drastically reduced corruption. Hariri embarked on upgrading the infrastructure to make Lebanon attractive for tourism and services (such as banking, higher education and medical care).
Despite Hariri’s efforts, Lebanon remained a hard sell. Many Lebanese accused the late prime minister of corruption, which they blamed for a stumbling economy. Like most Arabs, the Lebanese imagine — without substantiating evidence — that the amount of public embezzlement is enough to make their economies grow and prosper. Yet such argument is mere fantasy. Stolen public funds are a small fraction compared to national budget figures.
Hariri also found that it was nearly impossible to grow an economy in a “country of resistance.” As long as combat operations persisted in the south, Lebanon remained economically unattractive. Add to that the Assad regime’s continuous tampering with state institutions, especially the judiciary, and you can understand why Lebanon could not compete with hubs like Dubai.
Growing Lebanon’s economy is also key to undermining Lebanon’s other disaster: The oligarchy. Like with Europe’s industrial revolution, capital demands meritocracy, which in turn reinforces individualism at the expense of tribal sectarianism and its lords. That was America’s idea of how to manage post-Saddam Iraq, except that Americans found Iraq’s switchboard way too late. Because growing Lebanon’s economy is key, the country’s stability becomes priceless. Stability, however, is impossible with Hezbollah’s militia, which does not answer to the Lebanese state and therefore undermines its sovereignty. This is why the Lebanese need to come to terms with armed Hezbollah, and this is where conflict resolution gurus might have some useful ideas.
Maybe the party can hand over the Hariri International Airport to a government-contracted private company that can apply international security standards. If that happens, maybe direct flights between Beirut and major capitals can be resumed. Maybe Beirut’s airport becomes a regional hub that generates income for the treasury and creates high-paying jobs.
Maybe if Hezbollah’s militia steps back, the barricades erected in Beirut’s downtown to protect Parliament, government and UN’s ESCWA can be dismantled, allowing businesses and tourists to pour back into this urban and architectural marvel.
Maybe if Hezbollah rolls back its tasteless rhetoric about “resistance,” the Lebanese can start branding their country as a destination for its diaspora, tourists, investors, film-makers, wine growers and music festivals. Maybe if Hezbollah lets the oligarchy play its silly game of who becomes president or prime minister, that will give a semblance of normalcy and renew trust in Lebanon and its state. Putting Lebanon on hold until Hezbollah disarms is killing the Lebanese. Let Hezbollah keep its arms, on the condition that it keeps them out of sight and out of mind. Better ideas are welcome, only if they are realistic enough and can be measured in months.
**Hussain Abdul-Hussain is the Washington Bureau Chief of Kuwaiti newspaper Alrai. He tweets @hahussain
Sunni Sheikh Khoder al-Kabash’s son killed fighting for Hezbollah
Now Lebanon 04/16/BEIRUT
The son of a Lebanese Sunni cleric who supports Hezbollah has been killed fighting for the Shiite party in recent battles in Syria. The pro-Hezbollah website SouthLebanon.org which publicizes funerals of the party’s fighters killed “in confrontation with the mercenaries of disbelief and Wahhabism” – a reference to Sunni militants – announced his death on April 2. “With all pride and honor, the Islamic Resistance of Hezbollah and the southern city of Sidon trumpet the martyrdom of one of its new heroic knights and leaders, the martyr and mujahid Mohammad Khoder al-Kabash the son of Sheikh Khoder al-Kabash,” the outlet’s death notice said. SouthLebanon.org also revealed Kabash’s nom de guerre, “Zulfiqar,” which is the name of Imam Ali’s double-bladed sword and an important symbol in Shiite Islam. The outlet did not mention where the young man was killed in Syria, however the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights on Sunday reported that Hezbollah lost 12 fighters on April 2 in fighting south of Aleppo. Kabash’s father, a Sunni scholar with close ties to pro-Assad figures in Sidon, received condolences for his son’s death over the weekend. Sheikh Afif Naboulsi—a leading Shiite cleric in southern Lebanon—told Sheikh Khoder al-Kabash that his son’s “martyrdom proves that Sunni and Shiites are one spirit in the fight against Takfiri terrorism.” Khoder al-Kabash is known for his friendly relations with the Baath Party in Sidon as well as the leader of Popular Nasserist Party, a pro-March 8 party based in the southern city. He also is a firm supporter of Hezbollah’s Resistance Brigades proxy militia, which was established in 1997 to recruit non-Shiite Muslims as combatants for the party. The Resistance Brigades has stirred controversy in past months with its drive to recruit young Sunni men to fight for the party in Syria.
